GEntlemen, I hope I do not hin­der any business?

No, no, Sir; we are very glad of so good com­pany. For having receiv'd some Contribution-money from this Gentleman to day, I only invited him to a glass of Wine, to pay him my thanks, and to drink my Benefactors good health.

Worthy Sir, your acceptance is suffici­ent. But I hope when our design is accomplish'd, your services will be better rewarded, and your merits procure you the Guidance of men above my degree.

Yes o' my conscience, if ever we are so happy as to have a Catholick King, I shall not doubt, but to see Mr. L. Arch-bishop of Canter­bury, for he takes more pains than all the Jesuits put together.

That preferment were indeed but suitable to his deserts; but you know he's inca­pacitated for that by being married.

Puh! is the Bond of Marriage stricter than the Vow of perpetual Virginity? and yet how ordinary is it for his Holiness to dispense with that? Though in this case there will be no need of the Pope's kindness; for the Civil Law will serve Mr. L's turn, according to which, Impoten­cy makes a Nullity. And I'll warrant you his young Wife will be glad enough of a brisker Hus­band.

Come Sir, you have got such a habit of Raillery, that you exercise even upon your Friends; but I know your humour, and cannot be angry.

Troth Sir, I must be merry. But no more of that. Pray Gentlemen, what News?

Faith I have hardly any time to listen af­ter them, these Libelling Rascals find me so much work. And there's the Plaguey Tory Plot has [Page 3] kept me doing so long, that I am I know not how much behind-hand with 'em.

Indeed Sir, we are much indebted to you for the pains you have taken with that damn'd Libel; and for the hints you have given us to take off the imputations it casts on Loyal Protestants.

'Pox on't, it was too close and serious for me to meddle with; and, but that something was to be said, Observator had e'en as good have let it alone too, as, if you'l give me leave to per­sonate a Whig a little, I'le shew you.

As for the Whigs, they're such dull souls, any thing will confute them: and our Friends that are privy to the Plot, know, that nothing can be said to the purpose, to take off the suspicion; nor is there much need to palliate the business any longer, now it is just come to perfection. But however Mr. Whig, let's see what you can say against my Observations?

We understand one another, and there­fore freedom can be no offence. Have at your Observations then between Jest and Earnest. In the first place ( N. 130.) you find fault that he calls Addresses needless, (seeing they are but re­petitions of the Oath of Allegeance) and say it is as needful to repeat that Oath as Sacraments and Prayers. Now you know that Baptism is but once administred, and therefore can be no In­stance for your turn; and as for the repetition of the Lord's Supper, you of all men should not make use of such an Argument, that could neglect [Page 4] it for seventeen or twenty years together, and the publick Prayers in like manner; (but for Closet-Prayer indeed, I can say nothing.) So that by your own practice you confess Addresses need­less.

This is damn'd close! but however I could easily answer it, if I durst own going to Prayers to the Queens Chapel, and receiving the Body of Christ from my Confessor.

In the second place you are too Bare­fac'd in affirming, That if the matter of a Law be Controvertible, the Subject is not to dispute either the Authority of it or his Obedience.]

Why Sir, this is no more than we have been preaching these twenty years.

Pardon me Sir, if I say you mistake. For I never knew you affirm more, than that a Law can make a thing that is indifferent in its own nature, to become necessary as to practice. But the Observator extends this to all things Controver­tible, which comprehends all the Articles of Faith owned by the Catholicks and rejected by the Church of England, Worship of Images, praying for the Dead, &c. In a word, whatsoever is Controverted betwixt the Catholicks and Here­ticks.

Well, but you know when I writ that, I personated a Protestant; and those have con­demned such Tenets.

Ha, ha, he! What, are they therefore no longer Controvertible? Why, the Church has as well condemn'd the Protestant Tenets; will the [Page 5] Protestants therefore under a Popish Government never controvert such Tenets more? I wish you could persuade 'em to't, and then a Catholick Suc­cessor would make short work, for, as you say, The King only is the Government. (Numb. 131.) You are likewise too open, when you say, That you can name at least a dozen Sets of Dissenters that are more Diabolical Hereticks than the Pa­pists.] You know the most learned Doctors of the Reformed Religion have alwaies held the Pope to be Anti christ, and the Church of Rome to be Idolatrous; and the King-killing doctrine is avow­ed by none but our selves.

Puh! you would have me write to no pur­pose at all; must not I train up my Charge to preferr Popery before Presbytery; and how shall I do that, if I do not give the Schismaticks a wipe now and then?

Well, let that pass. But when you come to speak against the Bill of Exclusion, why took you no more pains to prove it unlaw­ful?

Why, have I not done it sufficiently? As to his Precedents, I have told him, ( N 131▪) That nothing is therefore well done, because it has been done; and it is to be suppos'd that none of his Precedents were justifiable.

Yes, yes, 'tis best arguing ex concessis.

And as to the point of Religion, I do not read of any Bills of Exclusion among the Primitive Christians. (ibid.)

Admirable! for it is to be supposed, that the Emperours and Senate of Rome were Primitive Christians.

And then I have prov'd it plainly unlaw­ful by this, That if any Parliament in Christendom shall preach any other Doctrine of Obedience to Magistrates, than what our Saviour and his Apo­stles have taught us, I am afraid that Parliament, without repentance, will go to the Devil, ( ibid.)

I wish they send no body thither before them. But where lies the Logick of this Argu­ment?

Why Sir, you very well suppos'd for me before, that the Emperour and Senate were primi­tive Christians; and now give me leave to sup­pose for my self, that first our Saviour, and after him S. Peter were Emperours, and the rest of the Apostles the Senate; and we do not find that ever they attempted to exclude Tiberius or Nero or any other from the Throne because they were Heathens, and those sure were as bad as Papists.

'Pshaw! but part of this Supposition is too gross. For our Saviour sayes, that his King­dom was not of this world: and that he came not to divide or dispose of Inheritances; which implies, rather than denies, that such whose kingdom is of this world, may dispose of Inheritances. But as for S. Peter indeed, if we may guess at his power and quality by the Pope's his Successour's, he was Universal Monarch; and if he had thought it law­ful, might not only have excluded an Heathen Successor; but from his plenitude of power, have [Page 7] deposed the present Heathen Possessor, and given the Crown to a Christian. Which because he did not do, your Argument indeed is very cogent, That no power on Earth can hinder any man from coming to the Crown in his course, be he as bad as the Devil.

Look you there! now I see you conceive me.

Yes, and as to the Apostles that made up the Senate, you have their opinions plain in their writings: Submit your selves to every ordi­nance of man——whether it be to the King as supreme: Obey them that have the rule over you: Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and Powers, to obey Magistrates. And abundance of such like commands we have. All which make it clear, (seeing the words are general) that Emperour and Senate, King and Parliament and all must obey, submit and give way to the presum­ptive heir. For seeing dispersed Jews and the meanest of the people are forewarned from rebel­ling against their lawful Soveraigns; it follows, a fortiori, that the King and Parliament cannot ex­clude any man from the Succession.

Indeed Sir, I think it is rather a debili­ori: and, upon my soul, if the Whigs argu'd at this rate, we should call it perfect Cant, and make sport enough with it. But however such Arguing may do pretty well out of the pulpit, for it looks like Atheism, Schism and Irreligion to question or dispute any thing deliver'd there. Well Mr. L. I see a word is enough to the wise, you need [Page 8] but give the hint, and your Charge have it presently.

Yes, yes, my Observations are their Common places, and I must leave them to improve them into Argument, for I have no time for that, nor does my talent much lye that way. But to go on: In the last place I prove the Bill of Ex­clusion unlawful, because the King, Lords and Commons can no more justifie an Unrighteous action than a private man. (ibid.). Now Sir, sup­posing the Bill unrighteous, 'tis plain they cannot pass it.

Well then your Argument lies thus:

If the passing the Bill of Exclusion be an unrigh­teous action, the King, Lords and Commons can­not pass it.

But such passing is an Unrighteous Action.

Therefore, &c.

Just so: for look you, get but the main point in question once granted, and my life for it, you win the cause.

Well, these hypothetical syllogisms are almost as serviceable as the Doctrine of probable opinions; the first to inform the reason, the latter to guide the practice. But what now if one should not grant you, that the passing of such a Bill were an Ʋnrighteous action?

If men will not believe the Apostles and primitive Christians, I cannot help it. But pray let's hear what you can say in the case.

Faith I shall say little in the case, seeing there's more said already than I see well answer'd. [Page 9] But this I will add: You'l grant me the King can do no wrong.

Yes, that I will.

Then I say, I canot see how his having the advice and consent of Lords and Commons should make him do wrong. For to me it seems indifferent as to that, whether the King do a thing from his own meer motion and science, or by the advice of his Privy Council, or of his Parliament. Now Sir, to do wrong, or to do an unrighteous action, as you term it, are all one.

Hang't, my mistake was, to bring the King into the Argument; for if I had only said Lords and Commons, I had hit it. But now I think on't, 'tis not the Pope and Council, but the Pope alone, that is infallible; and if I durst own my self a Papist, this would help me to make it out.

It would so, but the necessity of your dissembling that, hinders you from making the best of your Argument. However I am sure you are right in that which you instance in, That it would be an unrighteous action for the King, Lords and Commons to put a Man to death for refusing to swallow forty Thousand Black Bills: For no Power in Heaven or Earth can oblige a man to that which is impossible. But then what's this to the Bill of Exclusion; or where lies the parallel?

Now I see you are dull: Id possums quod jure possumus. The first is naturally impossible, and the latter morally. The first cannot be done, because it cannot; and the latter, because it ought not.

Here are two faults in Logick, first, transitus a genere ad genus, and then petitio prin­cipii. For you first pass from a moral to a natural action, and then you are at your old way of sup­posing the thing in question. But besides, this is nothing to the purpose; for the dispute was, a­bout what the King, Lords and Commons could do; and now you come to what a man can or can not do. For I see nothing to the contrary, but the King and Parliament may pass the Bill of Exclusi­on, though a man cannot swallow 40000 black Bills.

Come I warrant you would tye me up to the Pedantry of the Schools: I hate insisting too long upon one thing, for that does but confound a man: I love a touch and away.

Yes Sir, you are excellent at that: And thus you prove notably, That Parliaments are no essential part of the Government, for if that were so, in the Intervalls of Parliament there were no longer a Government. ( N. 131) And I'll give you such another, The Common Council are no essential part of the Government of the City, for if that were so, in the Intervalls of Common Coun­cils there would be no longer a Government. Now Sir, this Argument will not down with Ci­tizens, nor yours with any man else. For hey'l be apt to distinguish between the Government, and the administration of it. Now the Govern­ment (or more properly the Governours) are the King and Parliament, without whose joynt Authority no Law can be established. But the [Page 11] putting these Laws in execution, or administration of the Government, that indeed is in the Kings hand, or such as he will commit it to. And till an Order of the King in Council shall be as valid as an Act of Parliament, I doubt we shall not get it believed that the King alone is the Government. But enough of this. In the next place I do not well like your fastning the faults of the King's Ministers upon the King. ( N. 130.)

Why, do you not know the mystery of that? I have a double end in it: First, to get the Libellers punish'd; and then to cast the odium of all Male-administration upon the King. For you know well enough we care not what scandals and suspicious we draw upon the King, so we can but preserve the Duke's esteem. And hence I say, that the pretended devolution of an ill thing done, from the King to his Ministers, is as ridi­culous, as to excuse a man that commits a Mur­der, by crying he was set on. (ibid.)

So then, you will have the King respon­sible both for his own faults, and for theirs also that advised him to them. This will do the King's business, I'll warrant him. And yet it may be very serviceable Doctrine for a Successour: as thus: All the faults of his Ministers will lye upon him; and seeing he cannot be called to account, the greatest faults shall pass unpunisht, and so no man will be afraid of serving his pleasure, and then hey for arbitrary Government! However since you are the Champion for the present Government, it seeems but a quaint way of maintaining the King's reputation, by devolving those faults up­on [Page 12] Him, that the Whigs are content to fasten upon his Ministers only: but you have told me of the policy of it, and I am satisfied.

Well, is there any thing else you can ob­ject against?

How do you make it out that Prote­stants may not as well exclude a Papist from the Crown, as Papists a Protestant?

Thus: Either the Papists do Well in't, or Ill: If the former, they are not to be blam'd; if the latter, they are not to be imitated. (ibid) And this Dilemma I defie any Whig of 'em all to Answer.

Soft [...] little. For I think it not hard to make out, though the Papists are to be blam'd, yet the Protestants may law fully do the same thing.

Pray let's hear you, for methinks that sounds somewhat odd.

My enemy assaults me and endeavours to Murther me; that's ill done in him: I kill him in my own defence; that's well or lawfully done by me.

That's true: but how can you apply this to the Case in question?

Thus: The Papists are the Assailants, who if they can help it, will neither let a Prote­stant King enjoy his Crown, nor Protestant Sub­jects their Estates or Lives. Such King and Sub­jects may therefore lawfully unite and combine for their mutual defence and preservation; and make sure of him (or them) whose prevailing is sure to be their overthrow. For if it be lawful for the Subjects to defend the King and Government esta­blish'd; [Page 13] and for the King to secure the Estates and Lives of his Subjects; I do not see how it should be unlawful to disable or prevent any man from destroying them.

But we must not do ill that good may come of it.

Nor we must not do well that ill may come of it; if indeed it be doing well, to let one cut my King's, mine own and my Neighbours throat, when I can hinder it.

Well, but we should trust Providence.

We should trust providence indeed with a witness, if we should believe, it would protect us whether we would or no. 'Tis as bad to tempt providence as to distrust it. For my part, I think Miracles are too rare now adayes to be de­pended on; and therefore making use of lawful means, I do not take to be any distrusting of pro­vidence: nor does it appear that the means in question are unlawful, any further, than supposing them so, makes them so.

Now you act the Whig to the life; for, demonstrate a thing never so plainly, they're so obstinate, you shall ne'r convince them.

They're very refractory fellows I must confess. But have you not something somewhere concerning the Bill of Exclusion's reaching the King?

Oh yes: 'tis N. 131. If the Exclusion should pass, it would manifestly shew, that the Government were outwitted; for it would reach the King as well as the Duke.

Well, I see the King and the Government [Page 14] are still convertible terms with you, signifiying one and the same thing. But methinks the King is in a fine case betwixt you and the Whigs (for that may stand well enough for the House of Com­mons) For they cry, the King's person, &c. can­not be safe without the Exclusion; and you, that he cannot be safe with it. But why do not you prove your assertion, as they have pretended to do theirs?

Why, though I do it not in this very place, yet look but in the page before, and I have done it: 'Tis but drawing of one Stone out of the build­ing many times, that brings the whole fabrick up­on your head] Just so, remove but the Duke, and the King cannot stand.

But there's an old rule, That similitudes illustrate, but do not prove. And why should not the King stand, though the House fall? But now for my part, I think the Whigs speak reason; for seeing the King is reputed an Heretick by the Catholicks, and when he is removed, they have hopes of a Popish Successor, He is apparently in double danger, both as he's taken for an Heretick, and so it may be no sin to murther him; and also because in their opinion he keeps a better man from the Crown, and one that has more right to it. And besides, the Whigs still affirm, (and you dare not deny it) that for these reasons there were se­veral that actually undertook the Job, and I know not that their designs or principles are yet changed. But I care not for medling with these Edge-tools: let's pass to the power and priviledges of Parlia­ment; tis safe enough to speak freely there, for mortui non mordent.

As for the power of Parliaments, The House of Commons are as much subjects to the King joyntly at severally (N. 131.) They are made choice of by subjects, to represent as subjects. Their Commission is Temporary, and limited to the Ends for which they were call'd and chosen: And those Ends and Powers must be circumscribed by the Qualifications and Capacities of those that chose them: for the case is the same as betwixt a Trustee and his Principal. N. 135.

The summ of what you say is this, That the House of Commons have no more power, than those that chose them. Now I am not of your mind: Nor is there any correspondence between Free-holders and a House of Commons, and a Principal and his Trustee. For a Principal can both pitch upon the person and limit the Power of his Trustee: but so cannot the Free-holders, of their Representatives in Parliament. For though they elect the Persons, yet the Power is from the Law; and can neither be enlarged nor abridged by the Electors. You know, no subject has pow­er over the Life or Estate of his fellow-subject: And yet when twelve are elected or nominated by the Sheriff, they have a greater power than the King himself in depriving a man of either; which they have not from their Elector, but from the Law.

No, but they have their power from the King, whose Minister the Sheriff is.

If we should grant that, it would come still to the same thing; for the King must owe it to the Law, that he can give such a power. For if he had it absolutely of himself, he might himself adjudge any man to death that he thinks de­serves it, which you know he cannot do.

Well, but what's this to the business?

'Tis only the very same case. For as the King gives the Sheriff power to nominate the Ju­rors, who after their Impannelling have a power, which neither he that nominated them gave them, nor themselves have singly and apart: so by the several Writs directed to be proclaim'd by the Sheriffs, Bailiffs, &c. the King gives the people a power to Elect Members for Parliament, who be­ing return'd, and assembl'd in the House, are by the Law and Constitution of the Government in­vested in a power which neither their Electors have, nor themselves had before they were so assembled. They have not such a power indeed as Jurors have, but they have a power that is pro­per and peculiar to them, AS they are one of the three Estates in Parliament.

Well, but with all this, what kind of power is this these Commons have, seeing the King is the SOLE Soveraign, and they are only to do their part toward the furnishing of Materi­als for New Laws where they are Defective? (N. 135.)

The King indeed is a Monarch, and that is as much as sole Governour; not absolutely, but in a limited sence and suo modo. He's sole Go­vernour [Page 17] as to the Administration, not sole in Le­gislation. For I do not think the Lords and Com­mons to be only Labourers to serve up Materials to the King to build new Laws withal, but (to pursue your Metaphor) they are Builders as well as He.

How can that be? for let them Vote and Pass their Hearts out, all signifies nothing with­out Le Roy le veult, or Soit fait come il est de­sire.

'Tis true, the King has a Negative Voice; but consider it well, and 'tis no more than what either House have. For let the Commons pass a Bill, and the Lords can reject it; and on the contrary; though the rejecting House know that the King so much favour the Bill, that he would most certainly pass it into an Act, if they would but give their consent to it. So that it is evident the consent of either House is as neces­sary in order to the making of an Act, as the King's is. And indeed the usual preface to all Acts evidences this plainly, viz. Be it Enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and CONSENT of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and of the Commons in Parliament Assembled, and by the AƲTHORITY of the same. Here you have the Consent and Authority of the two Houses linked with the King's. Seeing therefore part of the power of Making Laws is in the Commons Assembled in Parliament, and they have no such power out of Parliament, but can then only Obey them; 'tis plain they are not in all [Page 18] respects as much subjects joyntly as severally, unless to make Laws and obey them be the same thing. Nor do I know to what purpose you should so much insist upon this point, unless you intend it as a bait to catch some fool with, that would be nib­bling at the disparaging of the King's Preroga­tive: (as you speak in another case of the Plot, N. 130.)

Why, that's the bottom on't, and I hope I shall catch some or other.

Well, enough for the Power, let's pass to the priviledges of Parliament. What do you think of them?

As to the Power, Priviledges, and freedom of English Parliaments; tell me what it is first, and what they are; and I'll give you my Answer. The four Inns of Court them selves are not able to determine what they are ( N. 132.) I had rather forty times the King should lay me by the heels without shewing cause for it, than a House of Commons; and be a Slave to an Imperial Prerogative, than to a popular priviledge. N. 135.

You were once indeed pretty near being laid by the heels; but all the cunning's in catch­ing. But what signifies it what you had rather? I think there is no necessity to be made slaves either to prerogative or priviledge, which are both useful and wholsome enough when they do not exceed their bounds. Now seeing neither you nor your four Inns of Court can tell what these priviledges are, or upon what they are bottom'd, I'll tell you [Page 19] my opinion. I think they stand much upon the same terms with Prerogative, part of which is con­firmed by express Law, and part has no other foundation, but Prescription; (the Kings and Queens of this Realm having exercised such a power in such and such cases, time out of mind:) and this part of the Prerogative I look to be as firm as the other. For prescription or Common usage, (time out of mind) is Common Law in all cases. Nor is there any reason why the Sovereign should not enjoy the benefit of that Maxime as well as the meanest subject, nor why the House of Commons should not enjoy it as well as either. 'Tis true, both Prerogative and Priviledge may be strained too far, or something may be call'd so, that is not so: but shall we therefore deny there are any such things, or turn them into ridicule? It signifies lit­tle what you shall deny to be priviledge, or I to be prerogative: for I doubt the King will think him­self a more competent Judge of the one, and the Parliament of the other.

Let them think what they please, but it does not stand with the Constitution of this Go­vernment to suppose them to be competent Judges of their own priviledges: For it is an abandoning of the very essentials of Church and State to their Mercy. What if they should seise upon the Mi­litia; the King' s Magazins and Shipping; Levy Arms, coin Money, &c. and tell ye all this is done by priviledges of Parliament? It would be no more than what we have seen and suffer'd already under the same pretence. Though I do not say [Page 20] that since the damn'd Apostasie of Fourty One, and the period of that accursed Train of Rebellions, we have labour'd under Many Abuses of that kind, N. 135.

Well, this Fourty one is [...], excellent at a dead lift. 'Tis a Fac totum, the Philosophers stone, a Panaceia, 'tis good for every thing. Now do not poor I Mr. Whig know i'the world what to say. But however I am re­solv'd to stand to my tackle, and see what can be said; and will maintain, that though the Parli­ament be held to be the sole competent Judges of their own priviledges, this is neither against the constitution of the Government, nor do Church and State lye at their mercy for all the Apostasie of Fourty One. You will grant me that 'tis necessary to all Secular Government, that there should be a supreme Power, from whence there should be no Appeal; and that in Absolute Monarchies, this is the Sovereign only; but in Limited, the highest or supreme Court.

What, I warrant you'l be for Mr. Prynn's Sovereign Power of Parliaments?

No, hold there; I am not for a Parli­ament's usurping a Power over the King and in­vading his Prerogative: I only affirm this, that beyond the High Court of Parliament there lies no Appeal.

Well, but Appeals are only made to the House of Lords, which is a Court of Record, and of Judicature; but what's this to the House of Com­mons?

'Tis as much, for my purpose, to the one as to the other. For though they be two Houses, they are but one Parliament, and have community of priviledges. And origi­nally they were but one House. This, Sir Edw. Cook, while he was Speaker of the House of Com­mons in 35 Eliz. has made out for me, ‘At first we were all one House and sate together, but the Commons sitting in presence of the King and amongst the Nobles disliked it, and found fault that they had not free liberty to speak. And upon this reason, that they might speak more freely, being out of the Royal sight of the King, and not amongst the great Lords so far their Betters, the House was divided and came to sit asunder. A bold and worthy Knight at the time when this was sought, (the King desiring a reason of this their request, and why they would remove themselves from their Betters) answered shortly, That his Majesty and the No­bles being every one a great person represented but themselves; but the Commons though they were but inferiour men, yet every one of them represented a thousand of men. And this An­swer was well allowed of. But now though we be divided in Seat, be we therefore divided Houses? No; for if any writ of Error be brought, as you shall see a notable Case in 22 E. 3. this Writ must be returned in Parliament, that is, to the whole House, and chiefly to the Upper House, for We are but a Limb of the House. Never any Man saw a writ returnable in the Lower House;—Yet I speak not this, to take any pri­viledge [Page 22] from this House; for—it is certain, whatsoever we do sitting the Parliament, it is an Act of the whole Court; for the Lords without the Commons, and the Commons without the Lords, can do nothing.] Vid. Journ. of Parl. of Q. Eliz. page 515, 516.’ You see here what unity and consent there is between the two Houses, so that one can have no priviledge, in which the other is not interested. Judgments indeed upon Writs of Errour are given by the Lords, but being the Writs are returned in Par­liament, the sentence is constructively the Com­mons also, unless one would be so absurd as to call the House of Lords the Parliament, as some do the House of Commons. But to make this plainer yet: You know the Upper House has no Jurisdi­ction over the Lower, so as to take cognizance of any thing transacted therein, otherwise than by desiring Conference; and that the Lower House has as well over the Upper: but in both cases it is improperly called Jurisdiction: for at the Con­ference, he that can shew the plainest Precedents or the most convincing Arguments, carries the thing in dispute: or if either side be obstinate, 'tis just so good and so good, the other may take its course, protest against the proceeding, and then sit down and be quiet.

Well, but though the Upper House are no Judges of the priviledges of the Lower, (nor on the contrary) why may not the Judges of the Land determine of these Priviledges?

As for that, the aforesaid Learned Law­yer [Page 23] brings you a precedent, ‘In Parl. 31 H. 6. Thorpe was Speaker, and the Parl. being sum­moned to be in June, it was prorogued until September; in the mean time Thorpe was taken in Execution by the Duke of York, he notwithstand­ing this thought to have had the priviledge of the Parliament. At the next sessions, the mat­ter being greatly considered, whether he could have a priviledge or no, a Conference was had in the Cause with the Judges. The Judges be­ing required, in humble sort refused, except it were so that the House did command them (for in the House of Parliament, sayes he, the Chief Judges and their Judgments are Controulable by the Court) but if the House did Command them, they would be Willing to inform them what in their opinions they knew and thought.]’ Ibid. Here the Judges were so far from determin­ing what were the priviledges of Parliament, that without a Command they would not so much as their opinion.

Yes, yes, and you have Serjeant Topham's Case for another Precedent.

This is but another bait to catch some fool with. I only show you the opinion of former times.

Come, come, I have been but dodging with you all this time, the King is the Judge of their priviledges.

The King's Prerogative indeed is hard enough for all their priviledges put together: And if that be well husbanded and maintain'd, I defie [Page 24] all the priviledges of Lords or Commons to do Church or State any harm, though themselves be still left to be the sole Judges what they▪ are. And this will bring us to your Non- [...]lich Argument of Fourty One. That the Long Parliament should do all those feats you mention, as Levying Arms, coining of mony, &c. under the notion of privi­ledge, I cannot imagine: I much rather believe they did them for maintenance of their priviledges, which they pretended the King went about to in­vade.

Why, 'tis all one.

No but 'tis not▪ unless ones Life, and the Means to guard it be the same thing. I say again, they pretended the King went about to invade their priviledges, and therefore they raised an Army in the defence of them, and coin'd money to pay the Army.

Well, and may not any Parliament pre­tend the same Invasion, and make the like defence as well?

No, that they cannot; and therefore for ever hereafter leave your bawling out of forty [...], [...] before God it is nothing to the purpose. ( [...] you know whose cause I am pleading, and therefore I hope you'l pardon this heat.)

Faith, and you act their part to the life.

You know in fourty one, &c. the pow­er of the Militia might seem somewhat a dispu­table point▪ not that I question but that it truly belong'd to the King▪ but he was not ins [...]ed in it [Page 25] by any express Law that I know of, though pre­scription in my opinion ought to have gone as far on the King's side as express Law. But to take away any pretensions of the Parliament for the future, you know that the Parliament Ann. 13. and 14. of this King chap. 3. has recogniz'd as it were, or expresly acknowledg'd, that the pow­er of the Militia appertains to the Crown of this Kingdom, so that for the future there cannot be the least pretence for any such claim in the Parli­ament, unless the King will consent to the repeal­ing of that Act, which you may suppose if you will.

Well, but this is nothing to the purpose; for if, for all this, the Parliament shall affirm that the Militia belongs to them, and they be the sole Judges of their own priviledges, the same things may be acted over again.

No, they cannot, for all that. For not to mention the improbability, nay moral im­possibility of the Parliaments pretending to a power which so recent and express an Act has declar'd to be in the King; yet though they should be so grossly unreasonable and bare-fac'dly factious, the Kings prerogative is able to cope with them. And this Prerogative Charles the First gave away when he assented to the Act of Perpetuity; in pas­sing of which if he shew'd little Policy, they shew'd less gratitude in making so bad an use of so redundant a Grace. But if the King will give away his Prerogative, who can help it? And if He will give the Parliament leave to sit as long as [Page 26] they please, he gives away the only Antidote a­gainst their pretence of priviledge. For though the King cannot determine of their priviledges, so as to sentence this to be one, and that not: Yet he can do as much as this comes to, he can pro­rogue or dissolve the Parliament whenever he sees reason for it, and that puts an end both to them and their Priviledges. And this is the incomparable Constitution of our Government! If it were other­wise, there lay a gap open either for arbitrary power on the King's side, or for usurpation on the Parliament's. For if the King might determine what were the Power and Priviledges of Parli­ament, we might soon have a Parliament of Paris; and if They might sit as long as they please, they would even be the high and mighty States of Holland, and the King but a Stadtholder, or if you will a Staff-holder. But 'tis best as 'tis; and so long as the King shall be so wise as to keep what is his own, and so gracious as to desire no more, 'tis impossible it should be otherwise on one side or t'other. And therefore to make a Cuckow's song of Fourty one, may indeed betray something of your own nature, but it signifies no more to the purpose you Chant it, than baculus in angulo.

Come, Sir, you are too sharp upon me. But the King's well holp up in the mean time: If the Parliament will entrench on the Prerogative, or will not do what He would have them, He can on­ly dissolve them, and there's all his mends. What's the King the better for being able to prevent their [Page 27] doing any mischief, if he cannot get them to do what he sees necessary for the maintenance of the Government? [I am for Parliaments that are sub­jects, as well together as asunder: for a House of Commons that will do the bus'ness they were Call'd for, and the bus'ness they were Sent for.] N. 135.

Truly, as to their doing what they are Sent for, I believe the Whigs will not be much against it. But then I doubt, if they do no more, the King would many times come short of Money. For the greater number of the Electors who are they that send them, do commonly (as most other men do) love their money so well, that they care not how little of that they part with, nor how saving a bargain they make for removal of their grievances. And as for other things be­sides raising of Money, I do not believe that any of us Tories do much care for their receiving or following the Instructions of those that chuse them, ever since the Members that were sent to Oxford were documented by their Electors. For if they could have been able to have accomplish'd what they were sent for, our hopes had been to­tally ruin'd by the Bill of Exclusion. 'Pray there­fore let's hear no more of doing what they are sent for. And as for their doing what they are Call'd for, I Mr. Whig do wish with all my heart, that they might alwaies see it reasonable to com­ply with the King's demands, and follow his directions; but yet I would leave Them a judge­ment of discretion, to consult whether such de­mands [Page 28] are reasonable, and such directions ad­viseable to be follow'd.

Well, if they be the Judges of that, the King is like to be finely serv'd.

And if they be not, Liberty and Propertv are finely secur'd! For if the King's dictates must be follow'd, and he may dictate what he please; all Acts of Parliament will be but Orders of the King in the Great Council of the Kingdom; and the like Orders in the Privy Council, might e'en as well pass for Acts of Parliament.

How now Monsieur! why so blank? Well, there's something more than ordinary in these Whigs; for while I have been but personating one, methinks I have spoken more reason than ever I did in my life. But let Whig and his Reasons both be damn'd; for they have made me as dull as a dog. Come let's have a Brimmer to the confusion of all Whigs and their Reasons, for that's the readiest way to confute them. And now am I, Heraclitus again, the Merry-weeping Tory. What therefore I shall say from henceforward, take as from a Friend, not an Opponent. And in the first place I wonder at your imprudence, that while you undertook to wipe off the suspicion of a Tory-plot, you have rather confirm'd the belief of it. For he that could not be convinc'd of it by that Pamphlet, nor the notoriousness of the thing it self, must needs make no doubt of it when he has read your Observations, if he will but do you the honour, to believe you the mouth of [Page 29] our Party. Come Sir, the Whigs and Jesuits are wiser in their generation than we Loyal Protestants. Charge them with a Plot, and though the thing be as plain as the Nose on one's face, they'l deny and forswear it even at the Gallows. But you now go about to traverse the business, and to justifie the crime; nay give matter of new Evidence a­gainst your self.

Why, you know the matter of fact could not be deny'd.

Then you should have taken no notice of the charge at all; and so our party could have vapour'd it out, as if you slighted it for it's im­pertinency: but now you have given it a cast of your Office to so little purpose, you cannot ima­gine how they are dampt. 'Pray what does it sig­nifie to quibble upon the Title page, to make Misopappas signifie a hater of the King, when you know it means a hater of the Pope, or at worst of the Bishops, (for a Pope and a Bishop are all one in the Greek.) Then, how weak a justification of our arraigning the two last Parliaments, is it to say that the Whigs vilifie the late Long Parli­ament? If they do well in that, why do you find fault; if ill, why do we imitate them; nay so far exceed them? for you say, they scandalize but about two hundred of that Parliament, and that for being Pensioners: but we Have at all, while we condemn them so much for what they Voted Nemine contradicente. And again, how weak is your allegation of fourty one, to prove that these Parliaments are guilty of what we accuse them? If [Page 30] those were Rebels, does it follow that others would raise such a Rebellion if they could, nay or could if they would? 'Pray remember what I said before, when I was Mr. Whig. In the next place you are but too injurious to his Majesty, to fasten on Him all the Miscarriages and male-administra­tions of his Ministers, as if it were impossible for the King that has so many servants, to have a good opinion of, and commit a trust to, a bad man. Nay and you stretch this so high, or rather so low, that a fellow cannot reflect on halfa dozen Printers Hawkers, but presently you cry, the King is wounded through their sides. If you hold on, I believe a man shall not call a Scullion wench of the King's Kitchin, dirty Slut, or his Corn-cutter, pitiful fellow, but you'l call it arraigning the Go­vernment. You know 'tis impossible the King should attend all the affairs of State himself, He must necessarily see many things with other folks eyes, and hear them with others ears; and there­fore if things be misrepresented to him, he may in­deed act otherwise than he would if he were bet­ter inform'd: but He is so far from being worthy to be blam'd for such acting, that those that were the evil advisers, ought rather to be doubly punished, partly for the thing it self of which they are truly the Authors, and much more for abusing his Majesty by their evil suggestions. But enough of that. Then as to the Bill of Excluston, you know the Author of the Tory-plot had taken some pains to prove it lawful, just and necessary; now one would have thought, if you would have [Page 31] meddl'd with it at all, you should have endea­vour'd to prove it unlawful, unjust and inconveni­ent.

Why, he has suggested Arguments enough, That supposing it unlawful, the Parli­ament cannot pass it; that there is no other rule of Obedience to Magistrates but that given by Christ and his Apostles; and that the primi­tive Christians never voted for a Bill of Exclu­sion.

Good Mr. Parson, these are only Ar­guments to persuade your Devotionists: As for your beaux Esprits, they are not at all moved at them; and the perverse Infidel Whigs as little as they. But to go on. When we were charged with a design of getting Parliaments laid aside, how do you excuse us; marry by making the business much worse: justifying our suggesting to the King that a Factious Multitude will make a Facti­ous Choice; and therefore he ought to have a care of such a House of Commons; there may be dan­ger in't. ( N. 131.) Just as if you had drawn up the Address from Devonshire, or had taken the hint from thence, who crave leave to observe, that our Corporations and Boroughs, who have so great a share in the Government, are now the Nurseries and Seminaries of Faction, Sedition and Disloyal­ty.

Well, and are they not so?

Yes; but truth must not be spoken at all times. For can you think that such Accusati­ons are a likely way to perswade the world, that [Page 32] we have an esteem for Parliaments? or rather do they not confirm any man in the belief of our de­sire to cast them quite off, whiles we insinuate that both the Electors and Elected are so factious, sedi­tious and disloyal? Then, what need was there for you to go about to excuse all the Extravagan­cies of the Addressers, as particularly that snivel­ling canting complement from Richmond, who tell his Majesty, that he dislolv'd the two last Parliaments by the inspiration of the special Spirit of God. You may guess what Spirit they are inspir'd with, by Thompson's Intelligence of May 13. where you see how they refuse to present any Abhorrence of the Association; no, damn 'em, not they. How bravely these Fellows deserve your Advocateship! And to what purpose was it to touch upon that importune Eulogie of his Royal Highness from Northumberland, who call him the Greatest Example of Duty and Obedience to His Majesty? Do you think the King has not both entreated him and Commanded him to continue his presence at the Chapel, if that would have done?

Nay then, if I must not keep up the Duke's reputation, I had has good give over wri­ting.

You do well to keep up the Dukes repu­tation, but then it must be by such Instances as are capable of being improv'd to that end; as by commending his constancy to his Friends, his valour, and the like: but surely you cannot com­mend every man from every Topick. In the last [Page 33] place, you too manifestly grosly pervert the mean­ing and scope of the Pamphleteer in several places.

Nay, if Vice correct sin, we shall have bles­sed doings!

'Tis true, my talent lies pretty much that way; but then it is when I have to do with a Brooks, or the like, that's marcht off the stage, and has no body to take up the cudgels for him; in such a case indeed I commend it as the only way, and that's the reason your Dissenter's sayings have taken so well: But now when you have to do with an Adversary that's alive, and looks out pret­ty sharp, that way will never do.

Well, but where have I so grosly pervert­ed his meaning?

I'll give you an Instance or two. When he had said, that even Papists might join in a Pro­testation to defend the Religion establish'd by Law, believing Magna Charta to be the firmest Law, and Popery to be establish'd thereby; what do you, but insinuate presently, that he calls the Protestant Religion, profest at present in the Church of England, flat Popery? than which no­thing is more contrary to the drift of his discourse. Thus when he goes about to prove that Kings cannot claim their Crowns by right of Primogeni­ture from Adam, from the frequent changes of Go­vernment in the same Nation, whereby such lineal succession is every where interrupted▪ and in or­der to prove this asks, ‘In how many Kingdoms has force and violence and the longest sword set­tled an absolute Monarchy? how oft has that yoke been shak't off, and the Government turn'd into a Free State? How many different Models of both Monarchies and States Are there [Page 34] at This day in the world? and yet, sayes he, none of them (that I know of) but are, and ought to be own'd by the Subjects for Law­ful Governments:]’ By this you say he justifies Fourty One, &c. and all Usurpations whatsoever. Now who can with any colour draw such a con­sequence from such premisses? He only shows that from the several revolutions of Government that have been in most Nations, the claim by primoge­niture lineally from Adam is so confounded, that 'tis impossible to make out any Right that way: But does he therefore say that Charles the First had by force and violence and the longest sword settled an absolute Monarchy, so that there should be any colour from thence taken to justifie the Usurpation of fourty one? The truth is, we that are for King's reigning altogether jure divino, are forc't to fly to this right of Primogeni [...]ure, seeing only paternal Government is Purely of divine original; all other Governments having a Mix­ture of humane policy: But seeing it is impos­sible to determine who is the eldest of the Family in a right line of succession from Adam; if that notion should be relied on, Princes Titles would be so much in the dark and admit of so much di­spute, that 'tis safer nay necessary to rely on the establishment by humame Law and the sworn Allegeance of the Subjects, though the general precepts of the Scripture, of obedience to humane ordinances, do confirm the duty and obedience of Subjects to their respective Rulers, be they Emperours, Kings, States, or of any inferiour kind or denomination. But this only betwixt you and me.—But there is one thing I had like to have forgot, the greatest subtilty in all [Page 35] your Observations, and that is N. 132. Where by severing the Successor from the Papist you will have the Addresser▪ transport of joy, that the Bill of Exclusion did not pass, to proceed only out of respect to the former. Now Sir if you could di­stinguish the Popish Successor, or Successor and Papist into two Persons, as you have done into two no­tions, you would do something; but otherwise your Quatenus is somewhat like that of the Bi­shop's, who being found fault with by a Coun­treyman for living too pompous and luxurious a life, so unsuitable to his office, answered, That he lived not so AS he was a Bishop, but AS he was a secular Prince: to whom the Fellow repli'd▪ But I doubt if the Prince go to the Devil, the Bishop will not stay far behind.] And 'tis believ­ed the Papist will be assoon in the throne as the Successor. And therefore that nicety had as good also been omitted.

Well, but there is one point I have han­dl'd to purpose, (both N. 132. and 135.) that to imagin the death of the Presumptive heir, is Treason.

Truly Sir, you seem not over-confident of what you have done as to that, for you say you will not deliever it for Law as a Lawyer, but should be glad to be better informed. (ibid.) Now Sir, you have been told already, that my Lord Cook delivers it for Law as a Lawyer (though you will not the contrary) that a Collateral Heir is not within the Stat of 25 E▪ 3. that makes the ima­gining the death of the King's eldest Son and Heir to be Treason. But methinks you are like some Philosophers, that undertake to solve Phaenomena, that never were in Nature. Before you had tak­en such pains to prove the presumptive Heir to [Page 36] stand upon equal ground with the King's Son and Heir, so as to make that which is Treason to the one, to be so to the other; I say you would have done well to have first made it out, that his death was imagin'd. For I do not find, by any Overt Act, that your Adversary has imagin'd any such thing.

Why, has he not call'd him Traytor, and protested He shall not Reign over him?

Not that I know not of. He calls such an one indeed a Traytor, as shall murder the King or force him to resign, and I think he does not call him out of his name: but 'tis you that in­terpret this of the presumptive Heir; which if one should suppose to be his true meaning, yet would not his protestation, that such an one shall not reign over Him, be an imagining his death; for 'twere but for him and his thousands he talks of, to slip over into Holland, &c. and the Pro­test were made good.

Well, I think I have not said one word but what you have found fault with? what would you have me do? write nothing, and starve?

No, but keep to your province of translating E­rasmus's Colloquies, Quevedo's Visions or French Romances: these will hold you doing, and keep life and soul together. And then if you do us no good, you'l do us no harm. And for my own part I'm half in mind to give over also; for Ben. Took's fifteen shillings a Week is but poor wages, and the Rogue thinks he gives too much too.

Good Gentlemen, be not discourag'd, for I can assure you, your Works are in great esteem amongst us: We should not know what course to Steer, if we were not guided by you. But come, 'pray let us adjourn to Sam's, I believe the House begins to fill by this time.

Herac. I, come let's go.