Herculeas ultra quem jactat rauca columnas
Famasnec officio par lamen illa suo).
En libi BARLOUM potuit quae Sculptor at ipsa
Arte licet claram vincit ut umbra manum!
Ora venusta vides, et nobilis Atria mentis;
Quod nitet interius nulla Tabella dabit.
The Tullie [...]

SEVERAL Miscellaneous and Weighty Cases of Conscience, Learnedly and Judiciously Resolved By the Right Reverend Father in God, Dr. THOMAS BARLOW, Late Lord-Bishop of Lincoln. VIZ.

  • I. Of Toleration of Protestant Dissenters.
  • II. The King's Power to pardon Murder.
  • III. Objections from Gen. 9. 6. answered.
  • IV. Mr. Cottington's Case of Divorce: With the Judgments of Dr. Allestrey, Dr. Hall, Sir Richard Lloyd, Sir Richard Raines, Dr. Oldys, and the Doctors of Sorbonne, upon the same.
  • V. For Toleration of the Jews.
  • VI. About Setting up Images in Churches.
  • VII. An Dominium fundatur in Gratiâ?

With two Pages omitted in the English Machia­vel, and his Lordship's Censure thereupon.

London, Printed, and sold by Mrs. Davis in Amen-corner, 1692.

The Bookseller's PREFACE to the Reader.

THE Reader may be pleased to take notice, that the following Tracts were written by the late Eminent and Learned Father of our Church, Dr. Thomas Barlow, Lord-Bishop of Lin­coln; and printed from MSS. written with his own Hand.

The Occasions these.

I. The Case of the Lawfulness of Toleration of the Jews, was writ at the Request of a Person of Quality, in the late troublesome Times; when the Jews made Application to Cromwel, for their Re-admission into England.

II. The Case of Toleration of Chri­stian Dissenters, was written to, and at the Request of the Honourable and Learned Mr. Robert Boyle, 1660. soon after the Restoration of K. Charles II.

III. Whether it be lawful for his Sacred Majesty K. Charles II. to reprieve or pardon a Person, convicted and legal­ly condemned for Murder; written up­on occasion of Mr. St. John's being un­fortunately convicted for the unhappy [Page] Death of Sir William Estcourt Bar.

IV. The Case of Murder, in Answer to an Objection then made, from Gen. 9. 6. That Kings have not Power to par­don Murder.

V. Mr. Cottington's Case, concern­ing the Validity or Nullity of his Mar­riage with Gallina, (her former Hus­band then living) 1671. Mr. Cotting­ton applying himself, and Mr. Brent coming from the then Earl of Danby, to request his Lordship's Opinion there­in. With a further Resolution of the same; as also the Judgments of Dr. Al­lestrey, Dr. Hall, (now Lord-Bishop of Bristol) Sir Richard Lloyd, Sir Richard Raines, Dr. William Oldys, and the Do­ctors of Sorbonne at Paris, in point of Law and Conscience, upon the same.

VI. A Breviate of the Case concern­ing setting up Images in the Parish-Church of Moulton, in the Diocess and County of Lincoln, 168 ¼. Writ upon occasion of this Learned Bishop's being cited before the Dean of the Arches, for suffering such Images to be defaced, &c. And upon reading of which Case, so truly and evidently stated, the whole Prosecution (which was then violently and virulently enough carried on) against him was stopp'd.

[Page] VII. Whether that Dominion is foun­ded on Grace, be a Tenet chargeable on the Church of Rome?

VIII. One Folio Leaf omitted out of Machiavel in English, with the Bishop's Censure thereupon.

The Reader may please to observe, in Mr. Cottington's Case, the Counsel use the Name of Frichinono, for the Hus­band of Gallina, which was his proper Name; but the Bishop that of Patrimoni­ale, which was the Title of his Publick Of­fice, and by which latter he was frequently known and called by at Turin. The Reso­lution of this Case may be of great use, it being never so fully stated before. Davila tells us in his fifth Book, Vide Hist. H. 4. France, by the Bp of Rhodes, and Monsieur D'Ossat 's Let­ters. Davila, lib. 3. that Hen. 4. was married to Q. Margaret, at Nostredame, by the Cardinal of Bourbon, in Presence of the whole Court; and she was given in Marriage by Charles 9. her Brother: and after a long Cohabitation, the Cardinal of Joyeuse, the Pope's Nuncio, and the Arch-Bishop of Arles, being delegated by the Pope, nulled the Marriage, propter vim & metum; Q. Margaret alledging, she was forced to it by her Brother. And the Sentence gave liberty to the King and Queen to marry whom they would: And accordingly, the King afterwards married [Page] Mary of Medicis, one of whose Daugh­ters was Henrietta Maria, the Wife of our K. Charles I. and Cardinal D'Ossat ju­stified the Legality of this Sentence, tho there had been no Cause shewn. But the Law of Nations does not oblige our Courts to execute or pronounce Sentence according to Foreign ones.

Now tho the Bishop gave these Cases to his Friends, when first writ, with his leave to print them; yet they, fearing some of them might prejudice his further Promoti­ons in the Church in those Days, forbore Publication of them. Tho we must do his Lordship this Right, to aver, that he had no regard to that: so careless was he of the Event of any Action he thought himself obliged to do, Religionis causâ, that he has been often heard to say occasionally, as a kind of Principle, viz. He who thinks to save any thing by his Religion, but his Soul, will be a Loser in the end.

And his Lordship lived to see the Church of England of his Opinion, in being indulgent to Dis­senters; for in that incomparable LETTER TO A DISSENTER, written by the best and noblest Pen of our Age, The M. of Hallifax. and upon the Measures of that Church, in the Reign of K. James II. the Dissen­ters are told in express Words, That the Church of England is convinc'd of its Error in being severe to them.

THE CASE of a TOLERATION IN Matters of Religion.

To the HONOURABLE ROBERT BOYLE, Esq

SIR,

IT is now a good while ago since you gave me com­mand, (for so your Desires are, and shall be to me) to give you my Opinion in writing, concerning the Toleration of seve­ral Religions, or Opinions, in a well-governed Church and State. And though it matters not much what my Opinion be, and (besides my many Disabilities both of Bo­dy and Mind, the little time I have (by reading or meditation, to collect more, or digest those No­tions [Page 4] I have, renders me uncapable of saying much, (or indeed any thing which you do not know al­ready;) yet (in obedience to your command) something I shall say, (for, Cur me posse negem, quod tu posse putes?) which may be an ar­gument of my confiding in your Candor and Goodness, and of my daring to trust you with all my In­firmities, and an evidence, not of my ability, but willingness to serve you. In short then, I shall give you some of my Thoughts concerning Toleration, tho not in that exact order and method, not with that clear explication, and confirmation of the Truth, as I really desire, and the Subject deserves.

I say then,

I. The Toleration we speak of, is a Toleration of several Religi­ons, or several Opinions concern­ing [Page 5] it: and therefore Atheists (if there be any such) come not under it. For he who acknowledges no God, cannot possibly be of any Religion, which essentially in­cludes both an acknowledgment, and worship of a Deity.

II. Toleration of Religions pre­supposeth several Religions, or different Opinions ( Respectu Do­ctrinae, Disciplinae, or both) for without such disserent, Religions can­not be different.

III. Now amongst several Reli­gions in any Nation, all cannot be true, ( [...], as Jamblichus tells us truly, Truth is one, and cannot dif­fer from it self); and that which is owned and established by the just Authority of any Nation, is suppo­sed to be the True Religion: It follows, that Toleration must ne­cessarily relate to those Religions, and ways of Worship, which are [Page 6] (at least supposed) false, as be­ing different from that which the Nation (that tolerates them) owns, and establishes as true. I say, supposed to be false: For it may, and many times does happen, that the False Religion may be established, and the true only tolerated. So in France Popery is the Religion own­ed, and Protestancy only tolera­ted; in England contrary.

VI. Now this Toleration, or Esta­blishment, must relate to some (and the same) Authority. That Authori­ty which establishes the True, must tolerate the Religion, or Religions which are supposed false; for we speak of an Authoritative and Le­gal Toleration. So that as the Su­pream Legislative Power must (and only can) legally establish the True, so it only can tolerate those ways of Worship which are supposed to be false.

[Page 7] V. And here further, As this Le­gal Establishment brings a two-fold obligation on those who sub­mit to it; 1. An obligation to Obe­dience, and a conformity in their Practice to the Established Law: And 2. An obligation to the Pu­nishments (mentioned in the Law) in case of Disobedience: So on the other side, a publick, and Legal Toleration exempts those to and for whom it is granted,

1. From the obligation to Obedi­ence, and conforming themselves to the established way of Worship: For Toleration intrinsecally notes the taking off such Obligation.

2. It exempts them from those Punishments which are (to those who have submitted to such a way of Worship) the consequents of non-obedience, and non-conformi­ty to the Established Religion. [Page 8] For no man can be justly punished for non-obedience to any Law, who is not under the obligation of it.

VI. Once more; As those to whom such Toleration is granted, may justly expect impunity, and exemption from all penal Suffer­ings, tho they conform not to the way of Worship publickly esta­blished; so on the other side, they cannot reasonably ex­pect the Privilegia quae contem­platione Religionis indulta sunt, catholicae tantum Legis observatoribus prodesse oportet: Haereticos autem & Schismati­cos ab his privilegiis alienos es­se volumus. Imperat. Constan­tinus, ad Dracilianum, l. 1. de Haereticis in Cod. Theodosiano. pag. 493▪ Rewards and Encouragements which a Prince distri­butes to those who chearfully obey, and give conformity to the Religion establish­ed. For as Rewards and Punish­ments are the Sepimenta Legis, the great Mounds and Hedges to keep men to their duty and obedience to any Law of God, or Man, (hope [Page 9] of Reward incouraging men to obedience, and fear of Punish­ment frighting them from disobe­dience) so they go together, and are inseparable, and belong only to those who are under the obliga­tion of such Law. So that he to whom the Law is not given, (and to these who have a Toleration it is not) as he need not fear punish­ment for Non-conformity (the Law not obliging him to it) so he can­not expect, or hope for those Re­wards, which are the encourage­ments of that obedience, which he refuseth to give. Those then who are under the obligation of such Law, are (in one respect) in a bet­ter condition, because they may justly expect from their Prince Re­wards and Encouragements, pro­portionable to the measure of their Obedience: So on the other side, those who have the Toleration, are [Page 10] (in another respect) in a better con­dition, because they need not fear any Punishment for their Non­conformity.

7. It must be remembred, that it is a Toleration we speak of, not an Approbation of those Religi­ons, or ways of Worship which differ from the Religion establish­ed in a Nation. For the Established Religion being always supposed to be true, (and as such owned by the Authority establishing it) the ways of Worship tolerated only, must of necessity be (supposed at least to be) false, and so cannot be approved by that Authority, which (for just Reasons) does, and may tolerate them. For such an appro­bation of the False, would be a condemnation of the True Religi­on; and so, if they approve what they tolerate, they condemn what they establish: which is such a [Page 11] contradictory piece of Indiscretion and Injustice, as hardly any Au­thority can be guilty of.

VIII. This premised, the grand Query will be; Whether, Query. and how far the Supream Power may, and ought to grant such a Toleration to Religions, and ways of Worship, differing from that established?

Now seeing the granting of such a Toleration (as almost all other humane Actions) may be good or bad, Answer. according to the va­rious Circumstances, and several Conditions,

  • 1. Of the Power that grants.
  • 2. Of the Persons to whom the Grant is made.
  • 3. Of the Religions tolerated.
  • 4. And of the time in which such Toleration is granted.

[Page 12] It cannot be expected that I, (or any body else) should give one Ab­solute and Categorical Answer to the intite Query: and therefore I shall crave leave to say something towards an Answer, by several steps and degrees, in these following Positions.

1. Then, it is to be considered, who they are who desire such a To­leration? their number and quali­ty at home, and what Friends and Assistants they may have abroad. For if the Persons desiring such Toleration, be so considerable for number and strength at home; or for their assistance abroad, that a War, or dangerous Insurrections and Seditions may follow (if a To­leration be denied) to the hazard of the publick Peace and safety of the Common-weal; Then (I think) the Magistrate (in Prudence and Conscience) may, and ought [Page 13] to grant their Desires; and rather tolerate a False Religion (with such prudent Qualifications, and for such time as shall be agreed up­on) than hazard the unsettlement and ruine of the True. For as in the Body Natural we endure a Gangrened Member with much pain and patience (tho without hopes of cure) when it cannot be cut off without endangering the whole; so in the Body Politick, or Ecclesiastical, an erring part may, and ought to be endured, and to­lerated, when the cutting off would hazard the weal of the whole. And indeed such a Toleration, in such a Case, is rather necessary than vo­luntary in the Magistrate: only he (in this case) makes a vertue of ne­cessity, giving that (by way of fa­vour and kindness) freely, which probably they might have by force. Thus he secures the publick Peace, [Page 14] and the Religion established, ob­liges the Dissenters by the civility and courtesie of a moderate Tole­ration; and yet all this is indeed but granting impunity, when he cannot punish. And this is most consonant to the Principles of right Reason, and the perpetual Practice of all Nations. For Quod multis peccatur inultum est; when Seditions have happened in a Common­weal, or Mutinies in an Army, if the Seditious and Mutineers were many, it hath ever been thought more prudent to pardon, than punish. Multitudo peccantium poenam tollit, licet non peccatum. As it is impossible to punish universally, so 'tis ever dangerous to punish a major, or any great and considera­ble part of a Community Minutius Felix Octav. pag. 77. De­fensio communis furoris est, furentium multitudo. And (I believe) whereever Protestants are tolerated in Popish [Page 15] or Catholick Countries, 'tis from this principle, That they do not think it prudent or safe for them­selves, to persecute the Protestants within their Territories. It has been (and is) the opinion of wise men, that the Spaniard by a mild and moderate Toleration might have compassed that in the Nether­lands at the beginning, which (un­happily taking the contrary way) hath cost him so vast a proportion of Treasure and Blood, and is not compassed yet, nor ever like to be. This particular will be con­siderable in the present condition of this Kingdom, wherein (by the unhinging of all Government, and an unhappy Civil War) Papists, Schismaticks and Sectaries, are mul­tiplied into so great a number, that possibly it may be more safe for the publick to pardon than punish, to grant a moderate Toleration, [Page 16] than run the hazard of further divi­sions and bloodshed. This I only propose (in thesi) to be consider­ed: But (in hypothesi) what is parti­cularly most fit to be done in this time and Nation, I shall not be so confident as to undertake the de­termination, but (according to my duty) leave it to the great prudence of those to whom God has given a greater measure of understanding and authority for such a business; and constantly pray for a blessing upon their endeavours in setling this divided Nation.

2. But admit that the numbers of those who dissent from the Re­ligion established in a Nation, be not so great, nor their Qualities and Assistants so considerable, as that the State need fear any new War, or publick disturbance; Is the Magistrate then bound in pru­dence and piety to punish, or may [Page 17] he (without violation of either) tolerate? To answer this, we must consider,

  • 1. The nature of the punish­ments to be inflicted.
  • 2. The nature of the false Re­ligions or Opinions for which they are inflicted.

The first; All punishments to be inflicted, are either Ecclesiasti­cal or Civil: The

  • 1. Spiritual, in foro interno, ex Potestate clavium, to be infli­cted by the Church, by those who have Spiritual jurisdi­ction, and are [...], and Stewards of Gods Houshold.
  • 2. Temporal, in foro externo, jure gladii, and belong to the Ci­vil Magistrate, as he is Cu­stos & Vindex utriusque Tabulae.

Now for the first of these, I say further, that the Church has no Commission from Christ or his [Page 18] Apostles, or any practice of the Primitive Church, to punish any man, either

1. With loss of Livelihood, by Pe­cuniary Mulcts, or Confiscations.

2. Nor loss of Liberty by Im­prisonment.

3. Nor loss of Life by Capital punishment.

The saying is old, and true, (admitted by all sober Protestants) Dominium non fundatur in gratia. Pa­gans and Infidels have a good ti­tle to their Patrimonies, and a just propriety in their Estates real or Personal; to become Christians, neither gives them a new, nor con­firms their old title. So that if they turn Hereticks, or (which is worse) Infidels, they do not for­feit their livelihood (much less their Libertas in­astimabilis res est. Paul. c. 2. ad Edict. Leg. 106. Stat. de Reg. Juris. And again, Infinita aesti­matio est liber­tatis. Id. l. 13. ad Plantiam, F. de R. Juris. l. 176. Sec▪ fi­nali. liberty or life) the Church may ( per modum paenae) take away what (on condition) they gave, if [Page 19] that condition be not made good. Our admission into the Church by Baptism, gives us Communion with the Church, and a right to all those Spiritual advantages for Heaven, which are dispensed in it (as hearing the Word, receiving the Sacrament, Absolution upon a serious and real penitence, &c.) these the Church gave, and (for heresie or impiety) may take away, but no more. If any Bishop or Church-Officers have any further power (as to imprison, lay Pecu­niary Mulcts, &c▪) this they have ex Indulgentiâ Principum, not from Christ, but the Civil Power of the Commonwealth where they live.

2. This being so, I observe further, that the persons we now speak of (as Papists, Schismaticks, and Sectaries) dissenting from the Established Religion, need no to­leration or grant of Impunity, as [Page 20] to Church-Censures, or Spiritual pu­nishments; as not being liable, or any way obnoxious to them. For the Church having no power to punish any save those of her own Body, (by Penance, Excommuni­cation, &c.) of which the persons we now speak, are not (as neither acknowledging the Churches power, nor living in Communion with her) it follows, that as she hath no power to punish them (they not being Members of her Body) so they have no need of a Toleration, or Act of Impunity, as to Ecclesi­astical punishments, to which (on the supposition now made) they are not obnoxious. And if the Church should Excommunicate them, it were but (at least) in their opinion, Brutum fulmen, and vanae, & sine viribus Irae. they would va­lue the Excommunication of our Church, no more than we value [Page 21] theirs, that is, nothing at all.

3. So then, the Impunity this Toleration (we nowspeak of) must give, is from temporal punish­ments inflicted by the Civil Ma­gistrate. Now before we can de­termine what Impunity such a Magistrate may give to men of a false Religion (for so all differing from that publickly Established, are in this case presumed, and sup­posed to be) we must consider the nature and condition of the Reli­gions or Opinions to be tolerated. And here I conceive,

1. That no State should or will grant a toleration to any Religion, which contains any thing in it which may be destructive to the Civil peace and safety of it self. Salus By [ Populus] I understand the whole Body Politick, Head and Members, King and People; and not the People only in opposition to the King. Appellatione populi, viri & cives significan­tur connumeratis Patriciis & Senatoribus. Instit. de Jure Nat. Gentium & Civili. L. Lex est. Populi, is (in all States) Su­prema [Page 22] Lex, the Supreme Law, and utmost end of all Authority. This publick safety, may and must be se­cured, though (if there be no other way) with the ruin of Particu­lars. For as in the Body Natural, if Fingers or Toes, Legs or Arms, &c. are so corrupted and gan­grened that they indanger the whole body, Ense recidantur, &c. they are not to be tolerated, but torn off. So in the Body Politick, or Commonweal, if any persons maintain such a Religion as is not consistent with the publick safety, as it were imprudence in the Ma­gistrate to grant, so it were irratio­nal for them to ask or expect a To­leration. For why should any power tolerate that which will ruin it self? Upon this account it will be hard to tolerate

1. Such Anabaptists as deny all Magistracy (for such there have [Page 23] been, and are) for why should any Prince own and protect them as subjects, who will not obey, or own him as their Prince?

2. Such as make it a part of their Religion, to believe all Oaths unlawful, and so will take none, (for such there are, whether really or in pretence I know not) for on this account they will refuse all Oaths of Allegiance. And then what tye or obligation can the Prince lay upon them, whereby he may be secured of their Loyal­ty? And then why should a Prince secure them (by a Toleration of Impunity) who will not secure him of their Loyalty.

3. Such (especially if their number be considerable) as by the Principles of their Religion, think all War unlawful (as being contra­dictory to the charity of the Go­spel) and by consequence must de­ny [Page 24] their Prince any Personal assist­ance in his Wars, though he and his Kingdom be in the utmost ha­zard and necessity. For if Subjects be once of this opinion (that they will not fight for their King and Country) the Prince is left to be inevitably ruined by the next In­vader: It being an easie matter to ruin that Prince whose Subjects will not fight for his preserva­tion.

4. Such, who (although they allow and will take an Oath of Allegiance, yet (by the Princi­ples of their Religion acknow­ledg a power which can Vid. Gratian. Gaen. 2, 3, 4. Causa. 16. Quest. 6. Inno­cent. Part. 5. Cap. ultimo, &c. ab­solve them from that Oath, and arm them against their Prin­ce, depose him, and dispose of his Kingdom, nay of all the Kingdoms of the world. For in such a case the Prince can ne­ver be secure of their Loyalty to [Page 25] him, or the publick safety against them. This the Papists do, as ap­pears by General Vid. Concil. Late­ran. sub Innocent. 3. Can. 3. de Haereticis, apud Petr. Crabb. Tom. 2. pag 948. Col. 1. & Concil. Trident. Seyalt. 25. de Reformation. cap. 19. & cap. 20. ubi [...] sic habet. Cogantur om­nes Principes Catholici conservare omnia sancita quibus immunias Ecclesi­astica declara Coun­cils of their own (and the most Authentique they have) and amongst their greatest Authors (not to trouble you, or my self with any more) Bellarminus de Ro­mano Pontisic. lib. 5. cap. 6. &c. Bellar­mine tells us, Non potest Pa­pa ut Papa, Ordinarie Prin­cipes deponere ….. tamen po­test mutare regna, & vim aufer­re, & alteri conferre, tanquam summus Princeps Spiritualis, si id necessarium sit ad animarum salutem. What safety can a Prince have, who has such peo­ple for his Subjects, who acknow­ledg the Pope to be Summus Prin­ceps, above all Kings, The supreme Power of this Nation by Act of Par­liament, command all to come to Common-Prayers (and so all did, Papists and Protestants till 11 o Eliz.) The Pope, Julius 5. by his Bull forbids it. The Papists obey him, not the Act of Parliament. (so that they are indeed not absolute or [Page 26] supreme, but feudatory Princes) and that so far above them, that they may dispose of, and give a­way their Kingdoms, Si id necessa­rium sit ad animarum salutem. Now he himself being Judge of this ne­cessity (if he had power) he can never want a pretence to depose any King; especially if he be a Protestant, and so (with them) an Heretick. Nay, if he be no He­retick, yet he can depose him for much less faults; so Gratia. Can. Alius 3. Lu­cet. 6. Can. 16. Gratian tells us, that Pope Zachary deposed the King of France, Non tam pro suis iniquitatibus, quam pro eo, quod tantae potestati esset inutilis. Nor is this a singular example, for he there adds, Quod etiam ex authoritate fre­quenti agit sancta Ecclesia. And if this Summus Princeps decree the depo­sition of any King, you may be sure he is to be obeyed. So Pope Stephen tells us, (in the same Gra­tian) [Page 27] Gratian. Can. Nulli. 5. Dist. 19. Nulli fas est, vel velle, vel posse transgredi Apostolicae sedis prae­cepta, & c. Nor must we wonder at this; for Pope Agatho tells us, that the Papal Sanctions must irre­fragably be obeyed, seeing (with them) the Popes Decretals pass for Gratian▪ Can. in Ca­nonicis 6 Di­stinct. 19. & Canon. E­nim verò 4. Ibidem. Canonical Scriptures, and that in the strictest sense of the word Ca­nonical; as if St. Peter himself had writ them: Sic omnes Apostolicae se­dis sanctiones accipiendae sunt, Idem ibi­dem Can. sic omnes 2. & Juv. Part. 4. cap. 238. tan­quam Ipsius Divini Petri voce fir­matae. And indeed, the Excom­municating of Queen Elizabeth, and encouraging the Spaniard to take possession of her Kingdom, the murdering of great Navarre in France (approved by the Pope in consistory) and the Powder-Plot In England, are sad Examples of this truth; too evident to be false, and too fresh to be forgotten.

'Tis true, Bellarmine saith, that [Page 28] the Pope cannot dispose of Tem­poral Kingdoms Directè and Ordi­nariè, but only indirectè ( in ordine ad spiritualia) and extraordinarie: which is no solution, but a plain concession of what we object. For if he may do it extraordinariè and Indirectè, then 'tis evident he may do it (in their opinion) and then how can a King be secured against the rebellion of such Subjects, and his own deposition, that one side of the distinction cannot do it, so long as the other may? Whether it be done directè or indirectè, 'tis all one, he is deposed. If my ene­my should tell me he could not run me thorough with the one end of his Sword (meaning the Hilt) what security were that to me, when he may do it with the point? If I am kill'd, 'tis no mat­ter which end of the Sword did it. Sure I am, as my enemy (if he [Page 29] have a mind to kill me) will make use of the point of his Sword, so the Pope well knows which side of the distinction to make use of when he has a mind to do mis­chief.

I do not speak this against all Papists, as if none of them could be good Subjects, (for I both be­lieve and know the contrary) but

1. I do not see how the Jesuits and those who believe and own their Principles (who are indeed the Puritans of the Roman Church) can be good Subjects to a Prote­stant Prince, or capable of a To­leration, without indangering the publick peace and safety of the Commonweal.

2. And that others are good subjects (as I know some are) it is to be imputed more to their piety and personal goodness, than the principles of their Religion, di­vers [Page 30] of which (as might easily and evidently appear) are no good dis­positions to Loyalty.

2. And as no King (in pru­dence) can give a Toleration to such Religions and ways of Wor­ship as are destructive to the Civil State and publick peace of the Commonwealth; so pari passu, (and for the same reasons) he can­not tolerate such as are destructive of the Ecclesiastical state or peace of the Vid. Constit. Impp. Honorii & Theod. in Append. Cod. Theod. Theod. pag. 31. contra Donati­stas, &c. & aliam Con­stit. ibid. pag. 38. ubi [...]idem Imperatores in Donatistas, Pacis &. Ecclesiae turbatores senten­tiâ capitali Vindicant. Et Cod. Theodosii. L. si quis. 31. de Episco­pis. Church; at least so far as they are so, and without such restrictions and qualifications, as may rationally secure the Esta­blished way of Worship: For otherwise he should be cruel to the true, while (by a Toleration) he is kind to a false Religion.

3. If any Religion, or way of Worship, approve and practise [Page 31] any thing against the Law of Na­ture, (as Blasphemy, Theft, Per­jury, Adultery, &c.) such as all sober men acknowledg to be crimes, and are destructive, or evi­dently dangerous to the well-being of humane Society; I suppose no prudent Prince should give a To­leration to such. Sure I am Seneca tells us, that no Nation ever did grant impunity to such Impieties. Seneca de Beneficiis, lib. 3. cap. 6. num. 27. pag. 38. in Edit. Just. Lipsii. H. Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 2. cap. 20. Sect. 50. pag. 345. In hoc consensimus (saith he) adver­sus omne maleficium datur actio, & ho­micidi, veneficii, parricidii, violatarum Religionum, aliubi & aliubi diversa poena est; sed ubique aliqua. But here it must be observed, that the crimes I now speak of, (to which I would have no impunity or toleration granted) must

1. Be such as are clearly and certainly crimes against the Law of Nature, so that all sober men ge­nerally know, and acknowledg [Page 32] them to be such. For if it be du­bious whether they be crimes or no, or how far, or what measure of malice is in them, then it will be very hard to punish them. For it will seem irrational, and (indeed) unjust to inflict a certain punish­ment, for a dubious and uncertain crime. Certa culpae cognitio, must always (in justice) be antecedent to the Inflictio poenae. If I hang a man, I am sure he has ( per modum paenae) lost his life, and therefore ( per modum culpae) I should be sure of the crime for which I hang him; Seeing it cannot be just to inflict certain death for an uncertain crime.

2. They must not only be con­fess'd Crimes (to which I now de­ny Toleration) but also such as are dangerous, and noxious to humane Society. For as Lipsius in locum Sene­cae praedi­ctum num. 27. pag. 47. Lipsus (on that place of Seneca) well observes: [Page 33] Naturae quodam instinctu, ea male­ficia coercent homines & puniunt, quae societatem convellunt. For there are many crimes against the Law of Nature, and Dictates of Right Rea­son (as Ingratitude, Lying, breach of Promise, &c. which yet in al­most all Nations, have had a To­leration and impunity, and have been left Odio hominum, & vindictae Deorum. So Seneca (in the same place) speaks of Ingratitude… Exceptâ Macedonum gente, non est in ullâ, data adversus ingratum actio; magnum (que) hoc argumentum dandum non fuisse. Hoc frequentissimum crimen nusquam punitur, ubique improbatur. Neque tamen absolvimus ingratum, sed cum Difficilis esset incertae rei aesti­matio, tantum odio hominum damna­vimus, & inter ea relinquimus, quae ad Vindices Deos remittimus. Where you see, the reason why Ingrati­tude (though certainly a crime a­gainst [Page 34] the Law of Nature) was not punished, but tolerated… Quia difficilis erat incertae rei aestimatio. It was very hard to know when a man was ingrateful, and the mea­sure of his ingratitude, and there­fore hard to punish it. All just punishments consisting in a pro­portion between the sin and the suffering of the person punished, which cannot possibly be known, unless the nature and measure of the crime be first known. 'Tis true ( in thesi) that all know and confess Ingratitude is a great crime, but ( in Hypothesi) whether Titius be ingrateful to Sempronius, and how far, 'tis hard (if not impossi­ble) to know; seeing that cannot be known, unless all the Courte­sies and injuries which each have done to other mutually, could certainly be (as indeed they can­not be) comprehended. By the way, [Page 35] when Seneca saith, that in nullâ (ex­cepta Macedonum) gente, adversus in­gratum dabatur Actio, and so not in Rome; he speaks this of his own time. For afterwards Ingratitude (by the Institut. de Capitis dimi­nut. L. Maxi­ma. Roman Law) was high­ly punished, even with Maxima capitis Diminutio, by which the in­grateful person & civitatem & li­bertatem amisit.

4. Upon these grounds some Sects amongst us, can have little reason to expect (and the Magi­strate as little to grant) a tolerati­on or impunity. As,

1. Adamites (such there were) who held a promiscuous use of women.

2. Quakers who give no civil respect to any, no not the Magi­strate, but curse and rail, and damn all but their own Disciples. These Crimes being evidently against nature, and inconsistent with hu­mane [Page 36] (much more with Christian) Society, are not to be tolerated, but severely punished. It were vain to reason or dispute with such men, who have cast off all civili­ty, and even humanity it self; Ar­gumentum baculinum, is the fittest means▪ (if not to convert, yet) to keep them within some bounds of reason and civility, that they may not make others worse, if they will not be better themselves.

5. These things considered (which relate to matter of fact, and the actions of persons pro­fessing a false Religion) we come now to the main Query, con­cerning matter of Faith and false Opinions: Query. Whether men of a false faith and heretical opinions, may be tolerated, and have a grant of Impunity, or whether the Ma­gistrate is to punish such erring persons? (suppose Sectaries, Pa­pists, [Page 37] Socinians, &c. and then how far, how long, with what punishments, and what measure and degrees of them he is to do it? for instance, Whether he may pu­nish them,

1. In their Purse only, by Pecu­niary Mulcts, taking away some part, or all their Livelihood.

2. Or in their persons too, ta­king away either,

1. Their liberty by imprisonment.

2. Or their City (the jus Civita­tis) by Banishment.

3. Or their Life, by Capital punishments, as the Donatists and Circumcellians of old, and they of Rome (of late) use those whom commonly they miscall Hereticks, consuming those to ashes whom they cannot confute otherwise than with Fire and Faggot; a way not only incongruous, but impi­ous and barbarous, whereby they [Page 38] may make men coals and cinders, but not Christians. I say the Que­ry is, (supposing those of the Re­ligion differing from that establi­shed, to be otherwise peaceable and good Subjects, neither rebelli­ously or seditiously disturbing the publick peace, nor injuriously wronging their neighbour, for in these cases it is irrational for them to expect, or the Magistrate to grant impunity, Whether the Ma­gistrate may justly grant them a Toleration of their Opinions and Religion (though at least supposed false) or compell them by punish­ments to the Established way of Worship, which is supposed true and Orthodox?

In answer to this, Answer. though I shall not say, that it is absolute­ly unlawful for the Civil Magi­strate (in this case) to use tempo­ral, and compulsory, punishments, [Page 39] yet thus much (giving my reasons for it) I think I may safely and tru­ly say, that it will be very difficult and dangerous for him to do it. My reasons are,

1. Because we find no Warrant for it in the Gospel; there is nei­ther any precept or practice of our Saviour, or his Apostles, to com­pell any to be Christians. The means they used, either to con­vert Pagans, or continue and con­firm Christians, were constant Preaching, and a rational pressing that truth to others, which they had received from God, and belie­ved themselves, a prudent and meek disputing, and reasoning men out of their Errors, a pious life and patient suffering for the truth they Preached: Verbo & ex­emplo agebant, non gladio, it was their Christian patience, not any coa­ctive violence which converted [Page 40] the world, it was dying them­selves, not killing others which planted and propagated the Go­spel; Sanguis Martyrum semen Eccle­siae, it was the blood of the Mar­tyrs, not of murdered Hereticks, which made the field of the Church so fruitful; and by what authority we should do that now, which they thought not fit to do then, I know not. Certainly, as they best knew what means were most proportionable, and congru­ous both for the plantation and propagation of the Gospel, so we have reason to believe that those mediums they made use of, were such; and (on the other side) we may rationally conclude, that had there been any other means as con­gruous and conducible to the end they aimed at, as those they used, they would not have omitted them. Seeing then neither Christ [Page 41] nor his Apostles ever commanded, or (by their example or practice) commended violence, or any co­active means to make or confirm Christians, we have great reason to believe, that they conceived such means not congruous; and if so, why should any think otherwise? Object. It is He [...]. Altin­gius Problem. Theolog Part 2. Probl. 20. pag 337. Williel. Zep­peru Legum Mosaicarum Forens. Lib 4. cap. 5. p. 258. reply'd to this, that there are is Scripture examples of coactive punishments; Answ. so Paul was struck to the ground, and punished with blindness, Ananias and Sapphi [...]a with death, Elymas the Sorcerer with blindness, &c.

But these Instances (though ur­ged by great men) are imperti­nent, as to this case we now speak of: For,

1. When Paul was so punish­ed, he was no Christian, (for he was afterwards Baptized) where­as we now speak of different opi­nions, [Page 42] and ways of Worship a­mongst Christians.

2. He was persecuting the Church with imprisonments and death, in which case we grant violent and coactive means may be used by the Magistrate, to In such ca­ses the Magi­strate is, (and▪ ought to be) Nutritius Ec­clesiae, and Defensor▪ fidei, and may use the Sword a­gainst those who abuse it against the Church.preserve the Church which such Persecutors would destroy.

3. The Question is, What man (the Magistrate Civil or Ecclesia­stical) may do Jur [...] ordinario, whe­ther he may punish Heresie or In­fidelity with loss of Livelihood, Liberty, or Life? Not what God may do, Pro dominio, & jure suo absoluto, extraordinarie? we deny not but God (who is the searcher and judg of our hearts, who knows perfectly our most secret sins, and inmost iniquities, together with the nature, measure, and aggrava­tions of them) may punish Here­sie, Infidelity, or any other sin, how [Page 43] and when he will; so he punish­ed Ananias and Sapphira with death: But we deny that man (the Ma­gistrate) can do so, Jure Ordinario. It is true, it was our Saviour which punished Paul, Act. 9. 5. I am Jesus whom thou persecutest; and so it may seem, that we have our Saviour's exam­ple for coactive punishments. But then we must consider our Savi­our; 1. In the state of Humility, while he was here: 2. In the state of Glory after his Ascension. The Punishment of St. Paul was an ex­traordinary Act of our Saviour af­ter his Ascension, when he was in the state of Glory, and so can be no good warrant or foundation of an Ordinary Power and Jurisdiction in any man here to do the like. For certainly there is little Logick in this consequent, Our glorified Savi­our by his absolute power, extraordi­narily punished Paul with blindness: [Page 44] Ergo, The Magistrate here may ordi­narily do it. The thing we deny, is, that our Saviour while he was here (in the state of Humility) hath left us any precept or example for coactive punishments: He tells us, that his Kingdom was not of this world; Joh. 18. 36. it was not a Temporal, but Spiritual Kingdom, and so the Ad­ministration of Justice in it, was not by Temporal, but Spiritual pu­nishments. His too zealous Disci­ples would have had fire call'd for from Heaven, &c. but he tells them that he came not to destroy, or take away any mans life, but to save it; and I believe he did not delegate that power to his Apo­stles, (not to Peter) which he nei­ther did, nor had Commission to use himself. 4. For the Examples of Ananias and Sapphira, and Elimas, they are as impertinent to the pur­pose for which they bring them, as that of Paul: For,

[Page 45] 1. They were punished for matter of fact, not of faith or opi­nion concerning Religion; Ananias and Sapphira for Sacriledg, and rob­bing God and his Church of the Consecrated things, and Elimas for perverting by Sorceries, and sedu­cing Christians; (as by the Text appears) in which cases we do not plead for impunity.

2. Their punishment was ex­traordinary, and miraculous from the hand of Heaven, not of any man or Magistrate. This is clear in the death of Ananias; Act. 5. 3, 4, 5.and tho Peter may seem to have had a hand in Sapphira's death, yet those words ( vers. 6.) are praedicentis, non infligentis poenam, he only foretells her, that the hand of God (not his) would be upon her. And so it was too with Paul and Elimas, The hand of the Lord shall be upon thee, Act. 13. 11. &c. 'Tis the hand of the Lord (not [Page 46] his) that made him blind; Paul (as a Prophet) foretold, what God (as a just Judg) did. However, 'tis (beyond dispute) evident, that those punishments of Ananias and Elimas were Extraordinary and Miraculous; and therefore cannot possibly be any just foundation of an ordinary jurisdiction. But too much of this, for (to me) these examples seem al­together impertinent, and though often urged, yet to little purpose, seeing they prove nothing, save that (sure) they wanted better ar­guments, who bring such bad ones as these. Object. 2.

2. It is objected by Hen. Altingius Pro­blem. Theol. Part. 2. Problem. 29. Pag. 333. Will. Zepperus in Ex­plication. LL. Mosaic. Lib. 4. cap. 3. pag. 262. Calvin. in Luc. 14. 23. pag. 182. August. Epist. 50. ad Bonifacium, & alibi passim. many, and great men, that the Gospel does afford ex­amples of coactive and compulsory means used to bring men to the faith. They urge that Parable of the Marriage-feast ( Luk. [Page 47] 14. 23.) [...], &c. Com­pelle intrare, (as the vulgar Latin) ut impleatur Domus mea. On which words St. Augustine thus, Qui com­pellitur, quo non vult cogitur: sed cum intraverit, jam volens pascitur. Hence they infer, that it is (at least) Lawful to use coactive means in case of different Religi­ons, to compell men to the best.

But in answer to this instance, Answer. which is so much urged by all those who are against Toleration, I say,

1. Locus parabolicus non est argu­mentativus, Parables are no proofs, nor a fit foundation for conclu­ding Arguments to be built upon.

2. But however it is true, what Grotius observes, that [...] there signifies not any external violence or coaction, but only Vid. Gro [...] ­um in Luc. 14. 2, 3. & de Jure Belli, Lib. 2. cap. 20. Sect. 48. pag. 345. to the same purpose, Dr. Hammond's Diodati, the Assembly-Divines, &c. on Luc. 14. 23. Instanti­am [Page 48] vocantis, the instance and im­portunity of the Call. Christo enim eo modo convivae cogi solent, sed im­portuna flagitatione. So Theophylact expounds the place, who tells us, that although [...], that all men do voluntarily believe, yet the Holy Ghost saith, [...], not only call, but compell; not that he means any coaction (properly so call'd) or violence, [...] Theophyl. in Luc. 14. 23. Pag. 438. c. [...], &c. Sed ut sciamus magnae Vir­tutis Dei esse, Gentes credidisse. And then concludes, [...] [...], &c. Admir abilemtran­slationem significare volens, necessitatem nominavit. And 'tis evident that the word, [ [...]] many times sig­nifies no more, but an earnest and prevailing importunity, even in Scripture it So Mat. 14. 22. Mark 6. 45. Gal. 11. 14. Vid. Grot. loco supra Citato. self.

3. It is certain and confessed, [Page 49] that in this Parable the Gentiles are meant by those who are said to be compell'd; Vide Theophy­lactum in loc. &c and yet neither St. Augustine (who first urged this passage against the Donatists and Circumcellians) nor any that I know since, affirm Pagans ought to be compell'd to Christianity; and so they quite mistake the meaning of the place (who urge it against To­leration) and the business they bring it for.

2. Besides this, [that there is no example or precept of Christ, Reas. 2. or his Apostles, that they did, or we should use violence, or any coactive means, to make, or con­firm Christians] there are several express places in the Gospel which strongly perswade the contrary; that no violence or coaction is, or ought to be used; so when some of our Saviours Disciples did Apo­statize [Page 50] and forsake him, he mild­ly asks the Twelve, Joh. 6. 6, 7▪ Will ye also go away? He neither recalls those who had forsaken him, nor con­firms those who stayed, by threa­tening loss of Livelihood, Li­berty, or Life; but faith only, Will ye also go away? To go or stay, was res spontaneae voluntatis, non coactae necessitatis; it was a thing of choice, not coaction, which was to make or continue them Christians. Ostendit se ne velle qui­dem discipulos nisi volentes, (faith ( a) Grotius;) Grotius in Joh. 6. 67. in the Constitutions of Clemens (an ancient Book, though not of (lemens his compiling) [...], &c. Liberam reliquit homi­nibus arbitrii potestatem, non morte temporali eos puniens, sed in altero sae­culo ad reddendam rationem eos vocans. And again, Athanasius Epistolâ ad Solitariam Vitam a­gentes. ( b) [...], &c. Domi­nus non cogens, sed libertatem suam voluntati permittens, dicebat quidem [Page 51] vulgo omnibus, si quis vult venire post me. Apostolis vero, numquid & vos abire vultis? And the Greek Fa­ther thus, Chrysost. in Joh. 6. 67. Idem habet Cyprian. Epist. 55. ( c) [...], &c. In­terrogat, an & ipsi velint discedere? quod omnem est amoventis vim & ne­cessitatem. Lastly, (as to punish­ing of Hereticks with death) our Saviour seems to resolve the case (in express terms) that they ought not so to suffer death, though they were Hereticks. It is in the Parable of the Mat. 13. 28, 29. Tares, where he tells the servants, that they must suffer the tares to grow with the wheat (Hereticks with Vers. 38. Ca­tholicks) till the Harvest (the Vers. 39. end of the world) and he gives the reason of it, Lest the wheat be in­dangered by the extirpation of the tares. How far the Romish Inquisi­tors, (and others who punish He­reticks with death) fulfill or fol­low this advice, let the world [Page 52] judg. Sure I am, this precept, [ Let them grow together till the har­vest] and their practice, are con­tradictory. He that consumes He­reticks with fire and faggot, does not let them grow and continue with Catholicks; Unless an abso­lute eradication of the Tares be a continuation of them with the Wheat, which would be an expo­sition like that in the Gloss of the Canon-Law Glossa ad▪ Cap. Statui­mus 4. Di­stinct. 4. apud Gratianum. Statuimus, (i. e.) abrogamus. When Theophylact had told us that by Tares, Hereticks were meant, he adds, [...], Theophylact. in Mat. 13. pag. 77. A. B. &c. Quae permittuntur esse usque in consummationem saEculi: nam si exscinderemus & occideremus Haere­ticos, seditiones fierent & pugnae, & forte etiam multi fidelium in seditioni­bus perirent, &c.

3. Such compelling punish­ments and coaction is not, Reas. 3. cannot be a fit and congruous means to [Page 53] work faith and true Religion in erring persons. That faith comes by hearing we read and know, but that men are or can be beaten into a belief of Truth we read not. Nova lex se non vindicat ultore gladio, (saith Tertullian) and the Fathers in the Council of Toledo, Concil. Toletanum 4. cap. 5. Statuit sancta Synodus nemini ad credendum vim inferre. And hence Gratian in­fers, Gratian. cap. de Jud. 5. Dist. 45. Ergo non vi­sed leberâ ac­btrii facultate ut convertantur, sua­dendi sunt, non impellendi. Admonen­di sunt, non cogendi, (saith the Glossa ad dictum cap. 5. de Jud. Dist. 45. Gloss there) to beget faith, Argu­mento opus est, non baculo. Bonds and Imprisonment may captivate the body, but not the understan­ding; Fire and Faggot may con­sume, but not convert an Here­tick. Religion is seated in the Un­derstanding and Will, things un­capable of force, or coaction. Plun­derings, Sequestrations and Impri­sonments [Page 54] may beget an outward compliance, and hypocrisie, not true and unfeigned Piety. To put me in Prison is a poor argument to prove that I am in an error, and we may justly suspect he wants better, who useth that.

By such means men are rather confirmed in their opinions than confuted, as is evident in the Christians of the Primitive times, when Christianity thrived, and Christians were multiplied by persecution; so that the Martyr­ing many made more. The Church (in this) like old Rome in the Poet:

Per damna, per caedes ab ipso
Ducit opes, animumque ferro.

He that suffers persecution, and boldly dies for his Religion and Opinions, (be they what they will, true or false) is (by his par­ty) esteemed a Martyr, not a Ma­lefactor; [Page 55] and such suffering is so far from a confutation, that it is indeed a great confirmation of them in their opinions; Crescit ad­versis fides, and a motive to make others imbrace them. The Massacre in France made more Protestants in one night, than all Calvin's Works have done since their first publication, And Erasmus observes, that a Carmelite Frier (who was imploy­ed to inquire after, and punish Hereticks) did by his Cruelty and Severities, increase the number of those he persecuted, Ubicun (que) sae­vitiam exercuit Carmelita (saith E­rasmus) ibi diceres factam fuisse Hae­rese [...]n sementem. So disproportion­able was the means he used to the end he aimed at, that whiles he murdered, he multiplied Here­ticks, and made more, even by those Mediums which he used to [Page 56] leave none. And as it was then, so it may be still; a prudent To­leration may prove a far more effectual means for the conversi­on of erring Christians, than the Serverities of a Persecution.

4. In all just punishments, Reas. 4. as the best Lawyers truly tell us, Grotius de Jure Belli, l. 2. cap. 20. Sect. 9. Salmanus de Arianis. there must be two things: 1. Cog­nitio culpae. 2. Aestimatio poenae, Haeretici sunt, sed non scien­tes; apud nos sunt haeretici, apud se non sunt; veritas apud nos est, sed illi apud so esse Praesumunt. Errant ergo, sed bono animo errant; non odio, sed affe­ctu Dei hono­rare se domi­num creden­tes. Et quali­ter pro hoc ipso falsae opini­onis errore in die judicii pu­niendi sunt, [...]c­mo potest scire nisi judex, &c. the crime to be punished, (together with the magnitude and measure of it, the degrees of the malice of it in it self, and the mischief it does to others) must of necessity be certainly known, else it can­not justly be punished, for the ju­stice of punishments consisting in a proportion between the crime and punishment, he that would justly proportion this to that, must first know the crime, and the mea­sure of the malice contained in it, the mischief done by it, else 'tis [Page 57] impossible he should proportion a just punishment for it. Now I con­ceive it very difficult, if not im­possible, for any man certainly to know how far Erroneous opinions in Religion, or Herefies, (as they call them) are sinful. For,

1. No Heresie, or erroneous opinion can be sinful, unless it be voluntary. That of Saint Augu­stine, is an universally and justly received principle; Peccatum non est peccatum, nisi sit voluntarium: There is no malice in the mind or will unless it be voluntary. But now how far the Errors of Titius and Sempronius are voluntary, whe­ther they proceed from weakness or wilfulness; and what degree of weakness or wilfulness they have, none (I believe) does, or can know (without Divine Revelation) but he that knows the heart, and there­fore none (but he) can justly pu­nish [Page 58] such Errors, because not knowingly; and this is the reason which Seneca de Beneficiis, 1. 3. cap. 7. Seneca gives, why Ingra­titude was not punishable by any Law in his time, Quia difficilis e­rat Incertae rei aestimatio, it was (to them) so difficult to know the measure and degrees of Ingrati­tude, that they did not dare to pu­nish it, but left it, Odio hominum & vindictae Deorum, who only knew the measure of the fault, and so the means justly to punish it, for although (in Thesi) all men by the light of Natural Reason knew, and confest Ingratitude to be a fault, yet (in Hypothesi) how far this, or that man (in particular) is guilty of that fault, is very difficult, if not impossible to be known by any, save him who knows the heart.

2. It is a known and received truth by all Lawyers and Divines generally, that no positive Law of [Page 59] God or man does, or can bind us, without a sufficient promulgati­on; such a sufficient Promulgation being necessary to the obligation of all positive Laws. But now, when the positive truths of the Gospel are sufficiently revealed and romulgated to Titius and Sempronius (to this and that parti­cular person) is difficult, if not im­possible for any man to know, un­less he could know the divers abi­lities and capacities of those per­sons to whom those Truths are published. For as those Pagans to whom the Gospel was never revealed (as to many Nations it never was) are no way under the obligation of it, nor any way lya­ble to sin, or punishment for not believing it (whence that saying of Augustine speaking of the Gen­tiles, Augustinus. Veniam habebunt propter Infi­delitatem, damnabuntur propter pec­cata [Page 60] contra naturam. So amongst those to whom it has been reveal­ed, there is a great difference in respect of the sufficiency or insuf­ficiency of its promulgation; for it may be a sufficient promulgation to one, which (their capacities con­sidered) is not to another, and so the error of one be a crime, when the other, tho holding the same opinion, is innocent. And theere­fore to persecute and punish men with loss of Livelihood, Liberty, or Life, for Opinions in Religion only (when we cannot know whe­ther, or how far they are crimes;) to consume diffenting Brethren with Fire and Faggot, to make a Coal of a Christian, and certainly kill him for an uncertain crime, this is that which none should, and it were to be wished that no Chri­stian wo'd do. It is (to this purpose) well observed by Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 2. cap. 20. Sect. 50. Grotius, that in [Page 61] the Jewish Religion) which was established (in some cases) by Pe­nal Sanctions, and Coactive pu­nishments) although the Sadduces deny'd the Resurrection, and (in that) were judged to be (as indeed they were) erroneous, yet they were not punished for it. Nun­quam eos poenis subdiderunt (faith Grotius) and he conceives the rea­son to be that we now speak of, (that is, want of clear revelation, or sufficient promulgation) Dogma resurrectionis verissimum illud quidem, sed in lege judaicâ non nisi obscurè, & sub verborum aut rerum involucris traditum. And on this ground I think many thousand poor Souls in Spain and Italy (who by Priests, and Parents, and Governours, are kept in an invincible ignorance of the Gospel) innocently disbelieve, or are ignorant of many Gospel­truths, which to us (who have a [Page 62] greater measure of Revelation) would be Criminal and dam­nable.

5. Upon this ground, Reas. 5. I am ab­solutely against punishing See many Reasons for this in the Lord Faulk­land's Reply, pag. 224, 225, &c. He­reticks with death, it being uncer­tain who are really such: For to kill a man for an Heretick, before I can tell whether he be so or no, is certainly a temerarious act, which may argue some zeal, but little Justice in him that does it. For further evidencing of this, I say,

1. That 'tis not yet Vid. August. de Haeresibus in Praefat. pag. 32. Edit. in 80. agreed a­mongst Divines who are formally Hereticks, and to agree of the pu­nishment (and that Capital) be­fore there be a constat for the crime, is a strange piece of justice.

2. Aquin. 2. 2. Quest. 11. Art. 2. & Commentat. ejus ibidem. Filiucius. Tra­ctat. 22. cap. 6. Sect. 152. San. lib. 2. cap. 7. Azorius. lib. 8. cap. 9, &c. Some would have the for­mality of Herefie to consist in per­tinacy, or contumacy, out of St. Au­gustine, who tells us, Qui in Ecclesiâ [Page 63] pravum quod sapiunt, si correcti non sa­piunt, sed resistunt Contumaciter Haere­tici sunt. So St. Augustin. de Civitat. Dei, lib. 8. cap. 51. & de Origine Animae, cap. 15. Augustine, and Ju­stinian to the same effect, though in other words, L. Nullus, 2. Cod. Just. de Summa Trinitat vid. Grotium in Tit. 3. 10. Haeresis est ob­stinatioris animi dementia. Now See­ing pertinacy is an internal thing, and such a [...] and constituti­on of the Soul, as none but God does, or can know; it were but just to stay the execution of Here­ticks, till they be certain what is Heresie. Constet de culpâ priusquam irrogetur paena.

3. The Greek Vid. Theo­phyl. & Oe­cumenium in Tit. 3. 10▪ Scholia (on that of Tit. 3. 10.) require to an Here­tick that he be [...] self-condemned, incurable, incorrigible; but none of these are within the compass of humane cognizance; for who can tell what Heretick is self-condemned, incorrigi­ble, or incurable? and if they cannot, why should they inflict a certain [Page 64] for an uncertain crime? Certainly all sober men will and must confess, that Auto­catacrisie, Incurability, and Incorri­gibility depend on many spiritual and internal Circumstances, which are visible to no eye but that of Heaven▪ And therefore the pu­nishment of those Crimes should be left to that Judge, who alone can certainly know them. Si judi­cas, cognosce.

4. They Aquin. 2. 2; Quest. 11. Art. 2. in Conclus. Ita Filiucius, Azorius, Na­varzus, alii, &c. say an Heresie must be contra Articulos fidei. Now 'tis not agreed which, and how many are such, and what makes them so; those being Articles of Faith to some, which are not so to o­thers. Certainly it is but equal that men should not be hanged for Heresie against the Articles of our Faith, till it be resolved and known what Propositions are such. If a man commit Murder, [Page 65] Adultery, Theft, Perjury, if he be a Traytor to his Prince, See the Lord Viscount Faulkland's Reply in de­fence of his Tract of In­fallibility, pag. 217, 218, 219, &c. That 'tis not law­ful to put Hereticks to death. or a Robber on the High-ways, all men generally agree in this, that these are crimes, and accordingly pu­nish them. But 'tis not so with Heresie and Opinions in Religion, each party believes his own Posi­tions to be true, and condemns his adversary; so that what is He­resie to one, is Catholick verity to another. In short, it were to be wish'd, that men would not be so fierce to punish Heresie, till they be more certainly informed, and assured what it is.

But if Heresie cannot be cer­tainly known, Dub. why doth the Apo­stle say, Haereticum de vita. How can we avoid what we cannot cer­tainly know? why do we and all Christians punish Hereticks with Ecclesiastical Censures, Suspension, Penance; Excommunication, &c. Can [Page 66] we justly punish that crime (with any punishment Ecclesiastical or Civil) which we cannot certainly know?

To this Discourse (in short) I say, Answer. 1. That the old Monk mi­stook the Apostles meaning much, when he would have us believe that the Apostle there commands to punish the Heretick with death, and reads the Text thus, Haereti­cus de Vitâ, (i. e.) de vitâ tolle. He was beholden to the Latin Tran­slation for that Gloss (for sure he was not guilty of much Greek, though the Latin was little behol­ding to him for mangling it so barbarously.

2. He saith only [...] Glossae ve­teres in calce Cyrilli, [...] Evita. evita, turn away from such a one. Such are to be admonished first, ( Mat. 17. 16, 17.) and then (as Grotius in Tit 3. 10. vid. Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. 4. cap. 13. Lat. 14. Gr. pag. 94. A. B. Grotius well observes) Id sinon prosit, abrumpenda est cum eis om­nis [Page 67] familiarior consuetudo. Here is no­thing of punishment, 'tis only Evita, not Excommunica.

3. And if you ask how I can a­void an Heretick, if I cannot cer­tainly know what Heresie is? I answer (and I am beholden to Hierom▪ in Tit. 3. 10. pag. 209. Hierome, Grotius in Tit. 3. 10. Grotius, and Christ▪ Ju­stellus in Cod. Can. Eccles. Univers pag. 213. ad Can. 12. & ad Cod. Can Eccles. Africanae, pag. 103. Ju­stellus for it) that such an Heretick as the Apostle here speaks of might be known well enough, and pu­nished too.

4. That this may appear, I say, 1. That the word [...] here, is (as all know) vox mediae significati­onis, sometimes taken in a good, sometimes in a bad sense. The se­veral Sects of Philosophers were anciently called [...] Diogenes Laert, de vitis Philosoph in Proaemi [...] pag [...]3. Vid Hieron in Tit. 3. [...]0 pag. 209. [...]. Hippobotus writ a Book, de se­ctis seu Haeresibus Philosophorum, [...], &c. So Christianity is call­ed Act. 24. 5. & 14 Act. 28. 22, &c. Vid. Euseb. Hist. 1. 8. c. 29. pag. 253. [...]. [...], by St. Luke. [Page 68] And [...]. Act. 26. 5. (in the same Luke) signifies the Heresie or Sect of the Pharisees. On the other side, sometimes it is taken in the worse sense. See Gal. 5. 20. (Heresies are reckoned amongst the works of the flesh) Tit. 3. 10. and in this of Titus also. 2. Concerning Heresie in the worse sense, I believe it true which Grotius observes, Ubi Haere­sis in malam partem sumitur, significat idem quod [...], nisi quod illa gene­ralitas [...], voce [...] limita­tur ad eas partes quae fiunt ex opinio­num diversitate. Est ergo Haereticus hîc is, qui per opinionem de Ecclesiâ partes facit. He is an Heretick here in the Apostles sense, who not on­ly imbraces and maintains an erro­neous opinion, but makes a schism in the Church by separating him­self from the Communion, and drawing others after him, and so disturbs the publick peace. This [Page 69] is the opinion of Grotius, and Justel­lus, and (long before them) of St. Hierome, Hieronimus in Tit. 3. 10. pag. 209. C. Inter Haeresin & Schisma hoc interesse arbitramur, quod Haere­sis perversum Dogma habet, Schisma propter Episcopalem Dissensionem, ab Ecclesiâ Pariter separet. Quod qui­dem in principio aliquâ ex parte intelligi potest diversum; caeterum nullum Schis­ma non sibi aliquam confingit Haeresin, ut rectè ab Ecclesiâ recessisse videatur. In his opinion Heresie and Schism do both agree in this, that they make a rent in the Church ( Pari­ter separant) and so break the bond of Peace, and Ecclesiastical Uni­on. Whence it is, that the Apostle calls him [...], self-condem­ned, so we render it, amiss I believe, for the Apostle speaks of such an [...], as men may know, see, and be sensible of; [...], (i. e.) knowing that such an Heretick is subverted, be­ing [Page 70] [...], not self-condem­ned, for who is so, none does or can know; It being impossible for any man to know when an Here­tick maintains his Heresie against the light of his own Conscience, none being able to know that, save he who knows the heart: And there­fore I conceive that [...], here should be rendered, à seipso separatus, rather than à seipso con­demnatus. One that broaches an er­ror, and separates from the Church. This self-separation may be known, but self-condemnation cannot, and therefore the Apostle speaks not of this, but that. And I am the ra­ther induced to be of this opi­nion:

1. Because the word will ve­ry well bear this signification, for [...] (whence [...] comes) originally and properly signifies seccrno, separo, as well as judico: [Page 71] And (if Stephanus mistake not) to separate, is the prime signification of it.

2. Because I find Justellus, Christoph. Justellus & Grotius locis supra citatis. and Grotius of the same opinion. Gro­tius on these words, [...]; saith thus, Non dicit Excommunica, nam ipsi ul­tro Communionem deserunt. And St. Hierome more fully, Hieronimus in Tit. 3. 10. pag. 209. Col. 2. C. Propterea à seipso dicitur damnatus, quia fornicator, homicida, adulter, & caetera vitia, per sacerdotes de Ecclesia pelluntur: Hae­retici autem in semetipsos sententiam ferunt, suo arbitrio de Ecclesia rece­dentes, &c. So that (in St. Hierom's opinion) the Heretick Saint Paul speaks of, is such a one, who (be­sides his Erroneous opinion) is Schismatical, and not only makes a separation from the Church him­self, but seduces others, to the di­sturbance of the publick peace; which crime is visible, and confes­sedly [Page 72] punishable. However, tis certain, we may know, and avoid all familiarity with such a person, which is all which that Apostoli­cal Injunction [ Haereticum devita] signifies. And so much for that passage in St. Paul.

3. For the practice of the Pri­mitive Church in punishing those they call'd Hereticks with Excom­munications, I confess tis true, they did so. But then, 1. It will not hence follow, they did well and justly in doing so. Afacto ad jus, non sequitur argumentum. We cannot infer, Illos justè fecisse, ex eo quod fecerint. Nay he that reads the ancient Church-story, will find that even those ancient Christian Bishops (though otherwise good men) were oft times too precipi­tate and passionately hot, and fierce against their Brethren, and too free of their Anathematismes [Page 73] and Excommunications (although they were not then come to the now practised Popish cruelty of confuting Hereticks with fire and faggot.) As is evident in that fa­mous story of Pope Victor (to omit others) Excommunicating the Asi­an Bishops for their Observation of Easter, Euseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. though no Law of God or man obliged them to keep it other­wise than they then did. 2. Yet I grant, that the Church anciently did, and still justly may punish an erring person with Excommunication (altho they cannot be certain how far, and in what measure such persons err culpably;) and yet neither Church or State can justly punish such persons with loss of Liveli­hood, Liberty, or Life. So (I sup­pose) an Arian, or one who denies the Resurrection (though other­wise peaceable, neither separating himself, nor factiously seducing [Page 74] others) may justly be Excommu­nicated by the Church, because he does not keep the Conditions on which he had the Christian Communion. He that has the grant of any Communion (Sacred or Civil) upon Conditions, can­not be Excommunicated justly while he keeps those Conditions, but if he do not, then ( conditione non praestitâ) he may be justly Ex­communicate. Now Christians anciently; (and in ours, and all Churches) were received into the Communion of the Church, on Condition of believing the Creed (or Faith into which they were Baptized.) The Priest at Baptism asked, Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty? &c. The party Baptized answered (by himself, if he were of age, by his Sureties, if not) All this I stedfastly believe. Then the Priest demands further, [Page 75] Wilt thou be Baptized into this Faith? He answers, That is my desire, &c. Upon these Conditions he was received into the Church, and ad­mitted into the Christian Com­munion. Now if after Baptism, and this promise, he deny any of those Fundamental Articles into the belief of which he was Bap­tized (though otherwise he lived never so peaceably) he might just­ly be Excommunicated by the Church. 'Tis a good and true Rule in Morality (and Divinity too) Volenti non fit injuria, he desired, and had the Communion on that Condition; and when he rejects, and does not make good that con­dition, the Church may justly eject him by Excommunication, (tho they cannot distinctly know the measure and degrees of the malice that is in such error, it being im­possible for any man certainly to [Page 76] know whether he err out of weak­ness and infirmity, or malice and obstinacy.) And further, every such person may be call'd [...], (as the Tit. 3. 10. Apostle here, Iren. adver­sus Haereses, lib. 1. cap pag. 103. Eras. Cod. Can. Ecal. Uni­vers. Can. 144. Irenaeus and others after him call all Hereticks) not because they maintain an error against their Conscience, (for certainly many do not, and when any do, none can possibly know, but he who knows the heart) but because (as Nic. de Lyr. in Tit. 3. 10. Lyranus tells us) Fidem quam in baptismo recepit ut veram, nunc con­demnat ut falsam. He condemns that Faith now, (and so himself) which before he professed as true. So that he is said to condemn him­self, Non respectu judicis interni, (for he may at both those times, think he is in the right) but respectu professionis, & facti externi; he pro­fesses that as true at one time, which he himself condemns (as [Page 77] false) at another. And so the same person at several times, approving and condemning the same Do­ctrine, may (properly enough) be said to condemn himself, seeing he now disapproves and con­demns what before he approved. Lastly, (which is no little preju­dice against punishing for Opini­ons) in the Primitive and purer times of Christianity, we find no persecution for Religion (except by Pagans.) The Arians (amongst the Professors of Christianity) were the first who used it. So Athanas. Ep ad Solita­riam Vitam agentes O­perum Tom. 1. Athana­sius tells us, and Hu Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 2. cap. 20. Sect. ult. pag. 347. vide Hilarium O­rat. ad Con­stantium. Grotius observes it out of him, In Arianam haeresin acriter invehitur Athanasius, quod pri­ma in contradicentes usa esset judicum potestate, & quos non potuit verbis inducere, eos vi, plagis, verberibus (que) ad se pertrahere anniteretur. Such force and compulsion may be means for Mahomet, for a Pagan [Page 78] or Arian to promote Infidelity and Heresie, but not for a Christian.

Nec tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis Christus eget.

After them the Donatists (equal­ly guilty of Heresie and cruelty) persecuted the good Christians: And Optatus (for this very thing) denies them to be true Members of Christ's Church, Optat. Mi­levit. lib. 2. pag. 51. Edit. Casauboni. Neque enim Ec­clesia dici potest, quae cruentis morsibus pascitur, & sanctorum sanguine & carnibus opimatur, &c. For though these be the words of Parmenian the Donatist, objecting to the Or­thodox that they persecuted the Donatists, and therefore were not the true Church: Yet Optatus grants his Position to be true, that, Ecclesia dici non potest quae cruentis morsibus pascitur, &c. And retorts the argument against them, telling Parmenian:

1. That the Orthodox and true [Page 79] Church persecuted none: Optatus ibid. lib. 2 [...] pag. 54. Doce aliquem nostrum (saith Optatus) cui­quam insidiatum esse: quem à nobis persecutum esse, aut dicere possis, aut probare? the Orthodox Christians did no such thing, nor any way approved it then.

2. But the Donatists did: Optatus ibid. & pag. 55, 56. vide constir. Ho­norii & The­odos. Aug. ad Curtium P. P. in Appen. Cod. Theod. per. Jac. Sir­mondum, pag. 31. De sedibus suis multos fecistis extorres, cum conductâ manu venientes, Basilicas invasistis, multi ex numero vestro, per loca plurima cruentas operati sunt caedes, & tam atroces, ut de talibus fa­ctis, ab illius temporis judicibus relatio mitteretur, &c.

Thus the Arians and Donatists, and Donatist. species. vid. Optat & Au­gust. de Haeres. cap. 69. & Notas L,. Danaei Sect. 3. Pag. 212. Genus homi­num azreste, & famosissiun. audaciae, in alios immania facinora per­petrantes. Au­gust. ibid. Pag 208. Circumcellians (the worst sort of Donatists) and after them the Church of Rome hath (of all o­thers) been most guilty of this cru­elty; using, when they wanted better reasons, force, fire and fag­got, to consume whom they could not rationally convince. And in­deed [Page 80] those who are so fierce for persecution for Religion, have no better examples to follow than Pagans (in their Persecution of Christians) or Mahomet (establish­ing the Alcoran by the Sword) or Arians, Donatists and Circumcellians. Now how far it may be safe or honourable for any to follow such examples, let sober men judg. Sure I am, neither our Saviour nor his Apostles, nor the Primitive and Orthodox Christians for several ages, either used or commended force and coercive punishments, as a congruous means to propagate the Gospel where it was not, or confirm it where it was. He that reads Justine Martyr, Athenagoras; Tertullian, Arnobius, Minutius Faelix, Lactantius, &c. or indeed any Ec­clesiastical Author for 300 years after Christ, will find Grotius his Observation to be true, Grotius in Luc. 14. 23. Pag 748. Quod per­petuò [Page 81] asserunt. Neminem ob fidei pro­fessionem esse cogendum. The anci­ent saying is still true, Tertullianus ad Scapulam. Religionis non est Religionem Cogere, quae sponte suscipi debet, non vi. Suaderi potest, cogi non potest. The internal Acts of the Soul (in which all true Re­ligion originally consists, and with­out which no external Acts of the body are capable of any Religion) cannot be compell'd, nor is there any possibility that they should be capable of compulsion. I confess the Body may be compell'd, the Feet to go to Church, the Ear to hear Prayers, Sermons, Disputa­tions, the Hand to subscribe Arti­cles and Canons, but all this (if the Heart and Hand do not go to­gether) is so far from true Religion and Sincerity, that it is down­right hypocrisie. Whence it was that St. Augustine (even when he was of opinion that in some cases, [Page 82] coactive punishments might be used) thought it best, August. Ep. 50. ad Boni­facium, pag. 219. Quod ad Catholicam veritatem cogeretur nemo, sed eam qui sine formidine vellet se­queretur, ne falsos & simulatores Ca­tholicos haberemus. Athenagoras plea­ding against Persecution for Re­ligion, to M. Aurelius Antoninus, tells him, and us, [...], &c. Athenag. in Legatione pro Christia­nis. Et uno verbo, quantum ad Gentes & populos, sacrificia peragunt quae volunt homines & mysteria. And then adds, [...], &c. Et ista omnia conceditis & vos & leges. Rome gave always Liber­ty of Religion to those Nations she subdued, they might serve their own Gods, so they payed tribute, and without sedition ser­ved her too. Fides voluntatis est, non necessitatis, was the saying of St. Ambrose, and still true. Our Saviour is Captain of our Salvati­on, (Christianity is a Spiritual Mi­litia, [Page 83] and the Church militant, an Army with Banners, Christians Soldiers, but Voluntiers, not press'd men.) Vid Joseph. Castim in Manuduct. ad Viam Pacis, pag. 40. E­leuth. 1650. Nec Christum invitis, servis aut mancipiis, sed liberis regnaturum, Psaltes Psal. 110. olim dixit. Populus tuus Spontaneus in die fortitudinis, seu vi­ctoriae tuae. The Original (if ren­dered ad verbum) sounds thus, Po­pulus tuus spontaneitatum. A people which must come without com­pulsion. Christ and his Apostles never inflicted or threatned any temporal punishments here, but eternal hereafter. Qui non credit, condemnabitur. Our Saviour's King­dom is Spiritual, and the means to preserve, increase, and propagate it, are so too. Fire and Faggot, Chains and Imprisonments are not amongst Evangelical means to make or confirm Christians. Those were things Christians were pati­ently to suffer themselves, not to [Page 84] inflict on others. The Gentiles ne­ver were compell'd, but freely came to Baptism, Sacro Christianae; militi ae Sacramento liberè obligati, (as a good Author tells me;) to be Christians, is to be in Covenant with Christ, which cannot be com­pell'd; 'tis essentially consensus mu­tuus, and where such free consent is wanting, there is no Covenant, or real and true Christianity. It is Tertullian who tells us, Hoc ad Ir­religiositatis elogium concurrit, ut non liceat mihi colere quem velim, sed co­gar credere quem Nolim. It seems to him irreligious to compell Religion. Piae religionis est, non cogere sed sua­dere, Athan. Epist. ad Solit. vi­tam agentes. (saith Athanasius.) And again, Dominus non cogens, sed libertatem suam voluntati permittens; dice­bat quidem vulgo omnibus, Si quis vult venire post me: Apostolis vero, Num­quid ae vos abire vultis? Chrysost. in Johan. cap. And Chryso­stome (on the same place of John) [Page 85] [...], &c. Interrogat, an & ipsi velint discedere? quod omnem est amoventis vim ac necessitatem. It is an excellent passage in Hilary to this purpose, Hilarius ad Constant. Im­peratorem. Intelligit singularis sa­pientia tua, non decere, non oportere cogi, & compelli. in vitos ac repugnantes, &c. Idcirco laboratis, ut omnes qui­bus imperatis dulcissimâ libertate poti­antur. Nec alia ratione quae turbata sunt componi, quae divulsa sunt coer­ceri possunt, nisi unus quisque nulla ser­vitutis necessitate adstrictus, integrum habeat vivendi arbitrium. And again, Permittat lenias tua populis, ut quos Voluerint, quos Elegerint audiant Do­centes, & divina Mysteriorum solennia concelebrent, &c. And a little after, Deus cognitionem sui Docuit potius, quàm Exegit, coactam confitendi se aspernatus est voluntatem. Deus uni­versitatis est, obsequio non eget neces­sario, non requirit coactam confessionem; non fallendus est, non promerendus, [Page 86] nolit nisi Volentem recipere, nisi oran­tem audire, nisi profitentem signare. Lactantius thus, Lactant. lib. 1. cap. 20. Defendenda Religio non occidendo, sed moriendo, non saevi­tiâ sed patientiâ; illa enim Malorum sunt, haec bonorum; & necesse est bo­num in Religione versari, non malum. Nam si sanguine, si tormentis, si ma­lo Religionem defendere velis, jam non defendetur illa, sed Polluetur & violabitur. Nihil enim est tam vo­luntarium quàm Religio. And the same Lactantius elsewhere: Non expetimus ut Deum nostrum velit nolit, Lactant. lib. 5. cap. 7. & cap. 14. colat aliquis invitus, nec si non coluerit irascimur. Quis imponit mihi Necessitatem vel colendi quod Nolim, vel quod Velim non colendi?’

St. Augustine was at first against all Persecution for Religion, and would not have the Emperor solli­cited to punish the Donatists with Secular and Temporal punish­ments. [Page 87] At last (as Aug. Epist. 50 ad Boni­fac. Operum Tom. 2. pag. 219. C. Edir. Frob. he confes­seth) he was of another opinion, yet even then he was against pu­nishing any (even the worst) He­reticks with death: ‘Ita enim lex fuerat promulgata ( August ibid. Col. 220. B saith he) ut tantae immanitatis Haere­sis Donatistarum (cui crudelius parci videbatur, quàm ipsa sae­viebat) non tantum violenta esse, sed omnino non fineretur esse impunè, non tamen supplicio capitali (propter servandam eti­am circa indignos mansuetudi­nem Christianam) sed pecunia­riis damnis, &c. There is in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. lib. 10. cap. 5. pag. 287, 288. Edit. Gr. Lat. Eusebius, an Edict of Constantine and Licinius, which gives a Tole­ration to all Religions, [...], &c. ‘Ut tum Christianis, tum aliis omnibus liberam optionem omnino da­remus, eam Religionem sequen­di, quam ipsi in animos indu­cerent.’ [Page 88] And again, [...], &c. Consilio rectissimo decrevimus, ut nemini prorsus libertas negetur Christi­anorum cultum imitandi, & Cui (que) detur copia, suam men­tem ei Religioni addicendi, quam ipse sibi maximè conve­hire censuerit.’ And he gives the reason of this Indulgence, [...] &c. Quia nostro­rum temporum tranquillitati & quieti revera accommodatum est, ut quisque facultatem ha­beat deligendi eam in Deo co­lendo rationem, quae sibi maxi­mè placuerit, hocque à nobis factum, ut nullius Religionis authoritas à nobis ulla ex parte imminui videatur.’ Af­terwards such Toleration was not granted, but (as we see in the Imperial Laws) some­times more or less according to [Page 89] the Vid. Justin: Cod. de sum­mâ Trinit. & fide Catho­licâ l. Cun­ctos & leg. nullus. 2. & Cod. de Haereticis & Manichaeis, & Cod. Theodos. lib. 16. Tit. 5. de Haereticis, & Constitut. Theod. & Valent. ad Amati­um P. PR. Galliar. in Append. Cod. Theodosiani per Ja. Sirmon­dum pag. 14. qua Haeretici omnes è Galliis exulabant. Et Constitut. Honorii & Theodosii, ibid. pag. 31. & eorundem Impp. Constituti­onem ibid. pag. 38. Et Gratianum Distinct. 45. cap. 5. de Judae is. Vide etiam Constit. Impp. Arcadii, Honorii & Theodos. A. A. A. Hadriano P. PR. in Append. Cod. Theodos. l. 21. p. 59. Constitutio sic habet: Adversarios Catholicae fidei Extirpare hujus Decreti authori­tate prospeximus, &c. Et paulo post, Quare hac lege sancimus, ut quis­quis fuerit rebaptizasse detectus, judici qui Provinciae praseidet offeratur, ut facultatum omnium publicatione mulctatus inopiae poenam, qua in perpetu­um adficiatu [...], expendat. Constitution of the Em­perors, and the fierceness and importunity of the Bishops.

But enough (if not too much) of this, and therefore manum de Tabula: He that desires more, ei­ther sayings of Fathers or Impe­rial Edicts, or Constitutions of particular Churches and Nations, concerning Persecution or Tole­ration of several Religions, may have them Collected to his Hand by many Grotius de Jure Belli, l. 2. c. 20. Sect. 48, 49. &c. Wil­helmus Zep­perus in Ex­planat. Leg. Mosaic. lib. 4. cap. 3. de Pseudo-Pro­phetis, Jos. Castim in Manuduct ad viam Pacis, pag. 25. us (que) ad p. 108, &c. Authors. Qui plura vellet, illos videat.

[Page 90] Quer. 1. Whether he that would give a Toleration to seve­ral Religions, should not (in pru­dence and conscience) first know what these Religions are, what Points they hold different from that Established, that so he may knowingly judg how far he may, or may not grant Impunity? For if he Tolerate a Religion before he know it, he Tolerates he knows not what: Which cannot be an act of prudence in any Magistrate. Seeing (in this case) he grants a Toleration to that Religion, which (for ought he knows) he ought not to Tolerate.

Quer. 2. Whether he that does (and justly may) Tolerate a Re­ligion different from that Legally established, and so compells none to be of his Religion, may not yet compell his Subjects to those Me­dia (and the use of them) by which [Page 91] may be informed of the reasons and truth of his Religion? As (for instance) whether our King, though he should grant a Toleration to Papists, and so no way compell them to be Protestants, may not compel them to come to Sermons, and hear Disputations, by which they may be informed of those Truths we hold, and the Grounds and Reasons of them. (As Parents compell their Children to go to School for Information, though they should not, cannot compell them to an assent, and belief of what they are taught.) Seeing (by the Law of Nature and Scripture) we and all men are bound to Try all things, and hold fast that which is good; and so may (by our Lawful Governours) be compell'd to an examination and rational trial of several Religions, though not to the belief of any? Now the rea­son [Page 92] of this difference in this, 1. It is evident (and confessed) that 'tis every man's duty to make such trial of the truth of several Reli­gions, that so he may be of the best Religion by choice, and not only by chance. 2. It is as evident, that the end of Magistracy is to bring all men under their Jurisdi­ction to do their duty, either by suasory allurements; or (if that will not do) by compulsory pu­nishments, and so (by conse­quence) he may compell them to such trial of the truth. 2. But after such trial made (by hearing Sermons and Disputations) the Magistrate cannot tell certainly, when it is their duty (of several Religions) to believe this, or that in particular; for 'tis no man's duty to believe any positive truth of Christian Religion, till it be sufficiently revealed (a sufficient [Page 93] revelation of truth being abso­lutely necessary, and antecedent to an obligation to believe it, and so to the duty of believing) and when that is, the Magistrate can­not certainly know; and there­fore he cannot compell any to the belief of these or those opinions (as a part of their duty) seeing he cannot certainly know, whether it be their duty or no.

Sir, These Adversaria (tumul­tuarily put together will need your pity and pardon, being neither in a just order or method, nor ha­ving that evidence of proof which otherwise they might have had, had either my parts been better, or my time for Meditation more. As they are, you freely have them, and an absolute power (to approve or condemn them) Given you by,

SIR,
Your most Obliged humble Servant, &c.

THE CASE OF MURDER.

The Case of MURDER.
GEN. ix. 6. An Objection from the said Text, That Kings have not power to par­don Murder, Answered.

FOR the clearing and fur­ther Evidence of the truth of this Position, Object. [ That Kings and Supreme Powers may in some Cases pardon Murder] there remains one (and for ought yet appears, but one) Objection to be answered; 'tis grounded on the Law given to Noah after the Flood, Gen. 9. 6. and about 796 years before the Mosaical Law, which says, that the Murderer shall surely be put to death: Numb. 35. 3 [...]. The Law given to Noah, [Page 2] was in these words; He that sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. Wherein God Almighty ap­points death to be the punishment of Murder. Now if it be granted, that the Mosaical Law binds only the Jews, to whom it was given; yet this Law given to Noah, and in him, to all his Posterity; must bind Jews and Gentiles too, who are all equally his Posterity.

Sol. In answer to this Objecti­on, and the reason of it, (which no way proves what is pretended) I say,

1. It is confess'd, that this Law given to Noah, did bind him and all his Posterity. There were three men (and but three) who could make Positive Laws, to bind all the World. 1. Adam. 2. Noal. 3. Our Bles­sed Saviour. Whatever Laws any of them made, (after sufficient Pro­mulgation) oblig'd the whole World; [Page 3] and what Laws God gave to Adam or Noah, all such Laws, (after suffici­ent Promulgation) oblig'd their Poste­rity; that is, the whole World; (for as before the Flood, all the men in the World came from Adam; so after the Flood from Noah; and it must be confess'd, that although this Law given to Noah, does not bind many, to whom it was never pro­mulg'd or made known; yet God has sufficiently made it known to all Jews and Christians, in the holy Scriptures; and therefore we must confess our selves under the Ob­ligation of it.

2. It is certain, that this Law given to Noah, was (as all Penal Laws are) a Positive Law; and that all such Laws are capable of Dispensa­tion; and that in several Cases, ( without any dispensation) their Obli­gation ceases: of which more anon.

[Page 4] 3. It is certain, that by these, Numb. 35. 30. words [ By man shall his blood be shed] By man there, the Magistrate is meant, who had Jus Gladii, Power of Life and Death; and so Authority to condemn and execute a Murderer; which no Private Per­son had, or could upon any just Grounds pretend to.

4. When it is said, That the Murderers blood shall be shed by man: The Proposition is not Universal, that every Murderer shall be put to death. For if Noah, or any Supreme Power had been a Murderer, (as even David the best of Kings was) he could not by this or any other Law be put to death. 1. Because it is evident that the Supreme Power has no Su­perior, and therefore none to pu­nish him, especially not with death, the greatest Punishment man can suffer. 2. Nor could he do it him­self, for although Kings and Su­preme [Page 5] Powers have Authority to take away other mens lives, (when they are Capital Offenders, and do things worthy of death) yet they can­not take away their own; [...], or Self-murder, being in no case lawful. 3. And as they could not without sin and great Impiety, kill themselves; so they could not give Commission to any to do it. It be­ing impossible that I should give another Power to do that, which I had no power to do my self.

5. And as this Law extends not to Supreme Powers; whose Blood cannot be shed by man, although man's Blood have been shed by them; so it extends not to all Subjects and In­ferior persons, who have Lawful Magistrates. This the infinitely wise and just Lawgiver ( God him­self) has told us in the Text, Exod. 21. 20, 21. That if a Master had slain his Man-servant, or Maid-servant, and they die immediate­ly [Page 6] under his hand, then he was to be punish'd; but if that Servant lived a day or two, (24 hours, say the Rabbins, Joh. 11. 9. the Jews accounting 12. hours for a day) his Master who kill'd him, was not to die. So that, though a Master had shed the blood of his Man-servant or Maid-servant, yet his blood (by this Law given to Noah) could not be shed for it.

6. Other Cases there may be, and are, wherein a man may shed man's blood, and yet his blood may not be shed for it. Numb 35. 30. For instance, Deut. 17. 6. The Law required two Witnesses to put any Murderer to death; and therefore if Sempronius had shed Titius his blood, yet if there was but one Witness legally to prove it, Sempronius his blood could not be shed by any man.

By the Premisses I think it is e­vident, that this Law given to Noah, [He that sheds blood, by man [Page 7] shall his blood be shed] is not so uni­versally obligatory as some may think it is. Seeing there may be many persons and cases, wherein man's blood may be shed, and yet he who did it, cannot be put to death for so doing. The Query then will be, Whether the Supreme Power, who (as to have his blood shed by any man) is not under the Obligation of this Law, may not (in some cases) pardon a person condemn'd for Mur­der? For a distinct answer to this Query it is to be considered;

1. That it is certain, that this Law given to Noah (nor any Law de poenis) is not a Natural or Moral Law; (all which Laws were ab Origine, at the Creation, writ in the Heart of Adam, and from him in the Hearts of all his Posterity, and their Obligation eternal and indispensable). But it was a positive Law given to Noah 1658. years after the Creation.

[Page 8] 2. It is certain, That all such Positive and Penal Laws, are capa­ble of Dispensations; and many Cases may happen, in some times and circumstances, (of which the Supreme Power is the only, or (at least) the Supreme Judge) wherein the Obli­gation of such Laws ceaseth; so that no man is bound to execute or under­go the Punishments appointed by those Laws. That this may evidently appear I shall give some few In­stances:

1. It was a Divine Positive Law, Gen. 17. 14. that all the seed of Abraham should be Circumcised the eighth day on pain of being cut off from his People: And yet the Obligation of that Divine Positive Law ceased, Josh. 5. 5, 7. for forty years, while they wander'd in the Wilderness; and yet Moses, their Supreme Power, did neither Punish (according to the Letter of the Law) nor blame them for it.

[Page 9] 2. It was a Divine Positive Law, that they should keep the Passover on the Fourteenth day of the first Moneth; and yet there were seve­ral Cases, Exod. 12. 6. wherein the Obligation of that Law ceased, so that they did not sin, though they did not that day eat the Passover: For if any one was casually unclean by touching a dead body, Numb. 9: 6, 10: or if he were on a jour­ney, &c. the Obligation of that Law ceased, (as to him) and he sin'd not though he did not eat the Passover, on the day appointed by the Law.

3. The Sanctification of the Sab­bath (as to that particular day) was injoyn'd by a Divine Positive Law; and (by that Law) it was capital to violate the Sabbath, Exod. 31. 14, 15. or do any of our own Work; the Worship of God Almighty being the proper and only work of that day: And yet it is certain (and on all sides confess'd) that in many Cases the Obligation of [Page 10] that Law ceaseth, so that we may lawfully do that which otherwise to the Jews was Capital. If an Ene­my invade our Country, or a City be set on fire on the Sabbath, or our Lord's day, we may lawfully take Arms to defend our Country; and (the Church and Divine Service left) make haste and labour hard to quench the fire, and save the City. Now as to the aforementioned Divine Positive Laws, there may be many Cases, wherein their Obligation cea­ses, so that the Punishment other­wise required by those Laws may law­fully be pardoned. So in this Law gi­ven to Noah there have been, and may be several Cases, wherein that Law does not bind ad Poenam, and so the Murderer may lawfully be pardon'd.

3. And it is further to be consi­der'd, that this Law (de Homicidio) given to Noah, does neither ex­pressly say, nor by any good consequence [Page 11] intimate, that the Supreme Power shall not (in any Case) pardon a condemn'd Murderer: It only de­clares death to be the just reward and punishment of Murder; but it does not say, that it must necessarily be always executed; so that no Pardon, in no case is to be admitted.

4. And it is certain, (and in our present case more considerable) That Jacobs two Sons, Simeon and Levi, Gen. 34. 25. were guilty of Murder, Gen. 49. 6. and yet were pardon'd, notwithstanding the Law given to Noah: Sure it is, that they were neither sentenc'd nor put to death for their Murders; but long after went down into Egypt with Jacob their Father, and died there. Though they had impiously and abundantly shed Man's blood, yet their blood was not shed for it. Tho Jacob their Father, and Isaac (who was then living) were the Supreme Powers in the then Church of God, [Page 12] (consisting in the seed of Abraham) and had power to do it. Nor could those Patriarchs ( Isaac and Jacob) be ignorant of the Law given to Noah, seeing Noah himself lived till the fifty seventh year of Abra­ham, and died only forty three years before Isaac's birth. Now, considering the persons of these two great Patriarchs, that they were Prophets, men of exceeding Piety, and beloved of God; we may be sure they would not have trans­gressed that Law given by God to Noah, if they had believed that the Obligation of it was such as excluded all possibility of Pardon. In short, if those pious Patriarchs might pardon Murder, then, I desire to know why Supreme Princes (in some cases) may not pardon it now?

5. Lastly I ask, Did that Law given to Noah, bind David and the Jews in his time, or did it not? If [Page 13] not, how comes it to bind us now, above 2700 years after David's death? If it did bind David then; so as no pardon was to be permitted, or granted to a Murderer, it is not probable that David (a Prophet and the best of Kings) would have transgress'd that Divine Law, and pardon'd Absolom. Especially if we consider, that his other known sins (as Murder, Adultery, Numbring the People, &c.) are confess'd by him; and in Scripture mentioned as his sins; but his pardoning Absolom, is no where in Scripture confess'd by him, or laid to his charge, as a transgres­sion of any Law. Sed manum de Ta­bula.

I desire you to ask those, Query. who made the former Objection against the King's power of pardoning Murder from the Law given to Noah, and think the Laws given to Noah still Obligatory; How it comes to pass [Page 14] that in the same place, Gen. 9. 4. the first Law given to Noah, is a Prohibi­tion to eat any Blood (which is con­firm'd by Moses, Levit. 17. 10. and no where ab­rogated;) And yet all Papists and Protestants eat Blood, notwith­standing that Law of God to Noah forbidding it. I desire to know of the Gentleman (who made the Ob­jection, which I hope I have pro­bably answer'd) why the second Law given to Noah ( Gen. 9. 6.) about Murder, should be binding, and yet the first Law ( Gen. 9. 4.) against eating Blood, should not be bind­ing too. He who can and will solve me this doubt, will do me a kindness, which (if any) few can. I am,

Your Faithful Friend and Servant, T. L.

THE CASE OF Pardoning Murder.

The CASE of Pardoning MURDER.
Query. Whether it be lawful for his Sacred Majesty to Reprive or Par­don a Person convict, and legally condemned for Murder.

My Honoured Friend,

ALthough I well know, your Loyalty to be as much, and your Learning and Knowledg of the Laws, and their Obligation, to be more than mine; yet (ac­cording to your command and my promise) I have here sent you, a Compendium and short Ac­count, of some Discourses I lately had with some, who seem'd to doubt, Whether our Gracious Sove­raign could reprive or pardon a person [Page 2] legally condemned for Murder? For a distinct answer to this Query, I consider,

1. That it is certain, that all we Subjects, are (by the indispensable law of God and Nature) bound, Prov. 24. 21. ( next to our good God, 1 Pet. 2. 17. the great King of Heaven and Earth) to honour and obey our Gracious Sove­raign; and that not only for fear of punishment, Rom. 13. 5. but for Conscience lake. Rom. 13. 2. So that to do, or speak, or think dishonourably of the Lord Anoin­ted, Act. 23. 5. our King, Exod. 22. 28. and to question and deny any of the Rights of his Crown and Prerogatives, Eccles 10. 20. is in all Subjects disloyal and impious. In the Natural Body, if there be any blemish or di­sease in the head, if it be in any dan­ger from without, all the members of the body (the dictates of Right Reason, and the principles of Nature requiring it) will industriously con­cur to cover and conceal that blemish, [Page 3] to cure that disease, and prevent all danger that may happen to the Head. So in the Body Politick, if the King (the Head of that Body) have any errors or failings, as (our Blessed Saviour only excepted) the best men in the world ever bad; then all the members of that Body (as by the in­dispensable Law of Allegiance, they are bound) ought to conceal the frailties of their Prince, and not to censure or publish them to his dishonour, either by word or writing.

2. But notwithstanding this, it is too certain, that in this Nation, in the late unhappy times of confusion, and most horrid Rebellion, we have had a multitude and rable of seditious people, (who miscall'd themselves the Goldy party) who have been so far from duly honouring their Graci­ous Soveraign, maintaining the known Rights of his Crown, and pre­serving his Sacred person from dan­ger, [Page 4] that they have (without all ground) falsly slandered, and in the Press and Pulpit, by Lyes and Libels, indeavour'd to ruin his honour and reputation. Nor stay'd they here, but having got power to compleat the Tragedy, they did, what before they desired, seise the Kings Re­venue, and all the Rights of the Crown into their own bands, and at last, with a prodigious, and more than Pagan impiety, ( horresco referens) they murdered their innocent and pi­ous Prince. An act so villanous, and so far beyond all expression barba­rous; that since our Blessed Savi­ours death, no Age or Nation ever had, or (I hope) ever will have, any Villany equal to it, and (all circum­stances considered) of parallel im­piety. And since his Majesties hap­py and Miraculous Restauration to his Fathers Throne in peace, it is too evident by the impious Plots and Con­spiracies [Page 5] happily discovered, and their disloyal and Trayterous designs dis­appointed, some still remain, who if they had (What I hope they never will) ability, want not a mind to do mischief, who have talk'd so long of that liberty and property of the sub­ject, that to maintain the just Rights and Prerogative of their Prince, (which in the first place ought to have been consider'd and preserved) is no part of their care and desire, but rather the diminution of it, and (had they ability and opportunity) the utter abrogation of it.

The Premisses consider'd, I think that every loyal subject, as he is (by natural or sworn Allegiance, or both) at all times, so especially in the cir­cumstances we now are, is obliged with more care and diligence, to maintain and vindicate his Soveraigns just Rights and Prerogatives. For where and when there is greater [Page 6] and more eminent danger, there ought to be greater care and diligence to pre­vent it. These Considerations, and some addresses of some ho­nest Cavaliers, who believed, that the King had power, by his Preroga­tive Royal, to pardon in the Cafe pro­posed, but could more easily believe the truth, than answer Objections a­gainst it, and therefore desired my assistance to help them to answer the principal (and indeed the only pretended) Objection, which seem'd (and only seem'd) to prove, that his Sacred Majesty could not pardon a person legally condemn'd for Mur­der. I say, that these reasons induced me more seriously to consider the Case proposed, and after di­ligent consideration of all the par­ticulars, being in my own judgment convinc'd, and having satisfi'd my doubting friends, That his Majesty might lawfully pardon such a condemn'd [Page 7] Malefactor, I shall now (in short) give you an account of those Rea­sons which satisfy'd me and them, and refer them to your better Judg­ment. And here, that I may set down what I have to say, with more method and perspicuity: I shall, 1. Suppose two or three things, which (to me) seem evident Truths, and will conduce to mani­fest his Majesties power to pardon, and then I shall proceed. I suppose then,

1. That the Kingdom of England is a Monarchy. That is, (as the word signifies) a Government, wherein the Supreme power is in one single person. This our Statutes say, Stat. 1 Eliz. cap. 1. and (in our Oath of Supremacy) we swear, That the King is the ONLY SUPREME, Governour of this Realm. 1. Supreme, and there­fore none above him. 2. ONLY Supreme, and therefore none coor­dinate [Page 8] with him, or equal to him.

2. That England is an Heredita­ry Monarchy. We say, the King ne­ver dies. The man who was King may die, and cease to be, but the King and Royal Power ceases not, but immediately descends to, and is seated in his next Heir and Successor. In the next minute after any King's death, the next Heir to the Crown, is actually King, as well and as much before, as after his Coronation. As in Matrimony, it is not the Solem­nization of it, in the Church, nor the Prayers and Benediction of the Priest, that makes Husband and Wife. For it is (by Law and Reason) certain, that consensus facit Matrimonium: Solemnization of it in the Church, is only a publick Declaration of the antecedent consent, which made the parties man and wife coram Deo, be­fore they came to the Church. So is Coronation to a King, it does not con­stitute [Page 9] and make him so, but pre­suppose and declare publickly, that this person is indeed our Prince. Neither has the Pope or people, any thing to do by way of Election or approbati­on of a Successor to the Crown. And so in our Oath of Allegiance, we swear fidelity to the King, Statut. 3. Ja­cobi, cap. 4. His HEIRS and SUCCESSORS. The same Oath of Allegiance we took to Charles the Martyr, in the next minute after his death, as equally and indispensably bound us, to be loy­al and faithful to his Son and Heir Charles the Second, our now Graci­ous King.

3. The Kingdom of England is not only a Monarchy, but an AB­SOLUTE Monarchy. So my Lord Cook tells us, My Lord Cook's Repor. Part. 5. de ju­re Regis Eccle­siast. pag. 40. Edit. Lond. 1612. in these signal words, Thus it hath appeared, as well by the ancient COMMON LAWS, as by the Judgment and RESOLUTION of the JUDGES of the Laws of En­gland, [Page 10] in All AGES, and by the Authority of MANY ACTS of Parliament, that the Kingdom of En­gland, is an ABSOLUTE Monarchy; and that the King is the Supreme Go­vernour, &c. And Sir John Davis, (that I may not trouble you with any more Quotations) says the very same thing, Sir John Da­vis his Re­ports, in the Case of Prae­munire, (which is his last Case) pag. 85. The King of England are ABSOLUTE EM­PERORS in their Dominions, &c. And again, Idem ibid. pag. 89. col. 2. The King of England has the same ABSOLUTE Liberties in his Dominions, as the Emperor in his Empire. The meaning is not, that our Kings are so absolute as to be freed from obedience of the Laws of God, ( natural or positive in the Gospel) but because there is no power on earth, ( except their own) which can lay any obligation or limitation upon them. And this is evident, because our Kings being supreme, having none superior or equal to them, it is impos­sible, [Page 11] that any power on earth, (for it is most certain that no inferior power can do it) should be able to oblige or limit them.

But it may be said, Object. If our Kings be absolute, so as no power on earth can oblige or limit them, then they may by themselves make and abrogate Laws, lay Taxes on the people, &c.

This does not follow; Sol. for al­though no power on earth is superior to them, or can oblige or limit them, yet they may limit themselves, by Oath or promise; and so our Kings have li­mited their power, and promised and (in their Coronation-Oath) sworn to do none of those things without the con­sent of their people in Parliament.

But does not this limiting them­selves, Object. take away and destroy their Absoluteness?

No; if any other power could lay Obligations and Limitations upon them, then (I grant) they were not absolute, [Page 12] but to limit themselves, is consistent with absolute power. For the truth of this, we have an evident and au­thentick instance. It is most certain, that God Almighty is an absolute King of all the world; yet, (for the comfort of his people) he has limited himself by Oath and promise, (so the Apostle tells us) That by two immu­table things, Heb. 6. 17, 18. in which it is impossible for God to lye, we might have strong consolation.

These things premised, concer­ning the great power of our Kings, That it is Monarchical, Supreme and Absolute, the Query is, Whether they can and lawfully may, either

  • 1. Reprive
  • 2. Or pardon

a person condemn'd for Murder?

Now it is a certain Rule,(in Law and Reason) that Omne illicitum est ex lege aliqua illicitum. Sin is the trans­gression of a Law; 1 Joh 3. 4 and, where there is no law, Rom. 4. 15. there is no transgression. If [Page 13] then such Reprive or Pardon be unlaw­ful, and may not be granted by the Kings of England, then it must be so, by some law, which prohibits it, and that must be either,

  • 1. Some Humane, or
  • 2. Some Divine,

Law.

For the first, unless it do appear, that the Kings of England are pro­hibited to reprive or pardon such malefactors, by some law of our Nati­on, to the making where of they have given their consent, and so limited their own power: I say unless there be such a law, it will be evident, that it can­not be unlawful (by any humane law) for our Kings to reprive or pardon such malefactors. But although I have reason to believe, that there is no such law; Yet whether there be any such Law or no, I shall not determine; but leave it to the Reve­rend Judges, and the learned in our laws, who are best able to determine [Page 14] that Question. It belongs not to my calling, or present business to determine the Case, by humane laws. That which was desired of me was this, Whether the Reprive or Pardon of a person legally condemn'd for Murder, were prohibited, and so unlawful by the law of God; particu­larly by that Law given to the Jews by Moses, in these words, Thou shalt take NO SATISFACTION for the life of a murderer, Numb. 35. 31. who is guilty of death, he shall SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH. NOW to determine this case of Conscience, by the Divine Law, is within the compass of my Calling; and by this time (at the Age of 77.) I am, or ought to be, in some measure, a competent Judge of such Cases. And therefore, see­ing nothing is required of me, save (what is in my power to give) my Opi­nion in the Case; I shall here,

1. Humbly and with submissi­on [Page 15] to my Superiors, give my opini­on and judgment in the Case.

2. The Reasons for it.

1. For the first, my present opinion and judgment is, That there is no Divine Law which pro­hibits, and so makes it unlawful for Supreme Princes, to Reprive or Par­don a person legally condemned for murder. And this I shall endeavour distinctly to shew and prove,

  • 1. That a Reprive
  • 2. That a Pardon

is not by any Law of God unlawful.

1. For the first, To Reprive, Repriving is not to null or make void the Sentence pass'd upon a murderer, or to free him from it; but only (for some time) the delaying the execution of it. Now 'tis certain, that there is no Law of God which prohibits such Reprive, and delay of executing the sentence, or any way make it unlawful for the Supreme power to grant such Re­prive. [Page 16] The severest Law against Murderers, is that in the Book of Numbers, Numb. 35. 31.(but now nam'd) which says; That no satisfaction shall be ta­ken for the life of a Murderer, but he shall surely be put to death. But that Law does not say, that he must die the same day the sentence pass'd, or the same week or month. If a Murderer be executed a month after the sentence passed, he dies As SURELY, as if he had died the same day. 2. There may be just reasons drawn from the Law of Nature and Scripture, why (in many Ca­ses) the supreme Magistrate not only lawfully may, but ought to grant such a Reprive. The Law of God and Nature, does indispensably bind all, to love their neighbour as their selves; Mat. 22. 39. and therefore (so far as we have abi­lity) to endeavour his Salvation. Now a condemn'd murderer (who has no pardon) is sure to lose a temporal [Page 17] life, and that he may not lose eternal life too, (it is the obser­vation and judgment of the best Scholar and Lawyer in his time) it will Ne cum vita, spatium ad pae­nitendum prae­cludatur, sciant hujus rei, à piis magistra­tibus, summam haberi ratio­nem, nec quen­quam ad sup­plicium RAPI, NISI DATO TEMPORE, quo peccata sua agnoscere, & serio dete­stari possit. Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 2. cap. 20. De Poenis. Sect. 12. and should be the care of pious Princes, not to hurry such condemn'd malefactors hastily to death, but to grant them some time, (by a Reprive) before they leave this, to consult their Ghostly Father, and (by prayer, con­fessing their sins, true penitence, and the comfort of Absolution) prepare themselves for a better life. 3. But although this be a certain truth, That the Supreme power may re­prive a condemn'd Murderer, yet it will further appear, (and beyond all contradiction) in the proof of the next particular: Where it will appear, That the King (by his Supreme power, and Royal Prerogative) may lawfully pardon such a con­demn'd malefactor, and therefore much more may he lawfully Re­prive [Page 18] him. For he who can law­fully pardon and remit the punishment of Death, that it shall never be in­flicted, may certainly for some small time, (for a week, a month, or two) suspend and delay the execution of it. And so I proceed to the se­cond particular.

2. It is not unlawful by any Divine Law, 2. Pardoning. for the Supreme Power, to pardon a person convict and condemned for Murder. The reason is evident, because there is no Divine Law, which prohibits the Supreme power to grant such a Pardon. That this may more distinctly appear, it is certain and confess'd, that Divine Laws are either,

1. Evangelical, made known to us in the Gospel.

2. Mosaical, such as God by Moses made known to his own people the Jews.

1. For the first, The Evangeli­cal [Page 19] Laws were given by our Blessed Saviour in the Gospel, for the ga­thering and perpetual Government of his Church. Now it is certain, that a­mongst these Laws there is nothing of any temporal punishment. Our Blessed Saviour tells Pilate, Joh. 18. 36. That his King­dom was not of this world; (it was no Temporal Kingdom) It was not to be promoted by the sword, or tempo­ral punishments. He left his Apo­stles no power to punish the transgres­sors of his Laws, either, 1. In their Purse, (by Pecuniary Mulcts or Fines.) Nor, 2. in their Persons (by Death or Imprisonments.) All such Pow­er does, and ever did belong to the Civil Magistrate, who only has Jus Gladii. Nor is there any Law in the Gospel, which so much as mentions, much less prohibits the Civil Supreme Magistrate, to pardon condemn'd Malefactors.

2. For the Mosaical Laws, ( Cere­monial [Page 20] and Judicial) they were such, as were given by God himself, for the good Government of the Jewish Com­mon-wealth. Now concerning these Laws, it is certain,

1. That they were given Psal. 147. 19. 20. Rom. 9. 4. Eph. 2. 12. only to the Jews, as is confess'd and fully Suarez de Legibus, lib. 9. cap. 5. Sect. 7. p. 738. A­quin. 1. 2. Quest. 98. Art. 4. Filliuc. Moral, Quest. Tom. 2. Trac. 21. cap. 11. Sect. 402. proved by the Schoolmen and Casuists.

2. It is certain, that no positive Law (Divine or humane) does, or can bind any save those to whom it is given, and sufficiently promulgated and made known. A sufficient Promulgation is absolutely necessary to the Obligati­on of any positive Law.

3. And hence it follows, that those Mosaical Laws never bound the Gentiles before our blessed Saviour's time, much less Christians since, (as will anon appear.) And therefore if that Law in Numb. 35. 31. (but now mention'd) or any other Mosai­cal Law, had absolutely forbid, and [Page 21] made the pardoning of Murder unlaw­ful to the Jews, yet it will not hence follow, that it should be ( by that Law) unlawful for Gentiles or Christi­ans to pardon it, seeing it is manifest, that those Mosaical Laws were never given to, nor any way obliged them. For the Transgression of any Law, does necessarily presuppose its Obligation: It being impossible I should trans­gress a Law, which never bound me to Obedience.

4. The obligation of the Cere­monial Laws ceased, (even to the Jews, to whom they were given) at the death of our Blessed Saviour. They were Types and Shadows of his Death, and our Redemption by him; and when the Substance, and thing typified by them was come, the Shadows ceased. Whence it is, that Divines (both Ancient and Modern) truly say, That at our Blessed Saviours Death, the Jewish Ceremonial Law was Mor­tua, [Page 22] (as to its obligation;) it was ab­rogated, and the observation of it not necessary; tho for some time, to gain the Jews, even the Apostles did voluntarily observe it. But when the Gospel was more fully published, it became Mortifera, and the obser­vation of it inconsistent with the Go­spel. Gal. 5. 2.

5. For the Judicial Law of the Jews, it is certain, that the Obligation of it ceas'd (at least) at the destruction of Jerusalem, when the Jewish Go­vernment, and their Commonwealth was utterly destroy'd.

6. And hence it evidently fol­lows, that all those Mosaical Laws, (Judicial and Ceremonial) have been abrogated and null, and have neither bound Jew or Gentile above this 1600 years last past; and there­fore it is impossible that any of them should now bind any Christian Su­preme Power not to pardon any con­demned malefactor.

[Page 23] And what is said of the Judicial and Ceremonial Laws, given to the Jews by Moses; that none of them ever did, or could bind any Gentiles or Christians; the same we say, of the Moral Law, (as to punishing or pardoning Murderers) that it never prohibited Supreme Princes to re­prive or pardon any person condem­ned for Murder. That this may ap­pear, it must be considered, that there are two Editions of the Moral Law; both writ by the Omnipotent and Gracious Author of it, by God himself,

1. In the heart of Adam, where it was most intirely and perfectly writ. His Understanding being clear, and abundantly able to know and distinguish good from evil; quid faciendum, quid fugiendum; and his will obsequious to follow those dictates of right Rea­son. But by the fall of Adam, this Writing and perfect Edition of the [Page 24] Moral Law, was much blotted, cor­rupted and defac'd, both in Adam, and all his Posterity. For although the substance of that Law, did ( after the fall) continue writ in their nearts; yet so defac'd by the Fall, that (igno­rance having blinded the Under stan­ding) it was in many places, not le­gible, nor ( sin having corrupted the will) practicable.

2. The second Edition of the Mo­ral Law, (in respect of the writing of it, which remain'd in the hearts of men after the fall) was multo auctior & emendatior. And this Edi­tion of the Moral Law, is that, which God, by Moses, gave only to his own Church and People the Jews. In which he gave them,

1. A just and perfect Compendium of that whole Law in two Tables of Stone, containing Ten Precepts.

2. A full and more perfect expli­cation of those Precepts, and the [Page 25] particular duties required by them.

3. An addition of many Gracious promises and blessings to those who sincerely observ'd those Laws; and many threats and punishments for those who transgress'd any of those Laws. This Edition of the Moral Law, with the many promises and pu­nishments annext, was (as I said) given only to the Jews, not to the Gentiles.

And this appears by that me­morable passage in St. Paul, where­in he tells the Romans in these words, The Gentiles which HAVE NOT THE LAW, do BY NA­TURE, Rom. 2. 14 These HAVING NOT THE LAW, are a law to themselves, which shews the work of the Law WRITTEN IN THEIR HEARTS. In which words, we have the two Editions of the Mo­ral Law, afore mentioned, expresly set down, and that the Gentiles [Page 26] had only the first Edition; and that the second and more perfect Edition, was given only to the Jews. For the Apostle says,

1. That the Gentiles HAD NOT THE LAW; to wit, as it was Lex scripta in Lapide, and given to the Jews, with the Addition of many Promises, and many seve­ral punishments annext to the trans­gressions of particular Precepts.

2. That the Gentiles HAD THE LAW writ IN CORDE, for so all men by nature had it. And 'tis the Moral Law he means, for no positive Law of God or man, is by nature writ in any mans heart.

Now what is said in the second and more perfect Edition of the Mo­ral Law, as it was given by Moses on­ly to the Jews, is either, 1. De Officiis. 2. Or de poenis & promissis.

I. De Officiis; quid faciendum aut fugiendum: What good we are to [Page 27] do in obedience to the Affirmative Precepts. As in that, Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy: Honour thy Father and Mother, &c. And what evil we are to avoid in obedi­ence to the Negative Precepts; such as these, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit Adultery, &c. In short, the sum of all those Duties which the Moral Law requires of us, is this, That we love God with all our heart, and our neighbour as our selves. Now as to all these duties, the obli­gation of the Moral Law, is Uni­versal, Eternal, and Indispensable. It binds all men, Jews and Gentiles, and that indispensably.

2. De promissis & poenis, concer­ning the Promises and punishments which are annext to the Moral Law, as it was given to the Jews by Moses. And here,

I. For the Promises, it is cer­tain that they were given only to the [Page 28] Jews. For the Apostle expresly tells us, That the Gentiles were aliens and strangers to the promises. For instance, the promise added to the fifth Com­mandment, Eph. 2. 12. & Eph. 3. 6. Honour thy Father and thy Mother, that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God GI­VETH THEE. Canaan is the Land promised and given to the Jews only, not to the Gentiles, nor ever intended for them; it being indeed impossible, that all Jews and Gentiles should live in that little Land. But to pass by the promises, (which do not so properly belong to our present business) I say,

2. That it is as certain, that all the Mosaical Laws de Poenis, are (not natural, but) Positive and Judicial Laws, which never bound any save the This the Schoolmen and Casuists generally con­sels and prove. See Suarez de Legibus, lib. 9. cap. 5. Sect. 7. pag 738. A­quinas 1, 2. Quest 98. Art. 4. Fillin­cias. Quaest. Moral. Tom. 2. Tract. 21. cap. 11. Sect. 402. Jews, (or those who became Proselytes, and voluntarily submitted to them) to whom only they were given. That this may further and [Page 29] more distinctly appear, it is to be confidered as certain and consessed,

I. That the Law of Nature (as all just Laws do) binds all men; 1. Ad Obedientiam, to a willing and perfect Obedience. And, 2. (upon supposi­tion of sin) ad Poenam. But the Pu­nishment to which the Law of Nature binds, is Death; and that Eternal Death. For as in Adam (by reason of sin) all die; so they had died eter­nally, 1 Cor. 15. 22. had not God most graciously sent his Son to redeem them from that death. Every sin (how small soever) by the Covenant of Works, (of which the Moral Law was the condition on mans part to be perform'd) was a capital crime, Deut. 4. 13▪ and Death the Wages or punishment, Rom. 6. 23▪ (by that law) due to it. But those many various laws de Poenis, which occur in the Mosai­cal law, which he gave to the Jews, are not [...], non leges nobiscum nataE, & in [Page 30] cord naturalitere inscriptae; not Na­tural laws, writ in our hearts, and born with us: But they are [...] ­ [...], leges à Deo datae, positive Laws, which neither do, nor ever did bind any but the Jews. As may appear,

2. Because they were given only to the Jews; and that after they came out of Egypt, Deut. 29. 1. which was after the Fall of Adam Israelitae ex­cunt ex Aegyp­to, Anno Mun­di, 2453. above 2450 years. But those Mosaical Laws de Poe­nis, (of which we speak) were never given, nor publish'd to the Gen­tiles. But had those Laws de Poenis, been Natural Laws, (as the Precepts in the Decalogue are) they would have bound all mankind from the Creation to this day, and that indis­pensably; and then all Christians should be bound to obey and pra­ctise those Penal laws, and punish all Malefactors with such punishments only as in those laws are appointed; which is evidently untrue, as may ap­pear,

[Page 31] 3. By the judgment and con­sent of the Christian World; for no Christian Church or State did ever think themselves bound to observe those Mosaical Poenal Laws, and to punish transgressors of the Divine Law, with those punishments which are pre­scribed by Moses. For instance, That the stealing of a Sheep should be pu­nish'd with restitutio in quadruplum, with restoring four sheep for one, Exod. 22. 1. (if the thief had sold or kill'd the sheep he stole); but if the sheep was found in his hand who stole it, he was only to restore two sheep for one. Exod. 22. 4. That the stealer of an Ox should restore five Oxen. Exod. 21. 1. That he who curseth, or who smiteth his father or mother, Exod. 21. 15. or will not obey them, Levit. 20. 9. should be punish­ed with death, Deut. 21. 20, 21. and stoned with stones. That to do any of our own work (so much only as to gather a few sticks) on the Sabbath day, Exod. 31. 15. should be capi­tal, Exod. 35. 2. and the offender in any one of Numb. 15. 32. 35. [Page 32] these things, surely put to death; al­though these, and such other Laws de Poenis, were Divine, given to the Jews by Moses, and obliged them; yet no Christian Church or State, did ever think themselves obliged to the observation and practice of them. And they had good ground in the Gospels to think so. For,

4. Our Blessed Saviour in his Sermon on the Mount, Mat. 5. 6, &c. explains and confirms all the Moral Laws de Officiis, yet those severe Mosaical Laws de Poenis, he did not confirm: But expresly declares, that legal se­verity to be inconsistent with the Charity of the Gospel. For though by the Mosaical law, a Jew might justly re­quire, Exod. 21. 24. and the Judge give an eye for an eye, Deut. 19. 21. and a tooth for a tooth; yet our Blessed Saviour expresly de­clares against such legal severity. You have heard (saith he) it has been said, Mat. 5. 38. (in the Law of Moses) an eye for an [Page 33] eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, Resist not evil, &c, He does not allow that severity in poenis, in the Gospel, which Moses allow'd the Jews under the Law; and therefore we may be sure, that it was not any Moral or Natural Law which requi­red those punishments appointed for several sins in the Law of Moses, (for then they had been unalterable, nor would our Blessed Saviour have contradicted them); but it was the positive law of Moses which required them of the Jews, to whom only these Laws were given, and obligatory. And here (for further evidence of this truth) it is to be considered,

1. That in that Mosaical Law, Numb. 35. 31. (which is ignorantly or maliciously urged to prove that our Gracious Soveraign cannot pardon murder) the strictest binding words are these, The Murderer SHALL SURELY BE PUT TO DEATH. Therefore, [Page 34] (say they) he cannot be pardon'd. They who reason thus, did not well consider the consequence of such arguing from the Penal Laws in Moses. For if this argument be good, Moses says, The Murderer shall surely be put to death: Ergo, He cannot be pardon'd: Then this ( groun­ded on the same law of Moses) will be every way as good and conclu­ding. Exod. 31. 15. The same Moses says, Who­soever doth ANY work on the Sab­bath-day, he shall SURELY be put to death; Ergo, He cannot be par­don'd. If such Logick were good, it would conclude all men to be unpar­donably guilty of death; seeing (I be­lieve) there is no man who on some Lords-day, has not done some work, and therefore (by such Lo­gick as this) must be unpardonably guilty of death. But enough of this, for indeed such arguments do not deserve any serious answer or confu­futation. [Page 35] Sure I am, that never any Christian Church or State did, (or had any reason to) believe, That the severe Jewish Law, for the observa­tion of the Sabbath, did oblige Christi­ans; and therefore there neither is, nor can be any more reason why their severe Law against Murder should be now obligatory to Gentiles or Christians, to whom it was never given.

2. When the Law says, Num. 35. 31. The Murderer shall SURELY die; our best See Ains­worth on Numb. 35. 31. and R. M. Mai­monides (by him cited) in his Tract. of Murder, cap. 1. Sect. 4. Commentators (out of the Rab­bins) say that this is spoken to the Judges, before whom such Causes regularly came. Now those Judges in the Jewish Commonwealth were ap­pointed by the Supreme Deut. 1. 13. & 15. 2. Chron. 19. 5. Power, and by his Authority judged and determined Causes under him. Admit then, that the Judges (who were Magistrates Subordinate to the Supreme Power) were to take no satisfaction for the [Page 36] life of a Murderer, but were (by that Law) oblig'd to condemn and execute him; yet it does not hence follow, that the Supreme Power (who made them Judges) might not (in some ca­ses) reprive or pardon some, whom they had condemn'd. Sure I am, that David (the best of Kings) who knew the Jewish Laws as well as any, did reprive Joab, who had murder'd Amasa and Abner, 1 King. 2. 5, 6. and delay'd the ex­ecution of the Law, and left it to Solomon his Son, who did according­ly put Joab to death. 1 King. 2. 29, 30. 2. And as David reprived Joab, so he pardon'd Absolon, 2. Sam. 16. 21, 33. who had slain his Brother Amnon. Nor does the Scripture any where impute the reprive of Joab, or the pardon of Absolon to David as crimes or transgressions of the Law of Moses; but rather declares him inno­cent, when it is expressy said, That David did that which was right in the eyes of the Lord, 1 King. 15. 5. and turned not aside, [Page 37] from ANY THING, that he com­manded him, ALL THE DAYS OF HIS LIFE, save ONLY in the matter of Uriah the Hittite.

Now, if notwithstanding those Mosaical Penal Laws, it was lawful for David, the Supreme Power a­mongst the Jews, (to whom those Penal Laws were given, and they bound to the observation of them:) I say, if David might lawfully Re­prive and Pardon Murderers, how can it by those very Laws be unlawful for the Christian Supreme Power and Gentiles (to whom those Laws were never given, nor they ever un­der the obligation of them) to reprive or pardon such condemned malefactors? In short, the sum of what I have said, endeavour'd to prove, and be­lieve to be true, is this:

1. That there is no Law of God or Man which does prohibit, (and so make it unlawful for) Supreme Prin­ces, [Page 38] to grant such Reprives and Pardons.

2. That the end of all Penal Laws, and of their due Execution, is, that the honour of our great and most Gracious God, and his true Worship and Religion be preserved, and, Ne quid detrimenti capiat Respu­blica, that the Commonwealth be not damnify'd, by too usual and frequent granting pardons! For too great Im­punity will occasion and encourage Impiety.

3. That all loyal and faithful subjects are bound, (and have good reason) to believe, that his Sacred Majesty, as he is Gods immediate Vicegerent, Defender of the Faith, and whose greatest Interest it is to pro­mote those good ends, so he will care­fully endeavour (by a due Execution of our good Laws) to attain those ends.

4. That such Cases heretofore [Page 39] have, and may again happen, where­in (the time, persons, and all other Circumstances duly consider'd) a Re­prive may not only be lawful, but necessary: And wherein a Pardon may conduce every way as much, (and possibly in some Cases more) for at­taining the good ends of Penal Laws, as a perpetual, severe, and rigorous execution of them. And of such Ca­ses, the King is the Supreme and sole Judge, who (if need be) may call for, and have The advice and counsel of any of his Subjects, of whose prudence and piety he is well assur'd. This is the sum and substance of what I have said, at several times, to several persons; to confirm them in the belief, and incourage them to a just vindication of His Majesties Legal Rights and undoubted Prero­gative. And what I have done in this, was a duty I did owe to my Gra­cious Soveraign, not only by com­mon [Page 40] Allegiance, as he is my King, but in gratitude as to my Patron, whose undeserved favour and good­ness, has plac'd me in the good Station wherein I am. And therefore, that God Almighty would be graci­ously pleased to bless and preserve his Anointed from all the impious Plots and Conspiracies of all His ene­mies, give Him a long and peace­able possession of a Temporal Crown here, and an Eternal Crown of Glory hereafter, is, and shall (while I live) be the Prayer of

Your Affectionate Friend and Servant, T. LINCOLN.

Mr. Cottington's Case, CONCERNING The Validity or Nullity of his Marriage with Gallina (her former Husband then living) Anno. 1671.

Mr. Cottington's Case: A DOUBT OR Case of Conscience PROPOSED.

CASE THE FIRST.

1. GAllina Marries Patrimoniale, Anno. 1664. Lives and Co­habites with him as his Wife a year and a half, has a Child by him (a Daughter:) And all this while volun­tarily gives him Reverence and due Be­nevolence; [Page 2] Sine protestatione aut Querelâ, without any protestation or complaint, of any Nullity or Illegallity of the Matri­monial Contract, by reason of any Antecedent Force or Fear to make her consent and plighted troth Involuntary; never endeavours to recede and make an Escape from him, when she was in Loco Tuto, and had opportunity to make such Protestation or recess with safety.

2. After this, Anno. 1666. The Arch­bishop of Turine (by sentence given) pronounces the said Marriage Void and Null, by reason of Force and Fear into which her Father put her; which ren­dred Gallina's consent involuntary (as was supposed) and contrary to the na­ture of a Conjugall Consent, which ( Jure Naturae) ought to be free and spontane­ous, otherwise it will not be Obligatory.

3. After this, Anno. 1671: The said Gal­lina Marries Mr. Cottington, (her former Husband then Living, and who is yet [Page 3] alive) and at Law, and in the Court of the Arches, claims him for her Hus­band.

4. The Court ( Sententiâ latâ) Deter­mines and Declares that Mr. Cottington and Gallina are lawfully Husband and Wife, (without taking notice of the Arch­bishop of Turin's Sentence, whether it was valid or void) and injoyn'd them to Co-habit.

2. This is the Case, and the Query is, Whether Mr. Cottington (after a just and serious consideration of the Premises) may acknowledge, The Query. take and use Gallina as a lawful Wife without Sin; and so with a safe Consci­ence, and (without Danger or Fear of offending God) with security to his Soul?

3. This is the Case of Conscience in which my Opinion is desired, The Answer. which how insignificant soever it may prove, yet (in Obedience to the com­mands of that Excellent and Noble Person [Page 4] who requires it, and Charity and Satis­faction to the doubting Gentleman, and discharge of my own Duty (as a Mini­ster.) I shall willingly give it, and plainly set down what (at present) I conceive truth in the Case, and the rea­sons why I do so.

The Premises then (as before set down) being supposed true, and (as to matter of Fact) granted, (with sub­mission to the better Judgments, of per­sons of greater Knowledg in Divinity, the Common, Canon and Civil Laws,) my answer is Negative: That Mr. Cotting­ton cannot (with a safe Conscience, and security from Sin) acknowledg, take and use Gallina as his lawful Wife. And this seems to me, not only a Probable, but a certain and evident Truth.

That this may appear, I consider.

1. That 'tis certain and confess'd that the Obligation of the Matrimonial con­tract, is not grounded on any Positive constitution of Man, but on the Divine [Page 5] Law of God and Jus naturale quod instinctu nature non constitutione aliqua ha­betur, ut viri & faemi­ne conjunctio. Can Jus naturale 7. Dist. I. & L. Jus naturale I In­stit. de Jure Nat. Gent. & Civil. Nature. For although the contract cannot be made without the posi­tive consent of the Par­ties, yet the consent once pass'd, the Obligation to conjugal Duties ariseth immediately from the Law of Nature.

2. Hence it is, That this Matrimoni­al contract (while the Rom 7. 2. 3. The Wife is bound to her Husband so long as he liveth, &c. Parties live) is Immutable and Indis­pensable; and therefore Marriage (in the Modestinus Leg. Nuptiae I F. De Ritu. nuptiarum. Law is defin'd to be, Maris & Faeminae Conjun­ctio, Divini & humani Ju­ris communicatio, & omnis vitae consortium.

3. And hence it follows evidently; That if the conjugall contract between Patrimoniale and Gallina, was ( Matrimo­nium legittimum & ratum) a legall and va­lid marriage, ab Origine; and when it was made, then it continues so, (both [Page 6] parties being yet living) and was and still is valid and obligatory. If it was a just and valid contract in 1664. it must continue, and be so now, in this year, 1677.

4. And further, if this be true and granted, that Gallina's Marriage with Patrimoniale in, 1664. was and to this day continues valid; then her Marriage with Mr. Cottington, Anno. 1671. is abso­lutely Null, and to all intents and pur­poses void; for first, Im­possibilium nulla est L. Impossib. 185 F. de Regulis Juris & L. 31. & 135 F. jisdem. `Tis certain a precontract nulls any subsequent Marriage. Canons I Jac. 1603. Can. 102. obligatio, or contractus con­tra naturam & bonos mores initus, est omnino nullus. If Gallina's pre-contract and marriage to her former Husband, was legal and valid, when her subsequent Marriage with Mr. Cot­tington, was an evident violation of the Law of Nature, (which indispensably oblig'd her to be Faithfull to her former Husband,) and of her Faith before So­lemnly [Page 7] given to another, and so abso­lutely Null, and in it self Void. Se­condly, It is consonant Nemo potest mu­tare consilium suum in alterius injuriam L. nemo potest 75 F. de Reg Jur. Antiquito Law and right Reason, and a received rule in all contracts (as well as Matrimonial.) Quod Renuntiare se­mel constitutae obliga­tioni adversario non consentiente nemo po­test L. sicut 5 Cod. de obligat. & Actionibus. nemo potest alterâ parte invitâ, a contractu semel perfecto recedere. And therefore, if Gallina's conjugal con­tract with Patrimoniale, was perfect and legally valid, she could not (without manifest Injustice) recede from it, leave him, and adhere to ano­ther Husband.

In Matrimony (as generally in other contracts,) our consent in Contractus ab Initio voluntatis, expost facto, necessitatis. Gothofred in notis ad dictam legem sicut. Lit. 1. making them, is, (and should be) free and voluntary; but when they are made, their Ob­ligation and our Obser­vance [Page 8] of them is necessary. So that if this be so, if the Matrimonial contract between Patrimoniale and Gallina be legall and really valid, then no power on Earth or ( de Jure) can oblige Mr. Cot­tington to Co-habit with Gallina, as with his Lawfull Wife; seeing on the forego­ing Hypothesis, she is indeed Wife to another Man. And if any (though the Supreme Authority) should command Mr. Cottington so to Co-habit with Gallina, this were to require him to live in impi­ous, and abominable Adultery with ano­ther Man's Wife, which as no Humane Power can justly command; so neither Mr. Cottington (nor any other) can obey without wounding his Conscience, and hazard of his Soul and Salvation. Tis active Obedience I mean, for if such commands should come, though we cannot do what's requir'd yet we may, and ought quietly to undergoe the pun­ishment, & agere & pati fortia Christia­num est, no Courage like that of a good [Page 9] Christian; who will suffer any thing patiently from his Governour, rather than sin against his God.

2. The next Query will be concerning the Invalidity and Nullity of Gallina' s Mar­riage with Patrimoniale. For if it be in­deed Null (as it seems, some do, and would persuade others to believe) then the Case is alter'd; Mr. Cottington may and ought to Co-habit with Gallina, as his lawfull Wife. For if her first Mar­riage were indeed a Nullity, then her second with Mr. Cottington, will be law­full and valid, and he obliged to Co-ha­bit with her, as her undoubted Husband. Now in the Case propos'd, I find but two Mediums brought to induce a belief, that Gallina's Marriage with Patrimoniale was a Nullity.

1. The Authority and Judicial Sen­tence of the Archbishop of Turine, de­claring it to be a Nullity.

2. The reason alledged (on which it seems that sentence was grounded) [Page 10] drawn from the Force and Fear, which made Gallina's consent involuntary.

Now I conceive (with submission to better Judgments) that these Mediums are too weak and insufficient to give satisfac­tion to Mr. Cottington, or to quiet his Con­science so as that he may, without dan­ger or doubting Co-habit with Gallina. For if he should Co-habit with her, and only doubt of the Lawfullness of it, he Rom. 14. 2. 3.certainly sins. It is a received and certain rule amongst Casuists, That quicquid fit reluc­tante vel dubitante conscientiâ est peccatum. If may Conscience tell me 'tis not, or doubt whether the thing I do be good and Lawfull (what ever it be) I sin if I do it. And that's the meaning of that saying of the Apostle (many times mis­taken) whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin. That is, whoever does any thing with­out a Moral Certainty, that what he does is just and lawfull, he sins in doing it. Now concerning the former of those [Page 11] two Mediums, the Archbishop's judicial Sentence in this Case, it is to be consi­der'd.

1 o For the Archbi­shop of Turin's Sen­tence. That admit that Archbishop and the Pope too (his Supe­riour and beyound Sea) their supreme Judge, had both concurr'd in giving the same Sen­tence, and declared the Marriage of Pa­trimoniale and Gallina a Nullity; yet see­ing (by the known and just Statut. 24. H. 8. cap. 12. and 25. Hen. 8. cap. 19. 20, 21. &c. I Eliz. cap. 1. 3. Jacobi. cap. 4. our Articles of Reli­gion. Art. 37. The Bishop of Rome hath no Jurisdiction in England. Laws of England) they have no Authority or Jurisdicti­on over any here; 'tis certain, they can lay no Obligation on any Eng­lish Men, to approve or submit to such Sentence.

2. Nor can such Sentence (if the Pope and Archbishop had given it, be any reason or just ground to warrant a­ny Judge or Court in England, to give the same Sentence, in the same or the like [Page 12] Case, or be any just bar or reason to hin­der them to give the contrary Sentence. All know that a Facto ad jus non sequitur Argumentum; the Pope, this, or that Court or Council, judg'd so; ergo; we must or may do so is evidently inconsequent. In the Case of Hen. 8. and Queen Ka­tharine, the Pope in and with his Consi­story, judg'd, that he had Power to give (and actually gave) a Dispensation to Marry Relictam Fratris, his Brothers Wife; and yet afterwards, our own at home, and abroad the greatest Universities in Christendom, judg'd the quite contra­ry in their Convocations call'd for that purpose. Nay our own Supreme Court (the Parliament) in Hen. 8. time Statut., 25. H. 8. cap. 22. Judg'd that Marriage to be against the Laws of God; and in Queen Mary's time, the Parliament (by Publick Act) declared that it was Statut. 1 Ma­riae Sess. 2. cap. 7. according to the laws of God. The Sentences of that Supreme Court [Page 13] are contradictory, and ergo; one of them (be which it may be, is evidently Un­true and Erroneous,) and therefore can neither be a just Warrant for any in England to approve it, or judg accor­ding to it, or a just Bar or Let to hin­der us to judge the Contrary. Now, if notwithstanding the respect and re­verence we owe to that Supreme Court, we may, in this (and many the like Cases) disapprove its definitive Sen­tence, and be of a contrary Judgment. Then much more may we disapprove, and be of a Judgment contrary to the definitive Sentence of the Archbishop of Turin, who is in nothing our Superi­our, nor hath any Authority or Juris­diction in England; especially in a mat­ter of Fact, wherein neither that Arch­bishop nor the Pope himself (though the Jesuites and some Canonists be of the contrary opinion) pretend to be infalli­ble.

[Page 14] And once more, as the definitive Sen­tence of any Popish Archbishop, or of the Pope himself in his Consistory, or in a general Counsel can be no good Pre­sident or just ground, to warrant any Protestant Judge or Court, to judge ac­cordingly, or any legall Barr or Let to hinder them to give a contrary Sentence; so sure I am, that no such Sentence gi­ven by such Persons and Judges in any of their Courts, Consistories or Coun­sells, can be a sufficient ground for Mr. Cottington to relie upon, to give stisfac­tion and quiet to his Conscience, so as to secure him, that he may safely and without sin, Co-habit with Gallina; as with his Lawfull Wife; only because they have pronounced her Marriage with Patrimoniale to be a Nullity. For (besides that he has many Reasons (if they may be heard, as in Law and Conscience they ought. Reg. Nullus 20. de Reg. Juris. in 6.) to suspect and deny that Sentence, and to believe it illegall [Page 15] and injust. The thing is evident, be­cause definitive Sentences given not on­ly in Inferiour, but in Superiour Courts, and General Councils, are so far from giving satisfaction to Protestants or Pa­pists, or quieting their Consciences in a belief of what is in such Sentences judi­cially defin'd; that in many things they actually dissent, and confidently deny such Definitions. so it was the Defini­tive Sentence of a Popish In the Convo­cation, Anno, Hen. 8. 22. Domini. 1531. Vid. Antiquit. Britan. in Archie­piscopo Warham, p. 325. Convocati­on and Parliament Vid. 24. H. 8. cap. 12. 25. H. 8. cap. 19, &c. (in the time of Hen. 8.) that the King was Su­preme over all Persons, and in all Causes Eccle­siastical and Temporal, and that the Pope had no Articuli Relig, Eccles. Anglic. Art. 37. confirm'd in Par­liament and subscripti­on required. Vid. Sta­tut. 13. Eliz. cap. 12. Vide Antiquit. Britan. P. 329. ad. Ann. 1534. Edit. Hano­viae 1605. power in England, yet the Sentence of those two great Courts (each Supreme in its kind) give little satisfaction to our Papists now, who [Page 16] absolutely deny such Su­premacy. So the Con­vocation and Parliament (in the beginning of Queen Mary's Reign) by their definitive Sentence E­stablish Popery here in England, which gave as little satisfaction to Protestants, who did both believe and know that the Religion Established was Erroneous, and therefore the Establishment, by the Law of God and the Gospel, unwarran­table and unjust. In short, the ade­quate and only rule of Conscience, (which can satisfie and quiet it, and on which it may securely relie for sure Di­rections) is the will of God made known to us, ( lumine naturae, aut scripturae) by natural Reason, or Divine Revelation in Scripture. For what ever can be made appear to us, by clear and con­vincing Reason, grounded on Nature or Scripture, de faciendâ, aut fugiendâ, this may and will satisfie, and secure our Conscience, so that we may innocently [Page 17] act accordingly; but otherwise, no Sentence of any Man or Court, ( Eccle­siastical or Temporal) can do it, unless the Reasons of such Sentence be (and ap­pear to be) sufficient. And this brings me to the second Medium, express'd in the Case, to shew the Marriage of Pa­trimoniale and Gallina to be a Nullity. The reason al­ledged for the Nullity.The reason alledged in the Case, as the ground of the Archbishop of Turin's Sentence, and of the Nullity of the said Marri­age, is this: That Gallina was under a Force and Fear, caus'd by her Father, by reason whereof her consent was not voluntary, (as by L. 12. & L. 14. Cod. de nuptiis & Leg. 21. & 22. F. de Ritu nuptiarum cap. Cum locum 14. extra De Sponsali & Matrimonijs. Law) it ought to be; and therefore the Matrimonial contract (for want of such a vo­luntary and free consent) invalid and a Nullity. But thisreason is too weak, and altogether insufficient.

[Page 18] To be a just ground either first, of the aforesaid Sentence of Nullity, or second­ly, to secure and quiet the Conscience of Mr. Cottington (it he obey'd that Sen­tence, and should Co-habit with Galli­na) as may appear if we consider,

1. That 'tis the avow'd Judgment of a Person Eminent for his great knowledge of all Learning, especially of the Laws, that no Fear, how great soever (humane Constitutions secluded) does make the actions which proceed from it Ego (saies Gro­tius) omnino illorum accedo sententiae qui existimant, (sepositâ lege Civili, quae obliga­tionem potest tollere aut minuere) eum qui metu promisit aliquid, obligari. Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 2. cap. 11. §. 7. Invo­luntary; so as to hinder their Obligation and Va­lidity. For he who pro­mises any thing for fear (which otherwise he would not have done) is yet oblig'd to make good his promise.

2. His reason is Quia consensus hic adfuit, nec condi­tionalis sed absolutus; nam, ut recte ait Ari­stoteles, qui naufragij metu res suas jactat, vellet eas servare sub conditione, si nau­fragium non immine­ret, sed absolute vult eas perdere, spectatâ scilicet loci & tempo­ris circumstantiâ. Gro­tius Ibidem. because he, or she, who consents and promises any thing for [Page 19] fear, does indeed and ac­tually consent and pro­mise, and that absolute­ly, and not upon any condition. This he fur­ther proves by the Au­thority, and an Aristotle Ethic. Nicom. lib. 3. and Rhodius, and all his Scholiasts and Com­mentators there. in­stance of Aristotle; who saies, That he who in a Storm at Sea, casts his Goods over Board, would be willing to save them on this Condition, if he might escape Shipwrack; but in those Circumstan­ces and Danger he is then in, he is absolute­ly willing to loose them, and cast them into the Sea.

Nor is it Aristotle only and Grotius, who say this, but all the Scholiasts and Commentators on Aristotle, both Greek and Latine, which I have yet seen, say the same thing. And then, if the Au­thority and Judgment of so many and so learned Men, be valuable, as no [Page 20] doubt it is, fear, as is pretended, does not make those Actions whose Principle it is, involuntary, and the truth of this, is further and beyond dispute evident.

3. Because Fear is the Principle which makes such Actions voluntary, and the Person under such fear willing to pro­duce them. For tis evident, that there is nothing which makes a Man in a Storm willing to cast his Goods into the Sea, but the fear to loose his Ship and his Life, if he do not so. Nay, second­ly, so far is fear from making our acti­ons Involuntary, that the greater the fear is, they are by it made more vo­luntary; for no Man before he was in fear, was ever, willing to cast his Goods into the Sea, but after the Storm and his Danger (and so his fear) begun, his willingness to loose his Goods and save himself begun too; and as the Danger and his Fear increased, so proportiona­bly his willingness to cast away his Goods; and when his Danger and Fear [Page 21] are come to the height, then, and not till then, he is absolutely willing to cast them into the Sea, and makes hast to put that will in Execution; being as really desirous and willing to loose his Goods, as by so doing to save his Ship and himself, so that if fear made our actions Involuntary, then the more the fear was they would be more Involun­tary; whereas the contrary is evident, that as our fear increaseth, so our wil­lingness to do those actions which pro­cede from it.

4. The fear and force Gallina pretends to make her contract with Patrimoniale, a Nullity. was from her own Father: It is pretended, her Father forc'd her to consent; whence it appears, that she had her Father's consent and command to marry him, and may be, many and severe Threatnings too, if she did not Marry him: Whether this was so, or not, I know not; but if it was so, yet this neither did, nor by any Law of [Page 22] God or Man, could make her Matrimo­nial contract a Nullity. First, That any Law of God, Natural or Positive, should make the consent, command or threatnings of a Father sufficient to Null the consent, and matrimonial contract of his Daughter, neither is, nor can be pretended. Secondly, For humane Laws the Civilians and Canonists tell us, That the fear of a Father makes not the Marriage or Consent of his Daughter a Nullity. Arnold. Vinni­us Comment. in In­stitut. De nuptjis ad Textum, Qui possunt nuptias contrahere, 53. Jachim. a Beust. De Jure connubiorum cap. 44. pag. 8. 6. Plane metust reverentialis, sive obsequium reverentiae Paternae debitum; matrimo­nium non impedit, uti nec Consensum. No not when the Daughter gives her consent Dionys. Gotho­fredus ad leg. Si Patre 22. F. De Ritu nup­tiarum, & idem ad lib. 3. F. Quiod metus causa, p. Patre suaden­te, admodum urgente & hor­tante. And the law it self tells us, That if a Fa­ther compell or force his Son to marry a Wife, there is the same reason for his Daughter [Page 23] to marry a Husband, which otherwise he would not have Married; yet the mar­riage is valid, and (by reason of that force) no Nullity; Dicta lege. Si Patre 22. F. de Ritu nuptiarum. The Law saies, Quod vi, metus­ve causa gestum, ra­tum non est. But then it must be, vis atrox contra bonos mores, non eam quam magistratus intulit, 1. 3. F. eod. si Filius Patre co­gente ducit uxorem, quam non duceret, si sui arbitrij es­set, contraxit tamen matri­monium, quod, inter invitos non contrabitur, maluisse hoc videtur. So that even ac­cording to Human, Civil, and Canon Laws, it is not all Co-action, force or fear from a Father which makes the consent of a Daughter in a Matrimonial contract, invalid or Nulli­ty; and therefore 'tis impertinently pretended for such in our present Case.

5. I confess, the Canonists and Civilians say, That fear makes the consent Invo­luntary, and so indces a Nullity. Cap. Cum Lo­cum 14 extra De Span­sali & Matrimonis. Locum non habet consen­sus, ubi metus vel co-ac­tio intercedit, &c. So saies [Page 24] that Law, and the Lawyers Panormitan. ad dictum cap. Vinnius, a Beute, Gothofredus, &c. Locis supra cita­tis. con­sent and say further; Quod Matrimonium per me­tum, vel minis contractum, deficiente consensu, est ipso jure nullum. But it is cer­tain, first, That they do not mean a Reverential Fear, a fear of displeasing a Father; for the same Men, in the same places say, That such a fear does not vitiate the consent, or make a Nullity: Now all the fear pretended by Gallina (in our Case) was from her Father. Secondly, If the fear arise from the many and se­vere Threats of a Father, yet this can­not make the consent involuntary, and so a Nullity. I confess, that if a Father should Command and Threaten his Daughter to Marry an impious and un­worthy Person, the Tum solum dis­sentiendi a Patre licen­tia Filiae conceditur, si indignum moribus, aut turpem sponsum ei Pater eligat, l. sed quae 12. § tunc autem F. De sponsalibus. Law will war­rant her disobedience; for in that Case she is [Page 25] Parentis con­sensus in nuptijs libero­rum requiritur, ex re­verentia parentis de­bita, nisi manifeste iniqua sit Parentis vo­luntas. Grotius de jure Belli lib. 2. Oap. 5. § 10.not by Law bound to obey her Father's commands or threat­nings. But in our Case, no such indignity or in­capacity of Patrimoniale's person is complain'd of, or so much as pretended for a cause why Gallina's consent should be involuntary, and the conjugal con­tract a Nullity.

Now if this be true, and the Law it self says it; That, tum solum dissentiendi a Patre licentia Filie & conceditur, cum indignum moribus aut turpem sponsum ei Pater eligat. If the Law allow a Daughter to disobey her Fa­ther's commands (proposing a Huband to her) only in such Case; then if he chuse and propose a Person better qualified, and no way unworthy of her, and give his con­sent and command, that she shall marry him (as the matter of Fact was in our Case) then she is bound to obey him. For if it be Lawful for a Daughter to disobey her Father, onely when he pro­poses [Page 26] and unworthy Husband; then, when he proposes one worthy, she is bound to obey him. Seeing then the Husband propos'd to Gallina, by her Fa­ther was no way unworthy of her, but she bound (upon her Father's consent and command) to marry him, it fol­lows, Thirdly, That her actual mar­rying him, upon her Father's command and fear to displease him, was an act of filial Obedience and Duty, and therefore could not possibly vitiate her consent, and make the conjugal contract involun­tary, invalid, and, as pretended, a Nulli­ty. Nay, Fourthly, 'tis certain that a Father hath a just Authority by the Law of God Exod. 20. 12. Honour thy Father and thy Mother, &c. and Nature, to consider and judge what is good for his Children, and not only to command their Obedience, but to use Threats and Menaces; yea, and Castigati­ons and Whippings too, to make them do their Duty, and obey his just commands; [Page 27] so our Heavenly Father commands us to obey his Laws, useth Menaces, threa­tens Death and Damnation if we do not; and these Means he has appointed, Threatnings as well as Promises, to make us willing to do what he com­mands, our Duty. And therefore to say, that such Paternal Commands and Threatnings (whether of our Heavenly or Earthly Parents) can be a just ground, to make our consents to such commands involuntary, which he has ordain'd to make us give a willing and voluntary Obedience, is to Blaspheme his infinite­ly wise Providence, and to say that the means which he has appointed to pro­duce a willing and voluntary consent in us to obey his Commands and do our Duty, has a necessary and contrary ef­fect, and makes them involuntary. So that it being granted that Gallina's Father commanded her to marry Pa­trimoniale, and to make her to do it, added many and severe Threatnings; [Page 28] for The Law saies, L. 2. F. Quod metus Causa, Quod vi, metusve causa gestum, ratum non est. But then it means, vim atrocem & contra bo­nos mores, non eam quam magistratus juste intulit, Scilicet Jure licito honoris quem sustinet, li, 3. Ib. non comminationem, neque alterius nudam Reve­rentiam. Gotofred. ad dictam legem. So that, tis evident, that the Menaces of a Father or Magistrate (who have Authority) do not cause any Nulli­ty, by Law, when what they command is, not illicitum or con­tra bono smores; as cer­tainly Gallina's Mar­riage with Patrimo­niale was not. fear of which she did (and with­out them would not have done it) marry him, this may prove, that (in those circum­stances, and to avoid her Father's displeasure) she willingly made that con­jugal contract; but nei­ther is, not can be any ground to prove that her consent was involunta­ry, and so the contract in valid, as is pretended, and a Nullity. Fifthly, And this may further ap­pear, that such Actions are not involuntary, by the consent of Christen­dom, thus: In the Pri­mitive Church and times of Persecution, some Christians suffer'd Im­prisonment and many Torments, for [Page 29] their Religion; yet at last for fear of Death, threatned by their Pagan Perse­cutors, they offered Incense in the Idol Temple; and yet all those Imprison­ments, Torments, and Threatnings of Death, did not make that act of theirs Involuntary, for then it had not been Sin; peccatum utique non est peccatum nisi sit voluntarium; and yet the Church and Christian World judg'd it to be a great Sin, and Ecclesiastical Punishments, and long Penances Vid. Can. 24, 25, 26, &c, in Cod. Can. Eccl. Universae seu Concilij Ancyrani. Can. 4, 5, 6. were imposed on them for it, as appears by the for it, as appears by the Antient and approved Canons. Now if all these Sufferings and Fears of present Death, did not make their act of Sacri­ficing in a Pagan Temple Involuntary, then neither will the like, if any such had been, make Gallina's act of marrying in a Christian Church invo­luntary, nor consequently invalid and a Nullity. Sixthly, But let it be further [Page 30] granted, that Gallina was unden very great force and fear from her Father, as is pretended; and that, that force and fear was of such a Nature and De­gree, as the Canon and Civil Laws judge What force and fear are suffici­ent, the Law tells us, L. 1, 2, 3, &c. F. Quod metus causa gestum est, Gloss. & Go­tofredi note ad dictas leges Tit. 20. Lib. 2. Cod. & Cap. 14, 15. 21. extra De sponsal. & matrimon. & cap. insuper 4. extra Qui matrimon. accus. pos­sunt vel contra. The Gloss. & Panormitan ib. & L. interposi­tus Cod. de Trans­actionibus. sufficient, to make a conju­gal contract invalid, and a Nullity. Yet seeing (in this case) Idem est non esse & non apparere, till this do legally ap­pear by just proofs; no judge can (as least none should) give sentence for a Nullity; nor can Mr. Cottington with any Security, Quiet or Peace of Conscience Co-habit with her, as with his legal Wife. And in this and such other Matrimo­nial Cases of Nullity and Divorce, our Church requires, that the greatest Cau­tion be used and all means possible, to [Page 31] find our the truth by deposition of Wit­nesses, and other lawful Proofs, but would have no credit given to the con­fession or oaths of the Parties. The words are these in our Canon: Constitutions and Canons Ecclesi­ast. I Jacobi 1603. Can. 105. We straitly charge that in all Proceedings to Nullities of Matrimony, good circum­spection and advice be used, and that so far as is pos­sible, truth be sifted out by deposition of Witnesses and other lawfull Proofs, and that credit be not given to the sole confession of the Parties, however taken upon Oath, either within or without the Court. This is the Law of England, for I believe a Canon made in Convocation, and confirm'd by the King's Supreme Authority, to be a Statut. 25. H. 8. Cap. 19. Judge Vaughan's Reports, pag. 327. and pag. 21. and 132. Law, in re Ecclesiasticâ, as well as an Act of Parliament is in re Civi­lis. And by this Law, no Sentence of Nullity of a Matrimonial Contract, [Page 32] can legally be pronounc'd, till just and That just proofs are prerequi­red to a just Sentence, Reason and Law tell us. L. Si dona­tionis 7. & L. Me­tum. 9. Cod. De his quae vi metusve causâ gesta sunt, & L. Inter­positus. 13. Cod. De Transactionibus.legal Proofs be made, and (by the same Law) the Con­fessions and Oaths of the Parties are no sufficient Proofs; so that in our present Case, if Patri­moniale and Gallina had both confessed and so­lemnly Sworn, that there was such force and fear (as is pretend­ed to be the ground of that Nullity) yet by our Law, such Confessions and Oaths are no legal Proofs. Nor does it appear, that there were any other le­gal and sufficient Proofs of it, and there­fore Mr. Cottington having no sufficient assurance or just ground to believe, ei­ther, First, That there really was any such pretended force and fear; or, Se­condly, That such pretended, but not prov'd, force and fear, was a sufficient ground of a Nullity; for while no force [Page 33] did by legal Proofs appear, it was im­possible to know the Nature, Degree and Measure of that pretended force, and so whether it was such as could cause a Nullity. I say Mr. Cottington having no sufficient certainty of these Particulars, he cannot with Innocence and a safe Conscience Co-habit with Gallina, as with his own Wife, seeing she may be, and (for ought appears to the contarry) is another Mans.

Lastly: But let it be granted (tho it ap­pear not by any legal Evidence) that Gal­lina was under some force and fear, at the time of her Marriage; so that her consent was not so voluntary and free, as other wise is requir'd in such Contracts; yet 'tis evident and confessed, that she after­wards lived with her Husband a year and a half, had a Child by him, and all that while never made any protestation or Vid L. Cum te. 2. Cod. De his quae vi metusve causà gesta sunt, where 'tis resolv'd, that he who said he was compell'd to pay Money, and yet, omissa Querela, having ground for it, did not complain; gestum praesumitur spontance factum, no metu. Gotofred. ad dictam legem. com­plaint [Page 34] of any such force or fear, or that her consent was involuntary, though she had all that time, and being in a safe place, many opportunities to have done it, which spontaneous and volun­tary Co-habitation with her Husband, was a legal confirmation and ratihabi­tion of her first consent; so that it was sufficient to make the conjugal contract valid, firm, and obligatory. This is an evident truth established by the Civil and Canon Laws, acknowledged by the best Civilians and Canonists, received and practised in their respective Courts. That this may appear, I say.

First, That a good Canonist Paul. Lancellot. Institut. Jur. Canon. 1. 2. tis. 22. §. Coactio. tells us, not obiter and casually, but in his institutions made and allowed by and Institutiones in Aula Rom. Mandato Pont. max. ab illustri­bus viris recognitae. So the Epigraphe. Authority of the Pope himself; That if a Woman do prove that her conjugal con­sent was through fear, [Page 35] at first involuntary; yet if afterwards, she willingly did Co-habit with her Hus­band, and he had Carnal knowledge of Her, the fear is Purg'd (though it was at first a just fear) and the Matrimonial contract valid and Obligatory. The words are these— Quae invita probat se sponsalia contraxisse, si comperiatur postea sponte cognita ad matrimonii Dissolutionem proclamare & metum causare non poterit. And the Lemma or Title of that Paragraph is this; Justus metus si purgatus fuerit, and Antecedentem metum spont anea copula ex post facto purgat, Matrimonium non impedit. We see that a just fear, and that proved, makes no Nullity nor Invalidity, if af­terwards she willingly consent to Car­nal Knowledge, and give due benevo­lence to her Husband. But Gallina's fear, in our Case, was pretended only, not prov'd; she Co-habited with him willingly eighteen Months, and had a Child by him; and ergo, much less could such pretended fear prove a Nul­lity.

[Page 36] Secondly, And the Cap. Insuper, 4. extra Qui matrimoni­ium accusare possunt, vel contra, &c. Law it self ex­pressly determines the Case, wherein the Lem­ma prefixed to the Chapter is this: Invita desponsata postea sponte Cognita contra Matrimonium non auditur; and then the Pope determines the Case, whether it was Gregory, the 9th. or his Chaplain Raymond calls him Clement the 3. Loco proxime citato, and Gratian calls him Celestine. Cant. Videtur. 2. Caus. 35. Qu­est. 6. Clemens or Celestine, I inquire not, ipsi vide­rint, thus; Adversus Mat­trimonium audiri non debet quae ante Cognitionem sui cum potuit minime recla­mavit, postquam enim copu­lae carnali semel consentit ex Ratihibitione sibi super hos silontium non ambigitur indixise. Gallina in our Case lived eighteen Months will­ingly with her Husband, had a Child by him, willingly I suppose, & cum potuit minime reclamavit; and, ergo, à fortiori, such her Spontaneous Co-habitation; and Carnal Copulation, was a real [Page 37] and legal Ratihabition and confirmati­on of her consent and conjugal contract; although it had been, which appears not, at first, through force or fear, invo­luntary. And that such a subsequent spontaneous consent is sufficient to ra­tifie an antecedent Contract suppos'd, or really being involuntary, is justified by the L. Si per vim. 4. Cod. De his Dqu [...]e. vi metusve causa fiunt, si per vim vel metum mortis aut cruciatus corporis, venditio à vo­bis extorta est & non postea eam consensu corroborâstis, &c. Civil Law and best Civilians. Nor does the Law re­quire that such subse­quent consent be gi­ven in express words, but a tacit con­sent, by doing some act which signifies, and gives a moral certainty of the inter­nal willingness of the party, is sufficient. Consensu etiam tacito (saies a most learn­ed Dionys. Gotho­fredus ad dictam legem, lit. p.Lawyer, and proves it by express L. Cum te. 2. Cod. De his quae vi metusve Causa, &c.Law) Ratihabitio ac­tus, as he goes on; ante­cedentem actum metu ge­stum [Page 38] non fuisse demonstrat. Consensûs gemi­natio tollit metûs Presumptionem. So Grotius de Jure Belli, lib. 2. Cap. 11. §. 20. Grotius, Tractat. de Jure Comnubiorum, Cap. 44. pag. 81. Joach. à Beust, Panormitan, and others cited by them, and ge­nerally all I have yet seen.

Thirdly. Once more: The truth of what I have said does further; and if that be possible, more evidently appear to be res judicata & proa veritate habenda. For it is a Case in Terminis, and express­ly determin'd by Pope Clement the Third, who was a better Casuist and Judge if not infallible; yet sure I am of far greater Authority than the Archbishop of Tu­rin: For Pope Agatho (if Gratian cite him right) has told us, Sic onnes Apo­stolicae sedis sanctiones accipiendae sunt tanquam ipstus Divini Petri voce firmatae. Can. Sic omnes. 2. Dist. 19. That all the Popes Decretals are to be received, as if the Di­vine Authority of St. Peter had confirm'd them. The Determination of Pope [Page 39] Clement, Cap. Ad id ex­tra De sponsalibus & Matrimoniis. which I mean was (by Gre­gory the Ninth) Regi­stred and referred into the body of the Canon Law; where the Title or Summary prefix'd to the Chapter is this; Matrimonium per vim contractum, Co-habitatione spontaneâ, convale scit, hoc di­cit, & quotidie allegatur; where we have, first, the Law in this Position. A sub­sequent spontaneous Co-habitation con­firms a conjugal contract made by force or fear Secondly, The received and common practice of it. It was no an­tiquated Law, or abolish'd by any con­trary Law or Desuetude. No, saies the Summary, Quotidie allegatur, it was in continual and daily use: Thus the Ti­tle, The Popes Decision of the Case, follows in the Chapter, so Parallel with our present Case as nothing can be more; Nec 1. The Woman then pretended force and fear in the Contract, made her consent involuntary, so does Gallina non. ovum ovo simili­us. [Page 40] The Case then was thus; A Wo­man was marryed un­willingly, 2. The Woman then desir'd, that for that force and fear that conjugal Contract might be declared inva­lid and a Nullity; so does Gallina now. and her con­sent involuntary, yet afterwards she li­ved with her Husband a year and a half; which Co-habitation was (by the Pope) judged a confirmation and ra-tihabition of the conjugal Contract, which was at first Involuntary. The words are these— Faemina quaedam cuidam Teutonico Matrimoni­aliter copulatur, quae quamvis ab initio invita fuisset ei tradita, & renitens; tamen quia postmodum per annum & dimidium sibi Cohabi­tans, 3. The Woman then after her contract, lived willingly for a year and a half with her Husband without com­plaining, or protestation of her unwillingness; so did Gallina. consensisse videtur, ad ipsum est cogen­da redire; Nec de caetero recipiendi sunt Testes, si quos dicta mu­lier ad probandum, 4. It was then judged, and it was then and still is Law, that the subsequent Co-habitation purged the former fear, and ratifi'd the contract; and Gallina's Case and the Law, being still the same, it should have the same Sentence. quod [Page 41] non consenserit nominaverit producendos, cum mora tanti temporis hujusmodi probati­onem excludit; from which Sentence and Law it is evident,

First, That though the Womans Act was at first involuntary, yet her Co-habitation with her Husband (for a year and a half) ratifi'd and con­firm'd the Matrimonial Contract; and therefore, in our Case, had Gal­lina's consent been at first involunta­tary, (which is not proved) yet her Co-habitation with her Husband for a year and a half (especially having a Child in that time by him) did by the same Law ratifie the former, though involuntary contract.

Secondly, That by this Sentence and Law of the Pope, the Woman having liv'd with her Husband a year and a half, that Co-habitation had so con­firm'd and ratified the conjugal con­tract, ex post facto, that although, ab ini­tio, it were involuntary; yet that could [Page 42] not cause any Nullity or Invalidity in the Marriage or Contract which made it. And therefore the Pope and the Law say,— Qu'd Testes de caetero non sunt recipiendi, quia mora tanti temporis hu­jusmodi probationem excludit. It was in the Pope's Judgment, against Reason and Law, after a spontaneous Co-habi­tation for a year and a half, to admit of Witnesses to prove that her consent was (at first) involuntary, in order to a Nullity of the Matrimonial Contract; seeing that being granted, it did not follow that there was any Nullity or Invalidity in the said Contract; and therefore the Pope truly judg'd, that it was impertinent to bring Witnesses to prove that, which (in that Case) was indeed granted; and otherwise, if it had been proved, could no way profit them: The subsequent spontaneous Co­habitation having abundantly ratified the Contract, and supplied the defects of the first involuntary consent. And [Page 43] hence, it farther follows, and (if I mi­stake not) evidently,

First, That the Sentence of the Arch­bishop of Turin (in Gallina's Case) was repugnant and directly contradictory to Law. First, Because he admitted and examined no Witnesses which (in such case) the Law expresly forbids. Secondly, In that he by his definitive Sentence, judg'd and declared that to be a Nulli­ty, which the establish'd, and, though may be not to him, the known Laws and the Pope too, had declared and judg'd to be none.

Secondly, That therefore that Sentence of the Archbishop (being against Law, and the definitive Sentence of the Su­preme Judge) was absolutely and in it self Sententia dici­tur nulla, quia lata est contra jus constitutionis, nulla vero non transit in rem judicatant. Panormitan. Judiciarij Ordinis Processus. Forma Apostolorum, & sententia lata contra legem, vel ex juris errore, est ipso jure nu. Commun. opinionum, Tom. 1. 51. Num. 11. Null, to all intents and purposes.

[Page 44] Thirdly, And then such sentence be­ing (by the Laws Civil and Sacred) absolutely Null; it follows, that the Matrimonial contract between Patrimo­niale and Gallina, was firm, valid and ob­ligatory.

The premises considered, I think there is some Reason to believe, that no Court or consistory on Earth, can just­ly oblige Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with Gallina, the conjugal Contract with her former Husband remaining firm and valid. Yet if any should ( quod absit) I am sure, he cannot possibly, with In­nocence and a good Conscience, use her as a Wife. For seeing the Law and right reason tell us, that illud solium possumus, quod L. filius 15. ff. de condit. instituti­onum. jure possumus, it can be no more possible for him to Co-habit with her (with a good Con­science) than to lie with another Man's Wife, as Gallina certainly is, and com­mit Adultery.

Ita est. T. Lincolne.

Query. Whether the Bishops of England have Power to questi­on a Sentence of the Archbishop of Turin?

My Honoured Friend,

I Understand by your Letter, that some say (who they are, I neither know nor inquire) that the King and Bi­shops of England have no Power to Questi­on the Archbishop of Turin's Sentence, given in the Case of Patrimoniale and Gallina. I confess, I do not a little wonder at the strangeness of their Position; the ra­ther, because (having consulted very learned Divines and Lawyers,) I can find no ground for it. But, on the other side, many (to me) evident reasons to the contrary, which I submit to your Censure: & si quid novisti rectius, candi­dus [Page 46] imperti, and I will be your thankful Proselyte. Here then, I consider, that a Sentence of the Archbishop of Turin, may be either,

  • 1. Such as concerns his own Subjects onely, over whom he has a just Au­thority and Jurisdiction.
  • 2. Or, such as may concern one or more of the King of England's Sub­jects.

For the first I conceive it is certain, First, That the Archbishop of Turin, be­ing (as to all his Subjects) a legal Su­perior, obedience is due to him. It be­ing Law with them of Rome, (and I shall not deny it) that in In dubijs, stan­dum est sententiae su­periorum, maxime Pontificum. Fillucius Quaest. moral. Trac­tat. 10. c. 2. Quaest. 8. §. 55. Can. Quod culpatur. 4. Caus. 23. Quaest. 1. & cap. Ad aures. 5. extra De Temp. ordinandorum. things lawfull, or dubious, the subject must stand to the Sen­tence of his Superiours; they have no [Page 47] power to question or rescind his Sen­tence. Secondly, And 'tis granted, that the King and Bishops of England, nei­ther have, nor pretend to have any pow­er to question any Sentence of that Arch­bishop (which only concerns his own Subjects) so as to rescind, make it Null, or not Obligatory. For that cannot be done, save by a power Superior to that of the Archbishop; such as neither the King nor the Bishops of England pre­tend to. Thirdly, But I think it as cer­tain, that the King and Bishops of Eng­land, may question any Sentence of the Archbishop of Turin, or the Pope him­self, so far, as to consider and examine the Truth or Justice of it (when there is a just occasion, and our King or his Subjects concern'd) and approve or con­demn, admit or reject it, when and so far as (all circumstances considered) they find it just and true, or otherwise, as shall (God willing) anon appear. But of such Sentences, I suppose, the present Query is not.

[Page 48] Secondly, But the question principally is concerning such Sentence, wherein a Subject of England is concern'd, (as in Mr. Cottington's Case) who owes Loy­alty and Subjection to his King, and may expect protection from him. Now in this case, the Archbishop's Sentence might either be.

1. For Co-habitation, requiring Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with Gallina: to give her due Benevolence and Mainte­nance.

2. Or, only to declare a Nullity of the Matrimonial Contract between Patri­moniale and Gallina.

For the first, If the Archbishop's Sen­tence was such as required Co-habitati­on, that Mr. Cottington should give due Benevolence and Maintenance to Galli­na; Then his Sentence was absolutely Null, Quia à non judice lata, (that Archbishop having no Jurisdiction over [Page 49] Mr. Cottington) and an usurpation of the just Rights of our King, the Supreme, and of our Bishops who (from and un­der him) have a sub-ordinate Jurisdi­ction over the Subjects of England, and so over Mr. Cottington. Sure I am, the Archbishop of Turin had no Jurisdicti­on over Mr. Cottington, a subject of the King of England. First, Not Supreme; that's only in our King, as our Laws and Oaths testifie. Secondly, Not Subor­dinate; for that must be derived from the King, who surely never gave the Archbishop of Turin any Jurisdiction over Mr. Cottington, or any of his Sub­jects. And therefore, if the Archbi­shop of Turin's Sentence was such, our King and Bishops might justly question and censure it, for what it was, a Nulli­ty, and an illegal usurpation of the Rights of the Church of England.

For the second, If the Archbishop of Turin's Sentence was only, that the Ma­trimonial Contract between Patrimoniale [Page 50] and Gallina, was a Nullity; then I con­sider,

First, That it is confess'd, that Res Leg. Res judica­ta 207. F. De Regu­lis juris. judicata pro veritate accipitur, and the Sen­tence may be put in Ex­ecution; Bronchorst. ad di­ctam legem. Si sententia judicis, appellatione nullâ suspensa sit, nec ex alia causa potest restau­rari. But this must be understood in re­spect of the Parties li­tigant, L. Eleganter 23. §. Si quis post. F. De condict. Indeb. Facit jus irre­tractabile inter partes, saies the Law and Habetur pro ve­ritate inter litigantes. Gloss. ad dictam Re­gul. 207. Card. Tus­chus Concl. Pract. Ju­ris, lit. R. Concl. 267. Num. 57. Law­yers. And they add, Abb. Cons. 73. Videtur primo Col. 2. In princ v. primo con­tra eum l. 1. Sententia à qua non est appellatum, facit jus inter partes, etiamsi ab initio fu­it injusta.

Secondly, But yet this Rule has several limita­tions and fallentiae, as they call them; for L. 2. Cod. Quan­ [...] provec. non est neocess. L. Si expressum. 19. F. de Appell. & Leg. Eum prolatis. 32. F. De re judicata. Si sententia judi­cis sit ipso jure nulla, & [Page 51] contra jus lata, tum sine ap­pellatione infringitur, & non transit in rem judica­tam. And a good Law­yer, with relation to the Laws cited in the Margint, tells me Ever. Bronchorst. ad l. 207. F. de Reg. juris. His legibus dicitur, quod sententia lata contra leges, statuta, vel constitutiones principum, est ipso jure nulla, & ideo citra ap­pellationem, causa de novo in judicium deduci potest. And Panormitan Abb. Cons. 60. in casu. Col. 1. in fin. l. 2. Card. Tuschus lo­co citato §. 27. And it is a memorable say­ing of Vlpian to this purpose. Condemna­tum accipere debemus illum, qui ritè con­demnatus est, ut sen­tentia valeat: Nam si aliqua ratione senten­tia nulla sit, dicendum est, condemnationis ver­bum non tenere. L. 4. §. Condemnatum. 6. F. De re judisata. sententia pro Matrimonio, non transit in rem judica­tam, cum extat impedimen­tum lege divinâ vel huma­nâ, & super eo non est dis­pensatum. So that it is not every Sentence of a Judge (though not sus­pended by an appeal) which passes in rem judi­catam, no not in the same State or Kingdom; [Page 52] and therefore the Archbishop of Turin's Sentence, declaring the Matrimonial Contract between Patrimoniale and Gal­lina, to be a Nullity, if it be against any Law of God, or Man; as undeniably it is against both; if the grounds on which it was given, be Ea quae contra leges fiunt, non solum inutilia, sed pro infectis habenda. Can. Imperial 13. Caus. 25. Quaest. 2. Rescripta contra jus elicitum, ab omnibus Judicibus praecipimus refutari. lb. Can. 75. Ita statuunt Impp. The­odosius, & Valent. log. Rescript. 7. Cod. De Precibus Imperat. Of­ferendis, &c. such as they have been represented to me, is it self Null, and to all intents and purposes invalid.

Thirdly, But let the Archbishop's Sentence, as to the Nullity, be what it will, true or false, just or unjust; yet if it concerns a Subject of England, our King and Bishops have good reason, and a just power to question and examine it; and according to its Validity or Nullity, admit or reject it.

Fourthly, And that it does highly con­cern a Subject of England, is evident: For [Page 53] although ab Origine, it concern'd only Patrimoniale and Gallina, two of his own Subjects; yet Mr. Cottington having be­fore, or since the Sentence, I know not, married Gallina: He is highly concern­ed to be sure, that the Archbishop's Sen­tence is just and true. For if it be not, if indeed there be no Nullity in that Contract, then what Casuist or Court soever determines and decrees, that he shall Co-habit with Gallina as his Wife; does ( ipso facto) decree,

  • 1. That he shall Co-habit with an­other Man's Wife.
  • 2. That he shall live in continual Adultery.
  • 3. That if he have any Children by her, they are none of his; for, is pater est, quem nuptioe demonstrant.
  • 4. And so in case she out live him, he shall not be in a possibility, to leave any lawfull Issue to continue his Name and Family to Posterity.

[Page 54] Fifthly, If then the Archbishop's Sen­tence be untrue, if the contract between Patrimoniale and Gallina, was Matrimoni­um ratum, and no Nullity; then all those sad or sinful consequences, will necessari­ly follow; and so not only Mr. Cotting­ton, by Co-habiting with another Man's Wife, but his Judges too, who com­mand such Co-habitation, will be guil­ty of those horrid Impieties. For if it be true, as undoubtedly it is, that the Ma­gistrate who Qui non prohibit peccare cum possit, ju­bet. So 1 Sam. 3. 13. Eli is declared guilty of his Sons impleties, because he restrain'd them not. pro­hibits not Impieties, when 'tis in his power, is himself guilty of them: Then much more will he be guilty, who expresly commands them. And that Magistrate, whoever he be, who by a judicial Sentence, commands Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with another Man's Wife, for so she is, in case there be no Nullity, commands him to commit and continue in Adulte­ry.

[Page 55] Sixthly, It will therefore, both in Prudence and Conscience, highly concern our Bishops and Ecclesiastical Judges, to whom the cognizance of this cause belongs, that they be As a Subject may not disobey his Superior unless he be morally sure that what he com­mands is illicitum and sinful; so a Superiour may not command, unless he be morally sure, that what he commands is licitum and not sinful. Vid. Rob. Lincoln. de obligat. Cons. Praelect. 6. § 16. pag. 227. morally sure, that the Contract between Pa­trimoniale and Gallina was indeed a Nullity, before they decree and require Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with her. It is evidently repugnant to the nature of Justice, and the integrity of a just Judge, to give a cer­tain damnatory Sentence, upon an un­certain and dubious Ground. Now 'tis absolutely impossible, that any Man should be sure of such a Nullity as is decla­red in the Archbishop's Sentence, unless he know the reasons on which that Sen­tence is grounded, and that they are such, as efficaciously prove the Nullity: And if [Page 56] Mr. Cottington doubt of the Nullity (as of necessity he must, till by some ratio­nal medium it appear) and be not sure, Gallina is indeed his Wife; I am sure he sins, if he Co-habit with her, seeing he Co-habits with one, who (for ought he knows) is another Man's Wife. And then the Rule is certain, Quicquid fit, re­luctante vel Rom. 14. 23. Quod dubitas ne fece­ris. Cicero. Whatever is not of Faith is Sin, sales the Apostle. Ex fide, id est, ex credulitate & fiduciâ conscientiae de eo quod agit, quod licitum sit id agere. Pererius Jesuita, in Rom. 14. Disp. 8. §. 45. pag. 1177. And what Pererius calls Credulitas and Fiducia Conscientiae; Estius calls Mora­lis Estimatio, &c. A Moral assurance, that what is done, is lawful. Estius in Rom. 14. 23. dubitante conscientiâ, est peccatum.

Seventhly, If it be said, That the Arch­bishop of Turin has, by a judicial Sen­tence, declared that Contract to be a Nullity. It is confessed, but that is no just ground for Mr. Cottington, nor any body else, to be assured it is so, unless the Reasons on which his Sentence is groun­ded, appear to be cogent and sufficient [Page 57] to prove such Nullity. That Archbi­shop and his Assessors, neither are, nor pretend to be Infallible, and the Sentence of a fallible Authority, (so long as the Reasons of it are unknown) is not suf­ficient to satisfie and quiet a doubting Conscience. Our Holy Mother (the Church of England) has truly told us, and all her Sons subscribe it, that Gene­ral Art. Religionis, 21.Councils may and have actually erred, much more may a par­ticular Popish Consistory. I know it pas­ses for good Law and Divinity, among the Popish Casuists and Schoolmen, that the People are bound to believe their Bi­shop, even then, when he preaches He­resie: And are so far from sinning in do­ing so, that their submission to the Bi­shop, and believing errors, when taught by him, is Meritorious. It is a Cardi­nal who tells us,— Card. Tolet. In­struct. Sacerdotum, lib. 4. cap. 3. § 7. pag. 612. Rothomagi, 1630. Si rusticus circa Articulos fideì credat suo Episcopo, [Page 58] proponenti aliquod dogma Hereticum, meretur in Credendo licet sit Error; quia tenetur credere, donec ei constat esse contra Ecclesi­am. And before him, our Rob. Holcot in lib. 1. Sententia­rum. Quaest. 1. Ad sex­tum principale, in Re­plic. Countryman, and he a famous School­man, tells us, to the same wild purpose;— Si au­diat prelatum praedicantem propositionem erro­neam quam nescit esse erroneam, & credat ei, non peccat, sed tenetur errare, quid tenetur ei credere—& meretur volendo credere erro­rem, & tum simplicitas & ignorantia excu­sant. Nay, such an ignorant person (be­lieving an Error, which the Bishop has preached and proposed as a Truth and Article of Faith) if he be put to Death, and die in defence of that Error, which he believes to be an Article of Faith, he shall be a Martyr and have the honour and merit of Martyr­dom. Holcot Lb. in dicta Replicâ. The errors of the Church of Rome are many and great, and there­fore it is their Inte­rest to keep the Peo­ple Ignorant, least they come to know and abhor them. And on this ground, they teach this irrational Doctrine, That the People may and ought to believe e­ven those errors their Priest and Pastor Preaches. For tho' this be irrational, yet 'tis in favour of their false Religion: And so 'tis trus which their Canon Law, saies, Favore religionis mul­ta contra rationem con­stituuntur. Cap. Quantae. 47. Verbo interpretans in Glossa Extra de sententia excommunicationis. Concedo, si in­terficiatur pro tali errore, quem credit esse articulum [Page 59] fidei, potest adipisci meri­tum debitum martyrî, quia error invincibilis non dimi­nuit de merito. But how­ever, this anciently did, and at Rome still does pass for Catholick Do­ctrine, with the Pope and his miserably in­slaved Party; yet the Church of England, and all her true Sons, be­lieve and know it to be a prodigious and stupid Error.

Eighthly, That our King and Bishops, have power to question that Archbi­shop's, or any such Sentence; and when our King or his Subjects are concern'd, if upon a just Examination, they find it for want of Truth or Justice faulty, they may justly condemn and re­ject [Page 60] it. This is, I believe, evident: For our Kings and Church of England (de facto & jure) have question'd, condemn'd and rejected Sentences of greater Po­pish Consistories, than that of the Arch­bishop of Turin; I mean, Sentences gi­ven by the Pope himself, in his own Consistory, and his general Councils: Of this we have a hundred Instances. I shall for your satisfaction set down three or four; thus.

First, Pope Julius the Second, Ex ple­nitudine potestatis, & certâ scientiâ, &c. Grants a Dispensation for Hen. 8th. to marry the Relict of his Brother Arthur, and declares the Marriage to be just and lawfull; and yet Hen. 8th. and his Bi­shops (b) Conterbury, Lon­don, Winton, Bath, Lincoln, and by the King's command at Dunstable. Vid. My Lord Cherbury's Life of Hen. 8. pag. 347. where you have the Sentence of our Bishops, &c. did and justly might afterwards exa­mine the Papal Sen­tence, disobey'd it, and declared it Null.

[Page 61] Secondly, Pope Paul the Third, ( Vene­rabilium fratrum Cardinalium consilio & con­sensu) gives Sentence and declares for a general Council, and by his Bulls sum­mons it to meet at To meet there, Cal. Jan. 1537. Mantua, then at Vincentiae, Cal. Maij, 1538. Vin­centia, and then at Trident. Cal. Nov. 1542. Trent. But Hen. the 8th. and his Bishops and Parliament, having seen those Bulls, containing the Pope's Sen­tence and Authoritate Pe­tri & Pauli, de Fra­trum nostrorum 5. Rom. E. Can. Consilio & assensu gen. conci­lium incipiendum, &c. statuimus, decernimus. Ita habet Bulla Pauli 3. in Bullario Cheru­bim. Tom. 1. pag. 550. §. 10. Decree for, and Summons of a ge­neral Council, at seve­ral times, and to several places; they did not only question his Sen­tence and Summons, but condemned (though they were Papists) and absolutely rejected it, shewing the ma­ny Nullities of that Summons, and ad­ded their Protestation which they made good, that they were neither bound nor [Page 62] would obey it; as is evident by an Epi­stle Sereniss. & in­clyti Regis Hen. 8. Eistola de synodo Vincen­tina, 1539.of Hen. the 8th. to the Emperor and all Christian Kings; and in a Illustriss. ac po­tentisse. Regis Hen. 8. Senatus populique An­gliae sententia, &c. de concilio quod Paulus Papa 3. Mantuae fu­turum simulavit, & de Bulla quae prorogavit. Edit. 1537. Tract contain­ing the Sentence of the King and Parliament, and their Protestation against the Pope's Sen­tence, for, and Sum­mons to, that Coun­cil.

Thirdly, When that Trent Council had met and sate eighteen Years, made ma­ny Canons and Constitutions, particu­larly about Matrimony, and pronoun­ced many Anathema's against all who did not believe and obey them: The Bishops of England were so far from thinking, that they had no power to question those Synodical Sentences and Constitutions; that they have constant­ly and publickly Preach'd and Writ a­gainst them, and proved them to be, in [Page 63] many things erroneous, impious or ido­latrous. Have the Bishops of England power to question and condemn the constitutions and synodical Decrees of the Pope, made in his own consistory, and his general Councils; and have they no power to question one single Sentence given in a consistory of an in­ferior Archbishop? Credat Judaeus Appella.

Fourthly, Pope Paul the Third, Paulus 3. Bul­la 7. Dat. Romae, 3. Cali. Sep. 1535. in Bullario Cherubim. Rom. 1638. Tom. 1. pag. 514. Habitâ cum Cardinalibus delibera­tione maturâ, & de illo­rum consilio & assensu, (by a solemn Sentence) Excommunicates Hen. 8. Deposes him, absolves his Subjects from their Oaths of Fi­delity, &c. So Pius 5. Bulla 101. In Pullario dicto, Tom. 2. pag. 229. Pope Pius 5. sub eadem formâ, Excommunicates and deposes Queen Elizabeth. And when some honest and loyal Papists had (un­der their hands) signifi­ed their (b) opinion. Anno 1648. Vid. Remonst. Hiberno­rum Authore R. Caron. Part. 1. cap. 4. §. 3. pag. 12.

[Page 64] 1. That the Pope could not absolve Papists from their Oath of Alle­giance to a Protestant King. 2. That he could not Depose and Murder Excom­municate Kings, &c. I say, when this was heard at Rome, Pope Innocent the 10 th. with his Sacra Cardinalium Congrega­tio, passes a damnatory Sentence, and condemns the true opinion of those loy­al Papists, as heretical: & declarat sub­scriptores, in poenas in sacris Canonibus & Constitutionibus Apostolicis, contranegantes potestatem Papae in causis fidei, incidisse. Now pray 'ask those Gentlemen, whether the Bishops of England, have not power to question the aforesaid Solemn and Ju­dicial Sentences of the Sure I am, that the incomparable Bi­shop Jewel, has a ve­ry loyal and learned Tract, wherein he fully shews the ma­nifold Nullities and Impieties of Pope Pius 5. his Bull of Excommunication a­gainst Queen Eliza­beth. It is extant, at the end of his reply to Harding's Answer. Inter ejus opera, Lon. 1609.Popes, for excom­municating, deposing, and murdering Kings? If they have such pow­er, and may question the Pope's judicial Sen­tences, [Page 65] given in his own Consistory, or his Gene­ral Councils; then cer­tainly, they may much rather question Senten­ces past in any Archbi­shop's or inferior Con­sistory. But if they say, what I sup­pose they will not, I am sure they should not, That we have not power to question such Sentences; they must par­don my incredulity, if I neither do nor can believe them to be Protestants or true Sons of the Church of England, but ra­ther Jesuited Papists; for I know none (save Campian the Ju­suite, (a Traitor to the Queen and his Country) in his exa­mination, said, for himself and his Soci­ety, That no Court in England had any power to question Pontificis Romani sum­mam authoritatem. Vid. Tractatum de Torturis, in Calce Justitiae Bri­tanniae. Lond. 1584. and the Pope's Para­sites, the Canonists, are of the same opi­nion. Can. Si Papa. 6. Dist. 40. such) who do or dare say, That such impious and traiterous Sentences given by the Pope in his Consistory, or Councils, may not be question'd by any Authority in the Church of England. Is it pos­sible, [Page 66] that any Prote­stant, nay, any honest Papist, should seriously think, that a Sentence of the Pope to depose a King and absolve his Subjects from all Fideli­ty and Allegiance to him, should be such as is not to be question'd by the King, his Bishops, or any loyal Subjects? If so, good night to Monarchy, and all the royal Rights of Kings; the Pope may when he will depose and deprive them of all their Jura Regalia, and their Subjects (though by the Law of God and Man obliged to it) must not assist them.

Ninthly, It is to be considered, That our present Case is an Ecclesiastical, not a Civil Cause, concerning the Vali­dity or Nullity of a Matrimonial Con­tract; which both by Vid. Statut. 24. Hen. 8. Cap. 12. our Laws, and those of Concil. Trident. sess. 24. De Sacrament. Matrimonij. Can. 12. Quit dicit Causas matri­moniales non spectare ad judices Ecclesiasticos, Anathema sit. Rome too, [Page 67] is of Ecclesiastical Cog­nizance. Now there is (both in Law, and the nature and the con­sequences of them) a great difference between Ecclesiastical, and Civil Causes. Many instances might be given, but being not my bu­siness, I shall only set down two or three; thus:

First, Had it been an action of Debt, and the Sentence at Turin had been, that Mr. Cottington should pay 500 l. to Gal­lina. Admit also, that no such Debt was due, and so the Sentence unjust; and ad­mit, that at Gallina's instance, that Sen­tence had been confirmed, and executed here in England, and Mr. Cottington com­pelled to pay that Summ. It might be a peice of injustice, and a sin in the Si praelatus ini­quum aut durum (quod tamen turpe aut inho­nestum non est) impe­ret, & subditus obse­quatur, & imperatum) faciat, tum unius Im­perantis culpa est; tam abest à culpa qui obse­quitur imperio, ut om­nino peccaret si non ob­sequeretur. Rob. Lin­colniensis, de obligat. Conscient. Praelect. 5. §. 8. pag. 165. Judge to sentence him to pay what was no way due. But (as to Mr. Cotting­ton) [Page 68] it might be his Ca­lamity, being compell'd to pay what he did not owe, but his crime it could not be. It could be no sin in him, com­pell'd by his Judge, to pay that Money, though indeed it was not due. For he might lawfully have given Gallina so much Money, without and before any compulsory decree; and that decree could not make it to him un­lawful. But in our present Matrimoni­al Case, it is far otherwise: For if there was no Nullity in the Contract, and the Sentence at Turin unjust, and if upon that Sentence, it be decreed here, that Mr. Cottington shall Co-habit with Gallina, here obedience to that unjust Sentence, will not only be his Calamity, but his Crime; because in this Case, he Co-ha­bits with another Man's Wife, and is guilty of Adultery. Nor will the Judge's Sentence, requiring such Co-habitation, [Page 69] any way excuse him. And on this con­sideration it highly concerns the Judges in this case to be assured of the Nullity, least they sentence Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with another Man's Wife, and so to sin and commit Adultery. But if they do, quod absit, it as highly concerns Mr. Cottington, to obey God rather than Men; and though he suffer for it here, rather disobey an unjust Sentence of an earthly Judge, than the eternally just Judge of Heaven and Earth, and suffer for it for ever hereafter.

Secondly, The Church of Rome has Ecclesiastical Laws, particularly about the Validity and Nullity of Matrimoni­al Contracts, which neither are nor ought to be approved by the Church of England. For, 1. They admit the Oaths and Confessions of the parties desiring Sentence for divorce or Nullity, and so it was in our present case, which the Church of England Vid. Canones 1 Jacobi. Anno 1603. Can. 105. admits [Page 70] not. 2. It is their generally received opi­nion, that although the Matrimonium be indeed ratum, yet a Papal Dispensation may dissolve the vinculum conjugale, and so induce a Nullity. Dico, saies a great Popish Vincent. Filluci­us, Quest. Moral. Tra­ctat. 10. Cap. 2. Quaest. 8. § 54. 55. pag. 152. Casuist, Ma­trimonium ratum posse dis­solvi per Papae dispensati­onem. And for Proof of it, he cites five Popes did dispense with such Marriages; and then adds Ib. §. 55. And the Trent Fathers tell us, That the Church may dispense with the Law of God in Levit. 18. And those degrees of Affi­nity or Consanguinity, Quae impediunt Matri­monium contrahendum & dirimunt contractum. And pronunces an Anathema to those who shall say the Church cannot con­stitute new impedi­ments to dissolve Marriages. Qui dicit Ecclesiam non posse con­stituere impedimenta Matrimonium dirimen­tia, Anathema sit. Con­cil. Trident. Sess. 24. De matrimonio. Can. 3, 4. And shall we not question the Senten­ces of such Judges, who determine cases by such Laws? Quod Gregori­us Papa 13 Unica die, cum undecim Matrimonijs ratis dispensavit. And further tells us out of Sanchez, of no less than fourty nine Divines, Canonists, Summists, &c. cited for the same opinion, (and he might have cited as many more;) and then he him­self [Page 71] from their own re­ceived Principles fully proves it. Now it high­ly concerns Mr. Cotting­ton, and his Judges too, to know on what grounds the Archbi­shop of Turin gave Sen­tence for a Nullity. For if it was only on the aforesaid Reasons and Popish Principles; no Bishop or knowing Casuist of the Church of Eng­land, will or can admit that Sentence to be just, or grant a Nullity on such Grounds, or sentence Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with Gallina, her former Hus­band yet living, and no just ground of any Nullity in their Matrimonial Con­tract appearing.

Thirdly, The Laws of England con­cerning all Ecclesiastical, particularly Ma­trimonial Causes, are Vid. Statut. 24. Hen. 8. Cap. 12. express, forbidding all persons whoever they [Page 72] be, inhabiting or resiant in this King­dom, to make use of or excuse the Judg­ments or Sentences of any Foreign Per­son, Court or Judicature; and requires, upon pain of a Praemunire, that all such Causes be tryed and finally determin'd within this Realm, by our own Laws and Judges. The words are thus, The said Sta­tute §. Be it further inacted, compared with the 2. §. And whereas the King. If any Per­on, Inhabitant or Resiant in this Realm, or any other of what condition soever, at any time hereafter, for any of the Causes aforesaid, (Matrimonial causes are ex­presly forenamed) do procure from Rome, or any other Foreign Court out of this Realm, any manner of Foreign Process, Sentences, or Judgments of what kind soever, or execute any of the same, or do any Act, &c. such persons shall incurr a Praemunire. I un­derstand not Law, and therefore referr this to you, and those who do: Only I observe, 1. That the Word in the Statute is not Copulative; If any Man do Pro­cure, [Page 73] and Execute, and do any Act, &c. but Disjunctive, If any Man Procure, or Execute, or do any Act, &c. That is, if any Man do any one of those particu­lars mention'd; if he either procure such Foreign Sentences, or Execute, or Abett and Assist, &c. Though he do not all, yet he is liable to the punishment ap­pointed by the Statute. 2. That the end of the Statute, is, to provide against the damages and greivances of the Subjects of England; and therefore forbids all Appeals to any Foreign Court, Prelate or the Pope; or to bring in any Foreign Pro­cess, Sentence or Judgment given in any Foreign Court whatsoever. And this is one reason of the Prohibition, which the Statute doth instance in; because Statut. 24. H. 8. Cap. 12. §. 2. And whereas the King. neither the necessary proofs nor the true knowledge of the Cause, can neither there be so well known, nor the Witnesses there be so well examin'd as within the Realm; so [Page 74] that the parties grieved by means of the said Appeals, be most times without re­medy. So that though the Title and Epigraphe of the Statute be against Ap­peals to any Foreign Judicature; yet in the body of the Statute the bringing in, and executing of any Foreign Pro­cess, Sentence, or Judgment, are equal­ly forbid.

Thirdly, Now for Gallina, no Subject of England, though now resiant here, to bring in a Sentence of a Foreign Court, and though the Proofs or Reasons of it be utterly unknown, to plead it, and have it, without Examination, executed, to the Irreparable damage of a Person of Quality, and a native Subject of Eng­land; this seems to me, to be against the true intent and meaning of this good Sta­tute.

To conclude, I do and must confess, that of the Laws, I have ventur'd to cite, Law being none of my Profession, I am no competent Judge; and therefore, [Page 75] begging your Pardon for my mistakes, and medling with them, I referr them, and my self, to You and the Learned Gentlemen of the Long Robe, who best understand them, who can, I know, ea­sily discover my mistakes; and will, I hope, without any severe Censure par­don them. But for the Theological part of the Controversie, and the Case of Conscience, wherein his Judges in the Ecclesiastical Court, and Mr. Cottington are concern'd; this being within the compass of my Calling and Profession, I may, and with modesty, and more confidence, do affirm, 1. That till the pretended Nullity of the Matrimonial Contract, between Patrimoniale and Gal­lina, do upon just grounds, and such as may induce a moral certainty, appear, no Judge can ( Conscientiâ & Justitiâ sal­vis) by a judicial Sentence, require Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with Gallina. For in this Case, idem est non esse & non appa­rere; Gallina must be reputed Patrimonia­le's [Page 76] Wife, he yet living to whom she was first contracted ( Solemni Ecclesiae ri­tu) and with whom she Co-habited ( si­ne querelâ) a year and an half, and by whom she had a Child. I say, she must be reputed his Wife till it appear she is not. And 'tis impossible that should appear, till the Nullity of that first con­tract be legally and sufficiently proved. 2. And if any Ecclesiastical Judge, should decree Mr. Cottington to Co-habit with her, before such Nullity (which is pre­tended, but hitherto no way proved) do sufficiently and by legal and just proofs appear; yet, notwithstanding such Decree, 'tis impossible for him, with a safe Conscience, to Co-habit with her, as his Wife: Seeing, for ought appears, or he knows, she may be ano­thers Man's Wife rather than his. And certainly he is highly concern'd to be sure, that she is indeed his own Wife, before he give her that due Benevo­lence, which without great Impiety and [Page 77] Adultery, cannot possibly be given to any other, who really is not his Wife, &c.

Your Servant.T. Lincolne.

PAtrimoniale and Gallina intermarry Anno 1664. and Co-habit about twenty Months, and have Issue, a Daugh­ter. But Gallina afterwards not liking that Marriage, pretends it was Null, propter vim & metum, and obtains a Sen­tence of Nullity from the Archbishop of Turin; but without any defence, for ought appears, made by her Husband Pa­trimoniale, or proof of the pretended force or fear: And in the said Sentence of that Archbishop, there is a Conditi­on interposed in these Words, viz. Sa­ving however the solemnity required by the Holy Council, and a solemn Oath to be before-hand taken before Us by the [Page 78] said Gallina, that she contracted the said Marriage, on force and for fear of her Fa­ther, and that she gave not her free con­sent unto the said Marriage; and by the Certificate annext to the Archbishop's Sentence, it appears that she Swore, That by the force and fear, that she was put into by her Father, she contracted Marriage with Patrimoniale, and that in that Con­tract, she did not give her free consent; but does not swear that she gave not her consent to the said Marriage.

Patrimoniale afterwards marry'd ano­ther Wife, and Gallina being thus sepa­rated, doth in the Year 1671. marry Mr. Cottington; against whom in the Year 1674. she brings an Action in Causa Ma­trimoniali, before the Dean of the Arches here in England, where she doth Alledge and prove her Marriage with Mr. Cot­tington; to which Mr. Cottington doth an­swer, That her first Husband Patrimoniale was and is still alive. She replies, 'tis true, but that first Marriage of hers was [Page 79] declared Null and Void by the Archbi­shop's Sentence; and Mr. Cottington re­joins, That that Sentence it self was Null and Void, being given without proof, and contrary to Law. The Dean of the Arches having this Fact before him, doth give Sentence for this second Marriage of Gallina, and enjoins Mr. Cottington and her to Co-habit; alledging that he hath no power, and is not by Law to examine or question the Validity of the Archbishop's Sentence; but ought, not­withstanding any Defects or Nullities therein, to give Sentence for this second Marriage of Gallina. Mr. Cotttington say­eth, That the Dean of the Arches at the time of his giving Sentence against him, declared his Mind in Words to this effect, viz. As a private Man, I should look upon the Sentence of the Archbishop of Turin, for dissolving the Marriage be­tween Patrimoniale and Gallina, to be an irregular, wrongful, and an unjust Sen­tence; but, as I am a publick Minister, [Page 80] I must look upon it as good against Mr. Cottington, because all Sentences given beyond Sea by any equal Court, I ought to look upon as good; whether good or bad, having no power to reverse or exa­mine them; and therefore ought to cast Mr. Cottington in this Case.

It is not on Mr. Cottington's part deny­ed, but that when he Married Gallina, he knew of her being Married to Patrimo­niale, and of Patrimoniale's being still a­live, when he the said Cottington marry'd Gallina; nor is it alledged and proved by Gallina in this Cause here in England, that she at any time made any Protesta­tion of the pretended force and fear she was under, or that she used any endea­vours to escape from Patrimoniale, when she was in a safe place, and might have escaped from him if she had pleased; but on the contrary, her Co-habitation with Patrimoniale for about twenty Months, and her having had a Child by him in that time, and her having the [Page 81] usual liberty of Women in a Married Estate, during that Co-habitation, hath been proved in the Court of Arches by her own Witnesses. But Mr. Cottington, being unwilling to make unnecessary contests with the Sentences of Courts, and being now fearful of offending God or his own Conscience, doth most hum­bly request the Reverend Doctor, Rich­ard Allestry, the Regius Professor of Di­vinity, in the University of Oxford, to give him his Opinion, whether the matter of Fact, being true according to the Premis­ses, he the said Cottington may Salvâ Con­scientiâ, Co-habit with Gallina as his Wife.

Supposing this Case justly stated, and the matters of Fact true according to the Premisses; I conceive the marriage of Patrimoniale and Gallina (especially being ratified by such Co-habitation, and the effects of it) valid and firm. And con­sequently, notwithstanding any Sen­tence of Nullity, that she is his Wife, [Page 82] and therefore that no other person can Co-habit with her, Salvâ Conscientiâ, as with a Wife.

Richard Allestry.

MR. Cottington having desired the Opinion of Dr. Hall, the Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity in Ox­ford, to the same case propounded to him, as was to Dr. Allestry, the Regius Profes­sor there; Dr. Hall gave his Opinion thereupon as followeth, viz.

As this Case is Stated, I conceive that the Marriage of Patrimoniale and Gallina is not Null, and therefore Mr. Cottington cannot with a safe Conscience Co-ha­bit with Gallina as his Wife.

Jo. Hall.

Mr. Cottington for his further in­formation, sent the following Case to the Doctors of Sorbonne, and had the following return from them.

LUcius an English Man Marries Sem­pronia an English Woman in Eng­land, according to the Laws and Cu­stoms of the Church of England, and she Co-habits with him about a year and a half, and has a Child by him; and af­terwards she makes Application to Titi­us the Bishop of the Diocess in England, and alledges before him, that her Mar­riage with Lucius was made by fear and force of her Father; and therefore de­sires, that he by his definitive Sentence, would dissolve that Marriage; which Titius accordingly doth, and by his Sen­tence declares it Null and Void, and by [Page 84] the said Sentence pronounceth it lawfull for Lucius and Sempronia to marry whom they will; yet so that a solemn Oath be taken by Sempronia, that she contracted Matrimony with Lucius out of fear and force from her Father, and that to her Marriage with Lucius, she gave not her free consent; which Oath she took, and no proof of the fear and force in that her Marriage with Lucius appears, to have been otherwise made before Titius.

Sempronia afterwards, in England Mar­ries Caius a French Man, Lucius being still alive; and Caius after that going into France, and there living a part from Sem­pronia, she is advised by her Councel, to cause Caius to be cited before Maevius, a Bishop of the Roman Catholick Church in France, and to endeavour to obtain the Sentence of Maevius to compell Caius to Co-habit with her, saying, That her Marriage with Caius is not Null and Void, although Lucius was still alive; because her Marriage with Lucius was [Page 85] dissolved and declared Null by the Sen­tence of Titius, who though he was a Protestant Bishop of the Church of Eng­land; and though that Sentence as to its form was Irregular and Null, and as to its substance contrary to the Law of God, and to the Law of the Roman Catholick Church, and contrary to the Canon, and contrary to the Law of France, and even contrary to the Laws of the Church of England, yet the said Sentence being de facto, given by Titius, her Councel saith; That Maevius: hath not power to question it, nor to pro­nounce contrary to it, as being but of equal power with Titius, they both be­ing Bishops of several Diocesses; but that he ought to pronounce Caius and Sem­pronia lawfull Man and Wife, and com­mand them to Co-habit; and he declares that his Opinion in this Case, is accord­ing to the practice of France.

Now the Query is, if Maevius hath not power to question the Sentence of Titius, [Page 86] because he is but of equal Power with Titius, they being both Bishops, though of different Countries and Churches, and if he ought to pronounce Caius and Sempronia lawfull Man and Wife, and command them to Co-habit.

The Doctors in Divinity of the Fa­culty of Paris under written, having seen the Case above put with all its cir­cumstances, do esteem that the first Mar­riage is valid, and that the first Sentence given by Titius is against all sort of Ju­stice; and therefore that the second Mar­riage is Null.

Given at Paris the 16. of Decemb. 1677.

  • Puischard.
  • Thuby.

Here follow the Opinions of Sir Ri­chard Lloyd, and Dr. Ri­chard Raines, Doctors of Law.
THE CASE.

PAtrimoniale and Gallina intermarry 64, and Co-habit (about twenty Months) and have Issue a Daughter.

But Gallina, it seems not liking that Marriage, pretends it was Null, propter vim & metum, and obtains a sentence of Nullity from the Archbishop of Turin; but without any defence, for ought ap­pears, made by her Husband Patrimoniale, or proof of the pretended force or fear.

Gallina being thus separated, doth Anno 71, marry Cottington, against whom Anno 74, she brings an Action in Causa Matrnio­niali here in England,—where she doth al­ledge and prove the second Marriage.

[Page 88] To which Cottington doth answer, that her first Husband Patrimoniale was then, and is still alive. She replies, 'Tis true, but that first Marriage was declared Null and Void by the Archbishop's Sentence; and he rejoins, That that Sentence it self was Null and Void, being given without proof, and contrary to Law.

The Ecclesiastical Judge here in Eng­land having this Fact before him, doth give Sentence for this second Marriage, and enjoins the Parties to Co-habit; al­ledging, that he hath no power, and is not by Law to examine or question the Validity of the Archbishop's Sentence; but ought, notwithstanding any Defects or Nullities therein, to give Sentence for the second Marriage.

Q. Whether the Judge of one Terri­tory may by Law examine and question the validity of a Sentence of a Foreign Judge, and in particular as this Fact is where it is given in a Matrimonial Cause?

[Page 89] A. We conceive that the Judge of one Territory cannot directly examine and question the Sentence of a Foreign Judge, because he hath no Superiority over him. But if it happens that such Sentence doth upon any incident come before him; as if he be requested to put the same in Execution, or if one of the parties litigant shall (as the cause may require) make his Plea and found his intention on such Sentence, then the Judge may enquire into the grounds and merits thereof; and if he finds it is not agreeable to the Principles of internal Justice, and that it wants the substan­tials of a Sentence requisite, not by the positive Laws of the place, but by the common and general Law by which (it is supposed) the Case is to be judged, he is to forbear putting the Sentence into Execution, or to admit it as a Plea untill those points be declared, wherein he finds, or hath just cause to judge, it is not agreeable to the Law. There is a [Page 90] great difference in this matter, betwixt Judges of the same, and a Foreign Ter­ritory: In the first Case, the Sentence of the Superior is of force, by reason of Sub­ordination and Subjection; and for that Cause, Res judicata pro veritate habetur: But in the second Case, the Sentence is not simply took for truth; it hath only a presumption for it. And when that is took off by clearer evidence, it hath no force and operation on a Foreign Judge, who is to observe the Rules of that ge­neral and Common Law, and to respect the precept of the same Law; which saies, An unjust and null Sentence is not to be executed, or regarded, rather than the meer Authority and Jurisdiction of any equal Court and Judge.

Now the substance and perpetual rights of Marriage are determined by the Law Divine, and observed in the Catholick Church, which hath added some Supplement or Explications there­unto. All which at least, where they [Page 91] are received and practised, as they are here in England, make the common and general Law, to which every Ecclesi­astical Judge there is subject, and which he is ex officio, and by the precept of the Law, bound to observe, even against the consent of Parties, and the authority of any Co-ordinate equal Judge.

The Premisses considered, since in this Case here is a perpetual impediment ob­jected, by Cottington, viz. That the first Husband of Gallina was then, and is still a­live; and since the Archbishop's Sentence is grounded on a pretended force and fear, not proved (for ought appears;) and if it was, it is by the abovesaid Co-habitati­on and Issue, purged in construction of Law; we are of Opinion that the Judges of this Territory, ought not to pronounce for the second Marriage, un­till they shall be satisfied (if it may be) that the Archbishop's Sentence was good and valid.

  • Rich. Lloyd.
  • Rich. Raines.

In the Index of a Manuscript of Collections by Sir Julius Caesar, Fol. 277. is referr'd to under his own hand, in which Fol. is con­tain'd as followeth. (The Book is markt on the outside, A. A. 10.)

UPon the Treaty with Gray Lord Chandois, it was thought meet that 16500 l. should be alloted to the Lady for her right, to the value of 14500 l. in Land, and 2000 l. in Money. But in regard the whole Estate moved from the Lady, and that Sir John was able to give her no Advancement or Dower out of his Estate, it was thought meet, that the Lady should have 8000 l. at her sole dispose, and the residue to be at their joint dispose.

After, upon motion on the Lady's be­half, out of a fear, that the Estate might [Page 93] be wasted by Sir John, and thereby she deprived of maintenance (she then having on knowledge of the Marriage in Scotland, or hope of a Divorce, or Nul­lity of the said Marriage) it was appoin­ted that the same should be conveyed over to certain Feoffees in trust to her use; that she by her Indenture under her Hand and Seal, solely and without Sir John, might dispose thereof.

The which conveyance was directed by three living of this Honourable board, viz. The Lord Treasurer, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Lord Stanhope; and by the Lord Popham, Lord Tanfield, Sir Thomas Hesketh, Serjeant Dodridge, and Mr. Stephens.

The Land allotted the Lady, being sold for 7800 l, with 6500 l. thereof Barn-Elmes was purchased; but Sir John being trusted by the Lady to go to Mr. Stephens to draw the conveyance, went to other Councel; and in the clause where it should be freely at the Lady's dispo­sal [Page 94] solely without Sir John, he caused to be inserted these Words, That the Lady should have power to convey the same, to such intents and purposes as by the said Elizabeth, solely and without the said Sir John Kennedy by writing under her Hand and Seal enrolled, should be limitted and appointed. Wherein, be­sides the contradictariness of the Sence, he caused in that Deed delivered the Lady (the more to blind her Eyes) en­rolled to be razed and made indented. Deed. 31. Decemb. 3. Jac.

And after the Rasure was found out, then by his Deed Dat. 2. Julij, 4. Jac. he the said Sir John did limit power to the Lady by her Deed inrolled, or not inrolled to limit uses.

The Lady hath been a Suiter two years (if Sir John for saving his own Credit will not confess matter to make a Divorce) then that in course of Justice she may be admitted to her proof, which for that it concerneth matter of State (as is suggested) she is denyed.

[Page 95] 1. And therefore she hopeth, it is but the same equity to stay his proceed­ing, touching her Estate against her or her Feoffees in Course of Justice, con­sidering it is not by her lachess that the Marriage is not disproved, untill both the said causes having a dependency one upon another, may be handled at this Board.

2. The course of Conveyance by Feoffees, was by Honourable Personages, Grave Judges, and Learned Lawyers directed when the Lady was supposed the true Wife of Sir John, and they held in Law and Equity sufficient, and now à fortiore it should be more sufficient, she being none of his Wife, if she may be admitted to proofs.

3. Sir John hath already advanced himself by the Sale of the Lady's Estate, over and above the purchace of Tonbridge which cost 8500 l. wherein he hath a a joint Estate of Inheritance, and all her Debts that he hath paid, 7500 l.

[Page 96] 4. If the course propounded at this Honourable Board shall not hold, then will the Lady never assent to Sell, and so shall the Debts of the Lady before Marriage, now resting unpaid, being 2207 l. and Sir John's own Debts rest unsatisfied, to the oppression and cla­mour of many poor Men, and the King still troubled with renewing his Prote­ctions.

5. If Sir John should proceed in course of Justice, and that the conveyance made to Feoffees, should not be held sufficient and strong enough to convey the same to the Lady; yet Sir John can have but the profits thereof, being but 300 l. per annum, and not that clear which is not able to pay half the use of the Money.

6. Besides, before any Sute began, the said Mannor of Barn-Elms was for valuable consideration of Money lent, Mortgaged and now resteth forfeited for Non-payment of 2000 l.

In the Index of Sir Julius Caesar's Manu­script of Collections, Fol. 280. is under his own Hand referr'd to, in which Folio is contain'd as followeth.

The Book is markt on the outside A. A. 10. 'Tis in the Index writ with his own Hand, in relation to Fol. 280. Whether an Eng­lish Jurisdiction may disanull a Marriage solemniz'd in Scotland?

A. B. a Scotchman, in a Parish Church in Scotland, publickly in the pre­sence of the Congregation, solemnizeth Marriage with a Scotchwoman.

About six or seven years after the said Marriage, the Scottish Woman pretend­ing that at the time of her Marriage, she was but Ten years Old, or at the least under Twelve, before certain com­petent Judges in Scotland, procureth a sentence of Divorce to be given against the said A. B. whereby the Marriage be­tween A. B. and her was pronounced to [Page 98] be void, and of no force; and that she was at liberty to Marry again to any o­ther upon this ground, That she was un­der Twelve years of Age at the time of her Marriage, and that she never con­sented thereto after she was Twelve years Old, nor had Carnal knowledge of the said A. B. from which Sentence no appeal or provocation was made.

Afterwards, the said A. B. coming into England, did solemnize Marriage with an English Woman, the Scottish Wife being then living; after which marriage the said A. B. and the English Woman for certain years Co-habited to­gether here in England, as Man and Wife; the said English Woman being ignorant of the premisses done in Scotland. Du­ring the time of which her Co-habitati­on with the said A. B. the Scottish Wo­man dieth: After whose death the Eng­lish Woman being certified, that A. B. had another Wife living when he mar­ried her, so as he could not be her law­ful [Page 99] Husband at the time of her Marriage, the said A. B. and she dwelling both in England, she refraineth from the com­pany of A. B. and complaineth to the Ecclesiastical Judges in England, having Jurisdiction in the place where the said A. B. and she dwelleth; and craving Justice, offereth to prove that the said A. B. and the said Scottish Woman were lawfull Man and Wife; and after the said Marriage, had Carnal knowledge of each other, and that they Co habited toge­ther as Man and Wife, five or six years after she was Twelve years of Age, ad­mitting she had been under that Age at the time of the Marriage; and desireth to be admitted judicially according to the ordinary course of Law, to alledge and prove her aforesaid Assertions be­fore the said Judge, and upon proof thereof to have Sentence for the Nulli­ty of her own Marriage according to Justice.

[Page 100] It is objected on the behalf of A. B. That she ought not to be admitted there­to, for these causes, viz. Because the Mar­riage with the Scottish Woman was so­lemnized in Scotland; the sentence of Divorce was given in Scotland by the Judges there, where the Judges of Eng­land have no Jurisdiction, nor Superio­rity over them. That there was no appeal or provocation from that Sen­tence. That it was given by the Judges of an high Court in Scotland, from whence no Appeal lieth: And that if the English Woman's marriage should be pronounced void here in England, the justice of the Realm of Scotland may thereby seem to be taxed.

The Question is, Whether the Eccle­siastical Judges or Judge, having Juris­diction in the place in England, where the said A. B. and the English Woman dwell, be competent Judges, and may and ought at the Petition of the English Woman, to hear and determine this [Page 101] cause of Nullity, of the marriage be­tween her self and A. B. notwithstand­ing the former Objections?

We are of Opinion, without any doubt, That the Ecclesiastical Judge ha­ing Jurisdiction in the place in England, where the said A. B. and the said Eng­lish Woman dwell, may and in Justice, is bound at the complaint of the said English Woman, to hear and determine the said cause, concerning the validity of her said Marriage, and to pronounce the marriage between her and A. B. to be void, if she prove before him the matters by her alledged; notwithstand­ing the aforesaid Objections.

Neither can the Justice of Scotland be thought to be impeach'd thereby, though upon sufficient proof made before the Judge here in England, which was not made before the Judges in Scotland; he giveth a Sentence which may seem re­pugnant to the Sentence given in Scot­land.

[Page 102] In a Manuscript Book of several Col­lections made by Sir Julius Caesar, Ma­ster of the Rolls, and Chancellour of the Exchequer, and one of the King's most Honourable Privy-Council; there is referr'd to in the Index of the Con­tents, writ with his own hand, viz. That the question between Sir John Ken­nedy Knight, and his Lady, touching the lawfullness or unlawfullness of their Marriage, may be tryed, heard or deter­min'd in England, where both parties are inhabiting. And from Fol. 2d. of that Book, to Fol. 8th. the following Leaves are Transcribed; the Page before Fol. 8th. in Sir Julius Caesar's Book, is thus with his own Hand indors'd, viz. The Rea­sons of the Resolution of A. B. 25. Jan. 1610. The said Manuscript Dr. Trumball borrowed of Sir Charles Caesar, and it yet remains in the Doctors Hands. 'Tis markt in the back C. S. 8.

Certain Points in Law and Reason, whereby it may plainly appear, that the question be­tween the Lady Kennedy, and Sir John Kennedy, concerning the Validity of their Marriage, may and ought by ordinary course of Law, be heard and determin'd before the Ecclesiastical Judges in Eng­land, who have jurisdiction in the places where they both dwell. Whereupon the Ci­vilians have grounded their Opinions, given in this Case to that effect.

FIrst, by Law and Reason, there can fall out no Question or Controver­sie between any Persons inhabiting in any Civil Common-wealth or State, but the same must be decided by some com­petent Judge, or Judges, who ought to have Authority to hear and determine the same; or else there must needs en­sue Confusion and Horrour.

Secondly, When any Controversies hap­pen between any Persons proceeding of [Page 104] any contract whatsoever, that require a Determination or ending by Judgment wheresoever the Contract was made; those Judges are by Law the competent Judges to hear and determine that Con­troversie, who have jurisdiction and power in the place, where both the par­ties or the party defendant dwelleth, to hear and determine causes of that Nature.

Thirdly, If there fall out any Contro­versie between any two Persons, the Defendant cannot be compelled to ap­pear to answer the Plaintiff; but before the Judge of the place, where the De­fendant dwelleth, and especially if the Plaintiff himself dwelleth under the same Jurisdiction.

Fourthly, In all Causes where there may ensue peril of Soul and continuance in Sin, the Judge of the place ought of his Office to enquire thereof, and redress the same though no Man complain thereof.

[Page 105] Whereupon it followeth, That the Ecclesiastical Judges here in England, who have Authority to hear causes of Matrimony, are the competent Judges, and have power to hear and determine this matter of the lawfullness or unlaw­fulness of the Lady's Marriage; and the rather, for that the Lady's Marriage (which is the principal matter in questi­on) was made and solemniz'd here in England.

If it be objected, That because that Point whereupon the Validity or Invali­dity of the Lady Kennedy's Marriage de­pendeth, viz. the Marriage between Sir John and Isabel Kennedy, is already ad­judged by a definitive Sentence long since; from which there hath been no appeal or provocation, and therefore it must Barr the Lady. We answer, That although in Causes of other Nature, where no danger of sin might ensue, though the Sentence were against the truth; if a Sentence be once lawfully [Page 106] given, and not appealed from in due time, the matter cannot be called in question a­gain; yet, where a Sentence is given to dissolve or anull a lawfull Matrimony, that Sentence may at any time, though never so long after, be called in question and reversed, whensoever it may be made to appear that the truth is contrary to that Sentence; and that may be done even by the party himself who obtain'd that Sentence. And therefore not only Sir John Kennedy, but Isabel her self might have reversed that Sentence, proving the same was given by error; much less shall the Lady who was not party to that Sute, be thereby debarred from proving the Nullity of her Marriage, being a di­stinct cause from that. And the reason of the difference between a Sentence a­gainst a Matrimony, and a Sentence in another Cause; is, because in other Causes, where no fear is of Sin, or peril of Soul to ensue, the parties may by their agreement make what end of the [Page 107] Business they list, by composition or o­therwise. And therefore if they do not appeal from the Sentence given against them, they are thought by their consent to confirm the same; but because a Mar­riage by God's Law cannot be dissolved by the Agreement or Consent of the Par­ties, no Sentence therein given against a Marriage, contrary to the truth by er­ror, can by the Parties agreement be confirmed, lest if it should be otherwise, thereby they might by colour of the er­roneous Sentence marry other Persons and live in Adultery. Nay more, If the Parties themselves thus erroneously di­vorced contrary to the truth, would hold themselves contented with the Sentence; if either of them marry any other Per­son, or they both live incontinently with other Persons, the Judge of that place, where they inhabit, may and ought of his own Office to inforce the Parties, so by error divorced, to live together again, as Man and Wife, and separate them from their second Spouses.

[Page 108] If it be objected, That the Sentence was given in another Country, where the Judges of England have no Jurisdi­ction, and in an High-Court from whence there lieth no Appeal; and that the Judges of England have no Superiori­ty to call their Sentences in question, and that therefore the Lady cannot call that Divorce in question here: We an­swer, That the principal cause in this case of the Lady's, is not to reverse or call in question the Sentence given in Scotland: but the principal Cause here is, Whether her Marriage made in England with Sir John, be of Validity or no? For that (as we say) Sir John had another Wife living, viz. ( Isabel Kennedy) at the time of her Marriage, without any mention to be made by the Lady of any Sentence of Divorce given in Scotland; against which our Allegations, if Sir John object, That he was Divorced from her by Sentence in Scotland; this questi­on of the Divorce is brought in, but in­cidently [Page 109] by Sir John in this Cause, and also vainly and impertinently, if it can be proved, that the truth is contrary to that Sentence; for that Sentence is in Law meerly void, and cannot Barr the Lady for the reasons before alledged, and for that Ecclesia was decepta in giving of that Sentence. Now when a Sentence which is void in Law (and especially against a Marriage) is called in question, but in­cidently before any Judge whatsoever, though an inferior in a Cause which doth principally belong unto his Juris­diction, that Judge may take knowledge of, and incidently examine the validity of that Sentence, whether it were good or no, by whom and wheresoever that Sentence was given, though he were ne­ver so Superior a Judge; not to the end to reverse or expresly to pronounce that Sentence to be void or not void, but as he findeth it by examination of the Cause to be good or void; so to give Sentence accordingly, and determine the Cause [Page 110] principally depending before him, with­out ever mentioning the erroneous Sen­tence in his Sentence.

Neither can the Sentence given here for the Nullity of the Lady's Marriage, upon other matter than was pleaded and proved before the Judges in Scotland; although the same Sentence had been principally called in question, and di­rectly pronounced to be void, any ways impeach the Justice of Scotland; for sith Judges, in all Courts and Causes must judge according to that which is alledg­ed and proved before them; what im­peachment is it to the justice of any Judge (although his Sentence be re­voked, and a contrary Sentence given by another Judge) when the parties be­tween whom the Sute is, either can­not, or through negligence or collusion, will not alledge or make such proof before him, the first Judge as they might, but afterwards before the second Judge, good and sufficient proof is made; a [Page 111] matter which falleth out every day here in England, in every Civil and Ecclesi­astical Court, upon appeal made from one Court to another, and the like fall­eth out in all other Countreys; and yet the former Judge, whose Sentence is revers'd, thinketh not himself any whit impeached of injustice thereby.

That the absurdities which would ensue, may by example more plainly ap­pear, if the Law should not be as we say. Put this Case: A Widower in the confines of England towards Scotland, marrieth a Wife in a Parish-Church publickly, in the presence of a hundred Witnesses, and afterwards they live to­gether by the space of a Year, and have a Child; at the years end, upon some dis­contentment) they both being desirous to be rid the one of the other,) the Woman in England sueth her Husband to be Divorced from him; pretending that at such time as he married her, he had another Wife living, and produceth [Page 112] Witnesses which prove that he had mar­ried another Wife before he married her, and Paradventure make some probable shew, that that Wife was living, when he married his second Wife, who in truth was dead before, as the Man could have plainly proved by twenty Wit­nesses, if he had listed; notwithstanding, the Husband being willing to be rid of his Wife, either would not plead that his former Wife was dead, or else would not make any proof thereof. Where­upon the Woman obtaineth Sentence against the Man, whereby the marriage between them two, by this collusion and error, is pronounced void; from which Sentence there was no Appeal or Provocation. Now within a Month after this Divorce, this Man goeth into the Confines of Scotland, not ten Miles from the place where he and his di­vorced Wife formerly dwelt, and there marrieth another Woman, being ig­norant of the former Wife and collu­sory [Page 113] Divorce, and there Co-habiteth and dwelleth with her. This Woman shortly after, understanding of the pre­misses, and that she could not be his lawful Wife, but liv'd in Adultery with him, desireth before the Judge in Scot­land, under whose jurisdiction they both dwell, to be divorced from him, and to be delivered from her adulterous li­ving with him; and offereth to prove all the Premisses most manifestly. Were it not now a most absurd and abomi­nable thing, that this Woman should have no remedy any where, but be en­forced to live still in Adultery with this Man; because the Sentence of divorce was given by a Judge in England, pro­nouncing the Marriage between the Man and his second Wife to be void; whereas it can be most manifestly and apparently proved, that his first Wife was dead before his second Marriage; and so the Sentence was given against the apparent truth? And what impeach­ment [Page 114] of injustice can this be to the judge in England, before whom it was never proved, That the Man's first Wife was dead, to have his Sentence reversed upon new proofs made before the Judge in Scotland?

Now between the Lady's Case and this Case, there is no difference in truth of matter and point of Law, only by reason of the multitude of the Witnes­ses, the nearness of the time, and place when, and where these things in this case were done. The truth thereof may more easily and readily be proved, than in the Lady's cause it can; but if the truth in her Case be proved, though with more difficulty, the Cases are all one.

If any Man shall yet doubt, whe­ther this cause can be heard and deter­min'd by the Ecclesiastical Courts in Eng­land, it is desired, That Sir John's Coun­cel, considering the Marriage was made here in England, and the Lady and Sir [Page 115] John do both dwell here, and by Law Sir John is not compellable to appear in any other place than England for this mat­ter, they would tell, before what Judge this matter should be heard, and deter­mined? For it is to be presumed, that when two persons live in Adultery to­gether, and so in continual sin, and the one of them seeketh redress, and to be freed from that sinfull and adulterous life, no Man will say, That he or she shall be compelled to live notoriously in Adultery still, and have no Judge at all to separate them and remedy this enor­mity.

If further doubts be made how, where, or in what manner proof shall be made in this Cause; it is said, that this Questi­on doth not concern the Question, What Court or before what Judges, the cause shall be heard and determined; but to this, it is answered, That the proofs shall be made in such manner, as they be ordinarily in all other Cases; that is, [Page 116] by the Answers of the contrary Part upon Oath, by such Witnesses as they can procure voluntarily to come before the Judges here, from whence, or out of what Countrey soever they can pro­cure them. If they will not come vo­luntarily, then if they be within the juris­diction of the Judge, and the party pro­ducent think so good, he shall have Pro­cesses to compell them to come before the Judge; if they dwell so far off as that it will be too chargable to bring them before the Judge, then a Commis­sion shall be granted to some Commissi­oners to examine them near the places where they dwell, and this if they dwell within the Judge's Jurisdiction; but if the Witnesses dwell out of the Judge's Jurisdiction, in any other Place, Realm or Countrey, Then the Judge of the Cause may direct a Com­mission requisitory to the Judges of the Places or Countreys where the Witnes­ses dwell, to intreat them to examine [Page 117] the Witnesses remaining there by their Authority, and to send their Depositi­ons to the Judges of the Cause, also by the Records of other Courts; or any o­ther Instruments or Writings which may any ways further the Cause; these be­ing the ordinary and usual courses used for making of Proof in every Cause, e­very Day, and will not be denied by any acquainted with the Proceedings in any Ecclesiastical or Civil Courts.

Q. 1. Whether in the Tucin Process for the dissolution of the Marriage be­twixt Frichinono and Gallina, there ap­pears so manifest a Collusion, that if the said Process comes to be examin'd before our Court, the Sentence for the dissolution grounded on that Process will be declared Void?

A. I am of Opinion in the Affirma­tive.

A Collusion, as all other Clandestine Acts and Agreements, is accounted by the Law to be Difficilis Probationis, and [Page 118] therefore a direct Proof is not required, but Conjectures and Presumption alone, arising not only from what has been done, but from what was omitted, will pass for full and concludent Evidence, ut per Felin. c. Praeterea n. 2. de Testibus & D. D. com omnes in c. Literis, &c. tertio loco de praesumpt.

Now there does not appear through­out all the Acts, that the parsrea used any diligence to defend the Cause. 'Tis true there was the formality of a Pro­ctor, but he seems rather to be appointed to substantiate Proceedings on the o­ther side, than to defend the Marriage on this; for that it appears by the Sen­tence, there was nothing done on the part of Frichinono: the words are Visis Actis ex parte Gallinae tum distributis; Then 'tis Gallina that is at all the expence, though she obtains in her Suit, and like­wise gives an ample Reward of 100 Crowns in Gold to the Court for Testi­monials.

[Page 119] Frichinono, though in his Answer up­on Oath, he believes it to be a good Marriage, and never knew of any such Aversion as is alledged; yet he adds, That if it shall be so determined, he doth not dissent, but that the Marriage may be declared Void; and as he doth no­thing in this instance, so neither does he Appeal. Now by these Omissions the Collusion appears, which Collu­sion renders the Judgment Void, but especially against a third Party, and that it has been thus often determined in like manner.

Monoch. Consil. 501. n. 8. & 688. n. 35. Sententia inter alios lata, etsi certis in casibus nocet, Surdus de Ali­mentis. F. 9. Q. 42. n. 32. id ta­men intelligitur quando ille victus omnem adhibuit diligentiam ne vinceretur.

Atque ita constare debet eum bona fide li­tem pertractasse. L. Si duo patroni. F. De ju­rejur and. & ita communiter. Atqui nostro in casu non adhibuit, ut ne vinceretur, quia [Page 120] non modo non contradixit, sed quodammodo consensit, in that he declares he will not dissent. Praeterea (saith he) culpa & negligentia ejus detegitur, quia à sen­tentiâ latâ non appellavit, ut fieri solet, & jure permissum est. Et accidit quod haec o­missio Appellationis est tacita quaedam juri­um renunciatio, quae alteri quam renuncianti nocere minimè potest, sicuti in specie Bal­dus & Salicet in L. 2. C. quibus res jud. non nocet: & ibi, Imo non appellans, cum facere id debuit, colludere cum adversario praesumi­tur . L. Si servus plurium. §. Sed si ante­F. De Leg. & Decius Consil. 306. n. 4. alli (que) ibid.

This was in a Civil Cause, but the present Case is much stronger, being a spiritual Cause, ubi vertitur periculum ani­mae; and odious too, in that it is for the dissolution of a Marriage, which in con­sequence may occasion the Sin of A­dultery; in which there might have been pleaded many things as excepti­ons to the Persons of the Witnesses, [Page 121] and their sayings; But chiefly the Co­habitation with all its Circumstances; and at last, the Fear that is pretended is but Reverential. Why, what can be concluded from hence, but that by such Artifice the Church is decei­ved, 1. Lator de sen. & re jud.and the Law in that Case is, Quod quandocun (que) constiterit de errore, retractabitur sententia. c. Frater­nitas de frigidis & maleficiatis.

Q. 2. Whether the pretended proof of the Force and Fear, she suffered from her Father in that Process, be not insuffi­cient in Law?

A. I am of Opinion that the Proof is insufficient.

1. For that they are but single Wit­nesses , & nunquam probant etiamsi mille jungentur; especially in Arduis, such as are Criminal, and Causes de matrimonio dirimendo. But more especially where the presumption of Law is against it; as in our Case, if we Consider the Co-habitation with all its Circumstances.

[Page 122] 2. The matter deposed does not a­mount to such a Force as the Law takes notice of. And 'tis chiefly ex auditu, either from her own Relation, or the Father's or Brother's; as they heard her say, She had no Affection, That she would not consent, That her Father would Force Her. Giacono Batta and Compeggio depose no more; Rath. Qua­glini and Monfort, say, He told them so, and she too, but separate: Galliero heard Dominico chiding and threatning, but 'twas but the Father told him, 'twas in the Business with Frichinono. None but Cornelius swears to Knowledge, and he to an uncertain time. At Supper once she told her Father, She would not con­sent , for that she had no Affection for him; Dominico then rose and gave her two Blows; and when she was gone, he said, He would strangle her if she would not have him. This is the sub­stance of all the Evidence, which cer­tainly can make no concludent Proof, [Page 123] either of the Dislike, or Force or Fear; perhaps there might words of this Na­ture fall from her, as 'tis usual among young Women when they are Courted, either to their Familiars or their other Lovers; for by speaking against those that are absent, they more oblige him that is present.

But then there is this to be attended, and 'tis Argumentum à verisimili Negative. Is it probable that in Case there had been such an Aversion as she pleads, and such a clutter to force her Consent, that Frichinono should never know it before or after, either from her self or some other? For so he does directly swear; and yet 'tis apparent enough by what has been said, that he did counte­nance the Divorce, and so seems to swear against himself.

3. If there is any stress laid upon that additional proof made by her suppletory Oath, that's as weak as the rest, for that is not admissible by Law, [Page 124] especially in dirimendo matrimonio, c. Mu­lieris . De Testibus, & gloss. ibm. D. D. Coiter omnes in l. 3. &c. Admonendi. F. de Jurejurando, especially if we consider all the Circumstances in this Case.

4. In case the Force and Fear that is pretended were in full Proof; yet 'tis but Reverential, and the Force how soe­ver it may be in other Cases which are frequent in our Books; yet I find by the best Authorities, that the Law is o­therwise in case of Parents, especially where the Children are not Minors, that a reverential Fear cannot dissolve a Marriage; for that 'tis not believed that Parents would do any thing prejudi­cial to their Children, Cum praesuma­tur Patrem recte consuluisse filiae: and the Civil Law allows but one cause of Dis­sent: L. Sed ea quae, F. Despons. Tunc au­tem solum dissentiendi à Patre licentia filiae conceditar; si indignum moribus vel turpem sponsum ei pater eligat. There are some of Opinion that a Reverential Fear with o­ther [Page 125] Circumstances may, as if there be Minae & verbera in the Case, and that the Parents are wont to put their threats in Execution; and this Opinion is foun­ded Supra c. in literis De spons. impube­rum. I think a very weak Ground. The Case: There was a Girl of 12 years old, was espoused to a Boy of 9 or 10. Quae de voluntate parentum potius quam sua ad domum patris pueri adducta, ubi nolens & invita, minis parentum, impulsa moram feeit per annum, & tandem regressa est. The Judgment was, Cùm puer nondum ad 14 Annum pervenit, nec ad eandem carnaliter accessum habuit, she should have the Li­berty to marry with another. Now we are within but one Circumstance of that Case. The Woman here was near­er 30 than 12: It does not appear in Proof, nor is offered, that she was Forc'd by threats to continue at Frichinono's House; it is clear, that Frichinono was nearer 40 than 14, and that 'tis very probable he had the carnal knowledge [Page 126] of her, for she had a Child, which with the voluntary Co-habition for near 2 Years, with liberty of going whither she pleased, together with what is in proof by her own Witnesses, of her Vi­sits to Persons of Quality, and Frichino­no's Absence in France for about half a Year, and no protestation before or after. Bellus Consil. 65. is clear in this very Case.

Q. 3. Supposing the said Marriage were really made through Force and Fear, yet being ratified by a Co-habitation of almost 2 Years, and issue, whether the Council of Trent does Authorize its dissolution?

A. I am of Opinion in the Negative, for that the Council has prescribed a Probatory Form for Marriage, enacting, That all Marriages shall be void that are not celebrated in the Presence of the Parochus and 2 Witnesses. Now some are of Opinion that the old Law is cor­rected by this, not only in the Addition [Page 127] of the Parochus, but in a far greater mat­ter , collecting from hence, that a contract, so celebrated, but being void by reason of Force, though it were ratified by a sub­sequent Co-habitation with issue, which might purge the Force by a tacit con­sent; yet because it was not de novo, in the form of the Council celebrated before the Parochus, and two Witnesses as it was at first, Tom. 1. part. 2. c. 3. §. 6. Cons. 170. l. 4. it cannot pass into a substantial Marriage. But I do conceive this inference cannot be justi­fied out of the Council.

1. Because I do not find it asserted by any modern Authorities, such as have wrote since the Council of Trent, who otherwise are tenacious enough of the Decrees of that Council; such as Covaruvias, Parisius, Christinaeus and Bellus, (who was Prothonotory of the Apostolick Sea, and Dean of the Roe of Avignion, Anno 1620.) but that they all agree, that a subsequent Co-habi­tation [Page 128] where the cause of Fear does not remain, induces a Tacit Consent and establishes a Marriage, which might otherwise have been void. Now if the form of the Council had been ne­cessary a second time, these could ne­ver have been silent in it.

2. Because the Council does not ex­presly command it in this Case, and then the vulgar Rule is, Quod à jure ve­teri recedere non debemus, nisi quatenus jus vetus expressim est correctum. Neither is there a parity of Reason with the de­sponsatione Impuberum, which was adjudg­ed decis. noviss. part. 4. f. 69. for those are but sponsalia de futuro, though the words are de praesenti.

3. Reason suggests otherwise. 'Tis certain that Consent is an act of the Will, and does consist in the Mind, and can appear to us to be voluntary, by no other means than as Force and Fear is proved, and that by conjectures; now these conjectures must be collect­ed [Page 129] either from Words or Acts, such as may signifie and give a moral certainty of the internal willingness of the Par­ty, perhaps more than Words; for so it was adjudged of him that said he would not do the Will of his Father, but yet did it; if therefore the subse­quent Acts be of the like Nature, and pursuant to the principal, we always judge that they have respect to it as the Original, and serve to Expound and Confirm it, nam ratihabitio retrotrahitur & mandato aequiparatur. Now 'tis evi­dent in this very Case, here was a con­sent of Gallina solemnly exprest in the Form of the Council; whether 'twas vo­luntary and really her Mind or no, God and her own Conscience only can tell; but there does not appear any thing in Proof, to the contrary at the time of the Marriage.

And therefore admit, that before and after the Solemnity, she might say that her consent was not free, yet she did not [Page 130] say so at the time. And in Truth and Reality, notwithstanding these common. Pretences, it might then be free; and Law and Reason presume it was so, from those subsequent Acts that were in pursuance of it, such as was the Co-ha­bitation in this Case with all its Circum­stances; for those subsequent Acts do not create a new Marriage instead of that which was Null and Void for want of free consent; but ratifie only and confirm the first, or rather give us an assurance and demonstration that that was a free internal consent, which was exprest in the Form of the Council; notwithstanding those specious Pretences to the contrary, whereby she would im­pose upon us, and according to which we (that can see no further than outwardly) ought to have judged, in Case there had not been these subsequent Acts; and therefore undoubtedly there needs not a second Celebration in the Form of the Council, when by th [...]se Acts [Page 131] we are assured that she gave her free consent in the First. Ex coitu matrimo­nium praesumi, si prius consensus verbis ex­pressis, sed propter causam aliquam vel im­pedimentum humani juris nullum praecesserat: satis senim tacitè aliquo sufficiente signo no­vum consensum praestari, says Parisius, who was a Cardinal since the Council of Trent.

Q. 4. In Case the Council does au­thorise its Dissolution, whether it does therein act contrary to the Law of God?

A. I'll leave this question to the Di­vines, but if that be Law, I have said before, then I think God has joyn'd them.

Q. 5. Supposing the Council of Trent does authorise its dissolution, and that it does not act contrary to the Law of God therein; whether according to the due and usual proceeding of our Courts and the Laws of our Nation, where the [Page 132] Council of Trent was never received, we shall, or ought to allow of such a proceeding upon the account of a com­munity of Rights, or any other account whatsoever?

A. I am of Opinion in the Nega­tive.

For however it may be in Civil Cau­ses in point of Commerce or the like; the Reason is not the same in Criminal or Matrimonial, ubi vertitur periculum a­nimae, which may arise from the difference in Laws and Religions; for 'twould be strange Doctrine to assert, That a Sub­ject of England ought to be executed here upon a Sentence of Heresie in Rome; and as strange to adjudge the dissolution of a Marriage here, because it was not celebrated according to the form of the Council of Trent: or rather as this Case is, To force a Subject of England to Co­habit with a Woman, who in the con­struction of the Laws in England, is a­nother [Page 133] Man's Wife; for that is done by putting in Execution here a Sentence of Divorce, which was given at Turin upon the Council of Trent, (which Council was never promulgated in Eng­land,) and when the Law is in Terms otherwise, Hipol. de Morsil. singular. 138. n. 2. Judex, says he, unius territorij man­dat Executioni sententiam judicis alterius territorij, &c. Tene tamen mente quòd istud procedit quando Judex pronunciavit secundum leges, non autem statuta ipsius loci; tum al­ter judex non tenetur. And therefore says, Jason, In executivis debent attendi sta­tuta illius loci in quo fit executio, & non al­terius, secundùm Bart. & omnes. And fur­ther says Angelus l. Si ut proponi, c. De ex­ecut. rei Jud. Talis Judex alterius territorij po­test de iniquitate talis sententiae cognoscere, & si viderit esse iniquam, aut de hoc vehementer suspicaretur, non debet illam executioni man­dare. And this is the common Opinion.

William Oldys.

[Page 134] I have read and considered the An­swers given by Dr. Oldys to the foregoing Questions; and do agree with him in Opinion.

Richard Lloyd.

[...] DE JVDAEIS in Reipublica Christiana tolerandis, vel de novo admittendis.

THE CASE OF THE JEWS.

TO this Question in short I say, 1. That in Scripture Rom. 2. 28, 29. we meet with a Jew in a Double Notion.

  • 1. [...], & in Corde.
  • 2. [...], & in Carne.

2. For the First, they are called, Circumcisio Spiritualis & in Spiritu; The Second, Circumcisio Carnalis & in Litera. De Judaeis Corde non quaeritur, [Page 4] For so every true Christian is (in Scri­pture) called a Jew. Rev. 3. 9. & Rev. 2. 9.

3. For the Second Sort of Jews in Carne, they are,

  • 1. Natione tantùm Judaei.
  • 2. Religione tantùm.
  • 3. Natione & Religione simul.

Now the Question is only of a Jew in Religion (of what Nation soever) or of him who is a Jew, Natione & Religione simul. Whether such may be admitted in a Christian Common­wealth?

In Answer to this Question, I say, That the Toleration or Admission of such Jews may be considered in a Twofold Relation.

  • 1. Respectu Reipub.
  • 2. Respectu Ecclesiae.

[Page 5] 1. In Respect of the Common­wealth, there are only Two Things properly considerable to a Statesman, which may make their Toleration or Admission Legal or Illegal, Conveni­ent or Inconvenient, according to the Nature and Condition of those Poli­tick Considerations.

Now these Considerations are,

1. Whether there be any Law of the State against such Jews being here: for if there be, then stante Lege, they cannot legally be admitted. And in England there is such a Statut. de Ju­daismo. Termino Hilla­rii. An. 18. Edvardi 1. And they were ex­pell'd An. 1291. Th. Stubbs. de Pontif. E­bora. censib. in Joh. Romano. Law; but that Law taken away (and as the Supreme Power made it for good Reasons (as they conceited) then, so the Supreme Power may (possibly for bet­ter Reasons) alter it now; the State may readmit them Lege non obstante. So that if the Supream Power abro­gate [Page 6] that Law, then tis manifest there is no Legal Impediment (as to the Civil Law of this Nation) but that they may (if it seem good to the Wis­dom of the State) be readmited▪

The Second Consideration (as to the Political Part of this Question) is the Damage or Benefit, the Conveni­ences or Inconveniences which may accrue to the State by their Admissi­on or Rejection.

Now as to this I shall add,

1. That seeing the Law of Nature and Nations tell us, Cicero de legib. Lib. 1. that Salus Populi suprema Lex est, if it appear to his Highness and his Council (who only are Judges of this and not the People) that the Common-weal will be advantaged by their Admission, then (no doubt) they may and ought to be admitted.

2. If otherwise, they are not.

[Page 7] Now whether it be for the Bene­fit and Secular Advantage of the Com­mon-wealth to admit the Jews, I shall not Dispute, but leave it to the Pru­dence of the State, only I shall observe here Two Things.

1. That whilst the Jews lived in England it was a vast Benefit to the Crown. I shall give one Instance ta­ken by my Lord My Lord Cooke Institut. part. 2. pag. 506. De Statuto Ju­daismi. Cooke out of the Rot. Patent. An. 3. Edvardi 1. m. 14. 17. 26. Midleton Reddit Computum. Records. That from December 17. Anno 50. Hen. 3. till Shrovetide. 2. Edvardi 1. which was about Seven Years, the Crown had 420000 l. 15 s. 6 d. De Exitibus Ju­daeorum. The Ounce of Silver was then but xx d. and now tis more than thrice so much, so that (as Money goes now) The Crown had of the Jews in Seven Years, above 1260000 l. such a Sum now might save Contri­butions.

[Page 8] 2. It appears by our Story that the Jews (at their Expulsion, and many times before) were not only Videsiis Matth. Paris ad Ann. 1239. in Hen. 3. pag. 489. & ad Annum 1254. pag. 887. Walsing­ham Hypodig. Neu­striae, ad Ann. 1289. pag. 476. Unchristianly, but Inhumanely and Barbarously used; and then seeing Common-wealths and Societies never die (though par­ticular Persons do) it may be a Que­ry whether the Common-wealth of England now are not bound in Con­science and Equity to make some Sa­tisfaction by real Kindness and Civili­ty to the present Jews for the And as in Eng­land, so elsewhere the Jews (though bad e­nough) were falsly ac­cused, and upon that Banished. Vt eorum bona fisco vindicaren­tur. So they were expell'd out of Spain by Ferdinand, and Emanuel King of Portugal, out of France by Dagobert and Philip the Long. Bodinus de Repub. lib. 3. pag. 549. Edit. Francof. 1594. Injuries the same Common-wealth did to their Progeni­tors then?

[Page 9] Dub. The main Objection against them, why they were banished, was their Usury, and the Mischief that came thereupon, as appears by the Pre­amble of the Statutum de Ju­daismo Term. Hillarii 18. Ed. 1. Sta­tute by which they were banished.

To this I say, these things,

Sol. 1. That Usury is tollerated in all Christian Common-weals (even in ours) and therefore to expel Jews for that which is tollerated in Christi­ans, is irrational.

2. The State may limit their mo­dus usurae, not to exceed that allow'd by Statutes, and then no more Fault in them, then us.

3. If you consider the Tolleration and Readmission of the Jews, respe­ctu Ecclesiae, there are only Three things which may rationally hinder a Toleration and Readmission of them, into a Christian Common-wealth, as Christian.

  • [Page 10]1. Inhonestum.
  • 2. Incommodum.
  • 3. Scandalum.

1. Inhonestum. I conceive, that for Jews to live among Christians, or Christians amongst Jews is not Inho­nestum, or Malum per se, as being a­gainst no Law of God, natural or po­sitive, either that of Nature or Scri­pture. Because,

1. Our Saviour and his Apostles after him, lived amongst Jews uncon­verted, which they would not have done had it been unlawful.

2. The Apostles and primitive Christians lived amongst Pagan Ido­laters, who were far worse than Jews, yet made no Scruple of Conscience, nay the Apostles approving it: For the Apostle commands the Christi­ans to live so, that they might gain the Pagans to the Faith by their Pious [Page 11] and Christian 1 Pet. 3. 1. & 1 Pet. 2. 12. Con­versation: and there­fore they supposed they might live amongst them; for it were not Sense to suppose, that they could gain those by their Conversati­on, with whom they might not con­verse.

3. It is certain and an undoubted Principle, That Domium non fundatur in gratiâ, and therefore a Jew, nay a Turk, or Pagan hath a just Right and Propriety in their Estates, as well as Christians. And having so when some of the Jews were turned Christians, they were neither bound to quit their Inheritance or Country, to avoid the company and conversation of those Jews, who were not, nor when they were multiplied so, that the major and ruling Part were Christians, could they (by any Law of God or Man) without manifest Injustice, disquiet the Unconverted Jews in their Pos­sessions, [Page 12] or banish them from their In­heritance.

4. In the Jewish Church (by Gods express approbation and command) their Gezim Advenae, Deut. 14. 29. Ex­od. 20. &c. [...] (whom the 70 Interpreters, and Hellenists call [...] and [...], from the Caldee Gio­rim) even those which they call'd Proselyti Portae, who were neither cir­cumcised, nor submitted to the Law of Moses, were permitted to live; and God expresly commands, that the Jews should use them kindly; provided that they abstained from Idolatry and worship't the God of Israel: Now if these might live in the Jews Church though not circumcised, nor submitting to Moses's Law, why may not Jews live in the Christian Church, though they be not baptized and submit not to the Gospel?

[Page 13] 5. The Practice of the Christian World in all Ages, and the Leg. ultima Cod. Judaeis. & ibid. Leg. nullus 14. Imperial and Canon Extra de Ju­daeis. Can. sicut, &c. Vide Bodinum de Re­pub. 1. 3. p. 546. Edit. Francof. 1594. Et Au­ctores ibi in margine allegatos. Laws ap­prove the living of Jews amongst Christi­ans, and why it should be thought unlawful amongst us, I know not.

6. Our Merchants live and con­verse with Jews (nay Turks and Pa­gans) abroad, and therefore why may not Jews converse with them here? seeing that there is less Danger that a few Jews should live amongst many Christians here, than that a few Chri­stians should live amongst many Jews, Turks and Pagans abroad.

2. Incommodum. The Second thing proposed (which might render the ad­mission or toleration of the Jews un­reasonable) was the Incommodum, the Harm or Disadvantages which might [Page 14] come to Christianity or Christians by their company and conversation: For if indeed the admission, and tollerati­on of them were disadvantageous to the Gospel, and really tended to the abolition or diminution of the true Faith, or the subversion and hinder­ance of Christianity, it were certain­ly neither pious in the supreme Magi­strate, nor prudent to admit them; but he ought (in this case) rather to ex­pell them if they were here, than re­admit them, now they are away: see­ing he is, Non solùm Reipublicae, sed & Ecclesiae Nutricius, qui non solùm Civi­lia, sed & Sacra procuraret, being Cu­stos utrius (que) Tabulae; a sacred Obliga­tion lying upon him by the Law of Nature and Nations, to be vigilent and cautious; Ne quid detrimenti capiat Ec­clesiae. But on the other side, if the civil State may be advantaged by their ad­mission, and the Church secured a­gainst such pretended Danger, then [Page 15] ( ex hoc capite) there is no Reason but they may be admitted.

And that there is no such Danger which might rationally hinder their ad­mission, I am induced to believe,

1. Because, if there had been any such Danger, the Apostles would ne­ver (which yet they As above, 1 Pet. 3. 1. & 1 Pet. 2. 12.did) have permitted and approved the Christians living and conversing a­mongst the Jews.

2. It hath been the constant and continued Practice of Christendom, e­ver since to this Day, to admit Jews to live amongst Christians, and why we should pretend more Danger (in this particular) than either the Apo­stles or the Christian World ever since, I understand not.

3. 'Tis true they have been Bani­shed out of Thom. Stubbs. ubi supra in Johan. Romano Eboracensi Archiepiscopo. Anno 1291. Eng­land [Page 16] and Ad Annum Chri­sti 1252. pag. 861. France, and some other Coun­tries, Vide Statutum de Judaismo. Anno 18. Edvardi 1.but it was not for matter of Faith but Fact, not for their Re­ligion, that they were Religione Ju­d aei but for other crimes, and enor­mities, as their Blaspheming Jesus Christ, Crucifying Children in oppro­brium Christi, Vilating the Pacta con­venta and Capitulations of their Ad­mission, &c. as plainly appears by the Statut. de Ju­daismo Term. Hillar. Anno 18. Ed. 1. Preamble to the Sta­tute of their Banishment and by our Vid. Chronicon Joh. Brompton in Hen. 1. pag. 1005. lin. 53. Et in Hen. 2. pag. 1043. & pag. 1050. lin. 38. Hen. de Kinghton de Eventibus Angliae: lib. 2. pag. 2394. lin. 17. & lib. 3. pag. 2462. lin. 58. Et ibid. lib. 3. cap. 1. pag. 2466. lin. 16. Historians gene­rally.

3. It is the Judgment of an emi­nent Divine both for Learning and Moderation, that there is not much [Page 17] Danger that the Jews will subvert a­ny or much endeavour the seducing of others to their Religion, (and he hath it out of Osiander and Capito, two Per­sons of eminent Note in their time) and he gives his Rea­son, Philip. Melanch­on. Epist. 68. ( In E­dit. Corn. B.) pag. 75. Epistolar. lib. 1. Quia Judaei antiquitus, etiam stante eorum Politiâ ante Chri­stum natum, si Civitatem aliquam, aut Populum bello devicissent, legem Mosai­cum ipsis non imponebant, ( legem enim illam ad Gentes pertinere non put abant) sed solum ut relictis Idolis, Deum unum colerent, & praecepta Noachida obser­varent. And indeed as we find not in any Story that the Jews have been active to gain Proselytes, so we do not find any considerable number of Men in any Country which have apo­stated from Christianity to Judaism. And the Reason of this may be (be­sides the senceless irrationality of their Worship and Pretences for it, and [Page 18] the Odium that lies upon them univer­sally as being hateful to the Christian World) because they are a dispersed and vagabond People, Slaves where­ever they come, obnoxious to the Will of those Princes and States in whose Territories they live; and so want all those temporal advantages, which might allure Proselytes, having no Jurisdiction or Authority any where to Protect themselves, much less others who shall desert their own Profession to embrace theirs: So that in all likelihood (considering the E­vidence of Truth, and the very many Advantages which the Professors of Christianity have above that of Ju­daism ) by the Readmission of the Jews, the cohabitation and conver­sation amongst Christians, they may be sooner converted to Christianity, (God blessing the means) than Chri­stians seduced into Judaism.

[Page 19] And something we have to this purpose in Sacred and Prophane Sto­ry . In the time of Queen Annum Mundi 3495. Ante Christum. 509. Vide Ja. Vsse­rii Armach. Annales Mundi. Aetat. 6. Ad Ann. Mundi. 3495. pag. 163. Esther, the Jews by (her means) had infinite Honour and Priviledges in the Persian Monarchy, gained for them (by her) of Ahassue­rus ( Darius Hystaspis was the Man) her Husband, Adeo ut musti ex populis terrae facti sunt Judaei, saith the Ester 8. 17. Text, and the Reason is rendered, Quoniam pa­vor Judaeorum super eos erat. It was their great Priviledge, and secular Ad­vantages which made many turn Jews; But now, as their Religion is absolute­ly out of Date, and their Misery more, so the Fear that any should turn to them is less. Nor do I find that when that Jewish Common-wealth was in its Glory, they compelled any to be of their Religion, no not those who [Page 20] lived amongst them and Vide quae habet Grotius de jure Belli. lib. 1. cap. 1. s. 16. p. 7. Ex Deut. 33. 4. & Levit. 22. 25. were uncir­cumcised (for such did live quietly, and were permitted so to do) amongst them. Nor only so but they were very scrupulous in admitting those Proselytes which did voluntari­ly come unto them. As will fully ap­pear by a large Dis­course of Mr. Jo. Selden De jure naturali, & Gro­tium apud Hebraeos. lib. 2. cap. 2. & ibid. cap. 4. Sel­den's to that purpose. And though we find in Joseph. Origi­num lib. 13. cap. 17. Josephus, that Johannes Hyrcanus commanded the whole Nation of the Idumeans to be circumcised, yet that was because they were of the Seed of Abraham, and so (as his [...] and Posterity) bound to be circumcised. Whence it is that even Geograph. l. 16. Strabo, [...] 60. [...]. Ste­phanus and Lib. De differ­entia Bon. Ammo­nius do reckon them [Page 21] for Jews. But if it should be otherwise with the Jews now, if they should be sollicitous and busie to seduce any to their Religion, the Prudence of the State may by the Capitulations of their Admission, tye them to the contrary, and make such Seduction (if volunta­rily attempted by them) a Forfei­ture for their Priviledges, and so se­cure the Publick as to that particular.

3. Scandalum. For the third thing which might make the admission of the Jews unlawful, to wit, Scandal; I conceive the case will be more plain than the former: For though I know not what Scandal some may take (who are hardly pleased with any thing the Publick Magistrates do, which suits not with their ends and interest) yet I do not see any colour­able Reason; why the Readmission of the Jews into this Nation, should by any sober and intelligent Person, be thought Scandalous, ( Scandalum da­tum [Page 22] I mean) or be a ground of just Offence to any.

And that this may appear, I rea­son thus, If the supreme Magistrate by readmiting the Jews, give a just ground of Scandal, then it is either to Foreign States abroad, or their own Subjects at home, but neither of both can rationally be said.

1. Not to Foreign States abroad, for there neither is, nor hardly ever was any Kingdom or State in Chri­stendom , which sometime or other hath not admitted them: Sure I am most do now, and certainly such States have no just Reason (nor can have) to condemn us, for that which they do themselves.

2. Not to their own Subjects at home; and that this may more di­stinctly appear, I consider

1. That in relation to humane actions to be done, or not to be done by us, all things in the World are, [Page 23] and (of necessity) must be ranked in one of these three Particulars;

1. Some things are absolutely good.

2. Some are absolutely bad.

3. Some are Res mediae, and indif­ferent .

1. Things absolutely good are such, as are Sub praecepto divino affirmativo, ( naturali vel positivo) and these of ne­cessity ( necessitas praecepti) is meant, must be done, and without sin cannot be left undone by any Man in the World, (no one rational individuum excepted; For I speak not of Children or natu­ral Fools who want the use of Rea­son ) if they be juris naturalis: nor if they be juris positivi, can they (with­out sin) be left undone by any Man to whom that positive divine Law is sufficiently reveal'd. Now I take it for manifest, and a truth (which I be­lieve) [Page 24] will be granted by all sober Men; that neither the admission or exclusion of the Jews is absolutely good, or sub praecepto divino affirma­tivo ( naturali vel positivo.) For

1. If their admission were a thing absolutely good, and sub praecepto di­vino , then all those who admit them not (and much more they who eject them) would be found guilty of a manifest violation of the Law of God, which no Man ever said, nor with a­ny congruity of Reason can say.

2. If their exclusion were absolute­ly good and sub praecepto divino, then all those who have admitted them (and the Christian Churches in all ages, e­ven those of the Apostles themselves have done so) will be found guilty of a great sin, and manifest transgression of the Law of God, and then the pri­mitive Christians, and the Apostles themselves must of necessity be guilty [Page 25] of this Crime, which neither is, nor can justly be affirmed.

2. Things absolutely bad are such as are sub praecepto Dei negativo natu­rali vel positivo, forbidden by God, and and so absolutely unlawful for us; and that the admission of the Jews into this, or any other Christian Common-wealth should be thus unlawful, and so malum per se, I believe is not, and I am sure cannot with any congruity be asserted.

1. Because there appears no Law of God (natural or positive) against such admission, he that thinks other­wise let him shew it.

2. If admission of the Jews into a Christian Common-wealth, if cohabi­tation and an outward and civil con­versation with them, had been an evil of this high nature; then, as is before said, the primitive Christians and A­postles, nay our blessed Saviour him­self, which is impious to think, had [Page 26] been guilty of it; who all their lives permitted, and practise such communi­on and outward conversation with the unconverted Jews.

3. Well then, let the admission and exclusion of the Jews be (as most (manifestly they are) amongst the [...], the Res mediae, those things we call indifferent, and in themselves neither morally good or bad, but such as may be either, according as they are cloathed with several circumstan­ces; Then I say if the supreme Ma­gistrate, (who is trusted with the ma­naging of publick affairs) think it fit to admit the Jews into this Common-weal (and of the conveniences and in­conveniences of their admission, he only (and not the People) is to judge) and by a Law authorize their admis­sion; then (as to the Subjects) their admission is no more a thing of indif­ferency, but necessity: No more mat­ter of Offence or Scandal, but Obedi­ence; [Page 27] such as we who are Subjects, should not dispute, but obey. So that if any Man take offence, or be scandalized at it, it will certainly be Scandalum acceptum non datum. And so not the fault of the Magistrate but of the Men (if there be any such) who are irrationally offended. And this will manifestly appear, if we consider,

1. The Magistrate in reference to the People under him.

2. The People in reference to the Magistrate, and in reference one to another.

1. For the Magistrate, as he stands in Relation to the People, it is cer­tain (by virtue of that supreme au­thority with which he is entrusted) he is to judge what things are conve­nient or inconvenient for the People.

2 When after serious Debate and mature Deliberation, (all circumstan­ces [Page 28] considered) he shall really think and judge that this, (which before was indifferent and no way enjoyned) is hic & nunc best for the publick good, then he justly may (by his legislative Power) enjoyn the doing of it, and by a positive Law bring a just Obli­gation upon the Subjects to do ac­cordingly.

3. Nor is this all, he not only may, but is bound, and (if he will do his Duty) must do so, and that by the Law of Nature, and from the very first Principles of his Duty, and that Magistracy he is intrusted with, for it being certain, that Salus Populi su­prema Lex est, and by his great and sacred Office, an Obligation lies upon him (by all honourable and honest means) to procure their good, so far as in him lies: if he see such things, (though at present indifferent) would much conduce to the Publick Good, if they were enjoyned, and obey'd [Page 29] accordingly. I say, in this case, if he do not command them, he neglects his Duty, and violates that sacred Ob­ligation which binds him to it: So in this present case, if (all things ma­turely considered) he impartially judge the readmission of the Jews will really and indeed tend to the good of the Publick, he is bound to readmit them, and he should be wanting to his Duty in promoting the Interest and Good of the Common-weal, if he should do otherwise.

4. Nor is it possible that any Scan­dal or Offence taken by the People, should be of that moment as to hin­der him. And the Reason of this is manifest, because the Obligation of doing his Duty, and procuring the Peoples Good, lies so indispensably upon him, that he must not omit it, though they be never so much dis­pleased, seeing (if it must be so that one party will be displeased) it is far [Page 30] more rational to hazard the Peoples, than Gods Displeasure: For if he do it, and the People be scandalized and offended at it, that Scandal is only Scandalum acceptum, groundless, and (on his part) altogether causless. But if he neglect his Duty and do it not, God is really and justly offended. So that in short, (if after all things con­sidered) the Wisdom of the State shall judge it convenient and beneficial for the Publick to readmit the Jews, (and we are bound in Charity to think that unless they judge so they will not ad­mit them) then they are in Duty bound to do it, notwithstanding any Displeasure (or pretended Scandal) which their Subjects will or can con­ceive against them for so doing: It be­ing evident that no supreme Magi­strate is to neglect the doing of his Duty, or using his just and lawful Liberty and Authority in putting that in Execution, which upon impartial [Page 31] judgment and deliberation, he con­ceives convenient for the good of the Common-wealth. It is I (confess) to be wished, and heartily prayed for, that all Men would (with a charitable Opinion and obsequious Obedience) rest satisfied with the deliberate re­solutions and constitutions of their Magistrates really intended for the publick Good; and (no doubt) all so­ber and moderate Persons will do so. But this is rather to be wished than hoped for. The understandings, aimes, and interest of Men being so differ­ent, that supreme Governours in no Age or Country did ever satisfie all, no not with their best Actions, and therefore it is not to be expected now. But this pretended Scandal and Dis­satisfaction of some, should (in reason) be no Remora or Hinderance to the Magistrate to go on, and according to his best Skill and Judgment, pro­mote the Good of all. And if this [Page 32] be not admitted, it will unhinge and enervate all Governments whatsoe­ver: For the Command of no King ever pleased all his Subjects, of no Ge­neral all his Souldiers, of no Fatherof a Family all his Children and Servants, of no Schoolmaster all his Scholars: and yet this never did (or indeed should) hinder any King, or General, or Father, or Master to give Commands, such as in prudence they thought convenient, and being given, to put them in Ex­ecution. The truth is, it were im­possible for any Government to sub­sist if supreme Magistrates should make no Law, or civil Sanction, till all their Subjects were satisfied.

5. And as evident Reasons may, (in this Case of readmitting the Jews) be drawn for the Liberty, which (by the Law of Nature and Scripture) is inherent in the supreme Magistrate's, and his just Authority to determine of indifferent things, to prove that he [Page 33] gives no Scandal in case he use that Liberty and Authority in readmitting, and giving Priviledges, (such as in prodence he shall think fit) to the Jews: So there may be further Rea­sons (drawn for the same purpose) from the consideration of the Subjects in relation to the supreme Magistrate. For as they stand in this Relation, there lies an Obligation upon them, by the Law of God and Nature, to yield cheerful and willing Obedience to all the just Commands of their Go­vernours, (as this undoubtedly is) and then where Obedience is morally due, Offence and Scandal is in vain pretended. It is irrational and irre­ligious too to pretend Scandal for the neglect of my Duty, and so evident­ly disobey God, and my Governours, upon pretence, I am afraid so to do. But enough (if not too much) of this. He that would have more Reasons from the Nature of Scandal may find [Page 34] enough in the best Vide Dr. Saun­derson's Sermon on Rom. 14. 3. Conc. 2. Ad Clerum. Casuist of our Nation, (and may be of any Nation else) where al­though his Discourse in Hypothesi, be applied to other particulars, and a dif­ferent Case of Scandal from this now in question, yet what he hath said there in Thesi, is as applicable to this, as that.

6. Now concerning this Toleration of the Jews, we may further enquire;

1. What Power is to give this To­leration.

2. In what things they are to give it.

3. For what Reasons and Motives they are to do it.

4. How far, and with what Restri­ctions and Limitations this should be done.

[Page 35] For the First, notwithstanding what Tho. Erastus in Explicatione gravissi­mae Questionis, &c. Pes. clavii Anno 1589. Erastus with his Vide Tho. Hobbs in his Leviath. Part 2. Followers, and Joh. Seldenus li­bris de Synedriis Ju­daeorum. Selden of late have said, I believe it to be a manifest Truth, That in every Christian Na­tion there are (or should be) two divine distinct Powers.

  • 1. Sacred or Spiritual.
  • 2. Civil or Temporal.

In both which Powers we may con­sider.

1. Principium a quo, the Principle and immediate Cause from whence they flow, and from whence they are derived to Men, and thus the Tem­poral Power is immediately from God, as he is the great Maker and Monarch of the World, by whom Kings reign, who communicates his Power and Name to Magistrates, so that they [Page 36] are not only ( Rom. 13.) [...], his Delegates and Substitutes, but Vide Exod. 22. 28. Joh. 10. 34. [...] Gods too ( Psal. 82.) I have said ye are Gods. 2. The Spiritual Power is from Christ, as Head of his Church, his Father gave him, Matth. 28. 18. All Power in Heaven and earth, and some of that Power he hath communi­cated to his Apostles and Ministers, who are his Ambassadors, Pastors of his People, and Stewards of his Hous­hold.

2. Subjectum in quo, the civil Power in the civil Magistrate, the sacred Pow­er in the Ministers.

3. Finis in quem tendunt, the one being ordained to procure our tempo­ral Good here, the other our eternal Good hereafter.

[Page 37] This premised, I say, That the Jews neither desiring, nor intending to be Members of our Church, but only of our Common-weal; their Admis­sion or Exclusion depends only on the Civil Power. For the Command of the Common-weal (as it is a civil So­ciety) being solely in the Civil Magi­strate, to him only it will belong to judge whether it be fit to admit or exclude them, and to do accordingly. 'Tis true the Kingdom of Christ (his Church) is not a Temporal but a Spi­ritual Society, which he rules inward­ly by his Spirit, outwardly by his Mi­nisters (Bishops, or Presbiters, or Pastors, call them what you will) who are his Ambassadours and Stew­ards, who have a Law to rule by the Gospel of Jesus Christ. To these he hath committed the Keys of his House and Kingdom, so that they (and they only) can admit Men into it by Ba­ptism, [Page 38] and exclude by Excomunication. The end and use of a Key, being to open and shut, and these Keys com­mitted to them, they only have the use of them, and according to the best of their Skill, are to use them ac­cordingly. On which Principles it follows, that the Jews neither being Christians, nor (for ought appears) in­tending to be, their Admission or Ex­clusion no way belongs to the Spiri­tual Governours of the Church; their sacred Jurisdiction being only over the Houshold of Faith (the Christian Church) of which the Jews are no part, and therefore not under that Jurisdiction. So that I doubt not but the Admission or Nonadmission of the Jews belongs only to the Civil, not Sacred Power.

2. The Second Query is, In what things they are to be tolerated? And to this I say,

[Page 39] 1. That there is an Antithesis and Opposition between Approbation and Toleration of any thing; so that (in propriety of Speech) we approve good, tolerate bad things. And then when the Question is about the Toleration of the Jews, we suppose that there is some evil in them, which for some Reasons, some Ends and Purposes is to be tolerated in our Christian Com­mon-weal.

2. That evils may be of two sorts, 1. Such as are against the Law of Na­ture. 2. Such as are against positive Law; that we usually call the Law of Nature, this the Law of Scripture, both Divine. For in this Case the humane Laws come not in Consi­deration: For if it please the supreme Magistrate, to admit them by a Law, then all humane Laws of this Com­mon-weal (if there be any against [Page 40] them) are ipso facto null, and abroga­ted: And so their Admission (the will of the State legally declared for it, being supposed) cannot possibly be against any positive Law of this Com­mon-weal.

2. Now then for the first sort of evils, such as are against the Law of Nature, and are intrinsecè & ex natu­rà suàmala, these no Magistrate may tolerate. The Obligation of the Law of Nature is so inviolable, that God himself in all the Old Testament ne­ver gave any Vide Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 1. cap. 1. 5. 10. &c. Suarez Aquinatem. Pet. a sancto Joseph. &c. De legibus. Dis­pensation of that Law, nor Vide Grotium ubi supra §. 17. p. 9. ubi contrarium non si­ne errore asserere vi­det? Toleration of any sins against it, much less can the Ci­vil Magistrate who is but his Vicegerent and Deputy; and neither hath (nor can have) any Commission to do more than his [Page 41] great Lord and Master. 'Tis true, the Magistrate is [...], Gods Minister and Vice-gerent, and so Cu­stos utriksque tabulae, armed with the Sword of Justice, which he must not bear in vain, but is bound by his place, and that sacred calling he carries to be [...], Rom. 13.a Revenger of such Sins, and a Punisher of Malefa­ctors against the Law of Nature.

And that we may apply this in Hy­pothesi, to our particular Case of the Readmission of the Jews, I say,

1. That in the Vide Hug. Gro­tium de Jure Belli. lib. 1. cap. 1. §. 17. Law of Moses and the whole old Testament, there is nothing contained to the con­trary, or repugnant to the Law of Na­ture.

[Page 42] 2. That this Law of Moses, and the old Testament, is (or at least should be) the adequate rule of the Jews Re­ligion; and therefore so long as they keep to this, there is no thing in their Religion which is intollerable on this Account, as being against the Law of Nature.

3. But if there be any thing in their Religion (as now they profess it) superinduced by Error or Custom, which is indeed against Jus naturale, that should not be tolerated in this, or any Christian Common-wealth. And if the Christian Magistrate tye them to abstain from all Idolatry, Blasphemy, Murther, Adultery, and all such other Sins against the Light and Law of Nature, he tyes them to no more, then they (in their flourish­ing State of their Common-weal) ty'd others. For though they did not re­quire [Page 43] of their Proselytes (those of the Gate I mean) to submit to the posi­tive Law, and Precepts of Videsis Joh. Sel­den de Jure naturali & Gentium apud He­braeos. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 138, 139. & ex R. Mose Maimoinde & R. Mos. Mikotzi. Moses, yet they did universally require of them to abstain from Blasphemy, Ido­latry, and all natural Injustice, as is manifest in Josephus, the Sacred Text it self and their Rab­binical and Talmutical Writers. So that if Christian Magistrates do (as indeed they should) denie any Tole­ration of such unnatural Enormities, they have Reason to rest satisfied with it, seeing no more is denied to them in ours, than they denied to others in their Common-wealth.

Dub. But it must be said, Vsury, Boligamy, and the Marriage of a Sister, was (by the Law of Moses) permitted to them, and therefore the Practicers of some things against the Law of Na­ture.

[Page 44] Sol. To this I say, 1. That 'tis true, that Aristotle and divers other Philoso­phers, conceived Usury to be against the Law of Nature; and many Divines of eminent Note have thought (and pub­lished their Opinions to the World) That both Vsury and Poligamy and marrying a Sister, are so too. Vid. Aquinat. Quaest. 94. Art. 5. Commentat. ibid. Vas­quez. in 1. 2. Disp. 150. Fran. Suarez. de Legibus. lib. 2. c. 5, 6. &c. Fran. Duace­num ad Tit. de Just. & Jure c. 5. Hug. Do­nellum. Comment. de Jure Civili c. 6, 7. Ludov. Melinaeum de Justitiâ. Tract. 1. Disp. 4. pag. 10.Yet 2. This I conceive to be a ma­nifest Mistake, for it will evidently and un­deniably follow, God permitted Vsury and Polygamy and marrying a Sister to the Jews by a positive Law, there­fore neither of them is, or can be a­gainst the Law of Nature, it being a demonstrative Truth, and generally confessed by the best Lawyers, School-men [Page 45] and Casuists, That God Vid. Petrum a Sancto Joseph. in Idea Theologiae moralis. Lib. 1. De Legibus. Cap. 2. Resolu. 4. Pag. 14. never did, nor ( manente naturâ huma­nâeadem) could dis­pense with the Law of Nature. So that I think that Asser­tion of Grotius de Jure Belli. lib. 1. cap. 1. §. 17. pag. 9. Grotius, (and many before him) to be a certain Truth, That nothing was permitted to the Jews in the Old Testament, which was against the Law of Nature; nor should any such Sins be tolerated now.

2. The Second sort of Sins are, such as are against some positive Law of God, and of such the Jews must needs be guilty (I mean such of them, (and only such) to whom the Gospel has been sufficiently reveal'd) as denying the blessed Trinity, and the whole Gospel of Jesus Christ, That I may not be mistaken in this Assertion, I say,

[Page 46] 1. That sufficient Promulgation, is absolutely necessary to the Obligation of any positive Law of God, or Man, Humane or Divine, it being morally impossible that any Man should be bound to obey the Laws of any Au­thority, till it be sufficiently evidenced to him that indeed they are the Laws of such Authority.

2. If then there be any Jews in any part of the World (as I doubt not but there may be many) to whom the Gospel (or any part of it) is not suf­ficiently revealed, then I dare pro­nounce them innocently ignorant of all, or so much of the Gospel as hath not been sufficiently discovered to them, and Christians guilty, who have taken no more Care and Pains to dis­cover that Truth to others, of which they were abundantly convinced them­selves. And upon this ground I think [Page 47] that there lies a sacred and heavy Ob­ligation upon Christians (as being bound to seek the Glory of God, the Propagation of the Gospel, and the Conversion and Salvation of their Brethren) to endeavour the Conver­sion of the Jews, which certainly can­not be by banishing them from all Christian Common-wealths. And therefore they must either go to the Jews, or bring the Jews to them, that so they may win them to Christ by the Innocence of their Lives, and the Truth and Evidence of their Doctrine. Now these two are both one (as to our present Case and Purpose) for cer­tainly if it be lawful for us to go, and live amongst the Jews to Preach the Gospel, then it will be as lawful to bring them hither, and let them live amongst us to the same Purpose. And so the bringing in of the Jews will not be so irrational a thing as some phansie (for 'tis no more) very strong­ly, [Page 48] and would make the World be­lieve their Readmission to be guilty of (I know not what) Iniquity.

Dub. But it may (and may be will) be said, That the whole Gospel was suf­ficiently promulgated by our Saviour and his Apostles, that their Preaching, and innocent Life and prodigious Mi­racles done in Confirmation of it, and the Obsignation of it by our blessed Saviours Death and Resurrection were Evidences enough, that it was a divine Law, and therefore obligatory, both to them that heard it, and their Poste­rity; so that it needed no more Pro­mulgation, but is still obligatory by the Force of the First: as Moses his Law being once miraculously promulged in Mount Sina, brought an Obligation on those that heard it and all their Posterity.

[Page 49] Sol. To this I say, that 'tis a mani­fest and certain Truth, That the Pub­lication of the Gospel by our Saviour, and his Apostles, was a Promulgation of it abundantly sufficient to all those who heard and saw those divine Per­sons, their Preaching and Miracles, I say personally to them and properly, & per se, to none else unless [...] (as the Greek Scholia tell us) by the Tradition, and constant and faithful Testimony of those Eye-witnesses it had been carefully delivered down to Posterity. For suppose (which is not impossible) that all those who heard our Saviour's and his Apostles Do­ctrine and saw their Miracles, had concealed them from their Posterity, so that they had never heard any thing of them, Then I say their [...] and Descendents (who nei­ther heard the Doctrine, nor person­nally saw the Miracles, nor had them [Page 50] any way delivered to them by the Tradition or Testimony of their fore­fathers) were no way obliged to be­lieve any Gospel-Law, as never ha­ving any such Law sufficiently pro­mulged, and made known unto them, without which it was impossible they should know those Laws▪ and by consequent, impossible they should be obliged by them. So that it is not the first miraculous Promulgation of the Gospel, which does per se, and of its own Nature oblige us to Faith, and Evangelical Obedience, but the Continuation of it down to us, by the Tradition and constant concur­ring and faithful Testimony of those that were Eye-witnesses, and those that followed them. And if through the impiety or negligence of this (or any other) Age, this Continuation of the First Promulgation should cease, then the Obligation to believe the Gospel would cease also (as to our [Page 51] Posterity) unless it ceased by their Fault, or were otherwise made suf­ficiently known unto them. Whence also it follows, that the Sin and Infi­delity of those Jews who saw Christ's Miracles is far greater (as being a­gainst such demonstrative Evidences of Truth) then the Infidelity of the present Jews whose Evidences for Conviction (though enough) are much lesser, and by Consequent their Infidelity not so great. And hence it further follows evidently enough, that seeing the Apostles themselves held Correspondence, and had Communion and civil Conversa­tion with those Jews whose Obstina­cy and Infidelity was far greater (as standing in Contradiction to all those miraculous Works and divine Testi­fications of Evangelical Truth) cer­tainly we may have our Conversation and civil Communion amongst those Jews whose Obstinacy and Infidelity [Page 52] (though great enough) is far less. And then it will be manifest that their Readmission into our Christian Com­mon-wealth (with those bounds and limitations which we believe and hope the Piety and Prudence of the State will put upon them) is not in it self unlawful Quod er at dicendum.

I have stood the longer upon this Discourse, because I believe, that from these and such like Principles, an evi­dent and fundamental Reason may be given, why Sinners against the Law of Scripture and positive Evangelical Sanctions may be tollerated in a Chri­stian Common-wealth; when Sinners against the Law of Nature are not, nor indeed can be.

Quaere. Let the Query then be this; Why may a Christian Magi­strate tolerate Sins and Sinners against [Page 53] the positive Law of the Gospel, and not against the Law of Nature?

Sol. In answer to which Query I shall crave leave to say Two Things.

1. De facto, That it ever hath been so, in all Ages of the Church all Christian Kings and Common-weales (at least of which we have any story left) giving Toleration to the Jews, notwithstanding their In­fidelity, and Non-submission to the Gospel: and yet never tolerated them (or any else) in any Sins against the Law of Nature. So that they might disbelieve the Gospel impunè, and without Punishment; but if they were guilty of Blasphemy, Idolatry, Adultery, Homicide, Theft, or any other sins▪ against the Light and Law of Nature, the Laws did as severely vindicate these Sins in them, as any other Subjects.

[Page 54] 2. De jure, that rationally and up­on good grounds of Justice, it might be so; this is a harder Business, and of that Difficulty, that I find not one of those Casuists, or other Writers, (who have writ of this Subject) so much as offer at a Reason of it; that is, All Christian Common-weals have ever severely and indispensably pu­nished▪ Sins against the Law of Na­ture, and yet even then tolerated In­fidelity, and other Sins against the Law of Scripture.

Now (I conceive) that the fun­damental Reason of this Difference (as to the Vindication of some, and Toleration of other some Sins) must be taken from the nature of the Sins so vindicated or tolerated for.

1. Sins against the Law of Nature are evident, and manifestly such, and [Page 55] cannot possibly admit of any Apology in any Persons who have the use of Reason (for in Children and Ideots the Case is otherwise.) It is a mani­fest Truth and a received Principle, both amongst Philosophers, and Law­yers, That Ignorantia Juris Naturalis non excusat a peccato. So that if Ti­tius commits Murder, Adultery, or I­dolatry, &c. we are sure he is a Sin­ner, and the Magistrate may safely punish him for it, seeing there is no possibility of any pretence whereby he may render himself excusable either from the Sin, or suffering for it.

2. But then Secondly, for those Sins against the positive Evangelical Law, the Case is much otherwise, for

1. No positive Law of God (or Man) brings (or can bring) a just Ob­ligation upon us, till it have a suffici­ent Promulgation.

[Page 56] 2. The sufficiency of such Promul­gation is not easily known, for that may be sufficient Promulgation to one, which is not to another, accord­ing to the different measure of Parts and Abilities in those to whom it is promulged. For those to whom God hath given a larger measure of Understanding and Learning, may sooner come (unless they be wilfully obstinate) to a Knowledge of the Truth of the Gospel, and of those Reasons which may convince them of it; and then an Obligation comes upon them to believe accordingly, and if they do not they sin: where­as others of no Learning, and less na­tural Abilities, may innocently disbe­lieve, till further means (proportion­able to their Capacities) be used for their Conviction. Now this Difficul­ty of knowing when the Promulga­tion is sufficient, and consequently [Page 57] when Infidelity is a Sin (for till this time 'tis a Calamity, not a Crime.) should make Magistrates very cauti­ous not to precipitate the Punish­ment of such misbelieving Persons: For seeing in all such Punishments there should be Congnitio culpae, be­fore there can be Inflictio Paenae, he that punisheth before he be certain that the Person so punished is guilty of the Crime, doth an Act that may be just, but certainly he is not just in doing it.

3. But that which adds more Dif­ficulty yet is this; That no Promul­gation of any positive Law is suffici­ent till the Persons be convinced to whom it is promulged, (unless through their own Perverseness, for Ends and Interest, they willfully hin­der such Conviction.) Now whether the Infidelity of the Jews arise from the Perversity of their own Wills, or [Page 58] from their Infirmity and Want of suf­ficient Preaching and Promulgation, it is very hard (if not impossible) for any Magistrate to know; and till it be known, they cannot be justly pu­nished for their Infidelity, which neither is (nor can be) Sin in them (nor any body else) till after suffi­cient Promulgation they wilfully re­ject the Gospel. Now this great Difficulty (and almost Impossibili­ty) to know when they willfully (and so criminally) reject the Gos­pel, makes it very difficult propor­tionably, and almost impossible, for any Magistrate justly to punish them for such Rejection.

4. We commonly say (and there is much Truth in it if rightly under­stood) that the Mysteries of the Gospel are such as cannot be under­stood, [Page 59] and John 6. No man can come unto me unless the Father draw him. assent­ed to without the spe­cial Assistance of the blessed Spirit of God. And John 15. 5. Without me ye can do nothing. So that those who want this Assistance, or such a measure of it as may be suffi­cient to overcome all opposed Dif­ficulties, cannot possibly believe, and then it will be very questionable, whether Infidelity in such be a Sin, it not being in their Power (without such Assistance) to believe. This in Scripture is called the opening of the heart▪ So when Saint Paul Preach'd, Lydia believes, others did not, and the Reason is given in the Text, Acts 16. 14. God opened the heart of Lydia so that she at­tended to those things spoken by Paul. Now as the opening of her heart was no Merit or Act of Virtue in her (it being the Work of God upon her Soul, and the only pas­sive [Page 60] in that particular) So the not believing of others whose hearts he was not pleased to open might pos­sibly (at least for some time till they had heard him further and seen his Miracles) be no Sin in them. How­ever it will be sure enough, that see­ing no humane Magistrate can know whether the Jews now have such As­sistance, or what Measure of it they have, it will be hard for them to punish, least in so doing they may punish them for not doing that which is impossible for them to do; which with what Justice or Warrant from God's Word, they can do, I know not. And here I shall transcribe a Passage in Hug. Grotius de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 20. §. 48. pag. 345. Vide etiam An­notata ad dictum §. Groti­us (casually by me, but happily met with) if I mistake not, very pertinent to this pur­pose, Doctrina Evangelii ab his quinunc eam audiunt penitùs in animum [Page 61] admitti nequeat, nisi Secretis Dei Auxi­liis accedentibus, quae sicut quibus dan­tur non dantur in operis alicujus merce­dem: ita si quibus negantur, aut mi­nùs largè concedantur, id fit ob causas non iniquas illas quidem sed plerúmque nobis incognitas ac proinde humano ju­dicio non Punibiles. And then he adds many things out of Scripture and Antiquity to the same purpose, That neither Jews (nor any body else) is (by Punishment) to be com­pell'd to a Belief of the Gospel, (that's a Turkish slavish means, which may befit Mahomet to promote the Alcoran, but certainly contradictory to the Laws of Christ, and the Meekness of Gospel Dispensations.)

By what hath been said, I believe it may appear in part that the Tole­ration of the Jews in this, or any Christian Common-weal, is not in it self unlawful, either in ratione inho­nesti [Page 62] incommodi or Scandali; but that as de facto, they have been ever to­lerated in Christian States, so de jure they may still.

So then the Readmission of the Jews is in it self indifferent, yet may be made morally good or bad according to the several Ends, the different Limitations and Qualificati­ons of their Admission. First, The Ends of their admission may be either

  • 1. Civil,
  • 2. Or Sacred and Religious.

1. For the civil end of their ad­mission, that is in general the Emo­lument and Benefit of the Prince, and Common-weale. And though In compendio manualis. lib. 5. cap. 17. concl. 1. p. 510. Becanu [...] the Je­suite (with a transpa­rent piece of Hypo­crisie) condemn this end as unlawful, [Page 63] it is evident that his great Jupiter Capitolinus of Rome, as Eubulus Corda­tus in Epist. praefixâ libro Nicolas de Cle­mangis, de corrupto statu Ecclesiae. one said long since of some of his Predecessors) makes this an end (and a principle one two) of their admis­sion; and if he had no greater Faults, I should pardon this. For Secondly, 'tis manifest that the Supreme Ma­gistrate may justly make this one end of their admission: For by his Place and Office there lies an Obliga­tion upon him to preserve the Ci­vil Interest of his Nation, and the Good and Benefit of the Common-weal, and may propose it as an End by all honourable and honest means to be attained. Whence it is, that all Princes protect and incourage Trading, all Merchandizing, and Manufactures.

[Page 64] 2. The Sacred and Religious End of their Admission should be the Glory of God, and the Propa­gation of the Gospel, in the Con­version and Salvation of their Souls. And we are bound to endeavour this

1. By the natural Obligation of Charity, as they are Men, and so our Brethren, whose Good we ought to promote (especially that of their Souls) by all honest ways.

2. And more particularly as they are the Reliquiae of Gods own Peo­ple, concerning whom, and their Conversion, there are many gracious and glorious Promises in the Gospel, and it will be an Happiness to us if we have an hand in it.

[Page 65] It was a Saying of Martin Luther M. Luther in Epist. ad Jeselin. Ju­daeum Roshimensem operum. Tom. 6. Ton. German. fol. 509. apud Balduinum Ca­suum Conscienciae. 1. 6. cap. 6. Casu 5. pag. 188. Se propter unum Judaeum crucifixum omnibus fa­vere Judaeis. And if we love them, and de­sire their Conversion and Salvation, (as in Christian Cha­rity certainly we ought) then the way to effect that, will not be to banish them, and prohibit their Ha­bitation amongst us, so compelling them to live amongst Turks, Pagans, or Papists; The Images and Idola­try of which last, hath undeniably been the greatest Scandal, and Re­mora, which hath long hindred them from being Christians. Whereas (if they be permitted to live amongst us) that stumbling-block will be ta­ken away.

[Page 66] 2. For the Conditions of their Admission, for the Restrictions and Limitations to be put upon them, a great deal of Caution and Christian Prudence is to be used, lest while we pretend their Good we do Mis­chief to our selves. For as to de­ny them all Liberty and Commerce with us, may be an Act of unchri­stian and indeed inhumane Cruelty; So to give them too much, is an Act of Imprudence and Folly. And indeed we find some Andrew Rivet. Comment. in cap. 23. Exodi. pag. 95. col. 2.sober Men (not without good Reason) complain of the too much Liberty they have in some Christian Common-wealths. In short, what Qualifications and Limitations are to be put upon them, I shall not take upon me to determine, but leave that to the Piety and Pru­dence [Page 67] of the State. Yet (with Sub­mission) I conceive such Limitati­ons as these will be convenient, if not necessary; the rather because I find in our Histories, in the Impe­rial and Canon Laws, and in the old Capitulars and Canons of Councils, that such Restrictions have been anci­ently laid upon them. As,

1. No Toleration ever was, or de jure can be given them to profess or practice any thing against the Law of Nature.

2. No Toleration should be given them to speak any thing blasphe­mously or impiously against Jesus Christ and the Gospel: For though we may tolerate them in the Profes­sion of a bad, yet not in that Blasphemy Vide Rescript. Honorii & Theodosii. A. A. Anthemio. P. P. L. Judaeos. 11. Cod de Judaeis. of a good Religion.

[Page 68] 3. They never were nor should be permitted to circum­cise Leg. Judaei 16. Cod. de Ju-daeis & Ju­daeus. 18. Ibid & Ba­silicon. lib. 6. Tit. 54. cap. 31.Children of Christians, or seduce any Christians, to their Religion: Let them prosess, but not propagate their Re­ligion.

4. They were not permitted to carry any Office L. haec valitu. Cod. de Judaeis. or Dignity in the Chri­stian Common-weal, though Gloss. ad dict. L. verbo haec. ex F. de decur. l. generaliter § finali & can. cum. sit 16. Extra de Ju­daeis. it seems that sometimes even that was permitted them.

5. They were not permitted in any Suit or Difference between a Jew and a Christian, to draw the Christian, or his Cause before a Leg. siqua. 15. Cod. de Judaeis. Vide Bartolum ad L. Judaei. 8. Cod. de Judaeis Jewish Magistrate: For 'tis [Page 69] a ruled Case in the Imperial Law, Judaeus Actor vel reus, Forum sequi­tur Christianum.

6. They were never permitted to make Marriages Hoc prohibent Imp. P. P. valent. Theodos. & Arcadius A. A. A. leg. Ne quis. Cod. de Judaeis. with Christians, and the Glossa ad di­ctam. leg. Ne quis: Glossator gives the Reason of it in Law, Leg. 1. F. de Rit. Nuptiarum. Quia matri­monium debet esse com­municatio divini & humani juris. Whereas a Jew and Christian being of different Religi­ons cannot communicare in Sac is. And this is consonant to the Law of the Gospel, which forbids us to be 2. Cor. 6. 14. unequally yoked. upon which grounds, I believe all Marriages with Papists to be unlawful, that is, Fieri non de­buit, 'tis unlawful to make such Mat­ches, though that factum valet, when [Page 70] such a Match is made the Contract is valid.

7. Their frequent Imppp. Theodo­sius, Arcad. & Hono­rius. L. Nemo. Cod. de Judaeis. divorcing their Wives was tolerated. For though Moses seem to suffer it, yet the Emperours by ex­press Edict forbid it.

8. By the Imperial Laws L. Nemo. Cod. de Judaeis. Polygamy, and plurality of Wives was not tolerated in them.

9. If any of the Jews turn Chri­stian (by Vide Descript­um Constantini. A. ad Evagrium. P. P. L [...]g. Judaeis. Cod. de Ju­daeis. & Cod. Theodo­sian. L. 16. Tit. 8. leg. 5. Civil Law) in case the Jews endeavoured to reduce him, and maliciously injured him, they were to be burned for it.

[Page 71] 10. They might repair their old Synagogues, but were not tolerated (by the L. Haec valitu­ra. Cod. de Judaeis. & Can. Judaei. 3. Et Can. Car. Consuluit 7. Extra de Judaeis. Roman Laws) to build new.

11. They were not tolerated to have any Christian Servants, Nur­ses, or Midwives. Can. Praesenti. 1. Extra de Judaeis. Ex concilio malis conenti.

12. By the Can. in non­nullis 15. §. In die­bus. Extra de Judaeis. Ca­non Law they might not come abroad on Good Friday.

13. They were not permitted to wear Garments Leg. eadem. exactly of the Christi­an Fashion, but were to have distinct Habits, that all might know them to be Jews.

[Page 72] 14. They might not be Cap. Nullus & Cap. omnes. Causa 28. Quest. 1. Physiacians, or give Physick to any Christian.

15. They were not permitted to be of the Roman L. 16. De Ju­daeis▪ & Caelicolis. In Cod. Theodosiano. Militia (though they were permitted to be Advocates) by the Rescript of Ho­norius, and Arcadius to Romulianus P. P.

16. The Jews being the greatest Usurers in the World, and believing they may justly take the highest Use they can get, (even Vsurae centessi­mae, if they could have it) of us Gentiles, it is all the Reason in the World, they should be limited in this particular, and not permitted to take more of us, than the Law permits us to take one of another.

[Page 73] 17. They should be enjoyned to admit of friendly Collations and Disputations sometimes about Gos­pel Truths, and not obstinately to reject all means of Conversion, and Conviction, and Satisfaction of those seeming Reasons which keep them off from embracing the Truth: For there will be little hopes (or possibi­lity) of their Conversion, if they be permitted obstinately to refuse all means of doing it.

But enough (if not too much) of this, I shall only add one old Inter leges Ed­vardi Confessoris. leg. 29. In Edit. LL. Sax­onicarum. Per Abrah. Whelog. pag. 145. Law con­cerning the Jews made before the Conquest (above 600 Years a­go) and confirmed by the Conque­rours amongst other the good Laws of Edward the Confessor, and so con­tinued [Page 74] Law (for ought I know) in all the Kings Reigns till the Banish­ment of the Jews, which was An­no 18 Edvardi 1. The Law is this,

Sciendum quoque quod omnes Judaei, ubicunque in Regno sunt, sub tutelâ & defensione Regis ligeâ debent esse; nec quilibet eorum alicui Diviti se potest subdere, sine Regis licentiâ. Ju­daei enim, & omnia sua Regis sunt, Quod si quisquis detinuerit eos, vel Pecuniam eorum, perquirat Rex si vult, tanquam suum proprium.

I wish the chief Magistrate could admit them on these Terms, for so they, and all theirs ( omnia sua) should be suum proprium, which pos­sibly might supply him with Money and so save Taxes.

[Page 75] And upon these Terms I, (and I believe every body else) will willing­ly consent to their Readmission.

If any desire further Satisfaction in this particular, either from Civi­lians, Schoolmen, Casuists, Cano­nists, Historians, or other Divines, he may consult these or such like:

I. Justinian Cod. de Judaeis▪ & Cae­licolis, lib. 1. tit. 12. and the Gloss there.

II. Codex Theodosianus de Judaeis, Caelicolis, & Samaritanis, lib. 16. tit. 8. pag. 515.

III. Jacobi Sirmondi Appendix Cod. Theodosiani, leg. 6. pag. 14. & leg. 4. pag. 11.

IV. Marquardus de Susanis Tra­ctatu de Judaeis, & aliis Infidelibus in­ter tractatus Illustrium, tom. 14. pag. 28. Vide Bernardum, Hieronimum, [Page 76] Alexandrum Il tum, aliosque Auctores ab eo ibidem citatos.

V. Mathaeus Wesenbecius in Comen­tario in Codicem Justinianeum de Ju­deis, tit. 9. pag. 14.

VI. Decretum Gregorii extra de Ju­daeis, & Saracenis, lib. 6. tit. 6.

VII. Clementinar. lib. 5. tit. 2. de Judaeis.

VIII. Corvini Jus Canonicum, tit. de Judaeis, pag. 295.

IX. Fredericus Balduinus Casuum Conscientiae, lib. 2. cap. 6. casu 5. pag. 188.

X. Capitulare Caroli Magni, lib. 6. cap. 120. & cap. 308.

XI. Hen. Altingus Problematum The­olog. part 2. problemate, 21. pag. 340.

XII. Petrus Crespetius in summa Ec­clef. Disciplinae Verbo Judaeus, pag. 520, &c. fuse.

XIII. Phil. Melancthon. Epist. lib. 1. epist. 68. pag. 75. In Edit. Corn. Bee.

[Page 77] XIV. Martinus Becanus in compen­dio manualis, lib. 5. cap. 17. pag. 509.

XV. Decretum Concilii Viennensis contra Judaeos apud Hen. Canisium Lect. Antiquarum, tom, 1. pag. 621. & apud Binium, tom. 3. parte alterâ, pag. 1493.

XVI. Filiucius Casuum Conscientiae, tract. 22. cap. 5. pag. 40. col. 2. de Judaismo.

XVII. Johannes de Lugo, de virtu­te fidei divinae, disput. 22. sect. 4. & Auctores ibi citat.

XVIII. Bodinus de Repub. lib. 3 & 4.

XIX. Statutum de Judaismo apud D. Edvardum Cooke Institit. part. 2. pag. 506. & Commentarium ejus in dictum Statutum.

XX. Aquin. 2. 21. quaest. 10, 11. vbi varia occurrunt de Judaeis.

XXI. Erasmus Brockmannus Syste­mate Theologiae, universae, art. 41. cap. [Page 78] 2. quaest. 9. tom. 2. pag. 5043.

XXII. Basilica Lenuclavii, lib. 1. tit. 1. cap. 9. de Judaeis, Pag. 2.

XXIII. Hieronymus de sanctâ fide, lib. contra Judaeos.

XXIV. Petrus Galatinus de Arca­nis Catholicae veritatis.

XXV. Gilbertus Genebrardus in Symbolae fidei Judeorum è R. Mos. Ae­gyptio, &c.

XXVI. Vide etiam (si placet) Scri­ptores (innumeros penè) quos exhibet Georgius Draudius in Bibliotheâ Clas­sicâ inter Libros Theologicos, pag. 349, 350, &c. Alii alios de facili addant.

FINIS.

THE CASE Of Setting up IMAGES IN CHURCHES.

A Breviate of the Case con­cerning Setting up Images in the Parish-Church of Moulton, in the Diocess and County of Lincoln, Anno 1683/4.

UPON pretence of adorning & beautifying the Church, some of the Parishioners did,

1. Wash out all the Sentences of Scripture formerly writ upon the Walls in that Church.

2. Then (without the Appro­bation and Advice, or the general Consent of the Parish) they set up the Images of five or six of the Apo­stles; which giving great Offence, ( for thirty seven of the I have the original Prote­station, signed by thirty seven of the Parishioners Hands. Parishioners did under their Hands protest against it) they procured an Order from the Deputy-Chancellor of Lincoln, to [Page 4] approve and confirm what they had done, and authorize them to set up (as they were pleased to call them) more Effigies.

3. By this Order and Authority they set up the Images of thirteen Apostles, St. Paul being one: the Image of Peter they placed above the Ten Commandments; and that of Paul, above the King's Arms and the Holy Ghost in the Form of a Dove, over them; and (in con­tempt of the Translation of the Bi­ble, approved and received in the Church of England, and in compli­ance with the erroneous and ridiculous Vulgar Exod 34. 30, 35. In the Vulgar Latine it is, Facies Mosis erat Cornuta: Whereas their own most Lear­ned Translators (Arias Monta­nus and Pag­nine) are asha­med of it; and (as our English Version truly has it) render it, Resplendebat, aut Promicabat Facies Mosis. Latine) they picture Moses with Horns.

4. Then (when they had done all this) they did ( ex post facto) pe­tition the Bishop for his Approba­tion of what they had done, who denied their Petition, and for Rea­sons given them (some of which [Page 5] here follow) told them, that he never would, nor (de jure) could ap­prove what they (without and against Law) had done.

5. Lastly, The Chancellor nulls the Order of his Deputy, as to the set­ting up of those Images: and those who had done that Work (with­out the Consent of the Parish) appeal to the Arches, where now that Ap­peal depends.

This is the Sum of what the Painter and Parishioners have done, (in setting up so many and such Ima­ges, as (I believe) no Church in England has seen since our Refor­mation, and (I hope) never will permit) and what the Deputy-Chan­cellor (as he and they think) confir­med. But what they have done is Unwarrantable and absolutely Illegal, contrary to our known Laws, against the Authority and Doctrine of the Church of England, Declared and Established [Page 6] both by our Ecclesiastical and Civil Laws, and (to omit others) in these Particulars.

1. It is confessed, that to beautify Churches (which they pretended) is a Pious and Worthy Work. But in doing this, the Way they took was Unwarrantable and Illegal; for our Supreme Power Ecclesiastical (the King in Vide Canones. 1 Jacobi, Can. 85. Convocation) requires, That our Churches should be decently beautified, not according to the Hu­mour of an ignorant Painter and some few Parishioners, but according to an The Homily for comely Adorning of Churches, in the 2d Book of Homilies, p. 77. Edit London. (by the King's Authority) 1633. which Edition I shall always cite. Homily published for that pur­pose; in which Homily (compa­red with the 2 d Part of the In the 2d Book of Homilies, pag. 7. compaved with p. 80. of the same Book. Homi­ly for the right Use of Churches) it ap­pears, that Images are so far from beautifying, that, if they be set up, they defile and pollute our Churches.

2. Their razing out the Sentences of Scripture, formerly writ upon the Walls, was absolutely Illegal, and [Page 7] by no Law Warrantable: For those Sentences were placed there (as appears by the See the Canon Jacobi, Can, 82. Canon) by the Supreme Power of the King in Con­vocation; and therefore for the Painter and Parishioners to take away that, which the Supreme Power had by express Canon placed there, must of necessity be Unwarrantable and absolutely Illegal.

Nor could the Deputy. Chancel­lor's Order (got ex post facto) con­firm what they had illegally done: For it is both Reason and Law, that a Nullity is not capable of Confirmation, because Confirmation always pre­supposeth some antecedent Right Confirmatioest Juris prius habiti Corro­boratio. Cap. inter Dilectos, extra, de Fide Instrument. in the thing to be confirmed: It does not give a Qui consir­mat aliquid, is non censeturdare. Paulus Leg. Sidon­tae, & si Spon­sus, §. de Do­nat. Inter Vi­rum & Uxo­rem, & Leg. & quia. §. de Jurisdict. Right, but does only strengthen an antecedent infirm Right. Now it is certain that the Parishio­ners had no Right to raze out those Texts of Scripture, which the Su­preme Authority had placed there, [Page 8] and therefore no Order (got ex post facto) could confirm what they had Illegally done.

3. Nor could the Deputy-Chan­cellor's Order (if they had procu­red it before they went to raze out those Texts of Scripture formerly writ upon the Walls) have given them any just Power to raze out those Texts; it being Quae contra Jus fiunt, de­bent pro Infe­ctis haberi. De Reg. Juris. in 6. Reg. 64. impossible that any inferiour Judg or Court should null the Sentence of the Supreme.

I know that Pope Gregory the First (one of the first Introducers of Popish Superstition about Ima­ges) tells us, that Images are Lay­mens Books, and that Pictures are as Quod legen­tibus Scriptu­ra, hoc Idiotis praestat Pictura illam cernenti­bus, &c. Gre­gorius Magnus Epist. ad Sen­num, Tom. 4. pag. 349. Vide cundem, Tom. 4. Epist. 54. ad Stcundinun, pag. 271. profitable to Idiots who cannot, as the Scriptures are to those who can read them. An Assertion evidently er­ronoous and impious. And yet the Trent-Conventicle, to the same purpose, faith, That Images instruct and confirm the People in the Articles [Page 9] of Faith Doceant Episcopi Pi­cturis erudiri & confirmari Populim in Articulis Fidei commemorandis, & ex­nibus facris Imaginibus mag, num fructum percipi. Concil. Trident. Sess. 25. in Decreta de Invocatione Sanctorum & sacris Imaginibus. to their great Be­nefit. But God Almigh­ty by his Prophet tells us, That Images are Habak. 3. 18, 19. Rom. 1. 23. 25. Teachers of Lies. This King James of happy Memory, and his pious and learned Convocation well knowing, and that the Church of England had condemned the setting up of Images in our Churches, (as shall anon ap­pear) they Decree and Command, That instead of Popish Images, which were Teachers of Lies, the Ten Commandments, and choice Canones 1 Ja­cobi, Can. 82. Sen­tences of Scripture, should be writ upon the Walls of our Churches, whence (without fear of Error) the People might learn Divine and Infal­lible Truths. And here the Saying of an antient and excellent Person is worthy of our Memory and Consideration; 'tis this, They de­serve to err, who (as the Papists do) [Page 10] seek Errare me­ruerunt, qui Christum & A­postolos, non in sanctis Codicibus, sed pictis in Parietibus quaesiverunt. August. de Con­sensu Evangelist. cap. 10. Tom. 4. pag. 377. Edit. Basil. 1569. Christ and his Apostles, not in the Sacred Scriptures, but in Images and Pictures.

I know that the Painter and those few Parishioners, who were for ta­king away those Sentences of Scripture, antiently writ upon the Walls, have instead of them, writ some other Sentences of Scripture in se­veral Places where none were be­fore. But this does not excuse, but rather aggravate their Crime. For,

1. This was not done till some time after they had finished their Work, wash'd out the Texts of Scripture antiently writ upon the Walls, and set up all their Images. When finding what they had done displeased many, (particularly their Bishop) and that their Proceedings were censured as Illegal, and by no Law Warrantable; then, and not till then, they caused some other Texts of Scripture to be writ upon the Walls.

[Page 11] 2. And this they did without any Advice or Direction of their Mini­ster, or any who had the Cure of their Souls: Whereas the Canon re­quired, that Canones 1 Ja­cobi, can. 88. chosen Sentences of Scripture should be writ upon the Walls. And we may be sure that the pious and learned King and Convocation, who made that Ca­non, did not intend that the igno­rant Painter and poor Parishioners, but some who had more Under­standing, and Cure of their Souls, should choose such Sentences as should be for the Peoples Edificati­on, most plain and pertinent. But no more of this. For although what the Painter and a few private Persons, did against the Canon and Constitution of the Supreme Power, was Illegal, and by no Law War­rantable, yet the setting up Images in the place of those Sentences of Scripture, which they have erazed, [Page 12] was much worse, as being repugnant and directly contrary to the Do­ctrine of the Church of England, which has been and is approved, and by our Supreme Power at present stands established by our good Laws Ecclesia­stical and Civil. That this may evi­dently appear, it is to be conside­red,

1. That the Popish Church in their Trent-Council, (which to them is an Oecumenical and General Coun­cil) does define and command, in or­der to their superstitious and Ido­latrous Worship of them, That the Images of their Saints be had and Imagines Christi, Deipa­rae Virginis, & aliorū Sancto­rūm, in Tem­plis praesertim habendae & re­tinendae, eis (que) Veneratio de­bita impertien­da. Concil. Tril­dent. Sess. 25. in Decreto de Invocat. & Ve­nerat. Sancto­rum & sacris Imaginibus. re­tained more especially in Churches, where the poor People may see, and have opportunity to worship them.

2. That in the Reformation of our Church, our Supreme Powers who regularly begun, and piously and happily finish'd it, expresly condemn'd not only the worshipping [Page 13] of Images, but the having them in our Churches.

This does evidently appear in our Authentick Records (to say no­thing of our Learned particular Writers) published by Supreme Au­thority to that purpose. For,

1. By the Injunctions of Edw. 6. it is commanded thus, See the Injun­ctions of Edw. 6. to all his Sub­jects, as wel [...] Clergy as lai­ty, Anno 1547. Anno Reguisu [...] 1. Injunct. 29. They shall take away and utterly destroy all Shrines, &c. and all Pictures, Paintings, and all Monuments of Idolatry and Super­stition, that there remain no memory of them in Walls, Windows, or elsewhere, &c.

2. And about three or four Years after, in the same King's time, it is by Act of Vide Staturum Anno 3. & 4 Edvardi 6. cap. 10. Parliament expresly required, That all Images graven, carved or painted, which yet stand in any Church, should be defaced and destroyed. And though this Statute (in favour of Popish Su­perstition and Idolatry) was Staturum 1. Mariae, cap. 2. re­pealed [Page 14] by Q. Mary, yet that Queen's Statute was by good K. James Staturum 1. Jacobi, cap. 25. re­pealed; and to prevent and discou­rage Popery, that Statutre of Edw. 6. was expresly revived, and so re­mains still obligatory.

3. Queen Elizabeth in her The Injunctions of Q. Elizabeth to all her Sub­jects, Clergy and Laity, Anno 1559, Regni (que) sui 1. Injunct. 23. In­junctions, Injunct. 23. renews the Injunction of Edw. 6. in the same Words, That all Images, Paintings and Pictures, should be taken out of all Churches, &c.

4. And the Homilies published by Q. Elizabeth tell us, that Images de facto were taken out of Chu­rches. For the Homily says, See the Homily for repairing and adorning of Churches, pag. 80. in the Edition of our Homilies, Anno 1633. Part 2. and this Homily is appro­ved and confir­med by the King and Convocation, 1 Jacobi, Anno 1603. Can. 85. That the Churches were scowred and swept from the sinful and superstitious Filthiness which defiled them: By which, as ap­pears by the said See the second Part of the Homily for the right use of Churches, pag. 7. of the second Book of Homilies, of the aforesaid Edition, 1633. Homilies, Ima­ges are principally meant.

[Page 15] 5. To the same purpose Camb­den in his Life of Q. Elizabeth, tells us, That Images were actually remo­ved out of our Churches, by the Cambden's Elizabeth, Lib. 7. ad Annum 1559. pag. 17, & 20. of the English Edition. Au­thority of Parliament.

6. Once more, the learned and incomparable Bishop See Bp Jewel's Defence of the Apology of the Church of Eng­land, in his Works printed at London, Anno 1621. pag. 446, 447. Jewel, in his Defence of his Apology of the Church of England, doth both say and prove, that Images ought not to be in any Churches, or Places of God's Publick Worship.

By the Premisses it may, and I believe does appear, that in the Judgment of the Church of England, Images are not to be tolerated in our Churches, and Places of God's Publick Worship; and therefore they were removed and defaced by the Supreme Powers Ecclesiastical and Civil, decla­red and published in Canons of Con­vocation, and Acts of Parliament.

But here it is objected by the E­nemies of our Church and Refor­mation, [Page 16] That our Reformers have been so zealous and indiscreetly fierce against Images, that they have condemn'd the ingenious Art of Painting, and even the civil Use of Images.

But this is a malicious Calumny, Sol. and no real Consequence of our Chur­ches Doctrine about Images, as has been expresly and publickly decla­red both by our Church and State. For,

1. Our Church has declared her Judgment, that all Images are not absolutely See the third part of the Ho­mily against the Peril of Idola­try, in the be­ginning of it, pag. 39: of the second Book of Homilies, printed 1633. unlawful, or simply for­bidden in the New Testament, but on­ly some, in some Places and Circum­stances, when they may (especially to poor ignorant People) be dange­rous Occasions of Superstition and Idola­try: and more expresly a little af­ter, the Words are these; We are not so In the same Homily against the Peril of Ido­latry, pag. 44. scrupulous, as to abhor Flowers wrought in Carpets, Hangings, Arras, [Page 17] &c. or Images of Princes on their Coin: nor do we condemn the Art of Painting or Image-making, &c. Whence it is evident, that our Church is neither against the Art of Painting, nor any Civil Use of Images.

2. Our State has (by express Act of Parliament) declared, even in the time of our Reformation, That they did not condemn any Civil Use of Images. For even in that Statute in which they severely condemn, and command the defacing Images in Churches, they have this Proviso, Vide Statu­tum: Anno▪ 3 & 4 Edvardi 6 [...] cap. 10. ‘Provided always, That this Act shall not extend to any Ima­ges or Pictures, set or engraven on any Tomb, in any Church, Chappel, or Church-Yard, only for a Monument of any King, Prince, Noble Man, or any o­ther dead Person, which hath not commonly been reputed for a Saint, but that all such [Page 18] Images may continue.’

Whence it is evident, that our Church at the Reformation, did not condemn any Civil Use of Ima­ges, no not in sacred Places, as Church-Yards, Chappels or Chur­ches, much less in other Places. And that we may more distinctly know what Images they condemn'd, and why they would not tolerate them in Churches; It is further to be con­sidered;

1. That the Church of England absolutely condemns all Images of the Trinity, or any See the third part of the Ho­mily against the Peril of Idolatry, in the second Book of Homi­lies, pag. 40. Person in it, (Fa­ther, Son, or Holy Ghost) as abso­lutely unlawful, and expresly condem­ned in Deut. 4. 12, 15, 16, 23. Isa. 40. 18. Rom. 1. 23, 25. Scripture. Such Images are not to be tolerated neither in nor out of Churches.

2. No Images of our See the last named Homily, Book 2. p. 42. Blessed Sa­viour, of any Saints and Martyrs, (which with stupid Superstition and Idolatry have been, and still [Page 19] are worshipped in the Popish Church) are, in the Judgment of our Church, to be tolerated in our Temples, or any Place of God's publick Worship. For if they be, it will be to the great and Ibid. pag. [...]2▪ unavoidable dan­ger of Idolatry. This, I conceive, is the approved and received Doctrine of the Church of England: and that it may more plainly and distinctly appear to be so, I shall cite the Judgment of our Church, and her Rea­sons for it, in her own express Words: and amongst other things (too many to be transcrib'd) she plainly tells us;

1. That it is an ungodly thing In the second Book of Homi­lies, pag. 7. to set up Images or Idols (which in her Ibidem, pag. 12, 13.Judgment signify the same thing) in our Churches, because it may give a great occasion of worshipping them.

2. That Images in Churches, paint­ed on Clothes or Walls, are In the second Book of Homi­lies, pag. 24. unlawful, and contrary to Christian Religion.

[Page 20] 3. That setting up Images in Ibidem, pag. 42 Chur­ches, is to the great and unavoidable danger of Idolatry; and that the Law of God is Ibidem, pag. 43. against it.

4. That the setting up the Image of God, of our Ibidem, pag. 45, 46. Blessed Saviour, or any Saints, is not tolerable in Churches, but against God's Law.

5. Wo be to the setters up and main­tainers of Images Ibidem, pag. 55. in Churches.

6. It is not possible, if Images be in Churches, to Ibidem, pag. 56, 58, 60, 61. avoid Idolatry.

7. Images of God, our Blessed Sa­viour, and the holiest Saints, are of all others the Ibidem, pag. 61, 75. most dangerous to be in Churches.

8. Images in Churches are a Ibidem, pag. 65. Snare and tempting of God, to the great dan­ger and destruction of many.

9. That Images in Churches, in the Judgment of the Prophet and Apostle, are only Ibidem, pag. 72. Hab 2. 18. Rom. 1. 23, 25. Teachers of Lies.

10. God's horrible Wrath cannot be avoided, without Ibidem, pag. 75. utter abolishing Ima­ges in Churches.

[Page 21] This is evidently the express Doctrine of our Homilies, which absolutely condemns not only the worshipping, but having Images in our Churches. And it is no less evident, that the Homilies, and the Do­ctrine contained in them, are both approved, received and established by the Supreme Authority of our Church and State, Canons of Convocation, and Acts of Parliament. This will appear,

1. By the Testimony of King James, who commends the diligent rea­ding of our See K. James his Directions to the Clergy of En­gland, Anno 1622. They are in Dr. Heylin' s Cyprianus An­glicus, pag. 93. Direct. 1, 4. Articles and Homilies, set forth by the Authority of the Church of England.

2. By the Convocation of Q. Elizabeth, (the Supreme Ecclesia­stical Power) which expresly and particularly names and approves all our Homilies, and declares the Doctrine contained in them, to be a godly Do­ctrine; as appears by the In the 35 th Article. Articles [Page 22] of our Church, composed and publi­shed in that Convocation.

3. By the Convocation I Jacobi. For as the Article last named de­clares our Homilies to contain a godly Doctrine, so the Convocatio 1 Jacobi, Can. 36. Convocati­on of King James, declares all things contained in that Article, to be agreeable to the Word of God.

4. All the Clergy of Ibidem, Can. 36. England, all Graduates in the Universities, all Ibidem, Can. 127. Chancellors, Commissaries and Offi­cials, before they exercise any Ec­clesiastical Jurisdiction, are wil­lingly, and ex animo Ibidem, Can. 36. to assent, con­sent, approve, and subscribe these Ar­ticles, and this Doctrine, and that ab­solutely, without any My Ld Coke' s Institutes, Part 4. cap. 74. pag. 323, 324. Glosses or Sen­ses of their own.

5. And these Subscriptions are required (and so the Doctrine sub­scribed to confirm'd) by several See the Statute 13 Eliz. cap. 12. and the Sta­tute 14 Car. 2. The Act of Vniformity. Acts of Parliament.

[Page 23] 6. And if any impugn this Doctrine, so declar'd and establish'd by the Supreme Power, or maintain any Doctrine contrary or repugnant to it, he is by our Vide Canones 1 Jacobi, Can. 5. Canons to be excommu­nicated ipso facto; and by the Statutum 13 Elizabethae, cap. 12. Sta­tute, if he be a beneficed Clergyman, deprived.

The Premisses being certain and evident Truths, the natural and necessary Consequences which fol­low from them, to omit others, will be these.

1. That neither the Deputy-Chancellor of Lincoln, nor any in­feriour Court, has or can have any just Authority or Power to approve and authorize the setting up of such Images in the Church, which by the Supreme Power (Ecclesiastical and Civil, in Convocation and Parliament) is expresly condemn'd [Page 24] as altogether unlawful, and to the poor ignorant People pernicious.

2. That they who maintain and encourage this Doctrine of setting up Images in our Churches, if they persist in it, are by our known Laws now in Force, to be excom­municated ipso facto; and if they be beneficed Clergy-men, to be depri­ved. Viderint quorum interest.

3. And if any Ecclesiastical Judg or Court ( quod absit) should ap­prove, authorize or encourage the setting up of such Images in our Churches, it evidently follows from the Premisses, that in so do­ing, they approve and authorize that which the Church of England has publickly declared to be dan­gerous, against the Law of God, against Christian Religion, and (to many) pernicious. And therefore [Page 25] we have reason to believe, that no good Son of the Church of Eng­land, will approve, authorize or encourage that which his Holy Mother has so absolutely and pub­lickly condemned.

[Page] A Friend of the late Bishop of Lincoln's, observing how customary it is to Prote­stant Writers to charge on the Papists, the Tenet of Dominium fundatur in Gratiâ, requested his Lordship to resolve him how far the said Tenet is charge­able on the Church of Rome. And thereupon his Lordship was pleased to send him under his own Hand a Paper writ as followeth.

Quaeritur, An Dominium fun­detur in Gratia?

IN Answer to this, I shall say only a few things, which (to me) seem certain and evident Truths.

1. The Question must be held Negatively; Dominium non fundatur in Gratia: Neither Dominium Tem­porale, of Kings or Lay-Magistrates; nor Dominium Spirituale, of the Bi­shops and Clergy. This has been e­vidently proved by many of our Divines, especially and clearly by Dr. In his Book entituled, Derer­minatio Quae­stionum qua­rundem Theo­logicarum, &c. printed at Cam­bridg, 1634. Quaest. 30. pag. 130. Davenant Bishop of Salisbury.

2. The Papists (who are both the Accusers and Judges) do impute this Opinion to Wickliff and Hus, and their Followers, and condemn the Opinion, and them for it, as Hereticks, for saying, that Domini­um [Page 28] fundatur in Gratia: which is a manifest Calumny, and no just or proved Accusation; as might be proved out of Hus his printed Works, and several Manuscript Works of Wickliff in Bodley's Library. But they bring these lying Accusations against them, that they may have some pretence to destroy and mur­der them.

3. That erroneous and impious Council of Constance, Anno 1413, (which is an Oecumenical and Gene­ral Council at Rome) having con­fess'd, that our Blessed Saviour did institute the Eucharist in both kinds, they blasphemously add, Concillum Constantieuse, Sess. 13. Quod non obstante Institutione Christi, they de­cree, That the Sacrament should be taken only in one kind. Whence Luther would not call it Concilium Constantiense, but Concilium NON-OBSTANTIENSE. Now this Council condemns this Propositi­on, [Page 29] Dominium fundatur in Gratia;

1 st. In Ibidem, Sess. 15. John Hus and his Fol­lowers.

2 dly. In Ibidem, Sess. 8. Wickliff and his Fol­lowers.

4. I do not find any Popish Au­thor, who affirms and approves this Proposition ( Dominium funda­tur in Gratia) in those very Terms in which the Council of Constance had condemned it as Heretical: For this were to contradict their own Principles, and approve that for Truth, which their Supreme In­fallible Guide (a General Council) had Synodically declared Heresy.

5. But the Church of Rome (though in other Terms) doth both profess and practise this Doctrine, that Dominium fundatur in Gratia: For they say, that Dominium funda­tur in Fide & Religione Catholica, (so they miscal Popery, or the Roman Religion) so that if any Man, by [Page 30] Apostacy, desert their Religion, or, by Heresy, deny any Article of their Faith, he does not only for­feit his Dominion over his Inferiors, but all his Goods and Livelihood, and his Life here, and eternal Life hereafter. This is the erroneous and impious Doctrine of the Church of Rome, approved and vindicated, not only by their Schoolmen, Casuists, Canonists, Summists, &c. but recei­ved into the Body of their Canon-Law, in their last, and (as they say) the most correct Editions of it, and declared and confirmed in their General Councils. That this may appear, I shall (of many hun­dreds) give you some few, but pertinent and great Instances.

1. Aquinas Aquinas 2. 2. Quaest. 10. Art. 2. says, PRINCIPI­BUS apostatantibus a Fide, non est o­bediendum. And again, when such an Apostate Prince is excommuni­cared; Ipso facto, ejus Subditi à do­minio [Page 31] & juramento fidelitatis ejus li­berati sunt. And a little Aquinas 2. 2. Quaest. 11. A [...]t. 3. An Haereti­ci sint toleran­di? before, Haereticus non solum excommunicari, sed juste occidi potest: & excommuni­catus ulterius relinquitur judicio saeculd­ri, à mundo exterminandus per mortem. His Commentators do believe, and (as far as they are able) justify this Doctrine.

2. Alphonsus à Castro is very large and learned on this Subject, and proves, first, That for Heresy a Father does lose the Dominion (and yet that Dominium is jure Natu­rae Patri debitum) which he had over his Children; Propter Haeresin (says De justa Haereticorum pun­itione, lib. 2. cap. 7. Operum pag. 1244. B.he) Pater amititt Jus quod habuit super filios, &c. And again, Do­minium Politicum amittitur per Haere­sin, it a quod Rex I demibidem, pag. 1245. E. factus Haereticus, ipso jure est Regno suo privatus, & Dux suo Ducatu, &c.

3. Nicolaus Eymericus in his Di­rectorium Inquisitorion, Parte 2, & 3. [Page 32] and Francis. Pegna his Commentator, do assert all and more than I have said, and (out of many Popish Canons and Councils, and Papal Con­stitutions) fully prove it.

4. The Canon Law tells us, That Bona Leg. Cum se­cundum 19. de Haereticis in 60. & cap. Vergen­tis 10. Extra. de Haereticis. Haereticorum sunt ipso jure confiscata; and not only so, but their Children are made incapable of any Benefice or Office Ecclesia­stical or Civil; Leg. Statutum 15. de Haereti­cis in 60. Haereticorum filii, us (que) ad secundam generationem, ad ali­quod beneficium ecclesiasticum, seu pub­licum officium ne admittantur, quod st secus actum fuerit, sit irritum. There are many other Constitutions in their Vide praeci­puc cap. ad abo­lendam, 9. & cap. Excommu­nica [...]us, 13. Extra. dl Haereticis Canon Law, which expresly declare, that Hereticks (that is, such as deny any Article of their Popish Creed) lose all Dominion Ecclesiastical and Civil, of which they were justly possessed, before they fell from the Popish Faith into Heresy, as they call it.

[Page 33] 5. Lastly, Their Concilium La­teranum Magnum sub Innocentio III. in which there were (for so they tell us) about 1200 Fathers; I say, this great Council (which they ac­knowledg to be General or Oecume­nical) expresly declares, That an Heretick (tho a King or Emperour) does by his Heresy forfeìt all his Dominion; and therefore with them Dominion must be in Fide fundatum, that is, in their Apocryphal Popish Faith. For if believing, and con­tinuing in that Faith, do preserve their Dominion; and the rejecting it by Heresy, forfelt it; then it ne­cessarily and evidently follows, that their Roman Catholick Faith is the Foundation of their Domini­on, and the Cause which preserves it, as Heres is the Cause why they lose it. And as this is their Popish impious Doctrine, that not only Subjects, but Supreme Governors, [Page 34] Kings and Emperors, forfeit their Dominions by Heresy; so the Pra­ctice of their Popes has in this case been suitably impious and sinful. I need not go far for evident In­stances in particular: Paul Vide Bullari­um Romanum Romae, 1638. Tom. 1. pag. 514, 515. The Bull bears date, Jan. 3. 1538. III. excommunicates our Henry 8, for Heresy, absolves his Subjects from all Oaths of Allegiance, and declares him to have lost all Right to his Dominions. So Pius V. Vide Bullam Pii V. in dicto Bullario, Tom. 2 pag. 229. The Bull is dated at Rome, 5 Cal. Maii, 1570. for the same reason, (because Q. Elizabeth was an Heretick) excommunicates and deposes her, and gives her Kingdoms to Philip the 2 d of Spain, who came with his great Armada, and the Pope's Benediction (which brought the Curse of God upon him and his Fleet, for there is no Power or Policy against Provi­dence) to take possession of it, in 1588. In prosecution of these Prin­ciples, many hundred thousands have been actually murdered in the [Page 35] Papacy; either, 1. By open War, as in France, and the Countries ad­joining; in Ireland, in our late Re­bellion, &c. 2. By their bloody Inquisition. 3. Or endeavour'd to be murdered by secret Conspira­cies, as in our Gun-Powder Treason, and many Conspiracies against Q. Elizabeth, and our late gracious So­veraign. But his Sacred Majesty having graciously promised to maintain the Church of England, as it is by Law establish'd, (who has ever been, and I doubt not, will be faithful in his Promises) this secures me against such Fears, and makes me willing to believe, that the impious Popish Principles shall never be put in Execution in England. Dirum omen, qui solus po­test averruncet Deus.

And because in these Times, many who would be thought Wits, and who by the Vanity and Loosness of their Princi­ples, have been tempted to malign the Clergy in general, and have made the Priest-craft a Term in vogue, it is thought seasonable to stop such Persons in their Career towards Atheism, by letting them see from what Forge the virulent Expression of Priest-craft came. Nor yet is this late Reverend Bishop's Testimony given in his Letter against the Rebellion of 41, fit to be conceal'd.

To ….. &c.

My Honoured Friend,

I Received yours, and return (what is most due for that and many more Civilities) my hearty Thanks. News here we have none, and so I cannot requite your Kindness, by sending you (what you so kindly send me) Intelligence. You have seen (I believe) Machiavel's Works (translated out of Italian or Latine) in English, which came out the last Year, 1675. The Printer (in the second Page) says, it was Licensed, but tells us not by whom. In the end of it, there is a Letter of Machi­avel's (so 'tis pretended) in Vindica­tion of his Writings. That Letter in­deavours two things; 1. To mag­nify Democracy, (as the best Govern­ment) and decry Monarchy. 2. To decry the Clergy in general (not only [Page 38] those of Rome) as a sort of People, so far from holy, that they have nothing left of Integrity or Humanity. He tells us of an execrable innate ill Quality in­separable from the Priest-craft, and the Conjuration or Spell of their new­nvented Ordination; and would have them rooted out so, as not one Sibra were left, &c. When twas printed, (by whose Authority or Advice I know not) a considerable Piece (one whole Leaf in Folio) was left out, which I have in MS. and do here enclosed send you a Copy of it. The business of that Piece which is left out, is to tell us, what is not Rebellion, (so he pretends;) and if his Principles be true, we have had no Rebellion in England this 40 Years. My humble Service to your Neigh­bour, and my honoured Friend. I am in extreme haste, and

Your affectionate Friend and Servant, Tho. Lincolne.

Omitted out of Machiavel's Letter, in Vindication of himself and his Writings, between pag. 4, & 5.

NOW having gone thus far in the Description of Rebel­lion, I think my self obliged to tell you what I conceive not to be Re­bellion. Whosoever then takes up Arms to maintain the Politick Con­stitution or Government of his Country in the Condition it then is, I mean to defend it from being changed or invaded, by the Craft or Force of any Man, (altho it be in the Prince or Chief Magistrate himself) Provided that such taking up of Arms be commanded or au­thorized by those, who are by the Orders of that Government legally intrusted with the Custody of the [Page 40] Liberty of the People, and Foun­dation of the Government; this I hold to be so far from Rebellion, that I believe it laudable, nay, the Duty of every Member of such Common wealth: for he who fights to support and defend the Government he was born and lives under, cannot deserve the odious Name of Rebel, but he who endea­vours to destroy it.

If this be not granted, it will be in vain to frame any mixt Monar­chies in the World; yet such is at this Day the happy Form under which almost all Europe lives, as the People of France, Spain, Ger­many, Poland, Sweedland, Denmark, &c. wherein the Prince hath his Share, and the People theirs; which last, if they had no means of recovering their Rights, if ta­ken from them, or defending them, if invaded, would be in the same [Page 41] Estate, as if they had no Title to them, but lived under the Empire of Turkey or of Muscovy.

And since they have no other Remedy but by Arms, and that it would be of ill consequence to make every private Man judg when the Rights of the People (to which they have as lawful a Claim as the Prince to his) are invaded, which would be apt to produce fre­quent, and sometimes causless, Tumults; therefore it hath been the great Wisdom of the Founders of such Monarchies, to appoint Guardians to their Liberty, which if it be not otherwise express'd, is, and ought to be understood to re­side in the Estates of the Country, which for that reason, (as also to exercise their Share in the Sove­raignty, as making Laws, levying Monies) are frequently assembled in all these Regions in Europe be­fore mentioned. [Page 42] These are to as­sert and mantain the Orders of the Government, and the Laws Establish'd, (if it cannot be done otherwise) to arm the People, to defend and repel the Force that is upon them. Nay, the Govern­ment of Arragon goes farther; and because in the Intervals of the E­states or Courts, many Accidents may intervene to the prejudice of their Rights or Fueros, as they call them, they have, during the Inter­mission, appointed a Magistrate, called Justitia, who is, by the Law and Constitution of that Kingdom, to assemble the whole People to his Banner, whenever such Rights are incroach'd upon, who are not only justified by the Laws for such coming together, but are severely punishable in case of Refusal. So that there is no question, but that if the Kings of Arragon (at this day [Page 43] very powerful, by the Addition of the Kingdom of Naples, and of Sicily, and the Union of Castile) should in time to come invade their Kingdom of Arragon with the For­ces of their new Dominions, and endeavour to take from them the Rights and Priviledges they enjoy lawfully by their Constitution, there is no question, I say, but they may (tho their King be there in Person against them) assemble under their Justitia, and defend their Liberties with as much Ju­stice, as if they were invaded by the French, or by the Turk: for it were absurd to think, since the People may be legally assembled to apprehend Robbers, nay, to deliver a Possession forcibly detain­ed against the Sentence of some Inferiour Court; that they may and ought not to bestir themselves, [Page 44] to keep in Being, and preserve that Government which maintains them in possession of their Liberty and Property, and defends their Lives too from being Arbitrarily taken away.

But I know this clear Truth re­ceives Opposition in this unreaso­nable and corrupt Age, when Men are more prone to flatter the Lusts of Princes than formerly, and the Favourites are more impa­tient to hear the Impartiality of Laws, than the Sons of Brutus were, who complained, Leges esse surdas; that is, though they were fine Gentlemen, in favour with the Ladies, and Ministers of the King's Pleasure, yet they could not Op­press, Drink, Whore, nor Kill the Officers of Justice in the Streets, returning from their Night-Revels; [Page 45] but the Execution of the Laws would reach them as well as others, who in the time of Tarquin, it seems, found the Prince more exo­rable. Nay, the very Divines them­selves help with their Fallacies to oppugn this Doctrine, by making us believe, as I said before, that it is God's Will all Princes should be Absolute, and are so far in a Con­spiracy against Mankind, that they assert that in the Text ( This shall the Manner of your King be) God was giving that People the Jus Divinum of Government, when in truth he was threatning them with Plagues of Monarchy. But I spare the Divines here, since I shall have occasion, in discoursing of my next Accusation, to shew how that sort of People have dealt with God's Truths, and with the Interest of Men. And to be as [Page 46] good as my Word, I shall pre­sently fall upon that Point, ha­ving been so tedious already in the former.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

Mr. Cottington's Case.

PAge 17. after the last word, dele the Period. p. 63. for Appella, read Apella. P. 72. line 2, f. excuse, r. execute. P. 117. l. 12. f. Tulin, r. Turin. P. 119. f. Monoch, r. Menoch. P. 127. l. antepenult. f. Roe, r. Rote. P. 131. l. 6. f. senim, r. enim.

The Case of the Jews.

In Title-Leaf, r. Republica.

P. 8. in margine, r. videsis. P. 14. near the end, r. vigilant. P. 26. l. 2. r. practised. P. 43. l. penult. r. Practices. P. 63. l. 7. r. prin­cipal. Ibid. f. two, r. too. P. 70. l. 5. after was, add not. [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page 3] [...] [Page 4] [...] [Page 5] [...] [Page 6] [...] [Page 7] [...] [Page 8] [...] [Page 9] [...] [Page 10] [...] [Page 11] [...] [Page 12] [...] [Page 13] [...] [Page 14] [...] [Page 15] [...] [Page 16] [...] [Page 17] [...] [Page 18] [...] [Page 19] [...] [Page 20] [...] [Page 21] [...] [Page 22] [...] [Page 23] [...] [Page 24] [...] [Page 25] [...] [Page] [...] [Page 27] [...] [Page 28] [...] [Page 29] [...] [Page 30] [...] [Page 31] [...] [Page 32] [...] [Page 33] [...] [Page 34] [...] [Page 35] [...] [Page] [...] [Page 37] [...] [Page 38] [...] [Page 39] [...] [Page 40] [...] [Page 41] [...] [Page 42] [...] [Page 43] [...] [Page 44] [...] [Page 45] [...] [Page 46] [...] [Page] [...]

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