SECT. I.

To proceed then to the Considera­tions that make up the former Part of this Epistle; I shall in the first place di­stinguish betwixt that which the Christian Religion it self teaches, and that which is taught by this or that Church or Sect of Christians, and much more by this or that particular Divine or Schoolman.

I Need not persuade you, who can­not but know it so well already, that there are many things taught about the Attributes and Decrees of God, the Mysteries of the Trinity, and Incarna­tion, and divers other Theological Sub­jects, about which not only private Christians, but Churches of Christians do not at all agree. There are too ma­ny Men, whose Ambition, or Boldness, or Self-conceit, or Interest, leads them to obtrude upon others, as parts of Re­ligion, Things that are not only Stran­gers, but oftentimes Enemies to it. And there are others, who out of an indis­creet Devotion are so sollicitous to in­crease the Number and the Wonderful­ness of Mysteries, that, to hear them [Page 7]propose and Discourse of things, one would judge, that they think it is the office of Faith, not to elevate, but to trample upon Reason; and that things are then fittest to be believ'd, when they are not clearly to be proved or under­stood. And indeed, when on the one side I consider the charitable design of the Gospel, and the candid simplicity that shines in what it proposes, or com­mands; and on the other side, what strange and wild Speculations and Infe­rences have been father'd upon it, not only in the Metaphysical Writings of some Schoolmen, but in the Articles of Faith of some Churches; I cannot but think, that if all these Doctrines are parts of the Christian Religion, the Apostles, if they were now alive, would be at best but Catechumini; and I doubt not but many of the nice Points that are now much valued and urg'd by some, would be as well disapproved by St. Paul, as by Aristotle; and should be as little entertain'd by an Orthodox Di­vine, as a Rigid Philosopher. I do not therefore allow all that for Gospel, which is taught for such in a Preachers Pulpit, or ev'n a Professors Chair. And therefore, if Scholastick Writers, of [Page 8]what Church soever, take the liberty of imposing upon the Christian Religion their Metaphysical Speculations, or any other meerly humane Doctrines, as mat­ters of Faith, I who, not without some Examination, think Metaphysicks them­selves not to have been for the most part over-well understood, and apply'd, shall make bold to leave all such private Doctrines to be defended by their own Broachers or Abettors; and shall deny, that it will follow, That in case of this multitude of Placets, which some bold Men have been pleased to adopt into the Catalogue of Christian Verities, any or all should be found inconsistent with right Reason, the Christian Religi­on must be so too. For by that name I understand onely that System of Re­veal'd Truths that are clearly deliver'd in the Scriptures; or by legitimate and manifest consequences deduc'd thence. And by this one Declaration so many unnecessary and perhaps hurtful Retain­ers to Christianity will be at once thrown off, that I doubt not, but if you consider the Matter aright, you will ea­sily discern, that by this first Distinction I have much lessen'd the work that is to be done by those that are to follow it.

SECT. II.

In the next place, among the things that seem not rational in Religion, I make a great difference between those, in which unenlightned Reason is manifest­ly a competent Judge, and those which Natural Reason it self may discern to be out of its Sphere.

You will allow me, That Natu­ral Theology is sufficient to evince the Existence of the Deity; and we know that many of the old Philoso­phers, that were unassisted by Revelati­on, were, by the force of Reason, led to discover and confess a God, that is, a Being supremely perfect; under which Notion divers of them expresly repre­sent him. Now, if there be such a Be­ing, 'tis but reasonable to conceive, that there may be many things relating to his Nature, his Will, and his manage­ment of things, that are without the Sphere of meer or unassisted Reason. For, if his Attributes and Perfections be not fully comprehensible to our Reason, we can have but inadequate Conceptions of them; and since God [Page 10]is a Being, toto Caelo, as they speak, differ­ing from all other Beings, there may be some things in his Nature, and in the manner of his Existence, which is with­out all Example or perfect Analogy in inferior Beings. For we see, that ev'n in Man himself the Coexistence and intimate Union of the Soul and Bo­dy, that is, an Immaterial and a Corpo­real substance, is without all President or Parallel in Nature. And though the truth of this Union may be prov'd; yet the manner of it was never yet, nor perhaps ever will be, in this Life clearly understood, (to which purpose I shall elsewhere say more.) Moreover, if we suppose God to be Omnipotent, (that is, to be able to do whatever involves no Contradiction that it should be done,) we must allow him to be able to do many things that no other Agent can afford us any Examples of, and some of them perhaps such, as we, who are but finite, and are wont to judge of things by Analogy, cannot conceive how they can be perform'd. Of the last sort of things may be the recollect­ing a sufficient quantity of the scatter'd matter of a Dead humane Body, and the contriving of it so, that (whether alone [Page 11]or with some addition of other Parti­cles) upon a reconjunction with the Soul, it may again constitute a living Man, and so effect that Wonder we call the Resurrection. Of the latter sort is the Creation of Matter out of nothing, and much more the like Production of those Rational and Intelligent Beings, Humane Souls. For as for Angels (good or bad,) I doubt, whether meer Phi­losophy can evince their Existence, though I think it may the possibility thereof. And since we allow the Deity a Wisdom equal to this boundless Pow­er, 'tis but reasonable to conceive, that these unlimited Attributes conspiring may produce Contrivances and frame Designs, which we Men must be unable (at least of our selves) sufficiently to understand, and to reach to the bot­tom of. And by this way of arguing it may be made to appear, That there may be many things relating to the De­ity above the reach of unenlightned humane Reason. Not that I affirm all these things to be in their own Nature incomprehensible to us (though some of them may be so,) when they are once propos'd; but that Reason by its own light could not discover them par­ticularly, [Page 12]and therefore it must owe its knowledge of them to Divine Revela­tion. And if God vouchsafes to dis­close those things to us, since not only he must needs know about his own Na­ture, Attributes, &c. what we cannot possibly know unless he tells us, and since we know, that whatever he tells us is infallibly true, we have abundant Reason to believe rather what he de­clares to us concerning Himself and Divine things, than what we should con­clude or guess about them by Analogy to things of a nature infinitely distant from his, or by Maxims fram'd accord­ing to the nature of inferior Beings. If therefore he clearly reveal to us, That there is in the Godhead, Three distinct Persons, and yet that God is One, we, that think our selves bound to believe God's Testimony in all other Cases, ought sure not to disbelieve it concern­ing himself, but to acknowledge, that in an unparallel'd and incomprehensible Being, there may be a manner of Ex­istence not to be parallel'd in any other Being, though it should never be under­stood by us Men, who cannot clearly comprehend, how in our selves two such distant Natures as that of a gross Body [Page 13]and an immaterial Spirit, should be uni­ted so as to make up one Man. In such cases therefore as we are now speaking of, there must indeed be something that looks like captivating ones Reason, but 'tis a submission that Reason it self ob­liges us to make; and he that in such points as these believes rather what the Divine Writings teach him, than what he would think if they had never in­form'd him, does not renounce or in­slave his Reason, but suffers it to be Pu­pil to an Omniscient and Infallible In­structer, who can teach him such things, as neither his own meer Reason, nor any others could ever have discovered to him.

I thought to have here dismiss'd this Proposition, but I must not omit to give it a confirmation afforded me by chance (or rather Providence:) For, since I writ the last Paragraph, resuming a Phi­losophical Enquiry, I met in prosecuting it with a couple of Testimonies of the truth of what I was lately telling you, which are given not by Divines or Schoolmen, but by a couple of famous Mathematicians, that have both led the way to many of the Modern Philoso­phers to shake off the reverence wont [Page 14]to be born to the Authority of great Names, and have advanc'd Reason in a few years more than such as Vaninus and Pomponatius would do in many Ages; and have always boldly, and sometimes successfully attempted to explain intel­ligibly those things, which others scru­pled not either openly or tacitly to con­fess inexplicable.

The first of these Testimonies I met with in a little French Treatise put out by some Mathematician, who, though he conceals his Name, appears by his way of writing to be a great Virtuoso, and takes upon him to give his Readers in French the new thoughts of Galilaeo, by making that the Title of his Book. This Writer then speaking of a Paradox (which I but recite) of Galilaeo's, that makes a point equal to a Circle, adds, Et per consequent l'on peut dire, Pag. 22, 23. i. e. and consequently one may say, that all Circles are equal be­tween themselves, since each of them is equal to a point. For though the ima­gination be overpower'd by this Idea or Notion; yet Reason will suffer it self to be persuaded of it. I know (con­tinues he) divers other excellent Per­sons (besides Galilaeo) who conclude [Page 15]the same thing by other ways, but all are constrain'd to acknowledge, that in­divisible and infinite are things that do so swallow up the mind of Man, that he scarce knows what to pitch on, when he contemplates them. For it will follow from Galilaeo's Speculation, &c. which passage I have cited, to shew you, that Galilaeo is not the only Philosopher and Mathematician who has confess'd his Reason quite passed about the Attri­butes of what is Infinite.

The other Testimony I mention'd to you, is that of the excellent Des-Cartes in the second Part of his Prin­ciples of Philosophy, Numb. 34. where speaking of the Circle to be made by Matter moving through places still les­ser and lesser, he has this ingenious ac­knowledgment; Fatendum tamen est (sayes he) in motu isto aliquid reperiri, quod mens quidem nostra pereipit esse verum, sed tamen quo pacto fiat non com­prehendit, nempe Divisionem quarundam particularum Materiae in infinitum, sive indefinitam, atque in tot partes ut nulla cogitatione determinare possimus tam ex­iguam, quin intelligamus ipsam in alias adhuc minores reipsa esse divisam. And in the Close of the next Paragraph, he [Page 16]gives this for a Reason, why, though we cannot comprehend this indefinite di­vision, yet we ought not to doubt of the truth of it, That we discern it to be of that kind of things that cannot be compriz'd by our minds as being but finite.

If then such bold and piercing Wits, and such excellent Mathematicians are forc'd to confess, that not only their own Reason, but that of Mankind may be passed and non-plus'd about Quanti­ty, which is an Object of contemplation Natural, nay, Mathematical, and which is the Subject of the rigid Demonstra­tions of pure Mathematicks; why should we think it unfit to be believ'd, and to be acknowledg'd, that in the Attributes of God, who is essentially an Infinite Being, and an Ens singularissimum, and in divers other Divine things, of which we can have no knowledge without Revelation, there should be some things, that our Finite understandings cannot, especially in this life, clearly compre­hend.

SECT. III.

To this Consideration, I shall for Affi­nities sake subjoin another, which I leave to your Liberty to look upon as a distinct one, or as an Enlargement and Application of the former.

I consider then, that there is a great difference between a Doctrines being repugnant to the general and well-weigh'd Rules or Dictates of Reason, in the forming of which Rules it may be suppos'd to have been duly consider'd; and its disagreeing with Axioms, at the Establishment whereof the Doctrine in Question was probably never thought on. There are several Rules that pass current ev'n among the most Learned Men, and which are indeed of very great use when restrain'd to those things whence they took their Rise, and others of the like nature; which yet ought not to overthrow those Divine Do­ctrines that seem not consonant to them. For the Framers of these Rules having generally built them upon the Obser­vations they had made of Natural and Moral things, since (as we lately argu­ed) [Page 18]Reason it self cannot but acknow­ledge, there are some things out of its Sphere, we must not think it impossible, that there may be Rules, which will hold in all inferior Beings for which they were made; and yet not reach to that infinite and most singular Being call'd God, and to some Divine matters which were not taken into Considerati­on when those Rules were fram'd. And indeed, if we consider God as the Au­thor of the Universe, and the free Esta­blisher of the Laws of Motion, whose general Concourse is necessary to the Conservation and Efficacy of every particular Physical Agent, we cannot but acknowledge, that by with-holding his Concourse or changing these Laws of Motion, which depend perfectly up­on his Will, he may invalidate most, if not all, the Axioms and Theorems of Natural Philosophy: These supposing the Course of Nature, and especially the Establish'd Laws of Motion among the parts of the Universal Matter, as those upon which all the Phaenomena of Na­ture depend. 'Tis a Rule in Natural Philosophy, that Causae necessariae semper agunt quantum possunt; But it will not follow from thence, that the Fire must [Page 19]necessarily burn Daniel's three Compa­nions or their Cloaths, that were cast by the Babylonian King's Command into the midst of a Burning fiery Furnace, when the Author of Nature was pleas'd to withdraw his Concourse to the Ope­ration of the flames, or supernaturally to defend against them the Bodies that were exposed to them. That Men once truly dead cannot be brought to life again, hath been in all Ages the Do­ctrine of meer Philosophers; but though this be true according to the Course of Nature, yet it will not follow but that the contrary may be true, if God inter­pose either to recall the departed Soul and reconjoin it to the Body, if the Or­ganization of this be not too much vi­tiated, or by so altering the Fabrick of the matter whereof the Carkass con­sists, as to restore it to a fitness for the Exercise of the Functions of Life. A­greably to this let me observe to you, that, though it be unreasonable to be­lieve a Miraculous Effect when attribu­ted onely to a meer Physical Agent; yet the same thing may reasonably be be­liev'd, when ascrib'd to God, or to A­gents assisted with his absolute or su­pernatural Power. That a Man born [Page 20]blind should in a trice recover his sight upon the Application of Clay and Spit­tle, would justly appear incredible, if the Cure were ascrib'd to one that act­ed as a meer Man; but it will not fol­low, that it ought to be incredible, that the Son of God should work it. And the like may be said of all the Miracles perform'd by Christ, and those Apostles and other Disciples of his, that acted by virtue of a Divine Power and Commis­sion. For in all these and the like Ca­ses it suffices not to make ones Belief ir­rational, that the things believ'd are im­possible to be true according to the course of Nature; but it must be shewn, either that they are impossible even to the Power of God to which they are ascrib'd, or that the Records, we have of them, are not sufficient to beget Be­lief in the nature of a Testimony; which latter Objection against these Relations is Forreign to our present Discourse. And as the Rules about the power of Agents will not all of them hold in God; so I might shew the like, if I had time, concerning some of his other At­tributes: Insomuch that ev'n in point of Justice, wherein we think we may free­liest make Estimates of what may or [Page 21]may not be done, there may be some cases, wherein God's supreme Domini­on, as Maker and Governor of the World, places him above some of those Rules; I say, some, for I say not above all those Rules of Justice which oblige all inferior Beings, without excepting the greatest and most absolute Monarchs themselves. I will not give Examples of his Power of Pardoning or Remit­ting Penalties, which is but a relaxing of his own Right; but will rather give an instance in his Power of afflicting and exterminating Men, without any Provocation given him by them. I will not here enter upon the Controversie de Jure Dei in Creaturas, upon what it is founded, and how far it reaches. For, without making my self a party in that Quarrel, I think, I may safely say, that God by his right of Dominion, might, without any violation of the Laws of Justice, have destroy'd and ev'n annihi­lated Adam and Eve before they had eaten of the forbidden Fruit, or had been commanded to abstain from it. For Man being as much and as intirely God's Workmanship as any of the other Creatures; unless God had oblig'd him­self by some promise or pact to limit the [Page 22]Exercise of his absolute dominion over him, God was no more bound to pre­serve Adam and Eve long alive, than he was to preserve a Lamb, or a Pigeon; and therefore, as we allow, that he might justly recall the Lives he had giv­en those innocent Creatures when he pleas'd, (as actually he often order'd them to be kill'd and burn'd in Sacrifice to him:) so he might, for the declara­tion of his Power to the Angels, or for other Reasons, have suddenly taken a­way the Lives of Adam and Eve, though they had never offended him. And upon the same grounds he might without In­justice have annihilated, I say not, damn'd their Souls; he being no more bound to continue Existence to a No­bler, than a less noble Creature: As he is no more bound to keep an Eagle than an Oyster always alive. I know, there is a difference betwixt Gods resuming a Being he lent Adam, and his doing the same to inferior Creatures: But that disparity if it concern any of his At­tributes, will concern some other than his Justice; which allow'd him to re­sume at pleasure the Being he had only lent them, or lay any Affliction on them that were lesser than that Good could [Page 23]countervail. But mentioning this in­stance only occasionally, I shall not pro­secute it any further, but rather mind you of the Result of this and the fore­going Consideration; which is, That Divinely reveal'd Truths may seem to be repugnant to the dictates of Reason, when they do but seem to be so: Nor does Christianity oblige us to question such Rules as to the cases they were fram'd for, but the application of them to the Nature of God, who has already been truly said to be Ens singularissimum, and to his absolute Power and Will; so that we do not reject the Rules we speak of, but rather limit them; and when we have restrain'd them to their due bounds, we may safely admit them.

From Mens not taking notice of, or not pondering this necessary limitation of many Axioms deliver'd in general terms, seems to have proceeded a great Error, which has made so many Learn­ed Men presume to say, That this or that thing is true in Philosophy, but false in Divinity, or on the contrary: As for instance, that a Virgin, continu­ing such, may have a Child, is look'd upon as an Article which Theology as­serts [Page 24]to be true, and Philosophy pro­nounces impossible. But the Objection is grounded upon a mistake, which might have been prevented by wording the Propositions more warily and fully. For though we grant, that, Physically speaking, 'tis false, that a Virgin can bring forth a Child; yet that signifies no more, than that, according to the course of Nature, such a thing cannot come to pass; but speaking absolutely and indefinitely, without confining the Effect to meer Physical Agents, it may safely be deny'd that Philosophy pro­nounces it impossible that a Virgin should be a Mother. For why should the Author of Nature be confin'd to the ways of working of dependent and finite Agents? And to apply the An­swer to the Divines that hold the Opini­on I oppose; I shall demand, why God may not out of the substance of a Wo­man form a Man, without the help of a Man, as well as at the beginning of the substance of a Man he form'd a Woman without the concurrence of a Woman? And so, that Iron being a Body far hea­vier, ( in specie, as they speak,) will, if upheld by no other Body, sink in wa­ter, is a Truth in Natural Philosophy; [Page 25]but since Physicks themselves lead Men to the acknowledgment of a God, 'tis not repugnant to Reason, that, if God please to interpose his Power, he may (as in Elisha's case) make Iron swim, ei­ther by withholding his concourse to the Agents, whatever they be that cause Gravity in Bodies, or perhaps by other ways unknown to us; since a vigorous Loadstone may, as I have more than once try'd, keep a piece of Iron, which it touches not, swimming in the Air, though this thin Body must contribute far less, than water would, to the sustaining it aloft.

That strict Philosopher Des Cartes, who has with great Wit and no less Applause attempted to carry the Me­chanical Powers of matters higher than any of the Modern Philosophers; this Naturalist, I say, that ascribes so great a power to Matter and Motion, was so far from thinking, that what was impossible to them, must be so to God too, that, though he were urg'd by a learned Ad­versary with an Argument as likely as any to give him a strong Temptation to limit the Omnipotence of God; yet ev'n on this occasion he scruples not to make this ingenious and wary Acknow­ledgment, [Page 26]and that in a private Letter; For my part, says he, I think we ought never to say of any thing that 'tis impos­sible to God. For all that is true and good being dependent on his Almightiness, I dare not so much as say, that God can­not make a Mountain without a Valley, or cannot make it true, Volum. second Lettre vi. that one and two shall not make three; but I say only, that he has gi­ven me a Soul of such a nature, that I can­not conceive a Mountain without a Valley, nor that the Aggregate of one and of two shall not make three, &c. and I say only, that such things imply a Contradiction in my Conception. And consonantly to this in his Principles of Philosophy he gives on a certain occasion this useful Caution,— Quod ut satis tutò & sine er­randi periculo aggrediamur, Parte prima. Artic. 24. eâ nobis cautelâ est utendum, ut semper quàm maxime re­cordemur, & Deum Autorem rerum esse infinitum, & Nos omnina finitos.

SECT. IV.

In the next place, I think we ought to distinguish between Reason consider'd in it self, and Reason consider'd in the Exer­cise of it, by this or that Philosopher, or by this or that Man, or by this or that Company or Society of Men, whether all of one Sect, or of more.

If you will allow me to borrow a School-phrase, I shall express this more shortly by saying, I distinguish between Reason in Abstracto, and in Concreto. To clear this matter, we may consider, That whatever you make the Faculty of Reason to be in it self, yet the Rati­ocinations it produces are made by Men, either singly reasoning, or concur­ring in the same Ratiocinations and O­pinions; and consequently, if these Men do not make the best use of their Reasoning Faculty, it will not be neces­sary, that what thwarts their Ratiocina­tions, must likewise thwart the Princi­ples or the Dictates of right Reason. For, Man having a Will and Affections as well as an Intellect, though our Dijudi­cations and Tenents ought indeed (in [Page 28]matters speculative) to be made and pitch'd upon by our unbiass'd Under­standings; yet really our Intellectual Weaknesses, or our Prejudices, or Pre­possession by Custom, Education, &c. our Interest, Passions, Vices, and I know not how many other things, have so great and swaying an Influence on them, that there are very few Conclusi­ons that we make, or Opinions that we espouse, that are so much the pure Re­sults of our Reason, that no personal Disability, Prejudice, or Fault, has any Interest in them.

This I have elsewhere more amply discours'd of on another occasion; About the Di­versity of Re­ligions. where­fore I shall now add but this, That the distinction, I have been propo­sing, does (if I mistake not) reach a great deal further than you may be a­ware of. For not only whole Sects, whether in Religion or Philosophy, are in many cases subject to Prepossessions, Envy, Ambition, Interest, and other misleading things, as well as single Per­sons; but, which is more considerable to our present purpose, the very Body of Mankind may be embued with Pre­judices, and Errors, and that from their [Page 29]Childhood, and some also ev'n from their Birth, by which means they con­tinue undiscern'd and consequently un­reform'd.

This you will think an Accusation as bold as high; but to let you see, that the Philosophers, you most respect, have made the same Observation, though not apply'd to the same case, I must put you in mind, that Monsieur Des Cartes begins his Principles of Philosophy with taking notice, That, because we are born Children, we make divers un­right Judgments of things, which after­wards are wont to continue with us all our Lives, and prove radicated Prejudi­ces, that mislead our Judgments on so many occasions, that he elsewhere tells us, he found no other way to secure himself from their Influence, but once in his Life solemnly to doubt of the Truth of all that he had till then be­liev'd, in order to the re-examining of his former Dijudications. But I remem­ber, our illustrious Verulam warrants a yet further Prejudice against many things that are wont to be look'd on as the suggestions of Reason. For having told us, That the Mind of Man is be­sieg'd with four differing kinds of Idols [Page 30]or Phantasms, when he comes to enume­rate them, he teaches, that there are not only such as Men get by Conversation and Discourse one with another, and such as proceed from the divers Hypothe­ses or Theories and Opinions of Philoso­phers, and from the perverse ways of Demonstration, and likewise such as are personal to this or that Man, proceeding from his Education, Temperament, Stu­dies, &c. but such as he calls Idola tri­bus, because they are founded in humane Nature it self, and in the very Tribe or Nation of Mankind; and of these he particularly discourses of seven or eight; As that the Intellect of Man has an in­nate Propensity to suppose in things a greater order and equality than it finds, and that being unable to rest or acqui­esce, it does alwayes tend further and further; to which he adds divers other innate prejudices of Mankind, which he sollicitously as well as judiciously endeavors to remove.

Now, if not only single Philosophers, and particular Sects, but the whole bo­dy of Mankind be subject to be sway'd by innate and unheeded Prejudices and Proclivities to Errors about matters that are neither Divine, nor Moral, nor [Page 31]Political, but Physical, where the at­tainment of Truth is exceeding plea­sant to humane Nature, and is not at­tended with consequences distasteful to it: Why may not we justly suspect not only this or that Philosopher or parti­cular Sect; but the generality of Men, of having some secret propensities to err about Divine things, and indisposi­tions to admit Truths, which not only detect the weaknesses of our Nature, and our personal disabilities, and there­by offend or mortifie our Pride and our Ambition, but shine into the Mind with so clear as well as pure and chaste a light, as is proper both to dis­cover to our selves and others our Vi­ces and Faults, and oftentimes to cross our Designs and Interests?

And to this purpose we may take no­tice, that divers of those very Idols, which my Lord Bacon observes to be­siege or pervert Mens Judgments in re­ference to things Natural, may probably have the same kind of influence (and that much stronger) on the minds of Men in reference to Supernatural things. Thus he takes notice, that, if some things have once pleas'd the Under­standing, 'tis apt to draw all others to [Page 32]comport with, and give Suffrage, to them, though perhaps the Inducements to the contrary belief be either more numerous or more weighty. He ob­serves also, that Man is apt to look up­on his senses and other perceptions as the measures of things, and also, that the understanding of Man is not sincerely dispos'd to receive the light of Truth, but receives an infusion as it were of adventitious Colours (that disguise the light) from the Will and Affections, which makes him sooner believe those things that he is desirous should be true, and reject many others upon Accounts that do no way infer their being false. Now if we apply these things to Divine Truths (to which 'twere well they were less justly applicable) and consi­der, that in our Youth we generally con­verse but with things Corporeal, and are sway'd by Affections that have them for their Objects, we shall not much wonder, that Men should be very prone, either to frame such Notions of Divine things as they were wont to have about others of a far different and meaner na­ture; or else to reject them for not being Analogous to those things which they have been us'd to employ for the mea­sures [Page 33]of truth and falsity. And if we consider the inbred pride of man, which is such, that if we will believe the Sa­cred story, ev'n Adam in Paradise affect­ed to be like God knowing good and evil, we shall not so much marvel, that almost every man in particular makes the Notions he has entertain'd already, and his Senses, his Inclinations and his Interests, the Standards by which he estimates and judges of all other things, whether natural or reveal'd. And as Heraclitus justly complain'd, that every man sought the knowledge of natural things in the Microcosm, that is, himself, and not in the Macrocosm, the World; so we may justly complain, that men seek all the knowledge, they care to find, or will admit, either in these little worlds themselves, or from that great World, the Universe; but not from the Omniscient Author of them both. And lastly, if ev'n in purely Physical things, where one would not think it likely, that rational Beings should seek Truth with any other designs than of finding and enjoying it, our Understand­ings are so universally byass'd, and im­pos'd upon by our Wills and Affections; how can we admire, especially if we [Page 34]admit the fall of our first Parents, that our Passions and Interests, and often­times our Vices should pervert our In­tellects about those reveal'd Truths; divers of which we discern to be above our comprehensions, and more of which we find to be directly contrary to our Inclinations,

SECT. V.

And now 'twill be seasonable for me to tell you, That I think, there may be a great difference betwixt a things be­ing contrary to right Reason, or so much as to any true Philosophy, and its being contrary to the receiv'd Opinions of Phi­losophers, or to the Principles or Con­clusions of this or that Sect of them.

For here I may justly apply to my present purpose, what Clemens Alexan­drinus judiciously said on another Oc­casion, that Philosophy was neither Pe­ripatetical, nor Stoical, nor Epicurean, but whatsoever among all those several parties was fit to be approv'd.

And indeed if we survey the Hypo­theses and Opinions of the several Sects of Philosophers, especially in those [Page 35]points wherein they hold things repug­nant to Theological Truths, we shall find many of them so slightly grounded, and so disagreeing among themselves, that a severe and inquisitive Examiner would see little cause to admit them upon the bare Account of his being a Philosopher, though he did not see any to reject them upon the Account of his being a Christian. And in particular, as to the Peripateticks, who by invading all the Schools of Europe (and some in Asia and Africk) have made their Sect almost Catholick, and have produc'd di­vers of the famous Questioners of Chri­stianity in the last Age, and the first part of this; the World begins to be apace undeceiv'd as to many of their Doctrines, which were as confidently taught and believ'd for many Ages, as those that are repugnant to our Religi­on; and there is now scarce any of the modern Philosophers that allow them­selves the free use of their Reason, who believes any longer, that there is an Element of Fire lodg'd under the suppos'd Sphere of the Moon; that Heaven consists of solid Orbs; that all Celestial Bodies are ingenerable and in­corruptible; that the Heart, rather than [Page 36]the Brain, is the Origine of Nerves; that the torrid Zone is uninhabitable; and I know not how many other Do­ctrines of the Aristotelians, which our Corpuscularian Philosophers think so lit­tle worth being believ'd, that they would censure him, that should now think them worthy to be sollicitously confuted; upon which score, I presume you will allow me to leave those and divers others as weak Peripatetick con­ceits, to fall by their own groundles­ness.

But you will tell me, that the Epicu­reans, and the Somatici, that will allow nothing but Body in the World, nor no Author of it but Chance, are more for­midable Enemies to Religion than the Aristotelians. And indeed I am apt to think they are so, but they may well be so without deserving to have any of their Sects look'd upon as Philosophy it self, there being none of them that I know of, that maintain any Opinion in­consistent with Christianity, that I think may not be made appear to be also re­pugnant to Reason, or at least not de­monstrable by it. You will not expect I should descend to particulars, especi­ally having expresly discours'd against [Page 37]the Epicurean Hypothesis of the Origine of the World in another Paper; and therefore I shall observe to you in gene­ral, that the Cartesian Philosophers, who lay aside all Supernatural Revelation in their Inquiries into Natural things, do yet both think, and, as to the two first of them, very plausibly prove, the three grand Principles of Epicurus, That the little Bodies he calls Atoms are indivi­sible, That they all have their motion from themselves, and That there is a vacuum in rerum naturâ, to be as repug­nant to meer Reason, as the Epicureans think the Notion of an Incorporeal Substance, or the Creation of the World, or the Immortality of the Soul. And as for the new Somatici, such as Mr. Hobbs (and some few others) by what I have yet seen of his, I am not much tempted to forsake any thing that I look'd upon as a Truth before, ev'n in Natural Philosophy it self, upon the score of what he (though never so confidently) delivers, by which hither­to I see not, that he hath made any great discovery either of new Truths, or old Errors. An Honourable Member of the Royal Society, hath elsewhere pur­posely shewn, how ill he has prov'd his [Page 38]own Opinions about the Air, and some other Physical Subjects, and how ill he has understood and oppos'd those of his Adversary. But to give you in this place a Specimen how little their repug­nancy to his Principles or Natural Phi­losophy, ought to affright us from those Theological Doctrines they contradict, I shall here (but not in the Body of this Discourse, for fear of too much inter­rupting it) examine the fundamental Maxim of his whole Physicks, That no­thing is removed but by a Body contiguous and moved; it having been already shewn (by the Gentleman newly mention'd) that, as to the next to it, which is, that there is no vacuum, whether it be true or no, he has not prov'd it.

If no Body can possibly be moved but by a Body contiguous and moved, as Mr. Hobbs teaches; I demand, How there comes to be Local motion in the World? For, either all the portions of matter that compos'd the Universe, have motion belonging to their Nature, which the Epicureans affirm'd for their Atoms; or some parts of Matter have this motive power, and some have not; or else none of them have it, but all of them are naturally devoid of Motion. [Page 39]If it be granted, that Motion does na­turally belong to all parts of Matter, the dispute is at an end, the concession quite overthrowing the Hypothesis. If it be said, that naturally some portions of Matter have Motion, and others not, then the Assertion will not be Univer­sally true: For though it may hold in the parts that are naturally moveless or quiescent, yet it will not do so in the others, there being nothing that may shew a necessity, why a Body, to which Motion is natural, should not be capable of moving without being put into mo­tion by another contiguous and moved. And if there be no Body to which Mo­tion is natural, but every Body needs an outward movent, it may well be deman­ded, How there comes to be any thing Locally mov'd in the World; which yet constant and obvious experience de­monstrates, and Mr. Hobbs himself can­not deny. For if no part of Matter have any Motion but what it must owe to another that is contiguous to it, and being it self in Motion impels it; and if there be nothing but Matter in the World, how can there come to be any Motion amongst Bodies, since they nei­ther have it upon the score of their own [Page 40]nature, nor can receive it from external Agents. If Mr. Hobbs should reply, that the Motion is impress'd upon any of the parts of the Matter by God, he will say that which I most readily grant to be true, but will not serve his turn, if he would speak congruously to his own Hypothesis. For I demand, Whether this Supreme Being, that the Assertion has recourse to, be a Corporeal or an Incorporeal Substance? If it be the lat­ter, and yet be the efficient Cause of Motion in Bodies, then it will not be Universally true, that whatsoever Body is moved, is so by a Body contiguous and moved. For, in our supposition, the Bodies that God moves either immedi­ately, or by the intervention of any o­ther Immaterial Being, are not moved by a Body contiguous, but by an Incorpo­real Spirit. But because Mr. Hobbs, in some Writings of his, is believed to think the very Notion of an Immaterial Substance to be absurd, and to involve a Contradiction, and because it may be subsum'd, that if God be not an Imma­terial Substance, he must by Conse­quence be a Material and Corporeal one, there being no Medium Negationis, or third Substance that is none of those [Page 41]two: I answer, That, if this be said, and so that Mr. Hobbs's Deity be a Corporeal one, the same difficulty will recurr, that I urg'd before. For this Body will not, by Mr. Hobbs's calling or thinking it di­vine, cease to be a true Body, and con­sequently a portion of Divine Matter will not be able to move a portion of our Mundane Matter without it be it self contiguous and moved; which it cannot be but by another portion of Divine Matter so qualified to impress a Motion, nor this again but by another portion.

And besides, that it will breed a strange confusion in rendring the Phy­sical Causes of things, unless an expedi­ent be found to teach us how to distin­guish accurately the Mundane Bodies from the Divine (which will perhaps prove no easie task;) I see not yet, how this Corporeal Deity will make good the Hypothesis I examine. For I demand, How this Divine Matter comes to have this Local Motion that is ascrib'd to it? If it be answer'd, That it hath it from its own Nature, without any other Cause; since the Epicureans affirm the same of their Atoms, or meerly Mun­dane Matter, I demand, How the Truth [Page 42]of Mr. Hobbs's Opinion will appear to me, to whom it seems as likely by the Phaenomena of Nature that occur, that Mundane Matter should have a congenit Motion, as that any thing that is Cor­poreal can be God, and capable of mo­ving it; which to be, it must, for ought we know, have its Subsistence divided into as many minute parts, as there are Corpuscles and Particles in the World that move separately from their neigh­bouring ones. And, to draw towards a Conclusion, I say, that these minute Divine Bodies, that thus moved those portions of Mundane Matter, concern­ing which Mr. Hobbs denies that they can be moved but by Bodies contiguous and moved, these Divine Substances, I say, are, according to the late supposi­tion, true Bodies, and yet are moved themselves not by Bodies contiguous and moved, but by a Motion which must be Innate, deriv'd or flowing from their very essence or nature, since no such Body is pretended to have a Being as cannot be refer'd as a portion, either to the Mundane, or the Divine Matter. In short, since Local Motion is to be found in one, if not in both, of these two Matters, it must be natural to (at least [Page 43]some parts of) one of them in Mr. Hobbs's Hypothesis; for, though he should grant an Immaterial Being, yet it could not produce a Motion in any Bo­dy, since, according to him, no Body can be moved but by another Body con­tiguous and mov'd.

As then to this grand Position of Mr. Hobbs, though, if it were cautiously propos'd as it is by Des Cartes, it may perhaps be safely admitted, because Car­tesius acknowledges, the first Impulse that set Matter a moving, and the Con­servation of Motion once begun, to come from God; yet, as 'tis crudely propos'd by the favourers of Mr. Hobbs, I am so far from seeing any such cogent Proof for it, (as were to be wish'd for a Principle on which he builds so much, and which yet is not at all evident by its own light,) that I see no competent Reason to admit it.

I expect your Friend should here op­pose to what I have been saying, that formerly recited Sentence, that is so commonly employ'd in the Schools as well of Divines as of Philosophers: That such or such an Opinion is true in Divinity, but false in Philosophy; or on the contrary, Philosophically true, but Theologically false.

Upon what Warrant those, that are wont to employ such Expressions, ground their Practice, I leave to them to make out; but as to the Objection it self, as it supposes these ways of speak­ing to be well grounded, give me leave to consider, That Philosophy may sig­nifie two things, which I take to be very differing.

For first 'tis most commonly employ'd to signifie a System or Body of the Opi­nions and other Doctrines of the parti­cular Sect of those Philosophers that make use of the Word. As when an Aristotelian talks of Philosophy, he usu­ally means the Peripatetick, as an Epi­curean do's the Atomical, or a Platonist the Platonick.

But we may also in a more general and no less just Acception of the term, understand by Philosophy, a Compre­hension of all those Truths or Doctrines, which the natural Reason of man, freed from Prejudices and Partiality, and as­sisted by Learning, Attention, Exercise, Experiments, &c. can manifestly make out, or by necessary consequence de­duce from clear and certain Princi­ples.

This being briefly premis'd, I must in the next place put you in mind of what I formerly observ'd to you, that many Opinions are maintain'd by this or that Sect of Christians, or perhaps by the Divinity-Schools of more than one or two Sects, which either do not at all belong to the Christian Religion, or at least ought not to be look'd upon as parts of it, but upon supposition, that the Philosophical Principles and Ratio­cinations, upon which, and not upon ex­press or meer Revelation, they are pre­sum'd to be founded, are agreable to right Reason.

And having premis'd these two things, I now answer more directly to the Objection; that, if Philosophy be taken in the first sense above-mention'd, its teaching things repugnant to Theo­logy, especially taking this word in the more large and vulgar sense of it, will not cogently conclude any thing against the Christian Religion. But, if Philo­sophy be taken in the latter sense for true Philosophy, and Divinity only for a System of those Articles that are clear­ly reveal'd as Truths in the Scriptures; I shall not allow any thing to be false in Philosophy so understood that is true in [Page 46]Divinity so explain'd, till I see some clearer Proof of it than I have yet met with. I have had occasion in the fore­going Discourse, to say something, that may be apply'd to the Point under de­bate; and in the following part of this Letter I shall have Occasion to touch upon it again: And therefore I shall now say but this in short, That 'tis not likely, that God, being the Author of Reason as well as Revelation, should make it mens Duty to believe as true that which there is just Reason to reject as false.

There is indeed a Sense, wherein the Phrases, I disapprove, may be tolerated. For if by saying, that such a thing is true in Divinity, but false in Philosophy, it were meant, that if the Doctrine were propos'd to a meer Philosopher, to be judg'd of according to the Principles of his Sect, or at most according to what he, being suppos'd not to have heard of the Christian Religion, or had it duly propos'd to him, would reject it, the Phrase might be allow'd, or at least in­dulg'd. But then we must consider, that the Reason why such a Philosopher would reject the Articles of Christian Faith, would not be, because they could [Page 47]by no Mediums be possibly prov'd, but because these Doctrines being founded upon a Revelation, which he is pre­sum'd either not to have heard of, or not to have had sufficiently propos'd to him, he must, as a Rational man, refuse to believe them upon the score of their Prooflesness. And the same Philoso­pher, supposing him to be a true one, though he will be very wary, how he admits any thing as true that is not prov'd, if it fall properly under the cognizance of Philosophy; yet he will be as wary, how he pronounces things to be false or impossible in matters which he discerns to be beyond the reach of meer natural Reason, especially if So­ber and Learned men do very confi­dently pretend to know something of those matters by Divine Revelation, which though he will not easily be­lieve to be a true one, yet he will ad­mit, in case it should be prov'd true, to be a fit Medium to evince Truths, which, upon the Account of meer natural Light, he could not discover or em­brace. To be short, such a Philosopher would indeed reject some of the Arti­cles of our Faith hypothetically; i. e. [Page 48]upon supposition that he need employ no other Touchstone to examine them by, than the Principles and Dictates of Natural Philosophy, that he is acquaint­ed with (upon which score I shall here­after shew, that divers strange Chymi­cal Experiments, and other Discoveries would also be rejected;) but yet he would nor pronounce them false, but upon supposition that the Arguments, by which they lay claim to Divine Re­velation, are incompetent in their kind. For as he will not easily believe any thing within the Sphere of Nature that agrees not with the Establish'd Laws of it; so he will not easily adventure to pronounce one way or other in matters that are beyond the Sphere of Nature: He will indeed (as he justly may,) ex­pect as full a Proof of the Divine Te­stimony that is pretended, as the Nature of the thing requires and allows; but he will not be backward to acknow­ledge, that God to whom that Testimo­ny is ascrib'd, is able to know and to do many more things than we can expli­cate How He can discover, or ima­gine How any Physical Agent can per­form.

[Since I propos'd to you this fifth Consideration, I happen'd to light on a passage in Des Cartes's Principles, which affords of what I have been discovering the Suffrage of a Philosopher, Princip. Phi­les. part. pri­ma. Artic. 25. that is wont to be accus'd of excluding Theology too scrupulously out of his Philosophy. His words are so full to my present Purpose, that I need not, to accommodate them to it, alter one of them, and therefore shall transcribe them just as they lie: Si fortè nobis De­us de seipso, vel aliis, aliquid revelet, quod naturales Ingenii nostri vires excedat, qua­lia sunt mysteria Incarnationis & Trini­tatis, non recusabimus illa credere, quamvis non clarè intelligamus, nec ullo modo mira­bimur, multa esse tum in immensa ejus na­tura, tum etiam in rebus ab eo creatis, quae captum nostrum excedant.]

And let me add on this occasion, that whereas the main Scruples that are said to be suggested by Philosophy against some mysterious Articles of Religion, are grounded upon this, that the Modus, as they speak, of those things is not clearly conceivable, or at least is very hardly explicable; these objections are not always so weighty as perhaps by the [Page 50]confidence wherewith they are urg'd you may think them. For whereas I ob­serv'd to you already, that there are di­vers things maintain'd by School Di­vines, which are not contained in the Scripture, that observation is chiefly applicable to the things we are con­sidering; since in several of these nice Points, the Scripture affirms only the thing, and the Schoolmen are pleas'd to add the Modus: And as by their un­warrantable boldness the School Di­vines determine many things without Book; so the scruples and objections that are made against what the Scripture really delivers, are usually grounded upon the Erroneous or Precarious As­sertions of the School Philosophers, who often give the Title of Metaphysical Truths to Conceits that do very little deserve that name, and to which a rigid Philosopher would perhaps think that of Sublime Nonsense more proper. But of this I elsewhere say enough, and therefore shall now proceed to the con­sideration I chiefly intended, viz. That from hence, That the Modus of a revealed Truth is either very hard, or not at all ex­plicable, it will not necessarily follow, that the thing it self is irrational, pro­vided [Page 51]the positive Proofs of its Truth be sufficient in their kind. For ev'n in Natural things Philosophers themselves do and must admit several things, whereof they cannot clearly explicate or perhaps conceive the Modus. I will not here mention the Origine of Substantial Forms as an instance in this kind, be­cause though it may be a fit one as to the Peripatetick Philosophy; yet not ad­mitting that there are any such Beings, I will take no further notice of them; es­pecially because for a clear Instance to our present purpose, we need go no fur­ther than our selves, and consider the Union of the Soul and Body in man. For who can Physically explain, both how an immaterial Substance should be able to guide or determine, and excite the motions of a Body, and yet not be able to produce motion in it (as by dead Palsies, great Faintnesses, &c. it appears the Soul cannot,) and, which is far more difficult, how an incorporeal Substance should receive such Impressi­ons from the motions of a Body, as to be thereby affected with real pain and pleasure; to which I elsewhere add some other properties of this Union, which, though not taken notice of, are [Page 52]perhaps no less difficult to be conceiv'd and accounted for. For how can we comprehend that there should be natu­rally such an intimate Union betwixt two such distant Substances as an (In­corporeal) Spirit and a Body, as that the former may not, when it pleases, quit the latter, which cannot possibly have any strings or chains that can tye or fasten to it that which has no Body on which they may take hold. And I there shew, that 'tis full as difficult, Phy­sically to explicate how these so differ­ing Beings come to be united, as how they are kept from parting at pleasure, both the one and the other being to be resolv'd into the meer appointment of God. And if to avoid the abstruseness of the Modus of this Conjunction be­twixt the Rational Soul and the Humane Body, it be said, as 'tis by the Epicure­ans, that the former is but a certain Con­texture of the finer and most subtle parts of the latter, the formerly pro­pos'd abstruseness of the Union betwixt the Soul and the Body will indeed be shifted off; but 'twill be by a Doctrine that will not much relieve us. For those that will allow no Soul in Man but what is Corporeal, have a Modus to ex­plain, [Page 53]plain that I doubt they will alwayes leave a Riddle. For of such I desire, that they would explain to me, (who know no effects that Matter can produce but by Local Motion and Rest, and the consequences of it,) how meer Matter, (let them suppose it as fine as they please, and contrive it as well as they can) can make Syllogisms, and have Conceptions of Universals, and invent speculative Sciences and Demonstrati­ons, and in a word do all those things which are done by Man, and by no o­ther Animal; and he that shall intelligib­ly explicate to me the Modus of mat­ters, framing Theories and Ratiocinati­ons, will, I confess, not only instruct me, but surprize me too.

And now give me leave to make this short Reflection on what has been said in this Section, compar'd with what for­merly I said in the first Section: That if on the one hand we lay aside all the Ir­rational Opinions that the Schoolmen and other bold Writers have unwarran­tably father'd on Christian Religion, and on the other hand all the Errone­ous Conceits repugnant to Christianity, which the Schoolmen and others have prooflesly father'd upon Philosophy, the [Page 54] seeming Contradictions betwixt solid Divinity and true Philosophy will ap­pear to be but few, as I think the Real ones will be found to be none at all.

SECT. VI.

The next Consideration I shall pro­pose, is, That a thing may, if singly or precisely consider'd, appear Unreasona­ble, which yet may be very Credible, if consider'd as a Part of, or a manifest Consequence from, a Doctrine that is highly so.

Of this I could give you more In­stances in several Arts and Sciences, than I think fit to be here specifi'd; and therefore I shall content my self to men­tion three or four.

When Astronomers tell us that the Sun, which seems not to us a foot broad, nor considerably bigger than the Moon, is above a hundred and threescore times bigger than the whole Globe of the Earth, which yet is forty times greater than the Moon; the thing thus naked­ly propos'd, seems very Incredible. But yet, because Astronomers very skilful in their Art, have, by finding the Semi­diameter [Page 55]of the Earth, and observing the Parallaxes of the Planets, conclu­ded the proportion of these three Bo­dies to be such as has been mention'd, or thereabout, ev'n Learn'd and Judici­ous Men of all sorts, (Philosophers, Divines, and others,) think it not Cre­dulity to admit what they affirm.

So the relations of Earthquakes that have reach'd divers hundreds of miles; of Eruptions of fire, that have at once overflown and burn'd vast Scopes of Land; of the blowing up of Moun­tains by their own fires; of the Cast­ing up of new Islands in the Sea it self, and other Prodigies of too unquestionable. Truth; (for I know what work Igno­rance and Superstition have made about other Prodigies:) If they were attest­ed but by slight and ordinary Witness, they would be judg'd Incredible, but we scruple not to believe them, when the Relations are attested with such Circumstances, as make the Testimony as strong as the things attested are strange.

If ever you have consider'd, what Clavius, and divers other Geometricians teach upon the sixteenth Proposition of the third Book of Euclide, (which [Page 56]contains a Theorem about the Tangent and the Circumference of a Circle,) you cannot but have taken notice, that there are scarce greater Paradoxes de­liver'd by Philosophers or Divines, than you will find asserted by Geometri­cians themselves. And though of late the Learned Jesuit Tacquet, and some ri­gid Mathematicians, have question'd di­vers of those things, yet ev'n what some of these severe Examiners confess to be Geometrically demonstrable from that Proposition, contains things so strange, that Philosophers themselves, that are not well acquainted with that Proposition and its Corollaries, can scarce look upon them as other than In­comprehensible, or at least Incredible, things; which yet, as improbable as they are consider'd in themselves, ev'n rigid Demonstrators refuse not to admit, be­cause the [...] are legitimately deducible from an Acknowledg'd truth.

And so also among the Magnetical Phaenomena there are divers things, which being nakedly propos'd must seem altogether unfit to be believ'd, as indeed having nothing like them in all nature; whereas those that are vers'd in Magnetick Philosophy, ev'n before [Page 57]they have made particular Trials of them, will look upon them as credible, because, how great Paradoxes soever they may seem to others, they are con­sonant and consequent to the Doctrine of Magnetism, whose grand Axioms (from what cause soever Magnetisms are to be deriv'd) are sufficiently mani­fest; and therefore a Magnetical Philo­sopher would not, though an ordinary Philosopher would, think it unreasona­ble to believe, that one part of the same Loadstone should draw a Needle to it, and the other part drive the same Nee­dle from it; and that the Needle in a Seamans Compass, after having been carry'd perhaps many hunder'd Leagues (through differing Climates, and in stormy weather) without varying its Declination, may upon a sudden, with­out any manifest cause, point at some part of the Horizons several whole de­grees distant from that which it point­ed to before. To which might here be added divers other scarce credible things, which either others or I have try'd about Magnetical Bodies; but I shall hereafter have occasion to take notice of some of them in a fitter place.

Wherefore, when something deli­ver'd in or clearly deduc'd from Scri­pture is objected against, as a thing which it is not reasonable to believe, we must not only consider, whether, if it were not deliver'd in that Book, we should upon its own single Account think it fit or unworthy to be believ'd; but whether or no it is so improbable, that 'tis more fit to be believ'd, that all the proofs that can be brought for the Authority of the Scripture are to be Rejected, than that this thing which comes manifestly recommended to our belief by that Authority, is worthy to be Admitted: I say, manifestly recom­mended by that Authority, because that, if the thing be not clearly deliver'd in Scripture, or be not clearly and cogent­ly deduc'd thence, so far as that clear­ness is wanting, so far the thing it self wants of the full Authority of the Scri­pture, to impose it on our assent.

[Perhaps it will procure what I have said the better Reception, if I add a couple of Testimonies not of any mo­dern Bigots, no nor of any devout Fa­thers of the Church; but of two mo­dern Authors of Sects, and who in their kinds have been thought extremely [Page 59]subtle Reasoners, and no less rigid Ex­acters of Reason in whatever they ad­mitted.

The first passage I shall alledge, is the Confession of Socinus, who in his second Epistle to Andreas Dudithius, speaks thus: Jam verò ut rem in pauca confe­ram, quod ad meas aliorúmve opiniones, quae novitatis praese ferunt speciem, attinet, mihi ita videtur; si detur, Scriptur am sa­cram ejus esse Authoritatis, ut nullo modo ei contradici possit, ao de interpretati­one illius omnis duntaxat sit scrupulus, (which he allows) nihil, utut verisimile aut ratione conclusum videatur, afferri con­tra eas possit quod ullarum sit virium, quotiescunque illae sententiis atque verbis illius Libri aut rationibus liquidò inde de­duct is probatae atque assertae fuerint. Which confession of Socinus is surpass'd by that of his Champion Smalcius, to be produc'd elsewhere in this Paper. The other passage I met with in the Excellent Monsieur Des Cartes's Principles of Philo­sophy, Part. 2. Artic. 34, 35. where discoursing of the either Infinite or Indefinite Division of the Particles of Matter, which is necessary to make them fill exactly all the dif­feringly figur'd spaces, through which [Page 60]various motions do sometimes make them pass; he confesses (as he well may,) that the point is exceedingly ab­struse, and yet concludes: Et quamvis quomodo fiat indefinita ista Divisio cogi­tatione comprehendere nequeamus, non ideo tamen debemus dubitare quin fiat, quia clarè percipimus ill am necessario se­qui ex natura materiae nobis evidentissi­mè cognitâ, &c.]

And in this place it may be seasonable as well as pertinent, to take notice of three or four particulars, which, though they be in some measure imply'd in the former general Consideration, yet de­serve to be distinctly inculcated here, both for their importance, and because they may as well be deduc'd as Corol­laries from the foregoing Discourse, as be confirmed by the proofs I shall add to each of them. Of these the first shall be this, that we must not present­ly conclude a thing to be contrary to Reason, because Learned Men profess or ev'n complain, that they are not able clearly to comprehend it, provided there be competent proof that it is true, and the thing be Primary or Heteroclite.

For it is not alwayes necessary to the making the belief of a thing Rational, [Page 61]that we have such a Comprehension of the thing believ'd as may be had and justly required in ordinary Cases; since we may be sure of the Truth of a thing, not only by Arguments suggested by the Nature of the thing it self clear­ly understood by us; but by the exter­nal Testimony of such a Witness, as we know will not deceive us, and cannot (at least in our Case) be reasonably suspected to be himself deceiv'd. And therefore it may in some Cases suffice to make our belief Rational, that we clear­ly discern sufficient Reason to believe that a thing is true, whether that Reason spring from the Evidence and Cogency of the extrinsick Motives we have to believe, or from the Proofs suggested to us by what we know of the Thing be­liev'd, nay, though there be something in the nature of that Thing, which do's puzzle and pose our Understanding.

That many things that are very hard, and require a great attention, and a good judgment [...] made out, may yet be true, will b [...] [...]nifest from what I shall within a Page or two note a­bout divers Geometrical Demonstrati­ons, which require, besides a good stock of knowledge in those matters, an al­most [Page 62]invincible Patience to carry so ma­ny things along in ones Mind, and go thorow with them. That also there are other things, which, though they be as manifestly Existent, as those newly men­tion'd can be demonstratively True, are yet of so abstruse a kind, that it is ex­ceeding difficult to frame clear and sa­tisfactory Notions of their Nature, we might learn, if we were inquisitive e­nough, ev'n from some of the most ob­vious things; such as, for instance, Mat­ter and Time: As to the former whereof, ( Matter,) though the World and our own Bodies be made of it, yet the Ide­a's that are wont to be framed of it ev'n by the greatest Clerks, are incum­ber'd with too great difficulties (some of which I elsewhere mention) to be easily acquiesc'd in by considering Men. And as for the latter, (Time,) though that justly celebrated saying of Au­gustine, Si nemo ex me quaerat quid sit Tempus, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio; seem in [...] [...]rst part of it to own a knowledge [...] what Time is, yet by the latter part, (wherein he confes­ses he cannot declare what it is,) I am not only allow'd to believe that he could not propose an intelligible Idea [Page 63]of it, but invited to think that in the first part of the sentence he only meant, that when he did not attentively consi­der the Nature of it, he thought he un­derstood it, or that he knew that there is such a thing as Time, though he could not explain what it is.

And indeed, though Time be that, which all Men allow to be, yet, if per impossibile (as the Schools speak) a Man could have no other Notion or Proof of Time and Eternity, (even such Eternity as must be conceded to something,) than what he could col­lect from the best Descriptions of its Nature and Properties that are wont to be given; I scarce doubt, but he would look upon it as an unintelligible thing, and incumber'd with too many Difficul­ties to be fit to be admitted into a wise mans Belief. And this perhaps you will grant me, if you have ever put your self to the Penance of perusing those con­founding Disputes and Speculations a­bout Time and Eternity, that partly in Aristotle and his Commentators, and partly among the Schoolmen, and others, are to be met with upon these abstruse Subjects. And no wonder, since the Learned Gassendus and his Followers [Page 64]have very plausibly (if not solidly) shewn, that Duration, (and Time is but Duration measur'd) is neither a Sub­stance nor an Accident, which they also hold of Space; about which the Alter­cations among Philosophers and School­men are but little, if at all, inferiour to those about Time. And I the rather choose to mention these instances of Time and Space, because they agree very well with what I intimated by the expression of Primary or Heteroclite things.

To which may be referr'd some of those things, that are call'd Spiritual or Supernatural, about which the same Considerations may have place, especi­ally by Reason of this Affinity between them, that when we treat of either, some Proofs may in certain Cases be sufficient, in spite of such Objections, as in other (and more ordinary Cases) would invalidate Arguments seemingly as strong as those Proofs.

If it be here objected, That I am too bold in venturing without the Prece­dence or Authority of Learned Men, to introduce so great a difference be­twixt other things and those which I call Primary and Heteroclite: I answer, [Page 65]That I shall not solicitously enquire, whether any others have had the same thoughts that I propos'd; since, whether they be new or no, they ought not to be rejected, if they be Rational.

And I have this inducement to sup­pose, that there ought to be in some ca­ses a great difference between them and other things, and consequently between the judgments we make of the ways of arguing about them, and about other things; so that they are exceeding dif­ficult to be clearly conceiv'd and expli­cated by our imperfect Faculties, and by that difficulty apt to make what Men say of them, though true, to be less sa­tisfactory and acquiesced in, than things not more true or rational, suggested up­on enquiries about Subjects more fami­liar, or which are at least more propor­tionate to our Faculties: For, those ab­struse things, of which we have been speaking, being such, as either have no proper and clear Genus, by the help of which they may be comprehended, or have not any thing in Nature, that is (sufficiently) like them, by a resem­blance to which we may conceive them; or being perhaps both Primary and He­teroclite too, as not being deriv'd from [Page 66]the common Physical Causes of other things, and having a Nature widely dif­fering from the rest of things; 'tis no wonder, that our limited and imperfect Understandings should not be able to reach to a full and clear Comprehension of them; but should be swallow'd up with the Scruples and Difficulties that may be suggested by a bold and nice en­quiry into things, to which there seems to belong, in some respect or other, a kind of Infinity.

Upon these, and other Considerati­ons of kin to them, I count it not irra­tional, to think that things Primary and Heteroclite, as also by a parity of Rea­son, some things Immaterial and Super­natural, may be sufficiently prov'd in their kind, if there be such a positive proof of them as would be competent and satisfactory, in case there were no considerable Objections made against the thing prov'd (especially supposing that the asserted Doctrine be not in­cumbred with much greater inconveni­encies than the contrary Doctrine, or than any other, propos'd concerning that Subject:) Nay, I know not, why we may not, in judging of Primary and of Immaterial things, safely enough prefer [Page 67]that Opinion, which has the more Co­gent Positive Proofs, though it seem lia­ble to somewhat the greater inconveni­encies; because in such cases our un­derstanding is gratify'd with what it most requires in all cases, that is compe­tent Positive Inducements to assent; and it is not confounded by the Objections, because a disability to answer them di­rectly and fully may very well proceed either from the too abstruse Nature of the thing, or the limitedness and weak­ness of our humane Intellects.

And thus we may render a Reason, why, when we discourse of such un­common Matters, we may sometimes reasonably acquiesce in proofs in spight of such Objections as in ordinary cases would be prevailing ones. For the things, about which these proofs are conversant, being Primary or Heteroclite, or of as abstruse a Nature as if they were so, it too often happens, that, what Opinion soever we choose about them, we must admit something that is incum­bred with great difficulties, and there­fore will be liable to great Objections, that perhaps will never be directly and satisfactorily answer'd. And since it may fare thus with us, where two oppo­site [Page 68]Opinions are contradictory, we may conclude, that those difficulties will not cogently evince the falsity of a Theo­logical Opinion, which are but such, that the same, or as great, may be ob­jected against another, that either is manifestly or confessedly a Truth, or which must necessarily be admitted to be one, if the contrary Theological Tenet be suppos'd not to be one.

2. Another Corollary that may be drawn from the Discourse that afford­ed us the former, may be this; That it may not be unreasonable to believe a thing, though its Proof be very difficult to be understood. To manifest this, I shall need no other Argument, than what may be afforded by divers Geome­trical and other Mathematical Demon­strations; some of which are fetch'd by intermediate Conclusions from Princi­ples so very remote, and require so long a series of Mediums to be employ'd a­bout them, that not only a Man that were of Pilate's temper, who having ask'd Him that could best tell him, What is Truth, would not stay awhile to be satisfi'd about his Inquiry, would be­fore he reaches half way to the End of the Demonstration, or perhaps of the [Page 69] Lemma's, be quite discourag'd from pro­ceeding any further; but ev'n sedulous and heedful Perusers do find themselves oftentimes unable to carry along such a chain of Inferences in their minds, as clearly to discern whether the whole Ratiocination be coherent, and all the particulars have their due strength and connection. And if you please to make a Tryal upon some of the Demonstrati­ons of Vitellio, or ev'n of Clavius, that I can direct you to, I doubt they will put you to the full Exercise of your Patience, and quite tire your Attenti­on: And though the modern Algebrists by their Excellent way of expressing Quantities by Symbols, have so a­bridg'd Geometrical and Arithmetical Demonstrations, that by the help of spe­cies 'tis sometimes easie to Demonstrate that in a Line, which in the ordinary way would require a whole Page, (as our most Learned Friend Dr. Ward has ingeniously shewn, by giving the De­monstrations of about twenty of Mr. Hobbs's Theorems in less than so many Lines;) yet some Demonstrable Truths are so abstruse, that ev'n in the Symbo­lical way Men need more attention to discern them, than most Men would em­ploy [Page 70]in any Speculation whatsoever. And Des-Cartes himself, as famous and expert a Master as he was in this way, confesses in a Letter to one of his Friends, that the Solution of a Problem in Pappus cost him no less than six weeks study; though now, most Mathemati­cal Demonstrations do indeed seem far shorter than they are, because that Eu­clid's Elements being generally receiv'd among Mathematicians, all his Proposi­tions are so many Lemmata, which need be but refer'd to in the Margin, being known and demonstrated already. By all which it may appear, that, granting some Theological Truths to be com­plain'd of by many as things so mysteri­ous and abstruse, that they cannot rea­dily discern the force of those Proofs, that Des-Cartes, and other subtile Specu­lators have propos'd to evince them; yet if other Learned Men that are com­petent Estimators, and are accustomed to bring much Patience and Attention to the discernment of difficult and im­portant Truths, profess themselves sa­tisfi'd with them, the Probations may yet be cogent, notwithstanding the dif­ficulty to have their strength apprehen­ded. For if such a difficulty ought to [Page 71]pass for a mark that a Ratiocination is not valid, no Reasonings will be found fitter to be rejected or distrusted, than many of those whose Cogency has pro­cur'd such a Repute to Mathematical Demonstrations.

3. It may also be deduc'd from the foregoing discourse, That 'tis not always against Reason to embrace an Opinion which may be incumbred with a great Difficulty, or liable to an Objection not easie to be solv'd; especially if the Sub­ject be such, that other Opinions about it avoid not either the same Inconveni­encies, or as great ones. The first part of what is said in this Consideration, will often follow from the Supposition made in the precedent Discourse. For those things that render a Doctrine or Assertion difficult to be conceiv'd and explain'd, will easily supply the Adver­saries of it with Objections against it.

And as for the latter, viz. the Clause which takes notice that the Considera­tion, to which 'tis annex'd, will chiefly take place in that sort of Opinions that are specifi'd in it; it will need but lit­tle of distinct Proof.

For 'tis manifest enough, that if the Subject or Object, about which the Opi­nion [Page 72]propos'd is conversant, be such, that not only the contradictory Opini­on, but others also, are obnoxious ei­ther to the same Inconveniencies, or to others that are equal or greater; the difficulties that are urg'd against a Theo­logical Doctrine, may (as hath been shewn already in the first Corollary) be rationally enough attributed, not to the unreasonableness of the Opinion, but to somewhat else.

The last Consectary, that (as I in­timated) may be deduc'd from the precedent Discourse, is, That 'tis not always Unreasonable to believe some­thing Theological for a Truth, which (I do not say is truly inconsistent with, but) we do not clearly discern to com­port very well with something else that we also take for a Truth, or perhaps that is one indeed; if the Theological Tenet be sufficiently prov'd in its kind, and be of that sort of things that we have been of late and are yet discoursing of.

The generality of our Philosophers, as well as Divines, believe, That God has a foreknowledge of all future Con­tingencies; and yet how a certain Pre­science can consist with the Free-will of Man, (which yet is generally grant­ed [Page 73]him, in things meerly Moral or Civil,) is so difficult to discern, that the Socini­ans are wont to deny such things, as de­pend upon the will of free Agents, to be the proper Objects of Omniscience; and the Head of the Remonstrants, though a very subtle Writer, con­fesses that he knows not, how clear­ly to make out the consistency of Gods Prescience and Mans freedom; both which he yet confesses to be Truths, being compell'd to acknowledge the former, (for the latter is evident,) as well by the Infiniteness that must be ascrib'd to Gods Perfections, as by the Prophetick Predictions, whereby such contingent Events have been actually foretold. And the reconcilement of these Truths is not a difficulty peculiar to the Christian Religion, but concerns speculative Men in all Religions, who acknowledge the Deity to be infinitely perfect, and allow Man, as they do, to be a free Agent.

[But I have made this Section so pro­lix already, that I must not enlarge on this third particular. And therefore I shall shut it up with an acknowledg­ment of Des-Cartes, which may be ap­ply'd not only to it, but to almost all [Page 74]that has been discours'd in this Section, and indeed to a great part of this Let­ter. He then in an Epistle, that came not forth till some years after the Wri­ters death, speaks thus to the Philoso­phical Adversary to whom 'tis addres­sed: As I have often said, when the Question is about things that relate to God, or to what is Infinite, we must not consider what we can compre­hend of them, Volume 2. Letter 16. (since we know that they ought not to be com­prehended by us) but only what we can conceive of them, or can attain to by any certain Reason or Argument.

SECT. VII.

And now 'tis time to advance to one of the main Considerations I had to propose to you concerning the Subject of this Letter, and it is this; That when we are to judge, whether a thing be contrary to Reason or not, there is a great deal of difference, whether we take Reason for the Faculty furnish'd only with its own innate Principle, and such Notions as are generally obvious, (nay, and if you please, with this or [Page 75]that Philosophical Theory;) or for the Faculty illuminated by Divine Re­velation, especially that which is con­tain'd in the Books commonly call'd the Scripture.

To clear and inforce this the better, I shall invite you to take notice with me of the two following particulars.

We may then in the first place con­sider, That ev'n in things meerly Natu­ral, Men do not think it at all Irratio­nal, to believe divers such things upon extrinsecal Proofs, especially the Testi­mony of the skilful, as, if it were not for that Testimony, a Man, though born with good parts, and possibly very Learn'd in the Peripatetick or some other particular Philosophy, would look upon as Irrational to be believ'd, and contrary to the Laws of Nature.

Of this I shall give you some Instan­ces in the Phaenomena of the Loadstone, and particularly such as these; That the Loadstone, though (as was above inti­mated) with one part it will draw, yet with another the same stone will re­pel the same point of the same excited Needle; and yet at the same time be fit to attract either point of another Needle that never came near a Load­stone [Page 76]before: That though it be the Loadstone that imparts an attractive virtue to the Iron, yet when the Load­stone is cap'd, as they call'd it, and so a piece of Iron (and consequently a distance) is interpos'd betwixt the stone and the weight to be rais'd, it will take up by many times more than if it be it self apply'd immediately thereunto, insomuch that Mersennus relates In his little Tract de Mag­netis Propri [...] ­tatibus. p. m. 350., that (if there be no mistake,) he had a Loadstone that of it self would take up but half an Ounce of Iron, which when arm'd (or cap'd) would lift up ten Pounds, which (says he) exceeded the former weight three hundred and twenty times: That a Mariners Needle, being once touch'd with a vigorous Load­stone, will afterwards, when freely poiz'd, turn it self North and South; and if it be by force made to regard the East and West, or any other points of the Compass, as soon as 'tis left at liberty, 'twill of its self return to its former Position: That a Loadstone float­ing on water, will as well come to, and follow a piece of, Iron that is kept from advancing towards it; as, when it self [Page 77]is fix'd, and the Iron at liberty, 'twill draw that Metal to it: That without any sensible alteration in the Agent or the Patient, the Loadstone will in a trice communicate all its virtues to a piece of Steel, and enable that to com­municate them to another piece of the same Metal: That if a Loadstone, ha­ving been markt at one end, be cut long-wise according to its Axis, and one Segment be freely suspended over the other, the halves of the markt end, that touch'd one another before, will not now lie together, but the lower will drive away the upper; and that which regarded the North in the markt end of the intire Loadstone, will join with that extreme of the lower half, which in the intire stone regarded the South: That (as appears by this last nam'd Proper­ty) there are the same Magnetical Qua­lities in the separated parts of a Mag­net, as in the intire stone; and if it be cut, or even rudely broken into a great many parts or fragments, every one of these portions, though perhaps not so big as a Corn of Wheat, will, if I may so speak, set up for its self, and have its own Northern and Southern Poles, and become a little Magnet, sui juris, or in­dependent [Page 78]upon the stone from which 'twas sever'd, and from all its other parts: That, if a Loadstone be skilfully made Spherical, this little Magnetick Globe, very fitly by our Gilbert call'd a Terrella, will not only, being freely plac'd, turn North and South, and retain that Posi­tion, but have its Poles, its Meridians, its Aequator &c. upon good grounds designable upon it, as they are upon the great Globe of the Earth. And this will hold, whether the Terrella be great or small.

I might not only much encrease the number of these odd Magnetical Phae­nomena's, but add others about other Subjects: But these may suffice to sug­gest to us this Reflection, That there is no doubt to be made, but that a Man, who never had the opportunity to see or hear of Magnetical Experiments, would look upon these as contrary to the Prin­ciples of Nature, and therefore to the Dictates of Reason, as (accordingly) some Learned Aristotelians, to whom I had occasion to propose some of them, rejected them as Incredible. And I doubt not, but I could frame as plausible Arguments from the meer Axioms of Philosophers, and the Doctrine of Phi­losophick [Page 79]Schools against some Magne­tical Phaenomena, which Experience hath satisfi'd me of, as are wont to be drawn from the same Topicks against the My­sterious Articles of Faith; since among the strange Properties of the Loadstone there are some, which are not only ad­mirable and stupendious, but seem re­pugnant to the Dictates of the received Philosophy and the course of Nature. For, whereas Natural Bodies, how sub­tile soever, require some particular Dis­positions in the Medium through which their Corpuscles are to be diffus'd, or their Actions transmitted, so that Light it self, whether it be a most subtile Bo­dy, or a naked Quality, is resisted by all opacous Mediums, and the very effluvia of Amber and other Electricks will not permeate the thinnest Glass, or even a sheet of fine Paper; yet the Loadstone readily performing his Operations through all kind of Mediums, without excepting Glass it self.

If the Poles of two Magnetick Nee­dles do both of them regard the North, another Philosopher would conclude them to have a Sympathy, at least to be unlikely to [...]isagree; and yet, if he bring these Extremes of the same Deno­mination [Page 80]within the reach of one an­other, one will presently drive away the other as if there were a powerful Antipathy between them.

A somewhat long Needle being plac'd horizontally, and exactly poiz'd upon the point of a Pin, if you gently touch one end with the Pole of a vigorous Magnet, that end shall manifestly dip or stoop, though you often take it off the Pin, and put it on again. And this inclination of the Needle will continue many years, and yet there is not only no other sensible change made in the Metal by the Contact of the Loadstone; but one end has requir'd a durable Pre­ponderancy, though the other be not lighter, nor the whole Needle heavier than before. And the Inclination of the Magnetick Needle may be by an­other touch of the Loadstone taken a­way without lessning the weight of the part that is depriv'd of it.

The Operation that in a trice the Loadstone has on a Mariners Needle, though it makes no sensible change in it, or weakens the Loadstone it self, will not be lost, though you carry it as far as the Southern Hemisphere; but it will not be the same in all places, but in some [Page 81]the Magnetick Needle will point di­rectly at the North, in others 'twill de­viate or decline some degrees towards the East or the West: And, which seems yet more strange, the same Needle in the same place will not always regard the same point of the Compass, but, lookt on at distant times, may vary from the true Meridian, sometimes to the West, and afterwards to the East.

All the communicable virtues of the Magnet may be imparted to Iron, with­out any actual Contact of the two Bo­dies, but barely by approaching in a convenient way the Iron to the Load­stone for a few moments. And the Metal may likewise be depriv'd of those virtues in a trice, without any im­mediate Contact by the same or another Loadstone.

If you mark one end of a Rod, or other oblong piece of Iron, that never came near a Magnet, and hold it per­pendicularly, you may at pleasure, and in the hundreth part of a minute, make it become the North or South Pole of a Magnetical Body. For if, when 'tis held upright, you apply to the bottom of it the North-extreme of an excited and well-poiz'd Needle, the lower end [Page 82]of the Iron will drive away that Ex­treme, which yet will be drawn by the upper end of the same Iron. And if by inverting you make this lower end the uppermost, it will not attract, but repel the same Lilly or North-point of the Needle, just under which it is to be perpendicularly held.

Though, vis unita fortior, be a receiv'd Rule among Naturalists; yet oftentimes, if a Magnet be cut into pieces, these will take up and sustain much more Iron than the intire stone was able to do.

If of two good Loadstones the for­mer be much bigger, and on that ac­count stronger than the other, the great­er will draw a piece of Iron, and retain it much more strongly than the lesser; and yet, when the Iron sticks fast to the greater and stronger Loadstone, the lesser and weaker may draw the Iron from it, and take it quite away.

These Phaenomena, (to mention now no more,) are so repugnant to the com­mon sentiments of Naturalists, and the ordinary course of things, that, if ante­cedently to any Testimony of experi­ence these Magnetical Properties had been propos'd to Aristotle himself, he would probably have judg'd them ficti­tious [Page 83]things, as repugnant to the Laws of Nature: Nevertheless, though it seems incredible, that the bare touch of a Loadstone should impart to the Mari­ners Needle a Property, which, (as far as we know,) nothing in the whole World that is not Magnetical can com­municate or possess; and should ope­rate (as Men suppose) upon it at three or four thousand Leagues di­stance; yet this is believ'd by the Peri­pateticks themselves upon the Testimo­ny of those Navigators that have sail'd to the East and West-Indies; and divers even of the more rigid of the modern Philosophers believe more than this, upon the Testimony of Gilbert, Cabaeus, Kircherus, and other Learned Magneti­cal Writers, who have affirmed these things; most of which I can also averr to you upon my own knowledge.

Thus the Habitableness of the Torrid Zone, though (as I lately noted) upon probable grounds deny'd by Aristotle, and the generality of Philosophers for many Ages; yet not only that, but its Populousness is now confidently belie­ved by the Peripatetick Schoolmen them­selves, who never were there.

And though Ptolomy, and some other [Page 84]eminent Astronomers, did with great care and skill, and by the help of Geo­metry, as well as Observations, frame a Theory of the Planets so plausibly con­triv'd, that most of the succeeding Ma­thematicians for 12 or 14 Ages acqui­esc'd in it; yet almost all the modern Philosophers and Astronomers, that have search'd into these matters with a readiness to believe their Eyes, and al­low their Reason to act freely, have been forc'd, if not to reject the whole Theory, yet at least to alter it quite, as to the Number and Order of the Pla­nets, though these last nam'd Innovati­ons are sometimes solely, and always mainly built upon the Phaenomena dis­cover'd to us by two or three pieces of glass plac'd in a long hollow Cane, and honour'd with the name of a Teles­cope.

The last of the two things I invited you to consider with me, is this, That when we are to judge, which of two dis­agreeing Opinions is most Rational, i.e. to be judg'd most agreeable to right Reason, we ought to give sentence, not for that which the Faculty, furnish'd only with such and such Notions, whe­ther vulgar or borrow'd from this or [Page 85]that Sect of Philosophers, would pre­fer, but that which is prefer'd by the Faculty furnish'd either with all the Evidence requisite or advantagious to make it give a right Judgment in the case lying before it; or, when that can­not be had, with the best and fullest In­formations that it can procure.

This is so evident by its own light, that your Friend might look upon it as an affront to his Judgment, if I should go about solicitously to prove it. And therefore I shall only advertise you, that, provided the Information be such as a man has just cause to believe, and perceives that he clearly understands, it will not alter the case, whether he have it by Reason, as that is taken for the Fa­culty furnish'd but with its inbred No­tions and the more common Observati­ons, or by some Philosophical Theory, or by Experiments purposely devis'd, or by Testimony Humane or Divine, which last we call Revelation. For all these are but differing ways of informing the Understanding, and of signifying to it the same thing; as the Sight and the Touch may assure a Man, that a Body is smooth or rough, or in motion or at rest; (and in some other instances se­veral [Page 86]senses discover to us the same Ob­ject, which is therefore call'd Objectum Commune;) and provided these Infor­mations have the conditions lately inti­mated, which way soever the Under­standing receives them, it may safely reason and build Opinions upon them.

Astronomers have within these 100 years observ'd, that a Star hath appea­red among the Fix'd ones for some time, and having afterwards disappear'd, has yet some years after that, shew'd it self again. And though, as to this surprising Phaenomenon, our Experimental Philoso­phers could have contributed nothing to the producing it, and though 'tis quite out of all the received Systems of the Heavens that Astronomers have hi­therto deliver'd; yet the Star it self may be a true Celestial light, and may allow us to Philosophize upon it, and draw Inferences from the Discoveries it makes us; as well as we can from the Phaenomena of those Stars that are not extraordinary, and of those Falling Stars that are within our own Ken and Region.

That the Supernatural things, said to be perform'd by Witches and Evil Spirits, might, if true, supply us with Hypothe­ses [Page 87]and Mediums whereby to constitute and prove Theories, as well as the Phae­nomena of meer nature, seems tacitely indeed, but yet sufficiently, to be ac­knowledg'd, by those modern Natura­lists, that care not to take any other way to decline the Consequences that may be drawn from such Relations, than sol­licitously to shew, that the Relations themselves are all (as I fear most of them are) false, and occasion'd by the Credulity or Imposture of Men.

But not to do any more than glance at these matters, let us proceed upon what is more unquestionable, and con­sider, that, since ev'n our most Critical Philosophers do admit many of the a­stonishing Attributes of Magnetick Bo­dies, which themselves never had occa­sion to see, upon the Testimony of Gil­bert, and others, who never were able to give the true causes of them; because they look upon those Relators as honest Men, and judicious enough not to be impos'd upon as to the matter of Fact: Since (I say) such amazing things are believ'd by such severe Naturalists, up­on the Authority of Men who did not know the intimate nature of Magnetick Bodies; and since these strange Phaeno­mena [Page 88]are not only assented to as true by the Philosophers we speak of, but many Philosophical consequences are without haesitancy deduc'd from them, without any blemish to the judgment of those that give their Assent both to the Things and the Inferences; why should it be contrary to Reason to believe the Testimony of God either about his Na­ture, which He can best, and He alone can fully know, or about the things which either he himself has done, as the Creation of the World and of Man; or which he means to do, as the destroy­ing the World, (whether the whole World, or our great Vortex only, I dis­pute not,) and the raising both of good and bad Men to life again, to receive Rewards and Punishments, according to their Demerits. For methinks that Apostle argues very well, who says, If we receive the testimony of men, 1 John. v. 9. the testimony of God is greater; especially about such things concerning his own Nature, Will, and Purposes, as 'tis evident that Reason, by its own unassisted light, cannot give us the knowledge of.

So that we Christians in assenting to Doctrines upon the account of Revela­tion, [Page 89]need not, nor do not, reject the Authority of Reason, but only appeal from Reason to it self, i. e. from Rea­son, as it is more slightly, to its Dictates, as 'tis more fully inform'd. Of which two sorts of Dictates there is nothing more rational, than to prefer the latter to the former.

And for my part I am apt to think, that, if what has been represented in this Section were duly consider'd, this alone would very much contribute to prevent or answer most of the Objections, that make such of the Questioners of Re­ligion, as are not resolutely vitious, entertain such hard thoughts of some Articles of the Christian Faith, as if they were directly repugnant to Rea­son. For, (as we were observing) that is not to be look'd on as the judg­ment of Reason, that is pronounc'd ev'n by a rational Man according to a Set of Notions, though the Inferences from these would be rational, in case there were nothing else fit to be taken into consideration by him that judges; but that is rather to be look'd upon as the judgment of Reason, which takes in the most Information procurable, that is pertinent to the things under consi­deration. [Page 90]And therefore Men, though otherwise learn'd and witty, shew them­selves not equal Estimators of the case of those that believe the Articles we speak of, when they pronounce them to assent Irrationally, because the things they assent to cannot be demonstrated or maintain'd by meer natural Reason, and would probably be rejected by De­mocritus, Epicurus, Aristotle, or any other of the ancient Philosophers, to whom they should be nakedly propos'd, and whose judgment should be desir'd about them. For, although this Allegation would signifie much, if we pretended to prove what we believe only by Argu­ments drawn from the nature of the thing assented to; yet it will not signi­fie much in our case, wherein we pre­tend to prove what we believe, chiefly by Divine Testimony, and therefore ought not to be concluded guilty of an Irra­tional Assent, unless it can be shewn, ei­ther that Divine Testimony is not duly challeng'd by us for the main of our Religion; or that in the particular Arti­cles we father something on that Testi­mony which is not contain'd in it, or rightly deducible from it. And to put us upon the proving our particular Arti­cles [Page 91]of Faith, sufficiently deliver'd in the Scriptures, and not knowable without Revelation, by Arguments meerly natu­ral, without taking notice of those we can bring for the proof of that Revela­tion on whose account we embrace those Articles, is to challenge a Man to a Duel, upon condition he shall make no use of his best weapons; and is as unrea­sonable, as if a Schoolman should chal­lenge your Friend to prove, that the Torrid Zone is inhabited, against the Rea­sons that the Aristotelians are wont to give to prove it uninhabitable, without allowing him to make use of the testi­mony of Navigators, who assure us of the constant Brises that daily ventilate the Air, and qualifie that heat which o­therwise would not be supported, and who furnish us with those other circum­stances whereon to build our proofs, which we, that were never there, can have but by Relation.

And indeed, the limitations, that Christian Religion puts to some of the dictates of Philosophy, which were wont to be admitted in a more general and unrestrained Sense, and the Do­ctrines about God and the Soul, &c. that it superadds to those which the light of [Page 92]Nature might lead Men to about the same Subjects; though to some they may seem injurious to Philosophy and Reason, are as little unkind to either, as is the Gardener to a Crab-stock, or some such other wild Plant, when by cutting off some of the Branches, and by making a slit in the Bark, that he may graft on it a Pare-main, or some o­ther choice Apples, by this seemingly hard usage he brings it to bear much nobler fruit, than, if left to its own na­tural condition, it ever would have done.

I know not, whether to all that hath been said in this Section. I may not add thus much further, that it sometimes happens, that those very things, which at first were propos'd to the under­standing, and believ'd upon the score of Revelation, are afterward assented to by it upon the account of meer Rea­son. To which purpose I consider, that not any of the ancient Philosophers, nay (as far as I have read) ev'n of those that believ'd God to be the Au­thor of the World, dream'd, that He created Matter of nothing, but only form'd the World out of praeexistent Matter, whereas Christian Divines usu­ally [Page 93]teach as an Article of Faith, That, besides what they call a mediate Crea­tion, as when Fishes were made out of the water, or Adam's body was made out of the earth, there was an immedi­ate Production of Matter it self out of nothing.

SECT. VIII.

After what has been hitherto dis­cours'd, it may be seasonable to consi­der, what kind of Probation, or what degree of Evidence may reasonably be thought sufficient to make the Christian Religion thought fit to be embrac'd.

Perhaps I shall not need to tell you, that, besides the Demonstrations wont to be treated of in vulgar Logick, there are among Philosophers three distinct, whether kinds or degrees, of Demon­stration. For there is a Metaphysical Demonstration, as we may call that, where the Conclusion is manifestly built on those general Metaphysical Axioms that can never be other than true; such as Nihil potest simul esse & non esse; Non Entis nullae sunt Proprieta­tes Reales, &c. There are also Physical [Page 94]Demonstrations, where the Conclusion is evidently deduc'd from Physical Principles; such as are, Ex nihilo nihil fit. Null a substantia in nihilum redigitur, &c. which are not so absolutely cer­tain as the former, because, if there be a God, He may (at least for ought we know) be able to create and annihi­late Substances; and yet are held un­questionable by the ancient Naturalists, who still suppose them in their Theo­ries. And lastly, there are Moral De­monstrations, such as those where the Conclusion is built either upon some one such proof cogent in its kind; or some concurrence of Probabilities that it cannot be but allowed, supposing the truth of the most receiv'd Rules of Prudence and Principles of Practical Philosophy.

And this third kind of Probation, though it come behind the two others in certainty, yet it is the surest guide, which the Actions of Men, though not their Contemplations, have regularly al­low'd them to follow. And the Con­clusions of a Moral Demonstration are the surest that Men aspire to, not only in the conduct of private Mens affairs, but in the Government of States, and [Page 95]ev'n of the greatest Monarchies and Empires. And this is considerable in Moral Demonstrations, that such may consist, and be as it were made up of particulars, that are each of them but probable; of which the Laws estab­lisht by God himself among his own People, as well as the practice of our Courts of Justice here in England, af­ford us a manifest instance in the case of Murder, and some other Criminal Cau­ses. For, though the Testimony of a single Witness shall not suffice to prove the accus'd party guilty of Murder; yet the Testimony of two Witnesses, though but of equal Credit, that is, a second Testimony added to the first, though of it self never a whit more credible than the former, shall ordinarily suffice to prove a Man guilty; because it is thought reasonable to suppose, that, though each Testimony single be but probable, yet a concurrence of such Probabilities (which ought in Reason to be attributed to the Truth of what they jointly tend to prove) may well amount to a Moral certainty, i. e. such a certainty as may warrant the Judge to proceed to the sentence of death a­gainst the Indicted party.

To apply these things now to the Christian Religion: If you consider, with how much approbation from discerning Men that judicious Observation of Ari­stotle has been entertain'd, where he says, that 'tis as unskilful and improper a thing to require Mathematical Demon­strations in Moral Affairs, as to take up with Moral Arguments in matters Ma­thematical; you will not deny, but that those Articles of the Christian Religion that can be prov'd by a Moral, though not by a Metaphysical or Physical, De­monstration, may without any blemish to a Man's Reason be assented to; and that consequently (by vertue of the foregoing Considerations) those other Articles of the Christian Faith, that are clearly and legitimately deducible from the so demonstrated Truths, may like­wise without disparagement be assented to.

We may also here consider further, That the choosing or refusing to em­brace the Christian Religion, which is not propos'd to us only as a System of Speculative Doctrines, but also as a Body of Laws, according to which it teaches us, that God commands us to worship Him, and regulate our Lives; [Page 97]the embracing, I say, or not embracing this Religion, is an act of humane choice, and therefore ought to be deter­min'd according to the dictates of Pru­dence. Now, though in matters that very much import us, we may wish for and endeavor after such Reasons, where­by to determine our Resolves, as may amount to Moral Demonstrations; yet Prudence will not always require, that we should refuse to act upon Arguments of a less Cogency than Moral Demon­strations. For oftentimes in humane Affairs it so falls out, that divers hazards or other inconveniences will attend whatever resolution we take; and in that case, all that Prudence requires, or can enable us to do, is, to take that re­solution which upon the whole matter seems to be preferable to any other; though that which is thus prefer'd, may perhaps be liable to some Objection that cannot be directly answer'd, but only obliquely, by the preponderancy of the Arguments that persuade the choice against which the Objection is made.

But here perhaps you will tell me, that the safest way in a case of such im­portance, is to suspend an action that is [Page 98]every way attended with difficulties, and to forbear either embracing or reject­ing the Christian Religion, till the truth or falseness of it come to appear evi­dent and unquestionable.

To which I answer, that indeed in matters of bare Speculation, about which our Ʋnderstandings only need to be conversant, the suspension of Assent is not only practicable, but usually the safest way; but Des-Cartes himself, who has been the greatest Example and In­culcator of this Suspension, declares, that he would have it practis'd onely a­bout humane Speculations, not about hu­mane Actions; Sed haec interim dubita­tio ad solam contemplationem veritatis restringenda; non quantum ad usum vitae: quia persaepe rerum agendarum occasio praeteriret, antequam nos dubiis nostris exolvere possemus. Non raro quod tantum est verisimile cogimur amplecti, vel etiam interdum, etsi è duobus unum altero ve­risimiliùs non appareat, alterutrum tamen eligere. And in some of his other wri­tings he speaks so much to shew, that 'tis unreasonable to expect in matters, where embracing or rejecting a course that requires practice is necessary, such a certainty as he judges necessary to make [Page 99]a true Philosopher acquiesce in refe­rence to Propositions about speculative matters, that I find by one of his Let­ters, that he was vehemently accus'd for having taught, that Men need not have as sure grounds for choosing ver­tuous and avoiding vitious courses, as for determining about things meerly Notional.

And here let me observe to you the difference, that I take notice of in the cases where we are put upon delibera­ting, whether we will choose or refuse a thing propos'd. For it may be pro­pounded to us, either as a proffer on whose acceptance an advantage may be hop'd, or as a duty, which, besides the advantage it promises to the perfor­mance, has a Penalty annex'd to the non-performance, or as an onely expe­dient to avoid a great mischief, or ob­tain a great good.

Thus when in the Theatrum Chymicum some of its chief Authors, as Lully, Geber, Artephius, who pretend to have been Adepti, i. e. Possessors of the E­lixir, very earnestly exhort their Rea­ders to apply themselves to so noble and useful a study as Alchymy (by the help of which, the last nam'd Artephius [Page 100]is said to have liv'd a 1000 years,) they make but a Proposition of the first sort. For though a prosperous attempt to make the Philosophers stone (supposing there be such a thing) would possess a Man of an inestimable Treasure; yet, if he either refuse to believe these Wri­ters, or, if he do believe them, refuses to take the pains requir'd of him that would follow their counsel, he can on­ly miss of the wealth, &c. they would make him hope for, but is really never a whit the poorer, or in a worse condition than if they had not endeavour'd to engage him.

But if an absolute Sovereign com­mands something to be done by his Sub­jects; and to enforce his Command, does not only propose great Recom­penses to those that shall perform what is prescrib'd, but threatens heavy penal­ties to the disobedient; this will be­long to the second sort of Cases above mention'd, in which, as 'tis evident, a Man has not the same latitude allow'd him as in the first.

But if we suppose, that a Man by a translation of very peccant Matter has got a spreading Gangrene in his Arm, and a skilful Chirurgion tell him, that, [Page 101]if he will part with his Arm, he may be recover'd, and save his life, which else he will certainly lose: This Case will belong to the last sort above mention'd; the Patients parting with his Arm being the onely remedy of the Gangrene, and expedient to save his life, and recover his health. And here also 'tis manifest, that there are far stronger Motives, than those mention'd in the first Case, to make a positive and timely Resolu­tion.

To bring this home to our Subject, I need but mind you, that the Christian Doctrine does not only promise a Hea­ven to sincere Believers, but threatens no less than a Hell to the Refractory.

The voice of Moses to the Jews is this, Behold, I set before you this day a blessing and a curse; Deutr. 11.26, 27, 28. a bles­sing, if ye obey the Command­ments of the Lord your God, which I command you this day; and a curse, if ye will not obey the Command­ment of the Lord your God, but turn aside out of the way which I command you this day.

And the Commission that Christ gave his Apostles to preach the Gospel, runs thus: Go ye into all the world, and preach [Page 102]the Gospel to every creature, i. e. to all Mankind; Mark 16.15, 16. he that believeth, and is baptiz'd shall be sav'd; but he that believeth not, shall be damn'd.

By this you may perceive, that as far as there is either truth or probability in the Christian Religion, so far forth he that refuses to become a Disciple to it, runs a venture, not only to lose the greatest blessings that Men can hope but to fall eternally into the greatest mise­ries that they can fear. And indeed our Case in reference to the Christian Re­ligion may not only be refer'd to the second sort of Cases lately mention'd, but to the third sort too. For as the language of the Author of the Chri­stian Religion was to his Auditors, If ye believe not that I am He (the Messias) ye shall dye in your sins; John 8.24. so of the two greatest Heralds of it, the one tells the Jews that neither is there salvation in any other: For, there is no other Name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved: Acts 4.12. And the other tells the Thessalonians, That the Lord Jesus shall be reveal'd from heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance [Page 103]on them that know not God, and obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; 2 Thess. 1. 7, 8, 9. who shall be punish'd with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.

By all this it appears, that the Chri­stian Religion is not propos'd barely as a proffer of Heaven in case Men em­brace it, but as a Law that Men should embrace it upon the greatest penalty, and as the onely expedient and remedy to attain eternal happiness, and escape endless misery; so that the forbearing to submit our necks to the yoke of Christ, being as well a ruinous course, as to reject it, that which Reason here puts us upon, is, not so much to consider, whether or no the Arguments for the Christian Religion be Demonstrations, and will enable a Man to answer directly all Objections and Scruples; (for there are divers courses that Prudence may enjoin a Man to steer, whilst Philosophy suggests speculative doubts about the grounds of such Resolutions;) but whether it be more likely to be true, than not to be true, or rather, whether it be not more adviseable to perform the conditions it requires upon a pro­bable [Page 104]expectation of obtaining the blessings it promises, than by refusing it to run a probable hazard of incurring such great and endless miseries as it per­emptorily threatens.

It will perhaps be said, that this is a hard Case. But that is an Allegation I am not here to consider; since it pro­perly belongs to the Doctrine about the Providence of God, who being the on­ly Author and absolute Lord of the Creatures, who can receive neither Laws nor Benefits from them, that can oblige him to them; has a right to pre­scribe them what Laws he thinks fit, that are not impossible for them to obey, and to punish their disobedience to such Laws; and much more has a right to an­nex what conditions he pleases to that inestimable Felicity he holds forth; the proffer of it upon any terms being a free act of his meer goodness, and the value of it incomparably surpassing whatever we Men can do or suffer to obtain it; especially considering, that, as he might ensorce his Commands, as Sovereigns commonly do by threatning Penalties to the disobedient, without proposing Rewards to the performers; so he has given Men such probable Arguments to [Page 105]ground their expectations on, that they will be self-condemn'd, if they reject the Religion he proposes, and yet main­tain it to be decent (if I may so speak) for him to crown their Faith with unva­luable blessings. But, as I was saying, the direct and full Answer to this Alle­gation belongs not to this place, where it may suffice to say, that whether the Case be hard or no, yet this is the Case. And therefore though the proofs of the Christian Religion did not amount (which yet I do not grant) to Moral Demonstrations, a Man may act ratio­nally in embracing that Religion, if, all things consider'd, it appear more like­ly to be true, than not to be true.

And I shall by and by shew you, that this is not the onely Case, where Pru­dence puts us upon making resolutions notwithstanding contrary doubts.

I know the harshness of the Case is by most Men made to consist in this, That for a Religion, whereof the truth suppos'd in its promises and threats is not demonstratively prov'd, we must re­sign up our pleasures, and sometimes undergo considerable hardships and los­ses, and consequently we must quit what is certain, for what is uncertain. I have [Page 106]in another Paper had occasion to say something else to this Objection, than what (to avoid repetition) shall make up my present Answer, which consists of two parts.

The first whereof is, That what we are to give up to become Christians, is not really so valuable in itself as the Objecters think, and that 'tis of scarce any value at all, if compar'd to the goods we may acquire by parting with them. For alas! what is it that Chri­stianity requires us to forego, but small petty enjoyments? which those, that have had the most of, have found them, and pronounced them unsatisfactory whilst they possest them, and which ma­nifest experience shews to be no less transitory, than they have been declar'd empty, since a thousand Accidents may take them from us, and Death will in­fallibly after a short time (which can be but a moment compar'd to Eternity) take us from them. And if it be said, that these Enjoyments, such as they are, are at least the only happiness that we can make our selves sure of, I must free­ly profess, that I think it therefore the more reasonable to part with them, if it be necessary upon the hopes that Chri­stian [Page 107]Religion gives us. For (especi­ally if a Man behold those things not only with a Philosophical eye that can look through them, but with a Christian eye that can look beyond them,) if there be no greater happiness, I do not think so poor a thing as Men call Happiness worth being greedily desir'd; and if there be such a transcendent happiness as Christianity holds forth, I am sure, that deserves to be the object of my Ambition. So that either the Meanness of worldly happiness will make me think it no great misery to want it, or the Excellency of heavenly Felicity will make me think it great wisdom to part with earthly for it.

And now, in the second part of my Answer, I must invite you to consider with me, that Christian Religion re­quires not of us actions more imprudent, than divers others, that are generally look'd upon as complying with the di­ctates of Prudence, and some of them practis'd by great Politicians themselves in the weighty affairs of State.

You know what a common practice it is in great storms at Sea, for the Mer­chants themselves to throw over-board their Goods, and perhaps too their Vi­ctuals [Page 108](as in Paul's case) though they be sure to lose what they cast away, and are not certain either that this loss will save the ship, or that the ship may not be sav'd without it. The wisest, and ev'n the worldliest Men, whether Prin­ces or private persons, think themselves never more so, than when they toyl and lay out their care and time, and usually deny themselves many things to pro­vide advantagiously for Children which they have but a Womans word for, and consequently a bare Moral probability to assure them to be theirs.

In the Small Pox many Physitians are for Bleeding, and others (as most of our English Practitioners) are very much against it. Supposing then (which is no very rare Case) that a person in­vaded by that disease, be told by one of his Physitians, that unless Nature be eas'd of part of her burden by Phlebo­tomy, she will never be able to overcome the disease; and on the contrary, the other assures him, that, if by exhaust­ing the treasure of life (the Blood) he further weakens Nature which is but too weak already, the disease must needs overcome her: What can a pru­dent Man do in this Case, where he [Page 109]can take no resolution, against which probable Arguments, that are not di­rectly and fully to be answer'd, may not be oppos'd, and where yet the sus­pension of his resolution may be as rui­nous, as the venturing to take either of those he is invited to?

And in the formerly mentioned Case, of a Man that has a spreading Gangrene in his Arm, if he consents that it be cut off, which Prudence often requires that he should do, he is certain to lose one of his usefullest limbs, and is not cer­tain but that he may save his life with­out that loss, nor that he shall save it by that loss.

And to give you an Instance or two of a more publick nature: How many Examples does History afford us of fa­mous Generals and other great Com­manders, who have ventur'd their For­ces and their Lives to seize upon places promis'd to be betray'd to them by those they had corrupted with money; though the ground, upon which they run this hazard, be the engagement of some, who, if they were not Traytors that could falsifie their faith, would ne­ver have been brib'd to make so crimi­nal and ignominious an engagement? [Page 110]How often have the greatest Politici­ans either resolv'd to enter into a War, or taken courses that they foresee will end in a War, upon the informations they receive from those they have cor­rupted in other Princes Councils; though, to believe such Intelligencers, those who venture so much upon their informations, must suppose them faith­less and perfidious Men?

It were not difficult, to add other In­stances to the same purpose, by which join'd with what has been above dis­cours'd, it may appear, that a Man need not renounce or lay aside his Reason to resolve to fulfill the conditions of the Gospel, though the Arguments for it were none of them demonstrative ones. For so much as a Probability of attain­ing by it such inestimable blessings, as it proposes, and little more than a bare Probability of incurring, by rejecting it, such unspeakable miseries as it threa­tens, may rationally induce a Man to re­solve upon fulfilling its reasonable con­ditions, and his Prudence may very well be justifi'd if it do but appear, that (1) It is more probable that some Re­ligion should be true, than that so many well attested Miracles alledg'd by the [Page 111]ancient Christians should be false; and that God who is the Author of the World, and of Men, (for so much, I think, may be Physically prov'd) should leave Man whom he has so fitted, and by benefits and internal Laws obliged to worship him, without any express dire­ction how to do it: And that (2) If there be any true Religion, the Christi­an is the most likely to be that, in regard not only of the excellency of its Do­ctrine and Promises, but of the Prophe­cies and Miracles that bare witness to it, the Records of which were made by honest plain Men, who taught and pra­ctised the strictest virtue, and who knew their Religion condemn'd Lying, free­ly join'd their Doctrine and Narratives with their blood: the truth of which was so manifest in the times when they were said to be done, that the evidence seem'd abundantly sufficient to convert whole Nations, and among them many considerable and prudent persons, who had great opportunity as well as con­cern to examine the truth of them, and who were by their interest and educati­on so indispos'd to embrace Christiani­ty, that, to make a sincere profession of it, they must necessarily relinquish both [Page 112]their former Religion, and their former Vices, and venturously expose for it not only their Fortunes, but their Lives.

If it be here objected, that it is very harsh, if not unreasonable, to exact up­on so great penalty as Damnation so firm an assent, as is requisite to Faith, to such Doctrines as are either obscurely delivered, or have not their truth de­monstratively made out: I answer, that whatever others may think, I don't be­lieve, that there is any degree of Faith absolutely necessary to salvation, that is not sutable to the evidence that Men may have of it, if they be not wanting to themselves through Laziness, Preju­dices, Vice, Passion, Interest, or some o­ther culpable defect. For considering that God is just, and gracious, and has been pleas'd to promulgate the Gospel, that Men whom it supposes to act as such (that is, as rational Creatures) should be brought to salvation by it; I see no just cause to think, that he intends to make any thing absolutely necessary to salvation, that they may not so far clearly understand as they are command­ed distinctly and explicitely to believe it; and what is not so deliver'd, I should, for that very Reason, unwillingly admit [Page 113]to be necessary to salvation: And you may here remember, that I formerly told you, I was far from thinking all the Tenents either of the Schools, or of particular Churches, to be so much as Christian Verities, and therefore am very unlike to allow them here to be funda­mental and necessary ones; and I take it to be almost as great as common a mi­stake, that all the Doctrines that con­cern fundamental Articles, must be fun­damental too; as if because the Head is a noble part of the Body, and essen­tial to life, therefore all the hair that grows upon it, must be thought such too. But then as to the absolute firm­ness of Assent, that is supposed to be exacted by Christianity to the Articles it delivers, I am not sure that 'tis so ne­cessary in all cases to true and saving Faith, as very many take it to be. For first the Scripture itself tells us, that some of the Truths it reveals, are un­fathomable Mysteries, and some other Points are [...], hard to be under­stood; and 'tis unreasonable to sup­pose, that the highest firmness of Assent is to be given to such Articles, or to those parts of them, as their obscurity keeps us from having so much reason to [Page 114]think that we clearly understand them, as we have to suppose we understand those that are far more plainly reveal'd. And (secondly) to speak more gene­rally, 'tis harsh to say, that the same de­gree of Faith is necessary to all Per­sons, since Mens natural capacities and dispositions, and their education, and the opportunities they have had of be­ing informed, do very much, yet per­haps not culpably, dispose some more than others to be diffident, and apt to haesitate, and frame doubts. And the same Arguments may appear evident e­nough to one Man to make it his duty to believe firmly what they persuade, which in another, naturally more scep­tical, or better acquainted with the difficulties and objections urged by the opposite Party, may leave some doubts and scruples excusable enough. And when either the Doctrine itself is not clearly deliver'd, or the Proofs of it, that a Man could yet meet with, are not fully cogent; for that Man, not to give such Truths the same degree of Assent that Demonstration may pro­duce, is not, as many interpret it, an affront to the Veracity of God, since he may be heartily disposed and ready to [Page 115]believe all that shall appear to him to be revealed by God, and only doubts, whether the thing proposed be indeed revealed by him, or whether the diffi­dent Party rightly understands the sense of these words wherein the Reve­lation is contain'd; which is not to di­strust God, but himself: And that in some cases, a degree of Faith not ex­empt from doubts, may, through Gods goodness, be accepted, we may learn from hence, that the Apostles themselves, who were so much in Christs favour, made it their Prayer to him, That he would encrease their Faith: And he that beg'd, that if he could do any thing for his son, and cryed out, Lord I believe, help thou my unbelief, was so far accepted by that merciful High Priest, who is apt to be toucht with the sense of our infirmi­ties, that his Request was granted, though it could not be so but by having a Miracle done in his favor. The Dis­ciples distrest by a storm, and crying to their Master, as thinking themselves up­on the very point of perishing, were saved by him at the same time when he gave them the Epithet of men of little faith: And at another time, Peter walk­ing upon the Sea, though he had lost a [Page 116]degree of that Faith that made him first engage upon that adventure, and was reproved for it by Christ, was yet rescu­ed from that sinking condition which both he and his Faith were in. And we are told, in the Gospel, of a Faith, which, though no bigger than a grain of Mustard-seed, may enable a Man to re­move Mountains: And though this pas­sage speaks not primarily of justifying Faith, yet still it may serve to shew, that degrees of Assent, far short of the great­est, may be so far accepted by God, as to be owned by miraculous Exertions of his Power. For the Faith then that is made a necessary condition under the Gospel, as the genuine fruit and scope of it is Obedience; so 'tis not indispen­sably such a Faith as excludes doubts, but refusals. And though the Assent be not so strong as may be produ­ced by a Demonstration; yet it may be graciously accepted, if it be but strong enough to produce Obedience; and accordingly whereas Paul in one place declares, that in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncir­cumcision, but faith operative through love; we may learn his meaning from a paral­lel place, where varying the words, and [Page 117]not the sense, of the latter part of the sentence, he says, that in Christ Jesus nei­ther circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision but the keeping of the Com­mandments of God. I readily grant, that attainment of a higher degree of Faith is always a blessing, and cannot be sufficiently prized, without being sin­cerely aimed at; but there are in some Virtues and Graces degrees, which though to reach be a great happiness, yet 'tis but the endeavoring after them that is an indispensible Duty. Likewise 'tis true, that the firmness of assent to Divine Verities, does, in some regard, bring much honour to God; as 'tis said of the Father of the Faithful, (who in reference to the promise made him of Isaac, did not consider his own age, nor Sarahs long barrenness, so as to entertain any diffidence of what God had told him,) that being mighty in faith, he gave glory to God: But 'tis true too, that in another respect a practical assent built upon a less undoubted evidence, may have its preheminence; for when Christ now risen from the dead, had said to the distrustful Didimus, Thomas, Be­cause thou hast seen me, thou hast believed; he [Page 118]immediately adds, But blessed (that is, peculiarly and preferably blessed) are those that have not seen, and yet have be­lieved; and indeed he does not a little honour God, (in that sense wherein Mortals may be said to honour him) who is so willing to obey and serve him, and so ambitious to be in an estate where he may always do so, that upon what he yet discerns to be but a pro­bability of the Christian Religions be­ing the most acceptable to God, he em­braces it with all its difficulties and dan­gers, and upon this score venturously resolves to submit, if need be, to a pre­sent and actual dereliction of all his Sins and Lusts, and perhaps his Interest and his Life too, upon a comparatively uncertain expectation of living with him hereafter.