The Reply.

2. Against this Answer, I say, That one thing may be related to, and affirmed [Page 26]of another, four ways chiefly: First, When it agrees with, or belongs to all together, and to every one in particular: in this manner one may say that all men are rational; because all Men taken to­gether are so, and every man taken in particular is rational. Secondly, One thing may be related to and affirmed of another, when it agrees with, or be­longs to every one in particular; and not to all together: and in this manner one may say that all men do occupy a certain place, and are not in several places at once, because every man in particular is in a certain determined place, and cannot be in divers places at once; but all men taken together are in divers places at once, viz. In England, France, Spain, Italy, &c. Thirdly, One thing is related to, or affirmed of a­nother, when it agrees with it because of some one, but yet not with every one in particular. In this manner one may say that the Kings of France are from the year Four hundred and twenty, or thereabouts; because Pharamond, who is thought to have been the first King of France, began to reign about that time; but every King of France is not from the year Four hundred and twenty: Likewise, One may say that [Page 27]the Romans did sometime Conquer the Gauls, because Julius Caesar a Roman, with the help of some Roman Legions did subdue the same; but every Roman Souldier did not do that Exploit or At­chievement. Fourthly, One thing a­grees with, or is related to another, when it belongs to all taken together; but neither to some one, nor to every one in particular. Thus one may say that the Kings of France have reigned above Twelve hundred years; which is onely to be affirmed of all the Kings of France taken together in their succession, but not of some one King, nor of every King of France in particular. So it may be said that the Apostles have preached the Gospel throughout the whole World, which must be said of all the Apostles taken together, yet dispersed, seeing every Apostle did not Preach the Gospel in every part of the World.

3. This being granted (as it must needs be) let us see which of these four ways, Atheists may understand the Pro­position in question, viz. That Gene­rations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beasts have been from all Eternity. And first, I say, that it cannot be understood, according to the two first wayes, which require that one [Page 28]thing be related to, and agree with a­nother in respect to every one in parti­cular, as hath been said: for every Ge­neration, every Day, every Man in par­ticular, hath not been from all Eternity; else we that live at this Day should have been from all Eternity; which is absurd. Secondly, I say, It cannot be understood in the fourth manner; for when one thing is related to, or agrees with all taken together, onely, and not with every one in particular, nor because of some one; then all are so necessary to establish the truth of the Proposition, that if you except or take one away, the Propositi­on will be false: For Example in this Pro­position, The Kings of France have reigned twelve hundred fifty six years; the Reign of twelve hundred fifty six years are so to be applied to, and affirm­ed of all the Kings of France taken toge­ther, that if one or two were not num­bred with the rest, they would not have reigned so long, and consequently the Proposition should be false. Thus in this Proposition, The Apostles are in num­ber twelve, the number twelve belongs to all the Apostles taken together so ne­cessarily, that if one should be taken a­way, or deducted out of that number, the Apostles should not be in number [Page 29]twelve, and consequently the Propositi­on should be false. Therefore in this Proposition, Men have been from all E­ternity; If to have been from all Eterni­ty, is proper to, and to be affirmed of all men taken together, only, and not of every man in particular, nor because of some one that hath been from all Eter­nity; it follows that all men are so ne­cessary to establish the truth of the said Proposition, that if one or two are ta­ken away, men shall not have been from all Eternity, and consequently the Pro­position will be false: but according to the confession of Atheists, Though one should take away all the men that have been four thousand years since, yet ne­vertheless they might have been from all Eternity and without beginning. There­fore in this Proposition, Men have been from all Eternity; to have been from all Eternity, doth not belong to, nor is to be affirmed of all men taken together, on­ly. Finally, since all men taken toge­ther, or the collection of all men, is not only two days since, much less from all E­nity and without beginning: It must then be concluded, that the Proposition in hand, viz. That Generations and Cor­ruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beasts have been from all Eternity; must [Page 30]be understood by Atheists, in the third way or manner; that is to say, because of some Generation, some Day, some Man, &c. that may have been from all Eternity: But I have proved already, that there hath been no Generation, no Day, no Man, &c. from all Eternity; and Atheists themselves confess it in their first Answer Therefore it must be concluded, that Ge­nerations and Corruptions, Days and Nights, Men and Beasts, &c. have by no means been from all Eternity.

4. Moreover, All the Old men which have been in time past, taken together, either have been from all Eternity, or not: if they have been from all Eterni­ty, it follows that their Old age is Eter­nal, which is impossible: Seeing that which is Eternal, is not after another, there being nothing before that which is Eternal: But their Old age is after ano­ther; to wit, after their Youth: There­fore their Old age is not Eternal. A man's Young age may well be with the Young age, or after the Old age of another man; but the Youth of a Man, can­not be with, or after the Old age of the same Man, and Old age must neces­sarily be after: Now we speak here of the same Men, that is, the same Old men; and consequently the Old age of [Page 31]all Old men, ought necessarily to be af­ter the Young age of the self-same Old men that have been Young: If they have not been from all Eternity, it will follow that men will have been from all Eterni­ty without Old age, or Old men; which is denied by Atheists themselves, who af­firm the World to have been from all E­ternity in the same state it is now, and consequently with Old men. And more­over, Either men have been from all E­ternity without Old men, during a finite time, or during an infinite time: If du­ring a finite time, it will follow that be­twixt that which is not from all Eternity, viz. Old men, and that which is not from all Eternity, viz. other men taken toge­ther, there is but a finite and limited time; and that the finite time, such as is the time, since the which there are Old men, added to the finite time, such as is the duration of Men, without Old men, will make up an infinite time, such as is the pretended Eternity of Men; which is absurd: If they have been from all Eter­nity without Old men, during an infinite time, it will follow, that Men will have been without Old men above a thou­sand thousands millions of thousands of years; which is ridiculous, and denied by these prophane Atheists themselves.

By the same Reason one may prove, that all young men taken together, which have been in time past, have not been from all Eternity; seeing their Young age is after their Infancy: and one may prove also that all Children taken toge­ther, which have been in time past, have not been from all Eternity: Seeing their Infancy, is after their Birth and Concep­tion. But if the Collection of all Children that have been, the Collection of all Young men that have been, and the Collection of all Old men that have been; If (I say) all these Collections have not been from all Eternity, it is evident that the Colle­ction of all men which have been in time past, is not from all Eternity; since it comprises only the Collection of Chil­dren, of Young and Old Men that have been.

5. Again, either all men which have been dead in time past, being taken together, have been dead from all Eternity, or not: If they have been dead from all Eternity, it follows that their death is Eternal, which is impossible; seeing that which is Eternal is not after another, there be­ing nothing before that which is Eter­nal, and without beginning: but their death is after another, viz. their life; seeing the death and life of the same men [Page 33]cannot be together; but their death ought to be necessarily after their life; therefore their death is not Eternal: If all men which have been dead taken to­gether, have not been dead from all E­ternity, it will follow, that men have been from all Eternity, without having any dead men; which is denied by A­theists, who affirm, That the World hath been from all Eternity, in the same state it is now; and consequently with dead men. And moreover, either men have been from all Eternity, without dead men, during a finite time, or during an infinite time: If during a finite time, it will follow that betwixt that which is not from all Eternity, to wit, dead men, and that which is from all Eternity, viz. the living Men taken together, there is but a finite and limited time; and that the finite time, that is to say, the time since the which there have been dead men, added to the finite time, such as is the duration of living men only, will make up an infinite time, such as is the pretended Eternity of men; which is con­tradictory. If during an infinite time, it will follow, that men will have been above an hundred thousand millions of thousands of years without dying, which is ridiculous, and denied by Atheists themselves.

[Page 34]6. To this may be added this Argu­men, That which is begotten, is be­gotten of another, seeing nothing begets or produces it self: But all men which have been in time past taken together, have been begotten; seeing that accord­ing to the opinion of Atheists, in the Col­lection of all men which have been in time past, there is never a man not be­gotten: Therefore all men which have been in time past taken together, have been begotten of another. From this Argument I form another, thus, What­soever is begotten of another, is after that other; seeing that a man who be­gets another man, did exist before he begat him: But all men taken together have been begotten of another, as I have proved: Therefore all men taken toge­ther have been after another. From this last Syllogisme, I will also form this, That which hath been from all Eternity, hath not been after another, seeing there is nothing before that which is Eternal: But all men taken together have been af­ter another, as I have proved; There­fore all men taken together have not been from all Eternity.

7. Lastly, The serious consideration of the very terms of this distinction of Ovi­edo, will cause any rational men to re­ject [Page 35]it as ridiculous: Men (saith he) have been from all Eternity; but no man hath been from all Eternity; the collection of men which have been in time past, is from all Eternity; but there is never a a man in all this Collection, from all Eter­nity: The Collection of Dayes is with­out beginning; but there is never a Day in all this Collection without beginning: as if one should say the Kings Successors of William the Conqueror have been e­ver since the year One thousand fourscore and seven, but there was never a King in that year.

The Reply.

2. Against this Answer I say, That the comparison is to no purpose, because things altogether unlike are compared in it, viz. that which hath been and that which never shall be totally; that which is totally past, and that which never shall pass away: For the Full and the New Moon, the Day and the Night, the Flow­ing and Ebbing of the Sea, the Illumina­tion of both Hemispheres, Men, and such­like Successive things, that are pretended to have been from all Eternity, have been indeed, but are no more, and conse­quently are past; and therefore the pre­tended Fore-Eternity, being of this na­ture, [Page 39]is certainly past. To make then a true and even comparison of Equal things, one should suppose of the After-Eternity, that which is most certain of the Fore-Eternity, to wit, that it is altogether past. Now if the After-Eternity should come to pass away, and have an end, it would be finite, and consequently there would be a later Day, and a later Night, a later Flowing and Ebbing, &c. and which is more than that, the After-Eternity should be limited on every side, that is to say, by this Day, and by the later Day, because it should be past as the Fore-Eternity: Sith then, that the pretended Fore-Eternity is past, it must be also finite, and consequently there hath been a first Day, a first Flowing, a First Man, &c. and which is more, it is limited on every side, to wit, by this Day, and by the first Day as well as the After-Eternity would be, if it were past.

3. From this Reply it is evident, That though one descending towards the fu­ture, might go or reach to the infinite; yet re-ascending towards that which is past, one could notreach to the infinite: be­cause in every progression to the infinite, there is always something to be taken in, so that one cannot run through such an [Page 40]infinite: Now re-ascending from this Day to the time past, there is not always something to be taken in, but one must stop at a first thing, and so by ascending to the time past, all the time past must be taken in: Therefore in ascending to the time past, there is no infinite to be reach­ed unto.

That there is not always something to be taken in, in ascending to the time past; and that from this Day, ascending to the time past, all that time past may be ta­ken in, it is evident; because to de­scend by the time past to this Day, and ascend from this Day towards the time past, are one and the same thing, or at least are things alike; as the way from Thebes to Athens, and from Athens to Thebes, is one and the same way, and all the time past either in ascending, or de­scending, is always the same. There­fore since that descending by the time past to this Day, all the time past is ta­ken in; it is evident that ascending from this Day towards the time past, all the time past may be taken in, and consequently there is no progression to the infinite that way.

4. Finally, One cannot conceive, that there was never a Man, a Day, a Flow­ing of the Sea, &c. from all Eternity, and [Page 41]that notwithstanding, the succession of Men, Days, and Flowings, be from all Eternity, and without Beginning; for if there be no Men, no Days, from all Eter­nity and without Beginning, it is impossi­ble the succession of the same should be from all Eternity, and without Beginning. Seeing the Succession of things cannot be without the things, whereof it is Succes­sion: And moreover it is certain and un­doubtable (and in this case is very consi­derable) that every Succession comprises Essentially many things, whereof one is after another; so that Succession, not only, cannot have a Being, but which is more cannot be conceived, without such things as are one after another: Now that which is after another cannot be E­ternal: there being nothing before that which is Eternal, and without Beginning: Seeing then that Succession comprehends Essentially such a thing as is after ano­ther, it follows necessarily that Succession in it self cannot be Eternal; for if it be said to be Eternal, it must be in relation to some one thing which is not after a­nother, but without Beginning and from all Eternity, which is denied by A­theists themselves; for they profess to believe, That there was never a Man, never a Day, &c. but they have been af­ter [Page 42]another (and by consequence cannot have been without Beginning) lest they be forced to confess that there hath been a first Man, a first Day, a first Flowing, &c. and consequently a Beginning, and so no Eternity of Men, Days, and Flow­ings, &c.

The Reply.

3. Against this Answer, I say first, That all Men which have been in time past are many, that is to say, are more than one, and consequently make up a multitude, which in it self is either nu­merable and finite, or innumerable and infinite: If it be numerable and finite, it follows that there hath been a certain number finite and determined in it self; and so that there have been some first, some second, &c. And therefore that they have not been from all Eternity: If it be innumerable and infinite, my argument is entire and sirm: which is thus: One cannot give a greater multi­tude than an innumerable or infinite mul­titude, else it should be exceeded, by this greater multitude: Seeing that of two multitudes the greater exceeds the lesser, and consequently should be finite and limited; seeing that which is ex­ceeded is finite and determined, where it is exceeded: But one can give a greater multitude than that of Men, which have been in time past; to wit, the multitude of Eyes, Fingers, Hairs, and [Page 48]Beasts: Therefore the multitude of Men, which have been in time past, is not in­finite, but finite and termined, and con­sequently hath not been from all Eternity, And here observe that in this place I use the words of multitude and number for one and the same thing.

4. Secondly, It is false, That in an in­finite multitude, or an infinite number, there is neither as much, nor more, nor less; for in whatsoever multitude of Men, either finite or infinite, it is cer­tain that there are as many Noses as Mouths, as many Hearts as Heads, as many Hands as Feet; and it is undoub­table that in the multitude of Men, which have been in time past, there have been more Hands and Fingers than Men; see­ing there is no Man in the Collection of all Men, which have been in time past (Monsters excepted) but he hath had two Hands and ten Fingers; and no Man can deny that the Collection of all Ani­mals which have been in time past, is greater than the sole Collection of all Men which have been in time past; seeing the Collections of all Animals contains the Collection of all Men, and of all Beasts. But the Collection of all Men and of all Beasts, is greater than the Collection of all Men only; else the whole, to wit, [Page 49]the Collection of all Men and of all Beasts, should not be greater than the Parts; to wit, the Collection of all Men onely. By the same reason one may prove that the Collection of all Days, and of all Nights, is greater than the Collection of all Days onely: and that the Col­lection of all Generations and Corrupti­ons is greater than the Collection of all Generations onely; and consequently, that the Collections of Days and Gene­rations which have been in time past, are exceeded, and so finite and determi­ned, where they are exceeded; and therefore are not from all Eternity, but have had a Beginning: Finally, In what­soever greater multitude, or whatsoever great number, either finite or infinite, there are more binaries than quarterna­ries, seeing every quarternary contains two binaries.

5. Thirdly, It is in vain to say that one infinite is not greater than another formally, that is to say, in respect to the infiniteness; but that it is so materially, that is to say, in respect to the Parts; because it is evident that the parts proper­ly make the infinite; and therefore if one infinite hath more parts than another in­finite, it will be greater than that, e­ven as an infinite; and moreover, though [Page 50]one infinite should be greater than ano­ther materially, that is to say, in re­spect to the parts, it will follow that the lesser shall not be truly infinite; seeing it will finish and be determi­ned, where the other will begin to ex­ceed it.

6. Fourthly, it is false, there is no absurdity of two infinites to make one greater than the other: for from thence will follow an apparent contradiction, to wit, that one and the same thing, will be finite and will not be finite; seeing the lesser infinite will be exceeded by the greater infinite, and consequently will be finite; seeing that which is exceeded, is finite and determined where it is ex­ceeded: And it will not be finite, see­ing it is supposed infinite, and that which is infinite is not finite: Therefore the same thing, to wit, the lesser infinite, will be finite and not finite, which things are contradictory.

Fifthly, The Answer of Atheists doth not at all hit or touch our chief and indisso­luble Reason, drawn from the distance of men, thus: The men which have lived in time past till now, are all distant one from another with an infinite distance of time only, or with a finite distance on­ly; or some are distant with a finite di­stance, [Page 51]and others with an infinite di­stance; if they are all distant with an infinite distance of time, it will follow, that betwixt King Charles the First, and King Charles the Second, there will be an infinite distance of time; which is al­together absurd: if they are all distant with a finite distance of time only, it fol­lows that their duration contains a finite time only, and consequently are not E­ternal, which is most true: If some are distant with a finite distance, and others with an infinite distance, and that of all them which are only distant with a finite distance, one takes the two re­motest; for Example, Peter who liveth at this day, and then remounts towards them that have preceded Peter, and from whom he is descended, if one takes him (I say) who in a finite distance is the remotest, to wit, John, I say, that if one remounts a little higher, that is to say, unto William, the father of John; it will follow that Peter and William will be distant one from another, with an infinite distance of time; seeing they are more distant and farther removed than Peter and John, which are the farther removed in a finite distance: So that it will follow, that betwixt the finite di­stance, which is between Peter and [Page 52] John, and the infinite distance which is between Peter and William, there will be but a very few years difference, that is to say, so many years (and no more) as are between William the father, and John the son; which is altogether absurd.

This Reason may be confirmed thus: Every multitude actually existing, or ha­ving actually existed, if it be actually fi­nite, it may be told; seeing that which cannot be told is necessarily infinite: therefore if from this day, remounting towards the time past, one begins to tell those men which have been successively one before another; the whole finite multitude of those men, will at last be told and numbred; so that beyond that multitude there will remain never a man to be numbred, that may with the said multitude, make a finite number: There­fore if to the finite multitude of all men, which have been in time past, one adds only a man, the result of it will be an in­finite multitude; seeing the precedent multitude, without that man added, was the greatest of all finite multitudes past; nay, even the whole finite multitude of men which have been in time past; and so that man added to the whole fi­nite multitude of those man, making the same greater, it must necessarily be infi­nite: [Page 53]Moreover, it cannot be infinite, seeing a finite thing, to wit, a man ad­ded to another finite thing, as the whole finite multitude of men, cannot make an infinite: and though never one man should be added to the said multitude, there would follow an evident contradi­ction; for there being as many more feet as men, it will follow that the feet will be finite, and not finite in number; they will be finite, because one finite, to wit, the whole finite multitude of men, and the double of this finite, to wit, the feet of these men, do not make one infi­nite; Also they will not be finite, be­cause the number of feet is greater than the whole finite multitude of men, which is supposed to be the greatest number of all finite things.

And it is no strong Argument, to say, as Oviedo in his Natural Philosophy, Controv. the 14th. Propos. 3. Paragraff 9th. There is never so great a finite number, but a greater may be always given, in infinitum; so that one cannot cannot properly say, the greater of finite numbers: for though it be true in things possible, that is to say, that God may produce and create, seeing God having created, for Example, a great number of men, may create and produce still a [Page 54]greater number, and always, a greater; but also always finite in infinitum; ne­vertheless in things actually existing, or having actually existed, as the Question is now, it is certain that there is a finite number, which is the greatest of all fi­nite numbers; and it is false that in a multitude actually present or past, there is no number finite, but will always admit of a greater number, and always greater, in infinitum; seeing if there were always a greater, and always a greater finite number, it would follow that the actu­al finite number could never be told, and consequently should be infinite; for that which is finite only cannot be told.

Further, All men which have been in time past are not distant one from another, with an infinite distance of time, else my Father and I should be infinitely distant one from another; therefore all men must be distant one from another, with a finite distance, and consequently must have lasted but a finite time, and must have made up but a finite multitude, or some must be distant with a finite di­stance, and others with an infinite di­stance; in which case those that are di­stant with a finite distance only, taken together, will have lasted but a finite time, [Page 55]and will make up but a finite multitude, and will make up the whole multitude finite, so that there will be no greater mul­titude, as I have shewed already. And it sig­nifies but little, to say with Oviedo in the above-cited place, that all these things are true of a finite number, when it is determined and specified; as for Exam­ple, of the number of an hundred thou­sand, or an hundred thousand millions, or a thousand times an hundred thousand millions, &c. but are not true of a finite number uncertain, undetermined, and not specified; for in those things which actually exist, or have actually existed, as the Question is at present, the number is always certain and determined; and if it be uncertain and undetermined, it is not in it self, but in respect of our selves who cannot determine it, because it is too great.

To this you may add this considerati­on, That that which is Eternal and with­out Beginning, is not after another; there being nothing before that which is Eternal: Now the Sons have been after the Fathers, Death after Life, Old Age after Young Age, Young Age after In­fancy, Infancy after Birth, and Birth after Conception: Therefore Sons, Dead Men, Old Men, Young Men, Children; all Men [Page 56]Born are not from all Eternity and with­out Beginning.

8. Now I must answer at large the three Objection; mentioned in the third Answer of Atheists, by which they pretend to prove, not onely that there is an infinite, but that an infinite is greater than ano­ther; for at first sight they appear so strong, that they must needs be exa­mined narrowly, to take away the of­fence they might otherwise give to the weak.

The first Objection drawn from the in­finiteness of the Oriental and Occidental space cannot be well resolved, until we have first taken a view, and attained to some knowledge of the essence of place or space: Therefore I shall shew first of all, what the space is not, and what it is, then I shall answer the objection.

For the first, I say, That the place or space must of all necessity be something or nothing at all: Now one cannot truly say that the space is nothing at all, or a meer nothing; therefore it must be some­thing. That the space is not a meer no­thing, appears, because a meer nothing is capable of nothing, and can do no­thing; because a meer nothing and an im­possibility do not differ: Now the space is capable of something and can do some­thing; [Page 57]seeing it is capable to receive the Bodies, and truly it is the receptacle of all Bodies; since that all Bodies occupy some space: therefore the space is not a meer nothing. Moreover, Betwixt two nothings there is no difference; but the space and that which is between two Bo­dies, touching one another, do differ greatly: therefore the space and that which is between two Bodies touching one another, are not two nothings; and since that which is between two Bodies touching one another, is a meer nothing; the space ought necessarily not to be a meer nothing: Now that the space and that which is between two Bodies touch­ing one another, do greatly differ, ap­pears, because a Body cannot be put be­tween two Bodies touching one another, but a Body may be put in the space.

Having shewed that the space is not a meer nothing, but that it is some­thing; it must necessarily be something real, or something fained and imaginary; but the space is not something fained and forged by humane wit, seeing that the space hath existed, and hath been occu­pied by the Heavens, the Earth, the Sea, before ever Man was; so far it is from being fained and forged by Humane Wit; and all Bodies occupy a space, [Page 58]though we do not observe it, or think of it: Therefore the space is something real.

Again, Every real being is either a substance or an accident; because every real being is either inherent to some sub­ject, and depending of the same, that is to say, so tied and fastened to the sub­ject, that it cannot be without it, and so is an accident, or is not inherent, and tyed to some subject, and depending on the same, but may exist alone, and so is a substance: But the space is not in­herent and tied to some subject, and consequently is not an accident: There­fore the space is a substance. That the space is not inherent to some subject, for Example, to some Body, appears, because that which is inherent and tied to the Body, moves with the Body, or according to the motion of the Body: So the Colour of a Horse moves according to the motion of the Horse; the Black­ness of a Crow moves according to the motion of the Crow; and the Figure of a Man, moves according to the motion of a Man, &c. But the space occupied by the Body, doth not move with the Body; or according to the motion of the Body: Therefore the space occupied by the Body, is not inherent and tied to the Body.

That the space does not move accor­ding to the motion of the Body, appears, because a Body by its motion, leaves one place and takes another, and having occupied one place, occupies another pre­sently; besides if place or the space should move according to the motion of the Body, it would follow that a Body going from London to Oxford, should not stir nor budge from its place, and would always be in the same place; see­ing the place or space would alwayes ac­company him. Nay, Aristotle and all other Philosophers before and after him, did all confess that place or the space was altogether immoveable. And it is in vain to say, that in the same time that a Body leaves the place or space, it did occupie; another Body succeeds, to which the space is inherent and tied: for be­sides that the general Maxime received of all, should be destroyed: That an ac­cident never passes from one subject to another, and that it cannot be separated from its subject, but by perishing; it is evident that the place or space is no more inherent to the Body, than a Chamber to those Men that are in it; than the Ocean to Fishes, the Air to Birds, and the Fir­mament to the Stars; all which not­withstanding are substances: It is evi­dent [Page 60]that the Bodies leave places, and tend to places, and that place or space is indifferent to all sorts of Bodies, and never ties it self to any.

Add hereto, that the place or space was before the Body, and that if there had not been a space before the World, it would have been impossible to make the World; and if there were no spaces beyond the World, it should be impossi­ble to put a Body there: and therefore seeing the space was before the Body, one cannot say it is an accident of the Body; for an accident is never before its subject. If any one say that God created the space with the World; and if he would create some other Worlds, he would also create other Spaces with them; and that beyond the World there is no space: Against that I say that where there is nothing at all, one cannot cre­ate neither Body nor Space: For Exam­ple, Between two Bodies touching one another, there is nothing at all; so that neither Body nor space can be created there: therefore, if beyond the World there is nothing at all, God cannot cre­ate there, neither Body nor Space; and if before the Creation of the World, there was nothing at all where the World is, God could not have created there [Page 61]neither Body nor Space; because that be­twixt two meer nothings there is no dif­ference; and we are to judge alike of things that do not differ: Therefore if the meer nothing that is between two Bodies touching one another, is capable of nothing, and neither Body nor Space can be created there; neither the meer nothing, that these Men say is be­yond the World, and the meer no­thing, that they say was where the World is before the Creation of the same, will be capable of nothing, and one cannotcreate there neither Body nor Space.

Moreover, God is not in a meer nothing, and one cannot say, that God is where there is nothing at all; for Example, God is not between two Bodies touching one the other totally, because between such Bodies there is nothing at all: But God is beyond the World, and before the World, he was where the World is: Therefore one cannot say, that beyond the World there is nothing at all; and that where the World is before the Crea­tion of the same, there was nothing at all; so that there was something, which can be no other than the space. That God is beyond the World, and that before the Creation, he was where the World is; [Page 62]appears, because nothing can act, where it is not, neither by it self, nor by its virtue and power: But God did act where the world is, in creating the same there, and God can act beyond the World, creating there other Bo­dies, and other Worlds: Therefore God is beyond the World, and before the World was where the World is, both by himself and by his power; Seeing the Power of God is nothing else but God himself. For God being most simple, all that is in God, or can be conceived to be in God, ought necessarily to be God him­self. And certainly, if God were only in the World, he should be finite, as well as the World, and so should not be God; for by the word, GOD, Men have al­ways understood an infinite Being.

Finally, To speak absolutely, and without any respect to God's will to cre­ate but one world; I think God may cre­ate another World, distant from this; in which case there would be an interval or space between the two Worlds, in which space God should be, else he would be divided from himself, seeing that he should exist in the two Worlds, without existing between both.

Having proved that place or space is not an Accident, it is easie to shew, that it [Page 63]is not the Superficies, or Surface of such a Body as compasses another. First, Be­cause according to the common opinion of Philosophers, the Superficies is an Ac­cident: But we have sufficiently proved, that place or space is not an Accident; therefore it is not a Superficies. Second­ly, The higher Heaven occupies a place and a space, and the World is necessarily in one place, and occupies and fills necessarily some space, and yet the World and the higher Heavens are compassed with no Superficies nor any other Body.

Thirdly, The Superficies or Surface of that Body that compasses another, is im­moveable, as it may be seen in a Tower, agitated with great Winds, in a Tree in the midst of a River, &c. But place or space is wholly immoveable, as I have proved already; which may be confirm­ed thus: If place were an external Su­perficies, it would follow, that a Body that stirs not, yet should move, and that a Body that moves, should not stir from its place: That it would follow, that a Body that stirs not, yet should move lo­cally, appears; because a Tower, a Ca­stle that stirs not, changes its external Superficies when it is agitated with great winds; and a Tree, that is in the midst of a River, without budging, changes its [Page 64]external Superficies; and therefore if place is an external Superficies, to wit, the Surface of a Body that compasses ano­ther; It is evident, that a Body that budges not, receiving any change or al­teration of Surface or Superficies, will al­so change its place, and move it self lo­cally, which is altogether absurd: That it would follow also, that a Body which should move it self locally, should not budge out of its place, appears, because a Body which moves it self locally, may retain the Superficies of the Body that compasseth it, and consequently may retain its very place; but that which is in one and the same place, do's not budge at all out of it.

Fourthly, It is certain that by local motion, one leaves one place, and passes unto another, since, a local mo­tion, is nothing else, but a motion to­wards another place: now by the local motion, a Body do's not necessarily leave a Superficies, and necessarily acquire ano­ther; for Example, If God should move a Body beyond the World, in the inani­ty, or in an empty place, that he should have made, that Body should not be com­passed with any Superficies: Therefore, the Superficies of a Body that compasses another, is not a true place to speak

Finally, The Superficies of a Body is a kind of quantity, and quantity is a pro­perty of the Body, or the Body it self; and therefore since a Body is in a place, the quantity and consequently the Su­perficies also, must be in a place, and not place it self; else place should be in ano­ther place, and this other place in ano­ther place, in infinitum; which is absurd. They being not able to obtund the edge and force of these Arguments, their re­fuge is to say, that place is not simply the Superficies of a Body that compasses another; but that it is such a Superficies, as is joyned with order and relation to certain fixed Points of the World, as are the Center of the World, and the Four Cardinal Points of it, to wit, the East, and the West, the North, and the South: for the Superficies retaining the said or­der and relation to these fixed Points, is said to be immoveable: and by this means they pretend to explain the manner in the which a Body changes place, to wit, whether it draws near to, or leaves, that is to say, departs from these fixed Points of the World: For Example, If a Body ascends, they say it moves, because it departs from the Center of the World; if it descends, it moves, because it draws near to the Center of the World, which [Page 66]is the Center of the Earth; if it goes to­wards the Pole Artick, it moves, because it draws near to the North, and departs from the South.

Against this Answer, I say, first, That a thing which should not move nor stir from its place, would nevertheless change place; for if God should move the Hea­vens with a direct Motion, the Earth remaining immoveable, it would follow that the Earth which should not move, would change the Order and Relation (according to these Mens Doctrine) it hath to those fixed Points of the World, and should be either nearer or farther from them; Seeing these fixed Points be­ing in the Heavens, should move with the Heavens: and therefore if place should consist and reside in such a rela­tion to the fixed Points of the World, the Earth having no more the said rela­tion, should have the said place no more; and consequently would change place, without budging and stirring from the same place, and without moving locally; all which is absurd.

Secondly, It would follow that a Body should move locally, without ever chang­ing place; for if God should move locally the whole World, with a direct motion, and that all the parts of the World should [Page 67]remain in their proper situation, it would follow that the Earth should move local­ly, with the whole World, and yet re­tain the same order and relation it hath, to the fixed Points of the World; and therefore if place should reside and con­sist in such a relation, the Earth retain­ing the same relation, should also retain the same place, and consequently would not change place in moving locally; all which is impossible.

Thirdly, If God should reduce or bring back all things to nothing, one stone excepted, it is certain this stone should exist in a place, and occupy a space; and yet it would have neither order nor relation, to these fixed Points of the World, seeing there would be none, and consequently place and space, do not consist in a certain order or relation, to the fixed Points of the World, seeing that place and space may be without them.

Finally, This superficies and relation to the fixed Points of the World, accor­ding to the opinion of Atheists, is an ac­cident: but I have fully proved above, that place or space is not an accident: from all which it do appear, that place or space being not an accident, it must ne­cessarily be a substance: Now all Sub­stance, [Page 68]according to the common Opini­on of Philosophers, is either Corporal or Uncorporal, that is, either a Body or a Spirit: Seeing then that place or space is not a Body, it must necessarily be a Spirit: That place or space is not a Body, appears; because a Body is im­penetrable with another Body; but the place or space is penetrable, with all sorts of Bodies: Moreover, Every Body may move, for moveableness is the property of the Body; but the place or space is immoveable, as I have proved already. In one word, Every Body is in a place, and occupies a space: but place is not in a place, else there would be progressus in infinitum, and a space doth not occupy another place by the same reason; there­fore place or space is not a Body. Since that place or space, is not an accident, but a substance, and that 'tis not a Body as I have proved just now, it must ne­cessarily be a Spirit: Now every Spirit is either Humane, or Angelical, or Di­vine; that is to say, it is either a reason­able Soul, or an Angel, or a God. There­fore place or space being a Spirit, must be one of the three: But it is easie to shew, that place or space, is neither a reasonable Soul nor an Angel; because reasonable Souls and Angels are in some [Page 69]sort moveable, for they are sometimes in a place, and sometimes in another; but the space is wholly immoveable. Moreover, Souls and Angels are finite, and are onely in the World, but Space is infinite, and is beyond the World; as I have proved above.

Besides, There being never a drop of the Ocean, never so small parcel of the Air, Fire, or Earth, but it doth occu­py a place: And there being never a part of the World, let it be never so small, but it does occupy a space, it would follow, that there would be ne­ver a bit of Sand, never a Drop of the Ocean, never a Leaf of a Tree, never so small a parcel of the Air, and Earth, but therein would be a reasonable Soul, or an Angel, and all the World would be filled, with Angels or reasonable Souls, which is altogether absurd. Upon this ground, some conclude that place or space is nothing else but the Immensity and Infiniteness of GOD, and conse­quently GOD Himself; and so pro­ceed to answer the Arguments of Athe­ists drawn from the infiniteness of the Oriental and Occidental Space: thus:

One must argue and discourse of the Immensity of God in respect to Bodies, as of his Eternity, in respect to Times [Page 70]and Ages. Therefore as Eternity, which is the Divinity it self, being indivisible, and without parts, is always the same, be­fore Ages, with Ages, and after Ages, if they come to pass away: So that the Eternity, which was before time, and that which is with time, the Eternity which was in the time of Adam, of No­ah, and of Jesus Christ, and that which is in this present time, are not many E­ternities, nor many parts of Eternity, but one and the same Eternity of God, which is as the receptacle of all Ages and Times; So that the Age of Adam, the Age of Noah, the Age of Jesus Christ, and all other Ages and Times whatsoe­ver, are in the same Eternity, and do not differ in duration, in respect to Eternity, which remaining always immutable, cor­responds to all things and to all Ages; but they do differ in themselves, in that Times and Ages being necessarily and es­sentially Successive, cannot be together, So Immensity, which is the Divinity it self being also indivisible and without parts, remains always the same, before the Bodies, with the Bodies, and after the Bodies, if they should happen to be destroyed; So that the Immensity which is beyond the World, and that which is where the World is; the Immensity [Page 71]wherein the Sun is, and the Immensity wherein the Earth is, are not many Im­mensities, nor many parts of the Immen­sity, but one and the same Immensity, which is the receptacle of all Bodies: So that Heaven and Earth, the Sea and all other Bodies whatsoever, are in the same Immensity, and do not differ in internal place, in respect to Immensity, which is the true and proper place of all Bodies; but differ in external place in themselves, in that being necessarily extended and im­penetrable, they cannot be together, and cannot be compassed of the same Su­perficies.

And though Philosophers (for the most part) do attribute to the Eternity and Im­mensity of God, Virtual Parts, and a Vir­tual Extension, as well to distinguish the Eternity from the moment of time, and the Immensity from the indivisible Point, as because they hold the frailty of hu­mane Spirit to be so great, that it can­not conceive so long a duration as Eter­nity is, nor so long a space as Immensity is, without parts and extension: Never­theless it is most certain, that God knows all things as they are, and he that knows perfectly his Eternity and Immensity, conceives them without parts and exten­sion; and yet he knows Eternity distant [Page 72]from the moment of time, and Immensi­ty distinct from the invisible Point.

And it is to no purpose to say, That by these Virtual Parts, Philosophers meant not true parts; but only somewhat equi­valent to these parts: So that Eternity hath somewhat equivalent to the actual parts of time, which have or may have run during Eternity; and Immensity hath somewhat equivalent to the Bodies or parts of the Bodies, which are in the Im­mensity: For as it cannot be truly said, that a Rock standing in the midst of a Ri­ver, hath so many virtual parts, as there are actual parts of waters, that run and beat it, whilest the Rock stands and re­mains always the same, in its firmness and unmoveableness: So it cannot be tru­ly said, that the Eternity of God, hath so many virtual parts, as there are actual parts, which run and as it were slide a­way, whilest Eternity remains always the same in its Immutability: neither can it be said that the Immensity of God hath so many Virtual parts, as there are actual parts of the Bodies, that are in this Immensity.

It is safer then to call things by their own name, and not give them that, which they have not; and therefore parts must not be attributed to the Eternity [Page 73]and Immensity of God, seeing they can have none: but one must say only, that the Eternity of God, being indivisible and without parts, was necessarily before time, and is now with time, and shall ever be the same, with or without time. So that the whole single Eternity corre­sponds to all times; and that the Immen­sity of God, being also indivisible and without parts, was necessarily before the Bodies, and is now with the Bodies, and shall ever be the same with or without Bodies; so that the whole single Immen­sity, corresponds to all the parts of all the Bodies, that are in this Immensity.

They do not absolutely deny, That humane Spirit, because of its great weak­ness, in so high mysteries, cannot conceive the Eternity and Immensity of God, with­out attributing to them somewhat equi­valent to the actual parts of Times and Bodies: That it cannot conceive the du­ration of God, since six thousand years and very near that the World lasteth, without attributing to thesame somewhat equiva­lent, to the six thousand years; and that it cannot conceive the Divinity co-exi­stent with all the Bodies of the World, without attributing to the same some­what equivalent to the actual extension of all Bodies.

If God should abolish and reduce this World to nothing, and should also cre­ate another, but not immediately after, they assure that the Spirit of Man cannot conceive the duration betwixt the two Worlds, without conceiving some space of time, or somewhat eqvivalent to the space of time: And if God should create another World, which would not touch this, they think that the Spirit of Man, cannot conceive the interval, that would be between the two Worlds, without con­ceiving some corporal extension, or some­what equivalent to this extension. But they think also, that God conceiving the duration or interval, that should be be­tween the two Worlds, would conceive them otherwise, without space of time or corporal extension. And that if any will attribute to the Eternity and Im­mensity of God, some virtual parts, that is to say, equivalent and correspondent to the actual parts of Times and Bodies; They say, that the same is so far from blunting the edge and force of their Ar­guments, that it favours them greatly, as will appear anon.

And so answering the Objection pre­cisely, they say, That the Oriental space, and the Occidental space, are nothing else, than Oriental Immensity, and the [Page 75]Occidental Immensity: and therefore as the Oriental Immensity, and the Occicidental Immensity, really and in themselves, are not two Immensities, nor two parts of Immensity, but are really one and the same Immensity, which is called Orien­tal and Occidental, only in respect to the Oriental and Occidental Bodies, that are or may be in this Immensity. So the O­riental space, and the Occidental space, are not really and in themselves two dif­ferent things, but one and the same thing, which is called Oriental space, and Occidental space, in respect to the Oriental and Occidental Bodies, that are or may be in the same.

Moreover, as Immensity, though Infi­nite, is Indivisible, and without Parts, as the Divinity from which it it is not di­stinct. So Space being nothing than the Immensity of God, though it be infinite, is also Indivisible and without Parts.

Finally, Even as a man, and a rational Animal, are not greater, and have no more parts than man alone; because a man and a rational Animal are one and the same thing: So the Oriental and Oc­cidental Immensity, or the Oriental and Occidental Space, are not greater, and have no more parts, than the Oriental Immensity alone, or the Oriental Space [Page 76]alone, because the Oriental and Oc­cidental Immensity, or the Oriental and Occidental Space, are one and the same thing.

And if one will allow, or suppose some virtual parts in the Eternity and Immen­sity of God, and says that the Eternity and Immensity of God have some virtual Replications, according to the multitudes of Times and Bodies, to the which the Eternity and Immensity of God corre­spond. They say, that as the Age of Adam was in a part or virtual Replica­tion of Eternity, and the Age of Noah in another: So Heaven is in one part, or virtual Replication of Immensity, and the Earth in another; and that we are thus to argue of other Times and Bo­dies.

And if any say, That all things pro­pounded hitherto, are incomprehensible, and altogether incredible: They answer, That God dwelling in an Inaccessible Light, one must not wonder, if Incomprehensi­bility is one of his Properties and Attri­butes; And seeing the Eternity and Im­mensity of God are nothing else than God himself, one must not think it strange, that they are incomprehensible, and can­not be perfectly conceived by humane Spirit. Therefore (say they) all things [Page 77]propounded hitherto, concerning the E­ternity, the Space, or Immensity of God, are indeed incomprehensible; but they have this advantage, that they are not contradictory: whereas all other ways of Arguing, concerning Eternity, Space, or Immensity, seem to involve many ab­surdities and contradictions, alleadged in this Tract. For my part, I think this Answer ought to satisfie any one that is not contentious; but because it is not common, and may be accused of Novel­ty; and indeed is not without difficulty, I submit to the Judgment of my Betters and Superiours.

But if this Answer does not satisfie, one must say, That space or the place of Bo­dies is the Eternal, without action, and infinite Inanity of Ancient Philosophers, which is neither Body or Spirit, nor Ac­cident, nor active Substance; but only such a thing as is capable to receive all Bodies, and which having them, is al­ways infinitely beyond them. And yet this Inanity must necessarily be supposed without parts really different; Else the Objection of our Adversaries will remain in its full force: for the Oriental and Oc­cidental Inanity being infinite and great­er than the sole Oriental Inanity, it would follow, that an infinite should be [Page 78]greater than another; which is absurd. And because such an Inanity, without parts, will hardly please, and receive admittance amongst sober, judicious, learned Men; I return to the first An­swer, and ground my Arguing upon it, yet submiting it to the judgment and censure of those that have attained to a deeper knowledge of these matters.

10. Their second Objection, drawn from the pretended infiniteness of the thoughts, both of Men and Angels, for the time to come may be resolved two ways:

First, In saying that God will give to every Man, and to every Angel in particular, one onely light and bright­ness of Glory, by which he shall possess and enjoy God Eternally; and conse­quently that every Man and every An­gel, shall have but one onely thought, by which he shall be fastened as it were, upon God Eternally: Therefore seeing that all Men and all Angels will be in number finite; so the thoughts of Men and Angels will be in number finite.

Secondly, Since I think that the thoughts, or the repetition of the same thoughts, shall always be divers in num­ber; I answer that the thoughts of Men and Angels for the time to come, shall [Page 79]be finite to the infinite, that is to say, shall increase alwayes, and perpetually be in greater number, and alwayes in greater number, but alwayes also in fi­nite number: And though to every Day, to every Moneth, to every Year: to every Age, and to every Time whatso­ever in particular, this finite number of Thoughts be definite and determined, so that God may assign and determine the number of the Thoughts of Men and Angels, which have been in time past to that Day, that Moneth, that Year, that Age, and that time inclusive­ly: nevertheless if one speaks indefinite­ly, without specifying, neither Day, nor Moneth, nor Year, nor Age, nor any other Time in particular, but asks simply, in what number will the Thoughts of Men and Angels be for the time to come? No other answer can be given, but that the number of their Thoughts, shall be finite to the infinite, or that their number, is finite indefinitely, and un­determinedly; for, because of the per­petuity of Thoughts one cannot assign or determine a certain number, beyond which one shall have no more Thoughts.

And if one demands further, The Collection of all the Thoughts which shall be for the time to come, supposed [Page 80]they have never an end, what number is it of? I answer, That Collection is impossible, and consequently a meer no­thing, because all future Thoughts, taken distributively, are future, but not taken collectively, seeing they shall ne­ver be collected and gathered, and that there will be still some to come to pass; and consequently to be collected and ga­thered: One may also demand whether the number of the future Thoughts of Men and Angels, which God knows is finite or infinite? To which I answer, That God knows Things as they are in themselves, and that he knows future Things no otherwise then they shall be in themselves; for the knowledge of God is alwayes true, and consequently alwayes conformable to the things known. Therefore seeing that the Thoughts of Men and Angels, shall always be finite to the infinite, and that their number shall always be finite indefinitely; it is evident that God knows them no other­wise, then as finite to the infinite, and that he knows certainly, that their num­ber is finite and indefinitely, which will appear more plainly in our Answer to the third Objection.

11. Their third Objection drawn from the pretended infiniteness of Men and [Page 81]Lions possible, that is to say, that God may produce and create, may be resolved the same way as the first; to wit, saying that Men and Lions possible are finite to the infinite, and that the number of them is finite, not definitely and determined­ly, so that one may assign a certain num­ber, beyond which none will be possible; but is infinite indefinitely, because there is never so great a nmmber of Men and Lions, but God may produce and create a greater, and always a greater, and still a greater, but notwithstanding always finite. If it be objected that the Col­lection of all Men possible, comprehends an infinite number: I answer, That such a Collection is impossible, and conse­quently a meer nothing; because all Men taken distributively, are indeed possible, but taken collectively are a meer impossible, and consequently a meer nothing; because God can never produce so great a number of Men, but he may always produce a greater, and agreater again; so that it is impossible that God may not always produce some Men; and consequently the Collection of all Men possible is impossible, and a meer nothing.

If it be farther objected, That there are as many Men possible, as God knows are possible; and that God knows a number [Page 82]infinite of possible; seeing that if he should know onely a finite number of Men, he should see the last Man possible, and should know he could not create any more, and should see the end of his Power, and consequently his Power should be finite: I Answer, That the number of Men possible, that God knows, is not infinite, nor also finite definitely and determinedly: So that one may as­sign and determine a certain number, be­yond which God knows no more; for there is never so great a number but God may see and know a greater, and always a greater, and still a greater, but not­withstanding always finite; because God knows things no otherwise than they are in themselves: And therefore seeing that Men possible are in number finite indefinitely; God also knows cer­tainly, that the number of Men possible is finite indefinitely, and from thence it doth not follow, that the power of God is finite and limited in it self, or that he sees the end of his power, since he may always produce and create other Men, though always in a finite number; but at the most it may be said to be finite, in respect to its objects, or its effects, which cannot be but finite; as the know­ledge God hath of this World, though [Page 83]infinite in it self; because it is not di­stinct from the Divinity, may be said to be finite, in respect to its objects, to wit, the World that is finite.

And now I will conclude this Chap­ter, desiring the Reader to take no­tice that when I have spoken of the E­ternity of God, of his Immensity, of his Power, and of his Knowledge, he must not imagine, nor conceive, that I put or suppose, divers things, or divers qua­lities in God; but he must believe with me, that there is one and the same thing, to wit, one and rhe same Divi­nity, to which divers names are given and attributed, according to the divers respects, to which it is considered. For the same Divinity, in as much as it contains all Ages, and corresponds to every one of them, and is infinitely before them, is called Eternity: Seeing that it is the receptacle of all Bodies, corresponds to every one of them, and is insinitely be­yond all the Creatures of the World, is called Immensity; as it gives being to every thing, and protects and preserves them; is called Omnipotency; as it pla­ces and disposes them together, accor­ding to the dignity of each of them, is called Wisdom: as it bestows all sorts of good things upon the Creatures, is called [Page 84] Goodness. And for as much it decrees, foresees, and rules all the Events in the World, is called Providence. And thus must we speak of all his other Attri­butes.

The Answer of Julius Scaliger, in his Exercitations against Cardanus, to Algazel his Argument, and which the Affrican maintained to be most sound and solid, hath been sufficiently refuted, when I have proved that an infinite is not greater than another; neither material­ly nor formally.

The Reply.

2. Against this Objection or Answer, I say that if the Chaos, that is to say, the Heavens, the Stars, and the Ele­ments, pell-melled and confused toge­ther, had been from all Eternity, it would follow, that either by degrees they had resolved themselves from all Eternity, or that a time finite or infinite would have passed before they had re­solved themselves: But they did not re­solve [Page 86]themselves by degrees from all E­ternity, and a time finite or infinite did not pass, before they did resolve them­selves: Therefore they have not been confused from all Eternity, and conse­quently the Chaos was not from all E­ternity. The Minor or second Proposi­tion, which is the onely one that may be questioned, is verified thus:

First, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, pell-melled toge­thar, did not by degrees resolve and se­parate themselves from all Eternity, appears; because the separation of cor­poral things, mixed together, is not made without the local motion of some of them: But nothing did move locally from all Eternity, as I have shewed in the first Chapter; where I have proved that time and motion have not been from all Eternity.

Secondly, Those things which did by degrees separate themselves from others, from all Eternity by local motion, they have remained, either a finite time, to separate themselves, or an infinite time; if a finite time, it will follow, that betwixt the mixture, and the per­fect separation, the difference and in­terval will be but a finite and limited time; and consequently that betwixt [Page 87]that which is from all Eternity; to wit, the mixture and that which is not from all Eternity, to wit, the perfect sepa­ration, the difference will be but a finite and limited time, which is impossible. And moreover, It would follow that a finite time, such as the duration of those things, since their perfect separation, added to a finite, such as is the time that passed in their separation, would make up an infinite time, such as is the pretended Eternity of the mixture; all which is against this true Maxime, that one finite added to another finite, does not make up an infinite.

If they have remained an infinite time to separate themselves, it will follow that they will have run, through an in­finite space in their separation; seeing that a finite space may be run through in a finite time: and truly, since time is the measure or duration of motion, it will follow, that if time be infinite, the motion will be also infinite; and if the motion is infinite, the place or space wherein things did move, will be infinite, either really or equivalently. But they have not run through an infinite space, either really or equivalently; else they would have run through a space, an hun­dred thousand millions of thousands of [Page 88]times, and a space a thousand millions of times greater than this World, really or equivalently; which is absurd. And besides, It would follow that an infinite, would be greater than another; seeing the space that they would have run through; until their perfect separation, and that which they would have run through since their perfect separation, should be greater than the sole space, they should have run through until their separation: For a farther confirmation, look back upon the first Chapter, where­in I have proved that time and motion cannot be infinite.

3. Secondly, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have not re­mained a finite time, before they have re­solved and separated themselves; ap­pears, because it would follow, that betwixt the mixture, and the beginning of their separation, the difference would be but of a finite time; and consequent­ly that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as their pretended mixture; and that which is not from all Eternity, as their separation, or the beginning thereof, the difference would be but of some limited time; and there would be wanting but a finite and limited time, lest that their separation, which had a [Page 89]Beginning, should be Eternal; and that one finite added to the other finite, should make up an infinite, which is impossible.

4. Thirdly, That the Heavens, the Stars, and the Elements, have not re­mained an infinite time before they have resolved and separated themselves, appears, because it is a Maxime received of all, that Idem qua Idem, semper facit Idem, at least when 'tis not a free and intellectual Agent. Therefore, If the Heavens, the Stars, and the Ele­ments, have been confused and pell-mel­led together, during an infinite time, or during Eternity; how came it to pass that they have resolved and disin­tricated themselves at last? certainly it cannot be of themselves, having re­mained in the same case and condition, above an hundred thousand millions of thousands of years: and if another has thus separated them (as it is most true) it cannot be ought else but God.

5. It will not be out of purpose to add to this Reply, The true sense of the two first verses of the first Chapter of Genesis, which are conceived in these words: In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth; and the Earth was without form and void, and dark­ness [Page 90]was upon the face of the Deep; and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters.

Because, out of these words some Christians have imagined a Chaos, say­ing, That God created first a Chaos, that is to say, the Heavens and the Ele­ments mixed confusedly together; and afterwards in six days did draw all Crea­tures out of the same; and others in greater number, say, that in the two alleadged verses, Moses makes a general Proposition of all things created, in these two words, Heaven and Earth; and that in the following verses, he specifies the Creatures as God created them every day.

Against that I say, That the true sense of the words of Moses, is, that in the beginning of the first Day, which was the beginning of the first Evening, and the beginning of Time, God created the Imperial Heaven, which should be the Mansion and Dwelling Place of God and the Blessed; the Earth which should be the residence of Men during this mo­mentary life, and the Waters which did then cover the whole face of the Earth. The chief reasons of my Assertions are these:

First, It is certain that the first day [Page 91]of the Creation, as well as the five o­thers, is divided in Evening and Morn­ing, and that the Evening is put before the Morning: For Moses saith, And the Evening and the Morning were the first Day; and from thence it is that the Jews ever began their Natural Day, with the Evening. From which Con­sideration I frame these two Argu­ments:

That which is part of the part, is also part of the whole: For Example, The Finger which it part of the Hand, is also part of the Arm, and of the whole Body; but the Evening is part of the Day, which is also part of Time: Therefore the Evening is also part of Time; and so when the Evening was, Time was also, or began to be. From this Argument I frame another thus: Time never was without some Corporal Creatures; seeing that Time is the dura­tion of Corporal Things, or of their Motion; but in the Evening of the first Day, Time was or began to be; for the Evening, being part of the Natural Day, is also part of Time: Therefore in the Evening of the first Day, there were some Corporal Creatures: Now what other Corporal Creatures were in the Evening of the first Day, but the [Page 92]Heaven, the Earth, and the Waters, whereof mention is made in these two first verses of the first Chapter of Genesis. Wherefore it appears evidently that in these words, In the Beginning God Created the Heaven and the Earth; these two words (in the Beginning) are to be explained thus: In the beginning of Time, in the beginning of the first Day, in the beginning of the Evening of the first Day, God Created the Heaven and the Earth.

Secondly, After that Moses hath said, In the beginning God Created Heaven and Earth; he adds immediately, and the Earth was without form and void, that is to say, the Earth that God created with the Heavens, was then without an external form or appearance of Earth, because then it was all covered with Water, and was void of the Ornaments, which now inrich and adorn it; for then the Earth had neither Flowers nor Fruits, nor Herbs, nor Corn, nor Trees, nor Living Creatures, &c. Now when was it that the Earth was covered with Wa­ter, without appearance of Earth, with­out Beauty, and without Ornaments, but onely during the two first Days, unto the third exclusively; in which God separated the Waters from the Earth, [Page 93]and beautified it with all sorts of Plants.

Thirdly, I say that in all the History of the Creation, described by Moses, no mention at all is made of the Creati­on of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters, but in the two first verses alleadged. For though the Fir­mament, which was Created the second Day, be called Heaven, v. 8. yet it must not be understood of the Imperial Heaven, which is the Throne of God, and the Dwelling place of the Blessed; because it is said of this Firmament, v. 7. That God divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the Waters which were above the Firmament; that is to say, this Firmament divides the Earthly and the Heavenly Waters; and at verse the 14. that in this Firmament God placed the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars; and at v. 20. that Fowls were appointed to flie towards it; all which cannot be understood of the Imperial Heaven, which is above all other Cor­poral Creatures, but onely of the Ele­ment of the Air.

Moreover, Though in the work of the third day, mention is made of the Se­paration of the Earth, and of the Sea; yet there is no mention made of their Creation; an evident proof that they [Page 94]had been Created before. And indeed Moses describing the work of the second Day, speaks in this manner: And God said, Let there be a Firmament in the midst of the Waters, and let divide the Wa­ters from the Waters: and God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the Waters which were above the Fir­mament. Now how would God have divided the Waters, if they had not been before? and how would he have created a Firmament between the Wa­ters, if there had been no Water be­before? Therefore let us conclude that in these two first verses, and no where else, mention is made of the Creation of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Water, that God made be­fore the Light, whereof it is spoken in the third verse.

Fourthly, Immediately after these words, In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth, and the Earth was without form and void; it is added, And Darkness was upon the face of the Deep; as if he should have said, when God created the Heaven and the Earth, and the Earth was covered with Water, without Beauty or Orna­ments; then the vast and spacious Waters, [Page 95]or the spaces between Heaven and Earth, were covered with Darkness, because there was yet no Light, as appears by the Text; and God had not yet created that great body of Light, which he created afterwards; to wit, in the Morning of the same first Day; and whereof proba­bly, in the fourth Day he made the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars, which may be very well thought to be the Element of Fire, seeing it hath all the effects and properties of it; and that in the whole History of the Creation, mention is made no where else of the Element of Fire; but when God said, Let there be Light. Moreover, It is certain that Darkness is nothing else but the privati­on of Light: now privation differs from a meer negation; in that privation sup­poses a subject capable to receive that whereof it is privation; and a meer ne­gation supposes none: For Example, Blindness is the privation of Sight, which supposes a Creature capable to receive Sight, Death is a privation of Life, that supposes a Body susceptible of Life, &c. Now seeing that Darkness which was before Light, as appears by the Text, is nothing else but a privation of Light, it is evident that Darkness supposes some Bodies susceptible of Light, which [Page 96]as well as Darkness have been before the Light; but these Bodies can be no others, but those mentioned in the two first verses, to wit, the Heaven, the Earth, and the Waters, which were created the Evening of the first Day.

But I suppose it will be objected, that the form ought always to be before the privation: For Example, The Sight be­fore Blindness, Life before Death; and that consequently the Light was before Darkness: But I answer, first, That all Philosophers agree, that all Physical Pri­vations, are before the Forms, whereof they are privations; because they are privations of future forms, as logical privations, are privations of forms past. And thus the seminal matter hath the privation of the Soul, before it hath the Soul it self; and every physical matter hath the privation of the essential form, before it hath such a form; and in the Example alleadged above, it may hap­pen that Blindness is before the Sight, Deafness before Hearing, and the pri­vation of Life before Life. So the Born Blind and Deaf Man that Jesus Christ healed, were Blind and Deaf, before they received either Sight or Hearing. And the Embryo, that is to say, the Infant in the Mothers Womb, before it [Page 97]hath got perfect shape, hath the priva­tion of rational Life, before ever he re­ceives the said rational Life.

Secondly, It is must true, that when a Subject is equally susceptible of the Form and the privation of it, if the A­gent may produce the Subject and the Form, it is then in the power of the Agent, if it be a free Agent, to pro­duce the Subject with the Form, or with the Privation thereof: But the Earth, and the Waters are Bodies equally sus­ceptible of Light and Darkness: There­fore God who is a most free Agent, and who hath created the Earth, the Waters, and the Light, may have produced the Earth, and the Waters, with, or with­out Light. So then seeing that by the Text it appears, that Darkness was be­fore Light, we must conclude, that the Earth and the Waters were produced tenebrous. Finally, It is most true, that the Light God created, is a most bright and shining Body, and not an accident, as I might make it appear, were not the Digression too long already. Now who seeth not, that God may have created the Earth, and the Waters before this bright and shining Body, seeing he can create one Body before another.

By the consideration of these things, [Page 98]it is clear, that in the two alleadged verses, Moses doth not set down a ge­neral Proposition, of all those things God was to create afterwards; but that he describes particularly, the creation of Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters, which were produced the Even­ing of the first Day. Moreover, It is e­vident, that in the said verses, Moses speaks not one word of a Chaos, con­taining all Creatures, pell-melled and confused together; seeing there is no mention made of the Firmament, nor of the Element of Fire, nor of the Stars, nor Plants, nor Living Creatures, but onely of the Imperial Heaven, of the Earth, and of the Waters; and yet there is never a word of the Heaven and the Earth being mixed together; and in the whole History of the Creation, there is no mention made of the separation of Heaven from the Earth, as there is of the separation of the Earth, from the Waters that covered it. But enough of this matter, it is time to come to the Consutation of other Objections and Answers of Atheists.

The Reply.

2. Against this Answer, I say, That if there had been from all Eternity a Matter without Form, it would follow, that the pretended Forms of Heaven, the Stars, and the Elements, as well as the Forms of Plants and Living Creatures, should have been after the Matter, and consequently would have had a beginning; and having not had beginning of them­selves, seeing that nothing produces it self, they would have been necessarily produced in time by another, and that other would be necessarily, either the the Matter or some other thing, differing from the Matter. Now these Forms can­not have been produced in time, neither by the Matter nor by any other thing differing from the Matter, unless it be by God himself; which I prove thus:

If any Eternal Matter had produced these Forms in time, it would follow necessarily, that before the product [...] of the same, a time either finite or in [...] nite, should have passed: not a [...] [Page 101]time, because betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as the Matter (is sup­posed by them to be) and that which is not from all Eternity, as these Forms or the Productions of the same, the dif­ference is greater than of a finite time And Moreover, It would follow, that a finite time, such as that which should have passed since the productions of these Forms, added to a finite time, such as that which should have passed before the production of these Forms, would make up an infinite time, or an infinite duration, such as the Eternity of the Matter would be; which is im­possible. Neither did an infinite time pass before the production of these Forms; for how should it come to pass, that the Matter having been an infinite time all alone without acting, would pro­duce them afterwards? Is it not a con­stant and true Maxime, that, Idem qua Idem semper facit Idem; when it is not a free and intellectual Agent, when there is no impedement, and the sub­jects which it works about are not dif­ferent. Now Matter being not a free and intellectual Agent, and finding no im­pediment nor different subjects, seeing it is supposed to be all alone, before the productions of these Forms; it follows [Page 102]necessarily it hath always done the same thing; and consequently that it hath not remained a time, either finite or infinite to produce these Forms, if it may have produced them. Moreover, All Men know that Causa naturaliis agit a dex­tremum suae potentiae; that is to say, Na­tural Causes act and work as much as they can: For Example, The Sun shines as much as it can, the Fire heats with all its strength; and 'tis most true, that, Causa necessaria, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, & sublatis impedimentis, ne­cessario agit. That is to say, Necessary Causes, all things required, granted, and having no impediments, act and work necessarily, and cannot keep back, nor suspend their action. Now then, seeing that Matter is a Natural and not a Volun­tary Cause, a necessary and not a free Cause, and that there is no impediment, being supposed all alone; it follows that if it may have produced these Forms, it must necessarily have produced them before (or without remaining) an infinite time.

3. Against the Epicures, teaching that the Eternal Atomes by a casual concourse, have made and disposed the World, in the same case and state it is at present; I say that this concourse of Atomes, to frame and fashion the World, [Page 103]cannot have happened without the local motion of some of them: From whence I argue thus, If the Atomes or the parts of the Matter had concurred, and con­sequently had moved themselves locally to frame and fashion the World in the case and state it is at present, it would follow that they would have moved themselves locally from all Eternity, or that they would have remained, either a finite or an infinite time without mov­ing, and then afterwards would have framed and fashioned the World in the case and state it is at present: but they have not moved themselves locally from all Eternity, neither have they remained a finite or an infinite time without mov­ing; as I have sufficiently proved in the precedent Chapter, Num. 2, 3, 4. for the same things I have said there of the Heaven and the Elements, may be said likewise of the Atomes.

4. Finally, That these Forms have not been produced by any thing differing from the Matters, but by God himself, ap­pears; because the Agent who should have produced them, would have been Eternal or not: if not Eternal he would have had a Beginning, and consequently, would have been produced of another; of whom I would ask, Whether he be E­ternal [Page 104]or not, and so always inquire, un­til one should come to such an Agent, as would not have been produced by another, and consequently would be Eternal. If Eternal, he should be either a necessary and natural Agent, or a free and volun­tary Agent: If a natural and necessary Agent, he would have forthwith produ­ced these Forms; for a natural and ne­cessary Agent, acts, and works, as much as it can, and cannot suspend his action; and consequently these Forms would have been from all Eternity, and consequently the World in the case and state it is at pre­sent; which I have demonstrated alrea­dy to be altogether impossible: And if a free and intellectual Agent, it can be no other but God; sceing that by the word GOD, we mean and conceive nothing else, but a free and intellectual Agent, who hath produced the world, in the state and case it is at present.

The Reply.

2. Against this Answer, I say, First, That there is no Author, let him be ne­ver so fabulous, that ever dreamed or writ, that men have their Original from the Tritons and Sirens. And Besides, my reason respecting all terrestrial Creatures, it would follow that Elephants, Lions, Bears, Oxen, and other terrestrial Crea­tures, would have had their Original from the like Marine Creatures.

Secondly, It is a Moral Maxime, That every thing seeks and endeavours to bet­ter its Condition: Now either it is better [Page 107]for waterish Creatures, to become ter­restrial, or not: If it be better for them? how came it to pass that they do not seek after it? And if it be not better for them, why have they done it in time past.

Finally, If they are become terrestri­al in times past, why do they not do the same now? And if such a thing has hap­pened heretofore, some where, why does it not come to pass again, either there or in seme other place of the World?

Thirdly, Histories make mention but of three Floods onely, to wit, that of Noah, that of Ogyges, and that of Deucalion; now these two last have not been universal, for they happened onely in one part of Greece; so that it was an easie thing to furnish it again, with neighbouring People. And as for the first, it cannot be believed, except one believes a Divinity, whether we re­spect the Miracles that went along with it, or the Holy Man that writ the Hi­story of it; who saith positively that God sent it, and commanded Noah to build the Ark, to save in it all kinds of Terrestrial Creatures; so that it is need­less to have recourse to Waterish Crea­tures

Fourthly, The Examples of Herodotus, [Page 108]Guicharden, and others, prove indeed that there are Tritons and Sirens, but they speak never a word, concerning Men having had their original from them. And as for the strange things they write of them, it is certain they had them by hear-say from others, who might have been deceived in the Narration, and by the Declarer, as well as themselves. And this will soon appear to be true, if we judge impartially of the Writings of Herodotus; for most part of what he writes from others, is so far from be­ing a true History, that it savours the Ro­mance altogether: As when he saith in his Second Book, That Rampsinitus King of Egypt, went down into Hell, and there played at Dice with Ceres; That the Sun did rise twice in the West, and did sit twice in the East: That Sen­nacherib King of Assiria and Araba, being in his March towards Egypt to War against Setho King of that Country, his Bows and Quivers were gnawed by Cats, so that he was fain to go back a­gain into his own Country with shame. That the Daughter of Cheopes King of Egypt, did prostitute her self to every Man that would give her but a Stone, whereof was made one of the Pyra­mides, which made one of the seven [Page 109]Wonders of the World. That Phero became blind for having shot an Arrow in the River Nilus; and ten years after recovered his sight by Washing his Eyes with the Urine of a Woman, that ne­ver lay with any Man but her Husband: And truly Diodorus in the Fourth Book of his History, observes, That Triton who shewed Jason and the other Argonauts, the way to avoid the Quick­sands of the Sea, was a King of Lybia and not a Fish. Acosta speaking of the Ʋros, does not affirm that they are Wa­terish Creatures, but onely a rude and unpolished People. These are are his very words, These, Uros (saith he) are so rude and blockish a People, that they do not repute themselves to be Men. And as for the Fishes of the River of Cochin whereof Nicolo Conti speaks, I say that in matter of Narrations and Histories, we ought not to believe whatsoever every one relates, who for to humour himself, writes the Imagi­nations of his own Brain, or the Stories of others that deceived him; but we must believe onely, that which is re­lated to us by such Men as have travel­led in those Countreys. Now many Hollanders, and Portugals, that have been at Cochin; and have seen the River [Page 110]and the Fishes in it, make no mention of such Fishes, and hold it as a Lie and a Fable, whatsoever Nicolo Conti writes of this matter.

Finally, If whatsoever is written con­cerning the Tritons, should be true, and that Men should be originary of the pretended Eternal Tritons; yet my Rea­son would remain whole and entire; and my Arguments against the Eternity of Men, may be applied to the Tritons: And I may argue thus again, If the Tri­tons have been from all Eternity, the number of these Tritons which have been in time past is infinite: That the Tritons which are pretended to have Lived from all Eternity, yet have not Lived an Eternity, but onely a certain limited time: And that the Tritons which have been in time past unto this very day, are all distant with a finite distant of time, or all with an infinite distance, or some with a finite, and others with an infinite di­stance: And so applying to the Tritons what I have said of Men in the First Chapter, it will clearly appear that the same absurdities do follow.

The Reply.

2. Against this Answer, I say, That if the Eternal Earth had produced in time, the first Men, or if the Sun, or a­ny other Eternal Agent, had produced them out of the Eternal Earth; it would follow that the Eternal Earth would have remained, either a finite or an in­finite time, before their production; but neither can be said without absurdi­ty: not a finite time, else it would fol­low that betwixt the Earth and the Pro­duction of the first Men, the difference would be onely of a finite and limited time; and consequently that betwixt that which is from all Eternity, as the Earth, and that which is not from all Eternity, as the Production of the first Men, the difference would be only of a finite and limited time, which is impos­sible. And besides, it would follow, That a finite time, such as should be that which should have passed, since the the Production of the first Men unto this day, added to a finite time, such as should be that which should have passed since the existence of the Earth, unto the Production of the first Men, would make up an infinite time, such as is [Page 113]the pretended Eternity of the Earth; all which is against this true Maxime: That a finite added to another finite, doth not make up an infinite. And further, That there would be wanting but a finite and limited time, lest that the production of the first Men, which hath had a Beginning should be Eternal, to wit, that finite and limited time that would have passed, since the exist­ing of the Earth, unto their producti­on. Not an infinite time also, else it would follow, that the Earth would have remained above an hundred thou­sand times, a hundred millions of years, without having produced Men; and that after an infiniteness of years, it would have produced them; which is absurd: because natural and necessary causes, such as the Earth is, all things remain­ing in the same state, do act al­ways the same thing. Now what I say concerning the Earth, may be said of all Elements together.

3. And it is to no purpose, to say, That after an infiniteness of time, the Eternal Earth is (as it were) become apt, and disposed to produce Men; and so con­sequently hath produced them; but be­fore was not disposed, and consequently could not produce them. For against [Page 114]that I say, That such an aptness or dis­position of the Earth, must needs have come to pass, either by degrees, from all Eternity; so that after an infinite­ness of time, it hath been perfected and accomplished; or that after an infinite­ness of time, it is come to pass, either all at once, or successively: now neither of these can be said without absurdity. Not that it is come to pass by de­grees, from all Eternity, else that dispo­sition or alteration of the Earth, would have had parts succeeding one another, from all Eternity; and so succession, motion, and time, would have been from all Eternity: which I have shewed above to be altogether impossible. Not also that after an infiniteness of time, it is come to pass, either all at once, or successively; for if it were so, it would have been the act and work, either of the Earth it self, or of another na­tural and necessary cause, such as are the other Elements; or of a free and in­tellectual Agent. Not of the Earth, or of any other natural and necessary cause; because natural and necessary causes, all things remaining in the same state, act and work always the same things, and act as much as they can, without having power to suspend their [Page 115]action; and consequently would not have remained more than an hundred thousand times an hundred thousand millions of years, to produce this apt­ness and disposition, much less an in­finiteness of time. If this Disposition hath been produced by a free and in­tellectual Agent, it cannot be but by the Creator of the Universe, who is the great and glorious God whom we adore.

4. Now add to what hath been said, this true Maxime of Philosophers, Na­tura progreditur ab imperfectionibus ad perfectiora. Nature proceeds from things more imperfect, to the more perfect: That is to say, Natural causes in their o­perations, produce first imperfect things, which afterwards become more perfect in time: So the Earth breeds first Shrubs, which in time become great Trees; and produces Frogs, and Worms, and Flies, and other small and weak insects, which in time become great and strong. There­fore, If the first Men have been produ­ced by the Earth, or the other Elements, they cannot have been produced but ve­ry little and most weak, as they that are newly born, and do but come out of the Mothers Womb; in which case Men would have been almost Dead as soon as [Page 116]Born, there being no succour nor help for them, and so there would be never a Man left at this time. For it were to overthrow the order of Nature, to ima­gine that the Earth, or the other Ele­ments, should have produced the first Men, as perfect as they are at this time, at Five and twenty, or thirty years of Age. And besides, Our Reason extends it self to all sorts of Animals, as well Terrestrial, as them that live in the Wa­ters; so that it would necessarily follow, that the Earth, the Air, the Water, and the Fire, or all the Elements together, should have produced, not onely the first Men, but also the first Lions, the first Elephants, the first Whales, the first Dolphins, and the like, in their per­fection, Male and Female, for the pro­pagation of the same; which is altoge­ther against the Order of Nature.

Moreover, If the Earth, or the o­ther Elements, have heretofore produced some Men, why do not they produce no more at this time? and if they have produced Lions, Whales, and other A­nimals, how comes it to pass that they produce none at this time, in some parts of the World? Surely, Mens Wits must be strangely perverted and overturned, to suppose such Extravagances and [Page 117]Dreams. Therefore since for the propa­gation of the humane kind, the first Men must necessarily have been in a perfect Age and State, and that Na­ture could not make them such; one must believe that as it is related by Moses in the Book of Genesis, to wit, that there is a God, who out of the Earth, mixed with the other Elements, hath framed end fashioned a perfect humane Body, and having breathed in his No­strils the breath of Life, he became a living Soul. Finally, It is an undoubt­ed Truth, That none can give that which he hath not: Therefore, Seeing that the Earth, and the other Elements, distitute of understanding, and much more imperfect than Men, neither con­tain, nor enjoy, either formally, or in eminency and vertue the excellent per­fections of the reasonable Soul; it is evident they cannot produce it, nor consequently Man, whose chiefest and noblest part is the reasonable Soul.

The Reply.

3. Against this Answer, I say, That very few Christians say that the World may have been created from all Eternity, in the state it is now, because of the contradictions that would follow, the which (I hope) I have sufficiently noted already: for the same contradictions and absurdities, which follow from the ex­istence of the World, do also follow from its creation from all Eternity. Therefore when some Christians by rea­son of a pious zeal, being willing to exalt the Omnipotency of God, have written, that God may have created the World from all Eternity; that is under­stood by the Learned of the World in another state, to wit, in a state of im­mobility. For Example, If God had created the Sun from all Eternity, it would have remained infinitely without [Page 126]motion; if God had created the Sea from all Eternity, it would have re­mained infinitely, without Flowing and Ebbing. If God had created Men from all Eternity, they would have remained from all Eternity, without Pulse, with­out Breath, and without Motion of the Animal and Vital Spirit; and without Dying; and if God had produced all o­ther Creatures from all Eternity, they would have remained infinitely without Motion, and without being capable to be Destroyed; and during this infinite­ness of time, God would not have had an obsolute Dominion and Sovereignty over them, seeing that during this in­finite time he could not have destroyed them. But seeing such an Answer is repugnant to right Reason, and neither favours nor countenances A­theists; seeing it grants a Godhead, and supposes the World in another state than Atheists do; I will insist upon it no longer, but will come to the Answer of their Reasons alleadged in their Answer.

4. To their first Reason, Drawn from that excellent Truth, That all Things are possible to God: I Answer, That God may do all Things possible; but he cannot do those Things that are im­possible and contridictory. For Exam­ple, [Page 127]God cannot Die, nor Lie; because to be God, and to be a Lier, or Mortal, are things contradictory. But the Eter­nity of the World is a thing impossible, and that involves and implies many ab­surdities and contradictories; as I have shewed heretofore. I Answer again, That all Things are possible to God, but that the Eternity of the World is not a Thing, because it is impossible, and that which is impossible is nothing, and consequently may not be called a Thing.

To the Second Reason, to wit, That God hath never been without Power to create the World, and that having been from all Eternity, he may have created the World from all Eternity: I Answer, That God hath never been without Power to create the World, when it may have been created; but the World can­not have been created from all Eternity, but onely in time: Therefore God hath never been without Power to create the World in time, but he hath been from all Eternity, without having power to create the World from all Eternity. It is most true that God hath never been without his Omnipotency, and conse­quently hath never been without the Power to create the World; but he could [Page 128]not exercise and execute from all Eter­nity, the Act of his Omnipotency, to wit, the Creation; but onely in time: Not that this proceeds from any Defect or any Impotency in God; but because the Creature cannot concurre and agree with Eternity, because of the contra­dictions that would follow, and which I have set down already in this Tract. And as the Soul of an Infant, which is still in the Mothers Womb, hath the power to reason, in that he hath the principle of ratiocination, that is the understanding, but cannot exercise the act of that power; to wit, ratiocina­tion; but onely after his Birth and Child­hood: not that such a thing proceeds from any defect in the Soul; but be­cause the Organ, whereby ratiocination is exercised, is not yet disposed as it ought: So God hath had indeed from all Eternity the Power whereby he hath created the World, but he could not exercise from all Eternity the act of this Power; that is the Creation of the World: Not that it proceeds from any Defect in God, but because the World cannot be Eternal; as I have already sufficiently demonstrated.

To the Third Reason drawn from this Example, That if the Sun had been [Page 129]from all Eternity, it would have acted, that is Enlightened from all Eternity; and likewise that God being from all E­ternity, hath acted, or may have acted from all Eternity, and consequently hath created or may have created the World from all Eternity. I Answer, That to suppose the Sun-Eternal is to suppose a thing impossible. Now one must not wonder, if supposing a thing impossible, to wit, the Sun Eternal; one supposes another impossible also, viz. the Eternal illumination: For if one Creature be Eternal, the other must also be the same. But in supposing God Eternal, one supposes a thing, not onely possible, but which is so actually; and from thence they infer and conclude, without ground or reason, that he may create the World from all Eternity, seeing that Eternity of this World is im­possible, as (I hope) I have sufficiently proved. Therefore as God, though he be infinite, cannot produce an infinite effect; and though he be immutable, cannot produce an immutable effect; so though God be Eternal, he cannot pro­duce an Eternal effect: because Eternity as well as infinity and immutability, are attributes incommunicable to the Crea­ture.

To the Fourth Reason, That if the World hath been sometimes impossible, to wit, from all Eternity, it will have been alw [...] [...]possible; and consequent­ly will not have been created. I Answer, That in the same manner, it hath been impossible, it will always be impossible; now it hath been impossible from all E­ternity: therefore it will be impossible to all Eternity. And as it is not abso­lutely impossible, that Man should be; but it is impossible that Man should be a Beast: So it is not absolutely impossible that the World should be; but it is im­possible that the World should be Eternal: and as Man never was, nor never will be a Beast; so the World never was, nor never will be Eternal.

To the Fifth Reason, That if the World hath been impossible from all E­ternity, it hath been impossible, du­ring a finite time, or during an infi­nite time; which is absurd, &c. I an­swer, That Time and the World are al­ways necessarily together; seeing that Time is nothing else but the continu­ance of Corporal Things, whereof the VVorld is made, or the continuance of their Motion. And therefore, Since that Eternity is before Time, it is e­vident that, that which is from all E­ternity, [Page 131]is before whatsoever Time, be it finite or infinite. Now it is ridiculous to ask, whether that which hath been before Time, whilst it hath been before time, hath continued and lasted, a finite or infinite Time. Moreover, I Answer as before, viz. That the VVorld hath not been absolutely impossible, seeing it hath been possible in time, but that it hath been impossible from all Eternity; and that this impossibility of the VVorld from all Eternity, hath been; is, and shall be to all Eternity.

To the Sixth Reason, That the World may be Eternal of the After-Eternity, and consequently that it may have been Eternal of the Fore-Eternity, and so from all Eternity. I Answer, That E­ternity being an attribute of the God­head, incommunicable to the Creature, is not different from the God-head: and therefore as the God-head is always the same, indivisible and without parts, though its immensity, which is not dif­ferent from it, be without Limits, and cannot be measured, by any greatness; all Bodies being but a point of this Im­mensity; So Eternity hath been, is, and always shall be the same, indivisible and without parts; though it cannot be mea­sured by Ages, which always will be no [Page 132]more than a point of this Eternity. From whence it follows, That those Men, which divide it, in the Fore and After-Eternity, do not at all understand the nature of Eternity; seeing that these words, Before and After, belong onely to such things, as are subject to Time, Motion, and Succession, and whereof the Parts perish one after another; and not to Eternity, which is before Time, and without Parts, and whereof nothing can perish. Besides, There is a vast difference betwixt these two pretended Eternities, as I have amply demonstra­ted, in my Reply to their second An­swer; chiefly in that the Fore-Eternity is all past; and that the After-Eternity shall never pass, nor end. And if one should suppose of the After-Eternity, that which is most true of the Fore-E­ternity, to wit, that it is all past; it is evident it should be finite and limited on all sides, viz. By this Day, and by the last time of this Eternity, which should pass, and end. And if it be finite, it cannot be a true Eternity; for a true Eternity is an infinite continuance.

To the Seventh Reason, That God might create the World before the time he created it, and before again, and always before, to the infinite, and con­sequently [Page 133]from all Eternity. I Answer, That though the World in its total, may have been created in less time; seeing that God who created it in six days, might have created it in one day, yea, in a moment. Nevertheless it is most true, That the World, if we have a re­gard to the first Creatures, which are the chiefest parts of the same, to wit, the Heavens and the Earth, could not be made sooner than it hath been made, and could not be created, before the time it hath been created; because before the time, that the World hath been created, there was no other continu­ance than Eternity: but the World can­not have been from all Eternity, as I have demonstrated: Therefore the World cannot have been before the time it hath been created. And indeed these words of Before and After, Sooner and Later, cannot belong but to time, that hath Parts, whereof some are Soon­er, some Later, some Before, and some After. But Eternity being indivisible, and without Parts (as I have proved) can have neither Before nor After; and consequently, though Eternity, may have been before the World and before Time, nevertheless there was in it neither Be­fore nor After. Therefore one cannot [Page 134]say, That the World may have been Before, and Before again, and always Before to the infinite: because where there is a Before, and again another Before, and always a Before, to in­finite, there are many Befores (if I may so speak) whereof one is Before, and the other After; but in the Eternity before the World, and before Time, there have been neither Before nor Af­ter.

And if any one objects. That the Heaven and the Earth which have been the first Creatures, may have been created later; and consequently may have been created sooner: I Answer, That Heaven and Earth may be consi­dered, either as Creatures, or as the first Creatures. If they be considered as Creatures, I say that they might have been created later, seeing that God, who created them the first day, might have created them the second day, and some others the first day: But if they be considered as the first Creatures, I say they could not be created later; because they could not be created later, but in creating them after some others. Now if they had been created after o­thers, they should not have been the first Creatures. Moreover, Though the [Page 135]Heaven and the Earth, which have been the first Creatures, might have been created later, in the manner a­foresaid; yet it doth not follow that they may have been sooner than they have been: because that before the Time, or before the first Creatures, there have not been, nor could have been any continuance, but Eternity. Now the first Creatures, and so conse­quently the World, cannot have been from all Eternity, as I have sufficient­ly proved. Therefore the World, or the Creatures, cannot have been before the time they have been; and conse­quently cannot have been sooner than they have been.

Finally, According to the common Opinion, one might say, That though the World might have been created be­fore, and before again; and always before to the infinite; yet it would not follow that the World might have been from all Eternity. For though a Body may be supposed greater than another, to the infinite, yet it does not follow, that there is a Body actually infinite; seeing that this progression to the in­finite, doth not reach farther, than to an infinite in power (i.e. Potentia; as they speak in the School) which is [Page 136]always actually finite: So though the World might have been before, and always before, to the infinite; it does not follow that the World may have been from all Eternity; seeing that this progression to the infinite, does not reach further than to all infinite in power, which is also actually finite, and comprehended, and included in the temporal continuance.

And now Courteous Reader, I shall end this Chapter, together with this long, but (I hope) solid Dis­putation, against the most prophane and ungrateful Men that ever were, I mean the Atheists, with this ad­vice, That if ever thou chancest to dispute with them, to make use of the Reasons set down in this Chap­ter, especially the first in the Reply, as being the chief that proves de­monstratively that there is a GOD; and so forcibly convinces Atheists, that they are not onely without Answer, but even without Evasion.