NEXT to the Treachery of Men, Vid. Pref. Seem to be too jealous of themselves, for fear some worldly Consi­derations, &c. who have not had that jealousie of themselves which the Right Reverend and Learned Author of the late Discourse makes a Vertue in his Brethren, who have renounced the Benefit of that Protection which this Government has extended to­wards them; nothing has more promoted the Interest of him, who, as some Great Men insinuate, still remains our Rightful King, than an obstinate Justification of all the Follies and Flatteries of some Clergy-men, at a time, when in their Tantivy speed to Preferments, they not only trampled upon the poor Persecuted Dissenters; but upon those Laws, which forbad their making Riots of Religious Meetings, and Statutes of Royal Edicts, or Pro­clamations.

Rather than it should be thought that they, who call themselves the Church of England were to blame in these Matters, and held Erroneous Opinions of Civil Power; this Government, which is a reverse to their Doctrines, shall be maintained to be an Usurpation, either upon King James, or upon the People of England; who invited their [Page 4] Deliverer, and made the most suitable Acknowledgment of such a Deliverance.

It is a Melancholly Consideration to think, how many are imposed upon, by Doctrines made for no Lay-end whatever; and which will serve no Government, but what is against or above Law: if there come in such consent of Men, Vid. Hooker Eccl. Pol. as the Learned and Judicious Mr. Hooker thought absolutely necessary for the making of Laws; this consent either must lose the nature of consent, or want Authority: for fear some Clergy­men should be condemn'd for having ascribed to Princes those Powers which were never given or allowed by the consent of the Nation: and if one who exercised such an Illegal Power, be Dispossessed against his will; Allegiance must be transferred to another, still without Humane Con­sent; for otherwise Passive Obedience to no Law, could not revive again, and be transplanted.

Nor could those Divines, whose Doctrines encouraged the late King to attempt what occasioned his Abdication, have expected to make Atonement by the Difficulties which they and their Partizans might bring upon the Successor; and yet hope to impose upon him, as if they were the only Loyal Men.

If they were as Passive themselves, when their Loyalty comes to be tried, as they would have others be, it were something; but they who take to themselves all the Pri­viledges belonging to Gods Lot, or Peculiar Inheritance, are like the Men of Kent; Vid. Camd. Brit. Parker's Antiq. Brit. Dicit Can­rii Comitatus quod in ipso Co­mitatu de jure debet de ejusmodi gravamine esse liber, quia dicit quod Comitatus ille, ut residuum Angliae, nunquam fuit Conquestus. who having op­posed William I. after the rest of the Nation had submitted to him, would have it, that all but themselves were a conquered People.

No respect to any Man's Person or Character, ought to come in Competition with the Duty which we owe [Page 5]our Country: on the contrary, while the Errors of Men, Great for Name of Learning, or Pomp of Office, derive Authority from their Persons; those Errors or Artifices, which tend to the Prejudice of the most valuable Interest of Men, as united in Societies; ought to be treated with the greater Freedom, and with that Contempt or Laugh­ter, which is due to the Folly, or the Disguise.

That the World may judge of the Merits of those Noti­ons, which are vented under the Venerable Authority of the L — A — and, as it should be thought, with such a charitable Design, as becomes that Office. I shall,

1. As far as they are consistent, and hang together, give a true Representation of them, with their plain and direct Consequences.

2. Shall shew their Inconsistencies.

3. Their Doubtfulness and Ambiguity; as if intended to serve either Prince or People, and to impose upon both.

4. The Weakness of the Reasoning, want of Authori­ty, and gross Mistakes, in relation to those Rights of Princes, which he would infer from Passages, or Omissions, in Sacred or other Writings.

5. That the shew of Reading, and the Positions are wholly beside the Cushion; not applicable to the Consti­tution of this Government, nor to the present Debate.

1. The manifest Scope of the Book, A Representati­on of the Do­ctrine. is to prove, or rather to maintain, by the Au­thority of the Person, without Proof, that all Kingdoms are disposed by Gods immedi­ate Act, P. 30. without the allowable Interposition of any, but Soveraign Princes, P. 32. and that the Acts of all others have an original Nullity.

Upon which I may make this general Reflection, to justifie my Anti-Title. If Acts proceeding from the Free Wills of Soveraign Princes, are no Objections against [Page 6]Gods Disposal of Kingdoms so far by his immediate Act, as that himself confers the Power by his sole Authority; neither would what proceeds, warrantably, from the Free Will of the People, be less Gods Act, or have his Authori­ty less immediately from his Gift. But how much soever God Almighty influences Mankind in the Choise of their Actions, we must suppose that they act with Freedom, even in the Changes of Kingdoms and States; or otherwise we must impute to the Almighty those Crimes, by which Changes are sometimes brought about: which to surmise, were Blasphemy. And if Changes are made according to natural Equity, and more especially the known Rights of any Kingdom, agreeable to that Equity, and allowed of, and exercised as there has been occasion in all times, from the first Erection of the Kingdom; we may well say, that those Acts of such a free People, which God permits, and blesses with Success, are by, and with, his Authority.

What, are the Rights and lawful Powers entrusted by God Almighty with the People of this Land, Vid. Bp. Bilsons. Christian Sub­jection. for the Preservation of their ancient Regiment, and Laws, it is not needful here to prove: but it is necessary to shew, in their proper Colours, those Arts, or in Truth, Weaknesses of Cler­gy-men, whereby they would bring in God Almighty to Authorize the Contrariety of their avowed Princi­ples to the Right of this Government; and of their Actions to any Principles, but such as may free them from Slavery to their Promises or Oaths; and at the same time might enslave all others: as if their Freedom were purchased at this Price, and were the Reward of such Merits.

I cannot but use this Book of one of so setled a Reputa­tion for learning, as a Demonstration, that it is necessary for their own Sakes, as well as for the Good of Mankind, that Clergy-men should not, in these Matters, be wise [Page 7]beyond what is written in our Law: If I am thought to expose the Nakedness of a Spiritual Father, I doubt not, but it will be pardonable, if not meritorious, when it is to preserve the Chastity and Freedom of our common Parent.

The Subject of the Book being of the Disposal of King­doms, and conferring of Power, the Measures of Power, or manner of enjoying it, might seem not to fall within the Question; and yet it will appear that here lyes the Hinge of the Controversie: for if the Government of England be in King, Lords, and Commons; then, Vid. Grot. de Jure belli & pacis de mo­do habendi potesta­tem. whatever Difference there be in the Modus habendi potestatem, ‘the manner in which the Sovereignty, or absolute Power, where­by the Nation is governed, is enjoyed;’ the King may, as Grotius has it, in partem non suam involare, ‘seize upon, or usurp that part of the Soveraignty which does not be­long to him:’ or to speak strictly (as the Soveraignty is in­divisible, though enjoyed by several) he may take to him­self alone, what the laws have communicated to him and to others.

And there would be no manner of Consequence, that a Conquest over the King, should, ipso facto, transfer the Dominion to the Conqueror, so far as to make the Subjects P. 20. In giving one Prince a Con­quest over another, he thereby puas one in Possession of the others Dominions, he makes the others Subjects become his Subjects, or his Slaves, as they come in upon Conditions, or at the Will of the Conqueror. Slaves, unless they obtain Conditions from the Conqueror, which is maintain'd in this Book.

And whereas the learned Author pretends that he has sufficiently provided against the Charge of Vid. Pref. Novelty, by the Number of Authorities (to no purpose, as I shall shew) I challenge him to bring one Author of clear Credit, who holds any thing like this.

I take Grotius to have given a much safer Rule in this, Grot. de Jure belli, P. 503. Potest autem Impe­rium victori acqui­ri vel tantum ut est in rege aut alio im­perante & tunc in ejus duntaxat jus succeditur non ul­tra, vel etiam ut in populo est, &c. and yet to have gone to the utmost Stretch, when he says, Do­minion may be acquir'd by a Conqueror, either only so much as is in the King or other Ruler; and then he succeeds only to his Right, and no farther: or also so much as is in the People.

All the Right of the People Grotius supposes not to be acquired meerly by a Victory over the Prince; where the Prince had not the Soveraignty absolutely and solely in him: and that in such Case the Conqueror succeeds only to that Right which the other had: that is, to a Govern­ment according to the Laws of that Country. But our Reverend Author is express, P. 49.50. That though the Prince that is disseized was obliged by that Law while he was in Possession, it never was a Law to the Prince that is now in his Place.

And thus by the Conquest of a Prince, limitted by Laws, according to him, the Conqueror would not only acquire all the Power which the Law gave the other; but would be let into a Power by Gods Gift, without any le­gal Limits.

But this Supposition, as it is wholly precarious, is very absurd, in any Government where the Sovereignty is communicated to more than one.

And how it is in England, next to the Determination of our Law-makers, who are the Judges ordained by God, recourse ought to be had to Men, whose Profession it is, to be acquainted with the Laws and History of the Go­vernment; but the Divine thinks himself insignisicant, if he cannot, like the Pope of Rome, hook-in Civil Power, and the Decision of its Rights, in Ordine ad Spiritualia; and therefore some Rule must be found out, common to all Soveraign Princes or Kings, as such; and that Rule must be one of which Divines may be allowed to be the most competent Judges, or Interpreters.

Whereas, therefore this Author resolves all Gods ways of conferring Power. 1. Into the Right of the First Pa­rents, called Patriarchical. 2. Conquest. 3. God's Nomi­nation. 4. Consent of the People.

1. He makes those Rights, which belong to one who was King by Divine Nomination, equally to belong to all of them. For, says he,

David; P. 5. as being a Prophet inspired, best knew the Mind of God, and his ways of dealing with Mankind. And David, as being called to be a King, by the immediate Designation of God, best knew what belonged to that Digni­ty. His word therefore is on all accounts a sufficient Proof.

He is indeed there speaking of the Exaltation to Power, P. 4. but either the Exaltation is all that be­longs to the Power, and then there is only a Name with­out Power till Man has consented; or else by what be­longs to the Dignity, he means all its Rights, or the Rights of Sovereignty. Whatever therefore was a Right of Sovereignty in David, is according to him the Right of all Kings, as such; because David was a King by the immediate designation of God.

And therefore where one who is called King has not such a Right of Sovereignty, P. 18, 19. as he sup­poses to be common to all Kings, he will have the Govern­ment to be properly a Commonwealth.

Wherein he has thought fit to explain the mystery, how it came to pass that all who hold Their present Majesties Right to this Government, after the Declara­tion of the States of the Kingdom, upon the late King's breach of the Original Contract, and Abdication; are run down as Republicans, and Enemies to the Monarchy; though they are the only Men who would preserve it to Their present Majesties.

And it is not an unpleasant story, for the truth of which I will not vouch; That when a Man was recom­mended to a Place of very great Trust, though he had [Page 10]been a constant Companion of them who Caball'd against their Majesties; this being objected, his Patron should say, O Sir! he is a Friend to the Monarchy.

2. As with this High Monarchical Author, the Rights of all Sovereign Princes and Kings, as such, are equal; he is not shy of letting the World know what Their Right is; P. 20. P. 64. and that it is a Right to make the Subjects Slaves: or in other words of his own, to do with them and theirs what they please.

For that he tells us is the Right of War, or of a Conqueror; and all Kings have the same Right, or else what David shews to have belonged to the Dignity, would not be a Rule to this day.

3. One would think that the consent of Men who are at liberty to dissent, proceeds from their Choice; and that they who chuse one to reign over them who had no Right before that Choice, P. 11. P. 11. give him the Kingdom; and that this (as himself calls it) is the Act of Man, and merely an Human Act.

But if this were only an Human Act, then the Govern­ment would be founded in Contract, if it was not given in an absolute manner; and the King that was chosen might be no other sort of Sovereign than Humane Laws made him. Wherefore it is necessary that this meer Hu­mane Act should not be a meer Humane Act, but should be spiritualiz'd to come within Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction; and that the Authority should be immediately from God only; and become such an Authority as he gives a King of his own Nomination, or one to whom he has given the Kingdom, in way of Judgment, upon an Appeal to him, and Tryal by Battle.

To get clear of the troublesom Objection here, you must understand, that there are but two grounds for their Election: 1. Real Merit in the Person chosen. 2. Favour towards him. P. 13. Where there is Real Merit, they could not go beside him in their Choice, they took him as one already chosen of God.

As to Favour, P. 14. whereby they prefer one be­fore others of as much Merit, it is the same great God who rules the roaring of the Sea, and the multitude of the People.

But if the Translators of the Bible were as well skill'd in the Hebrew, Psal. 6;.7. and rightly rendred it tumult or madness of the people; the most tumul­tuous, irregular and undue Election, would by this be ascrib'd to God as his immediate act.

But whether the Choice were regular or irregular, they it seems were not free to chuse, or not to chuse.

And as the Poet has it—

And according to our B—, where Men thought they exercis'd a Free Faculty given them by God; the Man of Merit took their Subjection as his Right, be­cause God had mark'd him out as their King; which would warrant the Usurpations of any Man, who could latter himself into a perswasion that he merited to be King.

But where they chose without Merit, it seems it was Choise without liberty to dissent, and consequently tho' his Choice were a sinful act, as sometimes it might be; [...]et he who makes God the Author of the Choice by is immediate Act, makes him the Author of the Sin. ^(a)

But as the Choice of the People is made no Choice; [...]ery little room is left by this Author even for that [...] Choice. For,

1. Where a Kingdom is Hereditary, P. 16. there [...]e Ancestors consented once for all following [...]enerations; and then though the Heir who Claims by [Page 12]Descent from the first Monarch, should be a natural Fool or Mad-man; God has given him the Kingdom for a per­petual Inheritance: and all the acts of the People alone, to set him aside be­fore his actual Possession, are a meer nullity: they can acquire no right against that which God alone has given the Prince, by reason of his P. 16. For the De­rivation of that Right to their Persons, they owe it only to God; for it comes to them by their Birth, and they owe their Birth only to God. Birth.

2. As the Succession is continued to the Heir of the Family, Pag. 15. Sect. 26. without other Human Act than the first consent; if the Crown be taken from the Heir of the Family, and another comes to en­joy it, 'tis God who Pag. 19. This (says he) can be understood of nothing else but the Con­quest of one Prince over an other. This which seems there to be only a Conquest over the Prince, he soon advances to a Conquest over the Nation; For thereby (he says) God makes the others Subjects become his Subjects or Slaves, accordingly as they come in, &c. God's putting down one being here ex­tendable to all cases of removals, even by Death, or cession, he, Pag. 49. finds it needful to insi­nuate as if he had proved in Sect. 26. only That Con­quest is the way by which a Kingdom is taken from a Sovereign Prince against his will. puts down one, and sets up another; and in all cases where God does this, it is by Conquest, and can be no otherwise understood. And in the case of Conquest, no con­sent of the People is required, but [thereby] God puts one in possession of the other's Dominions, before the Peo­ple express any consent to receive him for their Prince: and tho' the Con­queror should condescend to make them his Subjects, they are his Slaves by right of War. Should they capi­tulate with their Swords in their Hands, while the Event of a War which they might threaten, were doubtful; Yet God has given them up for Pag. 20. He makes the others Subjects become his Subjects or Slaves, ac­cordingly as they come in upon Conditions or with­out. Slaves, they have no Right to capitulate, but in their very capitulating, resist God's Ordinance, while they would put Li­mitations upon a Prince who by a Right given of God ought to be Absolute: and extort by force a Promise, Pag. 11. [Page 13]perhaps, to observe the Laws of the Country, from one to whom they never were nor ought to be Laws. Here our State-Casuists would find these Flaws in the Claim which the Subjects might make to their Ancient Freedoms.

1. The Prince his Promise is but the Grant of one in full Possession of an Absolute Power; and the Sovereign Power cannot bind it self.

2. It cannot have the nature of a binding Contract; because the People were but Slaves at the time of the Contract.

3. The Terms are extorted by force.

4. God Almighty has, prior to any consent of the People, entrusted the Prince with an Absolute Power, which he must exert upon necessity; and has made him the Judge of the necessity.

Since therefore, according to Men of these Notions, W. I. was a Conqueror, and the late King succeeded to the Right of the Conqueror; it is pretty plain, that the Exercise of the Dispensing Power, would not have brought the Ʋnion between the late King and his Subjects to a State next to a Dissolution; P. 66. had it not fell heavy upon the Clergy, who always intended to ex­empt themselves from the Consequences of their own Doctrine.

3. But suppose the Conqueror or his Heir should use the Right of Conquest over his Subjects, and make them his Slaves, notwithstanding former Concessions; the People are by this Author tied up from freeing themselves. He says indeed very truly, P. 24. If a Prince will have no Law but his Will, if he tramples and oppres­seth his People, their Patience will not hold out always, they will at one time or other shew themselves to be but Men.

But may they shew themselves to be Men? No, God forbid! What, shall Slaves rebel because they are used as Slaves? It is enough that they are allowed Prayers and [Page 14]Tears, the Arms of the Church: if the Prayers are in Church-Form, and the Tears flow decently and in order, God will raise up to them a Deliverer in some Foreign Sovereign Prince: till then they must wait.

And for their Comfort, P. 32. though all their Proceed­ings towards their Deliverance by War, have an O­riginal Nullity, even their Invitation of a Foraign Prince, how great soever the Occasion be; yet a Forraign Prince need not be very scrupulous.

If he be of their Religion, P. 45. He hath disco­vered an Hostile Mind towards the Professors of it. Na Pufendorf allows Subjects to use, even an absolute Prince as an E­neiny, if he discover an Hostile Mind towards them. Nay, allows this to any one, whom the Prince thus casts out of the Number of his Subjects, Pufend. Elim. Jurisprud. P. 340. and they are persecuted upon the Acount of their Religion; their Persecutor having dis­covered an Hostile Mind against all of the Religion, this is a Cause of War, which will justifie the Arms of a Fo­reign Prince.

But Religion is not to be preserved by any Sword, that is not Canonically ordained, or Consecrated.

If a Foreign Prince see himself in extream Dan­ger of suffering an intollerable Injury, P. 36. by another Prince's Oppression of his own People, (though God had given them up for Slaves) then he may make an open actual Invasion, Ibid. in Defence of another Kings Subjects; but rather to ward off the Injury which he was in danger of suffering.

But this Rule is not limitted to an intollerable Injury; but may be extended to justifie a War, P. 24. Princes have no other way to right them­selves for the least Injury. P. 30. Their Rights and Injuries are insepa­rably Joyned with those of their Kingdoms and Na­tions, &c. They must in­sist upon those Rights, with which God hath entrusted them for others, more than themselves: It is not only their Interest, but their Duty so to do. upon the receiving, or fearing the least Injury: and it is not only Lawful, but a Duty to God, for the Sakes of their own Subjects, to right themselves by War.

But the Sufferings of the People of other Nations, are then only to be relieved by a Foregin Prince; when he has a particular Interest, or Cause of his own, and receives im­mediate Prejudice thereby, or fears that he may.

Indeed, P. 47. As it is necessary, &c. so. when it is necessary to do this for themselves; then they ought to do it much the rather for the Sakes of their oppressed Brethren: no sufficient Cause, it seems, is to be found in that com­mon Relation between Mankind, Grotius, de Jure Bel­li & pacis, lib. 2 c 25. Sect. 6. Postrema, la­tissimeque patens est hominum inter se conjunctio, que vel sola ad opem feren­dam sufficit. upon which alone, Grotius and others, would justifie the Heroes of Past Ages; who have undertaken the Deliverance of oppressed Nations, meerly for the Sake of common Humanity, and as they were fit Objects of their Compassion.

They who confine Deliverers to selfish Ends, seem to envy them their greatest Glory; or to have been so sordi [...] themselves, as to have had no Idea of this Vertue: and like Mr. Hobbs, to draw a Scheme of Humane Natur [...] from too solitary a Dwelling at Home.

Whatever Latitude was given to warrant the Expedi­tions of Soveraigns, here they are confined: because per haps some could not imagine that they should take Plea­sure in what is so disinterested. But for Subjects, P. 32. how much soever oppressed, they have no Right to make War without Leave of their Prince. Ibid. None have Right of making War, but they that are in Soveraign Power. Whoever, it seems, is in Soveraign Power, though he be not the Supream, or Chief in Power, he is no Sub­ject: and you may be sure the Prince will never give his Subjects leave to make War against himself.

It must therefore be some Foreign Soveraign Prince, who makes War against the oppressing Prince; otherwise the War is not only unjust, P. 32. but no Right can be accquired by Success: there is an original Nullity in all the Proceedings.

Very good! But let us now apply this to our present Case, that we may come out of the Clouds. To make the Discourse pertinent, it must be admitted, that a War was made upon the late King, while he continued King, and that he was dispossessed against his Will.

Here I would ask this serious Question: Is not our De­liverance, and the Settlement of the Crown occasioned thereby, Vid. Pref. No other Doctrine than that which has been recei­ved and past for cur rent in the Church of England, ever since the Reformation, not only condemned, but ren­dered a meer Nullity, by the plain Conse­quence of this Doctrine, insinuated as the Doctrine of the Church of England?

All must agree, that King William, while he was but Prince of Orange, and Stadhol­der of Holland, was invited over by many of the Nobility, Gentry, and Clergy of this Land; that his Arms were joyned by Men of all Orders, immediate­ly upon his Landing; that he was, upon the late King's Withdrawing, petitioned to accept the Administration of the Government, and after that, freely chosen, toge­their with his Princess, to supply the vacant Throne: with­out any Force offered by him to the late King, or the People; much less setting up for himself, and compelling them to declare him King.

This I take to be the true State of the Question; but if we suppose such a State of it, as may make the B—s Discourse consistent, and to purpose, it must be ad­mitted.

1. That all they who invited the Prince to assist them, departed from the Doctrine of the Church of England.

2. That however, he having had Success, thereby im­mediately became rightful King: and that all who were for the Regency, or opposed his being King, equally de­parted from the Doctrine of the Church of England.

But upon the true State of the Case, there may natu­rally arise these two Questions, not here to mention more.

1. Whether, if King James were conquered, Vid. P. 49. it was by the then Prince of Orange, or by the People of England? and whether the Prince, or the Peo­ple, took the Dominion from the late King, against his Will?

2. Whether the Deliverance, in which his present Maje­sty was so gloriously instrumental, was, according to this Discourse, by a Soveraign Prince? That our King was not a Soveraign Prince, barely as Stadholder of Holland, must be granted; and then as to the Principallity of Orange, even according to this Book, though the Cause of War between the French King and the States, or their Stadholder, were unjust on that King's side; yet it was not only lawful, but a Duty for the Subjects of that Principality, P. 57. to obey the French King: Nay, the Government is so far setled in that King, that we are to presume a Right; for, says he, Wheresoever this is once setled, P. 51. whether by length of time, or even sooner, by general Consent of the Peo­ple; there it ought to be presumed there is a Right, at least there ought to be no farther Dispute of it.

But the Principallity of Orange is now setled in the French King, by a general Consent of the harassed People: his Right to it therefore is not to be disputed.

Farther yet, if that Principallity were feudatory to France; then by the Feudal Law it was subject to Forfei­ture, for the Fault of the Owner: and then, according to the Discourse, he was no Soveraign Prince; P. 19. for all Soveraign Princes, as they have their Authority from God, so they are only accountable to him.

2. Perhaps it may be said, Inconsisten­cies. that my Questi­ons here are not properly applied, they belong­ing to his Notion of Conquest; whereas our Case is not of a Conquest, but of an Eviction and a Deliverance thereup­on: which leads me to his Inconsistencies.

But I must premise, that no Man can avoid his own Positive Assertions, by contradicting himself elsewhere, [Page 18]especially by Contradictions to the very Ground-work and Foundation which he lays. The only way to Merit a Pardon of dangerous Positions, is ingenuously toretract them.

Besides, as he denies the Right of Conquest to any, but one who was a Sovereign Prince before; so he denies him the Right of a Deliverer, not allowing him to make War for a Deliverance. So that admit he were consistent throughout, yet my second question would deserve an answer.

But in truth it will appear, that either a Deliverer is one, who but calls, or suffers himself to be call'd a Deliverer, when he is a real Conqueror; or else his Notion herein is a direct Contradiction to his Fundamental Positions, and the manifest Drift of his Arguments; or rather Affirma­tions; for perhaps his Book is as improperly call'd a Dis­course, as any that has come out a good while.

If, Page 66. says he, another Prince, having a just cause of War, is so far concerned for an oppressed People, as to take them into his care; and to declare that he makes War for their Deliverance: The Effect of this War, though we may call it a Conquest, because it has a Resemblance of it, yet it cannot be properly so in any respect, &c. As to the Prince on whom it is made, it is properly an Eviction, by the just Sentence of God, Page 67. &c. As to the People, it cannot be a Conquest over them, who are so far from having the War made against them, that it was made chiefly for their Sakes. If there be any Pretence of a Conquest, it is only over them that were their Oppressors. But as for them that were oppressed, it makes all together on their side; so that they are the Conquerors in Effect, for they have the Benefit of it: And he that obtain'd this for them, hath a much more glorious Title than that of a Conqueror; for he is properly their Restorer and Deliverer. And elsewhere he says, Page 70. Though one may Conquer and drive out an Oppressing Prince, he may have no Right of Conquest.

This seems very plausible, but either is a downright Contradiction to his Fundamental Position; or is none of the ways, in which, according to him, God disposes of a Kingdom, when he puts down one Prince and sets up another; for, according to him, in all cases where God does this; immediately upon the Conquest of the Prince, the Conqueror [thereby,] in vertue of that Conquest, is by God put into Possession of the others Dominions: V. sup. Discourse p 56, 57. No consent of the People, &c So p. 28. he makes the others Subjects become his Subjects, or Slaves; Accordingly, as they come in, or sub­mit: and it is their Duty to obey him before he has their Consent.

Farther yet he says, Vid. inf. p 49. Conquest being the way by which a Kingdom or Dominion is taken from a Sovereign Prince against his Will; and by which another Prince gets into his Possession: as often as this happens, there arises a question between the two Princes, whether of them hath a Right to the Kingdom or Dominion.

This he will have to be decided by the Law of Nations, a Law common to both: P. 50. That can­not be the Law of the King­dom; for the the Prince that is disseiz'd, was oblig'd by that Law while he was in Possession; yet now it seems he is not; and it never was a Law to the Prince that is now in his place. for the Law of the Land, he holds that to be a Law to neither.

Where the People may take this for their Comfort, that if the Prince dispossessed or evicted, should be restored again; he will come back freed from all the Laws of the Country: Nor is the Prince, who Conquers him, a Re­storer of those Laws, eo nomine, as he is a Deliveror; for whatever the Assurances might have been, to induce the People to assist him, or not to assist the other; they are his Slaves, till he has condescended to grant them Liberty upon their coming in, or submitting after he has con­quered their Prince, or delivered them from his Person: but as to the Oppressions, what might have been an Usur­pation [Page 20]in their Legal King, would be but Right of War in a Deliverer. And thus if the Restorer or Deliverer dispossess the other, the Deliverer and Conqueror differ not, as to the Right which they acquire, or in Reality, but in name. P. 27. so 28. The Eviction was by God's Sentence; the effect of which, he says, is a just Conquest.

And if he be consistent with himself, he must agree, that however the People please themselves with the sound of the word, P. 63. Sect. 47. the Deliverer may by right of War, do with them and theirs what he pleases: for this he makes the right of War in all cases, where a War is made upon their Prince for just cause; and the Deliverer is one whom he supposes to have had a just cause of War: P. 66. Sect. 48. P. 59. but where the Justice of the War is certain, the Right of a Conquest he takes to be clear. And if we consider what he says, against a Deliverer's acquiring the Right of War, we may see that it is not with intent of opposing, if he insists upon that Right.

1. P. 67. sup. The People are the Conquerors in effect, because they have the Benefit of it; but if that Benefit is denied, they are not Conquerors in effect.

2. He says it has always been judged by the People of God, that such an one as he describes, is not properly a Con­queror: but mark his Proof, we have the Example of the Jewish Church in the time of Alexander the Great. I need not observe that this is a palpable Contradiction to our B—'s Letter about Jaddus, Vid. The Letter to D [...]. Sherlock about Jaddus, p. 28. This Story of Jaddus affords us a very good unquestionable instance of the Judgment of the Jewish Church in his Age; That it is lawful to submit to a Prince that comes in by Conquest. wherein he holds that the Jewish Church submitted to Alexander as coming in by Conquest. He gives other Examples of the like Nature in Cyrus and Constantine; but what he says of the last, runs through all, P. 69. though he had acquired a Title by the Expulsion of those Princes who had been Oppressors; and might have taken the Government upon him as a Conqueror; he did not.

But the Titles which all these Deliverers acquired, the Right which they might have us'd, was Conquest: and if they had thought fit to use the right of Conquest, ac­cording to himself, they were compleat Conquerors; and if they lost that Right, it was only for their Lenity. An admirable Admonition to Princes to have a care of being too generous.

Two of these Princes were Pagans; the third appears not to have been Christened when he set this Example: And yet because he held the (a) First General Council, and gave the Clergy Secular Power; he, by receding from his Right, made a binding Law to restrain the Right of fol­lowing Princes. Oh! the strength and weight of the Argument. (a) P. 69.

3. What has been observed under the former Head, might be enough to shew the doubtfulness and ambiguity of the Discourse, The doubtfulness and am­biguity of the Discourse. as if intended to serve either Prince or Peo­ple, and to impose upon both. But sometimes it is not unprofitable to shew the same Notions in different Lights.

One who comes to the Possession of a Crown by Succefs in War over a Sovereign Prince, may think he has Right of Conquest; for that is ascribed to all Princes whom God sets up, upon dispossessing another. But then

1. It is not enough to become a Prince by God's Gift of the Kingdom, but he must have been a Sovereign Prince before, or all is a nullity, God's Gift is void.

2. He must be sure not to suffer himself to be called a Deliverer, without Right of Conquest: for if he were such an one, he would not be a Prince of God's setting up; and therefore as he would maintain his Title from God, he must assert the Right of a Conqueror.

3. But call him Conqueror, Deliverer, or what you please, the Discourse founds his Right, upon the Dominions being taken from one against his Will; and another's coming into Possession.

If therefore both the one and the other be in some cases the Act of the People; then he lays no Foundation for any Right of Conquest, but what will be an equal Right in all Conquests; though the People be themselves the Conquerors over themselves.

Farther yet he comforts Princes, P. 23. That though they should be guilty of Breach of Faith, not only to their People, but to God also, yet they may not therefore be deposed by them. And yet he admits, That the Laws are the Bond of Ʋnion between Prince and People, P. 66. and that by these the Prince holds his Prerogative.

But the Breach of this Bond on the Prince's side, by his Act, he will have only so to loosen the Ʋnion, that it may be next to Dissolution. It seems there is some School-distinction between breaking a Bond, and dissolving a Bond. But one would think that when the Bond is broken by the Prince, it is dissolved by the Prince; and no doubt he meant so, but thought not fit to say so much. But per­haps, since he speaks of a Sovereign Prince; according to his Notion of Sovereignty, he might believe that he may break his Faith or Promise, and yet not break the Law, because his Will is the Law.

However he grants, P. 7. Sect. 6. That whosoever disobeys or resists the publick Order and Government of the Kingdom or State where he lives, he disobeys or resists the Ordinance of God.

The King therefore in a limited Government, where his Will is not a Law, nor can he dispense with Laws, may himself disobey the publick Order and Government. And by his breach of those Laws by which he holds his Preroga­tive, and which are the Bond of Ʋnion between him and his Subjects, may break or dissolve the Bond; and then he is no more their King. And thus the People are de­cently let into the Sovereignty, and may make War against him without Rebellion: Nay, he who was their [Page 23]Prince till the Dissolution of the Bond, resists the publick Order and Government, if he goes about to force himself upon them again.

Which are the lucid Intervals, those that bind up the Peoples Hands in all cases, unless Foreign Princes inter­pose; or those that set them free by the Act and virtual Cession of their Kings, we shall know when Elias, or someother Great Prophet comes. But the Book seems not so much to justifie submitting to a Deliverer, as to con­demn them that have not the patience, in all cases, to wait God's time for raising up some Foreign Prince for their Deliverer. Nor have Men reason to flatter them­selves with the Notion of a Deliverer, which has no Foundation in this Book: and if the Prince be a Deliverer, he must set up himself, or the People must set him up: For all that are of God's setting up, are Conquerors with Right of Conquest.

Again, the People may use the formality of a Choice, but it is no such thing in reality; this Act was not meerly humane, but divine.

And the Prince may think this God's immediate Act; and yet though he were a Conqueror, and had the Right of Conquest given and adjudged to him ^(a) by God him­self; this might have been by P. 53. So it was by those Conquests that God removed Kings, and set up Kings; though we see not that it was any more than by the permissive Provi­dence of God, &c. no more than the per­missive Providence of God.

4. It has appeared already, that he would have what David mentions, as belonging to the Royal Dignity, The weakness of reason­ing, want of Authority, and gross mistakes, in re­lation to those Rights of Princes which he would infer, from Passages, or Omissions, in Sacred or o­ther Writings. to be a Rule in all Ages and Countries. But David says of God Almighty, agreeably to what I shall shew of the Donation to Noah and his Sons, The Earth hath he given to the Children of Men. Which cer­tainly comprehends Dominion as well [Page 24]as Soil; and is a Confutation of his Notion of the Patriar­chical Power.

David says, God established a Testimony in Jacob, and ap­pointed a Law in Israel. Here God was the Law-Maker, not the King; as every Prince truly a Sovereign, accord­ing to the Notion which I oppose, is.

It appears that the Law which David tells us God established in Israel, Vid. Deut. 17. ver. 18, 19, &c. had particular Clauses li­miting the Right of the King. Here at least was a Law of the true nature of a Contract, superior to the King; and that the Law of a State or King­dom: Will they allow the Law of the Kingdom to be thus superior to their Sovereign?

The Rolls of this Law some Jewish Rabbins affirm that their Kings destroyed. When therefore our Learned B— shall produce an authentick Copy of the Law, or that manner of the Jewish Kingdom which Sa­muel wrote in a Book, 1 Sam. 25. and laid up before the Lord; his Arguments from the Jewish Polity may deserve Con­sideration: and yet what the present B— of Worcester says in his Irenicum would have its due weight.

Those who plead the obligatory nature of Scripture-Exam­ples, Iren. p. 13. must either produce the Moral Nature of these Examples, or else a Rule binding us to follow these Examples: especially when these Examples are brought to found a new positive Law obliging all Christians.

From hence he proceeds to treat of God's ways of conferring Sovereign Power immediate­ly in the Patriarchs time. Vid. p. 7. Marg. Ib Sect. 8. This (he says) at first was from God we are sure; because it was from the beginning of Mankind. The first Men that were born into the World, were all of Adam 's Family. And so were all that came after, till some of them went forth, as Cain did, to make Families for themselves.

Observe the reasoning here, We are sure it was from God, because it was from the beginning of Mankind.

Does he mean here from the Creation of Man; from the first Multiplying or Infancy of the Subjects; or from their Maturity and years of Discretion?

If the first, then we are sure Civil Polity, or Sovereignty, was not from the Beginning of the World: unless there was a King with­out a Subject. The second cannot be said to be Subjects of a Civil Polity; Pufend. Ele­menta Juris­prud. cap. ultim. and Pufendorf grounds the Paternal Power over them, upon their presum'd Consent. But for the last, it would be no Consequence, that because they were Subjects while they were not capable of Dissenting; therefore they must continue so when they are at years of consent. And if the Sovereignty began when they commenced Men; then there is no Presumption to the con­trary; but that it began upon their consent: nor will they be oblig'd to give up their Lives, and the Fruits of their Labours to their Parents, meerly for their having exercised that Affection towards them in their Childhood, which Nature both requires, and delights in.

Himself admits, that the Sons, when they come of Age, may chuse whether they will be under their Fathers Government or no: for he places the Power in being Father of the Family; and allows the Sons then to make Families by themselves, and to set up for Independent Princes: This is plain from the in­stance of Cain; Gen. 4.16, 17. he of his own accord left his Fa­thers Family, and built him a City. Till then, says our B— they were govern'd by the common Father of Mankind. Page 8.

So that Cain, who voluntarily deserted his Fathers Family, by that act of his, set up himself King in the Life-time of his Father.

But this Man was not the Patriarch, had no Divine Nomina­tion or Appointment; nor is it likely he should have: for he went out from the presence of the Lord, Gen. 4.16. cast off the Theocrasie, nor had any Appointment that ap­pears from his Father. Either then that City or Civil Society was govern'd popularly; or if he was a Sovereign, it was of the Free Choice of the Society; for otherwise he had no Right at all.

And thus Cain bids fairest for being the first Independent Mo­narch in the World; while Adam was under the Theocrasie: and this he must grant in consequence of his own words elsewhere: For, says he, when Jacob and all his Family went down into Egypt, Page 9. there ended their Patriarchical Go­vernment.

It appears therefore, that the Patriarchical Government was infe­rior to the Monarchical: And if Adam should have gone to dwell in Cain's City, his Patriarchical Government would have ended.

This matter is so intreagued, that I need not enquire.

1. Vid. Gielfusii op. pol. p. 5. An fuisset fu­tura politia instatu Innocentiae? Aff. Quia fuissent futurae Societates in primis duae priores eaeque certo ordine inter se devinctae: nulla tamen fuisset in imperando vio­lentia vel injustitia, sed dulcis harmonia. Hooker 's Eccles. Pol. c. 1. f. 26. There were as yet no Civil Societies, no manner of Publick Regiment established. Whether there was any occasion for the Rights of Sovereignty in the State of Innocence?

2. V. Gen. 9.3, 5, 6. Whether Power over Life was given by God to Man, till after the Flood?

3. Targum of On­kelos Polyg. f. 35 Quicunque effu­derit sangui­nem hominis, per testes ex sententia judicum sanguis ejus fundetur. Whether that Power, when it was given, was an Arbitrary Power; or only to be exercised in the way of Judicature?

4. Digests, Lib. 1. Tit. 61. Whether the Compilers of the Digests were in the Right, when they say, That the Law whereby Children begotten in Lawful Marriage, are in the Power of the Parents; (and that as the Commentator explains it, so far, as that they acquire for their Parents) is, Jus proprium civi­um Romanorum; "a Law peculiar to the People of Rome?

But to follow our Author to Noah. Noah was the Father of all them that lived after the Flood; P. 8. Sect. 8. and he was their Governor too, till his Children were too many to live in one Country, or under one Government: and then they branched themselves into Nations, among whom the Earth was divided.

Is this agreeable to Holy Writ? what matter for that, it serves the Hypothesis. Tho the Scripture shews expresly, that God gave the whole Earth, Vid. Gen. 9.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. and the Power over Life, to Noah and his Sons; and the whole Covenant was between God on one part, and Noah and his Sons on the other.

Upon which Mr. Mare Clausum, f. 13. Certe non obscura verum plane commu­nionis vestigia occurrunt, in donatione illa numinis, qua Noachus & tres filii ejus, &c. domini pro indiviso rerum omnium facti sunt. That Noah and his Sons, were, by Gods Donation, Lords of all things in common.

Either no natural Right can be inferred from this, because it was Gods immediate Free Gift; or it shews that they who are [Page 27]adult, have Right to share in Dominion with their Parents. Either way it cuts off the Patriarchical Power, which he would continue till Jacob went into Egypt. Pag. 9.

The Scripture says, Gen. 10.32. The Nations were divided in the Earth, after the Flood, by the Families of the Sons of Noah: And that the Families were after their Tongues.

He will have it to be by Noah's Children, and speaks of it as if it were a regular branching themselves into Nations; because the Children were too many to live in one Family. Page 8. He takes no notice of the dispersion upon the Confusion of Tongues; from which time, to God's setting up a King in Israel, he elsewhere owns that perhaps in some Nations it was the Peoples part to chuse who should rule over them. Page. 9.

This, if we consider it, will be more than a perhaps. Upon the Confusion of Tongues, there were 70, Cluverius Epit. Hist. as Cluverius holds. Noah's Children were not so many as there were different Tongues and Nations. The Heads of Families could not then be distinguished, and the People of every different Tongue must have chosen to themselves Heads, or have so many Commonwealths, or Communities without a So­vereign or Supreme Head.

When (says he) the Fathers, or some of those Nations, made Con­quests upon one another, as Nimrod did on the Nations about him, who was called a mighty Hunter before the Lord; or when they were other­wise incorporated together. These made the ancient great Monarchies whereof the Assyrian and Egyptian are famous in ancient History.

This his great Hunter before the Lord, or upon the face of the Earth, was an Usurper, and a Tyrant. And ^(a) Men of greater Autho­rity than himself, instead of before the Lord, render it against the Lord. But,

1. The Heads of those Nations, as appears, were not all Patriar­chical Heads, but many of them must have been Chosen by the People.

2. He leaves room for a voluntary Incorporation of all Fathers of Families; in which we say consists a Civil Society.

3. Families so incorporated, cannot be dissolved at pleasure of every Individual, as his Patriarchate may.

4, Several Powers and Necessities arise upon such an Incorpo­ration, of Men who have distinct Interests and Properties; which are not within single Families, where the Property is in one.

5. According to himself, God had given the Power to every one of these Fathers before the Incorporation. And the Sons of these Fathers are admitted at full age to make themselves Families; and so, ad infinitum: these are a Community or People. And all these, as Fathers of Families, have equal Patriarchical Power.

If then this Power be Sovereign; when they, or the majority, give up their Power to One, the People give him a Sovereignty over them, which he had no Right to before their Gift. And thus, with God's Permission, the People confer Power, Quod erat demonstrandum.

Upon his supposed Expiration of the Patriarchate in Egypt, Pag. 9. to the setting up of Kings, he will have it, That God's People were governed first by Moses, as a King; and after, by Judges of God's Nomination, or what was equi­valent to a Nomination. Which equivalent he soon stretches to a proper Nomination. For, speaking of the Government among God's chosen People, from the Beginning, to Solomon inclusive, Pag. 10. he says, There was no other standing Govern­ment in that Nation which God chose to be his peculiar Peo­ple, but what was administred by single Persons. And those Persons Title to the Government, was Patriarchical, or by Divine Nomination.

He seems to have put in the word [standing] for a fence against instances of other Governments set up among God's People with­in that time. But if the Publick Affairs were regularly admini­stred at any time, under any other known Form of Government, the word [standing] either will not help him, or ought to be struck out. And I desire him to shew the single Person that Govern'd the Commonwealth of Israel; or Headed them upon every Emer­gency, from the time of ^(a) Josuah, to Othniel; during which inter­val, they carried on several Wars with success, in the Name of the People of Israel. I think I need not put him to prove, that the Judges in Israel were Sovereign Princes; or to Answer Mr. Har­rington's Commonwealth of Israel; Nor to evade those Texts which, besides the Prophet, seem to place the High-Priest above the Tem­poral Judge.

When God's Chosen People came to have Kings, he tells us, God was pleased so far to grant his Peoples request, that they should be an Hereditary Kingdom.

The request was to have a King, that they might be like all the Nations. 1 Sam. 8.20. But himself says, In most [Page 29]Nations we read of at that time, it was the Peoples part to Chuse who should Rule over them. ( pag. 9.)

According therefore to them, who would have the manner of the Kings of other Nations at that time to infer a Right in the Jewish Kings; and the manner of the Jewish Kings, a Right in all others; the request of the Jews was not to have such an Hereditary King­dom as he contends for: but a Kingdom wherein the People might chuse their King.

If by Hereditary Kingdom, he means an established Monarchy, where the People were to be Governed by a Succession of Kings, and no other Form of Government: that might be the effect of a Promise made long before. And yet even that related not to all the People of Israel, The Scepter shall not depart from Judah. if it be taken for the Government of one alone over the whole Body of that Nation: For that People was divided into two Kingdoms, however they might have a settled Mo­narchy; and yet the People might have chosen the first King, and every Successor.

For the first King of the reigning Line (he says) God would have the chusing of him himself; and accordingly he chose Saul. But himself admits, That the Kingdom was not Hereditary to him.

Observe so much of the Fundamental Law of the Jewish Kingdom as is now extant, concerning the setting up of a King among them.

When thou shalt say, I will set a King over me, like as all the Na­tions that are about me, Deut 17.14.

Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee whom the Lord thy God shall chuse: one from among thy Brethren shalt thou set King over thee. Thou mayst not set a Stranger over thee which is not thy Brother, ver. 15.

Was this a Law to God himself, or a Promise, That he would never set a Stranger over them? Or was it a Law to them for a Limitation upon their Choice? If it were God's Promise, then he would never have suffer'd them to be in Captivity to any Fo­reign Prince. If it were a Law to them; then how much soever it might be God's Choice, as being within the Rule which he gave them; yet it was properly the Choice of the People.

Suitably to which the Learned Grotius ^(a) rightly observes, That the Law which forbids a Stranger's being set over the People, is to be un­derstood of a Voluntary Election; not of what the People was compelled to do through the necessity of Times.

If we observe the Circumstances previous to Saul's Accession to the Throne, we shall find, that though God had annointed him by his Prophet; that was not a Nomination made known to the People: 1 Sam. 10.16. Ib. ver. 20, 21. the matter of the Kingdom was a Secret kept even from his own Relations. And as the People chose to have a King, they proceeded regularly to the Choice of the Man, within the limitation chosen or appointed by God. The method agreed upon was what, in some sense may be called God's Choice, as Men thereby leave the matter to Chance, or to God's permissive or over-ruling Provi­dence, as he shall think fit. Themselves chose how many Lots to use, but indeed could not put in one for a Stranger.

God here, as in other Instances, as it were to baffle the Notion of Patriarchical Right, permitted or directed the Lot to fall upon Saul, of the House of Benjamin; the youngest Son of Jacob or Israel by Leah; and upon one who was not the Head of the Tribe, nor Head of a Family within that Tribe.

Then says our B—, God made choice of David. David having many Sons; among them all, God chose Solomon to continue the Suc­cession in him and his Heirs, as he did till the Babylonish Captivity. He by his reference in the Margin, founds God's Choice upon the Declaration of his Judgment against Saul, 1 Sam. 13.14. when David is not named; 1 Sam. 16. and it could not be known to Saul, or to the People, whom God design'd Suc­cessor. Samuel indeed had, in Saul's life-time, privately anointed David, the youngest Son of Jesse; and this was known in Jesse's Family. From whence it seems to have been published; but de­pending upon their Credibility, and meer Human Testimony, was not obligatory to the People: yet they having resolved upon chusing David, then took notice of this, as a Divine appointment; 1 Chron. 11. which hindred not their making a Co­venant with him. There was a Free Choice on their side, and Stipulation on David's with a Free People; or rather a mutual Stipulation and Contract.

Our B—'s Notion of an Hereditary Kingdom of Man's set­ting up, is, That it descends to the next in the Line by Right of Birth; Page 15. and that this Right cannot be for­feited: Yet it appears in the Sacred Story, that the Right of Birth which Adonijah had, upon his Hypothesis, was for­feited; because he exalted himself for King in the life­time of his Father. 1 Kings 1.

Nor did the Crown descend to the next after him: Nor yet does it appear that God immediately interpos'd, Ibid. ver. 20. but David set up Solomon, or recommended him to the People; in pursuance of the Promise that he had made to the beautiful Wife of Uriah. 1 Kings 1.17.

And whereas he will have it, that Solomon and his Heirs con­tinued the Succession till the Captivity; it is plain, the Succession was but to two Tribes of Twelve: the other Ten freely chose their King; their Choice was approved of by God, and he never permitted them to return to the House of David: the reason of which, according to Sir Walter Rawleigh, was, Sir W. Rawl. Hi­story, f. 437. that the Kings of the House of Israel used a more tempe­rate Method of Government than the Kings of Judah did.

The Promise that the Scepter should not depart from that House, Judah Jacob 's fourth Son by Rachel. till the Shiloh should come, was such an Ex­altation to that Younger House; that no wonder if it had the like Effect with our Passive Doctrines here.

But consider the Import of the word [Heir] in the Jewish Law, from whence this Writer would derive his Authorities; and it will appear, that the Eldest Son is not according to that, the Patri­arch or sole Father of the Family, upon his Fathers Death; two parts of three was the utmost that the eldest Son was entitled to: And this, as Mr. Selden observes, Deut. 21. v. 15. Selden de jure Succes. ad Leges Ebraeorum, f. 24. was only of what was in the Fathers Possession: what came in right of the Mother, or descended from the Grand-father who survived the Father; descended to all Males equally.

How well he has shewn, Page 14. that all the Kings that God set over his People, were by Divine Nomination; either themselves alone, or they and their Heirs, I leave to his second Thoughts.

I have dwelt too long upon his Scripture account of Power; wherefore shall advertise him but of one Mistake more, which he might have rectified by his Skill, in Profane as well as Sacred Story.

I do not, says he, speak all this while of Free States, or Commonwealths, Page 16. because I do not believe any such Government was known in David 's time; for as we read of no such Scripture, so it is agreed among the most Learned Hea­then Writers, that the first Government every where was by Kings.

Observe the reasoning: there was none in David's time, for the first was by Kings; as if notwithstanding there might not have been Commonwealths both then and before.

But what thinks he of the Commonwealth of Israel, Vid. Harring­ton's Common­wealth of Israel. in the Interval before mentioned, between Joshua and Othniel?

And what thinks he of the several Free Cities and Islands inhabited by Grecian Colonies in David's time? Cluverii epit. Hist. Tit. David.

I cannot but again return to his gross Mistakes about Con­quest.

1. No Consent of the People is requisite to establish the Right.

2. Be the Sovereign in Possession, possessed of the Soverignty only in the Supream manner, tho it be not Absolute; yet by the Conquest of him, it was the Duty of all, to whom the Sove­reignty was communicated, to give it up; tho they had Power to maintain it, and to restore their former King: for they are be­come Slaves immediately, by the Conquest over the Prince. And tho it were in an unjust War, Page 56. Page 57. He refers to Pufend. de Jure Nat. & Gent. 7, 8, 10. If the Usurper has no Pretence of Right, no Prescription of time, no consent of the People, but only an unjust Possession; it is a Duty to obey him, when the Legal King can no more do the Office of a King? Is not this a mighty thorough Settlement? This surely is not to be found in the Convocation-book which has been so much tossed about; much less I am sure is it in that admirable Author Pufendorf, tho the B—makes a general re­ference to several Sections in his Book of the Law of Nations, as if it were to be gathered from thence: and yet himself, in the next Page, cites one of those very Sections, which he refers to, Page 58. in Terms directly contradictory to what he would infer from him: unless a Prince who Con­quers in an unjust War, has a Right beyond him who Conquers in a just one; Pufend. de jure Nat. & Gen­tium VII. 7.3. for Pufendorf is there express, that after a Prince is overcome in a just War, till the Sub­jects consent, the State of War continues: and there is no Obligation, nor Faith; and so no Dominion.

3. In all cases where God puts down one, and sets up another, this is by Conquest; this Conquest must be by a Foreign Sove­reign Prince, and the Conqueror has the Right of War over the Subjects of the dispossessed Prince: From which Rule thus laid down absolutely, there must be these several Exceptions.

1. Himself excepts, and not excepts, the Case of a Deliverance.

2. Reason will oblige him to except the case of a limited Mo­narchy.

3. The case of a Prince's assisting the People to dispossess an Usurper.

4. All Instances when the People have renounced their Alle­giance to one King, and set up another from among themselves: as when Jeroboam, Solomon's Servant, having headed the People of Israel, 1 Kings 11.26. when they urged for an Assu­rance of a Regular Government from his Master's Son Rehoboam; the Servant was advanced to the Go­vernment of Ten of the Tribes, 1 Kings 12.13. after all Israel had renounced the Family of David.

Edward the Second among us, being governed by Gaveston, and the Spencers, murdered his Uncle Thomas Earl of Lancaster, and numbers of Great Men; the People rose against him, Imprisoned him, and a full Representative of the Nation, Anno 1326. Vid. The Porm of it. Knighton Col. 2549. in a Solemn manner renounced their Allegiance to him: but comforted their Abdicated King with the Declaration which they made, that they would suffer his Son Edw. 3. to succeed him.

Rich. 2. had been carried on in the like Extravagancies, by the Loyal Men of his time, the Duke of Ireland, and other Minions; these Men finding a Storm coming upon them, by the just Judg­ment of the Nation, perswaded the King to give himself up as a Vassal to France. The Nation, to secure their publick Regiment, and Laws, deposed him, and set up H. 4. a Subject of this Kingdom, till they made him King.

Upon these Instances, and more which might be brought, I would ask.

1. If there was a Conquest in any one of them, who was the Conqueror? the Prince constituted by the People, or the People who constituted him?

2. Whether the Prince so constituted, had a Right of War over the People?

3. Whether it was a Duty in all these cases, to expect a Deli­verance from some Foreign Sovereign Prince, when perhaps all Neighbour Princes might be Brib'd by Moneys extorted from the Subjects by Oppression and Tyranny; when all might be of the same Religion, or might have the same end in their Govern­ment; and would assist each other to Enslave their People.

5. Reason would except all cases, when a Prince comes with Title, or pretends it: and where he declares the occasion of his Arms, or condition of Success. These being used for Induce­ments to have Right done, or for the Subjects to joyn with, or not oppose him; are implicit Contracts; and either of them is a full bar to farther Claim.

More Exceptions would lye; but these are enough to set aside his General Rule.

5. That the shew of read­ing, and the Positions, are wholly beside the Cushion, not applicable to the Constitution of this Government, nor to the present Debate. It must be confessed, that in this Book he is not come to his second Head: wherein he undertakes to shew, That the work of God, in bringing [his] Majesty into this Kingdom, was truly Gods making use of his Prerogative, in putting down one, and setting up another.

But since his Discourse is with the professed intention of so applying it; surely it is allowable for me to try his Rule for him before hand, if it were only to perswade him to find out other Topicks for the Justification of [their] Majesties Right; and p [...]oving that [her Majesty] is of Gods setting up, as well as [his Majesty.]

This I hold, but am sure I cannot prove it from his Rule, ap­plied either to the Case of an Absolute Conqueror, or to a Deliverer; nor does he so much as pretend to say any thing, to shew that God has made [her Majesty] our Sovereign Lady.

The supposed Conquest would barr her Hereditary or other Right; and her Right, whatever it is, will not admit of a Conquest.

But the States of the Kingdom have declared, That King William and Queen Mary, are, and [of Right] ought to be our Sovereign [Lord] and [Lady.]

Tho this Declaration was made in a Convention of the People, by its Representatives, not called by a King, or Queen; yet the Parliament following declared the Acts of that Convention, which became a Parliament, upon acting in Conjunction with [their Majesties] to be binding Laws.

And if there be any question of [her Majesties] Sovereignty, because the Administration was placed in [his Majesty] the Act of this present Parliament impowering [her Majesty] to Ad­minister the Government during [his Majesties] Absence, has removed that Objection. Neither before that was [her Majesty] a Subject: Nor can a King make a Viceroy to act in his Absence, but such an one as must be a Subject, punishable for Treason against the King.

What shall be thought of them, who Swear Allegiance to [Two] and yet believe it to be due to but [One]?

This alone were enough to shew, that the Quotations and Posi­tions in tha [...] Discourse, are not to the purpose: if it be to justifie the Settlement and Submission to it.

The best which can be said of it is, That the Design is not for the Strength or Honour of the Government; but of the Clergy: And to shew, that though many of them were degenerate Sons of the Church, in contributing to the Revolution, (for all they are given up,) yet in submitting to it, they have done nothing but what is agreeable to that Doctrine; Preface. which (as the Preface has it) has pass'd for the Doctrine of the Church of England, ever since the Reformation.

But if it has pass'd for the Doctrine of our Church, and is not; it were a labour worthy of a Bishop to undeceive Men.

If it is the Doctrine, why should they not admit that it has been assented to only for the sake of Peace? As they say of other Doctrines, which the Church undeniably holds. And why do they continue to maintain it, when it so much disturbs the Peace of this Land, divided only by the means of it?

Farther yet: Our B— must admit, that being the Church is incorporated into the State; the late Bishops are duely depriv'd by the Law, though not Canonically. Why therefore is not an Act of Parliament, which places our present Settlement upon a down-right Contradiction to this Doctrine, enough to set aside a Doctrine which has not so much as a Canon, excepting always the Laudaean, to colour it? And which has no better Foundation than the Roman Traditions.

The Doctrine, perhaps may be suitable to the Canons of 1640. or to the Oath, generally taken by the Clergy, not to bear Arms against the King, or any one Commissionated by him.

The Great and Victorious King Edward I. Stat. 7. E. 1. Rast. f, 25. An. 1279. the Prelates, Earls, Barons, and Comonalty of the Realm, above Four hundred Years ago, set up a Land-Mark to Posterity. Which one would have thought they could not have gone beyond; declaring, That the Subjects are to Aid the King, to Defend Force, and Punish Offenders, [according to the Laws and Vsages of the Realm.]

But in the ferment of Loyalty upon the Restauration, the Flow­ers of some, falling in with the prevailing humour, and hopes of Preferment, made Men quit the substance of lawfully Commissio­nated; though they were convinc'd by the solid Arguments of the Great Vaughan, afterwards Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas, That this was in effect to give up Magna Carta, and all the ancient Li­berties purchasd at the expence of so much Blood and Treasure. It was therefore yielded by the Chief Advocate for a Commission, [Page 36]without the incumbrance of lawful, that it ought to be im­plyed.

But however, it past as a Snare, at a time when it was well known, that if Charles II. was not a Papist, his Brother James was.

But as to the Laudaean Canons of 1640. it was the same Year unanimously resolv'd by the House of Commons; Rash. Hist. Col. 2d. Vol. Resolv'd, Decem. 17. 1640. Nullo contradi­cente. That they do contain in them Matters contrary to the King's Prerogative, the fundamental Laws and Statutes of the Realm, to the Right of Parliament, to the Property and Liberty of the Subject, and Matters tending to Sedition, and of dangerous Consequence.

Nay, Stat. 13. Car. 1. c. 1. Not to con­firm the Canons made An. 1640. that very Parliament in which the High Church, or Laudaean Party, so far prevaild, as to pass the cramping Oath, put a particular Mark of Reprobation upon the Canons of 1640.

And the Oath is now repeal'd: so that if it ought to have been taken strictly, the Constitution of the Government is now freed from the Invasion.

But there is a Notion which makes specious Pretences to be part of the Constitution. Which is, That this Govern­ment has been made Hereditary in such a sence, Discourse, p. 15. that a Right to it is given, by God alone, to the Person who stands next, by reason of Birth.

This imposes upon our B— to believe a necessity to maintain that this Divine Right has been set aside by a Divine Judgment; and that our present Settlement results from the Event of a just War made by a Sovereign Prince: Or, to go in the path of the Answer to Ashton's Paper, Discourse, p. 47. An excellent Book, &c. to which our B— gives his Approbation, or Episcopal Confirma­tion, That the Right to the Government is Conquest.

His Notion of Hereditary, as it has appeard, has no Foundation from among the Jews; Answer to Asht. pag. 23. from whose Polity he would fetch Examples obligatory to us.

Dr. Hicks admits, Pref. to Jov. p. 11. That the words Heir, Heredi­tary, &c. never in the Latin or Greek Authors, signifie in that especial manner, which he presumes that they do here.

And it has been shewn, Vid. The Funda­mental Constitu­tion of the Eng­lish Government, proving Their Majesties our Lawful and Rightful King, and Queen. and may appear more fully, That no such Notion has been anciently receiv'd in our Law.

Our B— says, indeed, from Cerdic, King of the West Sanons, the Descent of our Royal Family is unquestionable.

If he means, that the Descent of the Crown has always from that time gone in a right Line, there is no colour for the Asser­tion. Nay, it will be difficult to shew the Right of the Family, acknowledg'd and observ'd before Ina's time.

If he means that the present Royal Family can make out their Pedigree from Cerdic; what is that to the inalienable Right of Inheritance in the next of the Line?

If by Hereditary, be meant no more than the Inheritance of a Family; such an Inheritance as may solve all the Breaches, or rather Windings in the Royal Line, from Ina's time to this day; we might agree, by putting in Ina at the Head of the Right of the Family.

But I challenge him to shew, that the next Heir of the Family has always succeeded, even from Inas time, or been accounted to have had Right to succeed: or, which is us'd as a Supplement, that the Nomination of the Rightful Possessor has been always had or thought necessary, where he that succeeded was not the next upon the Line.

But to shew to how little purpose he has laboured, I must mind him of the Clause in S. Edward's Laws, the Receiving and Keeping which is part of the Coronation Oath; by which if those Laws are wilfully broken by the King, Nec Nomen Regis in eo constabit. Not so much as the Name of King shall abide in him.

Suitable to this is that Passage in a Speech made by K. James I. to his Parliament; Cited pag. 23. wherein he tells them, Every King in a settled Kingdom is boundto observe the Paction, Na. Paction, or Contract. made to his People by his Laws, in framing his Government agreeable there­to. And that a King governing in a setled King­dom, leaves to be a King, and degenerates into a Tyrant, as soon as he leaves off Governing according to his Laws. In which case the King's Conscience may speak to him, as the poor Wi­dow said to Philip of Macedon, Either Govern according to your Law, Aut ne Rex sis, "Or be no King.

All this our B— himself refers to in his Margin; but tells us in such case, Kings are not to be deposed by the People: nor, indeed, is there need of it; for it appears that they by their own act, cease to be Kings; and therein depose themselves.

If there were any doubt upon so much of the Speech as we now have; there was none in the words then spoken to the Parliament, at [Page 38]least there is none in that Sense in which they took his Speech, and he submitted to.

For they, to keep him to his word, and handsomely to admonish all future Kings, of the Consequence of breaking Fundamental Laws, wisely repeat the Substance of his Speech in the Preamble to an Act of Parliament: wherein they say, His Majesty hath vouch­safed to express many ways, Stat. 1. Jac. 1. c. 1. how far it is, and ever shall be, from his Royal and Sincere Care and Affection to the Subjects of England, to alter or innovate the Fundamental and Ancient Laws, Priviledges, and Good Customs of this Kingdom; whereby not only his Regal Authority, but the Peoples Security of Lands, Livings and Privi­ledges, both in General and Particular are Preserved and Maintained. And by the Abolishing or Alteration of the which, it is impossible but that present Confusion will fall upon the whole State and Frame of this Kingdom.

Here is, in effect, the Judgment of Parliament, as well as Con­fession from the King, of the Consequence of a King's altering, or innovating the Fundamental Laws.

After this there will be no need to refer to Pufendorf, whom the B— himself cites; to Grotius, Bishop Bilson, and even Falkner, besides many more.

I need only ask him, whether he, who assumes a Legislative Power, in dispenceing with Laws, would not, cease to be King of England? or by altering a Fundamental Law, dissolve the State of this Kingdom?

But this I find needful to mind him of, which I was in hopes he would have attended to; that the Parliament has declared, that the Throne was vacant upon the late King's Breach of the Original Contract, and the Abdication: whether one alone were enough to make a Vacancy, it is not needful to determine, for Vindication of the Settlement; both at least were: And if King James ceased to be King, upon the Breach of the Contract, this was a full Justification of them, who invited over His Majesty, and were at his first Landing, ready to Fight on his side against the late King. However if there were a Vacancy, upon either, or both of the Grounds, then the Kingdom or Dominion was not taken from a Sovereign Prince against his Will; but himself, by his own Act, Vid. p. 66. dissolved the Bond of Union between Prince and People.

Now here was no King of Gods setting up after the Vacancy, ac­cording to the B—'s Notion; for upon the Abdication, the Govern­ment did not, thereby, come immediately to their present Majesties, [Page 39]but there was a Vaeancy, Vid. The Act reviving Law Proceedings. till [their Majesties] accepted the Crown: and the Parliament provided, that all Indictments for Misdemeanors in the In­terval, should be laid Contra pacem Regni, "against the Peace of the Kingdom or People.

During that time it seems the Power was lodged in the People; how then came it out of them, but by the Free Consents of all that were not infected with such Principles as are contrary to the Settlement?

I would desire him, therefore, when he treats of Politicks again, not to fill his Margin with Quotations, which are not in the least to that case to which he would apply them. And espe­cially I would advise him, as he values what he holds forth for the Doctrine of the Church, not to put Men in mind of reading that admirable Author Pufendorf; whose Works, if they were translated into English, would convince all, not obstinate against Convicti­on; that this Revolution and Settlement (which we say, was begun and finished with full Legal Warrant) is according to Natural Equity; and has the Suffrages of the best Writers of Politicks.

And let me intreat him, not to encourage or raise Scruples against complying with this Government; by yielding those Grounds, upon which Men may Scruple, till they find an Oracle less doubtful, a more sure word of Prophesie, than Bishop Overal's Convocation-book, or this Discourse of God's Ways of Disposing of Kingdoms.