ALthough you sōne Marke, The preface. hauing now 1. Parie. a yeare herd why he wri­tes to his sōne of philosophie in latine. Cratippus, & y ^• in Athenes, must needes flowe full of rules, and les­sons of philo­sophie: bicause of the passing great excellencie bothe of your teacher, & of y ^• citie: wherof the one may store you with knowledge, the other w ^t ensamples: yet as myselfe, to mine The studie of bothe toūges. owne furderaunce, haue euermore ioyned the latine with the greke: and haue done y ^•, not onely in phi­losophie, but also in the practise of oratorie: I think it [...]ere for you to doe thesame, that alike you may be Two ki [...]des of eloquence. in y ^• redinesse of bothe the kindes of eloquence. To the which purpose Example of h [...]elfe. verilye, we (as we suppose) haue brought great ayde to our countri­men: [Page] that not onelie the ignoraunt of the greeke tounge, but also the learned recken themselues therby to haue atteined somewhat, bothe to speche eloquēt, & also to iudgemēt Wherfore you shall learne in dede His maisters helpe. of the prince of philosophers in this age: and you shall lerne so long, as you will: so long perdie ought you to be willing, as it shall not repent ye, how much ye profite. But yet Tullies phi­losophie. reading my bokes, not greatly va­riaunt from the Peripatetikes (bi­cause we wil be both Socratians, & Platonians) of the verie maters vse your owne iudgemēt: for I no­thing let you: but of trouth, by rea­ding my woorkes, you shall make The latin tounge. your latin tounge the fuller. Nor yet I would haue this supposed of a vaunt to bee spoken. For gi­uing place to manie in the know­ledge of philosophie, if I take v­pon Tullies elo­quence. me that, which is an oratours propertie, aptlie, orderlye, and finelie to speake: bicause I haue passed my tyme in that studie, I seeme, after a certeine sorte, as in mine owne right, to calenge it. [Page 2] For which cause, I ernestly exhort Conclusiō o [...] this pa [...]e. you, my Cicero: y ^• diligentlie you reade not onelie my orations, but these bookes also of philosophie, which now welnie to those haue eeuened themselues in quantitie. For there is a greater force of elo­quence inthose: but this eeuen, and tempered kinde of style is also to be regarded. And this truly I see, hath Enlargemēt, by comparisō. happened to none of the Greekes, as yet: that one man trauayled in bothe the kindes: and folowed as well y ^• lawierlie trade of pleading, as this quiet fourme of reasoning: D. Phalere­us. except perchaūce Demetrius Pha­lereus may be counted in this noū ­ber: who was a suttle reasoner, no vehemēt oratour: pleasāt [...]et, so as you may know him for Theophra­stꝰ scholar. But how much we haue profited ī bothe, I referr it to other mens iudgemēt: certes we haue fo­lowed bothe. I think verily, Pla [...] Pla [...]. could haue spoken very grauelie, & plētifully, if he would haue practi­sed y ^• law like sort of pleading: & also Demosthenes could haue doone Demosthe­nes. full finelie, and semely: if he h [...]d [Page] kept still, and would haue vttered those thinges, which he learned of Plato. And after the same sorte I iudge of Aristotle, and Isocrates: Aristoteles. eyther of which, delited with his Isocrates. owne studie, despised the other.

But when I had determined 2. parte. to write somewhat vnto you at this What pointe of philosophie he will treate vpon. season, and many thinges hereaf­ter: I was moste willyng to begin with that, which both for your age Cōmendatiō of his mater. should be fittest, and for my autho­ritie y ^• grauest. For wheras many maters in philosophie, both weigh­tie, and profitable, be diligentlye, & plētifully disputed by philosophers those seme moste largely to sprede, which of duties by them haue been Duties. taught, & prescribed. For no part of mans life, neither in cōmō, nor pri­uate affayres, neither in maters abrode, nor at home, neither if ye do ought alone, nor if ye contract w ^t an other, may bew ^tout dutie: and in regardīg therof resteth all honestie of lyfe, and in despising the same, dishonestie. And this no doute is a common mater with all the philo­sophers. For who is he, which gi­uing [Page 3] no rules of dutie, dare name hymself a philosopher?

But there bee sondry doctrines, 3. parte. How he will teache. which in setting forth the endes of good, and bad, doe misturn all du­tie. Sectes of philosophers. For who in such wise appoin­teth the [...]erayn good, that it hath Epicurus. nothing adioined with vertue: and Aristippus. measureth the same by his commo­dities, [...] and not by honestie: it com­meth to passe, that this man, if in himself he agree, and bee not some­time ouercome with the goodnesse of nature: can vse neither frēdship, neither iustice, nor liberalitie: and in no wyse doutlesse can he be a mā ­ly man, who iudgeth payn the vtte­rest euil: nor he a temperate man, who counteth pleasure the greatest good. Which poinctes, though they be so apparaūt, that the thyng nedeth no disputation: yet they bee debated by vs in an other place. These doctrines then, if they wil in thēselues accorde, can say nothing of dutie: neyther of dutie can there be giuen any preceptes, sure, sted­fast, and with nature agreable: but by them, who mainteine, that ey­ther Stoikes. [Page] onelie, or chieflie, honestie for [...] itself is to bee embraced. And ther­fore the teaching therof properlie belonges to the Stoikes, and Aca­demiks, and Peripatetiks: bicause [...]. Aristoes, Pyrrhoes, and Herillus opiniō long sins hath been hyst out of the scholes: who neuerthelesse should haue their lawful libertie to reason of dutie: if thei had lefte anie choyse of thinges, that to the out­fynding of dutie there might haue beē an entrie. We will folow ther­fore at this season, and in this ma­ter, chieflie the Stoikes: not as a translatour: but, as we ar accusto­med, we will draw out of their foū ­tains, after our own minde, and iudgement, as much, and in such sort, as shall seme good.

It liketh mee thē, sithens all my The treatise. [...] to be [...]. discourse must be of dutie, to define before, what is dutie: which I mer­uail, was ouerskaped of Panetius. For euerie teaching of anie mater, y ^• by an orderly trade is takē in hād, must begin the processe at a defini­tiō: y ^• it may be perceiued, what the [Page 4] thing is, wherof y ^• treating goeth.

All the question of dutie is two­folde. Dutie [...]. One kinde ther is, y ^• belōges to the ende of good: an other, that standeth in preceptes, by the which the trade of life may bee fashioned in euery condition. Of the former kinde such exaumples there bee: Whether all duties bee perfite, or no? Whether one dutie be more thā an other? and such, as bee of the same sort. But those duties, wher­of preceptes bee giuen, though they appertein to the ende of good, yet the same dothe lesse appeare: bicause they seeme rather to belonge to the framing of life: of the which, in these [...]kes, we haue to open our An other wa [...] of diuiding dutie. minde. And also, there is an other diuision of dutie. For there is said to bee bothe a certaine meane du­tie, and a perfite. I suppose, wee maie call the perfite, or the right dutie, Rectum, which the Greeks doo terme [...]: and this mean, or common dutie, Commune, which they call [...].

And those thei doo thus define: Dutie de [...]. that thesame, whiche is Rectum, [Page] they define to be the perfect dutie [...] and that, they say, is the meane du­tie, for the which, a prouable reason may bee rendered, why it is done.

Aduisemēt then in coūsel taking is threefolde, as semeth to Paneti­us. Outfynding of duties, by choise of thin­ges. For first, men dout, whether it, that falleth in aduisement, bee ho­nest to be done, or dishonest: in wey­ing 1 wherof, many tymes, mennes Honest. mindes are diuerslye drawen into contrarie opinions. Nexte, they 2 serch, and cast, whether it wheru­pon Profitable they take aduisement, auayle or no, to commoditie, and pleasant­nesse of lyfe, to riches, and plentye of goodes, to power, and swe [...] of rule: whereby they maie help bothe themselues, and theirs: all which aduisement falleth into the nature 3 of profit. The third kinde of dou­ting Honestie, and profit cōpared is: when it, that appeareth to be profitable, semeth to striue with honestie. For whereas profit dothe seme to drawe to her, honestie con­trariwise, to call backe to her: it cō ­meth to passe, that the minde in ad­uising is haled to and fro, and it bringeth a perplexed studie of ima­gination. [Page 5] Whereas in diuiding, it is a fowle faulte to leaue out anye thing: two thinges bee ouerslipped in this diuisiō. For not onelie whe­ther y ^• thing be honest, or dishonest, is vsed to bee aduised vpon: but also two honest thinges laied before vs, 1 whether is the honester: and like­wise More hone [...]. two profitable thinges set be­fore 2 More profi­table. vs, whether is the more profi­table. So the way, which he toke to be but threefolde, is founde mete to bee diuided into fyue partes. First then we haue to treate of honestie, The sūme of these. 3. boke [...] but that in two sortes: next, as ma­nie wayes, of profit: lastlye, of the comparison of them bothe.

Frō y ^• beginnīg, to euery kinde of Giftes of nature. liuīg creature it is giuē by nature, to defend himself, his life, and his Thinges cō ­mō to beas [...] and men. bodye: and auoyde those thinges, which may seme likely to be harm­full: and seke, and get all thinges, y ^• be necessary to liue withall: as fee­ding, as coouerts, as other of the same sorte. The appetite also of cō ­ming together for engēdrīgs sake, and a certayn tendernesse ouer thē that be engendred, is a cōmō thyng [Page] to al liuīg creatures. But bitween man, and beaste, this chiefly is the Beaste. difference: that a beaste, so farre as he is mooued by sense, bendeth him Sense. self to that onely, which is present, and at hande: verie smallie percei­uīg ought past, or tocome: but mā, Man. who is partaker of reason, wherby Reason. he seeth sequels, beholdeth groūds, and causes of thinges, is not igno­raunt of their procedinges, and as it wer their foregoings: compareth semblaunces, & with thinges pre­sent ioyneth, & knitteth thinges to­come: dothe soone espye the course of his holle life, and to the leading therof purueieth thinges necessa­rie. Groundes of iustice.

And the said nature, thorough the power of reason, winneth man to man, to a felowshippe bothe in talke, and also of life: & engendreth a certein speciall fauour chieflie to themward, that are of thē begottē: and stirreth vp the cōpanies of mē, that they bee willing bothe to bee assembled together, and also to bee seruisable one to an other: and for those causes, that they studie to [Page 6] purueie such thinges, as maie fur­nish them for their apparaile, and for sustinaunce: not onelie for thē ­selues, but for their wiues, childrē, and other, whom they holde dere, & ought to defende. Which care stur­reth vp also mennes sprites, and makes them of more corage to doo their bysinesse.

Also searching, & tracing oute of Principles of wisdome trouth, is chiefly mānes propertie. Therfore when we bee voide of ne­cessarie cares, and bysinesse: thē we [...]oouet to see, to heare, and to lerne somewhat: & we thinke the knowe­ledge of thinges either hidden, or wōderous, verie necessarie to good and blisfull life. Wherof is gathe­red, that whatso is true, simple, and pure, is fittest for the nature of man.

There is ioyned to this loue of Sparkes o [...] manlinesse. espying the trouth, a certein desire of soueraintie: so as a wellframed minde by nature is willing to obey noman, but him, that enstructeth, and teacheth: or him, that, for cause of his weale, iustlie, and lawe­fullie gouerneth: wherin standeth [Page] the greatnes of corage, and the cō ­tempt of worldly vanities.

And that truly is no small power Certain sedes of sobermode of nature, and reason, that this cre­ature onely perceiues, what is or­der: what it is, that becommeth in dedes, & wordes: and what is mea­sure. And therfore, of those same thynges, which bee discerned by sight, no other creature perceiueth the beautie, the grace, and the pro­portion of partes. Which forme nature, and reason conueying frō the yies to the mynde, dothe much more iudge a beauty, a stedfastnes, and an order in counsells, & deedes fit to be obserued: and is hedefull, that it doe nothyng vncomelye, or womannishlye: and therto bothe in all thoughtes, and dedes, y ^• nothing wantonly either it do, or imagin. Of which thinges is forged, and Honestie. made that honestie, that we seeke: which though it bee not auaunced, yet honestie it is: and we truly say, though of no manne it be commen­ded, is yet commendable by na­ture. You see, sonne Marke, the ve­rie fourme doutlesse, & (as it were) [Page 7] the face of honestie: which in case it might be beholden with the yies, would styrre vp (as sayth Plato) a maruaylous loue of wisdom.

But al, y ^• is honest, springeth out Dutiful de­meanour. of some one of the fowre braūches. For it is occupied eyther in the in­syght wysdome. of trouth, and skilfulnesse: or in preseruing the felowship of mē, Iustice. and giuing euery body his owne, & keping a faithfulnesse in cōtractes: or in the greatnesse, & mightinesse Manl [...]sle. of haute, and vnconquerable co­rage: or els in the order, & measure Temperance. of all thynges, that are done, and sayde, wherein resteth discretion, & temperance. Which foure, though they be linked, and tāgled together: yet certain seuerall kyndes of du­ties doe growe out of euery one of them: as out of that braunche, that first was descriued (wherein we place wysdome, & prudence) issues Properties of wisdome. the searchyng, and trying out of trouth: and this is the very proper worke of that vertue. For whoso thorowseeth moste, what in euerye case is truest: and who most witti­ly, and redily is able both to see, & [Page] giue the reasō: he worthilie is wont to bee reputed the wittiest, and the wisest. Wherefore to this vertue trouth is appointed, as the mater, wherupon to worke, and wherin to bee occupied. But to the other three vertues are assigned necessi­ties, Duties of iustice, and man [...]nesse. to get, and kepe those thinges, wherby the trade of mannes life is mainteined: to the intēt the felow­ship, and neighbourhod of men bee preserued: and the worthinesse, and greatnesse of corage may shine a­brode: not onelie in augmenting of substaunce, and procuring of com­modities bothe to him, and his, but also much more in despising of the same.

But order, and stedfastnes, & mea­sure Properties of tempe­ra [...]nce. keping, & such like, haue to do [...] in y ^• kīde: wherunto must be ioined a certein doing, and not onelie an ernest occupieng of the witte. For applieng a certein mean, & order to such thinges, as be medled with in mānes life, we shall obserue bothe honestie, and comlinesse.

Now of those fowre places, wher­into 1 Wisdom [...]. we haue diuided the nature, & [Page 8] strength of honestie, y ^• same first, y ^• Knowle [...]ge of [...]routh. [...] in knowledge of trouth, toucheth māns kinde nerest of all. For we be all drawne, & led to a de­sire of knowledge, & science: wherin to passe other, we think it a goodlye mater: but to slide, to erre, to bee ig­noraūt, to be deceiued, we count it both euil, & dishonest. In this kinde faultes to [...] auoided. of vertue, which is bothe natural, & honest, two fauts must [...]e auoided: one, that we take not thinges, we [...] of rash [...] iudg [...] ­ment. know not, as though we knew thē, & rashlie assent to thē. Which fault whoso wil esch [...]w (all certes ought The remedie to bee willing) must emploie to the cōsidering of maters both leasure, and diligence. An other fault there is, that some bestowe ouer greate Maine curio­sitie. studie, and to much trauaile, in derk, and difficult things, and the­same nothing necessarie. Which Dutie in thi [...] behalf. faultes auoided, whatsoeuer labor, and diligence shall bee spent in ho­nest thinges, and worthie of know­ledge, thesame of right shall bee cō ­mended: Good kno [...] ­ledge. as in Astrologie, we haue herd, what Caius Sulpitius was: in Geometrie, we knewe, what [Page] Sertus Pompeius could doe: ma­ny in Logik, mo in the ciuil lawe: which sciences bee all occupied in tracing out the trouth: with y ^• stu­die wherof to be drawen from tra­uailyng in maters, it is againste dutie. For vertues holle praise con­sisteth in doyng: from which yet Practise. oftentymes ther is had a restyng while, and there be graunted many recourses agayne vnto studie: yea and the musyng of the mynde, that Speculation. neuer ceaseth, may continue vs in the studies of contemplation, euen without our trauail. But let eue­ry thought, & mouing of the minde be occupied eyther in taking of ad­uisement aboute honest maters, & perteining to the good, and blisfull life: orels in studies of science, and knowledge. And thus haue we spo­ken of the first fountaine of dutie. 2

But of the other three vertues Of iustice, as it is generall. remaining, that kinde extendeth fardest: wherin is conteined the felowshippe of men amonge them selues, and (as it wer) the enterpar­tening of mannes life. 1

Whereof there bee twoo partes: Particular iustice. [Page 9] iustice is one, in the which is the greatest brightnes of vertue, wher­of good men beare their name: and to this is ioyned bountiefulnesse, 2 which same we may terme either Liberalitie. gentlenesse, or liberalitie.

But the principall dutie of iu­stice 1 is, that no man hurt an other, Duties of iu­stice. onlesse he be prouoked by wronge: the next, that he vse thinges cōmon, as cōmon, and thinges priuate, as his owne. How beit by nature thin­ges Priuate thin­ges. priuate be none: but either by aūcient possessiō, as of theirs, who in old time cam into waste groūds: or by victorie, as of theirs, who got thinges in warre: or by lawe, coue­nant, condition, or lotte. Whereof it cōmes to passe, that the grounde Arpinas is coūted the Arpinatiās: the ground Tusculane, the Tuscu­lanians. And after thys sorte is the pointing out of priuate possessiōs. Wherupon seeing there is made a mans owne of euerie one of those thinges, which by nature wer cō ­mon: let euery one enioy, that to e­uery one is befallen. More thā that, if any man wyl couet to himselfe, [Page] he shall breake the lawe of mannes felowship. But bicause (as it is no­tablie writtē of Plato) we be borne [...]lato to Ar­chitas. not for our selues alone: but some­deal of our birth our coūtrey, some­deal our parentes, somedeal our frendes do claime: and (as liketh the Stoikes) whatsoeuer is bredde The Stoiks vpon erth, all to the vse of man is created: but man for mannes owne cause is begotten, that they amōg themselues, one may help an other: herein we be bounde to folowe na­ture Common fe­lowship. our leader: and to sette abrode, that may serue for cōmon commo­dities, by enterchaūge of duties in giuing, & taking: and also by arts, by trauail, by riches, to knitte the felowship of man with man.

But faithfulnesse is the founda­tion Faithfulnesse of iustice: which is in worde, and couenaunt, a trouth, and sted­fastnesse. Wherupon though this shall seeme to some perchaūce ouer­hard: yet let vs be bolde to folowe the Stoiks: which heedfullie serche oute, frō whēce wordes be fetched: & let vs think, that it is called faith­fulnesse, because it is fullfilled, [Page 10] which was faithed.

Cōtrariwise, ther be two kindes Iniustice. of iniustice. One of such, as offer it: an other, of those, who, though they be able, do not defend wronge from thē, to whō it is offered. For whoso vniust [...]ie doth make assaulte vpō a­nie man, either stirred by choler, or anie passion, he seemeth as with vi­olence, to kill his felowe: & whoso defēdeth not, nor withstādeth iniu­ri [...], if he be able, is as farre in fault: as if he should forsake his parents, his frendes, or his countrey.

And in deede those iniuries, that Occasions of wrōg doing. [...] done of purpose to hurt, do often­times arise of feare: when he, who 1 intēdeth to hurt an other, is afraide Feare. that onlesse he do it to the other, he may himself be touched with some discommoditie.

And for the moste parte manie men 2 take occasion to do wronge, of intēt Conetousnes to comepasse those thīges, that they haue coueted: in which kīde of vice, couetousnes most largelie sheweth The vse of riches. herself. Notwithstanding riches be coueted, bothe for necessarie vses of the life, & also to enioye pleasures. [Page] But in those, in whome there is a greater corage, coueting of money hath an yie to power, and ablenesse of pleasuring: as of late Marcus Crassus the riche. Crassus denied any substaunce to be greate inough for him, that in a common weale wolde be a prince: while he were not able with his re­uenue to maintein an armie. Sūp­tuous furnitures doo also delite, & countenaūce of life, with fijnnesse, and plentie. By which meanes it is come to passe, that endlesse is the desire of riches.

And trulie the enlargement of a mannes priuate goodes, hurtful to nobodie, is not to be dispraised: but euermore iniurie is to be shonned. But the moste parte of men chief­lie Ambition. be brought to forgette iustice: whē they fall into y ^• desyre of rule, honour, or glorie. For that, which is in Ennius,

In empire is no godlie felowship, nor no fayth, Ennius. reacheth furder. For whatsoeuer is of such sorte, wherin manie cā not be chief: therin commonlie happe­neth so great contention, that ve­rie hard it is to keepe a godlie so­cietie. [Page 11] The storme of Caius Ce­sar Caius Iuli­us Caesar. declared that of late: who tur­ned topset toruie all the lawes of God, and man, for that souerain­ties sake, which he to himself, by the errour of his own conceite, had imagined. And in this kinde, it is a greefful case: that desires of honor, rule, power, and glorie be cōmonly in the greatest corages, and goodli­est wittes. Wherfore the more hede must be taken, that we offende no­thing in that behalfe.

But ther is a greate diuersitie in Of twoo sor­tes in wrong doing, whe­ther is the woorsse. all iniustice, whether the wrong be done of anie sturre of the minde, which cōmonlie is but shorte, and for a seasō: orels of purpose, and ad­uisedlie. For the harmes be easier, that befall of some sodē moode, thā such, as be done being deuised, and prepared for. And thus we haue said inough of doing iniurie.

But ther are wonte to be manie causes, why we refuse to defend an other, and doo leaue our dutie. For [...], why som do [...] dutie, in not resisti wrōg. men be vnwilling to take vpon thē either displeasure, or trauail, or charges: orels they be so giuen to [Page] necligence, slouthfulnesse, idlenes, priuate studies, or certein bisinesse: that they suffer thē to be helplesse, whō they ought to saue harmlesse. Wherfore we must looke, leste it Idle Philo­sophers disa­lowed. be not sufficient, that is spoken of Plato, touching the Philosophers: y ^• therfore they be iust, bicause they be occupied in tracig out trouth: & bicause they despise, & set at nought such thinges, as the moste parte of men greedilie desire, and amonge themselues ar wonte to be at dag­gers drawing for the same. For while they attein one kinde of iu­stice, that they hurt nomā with do­ing of iniurie, they fall into the o­ther. For beeing letted with the stu­die of lerning, they forsake thē, whō they ought to defend. And therfore he thinks, they wolde not enter into the cōmonweale, wer they not cō ­pelied. But it wer more reasō, that voluntarilie it should be doon. For whatso is rightlie doon, thesame therbie is iust, if it be voluntarie. Ther be also, who either for loue of sauing their substaunce, or a cer­tein hatred to mē, do saie, that they [Page 12] meddle onelie with their owne ma­ters: leste they maye seeme to doo anie bodie wronge: who, whyle they bee voide of one kinde of in­iustice, doo runne into the other. For they forsake the felowshippe of life: bicause they bestowe no studie, no labour, nor substaunce vpon it.

Seeing then after the declaring Briefe reher­sall of things afore. of the twoo kindes of iniustice, we haue therto ioyned the causes of ei­ther kinde: and haue sette oute those thinges afore, wherin iustice is cō ­teined: we may easilie iudge, what is the dutie of euerie season, except we fauour ourselues to farre. For Care of other mens mater [...] it is hard to haue a carefulnesse o­uer other mēnes maters: although thatsame Chremes in Terēce coū ­teth nothing straunge to hym, of ought that perteins to man.

Neuerthelesse bicause wee per­ceiue and feele those thinges more: that doo happen to ourselues, ei­ther luckilie, or vnfortunateli [...], than such as befall to other: which (as ye wolde saye) wee beholde a greate waye of: wee iudge other­wise [Page] of thē, then of ourselues. Therfore they teache wel, that for­bidde to doo anie thing, which ye doute, whether it be right, or wrōg. For the verie right shineth of itself: but douting declares an imagina­tion of wronge. Exceptions in duties par teining to faithfulnesse.

But often ther befall seasons, that those duties, which seeme to be moste meete for a iust man, & him, whome we call a good mā, be chaū ­ged, and becomme contrarious: so that sometime it is iust not to re­store, that is laied to keepe: also, not to perfourme promes with a mad man: and to denie those thinges, which concerne ones trouth, and honestie. For it is meete, they be re­ferred to those foundations of iu­stice: which I layde in the begin­ning: first, that no mā be hurt: next, that cōmon profit be serued. When these be chaunged by time: chaun­ged is dutie, that it remaines not alwaies alike. For ther mai chaūce some promes, and couenaunt: that may be vnprofitable to be perfour­med, either to him, to whō it is pro­mised: orels to him, that ꝓmised it. [Page 13] For (as it is in the fables) if Neptu­nus Of These [...], & Neptunus. had not done, that to Theseus he promised: Theseus had not been bereft of his sōne Hippolytus. For of the thre boones (as is writtē) that was the third, which in his furie he asked, for the death of Hippolytus: and when he had obteined it, he fell into heauie wailinges. Therfore neither those promises ar to be ful­filled, which ar vnprofitable to thē, to whome you made them: nor if they hurt you more, thē they pro­fit him, whome you promised.

It is against dutie, the greater 2 harme to be rather admitted, than the lesse: as if you haue appointed yourselfe wyth anie man, tocome, as his counseler in his ma-ter, that is in hand: and in the meane season, your sonne beginnes to fall sore sicke: let it not be reckened a­gainst dutie, not to perfourme, that ye promised: yea and he more shuld swarue from dutie, to whome the promis was made, if he wolde com­plaine himself to be disapointed.

Now who seeith not? that it is not meete to stād to those promises. [Page] which a mā hath ꝓmised beeing cō ­strained with fear, or deluded with guile. Which thīges, for the moste 4 parte, be discharged by the Pretors courte: & manie of thē, by statutes. [...] ought to leane to the equitie of the lawe.

Wronges also oftentimes do rise vpon a certein cauillaciō, and ouer craftie, & suttle miscōstruing of the lawe: wherupō y ^• sayeng, Extreem lawe, extreem wrōge, is now made a welworne prouerb in cōmunica­tiō. In which kinde manie thinges be doon amisse, euen in the commō ­weales Cleomenes, a Lacedemo­nian. maters: as he, who, whē the truce was takē with the enemie, for xxx. daies, ouerrāne his land in the night: bicause the truce was taken for daies, & not for nightes. No nor yet our coūtreimā is to be alowed: Q. Fabius Labeo. if it be true, that Quintus Fabius Labeo, or any other mā (for I haue nothīg, but by hearesaye) beeing by the Senate appointed dayesman to y ^• Nolanes, & Neapolitanes, aboute y ^• boūdes of their land, did cōmune with either of thē aparte, when he cāme to the place: that they should not doo, nor couet any thing gree­dilie: & that rather they wolde serte [Page 14] backe, thā encroche vpō eche other. Which when either of them had so doon: ther was a percel of grounde left in the middes. And so he caused their boūdes to be staked oute, euen as they had tolde him: the residue, that was in the middes, he adiud­ged to the people of Rome. This plainlie is to deceiue, and not to iudge. Wherfore such wylinesse in euerie case is to be auoided.

Ther be certein duties also to be Ponnishing of [...]. obserued euen toward thē, of whom you haue receiued wronge. For in reuenge, and chastisemēt, ther is a measure to be vsed. And I wotte not, whether it be sufficiēt for him, y ^• began, to repent him of the wrōg: Hitherto o [...] ciuil iustice. but that he be ponnished, that he co­mit not y ^• like offēce again: & y ^t other also may be the slower to do wrōge.

And the lawe of armes must in a­nie wise be kept, in the cōmōweale. 2 For whereas ther be twoo kindes Of iustice in warre. of contention, one by reasoning, an other by violence: & the first is the propertie of manne, the seconde, of Speeche. Force. beaste: wee must flee to the latter, if wee may not vse the former.

[Page]Wherfore to this end, and purpose The end of warre, peas. we must enter in warre: that with­out iniurie we may liue in peas: & Duties in the end of war­res. when the victorie is gotten, they must be saued, who haue not beene cruel, nor vnmercieful in fight: as our aunceters euē into the citie re­ceiued the Tusculanes, the Equi­anes, the Uolscianes, the Sabines, and the Hernikes: but they vtterlie razed Cartage, and Numance. Co­rinth I wolde, they had not: but I beleue, they chieflie respected the si­tuation: leste the verie place might encorage thē, at any time, to mooue warre.

After my minde certesse, it is Peas all­waies to bee sought. meete alwaies to giue counsell to peas, that shal haue in it no fraude, nor guile. Wherin if men had a­greed to mee: we should haue had, although not the best, yet some cō ­mōweale, which now is none. And The vanqui­shed. not onelie for thē ye must prouide, whome by force you haue subdued: but they also, who cōme in with The yeelded. yeelded weapons, vpon affiaunce in the captaine (although the Rāme hath battered the wall) ar to be re­ceiued: [Page 15] In which poincte, iustice hathe beene so greatlie regarded Example of the auncient Romanes. with our mē: that they, who had ta­ken cities to mercie, or nations cō ­quered in warre, should be their pa­trones, by the custome of our aun­cete [...]s. And the iustice of warre is The [...]eciall lawe of bid­ding [...]. moste syncerelie descriued, in the fecial lawe of the people of Rome. Wherby may be perceiued, that no warre is iust: but which either for thinges in claime is mooued, or is proclamed before, and bidden by defiaūce. Pompilius the Romanes generall kept a prouince: in whose armie, Catoes sonne went for a Conscience in keeping their othe of war­fare. yong souldiour a warrefare. And when it liked Pompilius to dis­charge one legion: he discharged Catoes sonne also, who serued in that legiō as a souldiour. But whē he, for loue of the warres, remained in the campe stil: Cato did write to Pompilius, that if he wolde suffer him to remaine in the armie, he should sweare him soldiour again: because he might not lawfulli fight with the enemie, the former othe beeing discharged. So passīg great [Page] regarde they had in making their warres. Ther is a letter abrode, of Marcus Cato, the olde mā, to Mar­cus his sōne: wherin he wrote, that he herd, he was discharged by the Consul, beeing a souldiour in Ma­cedonie, at the Persian warres. He warnes him therfore to beware, that he enter not the battle: for he denieth, that it is lawfull for him, that is no souldiour, to fight with the enemie.

And this also I note, that hee, Their gentle naming their enemies, Hostes. which by his proper name was Per­duellis, that is to meanē, an open ene­mie, was called Hostis: the myldenes of the worde asswagīg the haynous­nesse of the thing. For he was cal­led Hostis, with our aunceters, whō now we name Peregrinum, a straūger. That the twelue tables declare, Aut status dies cum hoste: and again, Aduersus bostem eterna auctoritas. What may there be added to this kinde of gentlenes? to call him by so faire a name, with whom you make warre.

Notwithstanding processe of time Hostis is now taken for an enemie. maketh that name now more odi­ous: for it is gone from the signifi­cation [Page 16] of Peregrinus, that is to saie a straunger: & properlie it stands for him, y ^• beareth armour against one. But when ther is fighting for em­pire, Duties in warres hol­den for ho­nour, or life. and glory is sought by warre: yet it behooueth alwaies, that the verie same causes be therin, which I declared a litle before to be y ^• iust causes of warre. But those warres ar not so cruellie to be made, which be purposed for the glory of empire. For as, when we striue in the citie, we doo otherwise, if one be our ene­mie, otherwise, if he be but suter a­gainst vs: for with the one the strife is for honour, & dignitie, with the other, for life, & honestie: euē so war was holdē with the Celtibers, and with the Cimbers, as with our ene­mies, whether should liue, and not whether should rule: but with the Latines, the Sabines, the Samni­tes, the Penes, and with Pyrrhus, y ^• fight was aboute empire, & domi­nion. The Penes were leagbrea­kers, Annibal was cruell, the rest wer iuster mē. That is a noble sai­eng Pyrrhus an­swere to the Romanes. doutlesse of Pyrrhus, aboute the restoring of prisoners.

[Page] No golde do I craue, no price offer mee: Uerses of Ennius. No hucsters of warre, warremen as we bee, VVith dint for our life fight we, not with gold [...]. VVhether you for to raign, or me the ladie wolde Chaunce tryie we by force. This ansuer eke bare: VVhose manhod the happe of batell will spare, Their freedome I purpose to fauour also. Them giue I, them take: the goddes will it so. A princelie saieng forsothe, & well­beseemig the linage of y ^• Aiacidās.

Likewise if priuate men, driuen Priuate pro­ [...]es to the e­nemie. by occasions, shal promise ought to the enemie: they must keepe their promes therin. As Regulus did, Example of Regulus. that was takē of the Carthaginers in the first Punik warres: who, when he was sent to Rome, aboute the enterchaunging of prisoners: & had sworne, that he wolde returne: first, as soone as he came, his aduise was in the Senatehouse, that the prisoners should not be restored: af­terward, when he should haue been staied of his kinsfolke, and frendes: he was more willing to return to ponnishment, than to breake his promes giuen to the enemie.

And in the seconde Punike warres, after Cannas feelde, the How the Ce­sors ponm. [Page 17] [...]sors sessed at a yearlie fine all s [...]ed certein [...]. those tenne (as longe as anie of thē [...]ued, that taryed stil, and wer for­sworne) whiche Annibal sent to Rome, vpon their othe, that they should return: except they obteined the raunsoming of those, that wer prisoners there: & nolesse they sessed him, which for the deceiuing of his othe, had deuised an excuse. For when by Annibals licence, vpō his othe to return, he was gone with­out the campe: he returned within a litle while after, making his ex­cuse, that he had forgotten, I wo [...] not what. Afterward, being gone out of the cāpe, he thought himself discharged of his othe: and in wor­des he was, but not in deede. For A gener [...] rule. alwa [...]S in promise must be consi­dered, what ye meane, not what ye saie. But the greatest example A notable e [...] ample of the Romanes equitie. of iustice toward the enemie was showed by our aunceters. When a runawaye traytour from Pyr­rhus T [...]ochares had promised the Senate, that he wolde giue the king poysō, and kill him: the Senate, and Ca­ius Fabritius did deliuer the rūa­w [...] [Page] traytour to Pyrrhus. In such sorte, with trecherie, they alowed not the deth of their enemie: & such a one, as was bothe mightie, and mooued warre vnprouoked. Thus of warrefaring duties ther is i­nough spoken.

Let vs remember also, that euen 3 toward the basest sorte ther is a iu­stice Iustice in housholding. to be kept. The basest degree, and state is of slaues: whome they, Slaues. that will ye so to vse, as hyred men, in requiring their worke, & giuing them their due, doo teache you not amisse.

But whereas iniuries may bee Hurtes. doone twoo waies, that is to sai [...], other by force, or by gyle: gyle see­mes Force, Gyle. as of the for, force as of the liō: bothe introuthe ar verie vnfitte for man, yet gyle deserueth the greater hatered. But of all iniustice none is more pestilent, thā theirs: which when they begyle a man moste, yet False sem­blaunte. so handle the mater, that they will Hitherto, of the particular iustice. seeme to be wellmeaning men. Of iustice here is said inough.

Let vs now speake, as we pur­posed, Of liberalitie 2. parte of the gen. iustice. of bountiefulnesse, and libe­ralitie, [Page 18] for nothing without doute is to the nature of man more agree­able.

Notwithstāding it hath diuers ex­ceptions. Exceptions. For first, we must see, y ^t 1 our bountiefulnesse hurt not bothe How. those, to whome boūtiefullie it shal seeme to be doone, & also othermo: 2 next, y ^• our liberalitie be not more, How much. thā our abilitie: thirdlie, that to e­uerieniā 3 be giuen, according to his To whome. worthinesse. For that is the foūda­tiō of iustice, wherto all these must be applied. j. For bothe they, y ^t plea­sure 1 anie bodie with that, which may hurt him, whome they wolde seeme willing to profit: ought to be deemed not boūteous, nor liberall, but pestilēt flaterers: and they like­wise, who doo hurt sōme, that they may be liberall to other, doo fall into thesame iniustice: as if they should turn other mennes goodes into their owne. But ther bee manie, and namelie the desirous Partia [...] of honour, & glorie: who doo catche from sōme, that they maie lauish to an other: & these suppose, that they shall seeme bountiefull to their [Page] [...]endes, if they may enriche them anie maner waie. But that is so farre of from dutie, that nothing may be more cont [...]arious to dutie. We must see therfore, that wee vse such liberalitie, as may profit our frēdes, and hinder nobodie. Wher­fore [...]annie. Lucius Syllaes, and Caius Cesars conueyeng of g [...]odes from the iust owners to straūgers must not be thought liberalitie. For no­thing is liberall, which same is not iust.

The secōd pointe of exceptiō was, 2 that our liberalitie should not be more thā our abilitie: bicause who­so Foolelarge. will be lauisher, thā their goods will beare: they chiefly offend in this, that they be iniurious vnto their next akinne. For they conuey thosesame riches to fre [...]ne folke: which it wer more reason both [...] to be delt, and left to their kins­folke.

And ther is in such liberalitie a [...]ortion. greedinesse oftentimes of catchīg, and pulling awa [...]e with iniurie, that ther may be sto [...]e to lash oute. A mā may see some also doo much, [Page 19] not by nature so liberall, as led w ^t [...]. a certein glorie, y ^• they may seeme bountieful: which thinges may be thought to come rather of a bragge thā of a free hert. Such a fa [...]sse fai­nig is a nearer neibour to vanitie, than either to liberalitie, or to ho­nestie.

The third restraint, we s [...]ake of, 3 is y ^t in liberalitie there be a choice of worthinesse. Wherin ar to be cō ­sidered bothe his maners, vpon whōe y ^• benefite shall be bestowed, & also his good will toward vs: and the enterpartening & felouship of life, & frendlie turns doone before to our commodities: all which be [...] to meete togither: if not, the mo causes, and the greater shal haue in them the more weight.

Howbeit bicause wee leade not 1 our life with perfite men, and tho­roulie The first [...] of the third rule, touching maners. wise: but with such, as in whome it is a goodly mater, if ther be resemblaunces of vertue: I [...] this also meete to be cōsidered, that we despise no maner man, in whome anie signe of vertue dothe appeare: and speciallie, that euery­man [Page] so be regarded, as echeman chieflie shall be garnished w ^t these gentler kindes of vertues, sober­moode, temperaūce, and this same iustice, wherof allredie much hath been spoken. For a manlie corage, and a greate is commonlie sōme­what to feruent in a man, that wā ­tes of perfectiō, and wisdome: but those other vertues seeme rather to pertein to a good mā. Thus much in maners may be considered. 2

But concerning loue, that anie [...]ction to­warde vs. man beareth toward vs, this is the chiefe poīcte of dutie: that we giue moste to him, of whome wee ar moste beloued. But we must mea­sure good will, not after the gyse of yongmen, by a certein heate of loue: but rather by assur [...]nesse, 3 and stedfastnesse. Of r [...]iting a good turn.

But in case a mānes derseruing be such, that we haue not to seeke to creepe in fauour, but to requite his kindenesse: a certein greater care is then to be vsed. For ther is no dutie more necessarie, than requiting of kyndnesse. And if H [...]siodus willes ye, with larger [Page 20] measure (if ye may) to restore such thinges, as ye haue borowed to oc­cupie: what then ought we to doo, prouoked by benefites? Must we not doo like the frutefull feeldes, that yeelde much more, than they receiued? For if we sticke not to bestowe pleasures vpō them, who, we hope, will profit vs hereafter: what maner men ought wee to be toward them, that haue doon vs good allredie? For whereas ther be twoo kindes of liberalitie: one, of dooing a benefite, an other of re­quiting: whether we will doo it, or no, is in our owne choise: but to leaue ought vnrequited, is not law full for a good man: so he may doo it withoute iniurie. But ther Choice in [...]. be respectes to be hadde of bene­fites receiued: and there is no­doute, but moste is due to the greatest.

Wherin specially yet is to be wesed Measure the gift by the gi­uers good hert. of what minde, affection, and good will, a man hathe done it. For manie mē doo manie thinges of a certeī heddinesse, w ^toute discre­tion, or measure, toward euerimā: [Page] or [...]ls with a certein soden braide of minde caried, as with the wynde: which benefites ar not to be coun­ted alike great, as those, that be of­fered with iudgement aduisedlie, & constantlie. But in placing of be­nefites, A generall [...]. and requiting kindenesse (if all other thinges be correspōdēt) this is a prīcipall poincte of dutie: that as euerieman moste needeth help, so him moste of all we ayde. Which contrariewise is done of a greate meanie: for of whome they hope moste, although he hath no neede of them, yet to him they ar moste seruisable.

But the felouship, and neibour­hod 4 of men shal best be mainteined: The felo [...] ­ship of life. if as eueriemā shal be nerest vs, so on him we bestow most liberalitic.

But what be natures principles of neibourhod, and the felouship of man, I think good, to fetch sōwhat 1 farder of.

For the first is that, which is to The fir [...] de­gree of felou­ship. see in the felouship of al mankinde. The bonde wherof is reason, and Reason, and speeche, speeche: which by teachīg, learnig, conferring, reasoning, & iudging, [Page 21] winneth one man to an other, and ioineth them in a certein naturall felouship. Nor by anie thing fur­der we differ from the nature of sa­nage beastes: in whome we saie of­tētimes ther is an hardinesse: as in horses, and lions: but we neuer saie, they haue iustice, equitie, and goodnesse: for they be voyde of rea­son, and of speeche. And surelic this is y ^• felouship, that spreadeth moste largelie with men amōge themsel­ues, and with all among all: in the which ther must be kept a cōmon­nesse of all thinges, y ^• nature hath bredde to the common vse of man: so as the thinges, which be appoin­ted Ciuil lawe [...], by statutes, & the ciuil lawe, be obserued in such sorte, as it is or­deined: beside which, all other thin­ges The l [...]we of nature, ar so to be obserued, as is in the Greeke prouerb: Emonge frendes Thinges cō ­mon. al thinges be cōmon. But all those thinges seeme common to all men, which be of that kinde: as, beeing Ennius, put for example by Ennius in one thing, may be applied to manie.

The m [...]n, that gentlie showes th [...] way vnto the [...]andering wight,

[Page] Doth [...], as if [...] a candle shoulde at his owne can­dle 2 light,

That nathelesse' it light himself, when lighted is the other.

For inough is taught vs by one example: y ^• whatsoeuer we may lēd without hinderaunce, it be graun­ted to euerie bodie, yea to the vn­knowne. Wherupon these thinges be cōmon: Not to forbidde one the 3 rūnīg water: To suffer one, y ^t will, 4 to take fire at our fire: To giue 5 faithfull coūsell to him, y ^t asketh ad uise: which thinges be profitable to those, y ^t receiue thē, & nothing bur­denous to the giuer. Wherfore we must bothe vse these thīges, & some­what alwaies must we doo to fur­der the cōmō profit. But sithe eche priuate mānes substaūce is small, and the multitude is endlesse, that A measure in cōmon lib. neede it: cōmō liberalite must be re­ferred to that end of Ennius: That nathelesse it light himself: so as ther may bee an abilitie, wherwith we may be liberall to our owne.

Ther be mo degrees yet of the fe­louship 2 of men. For, to leaue that Nerer de­grees offe­ [...]ouship. endlesse noumber: ther is a nier de­gret [Page 22] to bee of one countrie, of one C [...]untrieme. nation, of one language: by the which, men be chieflye knit togi­ther.

A nerer also it is, to be of one citie. 3 For ther be manie thinges cōmon Citiezen [...]. to citiezens among them selues: as lawcourts, churches, galereywal­kes, hyewayes, statutes, lawes, iudgemētes, voices, customes: and besides these, familiarities, and ha­uing to doo in sondrie maters, and bargains with sondrie folke.

But a faster knitting of men to­gither 4 is the felouship of kinsfolke. [...]red. For out of that īnumerable felou­ship of mākinde, it is driuen to a li­tle, and a narowe comepasse. For whereas by nature this is cōmō to all liuing creatures, to haue a lust to engēdering: the first felouship is in verie wedlok: y ^• next, in childern: & after y ^t, one house, & all thīges cō ­mō. And this is y ^• original of a citie & as it were y ^• seedplotte of a cōmō ­weale. Thē folow y ^• kinreds of bre­thern: after, of brothers and sisters childern: who, when they now cā ­not be cōteined in one house, get thē [Page] abrode to other houses, as īto neew tounes. Then folow entermaria­ges, and aliaunces, of which also mo kinsfolke do arise. Which mul­tiplication, and succession is the roote of cōmonweales. Surelie the matching of bloodes, and good will that riseth therof, knitteth men in loue togither. For it is a great ma­ter to haue the like monumentes of aūceters, to vse al one religiō, and to haue the same burial places.

But of all felouships ther is none 5 better, none more assured, thā whē Frendship a­monge good men. good men alike in condicions bee enfeloushipt in familiaritie togi­ther. For that honestie (which we haue oftē mentioned) although we see it in an other, yet it mooueth vs & maketh vs frēdes to hī, in whome the same seemeth to dwell. And though al vertue allureth vs to her, & causeth vs to loue thē, in whome she seemeth to harber: yet iustice, & liberalitie worketh that moste of all. But ther is nothing, that win­neth more loue, nor surelier knit­teth men togither, than a likenesse in good condicions. For in whome [Page 23] be like desires, and like mindes: it happeneth amonge them, that ei­ther with other is as much delited, as with himself: and it is brought to passe, that Pythagor as requires in amitie, that man [...]e becōme one.

That common felouship also is 6 greate, which groweth of benefites Good tur [...] doone from one to an o­ther. to and fro giue, and taken. Which while they be cōmō from one to an other, and pleasurefull: they amōg whome those happen, be tyed in a fast felouship.

But when ye haue per used all 7 these thinges in your reason, and Loue of co­mon [...]eale. minde: of all felouships ther is none more acceptable, nor derer, than the same, which euerie one of vs hath with the commonweale. Dere be our parentes, dere be our children, dere be our kinsfolke, and familiars: but our countrey con­teines in it alone all the dere loue of thē all: for the which, what good man doutes to take his death, if he may profit the same? Wherby their beastly crueltie is y ^• more to be ab­horred: who haue rent a sōder their [...]oūtrey with al maner of mischief: [Page] and bothe bee, and haue been occu­pied in y ^• vtter ouerthrowīg therof.

But if question, or comparison Comparing of degrees. be made, to whome the greatest du­tie ought to be yeelded: our coūtrie, Countrey. and parents be the chief, by whose Parents. benefites we ar moste bounde: our children, and all our holle familie be the next: which hang al vpon vs Childern. alone, and can haue none other re­fuge: Familie. then be our kinsfolke, that a­gree [...]insfolke. well with vs: which common­lie stand in the like estate. Wher­fore the necessarie aides of life bee due to thē chieflie, whome I spake of before: but conuersation, and cō ­monnesse of table, coūselinges, cō ­munications, Frendes. exhortations, cōme­fortinges, yea and chydīges other­while amonge frendes bee moste v­sed: and that is the pleasaūtest frēd­ship, which likenesse of conditions hath yoked in one.

But in doing all these duties, This order [...]s often alte­red, as psones and times re­quire. we must marke, what is most need full for euerie man: and what eue­rie bodie is able, or vnable by vs, or withoute vs, to attein. So the degrees of frendshippes shall not [Page 24] d [...] alike with the degrees of times: and ther be duties, which ar due to some, more thā to other somme: as you shall sooner help your neibour Example [...] in inning his corne, than either your brother, or your familiar frend: but if ther bee a trauers in lawe: you shall rather defend your kinsman, and frend, than your neibour. These therfore, and su [...]h like must bee thorowlie consi­dered in euerie dutie: and we must Use, and ex­ercise. so vse, and practise our selues, that we may be good countmakers of duties: and see by adding, and de­ducting, what summe riseth of the rest: wherupon we may vnder­stand, how much is due to euerie­man. But as neither physicians, nor capteins, nor oratours, al­though they haue cōceiued the ru­les of their science, can attein anie thīg worthie great praise, withoute vse, and practise: so those rules of keeping dutie ar in deede taught vs, that we our selues should putte them in vre: but the hardnesse of the mater also requireth vse, and exer­ [...]se.

[Page]And how honestie, from which, [...]utie springeth, is setched oute of those thinges, that be within y ^• law of mannes felouship: we haue in a maner saide inough.

But we must note, that, wheras 3 ther bee fowre generall kindes of [...] [...] vertues pointed out, frō the which, honestie, and dutie should flowe: y ^• [...] of the [...]ame. seemes to shine brightest: which is wrought with a greate, and loftie corage, despisig worldly vanities. And therfore in reproche it is com­monly redie, if any such thing may be said, as this:

You yongmen iwis carie womens hertes, That virgin, a mannes.

Likewise if ought be like to this:

A goodlie great spoile at Salmacis wonne: VVithout anie blood, or swette was it donne.

And on the other side, in praises, those deedes, that be done manful­lie, notablie, & with great corage, I wot not how as with opē mouthe we commend. Herof came the rhe­toricians large feelde vpon Mara­thon, Salamis, Plateians, Ther­mopylanes, Leuctriās, and Stra­tocles: herof our Cocles, herof [Page 25] the Occians, hereof Cneus, and Publius the Scipiocs, herof Mar­cus Marcellus, and other innume rable, and speciallie the people o [...] Rome did exceede in greatnesse o [...] corage. And their desire of martia glorie is declared: in that wee see their images of honour be set vp, f [...] the most parte, in warrlike aray.

But if that hawtienesse of corage Māh [...]d [...] iustice falleth into diuers ex­treems. which is seene in perels, and tra­uailes, be voide of iustice, and doth not fight for a common safetie, but for a priuate profit: it is to bee reckened faultie. For that not only is not the propertie of vertue, but rather of brutishnesse, setting all Brutishne [...], humanitie aside. Therfore manli­nesse is well defined of y ^• Stoikes: where they saye, it is a vertue, that [...] hat is man­linesse,. fighteth in defence of equitie.

Wherfore noman, y ^t hath atteined the glorie of manlinesse, euer gott praise by wylie traines, and crafti­nesse. For nothing may be honest, that is voide of iustice. A worthi [...] sayeng therfore is that of Platoes, who saieth,

That not onelie the knowledge, which is seuere, [Page] from ius [...]ee, is rather to be called subteltie, [...] wisdome: but also the corage, which is forward to daunger, if it be sett on for ones owne greedi: nesse, and not for a comem profit: may rather Foolehardi­nesse. beare the name of lewed hardinesse, than of man: linesse.

Wherfore who bee manlie men, & stouteherted: those same we wonld haue also be good, and plain, louers The manlie must be plain. of trouth, and nothing at all deceit­full: which come oute of the middest of all the praises of iustice.

But this is odious, that in such Impedimētes of this vertue. hawtienesse, & greatnesse of corage, ther groweth a wilfulnesse verie­soone, Sturdinesse. Desire of so­uerantie. & an ouerseeking of rule. For as it is in Plato, that it was all the maner of the Lacedemonians, to be enflamed with desire of conquering: so as euerie man dooth moste excell other in greatnesse of corage, he will likewise be the verie hyest ouer all, or rather withoute pere. And when you couet to bee aboue all, it is hard to keepe au equitie, which is moste proper to iustice. Wherof commes topasse, that they can not abide to be bridled neither with reasoning, nor with anie common, and rightfull order [Page 26] of lawe: and they becomme in the commonweale for the moste parte giftgiuers, and partmakers: that they may attein to y ^• greatest pow­er, and bee rather by might supe­riour, than by iustice equall. But the harder it is to maister the affec­tion, the worthier is the mastrie.

For ther is no season, that ought to bee withoute iustice. They ther­fore bee counted manlie, & of greate corage, not who doo anic wronge, but who withstande it. But a true, and wise stoutehert iudgeth that honestie, which nature chief­lie foloweth, to stand in deedes, and not in glorie: and hadde ra­ther The moste parte likes not the best thinges. bee, than seeme the chiefe. For whoso hangeth vpon the wauering of the vnskilfull multitude, he is not to be counted amonge the noū ­ber of manlie men. But as euerie Glorie. man is of the hyest corage, and disirous of glorie: so is he soo­nest egged to vniust doinges.

Which is indeede a verie slipper place: bicause scase ther is anie man founde, who when he hathe susteined trauailes, and auentured [Page] daungers, dooth not desire glorie, as reward of his dooinges.

A manlie corage, and a greate The duties of manlinesse. is alwaies by twoo thinges chiefly discerned: wherof the one standes in the cōtempt of outward thinges: 1 Contempt of casual thiges. when it is persuaded, that a man ought not either to esteem, either wish, or desire anie thing, but that is honest: and vnseemlie to yeelde to none, neither man, nor affection, 2 nor chaunce of fortune. The other Doing of great entre­p [...]ses. thing is, y ^• when you be so disposed in corage, as I said before: ye doo great entreprises, and those same right profitable: but yet verie hard, and full of trauail, and daunger, bothe for life, & for manie thinges, that to life doo belōge. All y ^• glorie, and honour of these twoo thinges, I adde ther to the profit, standes in the latter: but the cause, & meane, that makes manlie men, is in the former. For in it is that, which 3 maketh e [...]cellent corages, and such Contempt of outward thinges. as despise the worldes vanities.

But thissame resteth in twoo thin­ges: if bothe you iudge that onelie to be good, which is honest, & also [...]nlie honesty good. [Page 27] be free frō all moodinesse of minde. Uoiding of affections. For it is to be counted the part of a greate, and manlie corage, bothe to sett light by those thinges, which doo seem precious, and gorgeous to the greater noumbre: and also to despise the same, with a sted fast, and grounded iudgement: and likewise it is a signe of mightie corage, and great sted fastnesse, so to beare those thinges: which seeme bitter, and be much, & sōdrie waies tost in mānes life, and fortune: as nothing you swarue from the order of nature, nor the worthinesse of a wiseman. And it is not meete, that he be sub­dued The manlie man is neuer vanquished of his owne af­fections. with desire, who is not sub­dued with feare: nor y ^t he be ouer­cōme with pleasure, who hath sho­wed himself vnable to be ouercōme with trauail. Wherfore bothe these faultes ar to be auoided, and also Couetise of money. couetousnesse of money is to be es­chewed. For nothing is so much a signe of a small, and slēder corage, as to loue richesse: nothing ther is honester, and nobler, thā to despise money, if you haue it not: & if you haue it, to bestowe it in bounteous­nesse, [Page] and liberalitie. We must also beware of desire of glorie, as I said tofore. For it pulles awaie the free­dome Loue of glorie. of the minde: for the which, all the endeuour of stouteherted men Desire of rule. should bee. And verelie we ought not to seeke for rule, but rather not to receiue it sōetime, or otherwhile to giue it ouer. And we must be free frō al troublesome sturre of minde: Uoidaunce of euill affecti­ous. from desire, & feare, from hertsick­nesse, and voluptuousnesse, & angri­nesse: that we may haue quietnesse of minde, and voidnesse of care: the which may bring bothe stedfast­nesse, and also a worthie estima­cion.

But diuers ther bee, and haue Of officebea­ [...]ing, or refu­sing. been: who desiring thatsame quiet­nesse, that I speake of, haue with­drawne themselues from common affaires, and haue gott them to quietnesse. Amonge these, bothe the noblest philosophers, and the verie chief, and also certein vp­right, and graue men neither could abide the maners of the people, nor of the rulers: and manie of them haue liued in desert places, as deli­ted [Page 28] onelie with their homematers. These shoote at the same marke, y ^t kinges doo: that is, to haue neede of nothing, to obey noman, and to vse their owne libertie: whose pro­pertie Libertie. is, to liue asye list. Wherfore sithe this is common bothe to the desirous of power, & those (whome I spake of) that leade the quiet life: the one sorte doo think themselues able to comepasse it, if they haue greate welth: the other, if they bee contented with their owne, and a litle. Wherin verilie the opi­nion of nother of them is vtterlie to bee despised: but the life of The philoso­phers life. the quiet liuers is bothe easier, and safer, and lesse greeuous, or The magis­trates life. troublesome to oother: and theirs is the profitabler for mankinde, and fitter for fame, and honour: who haue applied themselues to the commonweale, and going tho­rough with greate maters. Wherfore perauenture bothe they ar to bee borne withall, that take Refusing of gouernment in the cōmon­weale. not in hand the commonweale, who of an excellent witt haue applied themselues to learning: [Page] and also they, who being letted ei­ther by sicklines, or sōe other more weightie cause, haue conueyed thē ­selues awaie frō the cōmonweale: when they were well content to leaue to other y ^• authoritie, & praise of ruling thesame. But to whom ther is no such occasiō: if they saye they sett nought by those thinges, that moste men haue in admiratiō, as rule, and officebearing: to these I think it worthie to be counted not onelie no praise, but also a faulte. Whose iudgement it were verie hard to disalow, in that they despise glorie, & esteem it as nothing: but they seem to feare the troubles, and I feare con­trarie to mā ­linesse. greeues bothe of giuing offence, & hauing repulses, as a certein re­proche, and defame. For ther bee, who doo litle agree with thēselues in thinges, that be contrarie: as sōme moste ernestlie contēme plea­sure, and in paine be somwhat ten­derer: sōme regard not glorie, and be broken with sclaunder: & these thinges they doo not with sufficiēt stedfastnesse. But all lingering sett aside, offices ar to be taken, and [Page 29] the commonweale to be serued of Such as [...] meete, must serue the cō ­monweale. those: who haue by nature y ^• helpes of dispatch of maters. For other­wise can neither the state be gouer­ned, nor the greatnesse of corage be declared. And of such as take vpon them the cōmonweale, nolesse than Magistrates ought to auoide pass [...]s of min [...]e, no­les [...]e than philosophers. of philosophers, yea and I wott not whether more, must be vsed bothe a maiestie, & a contempt of worldlie thinges (which I often repeate) and also a quietnesse of minde, & void­nesse of care: for so they shall not be thoughtfull, and with grauite, and sted fastnesse they shall leade theyr life. Which thinges be so much the Philosophers mindes be not [...]pted so ma [...]e waies, as magistra­tes. easier to philosophers: as the fewer thinges lye open in their life, that fortune maye strike: and as the fewer thinges they stand in neede of: and bicause they can not take so sorè a fall, if anie aduersitie betide. Wherfore not withoute cause, greater motiōs of mindes be stirred vp in them: and greater enterprises ar meete to be compased, by the go­uernours of the commonweale, thā by the quiet liuers: and therfore the more greatnesse of corage, & void­nesse [Page] of greeucs ought they to vse. But whoso dothe cōme to the doing Undertaking of ētreprises. of maters, let him take heede: that not onelie this he consider, how ho­nest the mater is: but also that he haue an ablenesse to discharge the­same. In the which pointe must be considered: that neither ouersoone he despaire for dastardlinesse, nor Despaire. ouermuch haue affiaunce, for gree­dinesse. Presumptiō. And in all maters, before A lesson. ye go aboute thē, ther must be vsed a diligent preparation.

But wheras moste men suppose Citiematers aboue mar­tiall feates. martiall feates to be greater, than citiecauses: this opinion is to be a­bated. For many haue sought warr oftentimes, vpon desire of glorie: & it commonlie befalleth in greate wits, & corages: & so much themore, if they be men fitt for chiualrie, and desirous of warrfare. But if we mīde to iudge trulie: ther haue been manie citiematers greater, & nobler than martiall. For though The­mistocles Exaumples of greekes. Themistocles Salamis. be rightfullie cōmended, and his name is more famous, thā Solons: and Salamis is cited a witnesse of his moste glorious vic­torie: [Page 30] & it is preferd aboue that coū ­sell of Solon, wherwith he first or­deined Solon. the Areopagites: yet nolesse The Areo­page. praiseworthie is this, than that, to be adiudged. For that but once auailed, this shall for euer auaile the citie. By this counsell, the lawes of the Athenians, by this, The Athe­nians. the orders of their elders bee preser­ued. And Themistocles can alledge nothing, wherwith he furdered the Areopage: but Solō furdered The­mistocles. For y ^t warr was main­teined by the aduise of that Senate, which by Solon was established. We may saye as much of Pausa­nias, Pausamas. & Lysander: by whose deedes Lisander. of armes, though the empire of the Lacedemonians is thought to The Lacede­monians. haue been enlarged: yet verilie they ar not to bee compared in the leste parte, with Lycurgus lawes, Lycurgus. and order: yea moreouer by these occasions, they had their armies bothe forwarder, and valianter. Neither when I was a childe, me­thought, Examples of Romanes. Marcus Scaurus gaue M. Scaurus. place to Caius Marius: nor when C. Marius. I had a [...] in the commonweale, [Page] Quintus Catulus, to Cneus Pō ­peius. Q. Catulus. For of small force is the [...]n. Pompeiꝰ. warre abrode, onlesse ther be good Africanus. aduise at home. Nor Africanus, bothe a singular man, and captein also, did more profit y ^• cōmonweale in razing of Numance: thā at that time, Publiꝰ Nasica, a priuate mā P. Nasica. did furder it, when he sleew Tibe­rius Gracchus. Nowbeit this case in deede is not onelie a citiemater. For it belongeth also to the nature of martiall feates: sithe it was wraught by force, & by stronge hād. But yet that same was done by citi­counsell, withoute an armie. And that is a goodlie sayeng, wher with I heare, that I am wonte to be tou­ched of enuious, & lewed persones.

To the robe aboue armes let glorie belonge, And the laurel yeeue place to the oratours tonge. For, that I may passe ouer other: Tullie [...] Con­ [...]ship. did not armes yeelde vnto the robe, when I gouerned the cōmonweale? For neither in the commonweale was euer a sorer perell, nor yet a greater quiet. So by our counsell, & diligence, the verie weapons, full sone s [...]iding oute of y ^• boldest citizēs [Page 31] handes, did fall to y ^• groūde. What enterprise, I pray you, in warre was euer done so greate? what tri­umph is ther with it to be cōpared? For I may, sonne Marke, glorie be­fore you: to whome bothe the inhe­ritance of this glorie, & the imitatiō of my deedes dooth pertein. Cneus Cn. Pompeiꝰ triumphed thrise, ouer the A fers, an [...] the Sp [...]r­des, & [...] dates. Pompeius, a man flowing full of martial praises, gaue me this com­mendatiō, in the hearing of manie: that he said, he should in vaine haue borne awaie the third triumph: ex­cept, by my furderaūce, in the com­monweale, he shoulde haue had a place, where he might haue trium­phed. Homemanhod then is not in­feriour to martiall: in which also we must bestowe more labour, and studie, than in this. For allwaies that honestie, which we seeke in a The cause of manlinesse. hawtie, and a princelie corage, is wrought by y ^• strength of the minde Strength o [...] the minde. and not of the bodie. Yet the bodie Labour of the bodie. must be exercised, and brought in such plight: as it may be able to fo­lowe counsell, and reason, in execu­ting maters, & t [...]steining trauail. But y ^t honestie, wherafter we serch [Page] allholle cōsisteth in y ^• care, & casting of the minde: wherin they bring nolesse commoditie, who robed doo gouern the cōmonweale: than they doo, who armed doo make the war­res. And therfore, by their aduise of­tentimes, warres bee either not be­gonne, or ended, & manie times at­tēpted: as by Marcus Catoes coū ­sell, [...] [...]. was the third Punik warre wherin the authorite of y ^• dedde mā auailed. Wherfore rather wisdōe in determinīg, thā mālinesse in fightīg is to be desired: but we must beware y ^• we take not vp y ^• mater by aduise, more to auoide warr, than for cause of profit. And so let warre be takē in warre. hand, as no other thing may seeme, but peas, to haue been sought.

And it is verilie a token of a mā ­lie The proper­ties of a mā ­lie man. corage, and a constant, not to be disquieted in rough stormes: nor in making a hurl, to be thrust frō his place, as they saie: but to folowe the coūsell of a presēt corage, nor yet to swarue frō reason. Notwithstan­ding, the one commes of corage: the Corage. other proceedes of a greate witt, to witt. fore conceiue in minde thinges [...]o­cōme: [Page 32] & sōmewhat before to appoint vpō, what may befall on both sides: & what is to be done, whē anie thing shall happen: nor to cōmitt ought, y ^t at anie time one should haue cause to saie, Had I wist. These bee the workes of a greate, & loftie corage, & leaning vpon prudence, & coūsell. But for a mā to vse himself rashlie Rash [...] in feelde, & so to buckle with y ^• ene­mie hand to hād, it is a certein bru­tish, & beastlike thing: but whē time is, & necessitie requires, a mā must Necessitie. fight hand to hand, & preserre death before slauerie, and shame.

But touching the razing, and Razing o [...] cities. sacking of cities, this greatlie is to be considered: that nothing rashlie, nothing cruellie be done. And it is Justice to­ward the [...]. y ^• conditiō of a stouthertedman, in y ^• end of broyles, to pōnish y ^• offēders, to saue y ^• multitude, in euerie estate to maintein right, and honestie. For like as ther be (as I said tofore) who doo preferre martiall feates before citiecauses: so may ye finde manie, to whome daungerous, and hotebrained deuises seeme gloriou­ser, and greater, than quiet coūsels. [Page] We must neuer by seking to es [...] Fleel. ing of perell perell, deserue to seeme cowardes, dastardes: but this we must ta [...] Assailing of [...]tures. heede of, that we put not our selue in daunger, without cause: for th [...] can be nothing foolisher, than so [...] doo. Wherfore in auenturing da [...] gers, the gyse of the physicians is [...] be folowed: who doo lightlie cur the lightlie diseased: but to sor [...] sicknesses they be driuē to ministe daūgerous, & doutefull medicines, Therfore in a caulme to wish a sor [...] tempest, it is a mad mānes part: bu [...] to make shift in a tēpest, by all ma­ner meanes, it is a wisemās proper­tie: & so much the more, if ye attein more good, when the thing is past, than harm, whan it was in doute. But the doing of maters be daun­gerous Daungers. [...]. partlie to those, which take Common. thē in hand, & partlie to the cōmon­weale. And also sōme be brought in Of life. hasard of their life, sōe of their glo­rie, Of glorie. sōme of the peoples fauour. We Of fauour. ought therfore to be redier to aduē ­ture A precepte of dutie. our owne, thā cōmon perels: & to fight sooner for honour, & glorie than for other commodities.

[Page 33]But there haue been founde ma­nie, Against them that more e [...]eme their own glorie. than commō ­welth. who for their countrey wer re­die to spende not onelie their sub­staunce, but also their life: & those­same yet would not bee content to lose one iote of their glorie: no not though the commonweale woulde require it: as Callicratides, who Callicratides when he was captein of the Lace­demonians, in the Peloponnesian warre, & had done manie thinges worthilie: in the end, [...]uerturned all: when he did not folow their ad­uise: who thought good to trans­porte the nauie from Arginnuses, and not to fight with the Atheni­ans. To whom he made answer, how the Lacedemonians, that na­uie being lost, might make for the an other: but he could not flee with out his dishonour. And this was nodoute to the Lacedemonians a metely sore plage: but that was a pestilēt plage, wherby the Lacede­monians power fell flatte to the grounde: when Cleombrotus, fea­ring Cleombrotus enuie, had rashely encountred with Epamiuondas. How much Q. Fabius. better did Quintus Fabius Maxi­mus? [Page] of whom quoth Ennius: Ennius.

Which kinde of misdoing must Manlie co­rage in citie­maters. bee also auoided in citiematers. For ther bee men, who, bee it ne­uer so good, that they think, yet for feare of enuie they dare not vt­ter it.

Whoso shall bee gouernours of Affections, which rulers ought to re­sist. the commonweale, lette them ob­serue twoo precepts of Platoes: one is, that they so mainteine the profit of the commons: that what­euer they doo, they referre it therto, Mynding of priuate pro­fite. allwayes forgettyng their owne commodities: the other is, that thei haue care ouer the holle bodie of the commonweale: l [...]ste while thei Iniustice. vpholde somme one parte, the rest they leaue destitute. For like as gardenshippe, euen so gouernment of the commonweale ought to bee vsed to the profit of them, who ar co [...]itted: and not of them, to [Page 34] whom it is committed. But whoso prouide for parte of the people, and of parte bee recklesse: they bring in sedition, and discorde, the thing most hurtfull to the cōmonweale: Discorde. wherby it befalleth, that somme do [...] seeme peoplepleasers, somme affectionate to nobilitie, but fewe to the holle. Herof sprange greate diss [...]on among the Athenians: and in our commonweale, not one­lie seditiō, but also sore ciuil warr: the which a graue, and stoute citie­zen, and worthie of rule in the com­monweale, will flee, and hate: and giue himself holle to the common­weale: and nother hunt after ri­ches, nor power: but will so defende the holle state, as he maie prouide for all men. Nor by false accusati­ons False accus [...] ­tion. wil he bring anie man into ha­tred, or enuie: but allwaies will so cleue to iustice, & honestie: y ^•, while he maie maintein it, allthough he sore offēd other he wold desire death rather, than forsake those things, that I haue spoken of. Ambiciō no­doute, Ambition. and striuing for promotiō is a verie miserable thīg: wherof it is [Page] notablie said in thesame Placo: y ^e semblablie fare thei, who woulde striue together, whether of them should rather rule the cōmōweale: as if the mariners should be at va­riaūce, which of thē should thiestie gouern the helm. And thesame man hath taught vs: that those we take Dissension. as enemies, which would beare ar­mour against vs: & not those, who, by their discretion meane to pre­serue the commonweale: as the dis­sension bitwene Publius Africa­nus, and Quintus Metellus was without all bitternesse of malice. Neither ar thei worthie to be herd: which holde opinion, y ^• we shoulde be throughlie angrie with our ene­mies: Ange [...]. and do think, it is the proper­tie of a stoutherted, and a mannelie man. For ther is nothing more cō ­mēdable, nothing more semelie for a great and noble man, than plea­sablenesse, and mercie. But in free cities, and where ther is an equali­tie of lawe, ther must be vsed also a myldnesse, & noble corage, as they call it: leste, if we bee angrie either with commers out of time, or cra­uers [Page 35] without shame: we fall into a testifenesse of minde bothe vnprofi­table, Frowardnes and hatefull. And yet meek­nes, and mercie is so to be alowed: that, for the commonweales sake, a seueritie be vsed: without which, a citie can not bee gouerned. But all ponnishment, & chastisement must bee voide of malice: and not be ap­plied Malice. to serue his tnrn, who ponni­sheth, or rebuketh anie man, but to the commonweales behoofe.

We must also bee ware, that the Rigorousnes ponnishment bee not greater, than the faulte: and lest all for one ma­ter, Partialitie. some bee corrected, somme not once spoken vnto. And in ponnish­ing we must chieflie refrain from Anger. anger. For the angrie man, that gothe about ponnishment, shall ne­uer keepe that measure, that is bi­twene to mickle, & to litle: y ^• which measure liketh the Peripatetikes: and of good cause it liketh them, were it so, they would not cōmende angrinesse: and say, that it is profi­tablie Angrinesse. giuen of nature. But in all cases, that affeccion is to bee refu­sed: and it is to be wished, that such [Page] as gouern the commonweale, bee like the lawes: which bee moued to ponnish offenders, not vpon anie wrath, but vpon equitie.

Moreouer in prosperitie, & when Prosperitie. things flowe euen at our will, let vs ernestly flee pride, disdeīfulness, Pride. and arrogācie. For as it is a point Disoein. of lightnes, vnmeasurablie to bear Arrogancie. aduersitie: so it is no lesse, vnmea­surablie Unmeasura­blenesse. to vse prosperitie: & a con­tinuall Socrates and Lei [...]us kept euer one countenauce. euenesse in all a mānes life, and one chere euermore, & one ma­ner of face is commendable: as wee haue herd of Socrates, and also of Caius Lelius. Certesse I see, how Alexander o­uer [...]refull his father of more humanitie. Philip, king of the Macedonians, was excelled of his sonne, in prow­esse, and glorie: yet in myldnesse, & gentlenes, he was farre aboue him. Wherfore y ^• one was allwaies no­ble, the other oftentimes full beast­lie: so y ^• they seeme rightlie to teach, which warne vs: that howmuch the hyer wee bee in degree, so­much the lowlyer we beare our­selues. Panetius­Africanes sayeng.

Panetius reporteth, how Africa­nus, his scholar, & familiar frend, [Page 36] was wont to saie, like as horses, by reason of y ^• diuers fights of warres waxing ouerhotte, and coragi­ous, men vse to putte to ryders, that they maie haue them the rea­dyer: euen so men vnbridled with prosperitie, and ouertrusting to themselues, should bee brought as it wer within the commepasse of reason, and learning: that they might thorousee the trailnesse of y ^• worlde, and the wauering of for­tune.

Moreouer in our hyest prosperitie, Counsell of frends. we must most of all take the aduise of our frendes: and we must giue them also a greater authoritie, thā we did before: and in those sea­sons, we must take hede, that we o­pen not our eares to flaterers: nor Flaterers. suffer ourselues to bee clawed with flaterie: wherin it is an easie thing to bee begyled. For we think our­selues Selfloue. such, that of right we maie bee praised. Wherof doo springe innumerable faultes: when men puft vp with opiniō be shamefullie scorned, and bee wrapte in foolish errours. But of these maters [Page] thus farre we treate.

This then is to be taken thus: y ^• Rehersall of things afore. the greatest dedes, and of the grea­test corage, be done by them, which gouerne the commōweale: bicause Magistrates their ministratiō reacheth fardest, and to most men apperteineth. And that ther bee, and haue bene manie, The quiet li­uers. euen in the quiet life, of great co­rage: which either would trie out, or take in hand certein great enter­prises: and would kepe themselues within the boundes of their owne maters: orels, placed bitwene phi­losophers, Priuate hous holders. and those, that rule the commonweale, would bee delited with their homegoodes: not heapīg vp y ^• same, by all maner of meanes, nor barring theirs frō the vse ther­of: Priuate sub­staunce. but rather emparting thē bothe to their frendes, & to the common­weale, if at anie time ther should be neede. Which good, first, let it bee wellgotten, and with no dishonest, or hatefull gayne: next, let it be re­die to doo good to manie, so they be worthie: lastlie, let it bee encreased with discretion, diligence, & thrift: and not lye open rather to lust, and [Page 37] ryot, than to liberalitie, and boun­tifulnesse.

These foresaid lessōs whoso obser­ueth: Conclusion. maie liue bothe honourablie, grauelie, & stoutelie, & also plainly, faithfullie, and frendlie for y ^• trade of mannes life. 4

It folowes, that we speake of the Of [...]. other parte of honestie, which re­maineth: wherin shamefastnesse, & temperaunce, as it were the certein ornament of mannes life, and sober moode, and all appeasment of pas­sions of the minde, and the measure of thinges is seene. In this place Cōmelinesse. also comelinesse is conteined: the which maie bee named Decorum in latine, for in Greeke it is called [...]. The nature herof is such, that from honestie it can not be sō ­dred. For bothe what becommeth, is honest, and also what is honest, becommeth. But what difference ther is bitwene honestie, and come­linesse, it maie sooner be conceiued, Cōme [...] a watter vpon [...]. than expressed. For whatsoeuer it is, that becommeth, it then appea­reth, when honestie is gone before.

And therfore not onelie in this [Page] [...]rte of honestie, wherof in this [...]nesse of [...]eraūce. place we haue to dispute, but also in the three former partes it doth ap­pere, Comelinesse in wisdom. what becōmeth. For as it be­cōmeth one to vse reason, & speeche discreetlie: to doo, y ^• he should doo, aduisedlie: to espie, and maintein whatsoeuer is in euerie thing the trouth: so contrariewise to bee be, gyled, to erre, to fall, to be deceued, as much it misbecommeth: as to dote, and bee distraught in minde. Therto all iust thinges bee cōme­lie: Cōmelinesse of iustice. all vniust thinges again as they bee dishonest, so ar they vncōmelie. Like is the nature of manlinesse. A cōmelie [...]sse. For whatso is done manfullie, and with a greate corage, that dothe seeme meete for a man, and cōme­lie: whatso goeth contrarie: that as it is dishonest, euē so it is vncōelye. Wherfore this cōmelinesse, wher­of Cōmelinesse in al honestie I speake, doth pertein to al hone­stie in dede: and so perteins, that not after a certein hidden sorte it is seene, but standes in open sight. For a certein thing there is, that becommeth: and the same is perc [...] in euerie vertue: which more [Page 38] by imaginacion, than in dede, may bee seuered from vertue. For as goodlinesse, and beautie of bodie can not bee parted frō helth: so this Honestie, [...] helth of bodie cōmelinesse, like beautie. cōmelinesse, wherof we treate, is alltogither blended with vertue: but yet in ones minde, and thought it maie bee diuided.

But the discription therof is on Diuision. twoo sortes. For bothe wee con­ceiue a generall commelinesse to bee, which in all honestie hathe to doo: and an other speciall cōme­linesse vnder this, which belon­geth to euerie particular parte of honestie. And that former thus Definition. in a maner is wonte to bee defi­ned: that it is cōmelie, which is a­greable Generall cōmelinesse. to mannes excellencie in that, wherin his nature is differēt from other liuing creatures. But Particular cōmelinesse. they define the parte, which is vn­der the generall, in such wise: that it they will haue to bee coun­ted commelie, which is so to na­ture agreable, as in it maie ap­peare bothe measurablenesse, and temperaunce, with a certein honest showe. That these bee thus ment, [Page] of the philosophers, we maie gesse Comelinesse [...]call. by that comelinesse, which the po­ets folowe: whereof, in an other place, we are wont to saie more. But then, we faie, the poets keepe that grace, which becommeth: whē it, that to eche persone is sitting, The persone. bothe is done, and saide: as if either Eacus, or Minos should saie:

VVell, let them hate, all whyle they stand in fear [...] or this,

His childrens graue the parentself now is:

vncomelie it should seme: bicause we haue herd, that they were iust men. But Atreus saying so, it is li­ked of y ^• hearers: bicause the speeche is fitte for the persone.

But poets will iudge by the persō, Naturall comelinesse. what is comelie for euerie bodie: howbeit nature herself hath put v­pon vs a personage of great excel­lence, and preeminence aboue all other liuing creatures. Wherfore poets, in the great diuersitie of per­sones, will espie: what is fitte, euen for the wicked sorte, and what becō ­meth them. But seeing the parts of stedfastnesse, measurablenesse, tem­peraunce, and shamefastnesse bee [Page 39] appointed vs by nature: and seeing the same nature teacheth vs, not to bee recklesse, after what sorte we behaue ourselues to euerie mā: it cōmes to passe, that bothe it ap­peareth, how farre that cōmelinesse whiche apperteins to all honestie, dothe reache: and this also, which is marked in euerie sere kinde of vertue. For as the beautifulnesse of the bodie with proportionable making of the lymmes mooueth a mannes yies: and deliteth them euen with this, that all the parts with a certein grace agree togi­ther: rightso this cōmelinesse, that shineth abrode in our life, winneth their liking, with whom we liue, by an order, stedfastnesse, and mea­surablenesse in all our wordes, and deeds. There must bee vsed ther­fore a certein reuerēce toward mē, bothe to euerie one of the best sort, & also to the rest of meaner degrees. For it is not onely a signe of an ar­rogaunt bodie, but also of one alto­gether lawlesse, to be reckles, what euerie man thinketh of him.

But ther is a difference bitwene [Page] iustice, and shamefastnesse, iu eue­rie respect, that is to bee hadde. It [...]. is the parte of iustice, to offer men no violence: of shamefastnesse, to Shamefast­nesse. offende nobodie: wherin the nature of cōmelinesse is moste thoroulie seene. These things th [...] declared: I think it sufficiently cōceiued, what thing that is, which wee saie, be­commeth.

But the dutie, that proceedeth of Duties out of cōmelinesse commelinesse, chieflie taketh this waie: which leadeth to the agreea­blenesse, & preseruacion of nature: whō if we will folowe as gyde, we shall neuer go amisse: and shall fo­lowe bothe y ^•, which hath in it wit­tinesse, and thorousight by nature: and that, which is agreeable for the felowshippe of mē: and that, which is earnest, and manlie. But y ^• grea­test effect of cōmelinesse standeth in this part of vertue, wherof we now treate. For not onelie y ^• moouings of the bodie, which agree to nature ar to bee alowed: but much more Motions of bodie, and minde. the motions of the minde, that like­wise bee agreeable to nature, ar to bee commended.

[Page 40]For the power of the minde, and of nature standes in twoo partes. In the [...] is appetite, and reason. The one is placed ī apperite, which in greeke is [...]: and this hither, and thither haleth a man: the other hath place in reason: which tea­cheth, and showeth plainelie, what is to bee doone, and what to be re­fused. So falleth it, that reason ru­leth, and appetite obeyeth. But all our doinges must be without rash­nesse, [...]. and necligēce: neither ought Necligence a man to doo any thing, wherof he Dutifull [...] ­ing. is not able to render a proouable cause. For this in a maner is the definition of dutie. But wee must [...]ow appe­tites must be framed. bring to passe, that our appetites obey reason: & neither runne before it, neither for slouthe, or dastard­linesse, dragge behinde it: and that they bee quie [...], and voide of all sturre, and trouble of the minde. [...]. Wherby all stedfastnesse, and mea­surablenesse [...]. shall appeare in sight. For appetites, which go ouerfarre astraie: and (as it wer) ouerhatte [...] [...]. either in lōging after things, or in fleeing from things, bee not st [...] inough by reason: these without [Page] doute excede their boundes, & mea­sure. For they forsake, and sette a­side obedience: nor yet doo yeelde to reason, whereunto they bee made subiecte by the law of na­ture. By such motions not one­lie mennes mindes bee troubled, but also their bodies. We maie see 2 it in the verie faces of the angrie: or Uncomely hauior of the bodie, by rea­son of trou­blesome affec­tions. of them, who either with anie lust, or with feare bee styrred, or in o­uermuch pleasure doo reioice: for ther with the countenaunce, voice, moouing, & r [...]stīg of thē all is chaū ­ged. Of which things this is gathe­red (to the intent we may return to the fourme of dutie) y ^• all appetites ar to be pulled in, & assuaged: & that we must take good heede, and dili­gence, Our doings. y ^• we do nothing rashlie, and vēturouslie, nor vnaduisedlie, and necligently. For we bee not to this end ēgēdred of nature, y ^t we should Pleasantnes. seeme to bee created for plaie, & iest: but we be rather borne to sageness, Grauitie. & to certein grauer, & greater stu­dies. Yet we maie lawfullie vse ie­sting, & pastime: but euen as we doe slepe, and other restinges: at such [Page 41] time, as we haue sufficientlie ended graue, and ernest causes. And the Ies [...]ing. verie maner of our iesting must not be to large, nor vnsober, but honest, and plea [...]aunt. For as we giue not childern al maner libertie of play­eng, but such as swarueth not from honest exercises: so in our verie ie­sting let ther appeare sōme light of Kindes of i [...] ­stin [...]. honest wit. To be short, after twoo sortes is the maner of iesting: the one, vnhonest, raylīg, hurtful, baw­die: y ^• other, fine, ciull, wittie, plea­saunt. With the which kinde, not Plautu [...]. onelie our Plautus, and the olde The Attiks. comedie of the Attiks, but also the Socratians. bookes of the Socraticall Philoso­phers be well stored: and ther be of manie mē manie merie said sawes: Catoes short and feate sa [...] ­engs. as those, that of olde Cato be gathe­red, which be called [...] Easie therfore is the difference bi­twene honest, and vnhonest iesting. The one is meete for an honest ma, if it be done in season, and with a light hert: the other, meete for no man, if the vnclenlinesse of the ma­ter be encreased with filthinesse of wordes.

[Page]Also in pastime, ther is a certein Pastime. measure to be kept: that we be not therin alltogither excessiue, & puf­fed vp wtth pleasure, fall into sōme dishonestie. But bothe our Marti­all feeld, and also our exercises of honting doo finde vs honest exam­ples of pastime.

But it belonges to the holle dis­course [...]he excel­ [...]ce of mans nature. of dutie, euermore to haue in minde, how farre mannes nature exceedeth the nature of beastes.

For they feele nothing, but plea­sure, Pleasure of the bodie. and therunto be caried with their holle sweygh: but mans witte is fedde with lerning: and by studi­eng either sercheth, or doth alwaies sōmewhat: & is ledde with the delite of seeing, and hearing. Yea moreo­uer if ther be anie sōmewhat with the moste enclined to pleasures: so he be not of y ^• bestlie kinde: (for sōme ther be not mē in dede, but in name) but if ther be anie mā, that is sōme­what more vprightlye mynded: though with pleasure he be caught, he hydeth, and dissembleth his ap­petite of pleasure, for verie shame­fastnesse. Wherof it is soone per­ceiued, [Page 42] that pleasure of the bodie is n [...]t worthie to be matched with the excelence of man: and that it ought to be despised, and reiected. But if ther be anie man, who sommedeal yeeldeth vnto pleasure: he must ve­rie warelie keepe a measure, in en­ioyeng the same.

And therfore lette the feeding, and we must feed to liue, & not [...]ue to feede. apparailing of the bodie be refer­red to helth, and strength, not to vo­luptuousness. And therto if we will consider, what an excelence, and a dignitie ther is in nature: we shall A generall cōmelines [...]. vnderstande, how fowle it is to o­uerflowe in ryotte, and liue delici­ouslie, and wantonlie: and how ho­nest it is, to leade our life sauinglie, chastelie, sagelie, and soberlie.

We must vnderstand also, that we be cladde by nature (as it wer) 1 with twoo persones: wherof y ^• o [...]e A commune personage. is cōmune: bicause we all be parta­kers of reason, and the preeminece, wherby we surmounte beastes: frō which reason all honestie, & cōmeli­nesse is deriued: & out of the which, 2 the way of fynding dutie is sought: A persone proper to ech [...] man. the other is that, which properlie [Page] to echeman is assigned.

For as in bodies ther be great diffe­rences (for sōme we see passe other in swiftnesse to runne, somme in strength to wrastle: & likewise in fa­ces, some haue a portlie looke, sōme an amiablenesse) so also in mindes Difference of natures. ther be farre greater diuersities.

Ther was in Lucius Crassus, & Romanes. Lucius Philippus much pleasaūt­nesse: Pleasaūtnes. but greater, and more of sette purpose, in Caius Cesar, Lucius sonne. And at those daies, in Mar­cus Scaurus, and in Marcꝰ Dru­sus the yongmā, ther was a singu­lar grauitie: in Caius Lelius, Grauitie. Mirt [...]. much mirth: in Scipio his famili­ar, Henoursee­king. bothe greater honourseeking, & a sadder life. But of the Grecians, Greekes. Socrates, we haue herd, was plea­saunt, and feateconceited, a merie Merie con­ceites. talker, and in all his wordes a moc­ker, whō the Greeks named [...]: Dry moches. cōtrariwise, Pythagoras, and Pe­ricles atteined verie hye authoritie, Ernestnesse. without anie mirth at all. Of the Craftienesse. Penes, Annibal was craftie: of our capteins, Quintus Maximus, we haue herd saye, had a maruai­lous [Page 43] cōning in cloking, in keeping in, in dissēbling, in making a stale, in preuēting the deuises of the ene­mie. In which kinde, the Greeks before all other do preferre Th [...]mi­stocles the Athenian, and Iason the Pheraian. And chieflie the suttle, & craftie deede of Solon: who, y ^t bothe his life should be y ^• safer, and sōme­what the more he might furder the cōmonweale, fained himself to bee madde. Ther be other farre vnlike to these, plaine, and open: which do Plainnesse. think nothing in secrete, nothing with gyle, meete to be wrought: & be louers of trouth, and enemies to disceite. And again, ther be other, who wolde anie thing endure, and doo seruice to anie manne: so they A farre fetche to cōmepasse maters. might obtein that, they desire: as we did see Sylla, & Marcus Cras­sus vse them selues. Of which sorte, we haue herd, Lysander the Lace­demonian A suttle suf­feraunce. was the suttellest, and could moste abide. And contrarie­wise, of Callicratides: who was Plain dealīg. admirall of the nauie, next after Lysander.

And likewise we see an other man Familiarness in talk. [Page] in talk, though he be of great au­thoritie, so order the mater, that he seemēs one of the common sorte. Which in Catulus, bothe y ^• father, and the sonne, & thesame in Quin­tus Mutius Mancinus, wee haue seen. I haue herd moreouer of mine elders, y ^• same to haue been in Pub­lius Scipio Nasica. And contrari­wise, his father, euen him, that auē ­ged Sadnesse. Tiberius Gracchus wicked enterprises, to haue had no gentle grace of speeche. No nor Xenocra­tes, who was the sagest of the Phi­losophers, & for the selfsame thing became greate, and famous.

Innumerable other diuersities ther Cōmelinesse according to eche man nes nature. be of nature, and of maners, nodeal yet dispraisable. But eueriemans owne giftes, not such as be faultie, but naturall, ar earnestlie to b [...]e mainteined: wherby y ^• sooner may that commelinesse be kept, which we doo seeke. For in such wise wee must worke, as against all nature Nature. we neuer striue: which thing auoi­ded, let vs folowe our owne proper nature. So that though ther be [...] o­ther studies grauer, and better: yet [Page 44] let vs measure our owne, by na­tures rule. For neither is it to anye purpose [...]o fight against nature, nor to ensue anie thing, that ye can not attein. Wherupon it more ap­peares, what maner of thing this commelinesse is: bicause nothing becommeth, m [...]ger Minerua, as they saye: that is, nature withstanding, and resisting it.

In breefe, if ought be commelie, of A continua [...] euennesie of life. trouth ther is nothing more seeme­lie: than an euennesse in all a mans life, and euerie of his dooinges: which you can not keepe, if you counterfette an others nature, and lette pasie your owne. For as wee ought to vse that speche, which is knowne to vs: leste, as somme mēne chopping in greeke wordes, we be worthelie mockt at: so in ou [...] doinges, and all our life, we ought to showe no con [...]rarietie.

And this di [...]ence of natures hath so great a power: that otherwhile Going to death. somme one manne ought to kill himsellf, somme other in thesame quarell ought not. For Mar­ [...]us Cato of Uti­ca. Cato was not in one quarell, [Page] and the rest in an other, who yeel­ded thēselues vnto Cesar in Africa. Yet to the rest perchaunce it should haue been coūted a reproche, if they had slaine themselues: bicause their Deintie life. [...]de ma­ners. life had been deintier, and their ma­ners mylder: but when nature had giuē Cato an vncredible grauitie, and thesame he had strengthened with a continuall stedfastnesse: and alwaies had remained in his intēt, & determined purpose: it was meete for him rather to dye, than to looke Cesar noted for a tyraunt. vpon the tyrauntes facé. How ma­ni Ulysses, for a tune, suffered euerie thing. paines susteined Ulysses, in that longe wandering? when bothe to women he did seruice (if Circe, and Calypso ar to be named womē) and to all men in all his talk he wolde Faire speeche be fairespoken: and also at home did beare the spight of the slaues, and n [...]efes: that he might once attein to the thing, which he desired. But A­iax, Aiax. with the corage, that he is re­ported of, had rather dye a thowsād deathes, than to suffer those thingꝭ of an other mā. Which diuersities whē we beholde: it shall be necessa­rie to weye, what eche man hath of [Page 45] his owne: and to order those giftes: and not to haue a minde to try, how other mens graces wolde becōme him. For that becommeth echemā, which is moste of all echemannes Knowe yo [...] self. owne. Let euerie mā therfore know his owne disposition: and let him make himself a sharpe iudge bothe of his vices, and of his vertues: le [...]e Plaiers. players maye seeme to haue more discretion, than we. For they doo choose not the best enterludes, but the fittest for themselues. For who vpō their voices be bolde, they take Epigones, and Medea: who vpon gesture, do take Menalippa, & Cly­temnestra. Euermore Rupilius, whom I remember, tooke Antiopa: not often Esopus tooke Aiar. Shal a player then see this in the stage, that a wiseman shall not see in his life? We shall chieflie therfore la­bour A rule. in those thingꝭ, wherunto we shall be moste apte. But in case ne­cessitie shall driue vs sōmetime to those thinges, which shall not be for our disposition: all care, studie, and diligence must be employed: that, if we doo them not cōmelie, yet with [Page] as litle vncōmelinesse, as maye be: neither ought wee somuch to ende­uour ourselues to folowe the ver­tues, which be not giuen vs, as to flee vices.

And vnto these twoo ꝑsones, which Persones. before I named, ther is a third per­sone 3 ioyned: which sōme chaūce, or Cōmelinesse comming by fortune. time casteth on vs: the fourt also is that, which we shall fashon to our­selues, after our owne minde. For 4 kingdomes, empires, nobilitie, ho­nour, Cōmelinesse taken of sette purpose. riches, power, & those, which be contrarie to these, being placed in fortunes hand, be ordered accor­ding Examples of the former. to the times: but what persone we ourselues list to beare, ꝓceedeth The fourte. of our owne free will. And therfore sōme to philosophie, sōme to y ^t ciuil lawe, sōme to eloquence doo applie thēselues: & for the vertues, somme haue a more minde to excell in one, & sōme in an other: & whose fathers, Folowers of their aūcet [...]rs or aunceters in anie cōmendation haue been notable: y ^• moste parte of theirs do studie in the same kinde of praise to excell: as Quintꝰ Mutiꝰ, Publius sonne, did in y ^e ciuil lawe: Africanꝰ, Paulus sonne, in f [...]ates [Page 46] of armes. But diuers do adde sōm [...] of their owne vnto those praises, y ^t they receiued of their fathers: as this same Africanꝰ with eloquēce encreased the heape of his martiall glorie: which selfsame Timotheus, Conons sonne, did also: who, whē in praises of warre, to his father he was not inferiour, did ioine to that commendation the glorie of witte, and lerning. But it so falleth now Men newly cōming vp. and then: that somme letting go the imitatiō of their aūceters, doo fo­lowe a certein trade of their owne: and th [...]rin, for the moste parte, they chieflie trauail: who appoint them­selues greate enterprises, beeing borne of scaceknowne parents. In our minde, and thought then wee must cast all these thinges, whē we serche to knowe, what becommeth. But first of all we must determine, Appointing vpō the kind [...] of life. whō, & what maner men we wolde haue ourselues, & of what kinde of life. Which aduisemēt is y ^t hardest of all. For at y ^e entring in to y ^• yeres of discretiō, whē ther is most stēder­nesse of counsell: euerie mā doth ap­poīt hīself y ^t trade of leading his life, [Page] which he hath loued moste of all: & so he is entāgled with sōme certein kinde, and course of life: before he was able to iudge, what should be best. For wheras Prodicꝰ sayeth, that Hercules (as is in Xenophon) as soone as he waxed wheyberded, which time is graunted of nature, to chose, what waie of liuing eche man will enter: wēt forthe into de­sert: and there sitting, much, and a longe while douted with himself, when he behelde twoo waies, the one of pleasure, the other of vertue: whether of them it wer better to enter: this might perauenture hap­pen Hercules had a diuine gift aboue na ture. to Hercules, that was borne of Iupiters seede: but not so to vs: who doo folowe those, that euerie­one of vs list to folowe, and be allu­red to their studies, and fashions. Folowing of parents. And for the moste parte, being tra­ded with our parents preceptes, we encline to their gyse, and maner. Folowing of the multitude Other be caried after the iudgemēt of the multitude: and longe after those thinges moste, which to the greater parte seeme goodlie [...]. Ma­nie The right trade. neuerthelesse, whether of a cer­tein [Page 47] lucke, or of a goodnesse of na­ture, or by the instruction of their parents, haue folowed the right trade of life.

But that kinde of menne is seldo­mest Fewe take the best [...]. founde: who after they be ei­ther of excellent profoundnesse of witte, or of a famous lerning, and knowledge, or with bothe these ad­ourned, haue gotte a time to take aduisement: what race of life they wolde the rathest rūne: in y ^• which aduise, all a mannes counsell is to Nature. be applied to echemās ꝓper nature. For sithens in all thinges, that be done, out of that nature, wherwith eueriemā is borne (as before is said) we serch, what becōmeth: then, in pointing oute the holle life, much more regarde therof must be had: that in the continuing of our life we may agree with ourselues, and neuer haulte in anie dutie. Nature, and fortune.

But to this choyse seeing nature hath the greatest power, & fortune the next: ther must consideration be had of them bothe alwaies, in choo­sing the kinde of ones life: but of nature, more. For nature is much [Page] the surer, & the stedfaster: so that for­tune manie times, as mortall her­self, seemeth w ^t immortall nature to fight. Whoso then will applie all the purpose of his life, according to the kinde of his nature not corrup­ted: Stedfas [...]ness. let him keepe a stedfastnesse: for that becōmeth moste of all: except perchaunce he shall perceiue, that Misgoing. he hath gone amisse, in choosing his kinde of life. Which if it befall (as it may befall) ther must be made a Chaunge of life. chaunge of maners, and purposes. That chaūge then, if time shall fur­ther, we shall y ^• sooner, & more con­ueniētlie bring to passe: if not, faire & softlie, and by litle & litle it must be done: like as frendships, which do not delite vs, & ar not well liked, wisemē do iudge more conuenient stitch after stitch to rip, thā sodenly to cut asonder. And when we haue once chaunged our kinde of life: we must by all meanes take heede, that we be thought to haue done it vpon good aduisement. The [...]ertues, not the vices of elders must be folo­wed.

But forasmuch as a litle before it is said, y ^• we must folow our aunce­ters: first, be this excepted: y ^• their [Page 48] [...]ices ar not to be folowed: next; y ^• we folow thē not in some thinges, y ^• Nothing [...] ­gainst nature our nature will not beare: as the el­der Africanus sonne, who adopted this our Paulus sōne, could not be so like his father, bicause of sicklye weaknesse, as y ^• other was like his. [...] case therfore one be not able ei­ther to pleade causes, or to retein y ^• people with orations, or to folowe the warres: those thinges yet he ought to perfourme, which shal lye in his power: as iustice, faithful­nesse, liberalitie, sobermoode, & tē ­peraūce: to thintēt the thing, which he lacks, may be the lesse missed in him. Trulie the best inheritaūce, y ^• [...] fathers leaue to their childern, and more worthe, thā all liuelod, is the glorie of vertue, & worthie deedes: wherunto to be a staine, it is to bee accounted bothe vice, and shame.

And bicause not alike duties ar Comlinesse. according to age. assigned to vnlike ages: and somme ther be for yongmen, and sōme for the elder sorte: sommewhat also we haue to saie of this diuersitie. It is Yongmenne [...] ou [...]es. therfore a yōgmās part, to reuerēce Reuerence o [...] elders. his elders: & of these to choose oute [Page] the best, and most cōmended: whose counsell, & authoritie he may leane vnto. For the vnskilfulnesse of ten­der yeres, must by oldemens experi­ence be ordered, and gouerned.

And this age speciallie from lustes Stayednes. is to be wayned: and to be brought Labour. vp in labour, & paines taking bothe Pacience. of minde, & bodie: that both in mar­tiall, and ciuil duties, their diligēce Endeuour. may appeare. Also when they will refresh their wittes, and giue them­selues to pastime: let them beware Temperaūce Shamefast­nesse. of intemperaunce, and remember shamefastnesse: which shall be done y ^• easlier, if at such thingꝭ also their elders will be in presence.

But for olde men labours of the bo­die what is com ly for old m [...]. ar to be diminished, and exerci­ses of the minde seeme meete to be Exercise of [...]nde. encreased: and they must giue their Profiting of other. diligence, that much they ayde their frendes, & youth, & speciallie the cō ­mōweale Counsell. with coūsell, & wisdome. wisdome. But nothing more of age is to be taken heede of, than that it giue not Slouthe. itself to lithernesse, and idlenesse. [...]. As for riotte, to euerie age it is re­prochefull, and for olde age moste [Page 49] shamefull. But if the intēperauc [...] of lust be ioyned with it, [...]er is a dubble inconueniēce: bicause bothe age self taketh shame by it, and it causeth yongmēnes intēperaunce to be more shamelesse.

And this trulie is not oute of the what becom­mes a magi­strate. mater, to speake somwhat touchīg the duties of magistrates, of p [...] ­uate mē, of citiezens, and of straū ­gers. It is therfore the proper office of a magistrate, to consider, he re­presentes the persone of the citie: & that he ought to maintein the ho­nour, The hon [...] of the [...]. and reputatiō therof: and to keepe the orders of thesame: and to serte oute lawes fit therfore: and to remember, they be c [...]mitted to his charge.

A p [...]uate man it behoues to liue in A priuate man. an equalitie, and likenesse of lawe with the citiezēs: neither as an vn­derling, Egall lawe. and abi [...], nor bearing himself to hye: and also in the com­monweale to seeke those thinges, that be quiet, and honest. For such Quietnesse. a one we ar wōte bothe to call, and A citiezen, counte a good citiezen.

But it is the dutie of a straunger, & A straunger. [Page] alien inhabitaunt: to meddle no­thing beside his owne bysinesse: nor to enquire anie thing touching an other mā: & nowhit in a straūge cōmonweale to be curious.

Thus, for the moste parte, duties Conclusion. shall be founde oute: when it shall be sought, what becōmeth: & what is agreable for persones, times, & a­ges. And ther is nothing, that be­commes a man so much: as in eue­rie Stedfastnesse doing, and taking of aduise, to keepe a stedfastnesse.

But bicause y ^• same cōlinesse ap­peareth Comlinesse in thre pointes. in all deeds, & wordes, & in the mouing, & stayeng of the bodie: & thesame consisteth in three thin­ges, wellfauourd nesse. wellfauourdnesse, order, & fur­niture meete for ones doings (som­what Order. hard it is to expresse: but it Furniture. shall suffise, so it be conceiued) & in these three conteined is that care al­so: that we be alowed of those, with whome, and amōg whome we liue: of these maters likewise a fewe wordes let vs saye.

First, verie nature seemeth to haue 1 had a great respect of our bodie: Of wellfa­uourdnesse. which hath sette moste in sight our [Page 50] physnomie, and the rest of our shape, wherin ther is an honest showe: but she hath couered, and kept close the partes of the bodie, giuen for natures necessitie: which els should haue an euilfauourd, and fowle sight.

Mennes shamefastnesse hath folo­wed Shamefast­nes, natures scholar. this so conning a frame of na­ture. For whatso nature hath hyd­den: thesame all men, who be well in their wittes, do keepe frō the yie: & they doo their endeuour to serue verie necessitie, as closely, as they may: and of what partes of the bo­die the vse is seruile, neither those partes, nor their seruice by their names they doe call: and so, that, which to doe it is no shame, if it be secretlie, to tell it is vnclenly.

And therfore neither the opē doing vnshamefast­nesse. of those thinges is voyde of vn­shamefastnesse: nor the talk, with­oute Fylthynes. filthynesse.

Neither truly ar y ^• Cynikes wor­thy Cynikes. to be herd, nor any of y ^• Stoiks, which ar almoste Cynikes: who do reproue vs, & mock at vs: bicause Thinges, wordes. we call those thinges, in wordes [Page] shamefull to be spoken vpō, which bee indeede not dishonest: and yet those thinges, that be vnhonest, we terme by their names. As to go a theeuing, to begyle one, to commit aduouterie, is a thing indeede dis­honest: but it is tolde, withoute dis­honestie: likewise to gette childern indeede is honest, but to be vttered in talke it wer vnclenly. And mo thinges, for that purpose, be reaso­ned by y ^t said philosophers, against shamefastnesse. But let vs folow nature: and shonne all thinges, y ^t Nature. abhorre the verie pleasing of our yie, and eare. Let our standing, go­ing, Gesture. sitting, lyeng, chere, yies, and mouing of handes keepe that same comlynesse. In which thīges, two faultes we must speciallie take heede of: that nothing womannish­ly, Deintynesse. or deyntily, and nothing bloc­kishly, Blockishnes. or cartarly we doo. Neither must we agree, that these thinges should be seemly in players, and o­ratours, Players. and left loosely in our sel­ues. The custome of the stageplay­ers, euen of an olde order, hathe so greate regarde to shamefastnesse: [Page 51] that noman commeth on the stage, withoute britches. For they ar a­ferd: leste, if it chaunce by anie mis­happe, that sōme partes of the body be discouered, they should be seene vncomlye. And, as the fashion is w ^t vs: childern growing to mannes Baines. state be not bathed with their pa­rēts: nor sōnes in lawe, with their fathers in lawe. Therfore this kinde of shamefastnesse is meete to be obserued: namely when nature herself is gyde, and maistresse.

But wheras ther bee two kin­des Of fairnesse. of beautie: and in one of them ther is a louelinesse, in the other, a maiestie: louelinesse, we must thīk, Louelinesse. longes to the woman, and maiestie Portelynesse to the man. Therfore all maner trimmyng, that is vnsitting for man, must be kept from his oute­ward fourme: and the like faulte to this must be taken heede of in Gesture. ones gesture, & mouing. For bothe y ^t sturring like wrastelers is often­times misliked: and also many ges­tures like players ar not withoute foolish toyes: & in bothe these kin­des, those thinges, which be right, [Page] and naturall, be commended. Uisage. But y ^• maiestie of the fauour is pre­serued Colour. Exercise. by goodnesse of colour, & co­lour, Clenlynesse. by exercises of bodie. Ther must a clenlinesse be vsed besides: y ^• is not odioꝰ, nor curious, but one­ly escheweth cartarly, & vnnatu­rall slouenry. The like regarde we must haue of apparail: wherin a Apparail. meane, as in moste parte of things is best. We must take heede also, we vse neither to nyce a flownesse in our pase, like pageaūtes in triū ­phes: Goyng. neither tomuch haste in spede making, like wyldebraines. For whē it happēs, y ^• men do so: ther fo­lowes short breathing, the counte­naūce is chaūged, & y ^• face disfigu­red: wherof cōmes a great presūp­tion, that they haue no stayednesse.

But we must much more studie, y ^• the affections of our minde swarue Cōmelinesse in motions of the minde. not frō nature: which we shall at­teine, if we will beware, y ^• we fall not into moodes, and mazes: and if we will cōtinue in hauing heed­full mindes to the keeping of cōme­linesse. But the motions of mindes be of two sortes: sōme proceede of [Page 52] intelligēce, sōme of appetite. Intel­ligence Intelligence is chiefly occupied in ser­ching Appetite. out of trouthe: appetite stir­reth a mā to be doīg. We must pro­uide therfore: y ^• we vse intelligence aboute the best maters: & that we make our appetite obediēt to reasō.

And bicause y ^• power of speche is Cōmlynes in speeche. greate, and thesame is in two sor­tes: y ^• one of vehemēt speche, y ^• other Uehement speeche. of cōmō talk: let the vehemēt speche serue for pleadings in iudgemētes, orations in assēblies, & debating in Cōmon talk. y ^• Senatehouse: let talke be vsed in cōpanies, in disputations, in mee­tings of familiars: & let it also be at feastinges. Of vehement speche the Rhetoricians haue rules, of talke none at all: notw ^tstanding I wotte not, whether such also may be. Howbeit for their studies, that wil lerne, ther be teachers founde: but none ther be, that studie this: w ^t the route of Rhetoricians all places be replenished. Neuerthelesse y ^• same preceptes, which be of wordes, and sentences, shall appertein to talk. But sithens we haue our voice to Speeche. vtter speeche: and in voice we seeke Uoice. [Page] two thinges y ^t it be clere, & sweet: Clerenesse. Sweetnesse. they bothe ar to be fetched from na­ture euermore: but exercise will en­crease y ^• one: imitatiō of treatable, and softe speakers will help the o­ther. Catuli, the father, and the sonne. What was in the Catuli, that ye should suppose them to vse a perfite iudgement in pronouncing of letters? Howbeit they wer ler­ned: but so wer other to: yet these wer thought to vse the latine toūg best. Theyr sounding was sweete: their letters neither to much mow­thed, nor drowned: lest either it should be vnherd, or ouer harshe. Their voice was withoute strai­ning, neither faynte, nor shryll. The speeche of Lucius Crassꝰ was Lucius Crassus. more plentiefull, and nolesse feate­conceited: but, for well speaking, y ^• Catuli wer in as much estimatiō. Cesar was sawced with mirth, & Cesar. merie conceites: Catulus vnkle ex­ceeded Catulus vn­kle. all: so that in that lawierly kinde of pleadīg, he with familiar speeche passed the vehemence of o­ther. In all these therfore we must labour, if in all we serch, what be­commeth.

[Page 53]Let then this familiar talke (in Talk. Gentle. which y ^• Socratiās moste excell) be Not obs [...]i­nate. gētle, & nothing obstinate: let ther be therin a pleasauntnesse. No nor Pleasaunt. let a mā keepe out other, as though he wer entered into his owne pos­session: but as in other maters, so in common talke, he must think an Chaungeable cour [...]e. enterchaunged course oftentimes meete to be vsed. And let hī see, first of all, of what maters he speake: Applieng to the mater. if they be ernest, let him vse a sage­nesse: Sagenesse. it they be merie, a pleasaunt­nesse. [...]. Speciallie let him foresee, y ^• his talke bewray not sōme vice in his maners: which then chiefly is wonte to befall: whē either in moc­kage, or ernest, men do bysie them­selues to speake raylīgly, & spight­fully of the absent, to their sclaun­der. Sclaunde [...]ig But this common talk, for the The mater of talke. moste parte, is had either of house­holde maters, or of the common­weale, or of lerning, and teaching artes. We must therfore giue good heede: that when the cōmunication beginne to straye to other thinges, to these it be returned: yea howsoe­uer the mater falles oute, that is in [Page] hand. For neither all with one ma­ter, nor at euery season, nor alike we ar delited. We must marke al­so, Delectation. how farre our talk hathe in it a liking: and as ther was a waye to beginne it, so let ther be a measura­ble Measure. meane to end it. But bicause it is verie well taught: that in all our life we flee passiōs, that is to saye, [...] of the minde. vnmeasurable moodes of minde, not ruled by reason: likewise our talk must be voyde of such moodes: leste either anger aryse, or somme greedynesse, or slouthfulnesse, or cowardlinesse, or sōme such thing appeare. And moste of all, we must haue regarde: that those, with whome wee keepe talk, we seeme bothe to reuerence, & to loue. Chyding. Chyding also manie times cōmes in place, as necessarie: in which, one must vse perauenture bothe a greater strayning of voice, and a sharper grauitie of wordes. It must also be prouided: y ^• we seeme not to do those thinges, as irefull: but as physicians do cōme to sea­ring, & cutting: so let vs seldome, & vnwillingly fall to such maner of [Page 54] rebuking: and not at all, onlesse it be of necessitie, when ther will bee founde none other remedie. But Anger. yet let it be clere withoute anger: wherwith nothing rightly, nothīg discreetely can be done. And for the moste parte, we may vse a gentle Rebuking. maner of rebuking: yet tempered with a grauitie: so as bothe a sowr­nesse be showed, and all spight re­frained. Yea and that same byt­ternesse, which chyding hath in it, must be declared, to be vsed for his sake, who is chydden. It is good Braules. also, euen in those braules, which bee made with our vtterest ene­mies, although we heare wordes vnmeete to be spoken to vs: to keepe yet a grauitie, and to suppresse the Grauitie. angry moode. For those thin­ges, that be wrought with any pas­sion, neither can be cōstātlie done, nor alowed of those, that ar presēt. Euilfauourd also it is, to tell pray­ses of a mannes self, speciallie if [...]. they be vntrue: and, with the moc­king of the hearers, to resemble the glorious souldiour.

And bicause we go thorough al ma 2 Of furniture. [Page] ters, or at y ^•leste be mynded so to doo we must tell also, what maner of howse, it liketh vs, an honorable A princes house. mā, & a prince should haue. Whose The vse. end is the occupieng therof: accor­ding to the which, the platte of the buildyng must be made: and neuer­thelesse ther must respect be had to The buyldig a statelynesse, and hand somnesse in thesame. We haue herd faye, it was an honour to Cneus Octa­uis, Cneus Octa­uius. who the first of that familie was made Consul: bicause in the palaice, he had buylded a gorgeous howse, & full of statelynesse: which, when people resorting thither had seene, was thought to furder the maister, a man neewly cōmen vp, to the atteining of the Consulship. This did Scaurus pull downe, & [...]. enlarge the roume of his howses. And so Octauius into his howse first brought the Consulship: this other, a noble, and famous mānes sonne, into his enlarged howse not onely brought repulsse, but also a staine, & miserie. For a mannes ho­nour must be set out by his howse, and [...]ot all his honour sought by [Page 55] his howse: nor by the howse the maister, but by the maister y ^• howse must be honested. And as in all thi­ges els, regarde is to be hadde not of a mannes self onely, but of other also: likewise in a noble mannes howse, into the which bothe manye geastes ar to be receiued, and a nō ­ber of mē of euery sorte is to be ad­mitted: ther must be made a proui­sion Large [...] for roomethinesse. Otherwise, a large howse proueth to the mai­ster oftentimes a shame: if ther be in it a solitarinesse: and speciallie if once, with an other maister, it was wōte to be well fylled. For an odi­ous thing it is, whē of the bygoers it is sayde:

O auncient house, alas, we may see, How vnlike a lorde hath lordship on thee.

Which, a man may truly say now a dayes of manie. Ye must beware also, namelie if yourself be a buyl­der, that beyonde measure, in sūp­tuousnesse, Costlynesse. and greate cost, you doo not exceede: in the which kinde, euē of the ensample much harme ari­seth. For diligentlie moste mē, spe­ciallie Ensample. in this pointe, doo folowe [Page] the doinges of princes: as, of Luciꝰ Lucius Lucullus. Lucullus, a singular mā, who en­seweth the vertue? how manie yet haue folowed the great costlynesse of his manourplaces? In which thinges ther must doutlesse be vsed a measure, that to a meankeping must bee reduced: and thesame meankeping must bee referred to the common vse, and counte­naunce of the life. But of these hy­therto.

Now, in euerie deede, we take in Three rules [...]n mennes do [...]nges. hand, three pointes ar to be kept. First, that appetite obey reason: for nothing is meeter than that, Reason. for the maynteyning of duties. Next, that it be considerd, how greate a thing it is, which we minde to bring to passe: that nei­ther lesse, neither more care, and Care. paine be taken, than the case requi­reth. The third pointe is, that we haue an yie to vse a measure in those thinges, which pert [...]in to an Comelynes. honest showe, and seemlie grace. The best measure is to keepe the verie seemlynesse, wherof we spake before: and not to passe those boun­des. [Page 56] But of these three the chie­fest is, that appetite obey reason.

Hereafter, touching order of thin­ges, 3 and opportunitie of times, we Of [...] haue to say. And this knowledge cōteineth that, which the Greekes do name [...]: not this, which we interpret Modestia: in the which worde, Modus is comprehended. But that is [...], wherin is ment a keeping of order. And ther­fore, y ^• we may call the same Modestia, thus it is defined of the Stoikes: y ^e [...] Modestia (that is to saye) discretion is y ^• knowledge of setting those thin­ges, which ar done, or said, in their proper places. And so of order, and placing ther seemes to be all one Placing. Order. propertie. For thus also they define order, to be a framing of thinges in Place. apte, & cōueniēt places. And place, Opportu­nitie. they save, cōcerneth the doyng, op­portunitie the time. And time con­uenient for the doing, in Greeke [...], in Latine is called Occasio. Occasion. So falleth it, that this discretion, which we interpret, euen as I Discretio [...] sayde, is the knowledge of oppor­tunite of fitte season to doo a thing. [Page] But the same definition may be of Prudence. prudence: wherupon we treated in the beginning. But in this place, we serche after measurekeeping, & tēperaunce, & other like vertues. Therfore, what were y ^• properties of prudence, in theyr place we haue spoken. But what properlie be­lōges to these vertues, wherof here we haue begonne to speake, which pertein to shamefastnesse, and to their liking, with whome we liue: we must now declare.

Such an order therfore in our do­ings Circumstaū ­ces. is to be vsed: that as in an o­ration well buylded, so in mannes Agreablenesse life all thinges be accordaunt, and agreeable together. For a fowle hearing it is, and verie faultie, in a sage mater to bring in anie table talk, or wanton wordes. Peri­cles sayd well, whē he had Sopho­cles Pericles. ioined Pretor with him: and they wer commoning aboute their office: &, as by chaunce a well fauoured childe passed by, Sopho­cles Sophocles. sayd: Oh, ther is a fayre boye, Pericles: he answered: It becōmes a Pretor, Sophocles, to haue not [Page 57] only for bearīg hādes, but yies also. If Sophocles had sayd this same, where wrastelers bee allowed: he had been free from iust reproofe.

So greate a force ther is bothe of place, and time. As for example, if a man, that shall pleade a cause, bee musing to himself in his iourney, [...]. or inhis walk: or if anie other thing he myndeth heedfully: he is not re­proued: but if he doo the like, at a feaste: he may be thought vnciuil, for hauing no regard to the time.

Howebeit those thīges, which farre disagree from all humanitie, as if [...]. any māsing in the streate, or if any other greate disorder ther bee: by & by they appeare: and they greatly neede not our admonitiō, or rules: but from these, which seeme to bee small faultes, and of many can not be perceiued, we must the more di­ligentlie refraine. As in instru­mētes soūding by strings, or blast, though neuer so litle they iarre, yet Deedes mus [...] be like tunes. that of a conning man is wonte to be fownde: so must we liue in this life that nothing chaunce to iarre: yea and so much the more, as the cō ­corde [Page] of deedes is greater, and bet­ter, than of tunes. Wherfore as in instrumētes, musicians eares doo feele euen the leste discord: so, if we wil be sharp, & quick iudges, & mar­kers of faultes: we shall vnderstād oftētimes greate thinges by small. We shall soone iudge by the set­ting of the yie, b [...] smothe looking, Coūtenaūce. or bending of y ^• browze, by sadnesse, mirth, laughter, speaking, silence, Speaking. strayning, & falling of y ^• voice, & o­ther such like: what is sittīgly done: & what frō duty, & nature swarueth. Others life our glasse. In which kinde of things, it is not vnconuenient to iudge by other, of what sorte eche of the is: y ^• if ought misbecōmeth an other, we shōne it also in ourselues. For it cōmes to passe, I wot not how: y ^• we see more Others li [...]e. in other, thā in ourselues, if ought be done amisse. And therfore verie­soone those scholars bee corrected: whose faultes their maisters doo coūterfett, for to make thēamēded. Nor trulie oute of the waye it is, in The iudge­ment of the [...]kilfull. chosing of thinges, which bring a doutefulnesse, to take lerned mēns aduise, or skilfull by experience: & [Page 58] so to serche, what liketh them, con­cerning euery kinde of dutie. For the greater parte is cōmonlie wōte thither to bee caried, whither of ve­rie nature they be ledd. In which, we must see, not onely what echemā sayeth: but also, what eche mā thin­keth: and for what cause, eche man so thinketh. For as painters, & they that graue images, & y ^• right poetes also, bee willing to haue their wor­kes seene of all sortes of mē: that in­case The commo [...] people. ought be reproued of many, it may bee corrected: & therin both w ^t thēselues, & with other, they examin, what is done amisse: so after the iudgement of other, many thinges of vs bothe must be done, and left vndone, and also chaunged, and amended. Ciuil ma­ners.

As for thinges, which ar done after custome, and ciuil ordinaū ­ces: ther is no precept to be giuen of them. For they bee preceptes of themselues: neither it behoueth any man to bee ledde with this er­rour: Philosophers if Socrates, or Aristippus haue done, or spoken any thing a­gain [...] ciuil order, & custome: that [Page] he shoulda think thesame lawfull for him to do. They obteined such a large libertie of faultefyn­ding, by their greate, & heauenlie giftes. But the holle fashion of the Cynikes is vtterly to be refused.

For it is enemie to shamefastnesse: withoute which, ther can be nothig vpright, nor nothing honest.

But those we ought to reuerēce, Men of de­sertes. & giue attendaunce vpon thē: whose life hath been tryed, in honest, and worthy maters: who doo meane well to y ^• cōmonweale, & haue well­deserued, or do deserue wel therof: & to anyhonour, or rule be aduaūced: Olde age. also we must haue olde age in great estimacion: and must giue place to those, y ^• beare office: and make diffe­rence Officers. bytwene a citizen, & a straun­ger: The citezen. The straūger & in the verie straūger also we ought to consider, whether he cāme of priuate bysinesse, or for the com­monweales affaires. In a summe (that I treate not of euery particu­lar) we ar boūde to loue, mayntein, and preserue the cōmon atonemēt, Felou [...]ip. and felouship of all mainkinde.

Now, concerning occupations, [Page 59] and gainfull sciences, which ar to Of occupaci­ons [...] [...]. be counted honest, and which ar of base reputacion, thus cōmonlie we Gainings. haue lerned. First, those gaynyngs be disalowed, that runne in hatered with all men: as the gaine of toll­farmers, Tolfarmers. Ufurers. and vsurers. Oute of esti­mation also, and base be the gaines that men in wages doo take: whose labour is bought, & not their con­ning. For in thē the very hyre is as Hirelinges. it wer y ^• obligatiō of theyr bōdage. They moreouer ar to be coūted of y ^• Retailers. baser sorte: who bye of marchants, that oute of hād they retaile again. For, nothing they profit, onlesse they lie apace: & trulie dishon [...]ster thing is ther none, thā a vaine tōge. Handycraf­tesmen. And all kinde of handycraftsmen serue in meane occupations.

Neither can the workshoppe truly haue in it any gentlemanly doing: and nodeal to be praised ar these oc­cupatiōs, Belliseruers. which be seruers of plea­sure: as Trinkermen, butchers, cookes, pud­dingmakers, fisshermen, which Terence speaketh of. Putt to these, if ye list, Pleasure­feeders. perfumers, daūcers, and all hazar­ders.

[Page]But those sciēces, wherin is grea­ter Physi [...]. Building. wisdome, and no meane profit Lerning. fought: as physik, casting of buyl­dinges, & lerning of worthie know­ledge: be honest for thē, with whose Marchaun­dise. estate thei agree. And merchaūdise, if it be small, is to be coūted of litle estimation: but if it be greate, and well stored, conueyeng many com­modities rounde aboute: and dis­parsing those same into many men­nes hādes, withoute vaine wordes: it is not much to be dispraised: and fardermore, if being satisfied w ^t gaine, or contented rather, as it hathe often cōme from the sea to the hauen: so it chaunge from the hauen into landes, and possessi­ons: it seemeth, of verie good right it may be commended. For of all thinges, whereoute anie gayne [...]ulbandrie. is sought, nothing is better than groūdtilth aud trimmyng, nothing yeeldinger, nothing sweeter, no­thing meeter for a freeborne man. Wherof bicause in Cato the elder we haue spokē inough: thence shall you take, whatso to this place shall appertein.

[Page 60]But how duties doe proceede from those partes, which belonge to honestie: I think it sufficientiie declared. Now in thosesame thīges Comparison of honest thinges. which bee honest, ther may befall oftentimes a question, and com­parison, of twoo honest thinges whether is y ^• honester: which pointe is passed ouer of Panetius.

For whereas all honestie sprin­geth oute of four braunches: wher­of one is of knowledge, an other of common feloushippe, the third of great corage, the fourt of mea­surekeeping: it must needes bee, that in choosing of dutie these bee often compared togither. We think therfore, those duties be more agreeable with nature, which bee Common fe­louship [...]ust be preferred before know­ledge. borowed from common felouship: than those, which be fetched from knowledge: and that may bee proued by this argument: bicause The. [...]. argu­ment. if a wisemanne happen on such a life: that he bee enryched with a flowing plentie of all maner substaunce: though with verie great leasure he cōsider, and allto­beholde with himself those thinges, [Page] which ar worthie of knowledge: yet if his solitarinesse be so greate, that he cā not haue the sight of a man: he would wish to be oute of y ^• worlde. And y ^• wisdome, which the Greeks doo terme [...], is the princesse The. 2: arg. of all vertues. For prudēce, which the Greekes doo call [...], we take to bee of an other nature: Prudence. which is the knowledge of thinges to be desired, and thinges meete to be eschewed.

But that wisdowe, which I named Sapience. the princesse, is the science of heuenly, and worldly thinges: wherin is conteined the cōmōnesse of godds, and men, & their societie togither. Which vertue in case it be the greatest, as it is in deede: it must needes folowe, that the dutie, which is borowed of commonnesse, also is the greatest. For the know­ledge, Knowledge. and consideratiō of naturall causes should, after a certein sorte, bee maimed, and vnperfite: if no performaunce of deedes should fo­lowe. Dooing. And deedes must appeare in defending of mēnes commodities. They belonge therfore to the felou­ship [Page 60] of men: and for that cause ar to be preferred before knowledge. The. 3. arg.

And this euery bestdisposed man, The common iugement o [...] menne. whan it commes to the pointe, doth showe, and declare. For who is so desirefull of thorowseeing, & lernīg the nature of thinges? but, in case while he were treating, & viewing of maters moste woorthy of know­ledge: in the meane seasō he should sodenly heare tyding of the hazard, and daunger of his countrie, which he is able to succour, and withstād: he would leaue, & sett aside all those studies: yea though he thought, he wer able to nomber the sterres, or to measure the huge comepasse of y ^• worlde: & the same man also would doo as much, in his parents, and in his frendes cause, and perell.

By which thinges it is gathered: y ^• before y ^• studies, & duties of know­ledge, the duties of iustice ar to bee preferred: which doo belonge, to y ^• profit of men: than the which, a mā ought to holde nothing derer. The. 4. arg.

Also they, who haue spent theyr The ende o [...] contēplation. holle life, and studie in knowledge of thiges, haue not yet withdrawne [Page] themselues frō helping to increase mennes profits, and commodities. For they also haue enstructed ma­ny, The [...]udētes life profita­ble to the cō ­monweale. to make thē the better citiezens, and the more profitable in theyr commonweales: as Lysis the Py­thagorean L [...]s schole­mai [...]er to Epaminon­vas, Plato to Dion. scholed the Lhebane Epaminondas: Plato taught Diō the Syracusian: and many other, many mo: and whatsoeuer we our­self brought to the commonweale, (if any thing we haue brought) we cāme to it, enfourmed by teachers, and furnished with lexning. And Lorlled men profitable, euen after their death. they, not onely while they liue, and bee present, do schoole, and teache the studentesof lerning: but after their death also, by their monu­ments of lerning, they [...]o thesame. For they haue not ou [...]passed one pointe, y ^• cōcerneth lawes, custōes, [...] the commonwelth knowledge: so as they may seeme to haue em­ployed their quiet studies to our common affair [...]s.

Thus they being themselues giuen to the studies of lerning, & wisdōe, do chiefly bestowe theyr wisdome, prudence, and vnderstanding to [Page 62] mennes commodities. For the­same cause also, it is better to vt­ter plentyfully, so it bee discreet­lie, than withoute eloquence to conceiue neuer so wittyly: bicause Cōceiuing of maters. ones conceite serueth onely within it self: whereas eloquence gettes Eloquence. within her reache those, with whome wee ar ioyned in common felowshippe. And as swarmes of bees doe cluster togither, not to this end, to make combes: but beeing swarming by kinde, they worke their combes: so men much Common fe­louship. more, than they, by nature swar­ming, doe vse their conning of doyng, and deuising.

Therfore onlesse thatsame vertue, which consisteth in defending mē, that is to saye, the felowshippe of mākinde, dothe meete w ^t the know­ledge of thinges: it may seeme a verie bare, and alonewandering knowledge: and likewise great­nesse of corage, seuered from com­mon [...]. feloushippe, and neybourhod of men, muste needcs bee a certein sauagenesse, and beastly crueltie. [Page] So it falles oute, that the accome­panieng, & cōmon felowship of men farre surmountes the studie of Prudence. knowledge.

Neither is it true, which is sayd of some: that this common knott, and felouship is hadde emong mē, euen for necessite of life: bicause w ^toute other, we might not gett, & bring to passe those thinges, y ^• nature dooth desire: and that, if all thinges wer fownde vs, euen by the grace of god (as they saie) which appertein to food, & furniture of life: then would euerie one of a good witt, all bysi­nesse laide aside, settle himself holly in knowledge, and sciēce. But that is not so. For he woulde bothe flee solitarinesse, and choose a cōpanion of studie: bothe teache, & lerne: bothe heare, & speake. Wherfore all dutie, Conclusion. which auaileth to mainteine ney­bourhod, & felowship of men, is to be preferred aboue y ^• dutie, which consisteth in knowledge, & science. [...] sometime is aboue the particular [...].

This question perauenture may be well moued: whether this cōmon felouship, which is moste of all a­greable to nature, bee also alwayes [Page 62] to bee preferred before meane, and measure keping. I think not so.

For ther bee sōme thinges partlie so filthy, partly so haynous: that a wise man woulde not do them, no not to saue his coūtrie. Uerie many such, Possidonius hath gathered to­gither: but somme of thē so fowle, and so filthie: that euen to be spoken they seeme shamefull.

Those therfore ought noman to take in hād, for the commonweales cause: nother woulde the common­weale for her sake haue them enter­prised. But this mater standes in better case: for that ther cā befall no time: y ^• the commonweale shoulde neede to haue a wiseman doo any of them.

Wherfore let this be concluded, in Ju [...]ice ge [...] ­rallie aboue all. choise of duties: that such kinde of duties most excell, as concerne the felou [...]ippe of menne. For aduised Aduise [...] doing. doing will folowe knowledge, and wisdome. So it comes to passe, that to doe aduisedly is more wor­the, than wisely to deuise. And herof thus farre. For this place is plainlie inough sett oute: that it is [Page] not hard, in serching oute of dutie, to perceiue, emong them all which afore other is to bee preferred.

Yet euen in commō felowship ther Degrees of duties lōging to iustice. be degrees of duties: wherby may be knowne, what one is aboue the other: so as the first duties be due to the godds immortall: the secōde, to our countrie: the third, to our pa­rents: and so forthe by degrees, the rest to the rest.

Of the which maters, briefly de­bated, The order of his treating. may be gathered: how mē ar wonte not onely to doute, whether a thing be honest, or dishonest: but also twoo honest thinges layed before them, whether is the honester. This pointe (as I sayd before) is ouer­slipped by Pane­tius.

But now to the residue let vs procede.

AFter what sorte, duties The preface. should be taken oute of 1. part. honestie, sonne Marke, and frō euerie kinde of vertue: I suppose it sufficientlie declared in my former boke. It folowes, y ^t we go forward w ^t these kindes of duties: which be­longe to power, to riches, to y ^• fur­niture The cōtent [...] of this boke. of māns life, & to the pleintie of those thinges, y ^• men do occupie. Wherin, I said, it is sought: bothe what is profitable, what vnprofi­table: Profit. & also of profitable thinges which is the more profitable, or which the moste profitable. Of the which I will entre to speake: if I shall saye a worde, or twoo before, of my purpose, and meaning.

For though our bookes haue stir­red 2. part. vp manie mē to y ^• studie not on­lie why he gaue h [...]self to [...]udie philo­sophie. of reading, but also of writing: yet other while I feare, leste y ^• name of philosophie bee hatefull to sōme good mē: & that they maruail, I be­ [...]owe in it so much trauail, & time. In deede as longe as the weale [Page] was gouerned by them, to whome she had cōmitted herself: I did emploie all my care, & study vpō it. But whē one mā kept al in thral­dome: & ther was no place at all for Caesars mo­narchi [...]. coūsell, & authoritie: & I besides had for gone my cōpaniōs of preseruing y ^• state, who had been singuler mē: neither I gaue myself to greeues, wher w ^t I should haue been wasted, onlesse I had resisted thē: nor again, to pleasures vnseemlie for a lerned mā. And would god, y ^• cōmonweale had stoode in y ^• state, wherin it begā: & had not light vpon men, who wer not so desirous of altering, as ouer­throwing of thinges. For first, as we wer wonte to doo, whē y ^• cōmō ­weale was stāding: we would take more labour in pleading, than in writing: afterward, in verie wri­ting we would not putt the thiges, [...]ullies ora­tions. y ^• we doo now, but our pleadings, as we haue doone diuers times.

But whē y ^• cōmonweale, in which all my care, studie, & trauail was wonte to be bestowed, was none a [...] all: verilie those la [...]ierlie, & Sena­tehouse lerninges were husht.

[Page 64]But seeing my minde could not The euer [...]ir­ring soule. [...]hoose, but bee dooing: hauing bene occupied in those studies, from the beginning of my yonge age: I thought, sorowes might be putte a­waie most honestlie, if I returned miself to philosophie. Wherunto when being yong I had giuē much time, to lerne it: after that I began to attend honours, and betooke mi­self holle to the commonweale: so much leasure was left for philoso­phie: Time boro­wed for [...]udie as remained of the times spēt about my frendes, and the commō ­weales causes. And y ^• was all be­stowed in reading, for writīg I had no time. In our most miseries ther­ [...]re, we seme to haue gotten this so great a cōmoditie: that wee might put those maters in writing: which were not sufficientlie knowne to our men, & yet wer most worthie of knowledge. For what is ther in Praise of p [...] ­losophie. faith more wish full, than wisdom? what more excellent? what to a mā more worthe? what for a man more honorable? They then, who doo de­sire this, bee named philosophers: neither is philosophie ought els, if [Page] if ye will tell y ^• meanīg of y ^• worde, but y ^• studie of wisdom. And wisdō wisdom. (as it is defined of aūcient philoso­phers) is y ^• sciēce of heuēlie, & world lie things, & of the causes, wherby these things be vpholdē. And whoso dispraiseth y ^• studie therof: I wotte not verilie, what ther may bee, y ^• he wold deme praisworthie. For whe­ther y ^• delitīg of y ^• minde be sought, & quietīg of cares: what may be cō ­pared w ^t their studies, who alwaies gather sōmewhat, y ^• tēdeth, & auai­leth well, & wealfullie to liue? or if the waie of stedfastnes, & vertue bee sought, either this is the art, or ther is none at all, wherby wee may at­tein them. To vphold, ther is no art of the greatest things, seeing none of the leste be without art: it is a to­ken of mē speaking with small ad­uisemēt, and erring in the greatest maters. But if ther bee anie sci­ence of vertue: where shall it bee sought, when you bee gone frō this kinde of lerning? But these things Tullies boke called Hor­tensius, now lo [...]. ar wont to be more exactly discour­sed, when we exhort men to philoso­phie: which in deede we haue done, [Page 65] in an other booke. But at this pre­sent, onelie it was to be declared of vs: why we gotte vs chieflie to this studie, when we were bereft of our commonwelth offices.

But it is gainsaid vs, and that of 3 skilfull, and lerned mē, demaūding Of his sect & his libertie in writing. whether we seme to doo constantlie inough: who allthough we holde, y ^t nothing can be surelie knowne: yet both we ar wont to dispute of other maters, & at this same time we pro­secute precepts of dutie. To whō I wold our opiniō wer wellknowne. As the Pyr­rhonians. Forwe ar not thei, whose mīde wā ­dereth in errour, & hath not at all, what to folowe. For what a minde sholde this be, or rather what a life? wher y ^• meane not onely of disputīg but also of liuing is [...]aken clene a­wai. But as other, who do say sōme thīgs be certein, sōme vncertein: so we, dissēting frō thē, do saie again, sōme things be proouable, sōme vn­proouable. What is ther then, that should let me to folow those things which to me doo seeme proouable? which cōtrariwise, to disproue? & to voide the presumptiō of affirming? [Page] and to flee rashnesse, which disa­greeth from wisdome moste of all? But by our men ther is disputing agaīst all things: bicause this same thing, y ^• is proouable, can not shine for the: except ther should bee a con­ference of reasons expressed vpon Tullies Aca­demicall dis­putations. bothe sides. But these maters, as I suppose, bee diligētlie inough made plain in our Academiks. 4

But allthough, my Cicero, you Exhortation to his sonne. bee exercised in the moste auncient, and moste noble philosophie, Cra­tippus being your author: a mā ful like vnto those, who haue teemed these notable thīgs: yet I wold not, these of ours, very nere vnto yours, to you should be vnknowne. But now let vs go on to our purpose.

Seeing then fiue waies bee setts The treatise. Account of his order in the holle woorke. out of treating vpon dutie: wherof twoo do pertein vnto cōmelinesse, and honestie: other twoo belong to the commodities of a mannes life, to aboundance, power, riches: the fift dothe serue to the iudgement of choosing, if euer those, which I spake of, should seeme to striue to­gither: [Page 66] the parte touching honestie is made an ende of: which trulie I desire to bee veriewell knowne to you. But this, wherof we treate The presente purpose. now, is the veriesame, that is called profitable. In the which term cu­stome failing, hath swarued out of The nature of profit. the waie: and by litle and litle is brought to this point, that it wolde seuer profitable from honest: and woulde make sommething honest, which should not be profitable, and sōmething profitable, which sholde not bee honest: than the which, no greater daunger could bee brought to mannes life. Philosophers sure­lie of verie greate authoritie doo, grauelie no doute, & honestlie, in i­maginatiō sonder these three cōfu­sed kindes. For whatsoeuer is iust, they also iudge thesame to bee pro­fitable: and likewise, whatso is ho­nest, they take thesame to bee iust: wherof is concluded, that whatsoe­uer is honest, y ^• same is profitable. The which thing who smallie fore­see: they oftētimes hauing in admi­ration suttlewitted mē, & craftie, do repute their wylinesse for wisdom. [Page] Whose errour must be takē awaie: and their holle opinion is frō that to be brou [...]ht vnto this hope: that by honest counsell, and good dedes, not by guile, & craftiness, thei vnder stand thēselues in possibilitie to at­tein such things, as they would.

Sōme things then, which apper­tein A diuision of things profi­table and vn­profitable. to the mainteinaūce of mānes life, be liueless: as golde, & siluer, as those, which ar gottē out of y ^• earth, as other of thesame sort: sōme be li­uing, and feeling: which haue their Liuelesse. motiōs, & appetites to things. And Liuing. sōme of thē be voide of reason, sōme haue the vse of reason. Uoide of rea­son Uoide of reason. be horses, oxen, and other catel, & bees: by whose worke, sōmewhat is made for mannes vse, & life. But Hauing reasō God. of those tha [...] [...]aue vse of reason, two kindes ther bee put: one of goddes, an other of men. Deuotion, and ho­liness will make the godds fauora­ble. But next of all, and after the godds, men to men maie bee moste profitable. And again, ther is the­same diuisiō of those things, which Man to man dothe most hurt or profit annoie, and hurte. But bicause men do not think, y ^• godds do harm: [Page 67] these excepted, they suppose men to men to doe most hurt, or profit. For Things liue­lesse. the moste parte of thosesame, which we called liuelesse, be the effects of mannes work: & neither we should haue them, except hande, and craft had bene put therto: neither, w ^eout mennes seruice, we should vse thē. For neither preseruation of helth, nor sailing, nor ground tilth, and Helth. trimming, nor the inning, and sa­uing Nauigation. of corne, and other frutes, Husbandrie. without labour of men, could haue bene anie at all. Now moreouer, bothe cariage oute of those things, Merchaūdise wherwith we wer stored, and con­ueiaūce ī of those, which we should neede, ther could be doutlesse none: e [...]cept men should doe these offices. And in like maner, nother stones Stones. should bee hewed out of quarreis, necessarie to our vse: nother yron, Metalls. golde, brasse, siluer deepe hidden could bee digged vp, without the la­bour, & hande of mā. Howses also, Houses. wherby bothe y ^• sharpenesse of colde might be def [...]nded, & the noiaūce of heate might be assuaged: frō whēce either at y ^• beginning, mought they [Page] haue been giuē to mākīde? or after doo ease, if either by violence of tē ­pest, or by earthquake, or oldeness, they had gone to wracke? excepte common life had learned of men to aske the ayde for these thinges. Adde herunto conduits of water, turning of riuers, letting in wa­ter Water. ouer groundes, wharts made against streames, hauens cast by Hauens. hande: which, without mennes worke, we might not haue. By all which, and manie other thinges, it is euident: that by no meanes, without mannes hande, and tra­uail, wee could haue receiued the fruites, and profites: which bee gotten of those things, that be liue­lesse. What frutes also of beastes, Liuīg things or what commoditie could ther bee taken? but if men should help ther­to. For euen they doutlesse were men: who were the chiefe in deui­sing, what vse wee might haue of The vse of [...]. eche beast: nor at this season, with­out mennes seruice, might wee ei­ther keepe horses, or breake them, or saue them, or of them take seaso­nable commodities: and by men [Page 68] also bothe those beastes bee killed, which doo hurt, and those bee ta­ken, which may doo seruice. What Arts. should I noumber vp a heape of arts? without which, mannes life could haue bene none at all. For who should ease the sicke? What delite should ther bee amonge the Physi [...]. healthfull? what diet? what appa­raile? onlesse so manie arts shoulde serue vs. With which things mās life beeing furnished, is becomme so farre different from the feeding, and cote of beastes. Cities also, Cōm [...] gouernment. without the assemble of men, could neither bee builded, nor peopled. Cities. Wherupon ordinaunces, and cu­stomes Lawes. were made: also an indif­ferent Customes. setting oute of lawe, and a sure rule to liue after: by which, the life is ledde well, and weal­fullie. Which thinges bothe the myldnesse of mindes, and shame­fastnesse hath folowed: and it is brought to passe, that our life shoulde bee the more safegarded: and that, by giuing, and taking, and enterchāunging of goodes, & pleasures, we should wāt nothing. [Page] We bee longer in this place, than neede requires. For who is he, to whom those things ar not mani­fest, which in mo woordes bee re­cited of Panetius? that neither a­nie captein in warre, nor prince at home, could haue atchieued greate feates, & auailable, without mēnes endeuour. Kehersed of him is The­mistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesi­laus, Alexander: whom he denieth to haue bene able to commepasse so great thirgs, without the ayde of men. In a mater nowhit doutfull, he vseth witnesses nowhit necessa­rie.

And as we obtein great commo­dities, by the like minde, and con­sente The eruelnes of men, one against ano­ther. of men: so ther is none so lothesomme a pestilence, which dothe not growe to man by man. Ther is a booke of Dicearchus, Dicearchus booke of the death of mē. vpon the death of men: who was a greate Peripatetik, and plen­tifull: and after the other causes gathered togither, as of water­breakes, of pestilence, of destruc­tion, yea and of the sodain flocking [Page 69] togither of beasts, by whose violēce he showeth, how certein kindes of men wer consumed: afterward, he makes comparison, how manie mo men haue bene destroyed by mennes violence (that is) by warre, or rebellion, than by all other mi­serie.

Seeing then this place hath no maner of doute, but that men both profit, and hurte menne verie­much: By vertue must men bee wonne to our vse. I pointe this to bee a pro­pertie of vertue, to winne mennes heartes to her, and binde them to her vse. Therfore whatso in things liuelesse, and whatso in the vse, and occupyeng of beastes is done profitablie to mannes life: it is all appointed to the labour­somme trades. But mennes good wills, that bee preste, and rea­die to the aduauncement of our estate, bee stirred vp by the wis­dome, and vertue of excellente menne. For all vertue in a ma­ner Uertue släds in three points. consisteth in three poinctes. Wherof one is in thorowseeing Wisdow. what in euerie thing is true, and [Page] perfit: what agreable to eche thig: what is the sequele: wherof all things growe: what is the cause of euerie thing. The other, to kepe in Temp [...]ūce. the troublesomme moodes of the minde, which the greeks name [...]: and to make the appetites, which thei call [...], obediēt vn­to reasō. The third, to vse them so­berlie, [...] and skilfullie, with whom we be conuersaunt: by whose good wills, we may haue those things at fill, and heaped, which nature de­sires: yea & by them, if any harm be brought vpō vs, we may it auoide: & maie be wreaked of those, which haue gone about to hurt vs: and maie paye them with so much pon­nishment, as equitie, and mannes gentlenesse dothe beare. But by what meanes wee maie attein this power, that wee maie commepasse mennes good wills, and retein the same: we shall saie, and that, not long hereafter. But a fewe words ar to bee saide before.

That a greate power ther is in fortune, on eyther side, either for The stroke of for [...]ne. welfare, or euillfare: who is ig­noraunt? [Page 70] For bothe when wee enioye her prosperous blast, we ar caried to our desired ends: and when her winde is turned, wee ar afflicted. This same fortune then hath other chaunces, which be seldomer: first, that comme from things liuelesse: as seastormes, tēpests, shipwracks, dounfalls, burnings: then, from beasts, as stripes, bytinges, ouer­rūnings. These therfore (as I said) bee seldomer. But the destruccion of armies, as alate of three, oftē of manie: slaughter of capteins, as latelie of a noble, and singular mā: the enu [...]engs moreouer of the mul­titude: and by reason of thesame, oftentimes the banishments, the miseries, the fleeinges awaie of the welldeseruing citiezēs: and again, prosperitie, honour, empire, victo­rie, although they bee in fortunes hāde: [...]et without mēnes trauails, and studies, on neither side they can bee brought to passe. This then knowne: wee muste declare, by what meanes we maye allure, and styrre vp mennes good wills to our profits. The which processe [Page] if it bee sommewhat long, lette it bee compared with the greatnesse of the profit: so perhaps euen sōme­what to shorte it shall seme. What Causes moo­uing mennes good wills. soeuer then men giue to a man, to enriche, and aduaunce him: either they doe it for good will, when for sōme cause they beare affection to anie: orels for honours sake, if they reuerence anie mannes ver­tue, & think him woorthie of moste fortunate estate: or in whom they haue a trust, and doe suppose thē to prouide well for their maters: orels whose power they feare: or contra­riewise of whom they looke after sommewhat: as whē vsurpers and peoplepleasing men laie large gifts before them: or at last, they be ledde by meede, and rewarde. Which in­dede is the vilest waie, & the fowlest bothe to them, who ar caught with thesame, and to those, who do seke to haue refuge therunto. For the mater goeth not well: whē thesame that should bee wrought by vertue, is attempted by money. But bi­cause manie times this helpe is necessarie: we will tell, how it [Page 71] ought to bee vsed, if first wee shall haue spoken of those things, which bee nerer to vertue.

And likewise men make them­selues Causes of O­bedience. subiecte to the rule, and au­thoritie of an other, for diuers cau­ses. For they bee ledde either with good will, or gretness of benefites, or excelence of honour, or hope, it shall be profitable to them: or feare, leste by power they bee drieuen to yeeld: or as takē with hope of large gifts, and promises: or at last, as we see often in our commonweale, euen hyred for meede. Of good will and feare.

And certesse of all things neither is ther anie fitter to mainteine a power thā to be loued, neither anie vnfitter than to be feared. Notablie saith Ennius:

‘whom they feare, him they hate allwaie the most: whom anie man hateth, he wisheth him lost.’

But if afore it was vnknowne, Against Cae­sar. since alate it is well knowne, that no power can withstande the ha­tered of manie. And trulie not one­lie the death of this tyraunt, whom the citie beeing oppressed with force of armes did suffer, dothe [Page] declare, how much the hatered of men preuails to destruction: but the like endes of other tyraūts doo showe as much: of whome The endes of [...]aunts. scaselie anie hath escaped the like death. For, feare is an euill kee­per Feare. of continuaunce: and contra­riewise, good will is faithfull, yea for euer. But lette a roughnesse hardilie bee vsed of them: who by rule doo keepe straite such as bee brought vnder by force: as of mai­sters ouer seruauntes, if they can not otherwise bee stayed. But who in a free citie so order them­selues, that they be feared: ther can nothing possiblie bee madder, than they bee. For although the lawes bee sounke by sōme mānes might: allthough libertie bee alltoshaken: yet at length they swimme out a­gain, either by secrete iudgements, or by priuie voices in auauncing to honour: and certesse the stinges of ceased libertie bee sharper, thā of li­bertie continued. Let vs then em­brace y ^t, which moste largelie spre­deth: & moste auaileth not onely to safetie, but also to welth, & power: [Page 72] that feare be bānished, and loue re­teined. So moste easilie we shall ob­tein what we desire, both in priuate maters, and in the commonwelth. For whoso will themselues to bee had in feare: it must needes be, that they themselues feare thosesame, of whome they be feared. For what think wee of the first Dionysius? Dionysius the tyraunt, a mōg the Sy­racusians. with what torment of feare was he wonte to be troubled? who, fearing the barbers razers, with a reddehot cole singed of his owne berde.

What of Alexander the Pheraian? Alexāder the Pheraian. with what an hert, doo we suppose, he liued? who (as wee rede written) whē exceedinglie he loued his wife, Thebe: yet comming to her frō ban­keting Thebe, this [...] wife. into the chaumber, he com­maunded a kerne, and him also (as it is written) beprinted with Thra­cian marks, to go before w ^t a drawn sworde: and he sent of his garde a­fore, to ransacke the womens cof­fers: and seeke, that no weapō wer hidden in their garmentes.

O miserable manne, who thought bothe a kerne, and an yronbronded slaue faithfuller, thā his wife. And [Page] his opinion did not deceiue him: for by her he was slaine for a ielousie of spousebreache. And trulie ther is no strength of empire so greate, which with suppressing by feare can bee longe continuing. Phalaris.

Witnesse is Phalaris, whose cru­eltie is famed aboue others: who pe­rished not by treason, as this Alex­ander did, whom euē now I spake of: nor by a fewe, as this our man: Cesar. but against him the holle commons of the Agrigentines rose w ^t violēce. What the Macedonians? did they not forsake Demetrius, & allholle Demetrius. got them to Pyrrhus. What y ^• La­cedemoniās, ruling vnrightfullie? Lacedemo­nians. did not welnie all their leagfrendes sodenly forsake them? & shewed thē ­selues ydle lookers on of the ouer­throwe at Leuetra? Forein exāples gladier, thā homedeedes I reherse, in such a case. Neuerthelesse as lōg, The Roma­nes state. as the empire of the people of Rome was vpholdē by worthie actes, not by wrōges doīg: & wars wer made, either for defēse of leagfrēdes, or for empire: then wer the endes of war­res, either merciefull, or necessarie. [Page 73] The Senate was the hauen, & re­fuge of kings, of peoples, of natiōs. And our magistrates, and capteins endeuored to gette greate praise, by this onelie meane: if prouinces, if leagfrendes, in right, & truthe, they had defended. Therfore it might haue been named the protectiō more trulie, than the empire of the world. By litle and litle we abated this cu­stome, and order, sōmewhat a [...]ore: but after Sylla [...] victorie, vtterlie we lost it. For men ceased to accoūt Sylla the vic tors cru [...]ltie against the [...]arians. anie thing vnreasonable toward leagfrendes: when so greate cruel­tie was shewed euen against citie­zens. Therfore ther folowed in him of an honest quarell an vnhonest victorie. For when the [...] was pight: and in the market place he solde y ^• goodes bothe of goodmē, and riche, and those euen citiezens: he was so bolde to say, that he made sale of his lawfull bootie. One succeeded, who in a wicked cause, and a more shamefull victorie, not Cesar cruel­ler than Syl­la. onelie put the goodes of euerie one of the citiezens to open sale: but in one state of miserie enwrapped [Page] holle prouinces, and regions: and so forein nations being vexed, & vn­done: wee sawe Mastilia borne a­boute Mastilia, a goodlie citie of Gallia Narbonēsis, by Cesar borne aboute in triumph. in triumph, for a showe of our empire lost: and triumph made ouer that citie: without which, our capteins of warres neuer gotte a­nie triumph, beyonde the alpes. I coulde reherse manye mo cursed deeds beside, done against our leag­frendes: if the sōne had seen ought, more haynous, than this one. Iust­lie therfore ar we skourged. For, had we not suffred the wickednesse of manie to be vnponnished: such a lawlesse libertie had neuer cōme to the hādes of one: from whō soothe­lie the inheritaunce of his goodes cāme to fewe, but of his greedie de­sires, to manie naughty men. Nor trulie the seede, and cause of ciuil warres shall euer faile: as longe as mischieuous mē shall bothe remē ­ber, & hope after that bloodie sale­s [...]affe: Syllaes, and Cesars sale­staffe. which when Publius Sylla had shaken, his nye kinsman being Dictator: thesame stept not once backe frō the shaking of a like more mischieuous staffe, y ^• sixt & thirtieth [Page 74] y [...]re after. But the other, who in y ^t Dictature had been Secretarie, in this was Treasurer for the citie. Wherupon ought to be vnderstan­ded: that while such booties be lay­ed afore men, ciuil warres shall ne­uer want. And so, onelie the walles of the citie do stand, & remaine: yea and thosesame euennow dreeding their last mischief: but the commō ­weale we haue vtterlie lost. And into these destructions we ar fallne (for wee must return to our pur­pose) while we had rather to be fea­red, than to be deare, and welbelo­ued. If all this coulde befall to the people of Rome, ruling vnrightful­lie: what ought euerie sere man to think? Which thing sithe it is eui­dent, that the power of good will is greate, of feare, [...]: it folowes, that wee make discourse: by what meanes we may soonest, with ho­nour, and vprightnesse, attein that loue, which we desire.

But all wee doo not alike stand in Certein ex­ceptions. neede of y ^• same. For to the trading of echemans life it must be applied: whether it be needefull, of many, or [Page] sufficiēt, of fewe to be beloued. Let this therfore be certein: as y ^t thing, which is bothe principall, and most necessarie: to haue faithfull famili­arities of frendes, louing vs, and Frendship, hyelie esreeming our vertues. For this is the onelie meane in deede: that ther be not much difference bi­twene greate, and meane men: and it must be procured, in a maner, of them bothe. Not all parchaunce do stande in like neede of honour, & glorie, and citiezens good will: but yet whoso hathe them: they [...]urder sommewhat bothe to other things, and also to the purchasing of frend­shippes. Tullies boke of frendship. But of frendship wee haue spoken in the booke, which is entit­led Lelius: now let vs speake of His bookes of glorie be [...]ost. glorie, though of that mater also ther be twoo bookes of oures: yet let vs touche it, bicause thesame a­uaileth much, in executing of grea­ter maters. Thinges per te [...]ing to glorie.

The hyest therfore, and perfite glorie standeth of these three: if the multitude fauour vs: if they haue a Good will. trust in vs: if with a certein admi­ration Credit. they count vs worthie of ho­nour. Admitation. [Page 75] And, if we must speake it plai­lie, and brieflie: as these be gottē at the handes of euerie sere mā, by the­same meancs in a maner they be ob­teined of the multitude. But ther is also a certein other enteraūce into y ^t multitude, y ^t we may (as ye wolde say) flowe into y ^• hertes of the holle. And first, let vs see touching those 1 three, which before I called the pre­ceptes Of getting good will. of good will: y ^• which nodout Benefites. is caught moste of all by benefites. And secondarilie good will is allu­red by a welwillig minde, although Good hert. perhappes abilitie suffiseth not.

But wonderoustie the loue of the Estimatiō for honestie. multitude is alltosrirred with the fame, & opinion of liberalitie, boun­teousnesse, iustice, faithfulness, & of al those vertues, which appertein to the myldenesse of maners, & gentle­nesse. For that veriesame, which we name comelie, & honest, bicause ofit self it liketh vs, and with his owne nature, and beautie mooueth all our mindes: & principallie shi­neth (as it wer) out of those vertues, which I haue reherced: therfore by verie nature wee are enforced [Page] to fauour them, in whom we think those vertues to be. And these veri­lie be the weightiest causes of fauo­ring: for othermo lighter ther maie be beside.

But, that a trust may be had in vs, 2 by two thinges it may be brought How to get a credit. to passe: if we shall be thought to haue atteined prudence ioined with iustice. For bothe to them we haue Prudence with iustice. a trust, whom we suppose to vnder­stand more, than ourselues: and al­so to them, who, we beleeue, be able bothe to foresee thinges tocomme: & also to dispatche the bysinesse, and forth with to take counsail: whē the mater is in hand, and stādes in ha­sard. For all men do iudge this the profitable, and true prudence. But in such wise credit is giuen to iust, and trustie mē (that is) to good mē: that in them ther is no suspicion of deceite, and iniurie. Therfore to these our life, to these our goodes, to these our childern we suppose verie well to be cōmitted. Of these twoo then iustice is of more power to wi a credit: bicause it without prudēce hathe sufficient authoritie, prudēce [Page 76] withoute iustice is nothing worthe Prudence, withoute iu­stice, is sus­pected. to get credit. For, the sutteler, and the craftier that a man is: so much the more he is hated, and suspected, when the opinion of his honestie is pulled awaie. Wherfore iustice ioyned with vnderstanding, shall haue as much power, as it list, to purchase credit: iustice w ^toute pru­dēce shal be of much power, prudēce w ^tout iustice shall be nothīg worth. But leste sōme man haue maruail: seeing amongst all philosophers it why he seue­reth vertues, coupled by nature. is plaine, and by miself disputed of­ten: him, that should haue one ver­tue, to haue all the vertues: why I do now sonder them so, as though ther may anie man be iust, which same is not prudent: of one sorte, is y ^t suttlenesse, when verie trouth is leueled in disputation: & of an other sorte is y ^t talk, whē it is all applied to the cōmon opiniō. Wherfore we speake so in this place, as the cōmō sorte doo: that we call sōme one sort manlie, sōme other good men, sōme other prudent. For with the peo­ples wordes, and vsuall termes we must treate, when we speake of the [Page] [...]onron peoples opinion: & that did Panetius, after thesame sorte. But to the purpose let vs returne. 3

Of y ^• three therfore, which should That wee may be recke­ned worthie of honour. appertein to glorie, this was the third: that with admiration of mē, we might by them be thought wor­thie of honour. Generallie thē they haue in admiration doutelesse all [...] things things: which they haue noted to be greate, and beyonde their wening: and seuerallie in euerie sere man, if they perfitlie see good thinges vn­looked for. Therfore they honour those men, and with highest praises set them alofte: in whom they think themselues to beholde certein pas­sing, & singular vertues. But those Despisemēt. they despise, & set at nought: in whō Despisemēt. no vertue, no corage, no strength they iudge. For all men do not de­spise them, of whō they think euill. For whome they deeme dishonest, misreporters, gylefull, and redie­framed to do wrong: those they de­spise not certesse, but of them they think euill. Wherfore (as I said a­fore) they be despised: who neither to thēselues, nor to other do good, as [Page 77] they saie: in whō ther is no painful­ness, no diligence, no caring: but they Admiracion, for [...]tayedness. be reuerēced with a certein admira­tiō: who ar thought to go before o­thers in vertue: & to be w ^tout bothe all vnseemlinesse, and also those vi­ces, which other can not easilie w ^t ­stand. For bothe pleasures, full fla­tering Pleasures [...] ­ter [...]g dames. [...]ames, do oftentimes wrest the greater parte of the minde from vertue: and also whē the brondes of Brondes of paines. paines be laid vnto thē, most mē be­yonde measure be alltofrayed.

Life, death, riches, pouertie, moste Admiration for [...]. mightilie mooue all men. Which things whoso on either side, with a loftie, & great corage do despise: and whē before thē is offered any good­lie, & honest thing, it turneth, & ha­leth them holle to it self: then who doth not maruail at the brightness, Admiration for iustice. & beautie of vertue? Therfore bothe this despisig minde causeth a great wondering: and speciallie iustice, of which vertue alone good men be named, seemeth to the multitude a wonderfull thing: & not withoute cause. For none can be iust, who dreedeth death, paine, banishment, [Page] or pouertie: nor any, y ^t before equi­tie preferreth the contraries. And moste of all, they wonder at him, Admiration, for despysing of money, who is not tempted with money: [...] in what man that is well tried, him think they worthie to be regarded. Therfore iustice dothe worke all Iustice, a worker of [...]oue & glorie. those three, which be pointed oute for glorie, and gettes good will al­so: bicause it meanes to profit ve­rie manie: and for the same cause, it worketh credit likewise, and admi­ratiō: bicause it despiseth, & nough [...] regardeth those thinges, wherunto moste men enkindled with greedi­nesse be haled. And surelie, after my iudgement, euerie trade, and order Mans ayde. of life requireth the aydes of men: [...] chieflie that ye haue somme, with whom you may debate in familiar talk: which is hard, onlesse ye beare vpō you the showe of an honest mā. Therfore opinion of iustice is ne­cessarie How necessa­rie it is, to be takē for iust. euen to the aloneliuer, and one that leades his life in y ^t feeldes: yea and so much the more, bicause if they haue it not, vniust they shall be counted: and beeing garded with no defēce, shall be vexed with manie [Page 78] iniuries. And to these also, who do sell, bye, hyre, lette, and be entāgled in bargaining bysinesse, iustice, to go thorow wich their maters, is ne­cessarie. Whose power is so greate: y ^• euen they, who be fedde with euill doing, and mischief, cā not possible liue withoute somme percell of iu­stice. For who stealeth, or priuielie Robberie. pyketh anie thing from anie of thē, with whom he goeth a theeuing: he leaueth not himself a place, no not in robberie. And onlesse he, who is named the archpirate, deuide the prise egallie: either he shall be slaine of his mates, or els forsaken.

Yea and it is said, ther ar lawes a­monge Lawe [...] o [...] theeues a­monge them­selues. theeues: wherto they obey, and doo obserue them. And so, by reason of the euen portioning of Bargulus. the prise: bothe Bargulus, the Illy­rian robber, of whom mention is made in Theopompus, had greate Uiriatus. riches: and much greater had Ui­riatus the Lusitane: to whome of trouth euen our armies, & [...]aptains Caius [...]. gaue place: whom Caius Lelius, he that was commonlie called the wise, being Pretor, didde discom­fite, [Page] and abate: & so alayed his fers­nesse, that he left an easie warre to other. Seeing then the strēgth of iu­stice is so great: y ^t it also stablisheth, & encrcaseth robbers richesse: how great suppose we y ^t power therof to be, among lawes, & iudgemēts, and ordinaūces of a cōmon weale? Cer­tesse methink, not onelie amonge y ^t Medes (as telleth Herodotꝰ) but al­so The Mebes. among our aūceters, in old time, wellcōditioned kings haue bene or­deined, Kinges. for y ^t end of enioyēg iustice. For at the beginning, when y ^• mul­titude was oppressed by them, who had y ^• greater power: for refuge they fled to sōme one, excelling in vertue: who, when he saued the weaker frō iniurie, by p [...]inting out an equitie, Lawes. kept the hyest w ^t the lowest in indif­ference of lawe. And the like cause ther was of making lawes, as of kings: for euermore an egall right hathe beene sought: for otherwise it wer not a right. If they obteined y ^t ­same Right. at the hādes of one iust, & good man, w ^t him they wer cōtented: whē y ^t chaunced not, lawes wer deuised: which w ^t all men alwaies, in one, & [Page 79] alike voice shoulde speake. Wher­fore this is doutlesse a cleare case: y ^• they wer wonte to be chosen to go­uern: of whose iustice the opiniō of the multitude was great. And this therto adioined, y ^t they also might be coūted wise: ther was nothing, y ^• men, vnder those guides, shoulde wene thēselues vnable to attein. Iu­stice therfore is by all maner mea­nes to be regarded, & mainteined: bothe it for itselfsake (for els it wer not iustice) & also for y ^• enlargement of honour, & glorie. But as ther is a waie not onelie of getting money, but also of bestowing it: which may suffise for continuall charges, not onelie such as be necessarie, but also liberall: so glorie must be both got­ten, & ordered by a meane. Notw ^tst ā ­ding Socrates. notablie Socrates did saie: this The hye way to glorie. to be the nerest, and (as it wer) the gaine waie to glo rie: if a man wold endeuour this, to be in dede such as he wolde be counted. And if anie doo deeme thēselues able to attein sted­fast Faining. glory, by false pretence, & vaine Bragging. outshow, both w ^t fained spech, & coū tenaūce: they be farre out of y ^• waie. The true glorie taketh deepe roote, [Page] and also shootes abrode: all coun­terfet thinges do soone shed, as do the litle flowers: neither can ther anie forged thing be durable. Wit­nesses verie manie ther be on bothe sides: but for shortnesse sake, we will be contented with one familie.

For Tyberius Gracchus, Publiꝰ Tyberius Gracchus. sonne, so longe shall be praised, as remembraūce of the Romane state Tyberius & Caius Grac­ch [...], bothe siayne for se­dition. shall stand. But his sonnes neither tiuing wer liked of good men, and dedde go in the noumber of menne rightfullie pu [...]e to death. Let them then, whoso the true glorie will at­teine, perfourme the duties of iu­stice. What those wer, it was tolde in y ^• former booke. But to y ^• ende y ^• soone we may seem such maner mē, as we be: although the greatest ef­fect is euen in this pointe, that wee Preceptes of purchasing glorie. be such, as we wolde be counted: yet certein preceptes ar to be giuē. For Youth. if anie from his first entered age hathe cause of name, and fame: ei­ther receiued of his father, which to you, my Cicero, I suppose to haue Nobilitie. happened, or by anie chaunce, and fortune: on him al mēs yies ar cast: [Page 80] and of him ther is serching, what Noble men mus [...] not stain their s [...]ocke, with re [...]rochefull life. he dothe, and how he liueth: and so, as though he should leade his life in mo [...]e open light, nother worde, nor [...] of his can be vn­knowne. But whose first age is New com­mers vp need great vertue [...] passed withoute mennes know­ledge, by reason of basenesse, & vn­knowne name: these, as so [...]ne as they begin to be yongemen, ought to looke after greate thinges: and Great c [...]rage to prease vnto thesame with direct studies. Which they shall doe with so much the better corage: bi­cause that age is not onelie not [...], but also fauored.

The chief setting forth [...] [...] [...] Rules of [...] [...] [...]. yongman to glorie is, it an [...] [...] may be gotten by seates of [...] wherin manie haue showed them­selues, [...], among our aunceters: for warres wer almoste [...] [...] sonne. kept. But your age chaunced vpon that warre: where the one side had Cesars side. tomuch mischief, the other, litle [...] side. good fortune. In which warre yet, whē Pompeius had made you cap­tein of the one wing: bothe of a m [...] most noble, and of the armie, you [Page] gotte great prayse, with riding, with throwing the darte, and sus­teining all thinges with a souldi­ourlike painfulnesse. And verilie that your praise, and the common­weale fell togither. But of me this treatise is not taken in hand tou­ching you, but touching the holle generaltie. Wherfore let vs go forward to such thinges, as do remaine.

As then in other maters, the wor­kes workes of the minde. of [...]he minde be much more, thā of the bodie: so those thinges, which with witte, and reason wee go thorow, be of more grace, than those, which we do with strength. The first commendation then pro­cedeth Sobernesse. of sobermoode: the next, of [...] loue. Good will. naturall dutie toward parētes: the third, of good will toward theirs. But to the best cōmēdation, yong­men be knowne soonest of all: who Iinitation of worthie men haue bestowed themselues with noble, and wise men, well counse­ling the cōmonweale: on whome if they be attendaunt, they bring the people in beleefe: that they will proue like them, whome they haue [Page 81] chosen themselues to folowe. Pub­lius But [...]s. Mutius house did set out Pub­lius [...]ꝰ youthstate, for [...] [...] [...] of harmlesse life, & of know­ledge in the law. For as for Lu­cius [...]. in [...] youthe, go [...] a greate fame. [...] [...] Caius [...]. Crassus, when he was a verie yongman, he [...] not from a­nie other place, but wanne himself a verie greate praise, by that noble, and glorious accusation. And in Eloquence. which age, they, who haue exerci­ses, ar [...] to bee [...] with praise: as wee haue heard by [...]: in thesame age Lu­cius Crassus did showe himself in open courte, to do that veriewell, hauing forestudied: which [...] then at home with praise he might haue exercised.

But wheras ther bee two [...]ortes Talke. of speeche: wherof in the one is fa­miliar talk, in the other, [...]: [...] speeche. it is no doute, but the [...] of sp [...]he may do mos [...]e, and hathe the greater furderaunce to glorie. For y ^t is y ^• thing, which we do call eloquēce: but yet it is hard to tell, Eloquence. Genile [...]. how much a gētlenes, [...] familiarnes of speeche winneth ménes mindes. [Page] Ther be letters abrode of Philip­pus Letters of Philippus, Antipater, & Antigonus. to Alexander, and of Antipa­ter to Cassāder, and of Antigonus to Philippus, three very wysemen (for so we haue heard) in which thei giue rules: that with gentle speche they allure the hertes of the multi­tude, to owe theyr good will: & that they please their souldiours, by speaking to them with faire wor­des. But y ^e oration, which is made amonge the multitude, with vehe­mence, oftentimes raiseth an vni­uersall glorie. For great is the wō ­derment Admiration, for [...]. at him, that plentiefullie, & wiselie speaketh: whome the hea­rers doe iudge also to vnderstande more, and to be wiser, than other. And if in the oratiō ther be a graue­nesse Grauitie. mingled with sobermoode: Sobernesse. nothing ther can be done more wō ­derfull: & somuch the more, if those be in a yongeman. But wheras ther be verie manie kindes of cau­ses, which doe require eloquence: and manie yongmen in our com­mōweale, bothe before the iudges, & before the Senate, haue atteined praise, by speakīg in maters: y ^• grea [Page 82] test admiration is in iudiciall cau­ses: Iudiciall cau ses. y ^• nature wherof is in two par­tes. Accusation. For it stādeth in accusation, & Defence. defence: of which albeit defence is the more commendable, yet also ac­cusation is oftentimes alowed. I spake of Crassus, a litle before: L. Crassus. the like did Marcus Antonius, be­ing M. Anton. a yongman: an accusation also P. [...] brought Publius Sulpitius elo­quence to light: when into iudge­ment he called the seditious, & vn­profitable citiezen, Caius Norba­nus. But this sothelie is not often to be done, nor at anie time: onlesse either for the commōweales cause: as did the twoo Luculli: or for pro­tection Luculli. sake: as we did for the Sici­lians, Ciceroes ac­cusation of Uerres. and for y ^t Sardines: Iulius Cesar, for Marcus Albutius did y ^t Julius Ce­sar. like. Also, Lucius Fusius diligēce was knowne in the accusing of L. Fusius Marcus Aquilius. Once then it may be done, not oftē certesse. But in case a man must needes do it of­ten: let him ascribe this office to the commonweale: whose enemies to reuēge often, is not to be reproued: yet let ther be a measure present.

[Page]For of a hardherted man, or rather scace a man it seemes, vpon manie to bring the daūger of life: for that bothe is daūgerous to himself, and also a shameful blotte in his name: to giue cause, that he be named a promotour. Which chaunced to M. Brutus, a [...]ore accuser. Marcus Brutus, borne of a noble stocke, his sonne, who was verie well skilled in the ciuil lawe. And therto, this rule of dutie must bee diligētlie kept: that ye bring no in­nocent, at anie time, in iudgement vpon life: for that can in no wise be done withoute haynous wicked­nesse. For what is ther so vnnatu­rall, as to turne eloquence, being giuen of nature for the safegarde, and preseruation of men, to the harme and destructiō of good mē? And yet, as thi [...] is to bee [...]schewed: so is it not to be counted contrarie to godlinesse, to defend the giltie o­therwhile, and mischeuous, and wicked. This the multitude de­sireth, custome beareth, humanitie also worketh. The iudges parte is, euermore in causes to folow the trouth: the counselers parte, ma­nie [Page 83] times to defend the trouthlike, though it be not so true: which to write I wolde not be bolde, name­lie seeing I treate of philosophie: but that thesame liked Panetius, Panetius. the grauest of the Stoikes. But moste of all, by defending, bothe Defence. glorie, and fauour is gotten: and so much the more, if euer it befall, that he bee defended: who dothe seeme to be besette, and pressed with the richesse of anie man of power: as ourself did, bothe of­ten Ciceroes ora­tion at. 27. yea res of his age, for [...] Roscius. at other times, and also be­ing yong, for Sextus [...] the Amerine, against the might of Lucius Sylla, bearing swey: which oration (as ye wotte) is a­brode.

But now we haue sette forthe Liberalitie. yong mennes duties, which auaile to the atteining of glorie: here­after we must speake of bountie­fulnesse, and liberalitie. Wher­of two maner waies ther ber. For liberall dealing is showed to Trauail. such, as neede, either by trauail, or with money. This latter is the Money. easier, speciallie to the possessioner:

[Page]but that other is the goodlier, and more glorious, & meeter for a man­lie, and a noble man. For though ther is a liberall will of pleasuring in bothe: yet the one oute of the cof­fer, the other oute of vertue is takē: and the lauishing, which is made Lauishing. of a mannes housegoodes draweth drye the verie fountane of liberali­tie: so liberalitie is by liberalitie wasted: and toward y ^• mo that you do vse it, the lesse ye can be able to vse it toward manie. But whoso [...]ing. shall be bountiefull, and liberall of trauail (that is) of vertue, and dili­gence: first, the mo they haue profi­ted, the mo furderers they shall haue toward dealing liberallie: af­terwarde, by customable vsing of boūteousnesse, the redier they shall be, and (as it were) the more practi­sed to deserue well of manie.

Princelie dothe Philippus, in a Philiphus to Alexander certein epistle, accuse Alexander, his sonne: that, by lauishnesse, he hunteth after the good will of the Macedonians. VVhat reason, in a mis­chiefe, quoth he, hath brought you into this hope? that ye should think, those wolde be to you faith­full, [Page 84] whome you had corrupted with money.

VVhy? go ye aboute this, that the Macedonians may think you not their king, but their seruaunt and briber?

Well, he sayd, seruaūt, and briber, bicause it is vile for a king. Better also he sayd, in that he called large­giuing corruption. For he, that re­ceiueth, is made the worsse therby, and the redier alwaies to looke for the like. This said he to his sonne: but let vs think it giuen in precept to vs all. Wherfore this certeinlie is no doute: but that same liberali­tie, which standeth in trauail, and diligence, bothe is honester, and al­so spreddeth farder, and is able to profit mo. Oftentimes yet a man Giftes giuīg. must giue largelie: and this kinde of liberalitie is not to bee vtterlie cast of: and wee must manie times giue parte of our substaūce to mete men, that haue need: but wee must doo it heedfullie, and measurablie. For diuers haue spoilde oute their liuelod, by lauishing it vnaduised­lie. wastefulnes. But what is folisher, than to cause, that you cā no lenger doe the thing, which ye loue to doe? And [Page] also spoile foloweth of lauishnesse. For when by giuing they begin to be needie: they be driuen to lay hād on other mennes goodes: so when Extortion. they wolde be beneficiall, for cause of goodwill getting: they purchase not so greate loue of theirs, to whome they gaue: as of them they gette hatered, from whome they tooke. Wherfore neither a Couetise. mannes substaunce is so to bee Prodigalitie. shutte vp, that liberalitie can not open it: nor so to be vnlocked, that it lye abrode for euerie bodie.

A measure is to be kept, and let it bee referred to abilitie. In anie wise wee must remember that: which with our men is verie ofte in vsage, and now is comme in­to the custome of a prouerb: that Lauishnesse findes no bottome. For what Lauishnesse. staie can ther be? when bothe they, who ar wonte to it, and other do desire one thing? In all, ther be two sortes of largegiuers: of which the one be called foolelarge, Large giuers the other liberall. Foolelarge we call them, who with open feastes, Foolelarge. [Page 85] and fleshgiftes, and fenseshowes, and furniture of sightes, and hon­tinges, power oute their money on those thinges: wherof they shall leaue a memorie either shorte, or none at all. But liberall they Liberall [...] be named, who with their riches do raunsome men taken by preye­seekers: or for their frendes sake, do become sureties for dette: or do ayde them, in their daughters preferment of mariage: orels do help them either in getting, or en­creasing their goodes.

And therfore I maruail, what Theophra­stus praiseth sumptuous­nesse. camme in Theophrastus minde, in that boke, which he wrote of riches: wherin he spake manie thinges notablie, but this, oute of course. For he is much in prai­sing greate sumptuousnesse, and furnishment of peoplepleasing showes: and he deemeth the able­nesse of such charges to bee the frute of riches. But methin­keth that frute of liberalitie, wher­of I haue putte a fewe examples, is bothe greater, and more cer­tain.

[Page]How much more grauelie, & tru­lie dothe Aristotle reproue vs? who Aristotles iudgement, of sumptuous­nesse. ar not in a wondermet at these las­shinges oute of money, which bee done to clawe the multitude: but in case they, who ar besieged of ene­mies, should bee driuen to bye a quarte of water for tēne crownes: that this, at first hearing, seemeth to vs vncredible, and all make a maruail at it: but whē we haue gi­uen good heede therto, we holde w ^t necessitie: yet wee make no greate maruail at these exceeding losses, and endlesse charges: when special­lie neither necessitie is relieued, nor worship encreased: & that self­same clawing of y ^• multitude shall endure for a short, & a small while: yea and that, w ^t euerie of the ligh­test mindes: & yet in the verie same, euen togither with the fulnesse, the remembraunce also of the pleasure dieth. It is also well gathered: that these showes be wellliked of Chil­dern, and women, and slaues, and freemē moste like vnto slaues: but y ^t no wayes they cā be allowed of a sage man, and one, y ^t with a groun­ded [Page 86] iudgement weyeth those thin­ges, that be done.

Neuerthelesse I perceiue, in our The [...]lles office. citie, it hath growne into vse, now in this good worlde: that the gay showes of the Ediles office is loked for, [...]uen of the best men. Therfore Publius Crassus, the riche. Publius Crassus, bothe by sur­name riche, and also in substaūce, kept his Edileoffice marueloꝰ sūp­tuously. And soone after, Lucius Lucius Crassus, the oratour. Crassus, with Quintus Mutius, the greatest meanekeper of all mē, Q. Mutius Sceuola. kept the time of their Edileoffice most royally. Then, cāme Caius C. Claudius. Claudius, Appius sonne. After­warde Lucullus. succeded manie, as Lucul­lus, Hortensius [...] Hortensius, Silanus. But Silanus. P. Lentulus. Publius Lentulus, when I was Scaurus. Consul, passed all his predeces­sours. Scaurus folowed him.

But our Pompeius showes, in his Pompeius. second Consulship, wer y ^• costliest of all: in eueriedeale wherof, you see, what liketh me. We must yet a­uoide suspicion of couetousnesse.

For the refusall of the Edileship Mamercu [...] brought to Mamercꝰ, a verie riche man, a fall for the Consulship.

[Page]Wherfore the thing is to be done, Large giftes, with measure and for ho­nest causes. bothe if it be called for of the peo­ple: & good men, though they do not require it, do yet allow it: so it be according to ones abilitie, as we ourself haue done: and also, if a­nie greater, and more profitable thing is wonne at anie time, by peoplepleasing largesse: as of late, Orestes fea­sted the peo­ple. a greate honour to Orestes wer the dynings in opē waies, in name of his tenthes. No nor it was not M. Seius, li­berall to the people. coūted a reproche to Marcus Seiꝰ: that in a derth of corne, he gaue to the people for foure pēce a busshell. For frō a greate, & a lōgefestred en­uie he deliuerd himself, neither by a dishonest losse, seeig he was Edile, nor yet verie greate. But alate, it Milo sup­pressed Clo­dius attēptes was paūīg hie honour to our Milo: bicause for the cōmonweales sake, which in our safetie consisted, with hired fēsmen he suppressed all Pub­lius Clodius attēptes, and rages. Ther is therfore cause of largesse, if Necessitie. either it be necessarie, or ꝓfitable. Profit. And yet in thesesame, the rule of meankeeping is best. Certesse Lu­cius Philippus, Quintus sonne, [Page 87] a manne of great witte, and moste L. Philippus who with­out any large giftes came to great dig­ni [...]ies. famous, was wonte to glorie: that he, withoute anie gift giuing, had atteined al maner dignities, which were counted moste honorable.

The like said Cotta Curio. We Cotta Curio. Ciceroes Edileship. also in this may glorie, after a cer­tein sorte. For doutlesse small was the cost of our Edileship: in respect of such large honours, as by all­mennes voices we atteined, euē in our yere: which hathe befallne to none of them, whome I named [...]while. And also these expenses In what thinges such cost is better bestowed. be better: which ar bestowed vpon citiewalles, shippedockes, hauens, conduites, and all, that appertein to the vse of the cōmonweale. Al­though y ^• is more pleasaunt, which presentlie is giuen (as it were) in hande: yet for time to cōme these be more acceptable. Sightcourts, ga­lereywalkes, and new churches, the more reuerentlie I fynde faulte with, for Pompeius sake: but the best lerned men do not alow them: as bothe this same Panetiꝰ, whōe I haue folowed much in these bo­kes, Panetius, & yet not translated him: & al­so [Page] Phalereus Demetrius: who dis­praised Demetrius Phalereus discōmended. Pericles. Pericles, the prince of Greece, bicause he layed so much money vpon those goodlie porches. But of this kinde vniuersallie, it is Tullies bo­kes of a com­monweale. now lost. diligētlie disputed, in those bokes, which I wrote of a commonweale. The holle maner then of such lar­gesse generallie is faultie, yet for certein times it is necessarie: & then the same is bothe to bee referred to ones abilitie, and to bee tempered with a meankeeping.

But in that other kinde of large­giuīg, Liberalitie. which proceedes of liberali­tie, not all alike in causes vnlike, we ought to be disposed. Otherwise is his case, who is pressed with mi­serie: & otherwise his, who seeketh more welth, hauing no aduersitie. Towarde the miserable, liberalitie Relefe to the miserable. ought to be forwarder: excepte per­aueture they shall be worthie of mi­serie. We ought yet in no wise to be altogither pinching toward those: who wolde haue themselues to be holpen, not that they may feele no affliction, but that they may rise to hyer degree: neuerthelesse in choo­sing Worthinesse. [Page 88] oute meete mē, we ought to vse a discretion, and a diligence. For notablie sayeth Ennius:

But whatso is giuen to a good man, and a thankfull: therby bothe ther commes frute from him, & also frō other. For so rashnesse be auoi­ded, liberalitie is verie pleasureful: and somuch themore ernestlie most men praise it: bicause euerie greate mannes goodnesse is the common refuge of all. Our endeuour ther­fore is to be done, that we rewarde them with verie manie benefites: to whose children, and ofspring a memorie may be left: so y ^t of good right they can not be vnthankfull. For all men do hate the forgetter of [...] nesse. a good turne: and doe deeme that wronge euen to themselues to bee done, in frayeng awaie ones libe­ralitie: and thei take him, who cau­seth it, to be a commō enemie of the poore. And this liberalitie also is profitable to the commonweale, to haue prisoners redemed out of cap­tiuitie, and the poore enriched.

[Page]Which we see written at large in y ^• oratiō of Crassꝰ: y ^• it was wōt to be Crassus ora­tion. done abrode by vs of y ^• Equestriall order. I place therfore this vsage of liberalitie before lauishnesse in sho­wes. This is for graue mē, & great: that other, (as it were) for flaterers of y ^• people, tickleling, as ye would saie, y ^• lightnesse of the multitude w ^t pleasure. But it is meete for a mā, bothe to be liberall in giuing, and nothing eyger in requiring: & also in euerie mater of bargaining, sel­ling, Iustice. bying, hyring, letting, nye­dwellinges, Gentlenesse. and partieboundes, to be iust & gentle: and to remitt much of his due to manie: but from tra­uerse in lawe to refraine as much, as he may: and I wott not, whether S [...]mewhat to remitt of a manns owne right. somewhat more also, than he may. For it is not onlie a liberall pointe, to for go sōmwhat of his right other­while, but sōmtime also profitable. But regarde of a mans welth must be had: which verilie to suffer to de­caye, is a foule faulte: but so, as sus­pitiō of niggardlienesse, and coue­tousnesse, be auoided. For nodoute it is the greatest frute of money: y ^• [Page 89] a man be able to vse liberalite, not making spoile of his liuelhod. Wel also, is hospitalitie praised of Theo­phrastus. Hospitalitie, Theoprhast [...]. us. For it is (as methinketh) verie seèmlie, noble mēnes howses to be open for noble geastes. And y ^t also is an honour to the state: that outelandish men in our cite do not want this kinde of liberalitie. It is also exceeding profitable to them, who honestlie desire to be able to do much: to preuaile in power, and fa­uour, by their geastes, amōge forein natiōs. Theophrastus indeede wri­teth: Cimon [...] y ^• Cimō at Athenes also was a good housekeeper, for y ^• Laciadans of his warde. Bicause he toke order so, & cōmaūded his bayleis: that all things should be offerd to whatsoe­uer Laciadā turned ito his manour. Liberall en­deuour.

But these benefites, which bee be­stowed by trauaile, & not by large­giftes, ar emploied bothe vpon the holle cōmōweale, and vpon euerie Aduise. citiezen aparte. For in lawe to giue Counsel [...] aduise, w ^t coūsel to help, & to furder verie manie w ^t this kinde of sciēce: it auaileth veriemuch, bothe to the encrease of riches, & also to fauour. [Page] Therfore as ther were manie wor­thie thinges of our aunceters: so alwaies in greate price was the knowledge, & y ^e opening of the right Ciull lawe, had in price with aunci [...]t rulers. well ordeined ciuil lawe: which truly, before this turmoile of times, rulers reteined in y ^• due estimatiō: now as honour, and as euerie de­gree of worship, so the glorie of this science is blotted oute. And that is somuch y ^• shamefuller: bicause this happened at y ^t time: whē he reigned, Ce [...]ar. who in knowledge clerelie exceded all his foregoers, to whome he had been pere in honour. This trauail therfore is pleasurefull to manie, & verie fitt, to bynde men with bene­fites. And y ^• grauer, & gracefuller, Eloquence, a grace moste cōmendable. and trimmer feate of oratorie is nere coosin to this science.

For what is more praiseworthy, & better, than eloquence? either for y ^• admiration of the hearers, or the hope of the needers, or for their cause, who haue been defended.

Therfore to this likewise a preemi­nence in all honour was giuen of our elders. The benefites then, and the pleading of a finespoken man, [Page 100] and gladlie taking paines, and (as it is in his countrie fashion) bothe not vnwillinglie, and also freelie defending manie mennes causes, be farre spredd abrode.

The mater hath put me in minde: Discontinu­aunce of elo­quence. that in this place also I shoulde be­waile the discontinuance, I will not saie the destruction of eloquēce: but y ^t I feared, leste touching miself somewhat I shoulde seeme to com­plaine. Notwithstanding we see, what notable oratours haue been putt oute of the waie: and how in a fewe a hope, in fewer a skill, in ma­ny a boldnesse ther remaines. But Of smaller trauail also how fauour is wonne. seing neither all, nor yet manie can be either conning in the lawe, or wellspoken men: one yet with his trauaile may furder manye: that seeweth for their commodities: that speaketh in their fauour to the iudges, and magistrates: that sle­peth not oute an others cause: that entreateth thosesame, who either be counselers, or defenders: which whoso do, thei attein verie much fa­uour, and their painefullnesse fio­weth all abrode.

[Page]Now they ar not to be admonished of this (for it is wellknowne) y ^t they Justice. O [...]ence. take heede: when they will help o­ther, that they offend none. For of­tentimes either they hurt thē, whō they shoulde not: or them, whō it is not behooueable: if vnwarelie they do it, of necligēce it is: if wittīglie, of rashnes it cōmes. You must vse also to thē, whō you offend against Offence must either be [...]uoided, or [...]uaged. your wil, such an excuse, as ye may: for what cause the same, y ^• you haue done, was necessarie, and you could not do otherwise: and y ^• which was done offensiuelie, shal be recōpensed w ^t other trauails, & frendly doings. Trauail for the poore rather, than the riche.

But whereas, in helping men, ei­ther their cōditions ar wonte to be considerd, or their estate: indeede it is soone said, & so they do cōmonlie speake: that in bestowing their be­nefits, they regarde mēns maners, Maners. and not their estate. An honest Estate. sayeng it is: but who is ther at all, which in bestowing his trauaile, dothe not preferre the fauour of a richeman, & one of power, before y ^• poores, & a right good mānes cause?

For frō whō, we think, a speedier, [Page 101] and redier recōpence will cōme: to him warde commonlie our good will is the more enclined. But we must marke more diligentlie, what is the nature of thinges. For verily though y ^t pooreman can not render due thanks: yet if he bee a good mā, owe them for soothe he may. This surely was in place, whosoeuer said it: Money who haueth in hand, hath To pa [...]e money. not payde: & who hath paide, haueth in minde: but thākes both who hath To render thankes. paide, haueth in mīde: & who haueth in minde, hath rendered. But these, The riche. who counte thēselues riche, hono­rable, & wealfull, will not bee once boūd to a mā for a pleasure: but thei think rather, y ^t thei haue done a plea­sure: when, yea although they haue taken sōme great thing, thei suspect somwhat likewise of thē either to be craued, or looked for: but thei rechē it euē like a death: y ^t thei should seme to haue vsed ones furderaunce, or should be called hangers on. But y ^• other poremā, thīking hīself regar­ded, & not his state, whē any thing is The poore. done vnto him: desires, y ^t he may be thought thākfull not onelie to him, [Page] who haue deserued it: but also to thē (for he standes in neede of manie) of whome he lookes for ought. Nor yet w ^t wordes he setts oute his ser­uice, if perhappes he doe anie, but also abaceth it. And thissame pointe is to bee considerd: that if you defēd a riche, and a welthie man: y ^• thank remaines in him alone, or perchaūce in his children: but if you do it for him, that is poore, and yet honest, & discrete: all the meane degree, being not dishonest, (which is a greate multitude amonge the people) do se succour prepared for them. Wher­fore Set the good before the riche. I think a benefite better to bee bestowed vpon good men, than vpō riche. Yet allwaies we must giue our endeuour, that we may content all maner of men: but if the mater shall cōme into comparison: verilie Themistocles is to be taken for an Themistocles author: who, when he was asked coūsel, whether one should bestowe his daughter vpon a good pooremā, or a riche manne not so honest: I (quoth he) do rather like a man, who lacketh money, than money, which wanteth a man.

But maners bee corrupted, and Loue of ri­ches. [Page 102] marred, by ouerregarding riches. What do the the great store therof pertein to euerie one of vs? Pera­uenture it helpeth him, that hath it: and that, iwis not allwaies. But graunte, it helps: indeede he may be the mightier, but which waie may he bee the honester man? And if the richeman bee also a good man: let not his riches hinder him, & cause him to finde thelesse helpe, so they Discerne mē by their ver­tue, not by their fortune. furder him not: & let a mānes holle iudgement bee, not how riche, but what maner man echone is.

And in bestowing benefites, and In a shame­full cause no trauail is to be spent. trauail, the last lesson is: that you labour nothing against equitie, & nothing with wronge.

For iustice is the grounde of a con­tinuall commendacion, and fame: withoute which, nothing can bee praisable.

But seing we haue spoken of such Benefite [...] vpō the com­monweale. kinde of benefites, as belōge to eche seuerall manne: hereafter we must treate of those, which pertein to all men, and to a commonweale.

And some of thosesame bee of such sorte, that they pertein to the holle The hol [...]e [Page] nonmbre of citizens: sōme that they Euer [...]eone. concern euerie sere man: which bee also more fauourfull. A diligence doutlesse ther must bee giuen, if it may, that it be prouided for bothe: & nolesse also, for euerieone: but so, as the thing either maye furder, or at leste not hinder the commonweale. Caius Gracchus, to large a giuer. Caius Gracchus cornedole was greate: he wasted therfore the trea­surie: Marcus Detauiꝰ made such Marcus [...]ctauius, in large gifts measurable. a one, as was measurable, and as the commonweale might beare, & necessarie for the people: & therfore wealfull bothe to the citizens, and also to y ^t state. But speciallie it must be sene to of him, who shall gouern the commonweale: that euerieman keepe his owne: and that ther be no impayring of priuate mēns goods, Philippus, a people­pleaser. for cōmon charges. For Philippus did daungerouslie in his Tribune [...] ship, whē he made the lawe concer­ning lādes: which yet he soone suf­ferd to be repealed: & therin maruai­louslie hee showed himself a sober man: but as hee did euill, in setting for the manie thinges people plea­singlie: so this he spake euill: y ^• ther [Page 103] wer not in the citie twoo thousand men, who had anie substaunce.

It is surelie a mischieuous sayeng, Making of goodes com­mon. & sounding to y ^• making of goodes cōmon: & what greater pestilēce cā ther be, thā that? For cōmōwelths, Countries. & countries ar ordeined to this ende speciallie, that men may kepe their owne. For although mē assembled togither, nature beeing guide: yet they sought the defenses of cities, Cities. for hope of safekeeping of their goodes.

Ther must also good heede be giuē: Exacting of tributes is to be auoided. that (as often it happened amonge our aunceters) for the poorenesse of the treasurie, and continuaunce of y ^• warres, a tribute be not nedefull to be paid. And longe before it must be prouided, that it may not befall. But if anie necessitie of this dutie shall happen vpō any cōmonweale: (for I had rather prophecie to sōme others, than to owres: & yet I reasō not of owres, but of euerie cōmon­weale) ther must bee giuen a dili­gence, that all men may vnderstād: that if they will bee in safetie, they must obey necessitie.

[Page]And moreouer all such, as shall Store of ne­cessarie thinges. rule the commonweale, ought to prouide: that ther bee store of those thinges, which ar necessarie. Of which it is not needefull to dispute, what a prouision is wonte, & ought to be made: for y ^• mater is manifest: this place was nomore, but to bee touched.

But the chief poincte is, in all ad­ministration Couetous­nesse. of maters, and com­monweale offices: that euen y ^• leste suspitiō of couetousnesse bee auoi­ded. Would god, quoth Caius Pontius th [...] Samnite, fortune had Caius Pontius. reserued me to those daies, and I had then been borne: when the Ro­manes Bribes. begōne once to take bribes: I woulde not suffer them anie len­ger to rule. Hee needed not iwis to haue taried for manie worldes.

For of late this mischiefe entered into this commonweale. Therfore I am well content, that Pontius rather liued then: if ther was in him somuch manhod indeede.

Not yet a hundred, and tenne yeres be past: sins the lawe of pil­lage A lawe for pillage. was made by Lucius Piso: [Page 104] wheras none before had been. But Luciꝰ Piso [...]. Tribune of the people, when Cen­sorinus, and Manilius wer Cōsuls. afterward folowed so many lawes, and euerie of the later, the harder: so manie accused, so manie condē ­ned: so greate an Italian warre, raised for feare of iudgements: whē lawes, and iudgementes wertaken awaie, so greate polling, & robbing of leagfrendes: y ^• by the weaknesse of other, not by our prowesse, we do preuaile. Panetius praiseth Afri­canus, Panetius. Africanus, praysed for [...] refrayning hand. bicause he was no taker.

Why should he not be praised? But other greater thinges ther were in him. For the praise of restraining from taking is not onlie the mans, but also that times. Paulus got all Paulus Emilius. the Macedonians treasure, which was exceeding greate: he brought somuch riches into the treasurie, y ^t one capteins bootie made an end of tributes: but he bore nothing into Scipio Emylianus, who was called Africanus minor. his house, saue an euerlasting me­morie of his name. Africanus folo­wed his father, nowhit the more enriched by Cartage razed. What of Luciꝰ Mummius, who was his L. Mummiꝰ Achaicus. officefelow in the Censorship? was hee aniedeale the richer, when by [Page] the ground he had ouerthrowne the moste riche citie? Hee was willing Cori [...]thus. rather to bewtifie Italie, than his owne house: allthough Italie bee­ing beautified, his verie house see­meth to mee the beautifuller. No vice then is ther fowler (that thither my talke may return, frō whence it is strayed) than couetousnesse: spe­ciallie, Couetous­nesse, a verie fowle vice. in princes, & commonweale rulers. For it is not onelie disho­nest, but wicked also, & shamefull, to make a gaine of the cōmōwelth. Therfore wheras Apollo Pythius Apolloes answer, that Spartaes fall should cōme by co­uetise. gaue oute by oracle: that Sparta no other waie, but by couetousnesse should cōme to destructiō: the same hee seemeth to haue prophecied not onelie to the Lacedemonians, but also to all welthie peoples. For they, who rule ouer the common­weale, maye by no meanes sooner winne the good will of the multi­tude: A refraining hand. than by a refraining hand, & stayednesse. But woso will be peo­plepleasers: Stayednesse. and for that cause, do The lawe for laying out of landes. either attempt the mater of landes, that the owners may be driuē from their holdes: orels do think meete, [Page 105] that loned money bee remitted to the detters: they shake the founda­tions of the commonweale: first, they take awaie cōcorde: which can Concorde. not bee, when money is pulled frō sōme, & forgiuē to other sōme: next, they bānish equitie: which is hollie Equitie. rooted oute: if it bee not lawfull for euerie man to haue his owne.

For that is the proper ende, as I said before, of a citie, and borough: that ther bee a free, and no trouble­some keping of euerie mannes owne good. And in this mischief of the commonweale, they do not attein such fauour, as they suppose Fauour. thei do. For he, from whome goods be taken, is becōme an enemie: hee also, to whome thei ar giuē, makes, as though he is not willing to take them: and moste of all hee hydes his ioye in loned money forgiuen: leste hee maye seeme to haue been vnable to paye it.

But surelie, hee that receiueth the wronge, bothe beareth his greefe in remembraunce, and showeth it in sight: neither if they bee mo, to whom wickedlie it hath been giuē, [Page] than they, from whome vniustlie it hath been taken: it foloweth, that therfore thei be also more in power. For these thinges be iudged not by noumber, but by weight. And what equitie is in this? y ^t he shoulde haue land, who hathe had none: and hee shoulde forgo land, who hathe had it manie yeres, yea or hunderds of yeres before continued in possessiō. The Lacede­monians. But, for this kinde of iniurie, the Lacedemonians draue out Lysan­der Lysander expulsed. the Ephorean: and they sleew Agis y ^• king: which had neuer hap­pened Agis, slayne. among them before. Wherof folowed, at that time, so great dis­sensions: y ^• there arose tyrauntes: and their noble men wer exiled: & a verie well ordered commonweale wēt to ruine. Nor trulie their state onelie had a fall: but also it ouer­threew the rest of Greece, with the infections of mischiefes: which springing from y ^• Lacedemoniās, did flowe farder abrode. What of our Gracchi, Tiberius Gracchus, Gracchi, lost by lādstrifes. the noble mannes sonnes, Africanꝰ childerns childern? did not land­striues bring them to destruction? [Page 106] But in dede Aratus the Sicyonian Aratus the [...]icyonian, a right good cōm [...] eaith­man. is rightfullie cōmended: who, whē his c [...]tie was fiftie yeres witholden by tyraunts: being departed fr [...]m Argos to Sicyon, with a p [...] ­sto [...] entrie, g [...]tte possession of the citie: and when, [...] [...] [...], he had ouer [...] [...]n the tyraunt, Ni­cocles: he [...] h [...]me again six hundred ba [...]sht men, who had been the greatest possessioners of y ^t citie: and, by his comming, sette the [...]ommōweale at libertie. But whē he perceiued the greate inconueni­ence in the goodes, and possessions: bicause bothe he thought it verie vnreasonable, y ^t they should [...]acke, whō he himself had restored, wh [...]se goodes other had possessed: & again to remoue fiftie yeres possession, he iudged it not verie indifferent: bi­cause that in s [...] l [...]ng a space, much by inheritaūce, much by sale, much by dower, was holden: w ^t out wrōg he thought it was necessarie: nei­ther the goodes to bee taken from them, nor those to bee vnsatisfied, whose they had bene before. When he had then determined, y ^t he should [Page] neede money, for the ordering of y ^• mater: he saide, he would make a viage to Alexandria: and commaū ­ded, the mater to remaine vntou­ched, vntill his return. And he w ^t spe [...]e went to Ptolemeus, who had bene his entertainer: which then reigned the seconde, after the buil­ding of Alexandria: to whom when he had declared, y ^• he was minded to set his countrie at libertie: and had enfourmed him of the case: the no­ble man soone obteined of the riche king, to bee ayded with a masse of money. Which whē he had brought into Sicyon, he toke to him in coū ­sell fift [...] one of his nobles: with whō he examined the cases bothe of them who did withholde othermennes, & of theirs, who had lost their owne: & did putte these fifteene in commis­siō for the valewing of possessions: and to perswade somme, that they would be willinger to take money, and [...]ease their possession: and other somme, to think, that to haue as much payed them in valeew, it were more profit, than to recouer their owne. So it camme to passe, [Page 107] that they all departed withoute complainte, by a wellordered con­corde. O manne of much honour, and woorthie to haue bene borne in our commonweale. Thus it is meete to deale with citiezens: and not (as twise allreadie wee haue seene) to pitche a salestaffe in the marketplace: & to put the goodes of the citiezens in y ^• cryers mouthe. But that Greeke thought meete to prouide for all: which was the part of a wise, and a woorthie manne. And that is the greatest discretion, and wisdome of an honourable ci­tiezen, to defende, not to pull awaie the citiezens commodities: and to contein them all within one maner of equitie. But sōme will saie, men Equitie. maye dwell rentfree in an others house. Why so? That when I haue bought it, haue builded it, doo re­paire it, do laie charges vpō it: thou shouldest haue y ^• vse of mine, agaīst Unlawfull pa [...]ting of landes. my will? What is this els, but from somme to take their owne, & to sōme to giue other [...]? And The neew tables for re­lea [...]ing of det. as for the neew tables, what rea­son haue they? but that you may bye [Page] land with my money, and possesse it yourself: and yet I may not haue my money. Wherfore it must bee prouided: y ^• ther bee no dett, which may hinder the cōmōweale: which thing may bee looked too, manie­waies: if this bee not suffered: that possessioners loze their owne, nor detters gain other mennes. For nothing more stronglie preserueth a commonweale, thā faithfulnesse: which can bee none at all, excepte Faithfulnesse ther bee of necessitie a payment of things loned. For neuer more ear­nestlie it was gone about, thā whē I was Consul, that there should be Cicero Con­sul. no paiments. The mater was at­tempted with speare, and shield, by euerie sorte, and degree of menne: whom in such wise I withstoode, y ^• this so great a mischief was rooted out of the commonweale. Neuer was there more derte, nother bet­ter, nor easlier payed. For when hope of defrauding was taken a­waie, necessitie of paymēt folowed. But this our conquerour, now ve­rilie Caesar. conquered, hath commepassed those thinges, which he purposed: [Page 108] wheras now he is neuer awhit the be [...]ter. So greate was his desire to do [...]: y ^t euen the verie doo­ing of noughtinesse delited him, al­though he had no occasion. They then, who shall vpholde the cōmon­weale, must kepe them awaie from this maner of large gifts: that to somme they bee giuen, and from o­ther they bee taken: and speciallie must giue their diligence: that by e­quitie of lawe, and iudgement, e­uerieman may holde his [...]wne: and neither the poorer sorte, for their sma [...]l abilitie, bee deceiued by co­uine: nor enuie may hinder y ^• riche, either to keepe, or recouer their owne: moreouer, by what meanes soeuer they can, either in warre, or peace: lette them enlarge the com­monweale, with dominion, lande, and custome. These be the deeds of Conclusion. noble men: these wer practised a­monge our aunceters: these kindes of duties whoso folowe: shall, with verie great profit to the common­weale, gette themselues both great fauour, and glorie. Waie prepa­red to the res [...]

But in these precepts of profit, [Page] Antipater of Tyre, the Stoik, who Antipater. alate dyed at Athenes, thinks, that two precepts be ouerscaped of Pa­netius: tendering of helth, and pro­uision of money. Which things I Panetius de­fended. suppose to haue bene ouerpassed by the noble philosopher, bicause they wer light maters: yet without dout they be profitable.

But helth is preserued, by know­ledge [...]fhelth. of ones owne bodie: & markīg those things, which ar wont either to do good, or harme: & by a stayed­ness bothe in all a mānes diet, & ap­parail, for cherishing of the bodie, & also in forbearing pleasures: & last­lie, by their conning, to whose sci­ence these things pertein.

But a mannes substance must be Priuate goodes. gotten, by those things, which bee farre from dishonestie: and must be saued, by diligence, and honest sparing: and by thosesame meanes also, it must bee encreased. Xenophō Xenophons boke o [...] orde­ring an hous­holde. the Socratian hath gone thorowe these things verie handsomelie, in y ^e boke, which is entitled Economi­cus: the which wee turned oute of greeke into latine, when we wer at [Page 109] the same age in a maner, as you ar now.

But cōparing of profits (bicause Of two pro­fitable things w [...]ether is the more pro­fitable. this fourt place was ouerpassed by Panetius) is oftētimes necessarie. For bothe [...]he gifts of the bodie ar wonte to bee compared w ^t fortunes gifts: & also fortunes gifts, with the bodies gifts: & those of y ^• bodie, one with an other: & those, that fortune giues, likewise one with an other. The bodies gifts bee compared w ^t fortunes, after this sort: that ye had rather bee in helth, than bee [...]: fortunes gifts bee compared with the bodies, in this wise: that you had rather bee riche, than of verie greate strength of bodie. Those of the bodie bee compared one with an other, thus: that good helth bee preferred before pleasure, & strēgth before sw [...]ftnesse. But fortunes gifts be cōpared togither, this way: that glorie bee esteemed before ri­ches, and [...]itietribute before the [...] t [...]lde, wh [...]t is the [...] countreys. Of the which kinde of comparison is [...] [...]aying of Cato, the oldeman [...] of whom when it [...] deman̄ded, what [...] [...] [...] [...] [Page] for a mannes substaunce: he made answer, To fede well: what the se­conde, To fede sufficientlie well: what y ^• third, To clothe well: what the fourte, To plow: and when he, who had mooued the question, had Usurie. said: What, to lēd vpō vsurie? then, What is it, quoth Cato, to kill a mā? Wherupon, & of manie other things it ought to bee gathered, y ^• comparisons of profits ar wont to be made: and that this is veriewell adioyned for the fourt point of ser­ching out of duties.

But of this holle mater, of gettīg Referring of the mater to [...]. money, of bestowing thesame, & al­so of vsing it: farre better it is dis­puted by certein honest mē, sitting A place in Rome, so cal­led, bicause Ianus ima­ges wer there to bee sene. at the middle Iane, than of anie philosophers in anie schoole. Yet ar they to bee knowne, and of them in this boke wee haue treated. The rest will we prose­cute hereafter.

THesame Publius Sci­pio, The preface. 1. part. sonne Mark, who the first Africanus was why he sp [...]ds his vacant time in philo­phie. named, would commō ­lie saie: as Cato hath written, who was in a maner his like in yeres: That he was neuer more leasurelesse, thā whā he was A [...]eate say­eng of Scipio, touching lea­sure, and soli­tarinesse. leasurefull: and neuer lesse alone, than whan he was all alone. A no­ble sayeng surelie, and meete for a worthie, and wise man: which de­clareth, that he bothe in his leasure was wont to muse of maters to bee done: and also in his solitarinesse, to debate them with himself: so as he was nothing ydle at anie time, and sometime neded not the cōmu­nication of other. And so these two things, leasure, and solitarinesse, which bring a dulnesse vpon other, His own va­catiō compa­red with Sci­pioes. made him y ^• quicker. I wold wish, that we likewise might trulie saie the verie same. But allthough by [...] we ar not able to attein so [Page] great excelence of witte: yet doute­lesse in desire we comme verie nere him. For bothe by wicked warre, and power, being put of from com­monweale maters, and iudiciall causes, we take our quiet leasure: & for that cause leauing the citie, and walking abrode in the countrie, of­tentimes we be alone. But neither this leasure is to be compared with Africanus leasure: nor this solita­rinesse, with that of his. For he ceasing from the goodlie ministra­tion of the commonweale, tooke himself leasure otherwhile: and from the prease, and resorte of men, now and than into a solitarie place, as into a hauen, withdrewe himself. But our leasure commes Leasure. not of desire of rest, but for lacke of hysinesse. For seeing the Senate is deposed, and iudgementes ab­olished: what is ther, that ei­ther in courte, or in place of plea, meete for vs, wee may do. Ther­fore we, who in the greatest as­semble, and in the yies of the ci­tiezens sommetime haue liued: now [...]leeing the sight of the wicked, [Page 111] with whom all places swarme: do Solitariness [...]. withdrawe ourselues, as much as wee may, and ar oftentimes alone. But bicause thus we haue herd of lerned men: y ^• not onelie we ought of euils to choose the leste: but also if ther wer anie goodnesse in them, Good oute of euill. to pike it out: therfore bothe I en­ioye quietnesse: not such ywis, as he ought to haue, who once procu­red quietnesse to the holle citie: and also do not suffer that solitari­nesse to wax ydle: which necessitie brings vpon me, and not mine own desire. Allthough Africanus did gette greater praise, euen in my iudgement: yet no monuments of his witte put in writing, no worke of his quiet life, no frute of his so­litariness remaines abrode. Wher­of it must needes bee gathered: that he, by earnest occupyeng of his minde, and by beating oute those things, which by musing he attei­ned: [...]. was neither ydle, nor at anie time alone: but we, who haue not so greate deepenesse of witte, that by secret musing we bee drawne from solitariness: do turn all our studie, [Page] and endeuour to this trauaile of Writing. writing. And therfore wee haue written more in a shorte space, sins the state was ouerthrowne: than in manie yeres, when it stoode.

But wheras all philosophie, my 2 Cicero, is verie good, and f [...]ute­full: Exhortatiō to his sonne. Philosophie. nor anie parte therof is bar­rein, and waste: yet no place ther­in is more yeelding, nor more plen­tiefull, than the place touching duties: from which bee borowed Duties. the preceptes of liuing constant­lie, and honestlie. Wherfore al­though I trust, you dailie heare, & receiue this same of our Cratip­pus, His sonnes scholemaister. prince of Philosophers in these dayes: neuerthelesse I holde it profitable, that I ring aboute your eares with such soundes, on euerie sid [...]: and that they, if pos­siblie it maye bee done, heare none other thing. Which bothe is to bee done of all those, that minde to enter the honest life: and I wott not, whether of anie man more, than of yourself. For you carie an expectation, not small of folow­ing His [...]. our trade, greate of comming [Page 112] to our honour, somme paraduen­ture His bringing vp. of atteining to our fame. You haue taken vpon you moreouer a greate charge, bothe by reason of Athenes, and also of Cratippus: to the which seing, as to the marte of good sciences, you haue t [...]a­uailed: to return emptie, a g [...]eate reproche it is, st [...]ining the woor­shippe bothe of the citie, and also of your maister. Wherfore as much as by witte you ar able to comme­passe: as much as by pain [...] [...] can endeuour (if to studie be rat [...]er a paine, than pleasure) so [...]uch [...]ee, that you do in deede: and giue no occasion, that seeing all thing [...] a [...] suffised by vs, you should seeme to haue disapointed yourself. But of these maters hitherto. For we haue oftentimes written much vnto you, in wa [...]e of exhortation. Now to the part remayning of the foresaide diuision lette vs return. The treatise. He remoueth [...], suppl [...]eng the perceil, [...]hat his au [...]hour did not prose­cute.

Panetius therfore, who without doute of duties hath most viligētlie disputed: and whom we, vsing [...] certein correction, haue chieflie [Page] folowe [...]: when h [...] h [...]d setteforthe three [...], [...] [...] menne w [...]r w [...]nt to counsell, and aduise them­selues How ' [...] wrote of duties. of dutie: the one, when they should doute, whether it, wherwith they were in hande, were honeste, or [...]: the other, whether it were profitable, or vnprofita­ble: the third, if that, which should haue the [...]howe of honestie, should striue with it, that seemed profi­table: how it should bee necessarie thosesame to bee discerned: of the first twoo kindes, in three bookes he opened his minde: and of the third kinde, he wrote, he woulde speake afterwarde: and that did he not perfourme, which he had promised. Wher at I mar [...]aile Possidonius, Panetius scholar. the more: bicause it is written by his scholar Possidonius: that Pa­netius liued thirtie yeares after he had settefoorth those bokes. Which place I wonder, it was so brieflie touched of Possidonius in certein [...]: speciallie seeing he writes, ther is no place in all [...]hilosophie so necessarie. But in nowise I agree with them: which [Page 113] denie, this place did ouerskape Panetius: but that of purpose it was left oute: and that it was not to bee written at all: bicause profit might neuer striue with honesti [...]. Touching the which, the one may haue in it a doute: whether this parte, which in Panetius diuisi­on is the third, was to bee ad­ded, or vtterlie to bee left oute: the other can not bee douted of: but of Panetius it was taken in hand, and yet left vntreated. For who­so of a threeparted diuision twoo partes hath finished, to him the third must needes remain. More­ouer, in his third booke, towarde the ende, he promiseth, that af­terwarde he will speake of this parte. Hereto commeth a substan­tiall P. Rutilius Ru [...]us, Pa­ne [...]ꝰ scholar. witnesse, Possidonius: who also writeth in a certein letter, that Publius Rutilius Rufus, which The notable image of Ue­nus: whose hedde onelie Apelles fini­shed and left her bodie no­more but sha­dowed. had herd Panetius, was wont to saye: like as no painter might bee founde, who coulde finish vp that parte of Uenus, which Apelles had left vnfinished: (for the beautie of her face tooke awaie the hope of [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] coūterfetting the rest of her bodie) so those things, that Panetius had ouerpassed, & had not finished, ther was no man to prosecute: bicause of y ^• excelēce of those maters, which he had gone thorou withall. Wher­fore of Panetius iudgement it can not bee douted: but whether he to the serching out of dutie this third parte adioyned well, or no: therof parauenture it may be douted. For whether honestie be the onely good, The Stoiks appoint one thing onelie good: the Pe­ripat [...]tiks make an order of good thigs. as liketh the Stoiks: orels honestie in such sorte bee the souerain good: (as semeth to our Peripatetikes) that they counte all things, set on the other side, of ve [...]y small weight in comparison: it is not to bee dou­ted, but that profit can neuer bee Profit. at strife with honestie. Therfore, [...]onestie. we haue herd saye, Socrates was wonte to curse them: who first par­ted a sonder in opinion these, that by nature wer coupled togither. To whom doutlesse the Stoiks so assented: that whatso wer honest, the same also they iudged to be pro­fitable: nor anie thyng to bee profitable, which wer not honest. [Page 114] If Panetius wer the man, who wolde saie: y ^• vertue therfore should be honored, bicause it is y ^• causer of profit: as they, who measure things meete to be desired either by plea­sure, or vngreffulnesse: he might maintein, that honestie sommetime striues with profit. But seeing he is Good. the man, who iudgeth that onelie good, which is honest: and that mās Honest. life is made neither y ^• better, by en­crease of such thinges, as be repug­naunt to honestie vnder a certein showe of profit: nor by decrease of thē, the worsse: it seemes, he shoulde not haue brought in such maner ta­king of aduisement: wherein that, which should seem ꝓfitable, should be cōpared with that, which is ho­nest. For that, which of the Stoiks is called the souerain good, as to liue agreably to nature: it hath (as I suppose) this meaning: w ^t vertue To li [...]e a­greably to nature. alwaies to agree: & other thinges, which shoulde be according to na­ture, so to chose: if to vertue they wer not repugnaunt. Which see­ing it is so: somme suppose, this cō ­parison was not well brought in: [Page] nor anie thing at all, touching that braunche, should haue bene taught. And surelie that honestie, which is properlie, and trulie so called, is in the wise onlie: and from vertue can neuer be seuered: but in those, in The true vertue is onelie in perfite wisemen. whō is not perfect wisdome, dout­lesse that same perfect honestie cā in no wise be: semblaunces of honestie ther may be. All these duties ther­fore, wherupon in these bookes we dispute, the Stoikes call the meane The meane duties. duties: and those be commō duties, and do spread farre: which manie attein, bothe by goodnesse of witte, and by going forward in learning. But that, which they call R [...]etum, The perfite dutie. is the perfite, and absolute dutie: [...], as they also saye, it hathe all his partes: neither can happen to anie, but a wiseman. And whē any thing is done, wherin the meane duties may appeare: it seemeth to be fullie perfite: bicause the cōmon people al moste vnderstādeth not at all, what it wāteth of perfite: but as farre as they vnderstād, they think, nothing is left vndone. And wher as it com­monlie chaūceth in meeters, & pain­tinges, [Page 115] & in other thinges mo: y ^• the vn [...]kilfull be delited, & praise those thinges, y ^• ar not to be praised: for y ^• Of arts none can [...] [...] iudge, but the craft [...]master: and of vertue none but the wi [...]e. cause, I beleue, they do so: y ^• in those ther is sōme good grace, y ^• catcheth the ignoraunt: who in deede be not able to discern, what fault is in eue­rie thing. And therfore, whē they be taught of the skilful, they soone fal frō their opinion. The Stoiks then say, y ^• these duties, wherupō in the [...]e [...]okes we treate, be (as who saieth) certein second sorts of honestie: not proper onelie to the wise, but cōmon also to all maner of men. Therfore all be allured with these, in whome ther is a forwardnesse of vertue. [...]ecii, the fa­ther, and the sonne. And when the twoo Decii, or y ^• two Scipioes be vouched for mālie mē: orels when Fabritius, or Aristides Scipioes bre the [...]. be alledged as iust: neither of them for manlinesse, nor of these for [...] Fab. a despi­ [...]er of golde. the example is brought, as of perfite wisemen. For none of these [...] of a thens deier [...]ed this sur­n [...]me, [...]ust. in such sorte is wise, as in this place we will haue a wise manne taken: nor Marcus Cato, and Caius Le­lius, Cato. & Leli­us, surname [...] the wi [...]e. who wer counted, and called wise, were perfite wise menne: [Page] no nor those seuen sages of [...] The. vii. wise masters of Greece. but by the often vsing of the meane, & cōmon duties, they bore a certein semblaunce, and showe of wisemē. Wherfore neither it is lawful, that the thing, which in deede is honest, be compared with the contrarietie of y ^• profitable: neither y ^•, which cō ­monlie we call honest, and which is exercised of them, who will haue themselues good mē to be counted: with commodities at any time is to be compared: and as well that ho­nestie, which falleth into our vn­derstanding, is of vs to be maintei­ned, and kept: as that is, of the wise: which properlie is called, & indeede is honestie. For otherwise it cā not be holden on, if ther be atteined any proceeding to vertue. But this wee say by them, who by keeping of du­ties ar esteemed for good men. Epicureans.

But who do measure all things by profits, and commodities: and will not the same to be ouerweyed with honestie: these ar wonte in aduise­mēt taking to cōpare honestie with it, which they recken profitable: good men vse not so to do. Therfore [Page 116] I think, Panetius, whē he said, mē Panetius. ar wonte in this cōparison to dout: ment the veriesame, that he spake: that mē onelie ar wonte, but not, y ^t To be wont. they must needes. For not onelie to To do of ne­cessirie. iudge the thing, that seemeth profi­table, more worthe thā that, which is honest: but also to compare these togither, & in them to cast doutes: a verie fowle shame it is. What is it then, that manie times is wonte to bring a doutefulnesse? and seemeth meete to be considered? I suppose, it is, if at anie time ther befall a dout­fullness: what maner of thing it is, wherof consideration is taken. For often, by the time, it cōmes to passe: that it, which for the moste parte is wonte to be counted dishonest, is founde not to be dishonest. For exā ­ples sake, let ther be put sōme case, that more largelie extendeth. What greater mischief can ther be, than one to kill not onelie a man, but al­so his familiar? Hathe he then gil­tied himself of murder, who hathe slaine a tyraunt, all wer he his fa­miliar? To y ^• people of Rome dout­lesse it seemeth not so: who of all [Page] worthie deedes esteemeth that the noblest. With them therfore profite passed honestie: yea rather honestie folowed after profit.

Therfore, that withoute anie er­rour what to de­termin, [...]here profite seems to striue with honestie. we may be able to iudge: if e­uer y ^t, which we cal profitable, shall seem to striue w ^t it, which is known for honest: a certein rule is to be ap­pointed: which if we will folowe in the cōparison of things, from dutie we shall neuer swarue. And this why he fo­lowes chief­lie the S [...]o­ikes. rule shall be moste agreeable with the trade, & doctrine of the Stoiks: which verilie, in these bookes, wee therfore folowe: bicause although of the aunciēt Academiks, and our Peripatetiks, (who were once all one w ^t the Academiks) those things, Honest. which be honest, be preferred before such, as seeme profitable: yet these Profitable. more goodlily be disputed of y ^• Sto­iks: to whō whatso is honest, y ^• same seemeth profitable: & nothing semes profitable, which is not honest: thā it is of those: who recken sōmewhat to be honest, and not profitable, or sommewhat profitable, and not ho­nest. The Acade­mian schole. But to vs our Academia giues [Page 117] great libertie: y ^t whatsoeuer moste proueable [...]ōmes in place, thesame by our prerogatiue wee may law­fully defēd. But I return to y ^• rule.

To pull awaie then anie thing A precept of iustice. from an other, and a mā to encrease his commoditie with an other mās Profit by an other mās dis commoditie. discommoditie, it is more against nature: than death, than pouertie, thā paine, and other things, which may happen either to the bodie, or to the outward state. For first of all it takes awaie the conuersation, & fe­lowship of men. For if we shall be so disposed: that euerie man, for his owne cōmoditie, spoile, & wrong an The felow­ship of men. other: that felowship of mankinde, which is most according to nature, must needes be broken. As if euerie Comparison betwene mās societie, & the partes of his bodie. parte of y ^t bodie should haue this i­magination: to think, it might be strong, if it had conueyed to itself the strength of the next limmes: of force it should folowe, that the holle bodie should be weakened, & perish: euenso if euerieone of vs catche to himself the cōmodities of other, and pulleth from eche mā what he can, for his owne profites sake: y ^• felow­ship, [Page] and cōmon companie of men must needes be ouerthrowne. For it is sufferable, and nature not a­gainst it: that euerieman be more willing for himself, than for an o­ther man, to get whatso perteineth to the vse of his life. This doutlesse nature doth not suffer: that, with the spoile of other, we encrease our riches, substaūce, and welth. And not onely it is ordeined by nature, that is to witte, by the vniuersall lawe of nations: but also in like Lawes. maner, by the lawes of people, wherby in euerie citie the common­welth is vpholden: that it shoulde not be lawfull, for a mannes owne profits sake, to hurt an other. For the lawes tend to this, and this they meane: that y ^• felowship of citiezens be in safetie: which whoso riue a sō ­der: those with death, bannishment, prisonmēt, and penalties, they pon­nish. And this much more doth the verie course of nature require, The lawe of nature. which is the lawe of God and man: the which whoso is willing to obey (all trulye will obey it, that haue a minde to liue according to nature) [Page 118] shall neuer so offēd: y ^t an other mās goodes he wolde couet: and take to himself, that he hathe pulled frō an other. For much more according to nature is the hynesse, and greatness Great corage. of corage: and likewise common fe­lowship, Common [...]. iustice, & liberalitie: than pleasure, than life, than rychesse. Which thinges doutlesse for a man to despise, and set at nought, in cō ­parison of commō profit: is a signe of a greate, and hawte corage. But to pull from an other, for ones own wrong doing is against na­ture. profits sake, is more against na­ture: than death, than sorowe, than the rest of y ^• same kinde. And in like maner, more according to nature it Commō safe­tie. is, for the sauing, and ayding of all nations (if it may possiblie be done) to vndertake greate trauails, and paines: folowing that notable Her­cules, Hercules, for his worthie deedes, was takē as a god. whom mens reporte, the re­corder of desertes, hath placed in y ^• companie of thē aboue: than to liue in solitarienesse, not onely without anie paines, but also in great plea­sures, flowing full of all richesse: yea though moreouer you may ex­cell all other, in beautie, & strength. [Page] Wherfore euerieman of the best, & moste noble disposition, preferreth that life farre before this. Wherof it cōmes to passe, y ^t a man obediēt to nature cā not hurt a man. Furder­more, Doing of in­iurie. whoso wrongeth an other, y ^• himself may get sōme cōmoditie: ei­ther beleeues, that he doth nothīg a­gaist nature: or wenes, y ^t he should shōne death, pouertie, sorrowe, the losse also of childern, kinsfolk, fren­des, rather than the doing of iniurie to any man. If he thinketh nothing to be done against nature, in wron­ging of men: what should you reasō with him, which cleane takes away man from man? But if he plainlie thinketh that meete to be auoided: & yet these he deemeth much worsse, death, pouertie, sorowe: he is in this point out of the waie: that he taketh any discommoditie either of the bo­die, or of fortune to be sorer, thā the vices of the minde. Therfore there must be in all men one entent: that alike may be the profit of euerie sere mā, and of all vniuersallie. Which The law, and right of mās felowship. profit if eche man plucke vnto him­self, all mannes felowship shall be [Page 119] [...]. And if nature dothe also appoint this: that man woloe haue The lawe of nature. manne prouided for, whatsoeuer he be: yet euen for thissame respect, bi­cause he is a manne: it must needes folowe, that according to thesame nature, the profit of all be in com­mon. Which if it be so: we all be cō ­teined in one, and the like lawe of nature. An [...] if the same be so: doute­lesse, by the lawe of nature, wee ar forbidden one to wronge an other. Now, the antecedent is true: ther­fore true also is the consequent.

For that verielie is reasonlesse, that somme saye: from their parent, or brother, they will take nothing awaye, for cause of their owne pro­fit: but of other citiezenes, that ther is an other respect to be hadde. The right of mans societie mu [...] be kept, not onli with [...], but also with all men vniuer­sallie. These bee in opinion, that they haue no lawe, nor felowshippe to keepe with citizēnes, for a common profits sake: which opinion dothe rippe a sonder all the societie of a citie. And they, that saye, ther must regarde be hadde of citie [...]enes, and none of forainers: doo ry [...]e asonder the common felowship of mākinde [...] [Page] which being destroyed: all bountie­fulnesse, liberalitie, goodnesse, and iustice is vtterly rooted vp: which whoso take awaie, euen toward the goddes immortall ar to be counted irreligious. For such do ouerthrow the felowship by them among men ordeined.

Of the which felowship the surest The bond of mans felow­ship. bonde is: to think it to be more a­gainst nature, for one manne to vse extortion to an other, for his owne profits sake: than to suffer all dis­commodities, either outward, or of the bodie, yea or of y ^• minde: which happen withoute iust deseruing. Iustice.

For this vertue, Iustice, of all ver­tues is the ladie, and quene.

Perauenture, [...]me will say: Shall Questions [...]. not then the wiseman, if he be driuē by famine, take awaie meate, frō an other man good for nothing? No doutlesse. For my life is no more profitable to me: than such a dispo­sition of minde, that I wrong uo­bodie for my profits sake. What if a good man could spoile the cruell, and beastlie tyraunt Phalaris of his clothing: that he should not d [...] [Page 120] for colde himself? might he not do it? These be full easie to iudge. For if you take ought, from a mā on no behalf profitable, for loue of your owne commoditie: ye shall doo vn­kindelie, and against the law of na­ture: but if you be the mā, who may bring much profit vnto the commō weale, & the felowship of mē, if you remaine aliue: incase ye take away ought from an other, vpon that cō ­sideration: it is not to be reproued: but if the mater standeth not euen so: euerie manne must rather beare his owne discommoditie, than pull awaie of an others commodities. Sickenesse then, or pouertie, or any such like is not more against na­ture: than extortion, and greediness of an other mannes goodes. But to leaue alone the common profit, is against nature: for it is vniust.

Therfore the verie lawe of nature, which preserueth, and mainteineth mens profit: appointeth withoute doute: that frō the [...]dle, and vnpro­fitable man, necessarie thinges to liue with be conueied to the wise, y ^• good, and the manly man: who, if [Page] he should dye for wāt, should drawe awaye with him much of the com­mon profit: and yet so he must do it: that neither by ouerweenīg in him­self, Selflyking. nor louing of himself to well: Selfloue. he make this a pretenced colour to do wronge. Therfore alwaies let him do his dutie: prouiding for the profit of men, and that felowship a­mong men, which I oftentimes re­peat. For as touching Phalaris case, y ^• iudgemēt is verie easye. For with tyraunts we haue no societie, [...]. but rather be at extreeme dissension with them: neither is it against na­ture to spoile him, if ye can, whome it is honest to kill: and all such pe­stilēt, & wicked rables ar to be driuē out of the companies of men. For euen as certein limmes be cutte of: if they once beginne bothe to lacke blood, and life (as ye wolde say) and also do hurt the other partes of the bodie: so this sauagenesse, & cruel­nesse of a beast, vnder the shape of a man, must be parted (as it wer) frō the common naturalnesse of mans bodie.

Of this sorte be all those questi­ons, [Page 121] wherin dutie is sought out by circumstaunce of time. Such ma­ters He excuseth Panetius. therfore I beleue, Panetius wolde haue treated: had not somme chaunce, or bysinesse preuented his purpose. Concerning which maner of taking aduisment, in my bookes afore, many thinges be sufficiently taught: by which, it may be per [...]i­ued, what is to be auoided, for dis­honestie: & what is not to be shōned, bicause it is nothing dishonest. But for as much as of our worke begon, yet allmoste ended, now (as who saieth) wee sette on the roofe: as the Geometers ar wonte not to proue all: but to require, y ^t certein thinges be graūted them: to the intent, they maye more easylye sette oute their purpose: so doo I require of you, my He requireth one principle to be graun­ted him. Cicero: that ye graunt mee, if ye maye, that nothing but that, which is honest, is for itself to be desired. But if it maye not bee graunted, Ponessie, for itself, either one [...]y, or chief lie to [...]e de­sired. bicause of Cratippus: yet this no­doute you will graunte me: that the thing which is honest, is chief­lye for itselfe to bee desired.

[Page]Whether ye wil, is ynough for me: and bothe the one, & the other semes the more proueable: neither anye thing els appeareth proueable. And first, in this pointe, Panetius is to Panetius de­fended. be defēded: bicause he sayd not, that profitable thīges at any time striue with honest (for it was not lawfull for him so to saye) but those, which seeme profitable, might striue with honestie. But he often witnesseth, that nothing is profitable, which­same is not honest: nor honest, whichsame is not profitable: and he denyeth any greater pestilence to haue crept into mans life: thā their opinion, who haue deuided these two asonder. Therfore he brought Repugnaūce in seeming, & not in deede, bitweene ho­nestie & pro­fit, in that repugnaunce: which didde seeme to be, and was not in deede: not that, at any time, wee shoulde preferre profitable thinges before honest: but that withoute errour, we might discern them, if euer they fell in place. This parte therfore, left vntouched, wee will supplie: w ^t no others ayde, but (as they saye in warre) euen w ^t our owne force. For touching this percel [...], ther hathe, [Page 122] bene, sins Panetius wrote, not [...]g [...], that liked me: of all, that euer [...]me to our handes.

Therfore, whē any showe of pro­fit Profit from [...] is not t [...] be se­ [...]ered. is offer [...] vs, we must needes be styrred: but if, when ye giue good heede, ye se dishonestie [...]yned wi [...]h Dishonestie. A [...]owe of profit. that thing, which bringeth a showe of profit: then the profit is not to be desired: but we must think, where dishonestie is, there profit cā not be. Now, if nothing ther be so much a­gainst nature, as dishonestie: (for nature doth desire good, and cōue­uient, and sted fast thinges, and de­spiseth the cōtrarie) & again ther is nothing so according to nature, as ꝓfit: dout [...]lesse in the same ꝓfitable thig dishonestie cā not be. And also, if we be borne to honestie: & it is ei­ther Honestie. onely to be desired, as to Xeno it seemed: or in al estimatiō, is to be coūted of more valew, thā all other thinges: as pleaseth Aristotle: it must needes be, y ^• the thīg, which is honest, is either y ^• onely, or y ^t soue­rain good: & what so is good, y ^• same doutelesse is ꝓfitable. And so all, y ^t is honest, is profitable. Wherfore [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] when the errour of men not honest hath caught holde of sōmewhat, y ^• seemeth profitable: by and by it di­uides thesame from honestie. Her­of [...]inhonest profit, mother of all iuischief. murders, herof poysoninges, herof counterfet willes do spring: herof felonie, herof robbing y ^• trea­surie, pyllage, and extortions from leagfrendes, and citiezens: herof groweth the power of to exceeding rychesse, not to be suffered: and fi­nally in free cities th [...]r be the des [...] ­res of ruling: whereas nothing ei­ther more cruell, than they, or more detestable can be imagined. For with deceauable iyes they see the gaine of thinges: but the ponnish­ment, I will not saie, of the lawes, which they often breake thorough: but of dishonestie it self, which is sorest of all, they see not. Wherfore The [...] of shame. let such takers of aduisemēt be dri­uē frō amōg vs (for they ar alltogi­ther wicked, & vngodlie) who vse ad uisement: whether they may folow y ^t, which seems to be honest: or wit­tigly staine thē selues w ^t dishonestie. For in y ^• very doutīg a great faulte In a shame­full mater, ther is, allthough they neuer cōme [Page 123] to y ^• doing of it. Therfore those th [...] ­ges shamefull is the verie de­liberation. ar [...]ot to be aduised on at all, in which y ^• verie takīg of aduisemēt is dishonest. And also in all delibera­tion, y ^• hope, & opiniō of cōcealing, & hy [...]ig of maters is to be put away. For fully (in case we haue aniwhit profited in philosophie) we ought to A golden pre cept. be persuaded: though we could hide it frō all gods, & men: y ^t nothing yet couetously, nothīg vniustly, nothīg wantonly, nothing vnstayedly is meete to be done.

Herupō y ^t Gyges is brought in by The tale of the [...] [...]oyges. Plato: who, when the erth had ope­ned in certein great stormes, went In pla [...]oes second boke of a common­weale. downe into that gaping hole: and spyed a brazen horse, (as the fables tel) in whose sides wer dores: which being opened, he sawe the corse of a dedde man, of an vnwonted huge­nesse: & a golde ring vpō his finger: which as sone as he pulled of, he putte it on his owne fynger. This Gyges was the kinges sheppard.

Then he got hīself again to y ^• cōm­panie of sheppardes. There whē he had turned the hed of that ring to­ward the paulme of his hand: he [Page] was seene of nobodie, yet he sawe euerie thing: & he was seen againe, whē he had turned y ^t ryng in sight. And so vsig this vaūtage of y ^• ring, he lay w ^t the quecne: & by her ayde, he sleew the king, his maister: and made dispatche of them, whome he thought to stand in his waye. Nei­ther could anie man see him, being aboute these mischeuous dcedes.

So, by the commoditie of his ring, he became sodenly king of Lydia. This same ring then if a ꝑfit wise­man should haue: he wolde think it nomore lawfull for him to offend, than if he had it not. For honest thī ­ges, not secret thinges by good mē be sought. And in this place, cer­tein philosophers, and those not of the worste, but yet not all of the fi­nest say: that Plato tolde a fained, and deuised fable: as though he de­fendeth, that either the thing was done, or was po [...]ble to be done.

This is the effect of this ring, and The mea­ning of this fable. of this exaumple: if noman should knowe, or noman should once sus­pect: whē you should do any thing, for regarde of ryches, power, rule, [Page 124] or lust: yea if it should be vnknown for euer bothe of god, & man: whe­ther you wolde doo it, or no. They denie it possible to befall: and all­though it can not so befall in deede: yet I demaunde, incase y ^t might be­fall, which they deny to be possible, what wolde they do? They force on, grossely in good soothe. For they holde, it is vnpossible, & therin they stay still. What this worde (if) importeth, they se not. For whē we demaūde, if they be able to cōceale, what they will do? wee do not de­maūde, whether they be able to cō ­ceale it, or no: but we lay before thē as it wer y ^t racke, & certein manik­les: y ^• if they ansuer, they wolde do, what thē liked, being sure to skape scotfree: they cōfesse thēselues to be wicked: if they say, they wolde not: they graūt, all dishonest thiges, for thēseluꝭ, meete to be eschewed. But now let vs return to our purpose.

Ther do oftentimes befall diuers maters, which trouble mēnes min­des, vnder a showe of profit: not when this is aduised vpō, whether honestie is to be left for the great­nesse [Page] of profit (for that plainlie is The thing. that [...] profitable. wicked) but whether the thing, which seemeth profitable, may bee done withoute dishonestie. Br [...]tus did wellynough, in expulsing [...].

When Brutus tooke awaye the rule from Collatinus Tarquimꝰ, his officefelowe: hee might haue [...] thought to doo it vniustlie: for, in driuing oute the kinges, he had bene Brutus assist aūt, & ayder also of his counsels. But when the rulers had agreed thus in coūsell: that the kinred of Superbus, & the name of the Tarquinians, and the memorie of y ^• kingdome should be vtterly driuen oute: bicause it was profitable to prouide for their coun trie: thesame was in such wise ho­nest, y ^• euen verie Collatinꝰ ought to haue liked it. And so profit pre­uailed, bicause of honestrie: w ^toute which, profit could not haue bene at all. But with y ^• king, who buil­ded [...] did not well [...]n that he slewe Remus. this citie, it fared not so. For a showe of profit strake in his mide: to whome when it appered more profitable, for him to rule alone, than with an other: he slew his bro­ther. This man forgotte bothe god­linesse, [Page 125] and naturalnesse: that he might obtein the thing, that semed profitable, and was not so indeede: and yet his brothers leaping ouer the wall he alledged, for a colour of honestie, neither alowable, nor suf­ficient Romulus Quirinus. ynough. He offended ther­fore: y ^t by Quirinꝰ, or Romulꝰ fa­uour, I may saye it. Notwithstan­ding we must seke our owne pro fit, withoute others hurt. wee ought not to leaue our owne cōmodities, & giue them to o­ther, when ourselues do neede the­same: but euerye man must serue his owne profit so farre, as with­oute an others iniurie it may bee done. Feately said Chrisippus in this, as he did in many things mo: Whoso, quoth he, ronneth in the A feate com­parison, made by Chrysip­pus. race: ought to endeuour, and la­bour, as much as he maye, that himsef may winne the game: but in no wise he ought to trippe him, with whome he ronnes, or to keepe him of with his hand. So in this life it is not vnlawfull for euerie man to gette himself, that may serue his vse: but to pull from an other, it is no right.

[Page]But moste of all, duties be put oute Nether de­nie, nor graunt your frend euery thing. of order in frendshippes: in the which, it is agaist dutie: bothe not to do, that rightfully you may, and to do, y ^t is not lawfull. But of all this mater a short, & no hard rule ther is. For these, which seeme pro­fitable, Set not your profit before frendship. honours, riches, pleasures, & other of thesame kinde, ar neuer to be preferred afore frēdship. And [...]. a good man, for his frēdes sake, no­ther will do against y ^t cōmonweale Othe. nother against his othe, & promes: no not though he shall be iudge vpō his owne frend. For he puttes of Iudgement. the personage of a frend, when he takes vpon him the persone of a iudge. Thus much he shall leane to frendship: that he had rather, his frendes cause wer true: and that he will graunt him time thorouly to pleade his cause, as much as by the lawes he may. But when by his othe he is to giue sentence: he must remēber, he taketh god to witnesse, that is to meane (as I suppose) his conscience: for nothing more god­like, than it is, hath god himself gi­uen to man. Therfore of our aun­ceters [Page 126] we haue receiued a goodly The olde ma­ner of requi­ring the iud­ges fauour. maner of desiring the fauour of a iudge: if we wolde keepe it: To do what he may, sauīg his othe. This request is referred to those things: which, a litle before is said, might honestly be graunted by a iudge to his frend. For if all thinges should be done, which frendes wolde de­sire: such wer to be coūted not ami­ties, Amitie. but cōspiracies. I speake now Conspiracie. of commō frendshippes. For in mē wise, and perfite, ther cā be no such thing. Men saie, that Damon, and Damon, and Pythias, a notable cou­ple of frendes Pythias, the Pythagoreās, wer so affectioned, one toward an other: that when Dionysius, the tyraūt, had appointed one of them his dy­eng day: & he, who was condemned to dye: had required certein dayes of respite, for the disposing of his thinges: the other becamme boūde body for body, for his forthcōming: vpon condition, that if he returned not at his daye, he wolde himself dye for him. Who, whē at his daye he was comme again: the tyraunt wondering at their faithfulnesse, required, that they wolde take him [Page] in for the third in their frendship.

When therfore that, which in frēd­ship seemeth profitable, is cōpared with that, which is honest: let the showe of profit yeelde, and honestie For your fren des sake, do nothing a­gainst hone­slie. preuaile. But when in frendship those thiges shalbe required, which be not honest: let religion, and vp­rightnesse be preferd before frend­ship: and so shal that choice of dutie be hadde, which we seeke after.

But vnder the showe of profite, in For a commo weale how­farreforthe we must do. the cōmonweale ther is oftētimes doing amisse: as our men did in the razing of Corinth. Sorer also delt Crueltie of Athenians to Egine [...]es. the Athenians: who made a decree, that the Eginetes thombes, who wer skilled in nauigation, should Egina, an yle right ouer a­gainst Attica. be cutte of. This was thought pro­fitable: for Egina did tomuch ouer looke Pireū, by reason of the nere Porte Pireū, by Athenes. bordering. But nothīg, y ^t is cruell, is ꝓfitable. For to mānes nature, which we ought to folowe, crueltie is most enemie. They also do euill, who barre straungers from vsing Straungers. their citie, & do bannish thē: as did Petronius, in our fathers dayes: & Papius, of late yeres. For, one to [Page 127] go for a citiezen, who is no citiezē, it is reasō, it should not be lawfull: the which law the verie wise Con­suls, Crassus, and Sceuola, Consuls. Crassꝰ, & Sceuola did make: but to forbidde straungers the vse of y ^• citie, it is doutlesse an vnciuil Profit. parte. Those doings bee notable, Honestie. wherin showe of cōmō profit is des­pised, in respect ofhonestie. Our cō ­monweale The Roma­nes stoutn [...]e in the second Punik warre is full of exāples, bothe often at other times, & chiefly in the secōd Punike warre: which, after y ^• ouerthrowe takē at Cannai, had greater corages, thā euer in ꝓsperi­tie: no token ther was of feare, no mention of peas. So greate is the force of honestie, y ^e it dymmeth the showe of profit. When the Atheni­ans no waie were able to w ^tstand y ^• Athenians assaulted of the Persians. assaulte of the Persians: & were de­termined, y ^t leauing y ^• citie, & settīg their wiues, & childern in Tro [...], they wolde take their shippes: and defend the libertie of Greece, with Cyrsilus. their nauie: one Cyrsilus they sto­ned to death: who persuaded w ^t thē, to keepe still the citie, and receiue [...]res. And he seemed to folowe ꝓfit: but that was none, where ho­nestie [Page] gainstoode it. Themistocles, after y ^t victorie of y ^• battail, which was holden w ^t the Persiās, said in the opē assemble: that he had weal­full coūsell for the state: but it was not expedient, it should be openly knowne: he required, that the peo­ple should assigne somme man, to whome he should tell it. Aristides was appointed. He tolde him, the [...], a no­table har­brow for ship pes, with the Lacedemo­nians. nauie of the Lacedemonias, which was conueyd to Gytheum, might priuilie be set a fire: by which acte, the Lacedemoniās strength should of necessitie be abated. Which thig when Aristides had herd: he cāme to the open assēble, with their great expectation: and sayd, it was verie profitable counsell, which Themi­stocles did giue, but nothīg honest. Therfore the Atheniās, the thing, The Atheni­ans refused Themisto­cles counsell, in a generall summe [...] by Aristi­des. that was not honest, did not coūte profitable at all: and, beyng aduer­tised by Aristides, they reiected the holle matter, which they had not once herd. Better did they, than we do: who haue pirates vnponni­shed, and leagfrendes tributarie. Let this therfore stand for a cōclu­sion: A conclusion that no vn­honest thing is profitable. [Page 128] that y ^• thing, which is not ho­nest, is neuer profitable: no not euē then, when ye attein y ^• thing, which you reckē to be profitable. For the­same to think profitable, which is dishonest, a miserable case it is. In bargains what is ho­nest, or profi­table.

But oftentimes (as I said before) ther so befall cases, when profit see­meth to striue agaīst honestie: that it is to be considered: whether alto­gither it dothe gainstand it, or may be made agree with honestie. Of A question, of a cornmer­chaunt. that kinde be these questiōs: If, for examples sake, a good man depar­ting from Alexandria, shall bring to Khodes a greate quantitie of corne, in the time of scarcitie, and famine, and extreem derth of corne among the Khodians: in case the­same man knowe, that many mer­chauntes be all redie set for the frō Alexandria: and saw their shippes, freighted w ^t corne, in their course making toward Khodes: whether he ought to declare it to the Khodi­ans, Byeng. or with silence should sell his Selling. owne for as much as he might. We put the case here, of a wise, and good man: touching his delibera­tion, [Page] and taking of aduisentent, we question: who wolde not hide it frō the Rhodians, if he thought it dis­honest: but he douteth, whether it be dishonest, or no.

In such maner cases, oue thing A pleasaunt disputation bit wene Diogenes, and Antipa­ter. Diogenes the Fabyloniaā, a great, & graue Stoik, is wont to think: an other thīg, Antipater, his scholar, a verie sharpwitted man. Antipa­ter holdeth, y ^t all must be opened: Antipaters opinion. that the byer be ignoraūt of no ma­ner thing, which the seller kno­weth: Diogenes saith, the scller Diogenes. ought to tell the faultes, as farre as is appointed by the ciuil lawe: & Ciuil lawe. the rest to do withoute deceites: and sceing he selleth, to desire with the best auauntage to sell. [...]ither haue I brought it, I haue set it for­the to sale: I sell mine for no more, than other do: perchaunce also for lesse, seeing I haue greater store: to whome is the wronge done? Ther Antipater. groweth a disputation by Antipa­ter, of y ^• cōtrarie side: What go ye aboute? Sithēs ye ar doūde to pro­fit Lawe of nature. men, & to serue the felouship of Common profit. man: & year born vnder such a law, [Page 129] y ^• ye should keepe those principles ofnature, which ye ought to obey, and alwaies to folowe: that your profit should bee common profit: again, and as well, common pro­fit should be youres: will you hyde from men bothe what cōmoditie, & what store also is at hand for them? Diogenes perauēture will ansuer Diogenes. thus: It is not all one thing to hide To hyde. from men, and to holde ones peas: To hoide ones peas. neither do I now hyde it from ye: though I tell ye not, what is y ^• na­ture of goddes, what is the end of good: which thinges well knowne wolde profit you more, than the cheapnesse of wheate. But it is not necessari for me to tell, whatsoeuer is profitable for you to heare. Yes Antipate [...]. verilie, saith he, it is necessarie: if so be, you remēber the felowship knit Common. among mē by nature. I remember Diogenes. it, sayeth y ^• other: but is this felou­ship such, that echeman may haue Priuat [...] nothing of his owne? In case it be so, nothing doutlesse is to be solde, but to be giuen.

You se, in all this cōtrouersie, this is not said: though it be vnhonest, [Page] yet bicause it is profitable, I will do it: but that in such wise it is profitable, as it is not dishonest: & of the contrarie side, that therfore it is not to be done, bicause it is disho­nest.

Putte the case, a good man sell a A question, of sellīg a house house, for certein discommodities, which he knoweth, & other knowe not: set case it be contagious, and is taken for holsome: be it so, it be unknowne, that in all the chaum­bers do appere venemous creeping beastes: and that it is euilltimberd, and redie to fall: but this none kno­weth, but the owner: I demaunde, if the seller opē not this to y ^• byers: & selles the house for much more, thā he thought, he should haue done: whether he dothe iustlie, or vnho­nestlie? He verilie doth dishonestly, saieth Antipater. For what other Antipater. thing is it, than not to showe the wāderer his waie, (which at Athe­nes was forbidden, vpon paine of common curses) if this be not it? to suffer y ^• byer to rush sodenly, & rūne hedlong by errour into a greate de­ceite? Yea it is more, than not to [Page 130] showe a mā the way. For it is wit­tingl [...] to leade one oute of the waie into a false beleefe.

Diogenes replieth again: did he Diogenes. cōpell ye to bye, who not once mo­ued ye to it [...] He sett to sale, that li­ked him not: you bought, that liked ye. If they, who offer to sell a good farme, and well builded, as they set it out, bee not thought to haue de­ceiued: although it be neither good, nor wellbuilded: much lesse then they, who haue not praised theyr house. For where the byers yie is his chapman, ther what deceit can ther bee of the seller? and if euerye sayeng is not to bee perfourmed: think ye that meete to bee perfour­med, that was not said? But what is more foolish, than the seller to tell the faultes of the thing, which he put [...]es to sale? And whatso fonde a hearing is ther: as if, at y ^• owners commaundement, the cryer thus should make a noyes [...] I haue a con­tagious house to sell.

Thus therfore, in sōme doutefull cases, of the one part is honesti [...] de­fended: of the other parte, ther is [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] speaking of profit: y ^• it is not one­lie honest to doo, but also dishonest not to do it, y ^• semeth ꝓfitable. This is y ^• dissēsiō, which semeth often to befall bitwene ꝓfitable thīgs, & ho­nest: which points ar to bee discus­sed. For we haue not set thē for the to make questiōs, but to open thē.

Methink then, neither thatsame Rhodian cornmerchaunt, nor this [...] opi­niō, touching these questi­ons. houseseller ought to haue hiddē the foresaide thinges from the byers. For whatsoeuer you keepe in si­lence, you doo not fullye so much, One thing it is, to hyde, & an other, to kepe silence. as it is to hyde: but when, for your profits sake, ye would haue those ignoraunte of that, you knowe, whom it standes vpon to knowe it. Now this kinde of hiding of what nature it is, and what maner of mannes, who seeth not? Doutlesse it is a parte not of a plaine, not of a simple, not of a gentlemanly, not of a iust, not of a good manne: but rather of a suttlewitted, close, wy­lie, deceitfull, gylefull, craftie, foxlike, and a verie dubbler. These so manie, and other mo names of vices to enter into, is it not vnpro­fitable? [Page 131] If they be dispraisworthie, Shame, to hide a thing, that is: more [...]ame, to lye in a thing, that is not. who haue helde their peas: what is to bee thought of those, who haue vsed a vainnesse of talke?

Caius Canius, of the Equestri­all order in Rome, a man not vn­pleasaunt, A merie tale, how a greeke [...] a Ro­mane. and wellynough lerned, whē he had gott him to Syracusai, euen for pleasure, and not for by­sinesse C. Canius. (as he was wonte to tell) he bruted, that he would bye somme place of pleasure: whither he might bid his frēdes: and where he might delite himself without troublers. Which when it was spred abrode: one Pythius, who kepte a banke of Pythius. exchaūge at Syracusai, saide: y ^• he had in dede a pleasaūt plat, howbeit not to sel: yet Caniꝰ, if it pleased hī, might vse it as his own: & therwith bad him to supper, against the next daye. When he had promised: then Pythiꝰ like a bāker, who was well in fauour with all degrees, called vnto him certein fisshermen: and required them, that the next daye they would fish before his groūde: and tolde them, what he woulde haue them doo. Canius camme [Page] at his time to supper. Sūptuouslie y ^• chere was prepared. A noūber of fissherbotes wer before their yies. Eche man, for his part, brought, y ^• he had taken. The fish was powred down at Pythiꝰ feete. Then quoth Canius, I praie ye Pythius, what is this: that ther is so great store of fissh, so goodlie a sorte of botes? What maruail? quoth he again: for whatsoeuer fish ther is about Sy­racusai, it is in this place: here is y ^• watering place: this grounde these citiezens can not well spare. Caniꝰ kindled with a desire to it, was er­nest with Pythius, that he woulde sell it him. He made it straunge, at the first. What nede manie words? He obteineth it: the man beeing in loue with it, and riche, bought it for so much, as Pythiꝰ would ask: & bought it furnished: he putteth in sureties: & makes vp the bargain. Canius, the next daye, desired his acquaintaunce thither, and came himself bitimes: he sawe neuer a bote: he enquired of his next ney­bour, whether it wer not sōme holi­daie with the fisshermen, bicause he [Page 132] sawe none of them. None, that I know, quoth he: but here none of them ar wont to fissh: and therfore yester daye I maruailed, what [...]haunce was befallne. Canius be­gan to chafe: but what could he do? For as yet Aquilius, my officefe­lowe, & familiar, had not setforth the cases, that should bee coūted co­uine. Aquilius de­finuion of co­uine. In the which same, whē I de­maūded of him, what was Couine: he answered, whē one thing is pre­tended, and an other done. This doutlesse was verie plainly answe­red, as of a mā skilfull in defining. Therfore bothe Pythius, and all, y ^t do one thing, and pretende an o­ther, be false, wicked, and gylefull. No deede then of theirs can be pro­fitable, when it is with so manie faultes bespotted. If Aquilius defi­nition bee truc: out of all mannes life must false pretending, and dis­sembling False pret [...]. be bannished. So euerie D [...]mulatiō. good man shall neither falslie pre­tende, nor dissemble, that he may bye, or sell the better. And this co­uine also was ponnishable by the Couine pon­nishable. lawes: as deceitfull gardenship, in [Page] the twelue tables: and craftie bee­gyling yongmen of their goodes, by the lawe Plectorian: and with­oute lawe, by iudgements, where the byll is put in, Vpon good conscience. But of all other iudgements these wordes be moste notable, that bee of course in a case of arbitriment of mariage: The better, The iuster: and in a Termes of lawe. case of trust, or confidēce: That among honest men ther be honest dealing. What then? Either in that, which is, The better, The iuster, can ther be anie point of couine? or when it is saide, Among honest men let ther be honest dealing: can anie thing deceitfullie, or gilefully bee d [...]e? But couine (as saith Aquiliꝰ) wherin co­uine stādeth. is conteined in fained pretence, and dissimulatiō. All lyeng therfore in making of bargains is vtterlie to be excluded. Let not the seller sette a raiser of the price against the bier: Lyeng in bar­gaining. let not the byer sette one, that maye lowe y ^• price again for him. If they bothe cōme to communicatiō: the [...] shall talk but once of y ^• mater. Whē Quintus Sceuola, Publius sōne, Sceuolaes conscience in [...]yeng. had required: y ^• the price of y ^• groūd, wherof he was a cheaper, shoulde [Page 133] once be showed him: & the seller had so done: he said, he valued it more­worthe, and gaue him more by. xxv. honderd crownes. There is nomā, y ^• can denie, but this was the parte of a good man: a wise mannes part Good. wi [...]. they denie it to bee: euen as if the other should haue solde it for lesse, than he might haue gotten. This therfore is the mischief: bicause thei recken good to bee of one sorte, and wise, of an other. Wherupon quoth Ennius:

It were true indeede: if I agreed with Ennius, what it is to pro­fit. I see, Hecato, the Khodian, Hecato, [...] scholar, wrote syx bokes of du­ties. Panetius scholar, sayeth in those bokes, which of duties he wrote to Quintus Tubero: that it is a wise mannes parte, dooing nothing a­gainst customes, lawes, and ordi­naunces: to haue a respecte to his substaunce. For we couet not one­lie Encreasing of priuate goodes. for our selues to be riche: but for our childern, our kinsfolke, our frendes, and speciallie for the com­mōweale. For the substaunce, and [Page] welth of euerie sere man is the ri­chesse of a citie. Sceuolaes doing, wherof I spake a litle before, can in no wise like Hecato: for Sceuola vtterlie denieth, that he will doo ought, for his own gaynesake, y ^• is not lawfull. To this man nother great praise, neither thanke is to be giuē. But whether bothe false pre­tending, and also dissembling bee couine, or no: fewe maters ther be, wherin this couine hath not a do: & Couine. whether he bee a good man, who Good. profits whom he may, and hurtes nobodie: full well a iust man, but Iust. not lightlie a good man we shall finde. It is neuer profitable then to Profitable. do euill, bicause it is euermore dis­honest: and bicause it is alwayes honest to bee a good man, it is all­wayes Honest. profitable.

And surelie touching the title of Selling of lande. land, it is ordeined with vs by ciuil lawe: that in selling of it, y ^• faultes also should bee tolde, which were knowne to the seller. For wheras by the twelue tables it was suffici­entlie prouided: that those thinges should bee perfourmed, which wer [Page 134] declared in woorde: which whoso would denie, should forfette double damages: there was also, by y ^• iud­ges of the law, a paine sette for con­cealment. For whatsoeuer faulte Concealment wer in the lād: if the seller knew it, except expresslie he had declared it: they decreed, that it ought to bee made good. As when in y ^• tower the The Augurs. Cl. Centima­lus, commaū ­ded to pull down certein houses. Augurs wer about their prophecy­eng by fouleflight: & had cōmaūded Titus Claudius Cētimalus, who had houses in mount Celie, to pull those downe, whose height shold let their prophecieng: Claudiusdid set thē to sale, & solde y ^• yland: Publius Calphurnius Lanariꝰ bought it. He was commaunded y ^• veriesame by the Augurs. And so, when Cal­phurnius had pulled them downe: & Calphu [...]us draue Claudi­us to arbitri­ment, for con­cealment. vnderstoode, y ^• Claudius had set the houses to sale, after he had bene cō ­maunded of the Augurs to pull thē downe: he draue him to arbitrimēt: Cato. For all, that he ought in that case, to recompense him, of good conscience. Marcus Cato, this our Catoes father, made the awarde. For as other ar named from their fathers: so this, who [Page] begatte such a starre, is to bee na­med from his sonne. He therfore, as In Claudius concealment was condem­ned for deceit. iudge, gaue sentence thus: that see­ing he knewe the thing, at the put­ting of it to sale, and did not declare it: he ought to rēder the byer his da­mages. Catoes iudgement. He therfore iudged, it stode with good conscience: that the faulte, which the seller knewe, shoulde bee knowne to the bier. That and if he gaue a true iudge­ment: neither well did the corne­merchaunt afore, neither well did this contagious houseseller in hol­ding his peas. But such maner of concealments can not all bee com­prehēded in the ciuill law: but such as may, be perfitly cōteined. Mar­cus How Mariꝰ solde Ser [...]ꝰ a house. Marius Gratidianus, our kinsman, had solde to Caius Ser­gius Orata that house, which he had bought of him a fewe yeres be­fore. This house did a certein ser­uice to Sergius: but Marius had not declared thesame in the liue­rie of seisine. The mater was brought to the lawe. Crassus plea­ded for Orata, Antonius for Gra­tidianus. Crassus stoode vpon [Page 135] the letter of [...]he l [...]we: [...]ause the The [...]etter of the lawe. seller, knowing the discommodi­tie, had not tolde it: that it ought to bee made good: Antonius enfor­ced the equitie of the lawe: bicause The equitie of the law. that discommoditie was not vn­knowne to Sergius, who had solde thesame house, that it was nothing nedefull to bee declared: and that he was not deceiued, who vnderstode, of what title it was, that he had bought. To what purpose tendes all this? That ye may perceiue, that couine liked not our auncetours. Couine. But one waie the lawes condemne couine, an other waie the philoso­phers: Lawes. the lawes, as farre as by Philo [...]ophie. open deede they can gather vpon maters: the philosophers, as farre as by reason, and vnderstanding they can comprehende. Reason therfore re [...]uireth this: y ^• nothing suttelly, nothing fainedly, nothing deceitfully be done. Is it then anie deceit, to pitche the toile, although you go not aboute to rous [...], nor chase the game? For the verie game lights vpon it oftētimes, when no­body folowes them. So when you [Page] offer your house to sale: you sett vp your bill, as a nette: you sell the house, bicause of the faultes: sōme bodie happs vpō it, vnware of thē: though I see, this through corrup­tiō of vse neitherby custome is cou­ted dishonest, neitherby ordinaūce, or ciuil law decreed: yet by the law of nature it is forbidden. For ther The felouship of men. is a felowship of mē amongst men (which thing although it hath bene oftentimes spoken of, yet oftener it must bee spoken) which in deede verie largely extendeth: and a nerer ther is of those, who bee of one na­tion: and a nier, of them, who bee of one citie. Therfore our aunce­ters The lawe of nations. would nedes haue the lawe of nations to be one thing, & the ciuil The ciuil law lawe an other. For what so is the ciuil lawe, the same is not conse­quentlie the lawe of nations: but whatso is the lawe of nations, the­same must needes be the ciuil law, But wee keepe no sounde, and ex­presse fourme of verie lawe, and Iustice. mere iustice: wee vse the shadowe, and images therof: yea and euen thosesame I would, we did folow. [Page 136] For they be takē out of y ^• best prin­ciples of nature, and patterns of trouth. For how precious bee those woordes?

That not by you, or your promes, I be snared, or Formes o [...] lawe drawne out of diuine, and natura [...] reason. deceiued. How goldē wordes be those? That among good men good dealing ought to be, and without de [...]uing.

But who bee good men, and what is good dealing, it is a greate que­stion. O. Seuola. Quintus Sceuola, the chiefe bisshop, saide, ther was greate sub­staunce of mater in all those arbi­trementes, in which ther should be treating according to good consci­ence: and the name of good consci­ence he iudged to reache verie farr: and that it had adoo in gardein­shippes, commepanies, maters of trust, cōmaūdemēts, thīgs bought, solde, hyred, and let out: by which, the felowship of mans life is vphol­dē: in these things, he said, it was y ^• office of a great iudge to determin, what echemā sholde do to an other: speciallie seing the iudgementes in most mē be cōtrarie one to another. Wherfore couine must bee vtterlie auoided: & y ^• wylinesse, which will wylin [...]e. [Page] nedes haue itself seme to be prudēce: but it is tarr frō it, & differs verie much. For prudence is placed in y ^t choise of good, & euil: wyliness, if al thīgs be euil, which be dishonest, p̄ ­ferreth euill before good. And not onelie in maters of lande: the ciuil law, y ^t hath his original of nature, dothe ponnishe wylinesse, & couine: but also in the sale of slaues & niefs, all couine of the sellers is forbiddē. For he, y ^t shoulde haue knowne of their helthfulness, of their fugitiue­ness, of their theuishness, doth make satisfaction by the Ediles decree. Otherwise is y ^• case of inheritours. Wherof is done to vnderstand: bi­cause Nature. nature is y ^t foūtain of law, y ^t Lawe. this is according to nature: y ^t no [...] go about by an others ignoraunce, to make his own gaine. Nor anye greater destructiō of māns life can be foūde, thā of a wylinesse, falsely False sainig. to dissemble ones vnderstanding. Wherof those innumerable incon­ueniences do grow, that profitable things seme to fight w ^t honest. For how manie will be founde: who be­ing sure to be free frō ponnishmēt, & [Page 137] knowledge of all men, can refrain from doing wrong? Lette vs make a proofe (if it please ye) in those ex­aumples, wherin the common sort of mē perhaps do not think, they do amisse. For it falleth not in this place to speake of murderers, poy­soners, willforgers, theeues, & rob­bers of the common treasurie: who not with woordes, & reasonings of philosophers, but w ^t chaines, & pri­sōmēt ar to be ponnished. But these things let vs consider: which they do, who be coūted good. Certein mē A counte [...] will. brought oute of Greece to Rome a counterfet will of Lucius Minutiꝰ Basilius, a verie riche man: and to the intent they might the easilier proue it: they did putte in as heires with them, Marcus Crassus, and Crassus, and Hortensius. Nuintus Hortensius, men of most power in thesame citie. Who when they suspected it to bee forged, and were not giltie of any fault in their owne conscience: they refused not the pretie reward of an others fals­hod. What saye wee then? Is this inough, that they seeme not to haue done anie fault? To me trulie [Page] it seemes not so: although the one I He loued Hortensius, in his life: he forgiues Cras [...]us, after his deat [...]. loued beeing aliue, the other I hate not beeing dedde. But when [...]asi­lius wold haue had Marcꝰ Satiriꝰ, his sisters sōne, to beare his name: & had made him his heire: I meane Fowle ga­pers for o­thers inheri­taunces. him, who was protectour of y ^• coū ­trie of Picene, & Sabine (O shame­full staine, in those daies) it was not reason, that the rulers of the citie had the goodes, and nothing but the name descended to Satiri­us. To fense of iniurie. For if he, that dothe not fense of iniurie, and keepe it awaie frō his, when he may, dothe vniustlie: as in my first boke I haue disputed: what maner a mā is he to be coūted: who not onelie doth not fense of, but also Inheritaūce. furdereth an iniurie? And true īhe­ritaūce also semes to me not honest if it be purchased by wylie flaterīg duties: & not by truthe, but by false fainīg. But in such cases, one thīg is wont sōmetime to seme ꝓfitable, an other, honest. Yet vntrulye it so semeth: for alike is y ^• rule of ꝓfit, as Profit. of honestie. Who foreseeth not this: Honestie. no guile, no mischief shal faile in hī. For thus imaginīg, This in dede is [Page 138] honest, but this is profitable: he wil take vpon him by errour to sonder things coupled togither by nature: which is y ^• welspring of all deceits, wicke [...] deedes, & mischiefes. Ther­fore A good man. if a good mā haue such power: y ^• if he do but becke with his finger, his name may creepe into the testa­mēt of the riche: let him not vse this power: no not though he knowe for certeintie, that no man at all will once mistrust it. But if ye shoulde giue this power to Marcꝰ Crassus: M. Crassus. that with a becke of his finger, hee might be putte in as heire, being no heire indeede: he would (beleeue me) leape for ioye in the opē streete. But a iust man, and he, whome we counte a good man, will catche no­thing from anieman, to cast it vpō hiself. Whoso hath wonder at this: he confesseth himself not to knowe, who is a good man. But if a man will vnfold the secret knowledge of his minde: by & by he may [...]nfourm himself: that he is a good man, who A good man. dothe good to whome he may: and hurteth nobodie, but prouoked by iniurie. How then? doth not he hurt [Page] another, who workes (as it wer) w ^t a certein poysō: that the true heires he may displace, and make himself succeede in their roume? May he not then do that, will somme saye, which is ꝓfitable, & which is auai­lable? Nay let him knowe: that no­thing Nothing pro­fitable which is vniust. neither auaileth, nor is profi­table, which is vniust. This whoso hathe not lerned, can not be a good Fimbria, Cō ­sul. man. I herd of my father, when I was a boye: that Fimbria, somme­time [...]. Luctatiꝰ Pythias. Consul, was iudge to Marcus Luctatiꝰ Pythias, one of y ^• Eque­striall order of Rome, in deede ho­nest: when he had put in sureties to answer the actiō, if he wer not foūd a good man: that therfore Fimbria said vnto him, he wolde neuer giue iudgement of y ^• case: leste he should either robbe a tried mā of his good name, if he had iudged against him: orels should seeme to haue determi­ned, that ther is somme good man: whereas that thing consisted in du­ties, & cōmendations innumerable. To this good man then, whom also Socrates. Fimbria, & not onlie Socrates had cōceiued: cā no way ought appeare [Page 139] to be profitable, that is not honest. Therfore such a man will not be so bolde to doo, no nor purpose an [...] Drede. thing, which he dare not auerre. Is [...]ent. it not a shame for Philosophers to dout in these thinges, whereof the closones of the coūri [...] do make no doute at all? Frō whom is sprong y ^• prouerb, which now is well worne by cōtinuaūce. For whē they praise anie mās cōscience, & goodness: they saie, he is such a manne, as ye maye plaie with him blyndfolde.

What other meaning hathe y ^•, but Nothing ex­pedi [...]. which is not cōmely. this? y ^• nothing is expedient, which is not cōmelie: although you may obtein it, w ^tout anie mās r [...]aūce. Do ye not see thā by this prouerb: y ^• neither y ^• same Gyges, can be borne with, nor this other, whō [...] I fained w ^t the wagging of his fin­ger to be able to turn to himself all mens inheritaūce? For as y ^• thing, which is dishonest, although it [...]e closelie kepte, can no wai [...] yet be made honest: so the thing, which is not honest, canne not be brought to passe to be profitable, euen nature being against it, & withstanding it. [Page] But yet where veri great [...], there is occasiō of euil doing. Whē Marius, to attein to the Consulship, did against his dut [...]. Caius Marius was farre of from hope of y ^• Consulship: & seuen yeres after his Pretorship, lay still: nor seemed as one, that euer woulde la­bour for the Consulship: to the peo­ple of Rome he accused Quintus Metellus, a noble mā, and citizen, whose ambassadour he was: when he was sent to Rome frōhim, being his captein: how that he prolonged the warres: & said, if they had made him Consul: he woulde in a short space haue brought Jugurtha, ey­ther quicke, or dedde, into the sub­iection of the people of Rome. And so in deede hee was made Consul: but he swarued from all trust, and iustice: who by faisse accusation brought in an enuie a verie good, & gr [...]ue citiezen: whose ambassadour he was, & from whom he was sent. No nor our [...]atidianꝰ trulie did [...]tidian re­proued, who [...]red to himself alone the [...], that was no­lesse due to the officers his felowes. then the dutie of a good man, when he was Pretor: & the Tribunes of y ^• people had [...]alled vnto them the cō ­panie of the Pretors: y ^t ther might be set [...] a standerd of the coyne by a [Page 140] commō consent. For in those duies the money was made so to fall, and rise: that noman could know, what he had. They penned a decree by a common agreement vpon a paine, and condemnation: and appointed, y ^t they all togither, at after noone, would go downe into Rostra. And then all the rest went echeman his waie: Marius from the Senatours benche gott him streight to Rostra: and alone proclamed that, which by a cōmon consent was made: and y ^t thing, if ye desire to knowe, was to him a greate honour: in all the stretes, images wer made him: and to thefame offered was incense, and lightes of war. What neede mame wordes? Noman was ther euer more beloued of the multitude.

These be the things, which trouble men oftentimes, in taking of ad­uisement: when the thing, wherin equitie is broken, is not counted so greate: but that, which is gotten by such dealing, seemeth [...]aruailous greate. As to Marius it seem [...] not so dishonest, to gett away the [...]o­ples fauour from his [...]lowes, [...] [Page] Tribunes, but to be made Consul for that doing, which then he had set before his yie, it seemed verie profi­table. A rule. But one rule ther is of all, which I wolde faine haue you tho­rowlie to knowe: either the thing, Looke, the sho [...]e of pro­fit be not dis­honest. & that no di [...]honest thing seeme profitable. which seemeth profitable, let it not be dishonest: or if it be dishonest, let it not seeme profitable. What shall wee then save? May wee either take this Mariꝰ, or that other, for a good man? [...]end, and straine your vn­derstanding, to see what shape, fourme, and image of a good man is in it. Doth it then commonly be­fall in a good man to lye for his pro­fit, to [...] accuse, to preuent, or deceiue? Of a suretie nothing lesse. Is there To deceiue. then any thing so precious, or anye gaine so much to be desired: that ye should therfore leese the glorie, and name of a good man? What is ther so much, that this profit (as they cal it) is able to bring vs, as it may pull from vs: in case it take awaye the name of a good man, & spoyle vs of trouth: & iustice? For what differēce is ther? whether one shapeturn him­felf frō a mā to a beast, or vnder the Man. [Page 141] [...]ourme of mā, beares in him y ^• bru­tish cruelness of beast? What of thē, Beaste. who set at nought all good & honest things, so they may attaine to pow­er? do they not, euen as he did: who Pompeius [...]oyned in ali­aunce with [...]. wolde needs haue him to his father in lawe: by whose bolde enterprises he might beare a swe [...]? For to him it seemed ꝓfitable to be of much pow­er, by an others enuic: but he sawe not how vniust, how vnprofitable, how vnhonest it was for his coūtry. But as for his father in law, he had C. [...]uliꝰ [...] dei [...]ed much to re­her [...]e these verses of Eu­ripides. alwaies in his mouthe Euripides greke verses of the Phenissians: which I will expresse, as well as I can: ꝑchaūce w ^t out their grace, but yet so as y ^• meanig may be cōcei [...]ed. If breach of lawes, a man shall vndertake: He must them boldely breake, for kingdoms sake: In eche thing els, looke you regarde the right. Hainoꝰ was y ^• [...]teocles, or rather Euri [...]ides: who excepted only this, which was most detestable. Why do we then gather these [...] ca­ses, as concerning inheritaunce, merchaundise, and deceitfull sale? Nay beholde him, that sought to bee King ouer the people of Rome, [Page] and all nations: and brought it to passe. This kinde of [...]esire whoso coūteth honest, he is not well in his wit: for he alloweth the ouerthrow of law, and libertie: and the cruell, and detestable oppression of them he reckens a glorious mater.

With what kinde of chydīg then, or rating rather may I attempte to turn him frō so great an errour: who confesseth, it is not honest to raigne as king in that citie, which bothe hathe been, and ought to bee free: and yet accoūtes it profitable for him, that can bring it to passe?

For, O ye goddes immortall, can the most shamefull, and cruel mnr­der of a mannes owne countrey be profitable? yea though he, that hath embrued himself in such blood, bee cleaped of y ^• oppressed subiectes pa­rent of the cōmōweale? Profit ther­fore Profit. is to be directed by honestie: & Honestie. y ^• so, as these two wordes may seem to differ in thēselues in termes, and yet to sounde all one in meaning.

Now to the opinion of the cōmon people. What greater profit can ther be, than to raigne, and to rule? [Page 142] C [...]trariwise I finde nothing more vnprofitable for him, who [...] hathe atteined it: whē I applie rea­son to the trouth. For can greeues, cares, dayly, and nightly [...]eares, & a life full of snares, and daungers be profitable to any man?

quoth Acciꝰ. But to which crown? Tantalus, Thesame, that from Tantalus, & Pelops. Pelops descēding, was by iust title possessed. For how many mo, think C. Cesar. ye, were vntrue, & vntrusty to that king: who w ^t an armie of Romane people oppressed y ^• people of Rome: and forced that citie to be subiect to him: which was not onely free of it self, but also a ruler of othernatiōs? What blotts of conscience, suppose you, had he in his hert? what woū ­des of remorse? But whose life can be ought worthe to himsel [...]: when y ^• state of his life is such, that whoso takes it frō him, shall be in most fa­uor, & fame? In case these things he not ꝓfitable, which speciallie seeme [Page] so to be: bicause they be ful o [...] shame & reproche: we ought now to be ful­ly Nothing pro­fi [...]able, which is not honest. perswaded, y ^• nothing is ꝓfitable, which is not honest. Notwithstan­ding the same, bothe at diuers other times, & namely in the warres with Pyrrhus, was so adiudged by Cai­us Fabritius in his second Consul­ship, [...]ow Fabri­ [...]ius, & the Se nate sent the traitour home again to Pyr­rhus: who for a rewarde of­fered to poysō his king. & also by our Senate. For whē king Pyrrhus vnprouoked had me­ued warre agaist y ^• people of Rome: & the fight was all about empire w ^t y ^• noble, & puissaūt prince: a rūaway traytour went frō him to Fabritiꝰ campe: & promised, that, if Fabritiꝰ wolde offer him a good rewarde: as he cāme priuily, so he wolde return [...] to Pyrrhus pauilion: & dis­patch him with poyson. Fabritius caused him to be caried backe again to Pyrrhus: & that deede of his was well cōmended of the Senate. But if we seeke the showe, & respect of ꝓ­fi [...]: true it is, this one runneawaye might haue made an end [...] of y ^• great warre, & that greuous enemie of y ^• ēpire: but it had ben a great shame, & fowle deede, to haue had him sub­dued not by ꝓwesse, but by trecheri: with whō y ^• fight was all for glorie. [Page 143] Whether then was it more ꝓfitable [...] [...] Fabritius, who was such a one in our citie, as [...] was at Athen [...]s: or for our Senate: who Profit not to be seuered f [...]ō honour. neuer [...] profit frō honour: to warre agaī [...]t their enemie with ar­mes, or wi [...]h poison? If empire be to be sought, for cause of glorie: let tre­cherie No glorie is in trecherie. Riches com­ming with [...] can not be profitable, The vnprofi­table adui [...]e of L. Philipp. [...]e eschewed, wherin cā be no glorie: agaī, if riches be sought any maner way: they cā not be ꝓfitable, if thei cōme with infan [...]ie. Therfore that aduise of Lucius Philippus, Quintus sonne, was not ꝓfitable: that those cities, which Luciꝰ Syl­la, for a certein sūme of money, had discharged of tributes, by decree of the Senate, should againe be tribu­tarie: & yet we should not res [...]ore thē y ^• money, which for their beeig free they hadde disbursed. The Senate­house agreed all w ^t him. A [...] it was to the gouernmēt. For of Pi­rates better is the promise, than of y ^• Senate. [...]ea but the tributes (they will say) wer [...] augmēted: ther fore it was profitable. How lōg wil they be bolde to call any thing ꝓfi­table, y ^t is not honest? Can hatred, & infamie be profitable to any [...] state: [Page] that should be vpholdē with glorie, and good will of their [...]? I miself oftentimes haue disagreed Cato ouer­stiffe. euen with my Cato: for ouerstiffly, methought, he defēded the treasurie gaine, and tributes: and denyed all maner alowaunces to the farmers of our customes, and many, to our leagfrendes: whereas toward these we should be beneficiall: & so deale with those: as we were wonte to do with our citizens, sent to inhabit newetownes: & so much the more, bicause y ^• knitting togither of those degrees of men did perteine to the safetie of the commonwelth. Curio Curioes cal­ling on profit also did euill, in that hee sayde, the Trāspadanes mater was iust: but yet euermore he cryed, Let profit preuail. He should rather haue said their mater was not iust, bicause it was not profitable for the commō ­welth: thā whē he sayd, it was iust, he should graūt, it was vnꝓfitable.

Hecatoes sixt boke of duties is full Questions out of Hecato of such questions: Whether it be fit 1 for a good mā, in a verie great derth In a greate derth, to giue ouer houskee­ping. of corne, to giue ouer housekeping? He disputes the mater on bothe [Page 144] [...]ides: but yet at last hee thinketh, [...]uite is directed rather after profit, than after humanitie.

He putts y ^• case, if one must needs 2 take losse by sea: whether should he To loze a good horsse. or a [...]. rather beare y ^• losse of a horsse much worth, than of a slaue litle worth. In this case, priuat profit leades a mā one way, & humanitie, an other. If a foole in a shipwrack catch hold 3 of a bourde: shall a wiseman take it Shall a wise man drowne a foole to saue himself? from him, if he can? He sayeth, no, bicause it wer iniurious. What may the owner of the shipp do? shall 4 he take his owne? No, nomore than what the ow ner of the ship may do. he may cast a passenger oute of the shippe into the sea, bicause it is his. For vntil they arriue at the place, whether the ship was hired: y ^• shipp is not the owners, but theyrs, that sayle in it. What if two in a ship­wracke 5 light vpon one bourde: and wisemen shif ting for th [...]ir liues. they bothe be wisemē: should either of thē pull it to himself? or one giue ouer his holde to the other? Yea, he should giue ouer: but to him, whom it wer more expedient to liue, either 6 for his own, or y ^• cōmōweales sake. Men alike in wisdome [...] What if these be alike in bothe? [Page] Then ther s [...]all be no stryuing b [...] ­twene thē: but the one must yeeld to the other: as the i [...]ser dothe in lots, or at the Italian p [...]ay with the fin­gers, called Tocco. 7

What if the father robbe churches? whether the sōne may opē his fathers fe­lome, or no? or vndermine the walles of the trea­surie? should the sonne open it to the magistrates? That wer surely a [...]ur sed deede: yea rather he should [...] his father, if he wer accused therof. Is not our countrie then aboue all duties? Yes truly: but it is ꝓfitable for ones countrie, to haue the inha­biters reuerence theyr parents. 8

What if ones father will go aboute whether the [...]onne may cō ­ceale the fa­thers treason, or no? to vsurpe, as a tyraunt, or to betray his countrie: shall the sōne conceale it? Nay he shal desire his father, not to doo it: if he nothing preuaile, he shall blame him, & threaten him al­so. And last of all, if the mater tend to the destraction of his countrie: he shall preferre the safetie of [...]is coun­trie before the safetie of his father.

He puttes a question also: if a wise­man 9 Counterfet money. vnwares receiued counterfet money in stede of good: after he per­ceiues it, whether he shoulde paye it [Page 145] [...]ute againe for good money, if he wer indetted to any [...] bodie? Dioge­nes sayth, he may: Antipater den [...]es it, to whom I rather agree.

He, that wittingly selleth wine, y ^• 10 will not last: whether ought he to [...]ine, that wil not last. declare it? or no [...] Diogenes thinks, it is not need full: Antipater reckēs it the dutie of a good man.

These be (as ye wolde saye) y ^• cases, Mo cases in [...]. in controuersie, in the Stoikes ma­ters of lawe. Whether, in selling a 11 Selling of a bondman. bondman, his faultes ar to be tolde, or no? I meane not those, which on­lesse you declare, the bondman may be turned home againe by the ciuil law: but these, that he is a lyer, a dy­cer, a pyker, a dronkard: sōme think meete to be tolde, sōme other, not so. If one selling golde, supposeth he 12 sells but copper: should a good man Selling pure golde, in ste [...]e of copper. of dutie tell him, that it is golde? or maye he bye for a peny, y ^• is worthe a thousand? It is allreadie verie plaine, bothe what I think: and what the controuersie is among the philosophers, whō I named. Whe­ther 13 Of couenāts, & [...]. ar couenaunts, and promises allwayes to bee kepte: which bee [Page] (as the Pretors vse to speake) made neither by cōpulsiō, nor by couine. If one minister to an other a medi­cine 13 for the dropsie: & bindes the pa­cient A medicine ministred vp­on condi [...]ion, the pacient shall vse it no more. by couenant, y ^• he shall neuer after vse the same medicine: in case he be made holle by that medicine: & within a fewe yeres after, do fall into the same disease: & can not ob­tein of him, with whō he made the co [...]enaūt, y ^• he may [...] i [...] likewise againe: what is to [...]e [...]: seeing he is so [...], & w [...]ll n [...]t graunt him to vse it: and yet he should take no harm therby? [...] [...] [...]ust haue regarde to his [...] li [...]e an [...] helth. [...] [...] [...] [...] be required of 14 one, who ma [...]es [...] his heire: where [...] thing. tw [...] millions, & fiue hundred [...] crownes bee left him by [...]: that, before he haue y ^• possessiō of it, he [...] openly, on y ^• daytime, in the mar [...]et: and he promiseth, so to do, b [...]cause otherwise the man [...] not put him i [...], as his heyre: should he [...] th [...]n, [...]hat he promi [...]ed? or [...] I woulde [...] he had made no such [...]: a [...]d that, I think, had bee [...] a [...] of grauitie: but [Page 146] [...] he promised it, if he counte it dishonest to daunce in the market: he shall with the more honestie go from his worde, if he take nothing of the inheritaunce: except [...]- [...]tur [...] he will bestowe y ^• same money vpō the commōwelth, in sōme time of great necessitie: that it may be no shame for him cuē to daūce, whē he shall procure y ^• welth of his coūtrie. 15 No nor those ꝓmises ar to be kept: Certein pro­mi [...]es not to be kept. which be not profitable [...] sor thē, to whome you made them. Titan (that we may return to [...]ables) sayd Of Sol, and Phaethon, his sonne. to Phaethon, his sonne: he wolde do, whatsoeuer he wolde desire. He desired to be taken vp into his fa­thers charret: the madde foole was hoysted vp: and on the syde, where he stoode, w ^t a flash of lyghtening he fell all on a fyre. How much better had it been, his fathers promes had not been in this perfourmed?

What shall we saye to the promes, Of Theseus, & Neptunus. that Theseus required of Neptu­nus? to whom when Neptunus had graunted three boones: Theseus asked the death of Hippolytus, his sonne: when his father had him in a [Page] selousie for his steppmother: which boone being obteined, Theseus fell into very great lamētatiō. What of Agamemnon? When he had vowed Of Agamem­non, who offe­red vp his daughter in sacri [...]ice. to Diana the fairest creature, that should bee borne that yeare in his kingdome: he offred vp in sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia: who was the fairest creature, borne y ^• yere. The promise rather shuld not haue been kept, than so hainous a deede should be cōmitted. Wherfore pro­mises also, many times, ar not to be perfourmed. 16

Nor at all times, things layde to Things laide to keepe. kepe ar to be restored. As if one, wel in his wit, shal leaue a sworde with ye to kepe: and aske it againe, whē he is madd: it wer a sinne to restore it, and dutie, to kepe it.

What if one, who hath lefte money w ^t you to kepe, would make warre against your countrie? shall ye re­store, that was layde ye to keepe? No, as I suppose: for ye shall doo against the commonwelth, which ought to bee moste dere vnto you. So, manie things, which by na­ture seeme to bee honest, by chaūge [Page 147] of times, becomme dishonest. To perfourme promises, to stande to couenauntes, to restore that is layde ye to keepe, when it other­wise behoueth: it becommeth disho­nest. And of these, which seeme to bee cases of profite, contrarie to iustice, vnder pretence of wis­dome: I think it sufficientlie de­clared.

But for as much as, in our first boke, we haue drawne all duties, out of foure fountaines of honestie: we shall continue styll in the same: when we teache, what enemies of vertue those thinges bee: which séeme to bee profitable, and ar not so in dede.

And thus of wisdom, whom wyli­nesse would resemble: and likewise of iustice, which is alwayes profi­table, we haue discoursed.

The other two partes of hone­stie remain: wherof the one is sene in the greatnesse, and worthinesse of an excellent corage: the other, Manlinesse. in the framing, and measuring of stayednesse, and temperaunce. Temperaūce. [Page] It seemed profitable to Ulysses (as Comparing of profit with manlinesse Ulysses. somme tragicall poetes haue sette it oute: for in Homer, the best author, ther is no such suspicion of Ulysses) but the tragedies doo laye it as a re­proche to him: that, by coūterfeting madnesse, he wolde haue scaped go­ing a warrefare. It was no honest deuise. Yet profitable it was (as somme perauenture will saye) to rule, and to liue quietly at Ithaca, with his parents, with his wife, & with his sonne. Think you any ho­nour, got in dayly daungers, & tra­uailes, [...]. is to be compared with this Quietnesse. quietnesse of life? I verilye iudge it meete to be despised, and reiected: bicause whatso is not honest, I coūt it in no wise to be profitable. For what, think you, Ulysses shoulde haue herd, if he had cōtinued styll in his coūterfeting? who, hauing done greate feates in warre, yet herd these wordes of Aiax.

For him nodoute it was better to fight not onely with his enemies, but also with the waues of the sea, as he did: than to shrinke from them of Greece, who had concluded togi­ther to make warre vpon the Tro­ [...]anes. But let vs leaue of bothe fa­bles, and forein examples: & comme we to trouth, and deedes.

When Marcus Attilius Regulus, Marcus Re­gulus. being second time Consul, was ta­ken by a traine in Afrik: Xantippus the Lacedemoniā being the guyde: and Amilcar, Annibals father, the generall: he was sent to the Senate vpon his othe: that except certein gentlemen taken prisoners wer re­stored to thē Penes, he should him­self return to Carthage. When he was comme to Rome, he sawe well [Page] the showe of profit: but, as the ma­ter proueth, he iudged it verie vain: which was but on this sort: to tarie still in his countrie: to bee at home with his wife, and children: to kepe his degree of Consular estate: and to take the miserie, which he had felt in warre, to be common to warrefaring fortune. Who can de­nye these thinges to bee profitable? What think you? Greatnesse of corage, and manlinesse saith nay to it. Loke ye for more substantial au­thorities? For of these vertues it is the pr [...]pertie, to bee aferde of no­thing, to despise all worldlie vani­ties, to think nothing vnsufferable that to man may befall. Therfore what did he? He cāme into the Se­nate: declared y ^• he had in cōmaun­demēt: refused to giue his sentence: and sayde, he was no Senatour, as long as he was bounde by othe ministred by his enemies. Yea and this moreouer he sayde (O foolish manne, will somme saye, and against his owne profit) that it was not expedient to haue the [Page 149] captiues restored. For he alledged, they were yonge, and good cap­teins: whereas he was worne, and spent with age. Whose authori­tie when it had preuailed: the cap­tiues were kept styll: he himself returned to Carthage: and nei­ther loue of his countrie, nor of his kinsfolke stayed him. Yet was it not vnknowne to him, that he returned to a verie cruell enemie, and to extreme tormentes: but he thought his othe meete to bee per­fourmed. Wherefore, euen at that time, when he was putte to death with continuall waking: he was in better state: than if he had remained an aged captiue, and a persured Senatour at home.

But fondly, will somme saye, Folse obiec­ted against [...]. he did: who not onelye iudged it vnmeete, that the captiues should be restored, but also disswaded it. How, I praye ye, did he fondlye? [...] de­fended. Did he so, seeing he auayled the cō ­monwelth? May y ^• be profitable for any citiezē, which is vnꝓfitable to y ^• state? Mē dowrest those foūdatiōs [Page] which nature laieth: whē they s [...]uer profit from honestie. For we all co­uet profit, and to it be caryed, nor by any meanes otherwise cā we do. For who is he, that fleeith profit? or who rather is ther, that foloweth not thesame moste diligently? But bicause nowhere wee canne fynde thinges profitable, but in prayse, seemlynesse, and honestie: therfore we esteeme those, as chief, and hy­est: and the commendation of profit we count not so honorable, as ne­cessarie. Touching an othe [...]ondrie [...].

What is ther then in an othe? will somme saye. [...] first.

Ar we aferd, Iupiter will be an­gry? Nay, this is common among all philosophers: not onely those, who holde, that God himself hathe nothing to do, & nothing appointes to an other bodie: but the also, who will needes haue God alwaies do­yng, and medling with sōmewhat: that God is neuer angry, nor euer hurteth any creature.

What greater harm could Iupiter 2 haue done, being offended, than Re­gulus did to himself?. Ther was [Page 150] then no respect of religion, y ^• might ouerturn so great a profit.

What? should he haue done disho­nestlie? 3 First, of euils the leste wer to be chosen. Shall then this disho­nestie haue in it so much discommo­ditie, as had that torment?

Moreouer this sayeng, that is in 4 [...],

though of a wi [...]ked king it be sayd, yet is it [...] sayd.

Hereunto they adde: that as wee 5 saye, sōme things seeme profitable, which ar not so in deede: that they in like maner saye, somme thinges seeme honest, which ar not so in deede: as for example, this same see­meth honest, that he did returne to torment, for the sauing of his othe [...] but it becamme dishonest: bicause that, which had bene wrought by the violence of his enemies, should not haue beene by him confirmed.

They laye also to this: that whatso 6 is verie profitable, y ^• same groweth [Page] likewise to bee honest, although it seemed not so at first.

These things commonlie be alled­ged against Regulus. But lette vs consider the first.

Jupiter was not to be feared, lest 1 he should hurt him in his anger: bi­cause Answer to the first ob­iection. neither to bee angrie, nor to do harme he is accustomed. This reason surelie maketh nomore a­gainst Regulus, than against all kinde of othes. But in an othema­king, not what the feare, but what the vertue of it is, ought to bee con­sidered, An othe. For an othe is a religious assuring of any thing. And whatso assuredly you haue promised, as ta­king god to witnesse: it ought to bee obserued. For y ^• othe now respectes not the wrathe of the godds, which is none at all: but iustice, and faith­fulness. For notablie said Ennius.

Whoso then stayneth his othe [...] he stayneth Ladie Faith: whom, as it appeares in Catoes oratiō, our aū ­cetours would needs haue to stand in our Capitole, next vnto y ^t great, [Page 151] and mightie Ioue.

Yea but Jupiter, being displeased, 2 coulde not haue done more harme to Regulus, than Regulus did to himself.

That is true: if ther were nothing euill, but to fele paine. But the phi­losophers, Paine. that be of the greatest au thoritie, do affirme: that it not one­ly is not the vttermost euill, but al­so no euyll at all. For whō, I praye ye, do not refuse to take Regulus, as no meane witness, but (I beleue) y ^• grauest of al. For what more sub­statial witness do we loke for, thā a pere of the cōmonweale: who, for y ^• cōtinuing of his dutie, did willing­lie enter into torments?

For wheras they saye, of euyls the 3 least ar to be chosen: meaning it is better dishonestly, than miserablye to liue: is ther any greater euyll, than dishonestie? Which if in the Dishonestie. deformitie of the bodie it breedeth sōme osfēce: how much must needs that corruption, and filth of a defy­led minde appeare? Therfore they Stoiks. who more pythilie debate these ma­ters, ar bolde to cal y ^t the onely euil, [Page] which is dishonest: and they, who dispute them not so ernestly, do not [...] stick to call y ^• same the vtterest euil. As for that sayeng,

it is therfore well brought in of the Poet: bicause when Atreus parte should go in hand, it was meete, the speeche should serue for his persone. But if hereof they take themselues a rule, y ^• it is no promes, which is made to a promesbreaker: let them Promise. take heede, ther be not sought a star­ting hole for periurie. The lawe of A gappe open for periurie. armes, and the promes of an othe is manye times to be kept with our e­nemie. For whatso in such sorte is Promes to be kept with [...]ust enemies, not with pi­rates, and theeues. sworne, that the minde of the swea­rer conceiueth, it is necessarie to be done: y ^• same is to be obserued: what­so falleth otherwise: the same if one do not, it is no periuri [...]. As if you bring not the sūme of money, y ^• ye promised rouers for your life: ther is no deceiuing in it: no, though, be­yng sworne therto, ye do it not. For a pirate is not coūted in the noūber [Page 152] of enemies to ones countrey, but a common enemie to all men. With luch a one neither promes, neyther othe ought alike, as with vs to be kept. For, to sweare an vntruthe, is not to forsweare: but not to per­fourm [...]. that, which according to the meanīg of your hert ye haue sworn, as by our custome is exprest in a certein fourme of wordes: surely it is periurie. For feately sayde Euri­pides:

In worde I sware, but hert [...]nsworne I bare.

But it was not fitte for Regulus with periurie to disturbe the condi­tions, and couenaunts with his e­nemies, and of warre. For with a iust, and lawfull enemie the thing was done: toward whom bothe all the feciall lawe, and diuers other lawes be in common. Which if it wer not so: the Senate wolde neuer haue deliuered to their enemies, noble men being prisoners. But yet The Ro­manes ho [...] subdewed by the Sānttes, at [...]. Titus Ueturius, and Spuriꝰ Po­sthumius, the second time, they wer Consuls: bicause whē they had not fought it well at Caudium: & our legions beyng subdewed, they had [Page] made a peas with the Sānites: they wer deliuered vnto them: for with­out commission of the people, & the Senate, they had done it. And at y ^• same time, Titus Numitius, and Quintus Emilius, who wer then y ^t Tribunes of the people, bicause the peas was made by their authoritie: wer deliuered also: that the peas with the Samnites might be refu­sed. And Posthumiꝰ self, who was deliuered, was the perswader, and cauier of thesame deliuerie. Which likewise Caiꝰ Mancinꝰ did, many yeares after: who, that he might be deliuered to the Numantines, with whom without authoritie of the Senate he had concluded a leage: perswaded that particular lawe: which Lucius Furius, & Sertus Attilius made by the decree of the Senate: and when it was receiued, he was deliuered to the enemies. This man delt more honestlie, then Quintꝰ Pōpeius: by whose inter­cession, when he was in y ^• same case it was brought to passe, y ^t the lawe was not receiued. With him, y ^• thig which semed profit, preuailed more [Page 153] [...] honestie. With the other afore­said, y ^• false showe of ꝓfit was sup­pressed by y ^• authoritie of honestie. But that, which was done by vio­lence, neded not to haue bene cōfir­med. As who should saie, violence could be done to a manly mā. Why then did he go to the Senate: name­ly seīg he was purposed to disswade them frō y ^• deliuerie of y ^• captiues? That in him was most cōmēdable, y ^• same ye disalow. For he stode not to his owne iudgemēt: but toke the mater in hand, that it might be the iudgement of the Senate: wherun­to if he had not bene a coūseler, the captiues no dout had bene restored to the Cartaginers. So had Regu­ [...]us remained safe in his countrye. Which thing bicause he toke it not to bee ꝓfitable for his coūtrie: ther­fore he thought it honestie for him, to be of that minde, and so to suffer. For where thei saye, that it, which 6 is verie profitable, dothe becomme honest: nay they should saye, it is in dede, and not becommes honest. Honestie. For ther is nothing ꝓfitable, which same is not honest: and not bicause Profit. [Page] it is profitable, it is honest: but b [...] ­cause it is honest, therfore it is pro­fitable. Wherfore of many mar­uailous exaumples, a man shal not lightlie tell either a more commen­dable, or a more goodlie ex [...]mple, than this. But in [...]ll this praise of Regulus, this one thing is worthie of admiration: that he thought it best, the prisoners should bee kepte styll. For in y ^• he returned, I think it no wonder at all: bicause in those dayes, he could not doo otherwise. Therfore that cōmendation is not the mannes, but the times. For our annceters wer of this minde: that ther is no strayter bonde to bynde a mannes promes, than an othe. The vertue of an othe in [...]ide time. The lawes in the twelue tables de­clare that: our holy orders declare the same: and our leages declare nolesse, wherby bounde is the pro­mes made euē with the enemie: the enteries, and ponnishmentes of the Censors declare as much: who a­bout no mater more heedfully gaue iudgement, than about keeping of othes. Marcus Pomponius, Tri­bune of the people, dyd summmon [Page 154] Lucius Manlius, Aulus sonne, when he was Dictator, to appeare Manlius [...] by Pompo [...]us. at a daie: bicause he had taken vpō him the occupieng of his Dictator­ship, a fewe dayes lenger, than he should: and accused him also, y ^t he had driuen his sonne Titus, who afterwarde was called Torquatꝰ, How Titus [...]ꝰ Tor­quatus did for his father being in trou ble. from commepanie of m [...]n: and had commaunded him to dwell in the countrie. Which whē the yongmā, his sonne, once herd of, that his fa­ther was brought in trouble: it is sayd, he ranne to Rome: & by breake of day, cāme to Pomponius house. To whom when it was tolde: bi­cause h [...] thought, that he beyng of­fended would bring somme mater vnto him against his father: he a­rose out of his bedde: and all hea­rers beyng voyded out of the place, he cōmaunded, the yongmā should comme to him. But he, as soone as he enterd, by & by drewe his sworde: and sware, he would kyll him oute of hand: except he made an othe vn­to him, that he would discharge his father. Pomponius, [...] with this terrour, made an othe so: [Page] he opened y ^t mater to the people [...] he enfourmed thē, why it was neces­sarie for him to let fall the actiō. He discharged Manlius. So gracatiy was an othe had in regard, at those dayes. And this Titus Manlius is what maner man Titus [...] proued. he, who gott his surname, at the ri­uer of Anien, of a chayn, y ^• he pulled from a Frencheman: whō he slew, beig begged by him: in whose third Consulship, the Latines at Uese­ris were discomefited, and putte to flight. A verie noble man doutlesse: and one, who not long afore being louing towarde his father, becāme sowre, & seuere agaist his sōne. But as Kegulus is to be commended, in He [...] we his sonne with the ax. for breaking law of armes. keping his othe: so those tenne, whō Annibal, after y ^• Cannensiā fight, sent to the Senate, vpon their othe, that they shoulde return into that Tenne messē ­gers frō An nibal to the Senate. campe, wherof the Carthaginers wer then in possession: excepte they obteined his request, for the raun­soming of certein prisoners: ar to be dispraised, if they did not return. Touching whom, al men write not after one sort. For Polybius, a spe­ciall good author, writeth: that of y ^• [Page 155] [...]enne chosen gentlemen, who then wer sent, nyne returned: whē y ^• ma­ter could not be obteined of the Se­nate: & that one of the tenne, who a litle after, he was gone oute of the camp, returned backe, as though he had forgotten sōmewhat: remained styll at Rome. For by his return to the camp, he toke himself to b [...]e dis­charged of his othe: but y ^• was not true. For gyle cōfirmeth, & not dis­chargeth periurie, It was then a foolish craftynesse, y ^• did peeuishly coūterfet wisdom. Therfore y ^• Se­nate made a decree: y ^t thesame suttle & wyly fox shold be caried pynniōd vnto Annibal. But this is a mer­uaylous mater: Annibal had i hold eyght thousand of our men: whō he toke not in battle, nor as fleeing a­way for feare of death: but thei wer left behynde in the camp, by Paulꝰ, & Uarro, y ^• Co [...]suls. The Senate did not think it good to raunsome them: wheras thei might haue done it, for a litle money: y ^• it might sink into our souldiours herts, eyther to winne the victorie, or manfully to dye. Which thing when it was [Page] [...]knowne, the sayd Polybiꝰ writes, y ^• Annibals hert was daunted ther­with: bicause the Senate, & people of Rome, euē in chaunces of aduer­sitie, wer of so loftie a corage. Thus the things, which seme profitable, be ouerweyed by cōparison of ho­nestie. But thatsame Acilius, who wrote y ^• storie in greeke, sayth: ther wer mo, which returned to y ^• camp, vnder thesame gyle: y ^• thei might be discharged of their othe: & that they were noted by the Censors with all maner of infamie.

Here an ende of this parcell. For it is euident, that such things, as bee Conc [...]usiō of the cōparison of profit with [...]. done with a fearefull, seruile, dast­ardly, & weake hert: as the doing of Regulus had bene: if either he had thought, concerning the prisoners, that he sawe expedient for himself, & not for the cōmōweale, orels would haue taried styl at home: be not pro­fitable: bicause they be reprocheful, [...]ile, and dishonest.

The fourt part is now behynde: Comparing of profit with temperaunce. which consisteth in seemelinesse, measurekeping, sobermode, stayed­nesse, and temperaunce. May then [Page 156] any thing be profitable, that is cō ­trarie to such an assēble of vertues? But the [...], & Anniceriās, [...]. who had their name of philosophers [...]. frō Aristippus, placed all [...] [...]. in pleasure: & therefore they iudged vertue to be cōmendable, bicause it was a causer of pleasure. And whē Pleasure. these wer worne out of estimation: then florished Epicurus, a furderer, Epicurus. & an author welnye of the same opie nion. Against them must we striue with toothe, & nayle (as they saye) if Reasoning a­gainst Epi­cureans: who placed felici­ti [...] in volup­tuou [...]nesse, cō ­trarie to tem­peraunce. we meane to defend, & preserue ho­nestie. For if not onely profit, but also all happy life consisteth in the good complexion of the bodie: & in a sure trust to thesame complexiō: as by Metrodorus it is written: doute­lesse this maner profit, yea and the verie chief (for so do they holde) will striue with honestie. For first of al, where shall ther be a place appoin­ted for wisdom? What? meane thei, that on euerie side she shoulde seeke after delicacies? How miserable a seruice were it for vertue, to bee a wayter vpon pleasure? But what should be the office of wisdō? Skil­fully wisdom. [Page] to choose oute pleasures? Ad­mitt, ther be nothing pleasaunter, than so to do: what can ther bee i­magined more dishonest?

Now with him, who sayeth, that pain is the vtterest euil, what place Manlinesse. shall manlinesse haue: which cares not for any paines, or trauails, y ^t be offered? For although Epicurus speakes in many places, touching paine (as he doth in this) stoutelye ynough: neuerthelesse it is not to be regarded, what he sayth: but what is meete for him to saye: who hath pointed out the limits of good thīgs to be in pleasure, & of euill thinges, in paine: as, if I shoulde heare T [...]peraunce. him speake of stayednesse, and tem­peraunce. He talks in deede in ma­ny places many things: but he is myered by the waye, as they saye. For how can he prayse tēperaunce, y ^• setts the souerain good in plea­sure? For temperaunce is enemy to lust: & lust is a wayting seruant to pleasure. And yet in these three kindes, not w ^tout suttletie, they fall to their shifts. Theibring in wisdō, The Epi­cures wisdō. as a sciēce ministering pleasures, & [Page 157] voydīg paines. They set vs out also The Epi­cures [...]. manliness, after a certein sort: whē they teache a way to despise death, and endure paine. Thei also fetche The Epi­cures tempe­raunce. in tēperaūce, w ^t much ado doutless, but yet as well as they may. For they holde, y ^• the greatnesse of plea­sure aryseth by putting of all pain. Iustice by the Epicures is [...]. Iustice staggereth w ^t them, or ra­ther lyeth vnder foote: and all those vertues, y ^• showe themselues in the common knotte, and felowship of menne. For ther can bee neither goodnesse, neyther liberalitie, nor [...], nomore thā frendship may: if they be not sought after, for thēselues: but be referred to plea­sure, or to profit. Let vs then driue our mater into fewe wordes. For as we haue taught, y ^t ther is no pro­fit, which is contrarie to honestie: so wee saye, all voluptuousnesse is contrarie to [...]. And so much the more I take Callipho, and Di­nomachus worthie to be reproued: who thought, they should ende the cōtrouersie: if they made a ioyning Uoluptuous­nesse contra­rie to honestie of voluptuousnesse with honestie, [...] of beast with manne. Honestie­admitts [Page] not this knot, but doth ab­horre, & reiect it. Nor truly the end of good, & euill, which ought to bee after one sort, may be mingled, and tempered with things disagreable. But hereof hitherto: for it is a weightie mater, & in an other place discoursed more at large. Now to the purpose.

After what sort then the mater is to be resolued, if at any tyme profit in apparaunce dothe striue with ho­nestie: it is before sufficiently deba­ted. But if voluptuousnesse also be counted to haue a showe of profit: it can haue no felowship w ^t honestie. For be it so, we sōmewhat esteeme pleasure: somme sawce perhapps it shall haue in it, but surely no profit at all.

You haue frō your father a pre­sent, The conclu­sion, and [...] of his worke, with an [...] to his sonne. sonne Mark, in my opiniō ve­rily muchworth: but it shall be euē so, as ye take it. Notwithstanding these three bokes ar, as straūgers, to be enterteined of you, amōg Cra­tippꝰ notes. But as ye should once haue herd me also, if I had cōme to Athenes: which had bene done in [Page 158] dede: but that my countrie called me backe with open mouth, in the mydst of my iourney: so seeyng in these volumes my voice is conueied vnto you ye shall bestowe as much time vpō them, as you may: and so much you may, as you wyll. But when I shall vnderstande, that you take pleasure in this [...] of know­ledge: then I bothe present there shortly, as I trust, and in your ab­sence, absent will speake with you. Fare you well therfore, my Cice­ro: & assure yourself, that you ar to me doutlesse right dere: and yet farre derer shall bee: if in such bookes, and lessons, you will sette your delite.