The Complete CAPTAIN, OR, An Abbridgement of CESARS warres, with observations upon them; Together With a collection of the order of the Militia of the Ancients; and A particular Treatise of modern war: Written By the late great Generall the Duke of Rohan:

Englished by J. C.

CAMBRIDGE, Printed by ROGER DANIEL: Printer to the Ʋniversitie: And are to be sold at the Angel in Popes-head-alley in London. 1640.

April 24. 1640.

Imprimatur per Typographum Acade­miae Cantabrigiensis,

Jo. Cosin, Procan.

To his worthy friend Captain Cruso up­on his excellent translation of the Duke of Rohan's Le parfaict Capitaine.

CAesar, whose brain contriv'd at once the fate
Of his great self and of the Romane State,
With mightie action caus'd, where-ere he stood,
The trembling place to sweat forth humane bloud.
Who tam'd rebellion so, as in that sinne
His own contrivance had the traitour bin.
How nimble-ear'd! and with what piercing sight
He could discern advantage! and then fight.
Cold, waves, winds, hunger, watching, labour, warre
Were accidents through which he oft did dare.
How patient for his ends! How quickly he
Unthought of could defeat his enemy!
Whose expedition, as an engine hurl'd
Him from one side to th'other of the world;
Whose way of victory begot the fame,
That he but went, and saw, and overcame.
Dark stratageme, quick action, and the all
Of him built up a mighty Generall.
And to make wonder gaze more, he could be
Th' Historiographer and th' Historie:
As if his mightie acts to vanquish men
Had been on purpose done to trie his pen.
Oblivion so threw dust upon what he
Most fairly wrote unto posteritie.
And thou, brave man at arms, great Roan, hast tane
His lively portraict out of Mars his fane,
And arm'd thy self by him: yea, shown to all,
Thou knew'st to write, and be a Generall.
See with what art the Chymist deals, and how
Spirits from bodies he extracts, so thou.
How smart he gives his stratagemes, and where
Their hidden vertue lies he makes appeare!
Mark with how curious hand he those doth trie
And fit unto our times, and so apply.
[Page]The Grecian tacticks Cesar brought to Rome,
And this brave Duke to us, as from their tombe.
What weapons and what forms may fit again
He well revives which seem'd before but vain.
If e'r Pythagoras were right to hold
A transmigration, he doth it unfold.
But view his own directions, quick and wise;
He makes towns strong, but strangely doth surprise:
He rouzeth lazie minds, and seems to write
Men into field, and teach them how to fight.
Mirrour of manhood, that art here, though gone;
Then Vertues self a better tombe there's none.
And Thou, my Friend, that freely dost discover
So rich a jewel, and hast brought it over,
Merit'st no mean applause. Me thinks, I see
Each noble mind admire thy industrie,
And cherish thy rare worth; since few there are
That for the publick undergo such care.
Mount still in thy endeavours, and shine bright:
His glorie's great that lends to others light.

To the right worshipfull, • Sir John Hobart Knight and Baronnet, , • Sir Thomas Woodhous Knight & Baronnet, , • Sir John Holland Baronnet, , • Sir Hamon le Strange Knight, , • Sir Edward Waldgrave Knight, , • Sir Charles le Gros Knight, , and • Sir Robert Kemp Knight, Deputie Lieute­nants of Norfolk and Norwich; And Clement Corbet, Doctour of the Civil law, Chancellour, and Deputie Lieutenant of Norwich. 

Right Worshipfull,

A Great book is a great mischief (as it is in the Greek Adagie) and therefore it was well said of Se­neca, Magni artificis est clau­sisse multum in exiguo. Such an Artist the late great Generall the Duke of Rohan hath here proved himself, in his excellent abbridge­ment of Cesars warres, with his own obser­vations upon them; and his Militia of the Greeks and Romanes. His work is like fruits which are dried in the sunne; contra­cted [Page] to a small bulk, but full of substance and virtue. The transcendency thereof mo­ved me to communicate it to our Nation in these times of action. May it please you to afford it your Patronage, and to accept it as a testimonie of all due respects from

Your most humble Servant, J. C.

The complete Captain, OR An Abbridgement of Cesars warres. The I. Book.

CESAR having the government of the Gauls for the space of five years, the first war that he made there was against the Suisses, Helvetii. caused by the am­bition of Orgetorix, who was a rich, noble and powerfull man in that Nation: He perswaded this people (which were hardy by nature, and exercised in arms by the warres which they had with their neighbours) to inlarge them­selves into Gallia, a countrey more spacious and better then their own. For this effect (resolu­tion being taken) they take three years space to make their preparations: In which time they furnish themselves with waggons and horses of burden, taking order that all their countrey be imployed to all sorts of grain to make their pro­vision of victuall, and name Orgetorix to be their Generall and Conductour, who for his part imployeth that time in fortifying himself by the assistance of his neighbours, Sequanus. perswadeth Casticus a Burgundian to make himself Lord of his countrey as his father had been, Aeduus. draweth in Dumnorix of Autun, brother to Divitiacus to the same designe, the most powerfull man of his citie, and giveth him his daughter in marriage. But the Suisses, being ever jealous of their liber­tie, and perceiving that Orgetorix aspired to [Page 2] bring them under subjection, seised on his per­son; and during the contestations about his tri­all (having a great train of kinsfolks and partakers) he died in prison. This abated not the designe of this people; which on their appoint­ed day having taken as much victuall as would serve them for three moneths, burnt the rest of their corn, and all their cities to the number of twelve, and 4. hundred villages, and having per­swaded those of Basil, Rauraci. Tulingi. Latobrici. Distalingen, and Clacky, their neighbours, to do the like, they depart and march towards Geneva, there to passe the Rhosne. Cesar having intelligence thereof goeth speedi­ly to Geneva, assembleth what forces he can, causeth a bridge to be broken down which lay upon the Rhosne, Rhodanus. and maketh a ditch and ram­pire of eighteen miles long from the lake of Ge­neva to the hill Jura, to hinder their passage over the Rhosne. Which the Suisses understanding send deputies to him to desire passage: he holdeth them in suspense, and promiseth them answer at another time; mean while he prepareth to hinder them: and they (after refusall, and having attempted the passage in vain) take their way through Burgundie which Dumno­rix procured for them. Which Cesar ob­serving, leaveth Labienus at Geneva, goeth and levieth new Legions, followeth them, and lighting upon them at the passage of the Saosne defeateth the fourth part of their troups, Arrar. which were not as yet passed over. Af­ter that, he maketh a bridge over the river, and pursueth them: but his victuall beginning to fall short, and perceiving that Dumnorix hindered those of Autun from affording him such pro­visions [Page 3] as they had promised, he acquainteth Divitiacus with it, being his great friend and brother to Dumnorix; who confesseth it, inter­cedeth for him, and obteineth his pardon. After that, having learned that the Suisses were in­camped at the foot of a hill, he causeth it to be viewed, and finding it to be of easie accesse, he sendeth Labienus thither (causing him to march all night) to gain the top of the hill: and in the morning, having put his forces into bat­talia, he dispatcheth Considius to discover; who, having taken the allarm of Labienus, returneth to Cesar that the enemy had seised the top of the hill, which stayed him that day from de­feating the Suisses. The day following he ta­keth the way of Beaulne to distribute corn to his armie: which the Suisses perceiving, Bibracte. follow him. Cesar seeing them coming possesseth himself of a hill, embattelleth his army about the middle of the descent, & on the top he quartereth two new levied legions and all the baggage, alighteth and sendeth away his horse, and causeth all the rest to do the like, to shew them that they must overcome or die. The Suisses charge him; he de­feateth them and pursueth them hotly, forbid­deth those of Langres to assist them with victu­all, Lingones. and in the end constraineth them to submit to his discretion: He disarmeth them, receiveth hostages, and forceth them to return to inha­bit their countrey, and reedifie their houses. And of three hundred sixtie eight thousand per­sons (whereof there were ninetie two thou­sand bearing arms) there returned in all but an hundred and ten thousand.

Observations.

THe resolution of this people, which seemeth to be bar­barous, and which for the bad successe is universally condemned, hath neverthelesse the same principles which all Conquerours have, namely, the desire of command and enlarging themselves: and they are remarkable in their fore­cast of three yeares preparation, in their constancie for not deficting from their designe after the death of their Gene­rall; and in the execution thereof, burning their goods and houses to the end they might leave themselves no hope of safetie, but onely in the sharpnesse of their swords. Whence we may gather, that we ought not to undertake any great designe timorously, nor to look to the means of escape but rather of overcoming. For if in the beginning of a dangerous designe you make known a way of escape, the impatience or naturall timorousnesse of men maketh them find out that way upon the least accident that befalleth. And if the Suisses had not met with the incomparable virtue of Cesar, who by his valour, industrie, diligence and good fortune stayed their furie, they might have atteined the scope of their enterprises.

In the managing of his warre Caesar hath shewed (as in all other) that that which hath made him fortunate in his exploits hath principally been his invariable order of encamping strongly, alwayes entrenching himself, that so he might never be compelled to fight but when he pleased, and that he might lay hold on such occasions as offered themselves to defeat his enemies; also his providence in taking care that his provision of victuall failed not; and his continuall keeping of his souldiers in exercise and in breath, to make them able to execute his designes readily and in good order.

The pardon of Dumnorix is observable: his naturall clemency induced him to it, suffering himself to be over­come by the intreaties of his brother Divitiacus whom he loved: Neverthelesse he caused heed to be taken to his de­portments, that so he might receive no new inconveniences by him afterward.

The errour of Considius sheweth how much it concern­eth to send men of experience to discover an army: And the commanding of the Suisses to return and reinhabite their countrie was an act of prudence, thereby hindering [Page 5] the Germanes (being a most powerfull nation) from pre­occupation thereof, and by that means their neighbour­bood to Provence.

The second warre.

THe subject of the second warre was this: The division of the Auvergnats and Autu­nois puissant people in Gallia had called in the Germanes, Averni & Aedui. by the help of which the first had o­vercome the other; neverthelesse they all found themselves oppressed, and the conquerours much more then the conquered: for these were discharged for some tribute and hostages, and from the other the Germans took away the greatest part of their lands, insomuch that all seeing themselves subdued, they hold an assem­bly of States by the permission of Cesar to desire his aid, which he promiseth. But having sent to Ariovistus, the Generall of the Germanes, to this end, he received replies so insolent, that at last they fell fowl; where Cesar defeated him, and chaced both him and all the Germanes out of Gallia, forcing them to passe the Rhine again.

These two wars were finished in one summer.

Observations.

VVHereby we may observe how dangerous such auxi­liarie succours are, especially when you require them of a people more powerfull then your own. Cesar hath indeed driven out Ariovistus, but the Gauls have done nothing but changed maister. He imbarked himself in this war for two reasons: the first, because be suspected that this puissant nation, taking footing in Gallia, might come to gain upon Provence, and so draw near to Italy; and the other, that thereby he insinuated himself insensibly into the con­quest of the said Gauls. Which businesse he managed so dextrously by enterteining their divisions amongst them, [Page 6] that by the aid of the one he conquered the other, and in the end subdued all.

We must further observe his diligence (so much recom­mended in all his actions) to possesse himself of Besancon, having prevented his enemies, and by this means provided for the nourishment of his armie. There it was that a pa­nike fear seised upon his souldiers, which began by the vo­luntiers: who desiring to depart discouraged the rest, that so they might cover their own shame by the generall delinquencie of the armie: which is a most dangerous thing, and whereof a Generall of an army ought to take extraor­dinary care, never to hazard any battel untill he hath re­covered his souldiers spirits again; which Cesar did at this time by making an oration to them, wherein he excelled. He further helped himself (as many other commanders, especially Marius) by encamping strongly before this ter­rible armie, and making his souldiers know by small skir­mishes that their enemies were not invincible nor more valiant then themselves; and causing them to conceive that joyning order and militarie discipline to the prudence of their Generall, they were their superiours. For the Ro­manes have never conquered other nations by their great number, nor by their valour, but by their knowledge in warre, (which they alwayes exercised) by the observa­tion of their order, and entrenchment of their camp. Whereupon we must consider that Ariovistus being encamp­ed between Cesar and the place from whence he had his victuall, and that Cesar not being able to draw him to battel in five dayes, after that he had well fortified that camp be goeth with all his army in battaglia to fortifie a small one, in a place of advantage, two miles distant from the first, and which favoured the way for his victuall, making the third part of his army to work whilest the other two thirds stood in battaglia, which repulsed the troups which Ariovistus sent to hinder the said fortifica­tion: which being made he leaveth two legions there, and leadeth away the rest into his old camp. The next day Cesar putteth himself into battaglia between the two camps, but being retired, Ariovistus assaulteth the small one, and is re­pulsed. Cesar having thus reconfirmed the courages of his souldiers, sallieth out with his whole armie in battaglia, and goeth up to the very trenches of Ariovistus, provoketh him to fight; who sallieth out, and is defeated.

The third warre. The II. Book.

CEsars third warre was against the Belgae, the third part of Gallia, and at that time the most warlike. The principall causes were, that, seeing the rest of the Gaules in peace with the Romanes, they feared an assault; besides they were solicited by certain Gauls discontented, or ambitious: the one of which took as little pleasure to see the Romanes as Germanes in their countrey; and the other apprehensive that during their abode they should not be able to possesse them­selves of any principalitie or dominion. The number of their forces amounted to two hun­dred eighty and one thousand fighting men. Cesar, having understood these great preparati­ons, Bellouaci. causeth those of Beauvais to be assailed by Divitiacus and those of Autun; and being assu­red of those of Rhems, which declared them­selves for him, he goeth & encampeth upon the river Daisne near to Soissons, relieveth Brenne, Axona. Suessones. Bibrax. and (the enemy attempting to passe that river) he opposeth and killeth a great number of them. After that, victuall growing short for so great an armie, and they of Beauvais understanding that Divitiacus harried their countrey, they resolved to return every man to his own home, and be in a readinesse to relieve the first that should be as­saulted: But they retreated in such disorder, that Cesar had leisure to overtake them; who charging on the rear, routed them, where he made a great massacre; Noviodu­num. and in pursuit of them he besiegeth and taketh Noyon. All these submit­ted, [Page 8] except they of Tournay, Nervii. esteemed the most va­liant of al; who having disposed of their old men, women, and children, resolved to defend them­selves. Cesar goeth to them: who assault him so fu­riously as he was going to his quarters, that they had like to have defeated him: so that he con­fessed, that in this conflict his good fortune had equall share with his valour and industrie. Ne­verthelesse he defeated them, after which he findeth no more resistance; the renown of whose victories made him dreadfull even as farre as Germanie, and gained him all Normandy and Bretain, which Publius Crassus one of his Lieu­tenants subjected to the Romanes with onely one Legion.

Observations.

VVE must here observe the judgement of Cesar, who by his diligence assured himself of those of Rhems, by his industrie and affabilitie held them faithfull, and by his foresight prepared a diversion against those of Beau­vois, (a bold and stout people) which redounded much to his profit. Further it is to be considered that an army of thirtie or fourtie thousand men trained and well disci­plined, is able (with patience well intrenching and en­camping it self) to discomfit the most numerous armies, which for want of victuall destroy themselves; and if they fight (provided that you avoid being surrounded on all parts) their disorders and confusion will also break them. The warres of the Romanes do prove this true; who have never defeated their enemies but with lesser number; nor were ever forced to sallie out of their retrenched camp, to give battel against their wills: and particularly this pre­sent, wherein Cesar hath had more to do against one Pro­vince [...]lone of the Belgae then against all the rest together, having very particularly described the battel which he had against those of Tournay, as one of the most dangerous which he ever had; wherein there be diverse things wor­thy consideration.

[Page]The first, That those of Tournay being advertised that Cesar caused every Legion to march with its baggage after it, they resolved to lay an Embuscado and to fight with them, truly judging that the baggage separating the Le­gions in an inclosed countrey, they should not be able to re­lieve each other, and that otherwise they might (with all their forces) set upon each Legion apart.

The second, That they found themselves deceived in their presupposition; because that though Cesar commanded his army to march so in a countrey of securitie for the com­modiousnesse thereof; neverthelesse when he was in a su­spected countrey, he caused six Legions to march together, then all the baggage, and in the rear of that two Legions newly levied. And it was in this order, and upon his en­camping, when they charged him.

The third is the confession of Cesar: who freely acknow­ledgeth that his armie was assaulted so unexspectedly and couragiously, and in a countrey so inclosed, that it was neither his customary order which saved him (for he had no leisure to embattel) nor his exhortations, nor his ap­pearance in all parts (for he was forced to fight in the place he then was in) but he attributed the safetie thereof onely to the continued discipline of his souldiers, which knew of themselves to range where they ought, & to that that he ever made all his officers exactly observe the performance of their duties, whilest the intrenchment of the camp was a making; so that in all parts were found some ready to command, and others to obey; which made good the resistance, and hin­dred the affrightment.

The fourth, That a rash resolution is oftentimes to be feared; and to avoid it, must never be omitted whatsoever dependeth on military discipline.

And the fifth, That the treason which those of Bolduc (whom he had besieged in the best of their fortres­ses) would have committed against him after they had yielded themselves, Aduatici. should teach us that we should alwaies distrust an enemy, and keep our selves so much the more up­on our guards, the nearer we are to overcome.

The fourth warre. The III. Book.

THe first exploit of arms was against Servius Galba one of Cesars Lieutenants, who ha­ving sent him with a Legion and some horse in­to the countreyes of Aelen, Antuates. Veragri. Seduni. Allobroges Lacus Le­manus. Valias, and Sion (which extendeth from Savoy to the lake of Geneva) to assure the traffick of merchants, af­ter some successefull combats, made peace with that people, received their hostages, and ha­ving left two companies in the countrey of Ae­len, he goeth with the rest of the Legion to quarter at the town of Martanach situated in a valley, Octodurus. and divided into two by a little river called the Branse: on the one side whereof he intrencheth his camp, and on the other he quar­tereth the Gauls which were with him. The small number of souldiers which he had in his camp (as yet not in good defense) emboldned those people to revolt; hoping that they should at the first assault defeat him. For it was in­supportable unto them that he should have their children in hostage: and they feared also that the Romanes would annex those places to Provence, which was near at hand. So that he saw him­self assaulted on all parts, before he had leisure to understand the danger he was in; and finding his affairs in great extremitie, having neither victuall to subsist nor men to make a long resi­stance, despair made him follow the counsel of Publ us Sextius Baculus first Centurion of that Cohort, Tribunus. and of Caius Volusenus Colonel of a thousand men, which was to sally out from all [Page 11] parts upon the enemy: which they did so vio­lently, that they which thought they were not able to defend themselves in their trenches de­feated them in open field. That done, he maketh use of their discomfiture to retire his Legion in­to a place of safetie.

But the occasion of the fourth warre was this. Publius Crassus one of Cesars Lieutenants having sent divers Tribunes to make provision of corn necessary for the feeding of his army, into the countreyes of Perche, Cornoaille, and Vannes; Vaelli. Curiosilitae. Veneti. they reteined them contrary to publick faith, in hope thereby to recover their hostages. By this example their neighbours did the like, and all sent word to Crassus that they would not deliver them up unlesse he restored their hostages. Cesar, having heard of this combination, pre­pareth diligently for a warre, truly considering that if he suffered this he should open a gap to a generall revolt; for he well knew the readi­nesse of the French to take arms, loving their libertie and abhorring servitude. He provideth in the first place to hinder the increasing of the league; to this end he sendeth Labienus into the countrey of Triers with the cavalrie, Trevori. giving him order to visit those of Rhems and the Belgae; Aquitania. Publius Crassus into Gascongne with 12 Legionarie ensignes, and good store of horse; Quintus Titu­rius Sabinus with 3. Legions into Perche, Allen­con, and Lysieux; Lexobii. giveth the command at sea to D. Brutus, & himself with the land-forces resol­veth to charge those of Vannes, the chief cause of this war. Their countrey is maritime, of dif­ficult approch, and strong in shipping; insomuch that when with much labour he had brought a [Page 12] place to the extremitie of being taken, the inha­bitants imbarked themselves with their goods, and removed to another: so that what he did was little worth, untill his navie being arrived he gave them battel, and defeated them: after which they yielded themselves to Cesar, who put to death all the Senate, and caused the peo­ple to be sold. At the same time the Lieutenants which Cesar had distributed amongst the Gauls had their hands full: Q. Titurius Sabinus was set upon by Viridonix, commander of severall na­tions, with strong forces; but by his patience and subtiltie he drew him on to assault him in his camp, and overcame him; which reassured all that countrey. P. Crassus on the Guyenne side defeated the Sontiates, besieging them in their citie, and took it. After capitulation Adcan­tuannus their Governour made a sally with six hundred of his trustiest souldiers, and attempteth to master the Romane camp; but being repulsed, Crassus neverthelesse holdeth himself to the ca­pitulation before agreed upon. During the time of this siege the people of Spain and Gascongne about the Pyrenean hils make a league together, and choose their commanders out of those Cap­tains which had been trained under Sertorius, Crassus assaulteth them: they entrench and cut off his victuall, in so much that he is constrained to fight with them within their trenches, wherein (as good luck served) he found some defect, by means of which he defeated them. This victory caused all that people to submit. Cesar seeing none in arms but onely those of Terovenne and Gueldres, Mori [...]i. Menapii. though the summer were farre spent, marcheth thither; where he findeth a new way [Page 13] of warring, the people holding themselves with­in, he goeth to find them out, and being near approched, as he was fortifying his camp they assaulted him, and were repulsed: after which, Cesar advanceth into the forrest it self, causeth the trees to be cut down, and made use of them in stead of a rampart; and by an incredible la­bour and diligence he was already advanced to the place where they kept all their cattel and last baggage; but the season grew so stormy and wet that he was constrained to draw his armie into their winter-garrison.

Observations.

SO ended this warre: where we will observe first the pro­fitablenesse of the intrenchments of camps, which in en­tire countreys serve for a bridle, as citadels to cities; the Romanes having never been able to have held so many conquered States under their obedience, but onely by that means: For armies garrisoned in sever all towns may by being so separated be defeated totally, or in part, by conspiracie; besides, the delicacies of cities do overthrow all militarie discipline, and abase all generous courage. How­soever if there be more fortresses then can well be maintein­ed, you must demolish them, to the end that nothing may be able to resist the armie: which being always in an in­tire body, opposeth it self against all combinings of con­spiratours; it being most certain, that not onely for the keeping reliefs out of a conquered Province, but also for the conservation of your countrey against greater forces then your own (giving order that there be no want of vi­ctuall) it is to be done by intrenching strongly: for whosoever putteth himself wholly upon the defensive, and shutteth himself up in walled towns, must in time ne­cessarily perish, unlesse he receiveth forreign reliefs: for that by two or three yeares spoil of the increase of the champains the cities must of necessitie starve, and thereby know your inabilitie to preserve them; so that they will rather yield to your enemy then perish.

[Page 14]In the second place we will consider how Crassus was put to it, when he had to do with commanders which had been trained under Sertorius, and which (according to the custome of the Romanes) could make benefit of the advan­tage of grounds, fortifie their camp, and cut off their enemies victuall: for by such a manner of warring they had brought the said Crassus to such a passe that he was constrained to assault their camp; which albeit he forced (whether by having better souldiers, or by finding some part of it ill fortified) yet it is certain that he undertook that task out of despair rather then judgement, as being in danger to perish for want of victuals.

We will further observe that Cesar in all these actions by no diversitie of making warre was ever astonished, whe­ther he were assaulted in open field or in his camp, whether surprised, or whether his enemie retired into places inac­cessible; alwayes finding them out in all places, and that without omitting one onely point of militarie discipline. For though our enemies sometime do actions which have shew of fear, the better to circumvent us; yet must we not therefore disesteem them: no profession being like to that of a souldier, wherein one fault can never be repaired, and wherein one houre causeth the losse of that reputation which hath been thirtie yeares acquiring.

To conclude this discourse I will onely adde this, That the crueltie which Cesar used towards those of Vannes ought not to blemish his clemencie manifested in the whole course of his life; but we must rather believe that he forced his disposition in this severe action to chastise the viola­tours of the law of nations, in that they imprisoned those which (under promise of safetie) went to negotiate with them; and also to give a terrour to all that people so sub­ject to revolt, by letting them tast the sweetnesse of a mild government while they kept within the lists of obedi­ence, and by using them rigourously when they departed from it.

The fifth warre. The IV. Book.

THe Germanes of Francfort and Hessen, Usipetes. Tenchtheri to the number of foure hundred thousand souls, finding themselves persecuted by the Suevians (the most puissant and hardy people of Germanie) abandon their native homes; and after, wandring through divers countreys, they approch the Rhine about the Provinces of Guel­dres and Gulick: out of which they drive the inhabitants, and possesse themselves of their ter­ritories on both sides of the river. Cesar (which knew the humour of the French to be turbulent and ready to shake off the yoke of servitude) resolved not to suffer the Germanes to settle themselves on this side the Rhine. And though he well perceived that they had begun a treatie with them, he dissembled it, and (anticipating the time which formerly he used for his going in­to the field) hastneth directly to fight with the foresaid Germanes: Which (being astonished at this diligence) send Embassadours to him to treat of peace. He giveth them fair audience and courteous answer, but holdeth on his march still towards them: at last they come to ac­cord, conditioning with Cesar to remain where he was three dayes; he granteth them one: whereupon his cavalrie (to the number of five thousand) advancing to forrage, encoun­treth with eight hundred Germane horse; which charge them bravely, rout them, and chace them even to the Romane camp: but the next day sending all their principall commanders to [Page 16] Cesar to excuse this action, and to make ap­pear unto him that it was by mere accident. He reteineth them prisoners, marcheth with his ar­my towards the Germanes, surpriseth them, and cutteth them all in pieces. Which done he makes a bridge over the Rhine, goeth into Germanie, re­lieveth the citie of Cullen, Ubii, or Colonia Agrippina. granteth peace to such as would deliver hostages, burneth and wasteth the rest, and at the end of eighteen dayes breaketh down his bridge and returneth into France.

Observations.

VVE must here observe Cesars wise conduct, who by his ready and unexpected march dissolved the practices which were in agitation between the Germanes and Gauls; by his dissimulation towards the Gauls (pre­tending not to know their plottings, and testifying his con­fidence of them) held them in fair quarter and hindred them from precipitating themselves into a league with the Germanes; by his industrie delayed them by treaties, whilest he still marched towards them; and when occasion served took his advantage to take them in disorder and destitute of commanders, making them believe they had first broke the treatie.

Next we must consider, that upon the fame of this great defeat he caused the Romane Eagles to flie on the other side of the Rhine, to strike a terrour into the Germanes, and be a means to retein them for the future from further at­tempting: Besides, he would not passe over the Rhine by boats, as a thing too full of hazard, but he made a bridge, which he caused to be fortified and guarded on both sides of the river: neither stayed be longer in that countrey then was necessary for the reputation of his armie; and at his return brake down his bridge, taking away by that course the means from the Germanes of making use thereof.

I adde further, that the defeat of five thousand Ro­mane horse, by eight hundred of the Germane cavalrie, [Page 17] and the day after, the defeat of foure hundred thousand Germanes by thirtie or fourtie thousand Romanes, sheweth plainly that it is not the naturall valour of one nation above another, nor the greater number above the smaller, which giveth the conquest; but the exact observation of milita­rie discipline, and the continuall exercise of arms: which instructeth men not onely to fight well, but also to take advantages, and to know when to fight and when not.

The sixth warre.

CEsars sixth warre was against the Britains, because the inhabitants of that Island did oftentimes assist the French against him. To this end he enquireth of merchants which trafficked there, what nations did inhabit it, what their manner of warring, under what laws they li­ved, and which were their best havens. Then he dispatched C. Volusenus to discover the coast: Then sent for his shipping, which he had used in his war against those of Vannes, and prepared all things necessary for his designe. The noise of this preparation gave occasion to many cities of Britain to send Embassadours to him, to pro­mise obedience, and to offer him hostages; which he returned with fair language, and with them Comius (whom he had made king of Arras) under which pretext he might the better discover the countrey: Neverthelesse, Atrebates. Comius, not daring to trust himself amongst the Britains, stayed onely five dayes upon their coasts, and then returned to give an account of what he had discovered. Mean time Cesar makes peace with those of Terovenne, Morini. that so he might leave no warre behind him, taketh two Legions and part of his cavalrie, sendeth the rest of his army into the countrey of Gueldres, Menapii. under the [Page 18] command of Q. Titurius Sabinus, and Aruncu­leius Cotta, giveth the guard of the Port from whence he imbarqued unto P. Sulpitius Rufus, and putteth to sea. He arriveth safely upon the coast of Britain (with his Infanterie onely) which he findeth all in arms; he at­tempteth to land there, where finding too much difficultie, he goeth and doth it eight miles fur­ther, and yet not without danger: Neverthe­lesse he so affrighted the Britains that they sent to him to desire peace. But a tempest arising, which battered many of his ships, and drove a-ground all those which carried his horse, gave them new courage; and in stead of giving him hostages, they armed all the countrey against him, ill intreating one of his Legions which went to forrage; which he relieveth, and bringeth safe­ly off. In these extremities Cesar taketh care for the repairing of his navie, for provision of victuall, and for the securing of his camp; and being again assailed by the inhabitants of the Island, he giveth them combat, and defeateth them: Which forceth them afresh to desire peace: he granteth it, taketh hostages of those that would readily deliver them, and carrieth back his armie into Gallia safe and sound; one­ly two shippes with three hundred souldiers, which landed a little lower, were set upon by those of Teraenne; which Cesar being inform­ed of, hastneth thither with his cavalrie, re­scueth them, and defeateth the enemies.

Observations.

IT is to be observed, that to beginne a warre in autumne, without apparent advantage, in a countrey undiscove­red, not having any intelligence there, and the Ocean to passe, is an enterprise (in my opinion) well worthy the invincible courage of Cesar, but not of his accustomed pru­dence. Neverthelesse, this escape must be attributed to his good fortune, which he had subjected to his will. For in this designe, where it seemed that men and elements were conjured against him, the earth refusing him victuall, the sea battering his ships, the air furnishing tempests, and the countrey where he landed conspiring his ruine, he constantly resisted all this; opposing against famine his providence of making provis [...]n for his armie; against the wracks of the sea, his diligence in repairing his vessels; against the as­saults of his enemies, his armies to resist them, insomuch that he constrained them to beg for peace: and so he re­turned gloriously from a bad countrey, where any else would have suffered extremely. Let us also consider, that before he departed from France he took care to provide what was necessarie to keep it in obedience, and for the securitie of his return. Let us further note, how abundant Cesar was in his inventions, for the advantagious taking of his time, in the very occasion it self: for perceiving that his souldiers (not accustomed to sea-fights) were distracted at their landing▪ he (in the very action) changeth his first order, and with his galleys approcheth nearer the coast, and in spite of his enemies landeth; and they (see­ing a kind of vessels they knew not) were affrighted, and betook themselves to their heels. Also we ought to ad­mire in Cesar two things which he had to perfection, and which render a commander excellent; namely that he fore­cast and provided for all things which might either further or hinder this designe before he undertook it; and that in the very execution be sailed not to take his advantage when occasion presented it, or to remedy upon the instant such unexpected accidents as befell; wherein he hath been inimitable.

The seventh warre. The V. Book.

CEsar not satisfied with his first voyage into Britain imployeth the winter to cause such equipage to be prepared as was necessarie for his passage thither the second time, and according to his custome goeth into Lombardy, from whence (before his return) he passeth into Sclavonia to quiet some seditions which were there befallen: Illyricum. afterwards returneth to his armie, findeth all in good order, commendeth every man for their di­ligence in getting all things in readinesse. But be­fore his departure he goes to Triers, a very pow­erfull people, about a division fallen between In­duciomarus and Cingentorix, the two great men of the town: The last cometh to him and promi­seth him all obedience: the other prepareth for warre; neverthelesse, fearing to be abandoned, yieldeth himself; Cesar receiveth him, but dimi­nisheth his authoritie, and augmenteth that of Cingentorix, whom he believeth best affected to him: which done, he continueth his designe, takes along with him the principall men of Gal­lia in this warre. Dumnorix of Autun makes dif­ficulties; Cesar presseth him, he excuseth him­self; then attempts to seduce the Gauls, at last he flies; Cesar sendeth after him, but refusing to return, Iccius. is slain. He imbarkt at Calice, where he left Labienus with three legions and two thou­sand horse; he passeth into Britain, and landeth without resistance: he fortifieth a camp to guard his vessels, leaveth Q. Atrius there, and passeth further; forceth the camp of the Britains not farre distant from thence. The next day A­trius [Page 21] sendeth him word that the tempests had shattered the greater part of his navie; he return­eth thither, imployeth ten whole dayes about re­pairing them, draws them on shore, causeth the camp to be well fortified, commandeth Labie­nus to cause n [...]w ships to be built, then advan­ceth towards Cassivellanus, declared Generall for the Britains, who dares not assail him but when he goes to forrage, which causeth him to go strong and in good order; & after he had triall of his manner of fight by some skirmishes, he defeat­ed him by C. Trebonius one of his Lieutenants, who went thither with three legions and all the cavalry. After this defeat there appeared no more enemies in grosse; and Cesar, being come to the river Thames passeth it at the onely place where it was fordable, in despite of the Britains, who endeavoured to their utmost to hinder him: which so astonished Cassivellanus, that all his care was to hide himself in the woods; & seeing that divers towns had yielded themselves to Cesar, he also sent to him; who received him, giving hostages, imposing a certain tribute upon the countrey. Thē seeing the season much spent, and fearing some tumults in France, he repasseth the sea, bringing back his armie gloriously, which (contrary to his custome) he was con­strained (by reason of the barrennesse of the yeare) to separate into divers garrisons to keep it alive. But before he could go into Italie, Ambiorix and Cativulcus instigated by Indu­ciomarus take arms, assail Sabinus and Cotta two of his Lieutenants, defeat and kill them as they were removing from their camp; from thence they go and assail Cicero in his camp, [Page 22] another of his Lieutenants, which defendeth himself with much difficulty; Cesar relieveth him, and defeateth the Gauls. The report of the defeat of two Romane legions inciteth the other Gauls to revolt; insomuch that Labienus is assaulted in his camp by Induciomarus: he with­standeth the assault, afterwards conquereth and killeth him. As the first defeat of the Romane legions moved all the Gauls to revolt, so these two last overthrows made them lay down their arms.

Observations.

IN this second voyage of Cesar into Britain, though he went thither with greater forces and better prepared then at first, having supplied those defects which were wanting before; neverthelesse going into a countrey which he could not come to but by sea, where he had no intelligence, and go­ing from another newly conquered, subject to revoltings, and which grudgingly endured subjection, he rather therein sa­tisfied his own ambition, then that he added any great pro­fit to the Romanes. Wherein we will first observe his dexte­rity and prudence, in that he carried along with him (as voluntaries) all the stirring spirit [...] ▪ amongst the Gauls, which served as hostages for him. But it appears, his naturall clemency made him commit an errour, in contenting him­self to have diminished the authority of Induciomarus, when indeed he should have ruined him; whereof he found the in­convenience afterward.

Secondly, that he never was moved at any unexpected accidents, for which he was prepared as if he had foreseen them, which he made to appear to good purpose in this great tempest, which shattered all his ships, and would have dri­ven any but himself to desperation.

Thirdly, though he were renowned for the Captain which best knew how to make use of his victories, and which hath pursued them homest; he would not do it here, because he was in an unknown countrey, and his camp not as yet well fortified.

Let us consider also, that howsoever the scarcity of corn [Page 23] compelled him (contrary to his custome) to cause his army to make their winter-garrisons in severall places, and not all together, to the end that they might with more facility be furnished with victuall; yet he did it with such judgement, as that the places where they quartered were not so far di­stant, but that they could easily relieve each other; nor so near, but they held divers States in obedience. Neverthe­lesse the successe sheweth us evidently, that it is not so good as to be quartered in an intire body, because it is easier to as­sail a small troop then a great; which gave encourage­ment to the Gauls to revolt and to assail the camp of Sabinus & Cotta: where the artificiall oration of Ambiorix perswa­ding them that the revolt was so generall, that at the same instant all the other camps were assaulted, and could not re­lieve each other, put them into such a confusion in matter of counsel, that fear made them choose the worst, which was to forsake their camp and retreat. Whence we may learn, That he never speedeth well that followeth the counsels of an enemy; and, That a retreat in view of the enemy is the most dangerous action that can be undertaken.

Cicero his resistance [...]ithi [...] his camp, which refused to follow his enemies counsel, and resolved to defend himself within his trenches, proved for his safetie and great glory; and gave time to Cesar to relieve him: wherein there be two things remarkable; The first of Cesar, who having under­stood that the Gauls came towards him to give him battel, finding himself weak maketh choice of an advantageous place, fortifieth it, maketh his camp very small, to the end he might the better defend it, and make his enemies believe that he was exceeding weak; whom (after they had many times provoked him to fight) they began to disregard, which begot a neglect of all order amongst them; so that they assaulted him ever after disorderly: having thus lulled them asleep, on a day he chargeth them so furiously, that he defeateth them without resistance And Lab [...]enus one of his Lieute­nants by a like stratageme did the like to Induciomarus. The second of the Gauls, who not being able to force the camp of Cicero, shut him up by a retrenchment which con­teined ten miles in circuit, made in three houres, and by men which had nothing to dig with but their swords, and nothing to carry earth with but their clothes: which argueth they were a great multitude, and sheweth what may be done by armies well regulated and well provided.

The eighth warre. The VI. Book.

CEsar, perceiving the affairs of the Gauls to incline to warre, fortifieth himself by three Romane Legions, and as many other souldiers as he could get; which fell out very happily for him: for after the death of Induciomarus the Tre­vois put their government into the hands of his kindred, which made league with all that would revolt, and particularly with Ambiorix; whereof Cesar being advertised, joyns foure le­gions together in winter, surprises those of Tour­nay, forceth them to yield & deliver hostages. And in the spring following causeth the Gauls to as­semble at Paris, Lutetia. from whence, on the same day that the assembly brake up, he goeth and assault­eth those of Sens, Senones. Carnutes. then those of Chartres, who (finding themselves surprised) yield. From thence he prepareth to set upon Ambiorix and those of Triers, but first he laboureth to draw a­way from them their allies: To which end he dis­cardeth all his baggage, which he commits to La­bienus (who was in the countrey of Triers) with two legions to guard it, and himself with five go­eth to assail the Gauls. For execution whereof he divided his army into three parts; for that he well knew they were not able to dispute the cham­pain with him, and so burnt and pillaged their countrie, that he constrained them to yield, to de­liver hostages, and to forsake Ambiorix. At the same time they of Triers assail Labienus; who making a shew of fear, and retreating as if he had fled, draweth them in disorder into places of disadvantage, where he defeateth them, and [Page 25] taketh the very citie of Triers. This expedition being finished, Cesar maketh a bridge over the Rhine, and passeth it: they of Cullen adhere to him; he fortifieth his camp, and maketh provision of victuall, attempteth to compell the Suevians to battel; but seeing them retreat into vast and deep forrests, he forbeareth to pursue them; repasseth the Rhine, cutteth off (on the Germane side) onely 120 foot of his bridge, maketh a good tower on the end thereof, at the other end on the side of Gallia he buildeth a fort, leaving twelve cohorts to guard that and the said bridge. (In this place Cesar maketh a description of the manners and customes of the Gauls and the Germanes) That done he goeth to continue the warre against Ambiorix; and the better to surprise him he sendeth L. Minutius Basilius before, with all the cavalrie, forbidding him the making any fire in his camp to the end his approch might be undiscovered, by which means he thought to have seised upon Ambiorix; who saved himself miraculously by flying from one place to another, & Cesar (the better to follow him) conveys again his baggage into a castle of the Liegeois called Vatucca, Eburones. Wachten­donck. for guard whereof he left Q. Tullius Cicero with one legion, commanding him for seven dayes (the time which his expedition would take up) to look carefully to his guards, and not to stirre out of his trenches. Then di­vided he his army into three parts to harrasse all that countrey; who meeteth with nothing in the form of an army to oppose him, insomuch that his greatest care was to prevent that his souldiers (co­vetous of booty) straggled not too far abroad, for fear of being cut off by the enemies, which lay [Page 26] hidden in forrests and boggs. The report reach­ed presently to the other side of the Rhine, that Cesar exposed the countrey of Gueldres to pillage; Menapii. which occasioned the Westfalians to participate of the booty: Sicambri. they presently get together two thousand horse, passe the Rhine, pillage without resistance, & are so well pleased with tast thereof that they resolve to set upon the Romane camp; when by misfortune, that day being the seventh from Cesars departing, Cicero (which had ob­served his command very exactly, and having no news, nor suspecting an enemie) suffered him­self by the importunity of his souldiers to give way to them to forrage, and at the same instant was (unexpectedly) assaulted by the Westfali­ans, against whom he had much ado to defend himself; untill that his souldiers returning from forrage, part of them made their way through the enemies, and regained the camp; but the rest were cut in pieces. Neverthelesse this relief bereft the enemies of all hope of forcing the camp; and so they returned to their countrey with their bootie. A while after arrived Cesar, who rebuked Cicero for transgressing his com­mand. Then he resolveth afresh to expose the countrey of Gueldres to fire and sword, and to pursue Ambiorix, who had yet escaped: after that he sendeth his army to garrison, which he supplieth with corn, and then goeth into Italy.

Observations.

IN this warre Cesar had no great resistance, all fleeing be­fore him, having nothing to do but to pillage and burn the countrey; notwithstanding there be very good observa­tions to be made thereupon: for though you learn not hence how to fight a battel, or to expugne fortresses, yet you may [Page 27] here learn how to deal with such as save themselves by flight and by retiring into inaccessible places: wherein many Commanders have failed for the not observing of three prin­cipall things, which Cesar did: First, to prevent the ene­my by such extraordinary diligence, as to surprise them be­fore they be able to retire themselves or their victuall into the forrests; so that by this means you may constrain the one to yield, and the other to perish through famine. The second, to divide your army into as many parts as you can with safe­ty, that so assayling a countrey in severall places all at once, the inhabitants thereof will be doubtfull to what part to re­tire unto. And the last is, to hinder the souldiers from dis­banding when they go to pillage, for fear they be cut off by the enemies. By which oversight many great inconveniences have often befallen conquering armies; which should teach us never to slacken the severity of military discipline, though we believe our selves far from an enemie, and in great securi­ty. The example we have in this book of Q. Cicero is excel­lent in that kind, who received a great losse, and had like to have been utterly defeated, by suffering himself to be per­swaded by the importunity of his souldiers, which (contra­ry to Cesars command) would needs go out of their trenches to forrage.

We [...] further see the difference between old souldiers and new, who (for want of experience) knew not how to choose what was for their safety and honour, but retreated to a hill and there were cut in pieces: but the other, know­ing there was no safetie but by recovering the camp, made their way with their swords, and saved both themselves and their camp. Here we may observe how ingenious sear is to seek out subjects to augment it self; for because this place was the same where Titurius and Cotta had been defeated the yeare before, they took it for an ill omen.

Let us further observe, that Cesar (when he would make an expedition for seven or eight dayes, wh re was diligence required) discharged himself of his baggage, which in truth is a marvellous impediment in a champain; & it is im­possible to conduct an army well, if (according to occasions) you do not strongly intrench your camp, or march without baggage.

Let us also admire the good intelligence Cesar had by spies; a thing of such utilitie, as that a Prince or Generall ought to spare no cost for, it being the most powerfull means to un­dertake [Page 28] brave designes, and to avoid great ruines.

Neither must we forget his dexterity in dividing those which were entring into a combination against him, and his assaulting them severally, nor his customary d ligence in surprising them; having atteined to the end of the most part of his great designes by these wayes.

We will conclude the observations of this book with the stratageme of Labienus: who, desirous to fight with those of Triers before the G rmanes were joyned to them, resolved to make it publickly believed that he was afraid of them, and that he would retreat; knowing right well that there were Gauls in his own army which would discover it to them; and in the mean time gave order secretly to retreat with a great noise, & making shew of much fear: whereof they of Triers having intelligence, without staying for the Germanes, con­ceiving they ought not to let slip the occasion which offer­ed it self unto them, passed the river, and came disorderly as to an assured victory: but Labienus turneth upon them in good order, and defeateth them. Yet would I not counsel you at any time to attempt such a stratageme with new-levi­ed souldiers, which usually are fearfull when they see men running towards them and without order; which (on the contrary) assureth those which are experienced.

The ninth warre. The VII. Book.

THe affairs of Gallia quieted, Cesar goeth in­to Italy, according to his custome: where he heareth of the death of Piso, and the garboils of Rome; which gave new occasion to the Gauls of revolting. Chartres began, the Auvergnats followed, and at length many others. Vercinge­torix an Auvergnat is chosen Generall for all. Cesar hearing this cometh away in the depth of winter, Gaballi. passeth the mountains of Genaudan co­vered with snow, and appeareth in Auvergne be­fore it was known that he was come from Jta­ly: which caused many to hold for him, and [Page 29] startled those which were revolted. With the same diligence he passeth into Burgundy and Champaigne, where he assembleth his army, co­meth to Berry, and besiegeth it; Bituriges. and taketh Vel­laudunum (from whence he takes 600 hostages) then forceth Gien (or Orleans) where was made a great slaughter: Vercingetorix, Genabis. seeing the successe of his enemie, and conceiving his army insufficient to deal with him in the field, endea­voureth to conquer him by taking away all means of subsistence; and to this purpose burneth more then twenty towns, Avaricum preserving onely Bourges (and that too against his advise,) Cesar besieged it, where he suffered much, and found himself in great difficulties and necessities; at length having overcome them, he taketh the town, putteth to the sword fourty thousand men, & there refresh­eth his army. During this siege he attempted to surprise Vercingetorix his camp, but was repulsed yet was not discouraged at all with all this ill successe, but continueth the warre with much re­solution and prudence; and Vercingetorix, to hin­der his enemie from passing the river of Alier, Elaver. breaketh down all the bridges: neverthelesse Ce­sar making shew to passe in one place, taketh ad­vantage to do it in another; then goeth and besie­geth Clairmont. Gergobia. Vercingetorix encampeth on the other side, where were many assaults and brave combats: neverthelesse Cesar is constrain­ed to quit the siege, whether for that he made doubt of taking the town, or whether to pre­vent the revolt of the Autunois artificially pro­cured by Litavicus; who having procured him­self to be chosen Commander of a relief sent to Cesar, being but ten leagues from him, pretend­ed [Page 30] to have received news from the army, that all the Autunois there were put to the sword; which news he presently conveyeth to Autun, so that both there and in his camp all that was Romane suffered the like, with the losse of their goods to boot, but chiefly the corn which they carried to relieve the army withall: Whereof Cesar being advertised by Eporedorix, without consul­tation taketh foure legions and all his cavalrie, marcheth day and night, overtaketh Litavicus with his forces, maketh known his fraudulent dealing to the souldiers, and without striking stroke reduceth them to obedience, and with great diligence sendeth to those of Autun, to give them knowledge of what had happened; & with the same celeritie returneth very oppor­tunely to his camp, which he relieveth, finding it strongly assaulted and hardly put to it by Ver­cingetorix. That done, he taketh his way again to­wards the river of Alliers and passeth it; mean time Litavicus (who was fled towards Vercinge­torix) procureth a league of the Autunois with him; Noviodu­num. Eporedorix and Viridomarus seise upon Ne­vers, where Cesar had left his hostages, corn, and publick treasure, which they pillage and burn: Which drove him into great straits, because that Vercingetorix alwayes coasted him, and cut off his victuall. At last he resolved by great marches to gain the river Loyre, Ligeris. which he passed over to joyn with Labienus, to whom (in the be­ginning of this warre) he had given foure legi­ons to go towards Paris. Whilest things passed in this manner, Labienus was much distracted by the garboils of all these revolts: Melodu­num. notwithstanding having possessed himself of Melun, he gave jea­lousies [Page 31] to his enemies in many places, insomuch that by this trick he passed the river Seine, Sequana. & be­fore that all these revolted people could joyn forces, he defeated the first which opposed them­selves, took Prouvins, Agendi­cum. and from thence joyned with Cesar. At the same time the Gauls renew their conspiracies and intelligences, they hold an assembly, where almost all the Gauls are present, they again choose Vercingetorix Generall, who maketh provision of great store of cavalrie to the end he might disaccommodate the Romanes by cutting off their victuall. On the other side Ce­sar maketh his provisions, payeth his Germane cavalry; but Vercingetorix being carried away with good opinion conceived of his cavalry, ad­ventureth a battel with Cesar, where he was de­feated. After that he retireth himself to Ale­xia, whither Cesar followeth him and resolveth to besiege him: Vercingetorix perceiving his de­signe gathereth together all the victuall of the town, causeth it to be distributed by measure, and judgeth that by well managing thereof there would be enough for near upon two moneths, dischargeth his cavalry, sendeth every one into his countrey to procure him relief in time, and he with eighty thousand fighting men shutteth him­self into Alexia: which Cesar surroundeth with double & treble trenches, then maketh a second circumvallation, to keep out reliefs from with­out, with an incredible labour and diligence, and maketh a provision of victuall sufficient to make the besieged consume theirs; which suffer great extremity. At length relief cometh under the conduct of Comius, to the number of two hun­dred and fifty thousand; he maketh three strong [Page 32] assaults at divers times, two in the day and one in the night, is repulsed, and retreateth: where­by they of the town are constrained to yield themselves to the discretion of Cesar, who re­teined the Autunois and Auvergnats, to regain those towns which were necessary for him, and distributeth the rest amongst his souldiers. After this, all the rest submitted. Thus ended this warre, the greatest and most dangerous of all that Cesar had in Gallia.

Observations.

ALl Cesars other warres in Gallia have been made by divided parts, having made use of their divisions to ru­ine them; but this, by a generall consent of almost all: they chose one supreme Commander, great in prudence & courage, who, well perceiving that the good discipline of the Ro­manes and their knowledge in the art military, made them invincible by way of battels, changed his own way of ma­king warre against them, and by prolonging time without hazarding a generall battel, finding himself superiour in horse, and the countrey to friend, not ready to supply their armies with victuall, made just account to have ruined them: whereupon we may make very good observations.

First, upon Vercingetorix, who having been by a generall consent chosen Generall of divers States (which had emula­tions one towards another) hath known so well how to go­vern them, that what adversitie soever he met with in his affairs, he hath alwayes mainteined himself in great autho­rity and aw amongst them; not sparing to be severe where occasion required (fear being the most powerfull means to keep men in order:) ill successes never being able to deject him or diminish his confidence. Even at that time when he was accused to have had intelligence with the enemy, he so boldly defended himself by an oration, that he came off more authorised then before. Also it is an efficacious means to continue severall people in a fair obsequencie, to parle of­ten with them upon such affairs as happen. He had the power to make them set fire on above twenty cities to dis­commodate their enemies, which argued his great judgement, [Page 33] for it was the onely way to have overcome the Romanes (stronger then they in battel) to have fought with them by famine. And in such affairs all moderate counsels, or but half executed, are ruinous: as the taking of Bourges serveth us for a memorable example, for the saving of it from burn­ing preserved it for the benefit of the Romanes; which (by taking thereof) found therein such commodious things as they stood in need of. His great credit is very remarkable: for to a free people at the beginning of a warre, before they had tasted of bad successe, and in their hope to be able to overcome without being driven to so smart remedies, he pre­vaileth with them to fire their houses and goods, for the con­servation whereof warre is for the most part made. It was a very hard enterprise, for that the losse of things certain and present which we see and feel, is preferrable (with the ignorant) to things whereof the events are uncertain, and the benefits remote; and no man can well apprehend this dif­ficulty that hath not experimented it in the government of the people. He hath besides shewed his constancy even to the end, and made no scruple (being the chief of so many severall nations) to be shut up in a citie, where he did all that a pro­vident and brave Generall ought to do, and hath sur­mounted hunger and the discommodities of a siege, having held out even untill his relief was repulsed and defeated; but because histories make not but for the victorious, we see usu­ally none had in esteem but the sonnes of fortune.

Now let us examine Cesars carriage in this warre, which brake out he being in Italy, in the depth of winter, his army dispersed in severall countreys, far distant from each other, and the revolted States so in his way, as it was almost im­possible for him to unite his legions. In so great difficulties he findeth no other means but to surmount them by incompa­rable labour, wherewith he maketh way over the mountains covered six foot thick with snow, and affrighteth his enemies more appearing in the middest of them (when they believed him still in Italy and out of possibility to get to them) then by his great forces. He also added to this astonishment by in­dustry, causing his cavalry to shew it self in severall places at one and the same time, to cause a belief that he was very powerfull.

Let us further consider that Cesar seeing the fashion of the warre changed, and that the enemy avoided battel, apply­eth himself to sieges, wherein he sheweth himself no lesse a [Page 34] master then in his other actions of warre. For all that which the most excellent modern Generalls put in practice, is drawn from his actions: and whatsoever we admire of Ost­end, Breda, The Busse. [...] Bolduc, and many other sieges of the late Prince Maurice (who hath surpassed all others in that mat­ter) is infinitely inferiour to the two circumvallations of A­lexia, where the industry, the labour, and the short time in which they were finished, farre exceedeth all that hath been done elsewhere. I am not ignorant that the invention of pow­der and of artillery hath changed the manner of fortificati­ons, of assaults, and of the defense of towns; but not in such sort, but that the principall foundations whereupon they are established are particularly taken from Cesar, who in that hath far surpassed all the Romane Generalls.

He is also admirable in his inventions and stratagemes, & in the undauntednesse of his enterprises, who when he in­tended an assault upon the trenches which were about Cler­mont, he put a jealousie into them by a body which he made of the horse-boyes and baggages of the camp, which he caused to march in their sight towards that part which he meant not to assault, but not at so near a distance that they might discover what kind of people they were; and having laid a legion in embuscado in the night-time, and caused some select­ed souldiers to convey themselves into the little camp which was nearer to the town, he assaulteth them so at unawares that he made himself master of all their trenches.

When he would have passed the river of Alliers, which Vercingetorix attempted to oppose, he caused some legions to lie in ambush near to a bridge which had been broken, and with the rest of the army (which he made shew as if it had been intire) he passeth along the river, as if he had sought some other passage, by which means he so deluded the ene­mies, as that he caused the bridge to be repaired before it could be taken notice of, and so passed over without any hin­drance.

When Vercingetorix (in the time of the siege of Burges) was gone out with his cavalry, he departed by night, and went and assaulted his infantery within the camp, and want­ed little of defeating it.

When at the siege of Clermont he understood of the revolt of ten thousand Autunois which came to his relief, he taketh foure legions, marcheth day and night to overtake them: which he doth, and took them all, and returneth time enough [Page 35] to defend his camp, which was assailed by Vercingetorix. Whereby we may observe by the way the benefit of having a camp alwayes well fortified, to the end we may be ever in a readinesse to attempt upon the enemy as occasions shall offer themselves.

I cannot forget his great modesty. Comius (whom he had favoured, raised to wealth & honour, and on whom he much trusted) he rather excuseth then blameth for revolt­ing; alledging that he was forced to comply with the generall resolution for recovering the liberty and glory of all Gallia.

Let us speak a word or two of Labienus, one of his Lieu­tenants; who finding himself in a strait with foure of Ce­sars legions, in this generall revolt, encircled on all parts with enemies, and being to passe the river Seine upon boats, to joyn himself to Cesar, opposed by strong forces which encreased every houre, in this extremity be imployeth both his courage and industry, divideth his troups into three parts, maketh great appearance of passing over in two places, where indeed he intended it not; by which means having separated their forces into divers troups, not knowing where to attend to op­pose him, he passeth over by night with three legions, or lesse, with which he fought with the first troups that came against him, and defeated them; insomuch that having passed the rest of his troups at their ease, joyned them (without fur­ther inconvenience) to Cesar. Whereupon I will make this observation, namely, That he which is not very carefull and diligent in the guarding of a passage of a river or moun­tain, is for the most part circumvented: because he which hath the possession thereof sleepeth securely upon the advan­tage he hath; and he which would have it searcheth out all possible means (and at last findeth them) to remove all ob­stacles.

The tenth warre. The VIII. Book.

THe Gauls desirous to make one attempt more to shake off their yoke of servitude, divers towns conspired together to revolt: whereof Cesar being advertised, surpriseth them so unex­pectedly, [Page 36] as that he continued those in their fide­lity which were not as yet revolted, and reduced the rest. Eighteen daies after his return to his win­ter-garrisons, they of Bourges gave him know­ledge that they were assaulted by those of Ca­stres; he goeth to relieve them, & (notwithstand­ing the unseasonable weather) bringeth them to submission. After that those of Rhems desired his assistance against the people of Beauvois, the most powerfull and valiant of Gallia, led by Corbeius and Comius two brave Commanders; he march­eth thither, taketh care to get intelligence from them, encampeth himself before them, where his souldiers receive an affront going to forrage; but after that Corbeius had charged his camp, and better fortified his quarters, he understood that he had laid an embuscado for his souldiers which went to forrage; whither he goeth so strong that he defeateth and killeth him. This victorie obliged those of Beauvois to yield them­selves. But Comius fled, not daring to trust himself amongst the Romanes, because that a lit­tle before Labienus would have caused him to have been made away by Vollusenus contrary to publick faith. This warre thus ended, Cesar go­eth and wasteth Ambiorix his countrey, to pro­cure him hatred amongst his own people, un­der the command of Fabius one of his Lieute­nants; he relieveth Limoges which was assaulted by Dumnacus, Lemovi­cum. whom he pursueth; and as he hasted to gain the river Loyre to put himself into safetie, he defeateth him. Then subjugated those of Chartres and Bretagne with great promptitude and alacritie. Under the command of Caninius he besiegeth Drapes and Luterius in the citie of [Page 37] Cadenac: Uxellodu­num. who sallying out to provide corn for the town, Luterius going about to convey it in is defeated; and at length Drapes is assaulted and taken in his camp. After this, he really formed the siege, whither Cesar came in person, who found means to hinder them from water, so that this poore people yielded themselves to his dis­cretion; with whom he dealt rigorously, causing their hands to be cut off which had born arms; which so went to the heart of Drapes (then their prisoner) as that he wilfully starved him­self: and a few dayes after Luterius was taken and brought to Cesar. At the same time Labie­nus defeated those of Triers, and the Germanes, and took all their Commanders.

After so many happy victories of Cesar, obtein­ed by himself or his Lieutenants, he finisheth that summer by visiting the towns of Gallia, the better to assure his conquest, especially in Gasco­nie, where he had been but little, and disperseth his army (composed of ten legions) into such places as he conceived most advantageous; which served him for a strong support to main­tein himself in the civil broils of his native coun­trey, which he was going into.

Observations.

SOme attribute the so frequent revolts of the Gauls to their changeable and impatient humour, which cannot endure to be lorded over by strangers: and others, to the too great clemency of Cesar. I grant that clemency apt to par­don emboldens to revolt; for that we easily forget all benefits which do not intirely establish our liberty; but if cruelty cau­seth them lesse frequent, yet it renders them more dangerous; for that when despair driveth men thereunto, and that the hope of safety resteth onely in victory, the revolted become all valiant, obstinate, constant, and faithfull to the end; [Page 38] which never falleth out where there is hope of the enemies clemency. We have here plentifull examples thereof. Cesar in the greater part of the revolts of the Gauls hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience, by reason of his clemency; which hath been a powerfull means for him to make divisions amongst themselves, and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts: and if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity, it hath been occasioned by fowl and un­worthy acts; as when they of Vannes under publick faith imprisoned the Romane officers which came to them to buy corn for the sustenance of the army, (but I cannot excuse that of Cadenac.) On the contrary, the cruelties of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of Alba drove poore fishermen so into despair, that they have shaked off his insupportable yoke; and with an admirable constancie have mainteined and enriched themselves, and are grown so po­tent as that they are able to resist him by land, and by sea take from him his treasure in the Indies.

Cesar sheweth us also by [...]s care and industry to get in­telligence of the enemies proceedings (whether by taking pri­soners in the field, or by having good spies) the advantage which may be made thereof; many of his successefull designes having been founded thereupon, there being great advantage in the attempting them; for that he which assaileth hath more courage then he which is assailed, and alwayes believeth the assaliant to be the stronger, not knowing what part he will assail, and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence. Briefly, all that a well exercised and well disciplined army is able to do in such a case, is to defend it self; but where are new-levied souldiers fall out great disorders: which was the reason he took so much care to fortifie his camp very strongly, to the end he might defend it & all his baggage with a few men, & might without danger execute many brave designes, being alwayes assured of his retreat. Let us further take view of the siege of Cadenaci which Cesar judging to be im­pregnable by force, and knowing it to be well provided of corn, undertaketh by a great and dangerous labour to keep them from water, which was from a fountain without the town, from whence they were onely supplyed: which the be­si [...]ged perceiving, having set fire on Cesars works, by a salley they hindred him from quenching it. Cesar not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place, resol­veth to make an assault upon the town; which apprehension caused them to retreat.

The Abbridgement of the ci­vil wars of Cesars Commentaries. The I. Book.

THe true cause of the civil warre be­tween Pompey and Cesar was, because the one would have no companion, and the other could not endure a su­periour: but that which appeared, was the refu­sall made to Cesar of admitting his solicitation for the Consu [...]ship being absent (though it had been promised him) or else because they would have him alone disarm, and that they which were his declared enemies should continue still armed: a forced resolution, and contrary to the will of the Commons; insomuch that the Tri­bunes of the people were constrained to quit the citie, and to go find out Cesar: Who taking oc­casion by the forelock, of his private cause he maketh a publick; declaring to his souldiers that he is not in arms to other purpose but to restore the people (now oppressed by the Senate) to their libertie; and having well incouraged them thereupon, he departeth from Rimini, Ariminum. which was yet part of his gove [...]nment, and possesseth himself of all the marches of Ancona; which cau­sed a great astonishment at Rome. Pompey and the Consuls forsake the citie, and dare not ga­ther their grosse nearer then Capua: mean time Cesar continuing his march besiegeth Domitius Aenobarbus within Corfinium: who with all the Senatours which accompanied him were deli­vered [Page 40] unto him by his own souldiers, which ad­here to Cesars partie. He gave leave to Domitius and the Senatours to dispose of themselves where they pleased, causing all to be restored that be­longed unto them. Following his designe he be­siegeth Pompey in Brundusium: who unwilling to sustein the siege, crosseth the seas with his armie, which he could not do but at two times, for want of shipping; yet used he much art and precaution to conceal his retreat from Cesar, and to prevent those of Brundusium from giving means to his enemie to entrap him. Cesar, not being able to follow him for want of vessels, sendeth Valerius into the Island of Sardinia, and Curio into that of Sicilia; Cotta abandoned the one, and Cato the other; complaining that Pompey had very inconsiderately imbarked them in this warre, and so went into Africa. Mean while Cesar cometh to Rome, justifieth his acti­ons, and offereth to condescend to a reasonable peace: but seeing that his enemies protracted time, he passeth into Gallia, to strengthen his armie with Gauls. M [...]ssitia. Marseilles refuseth him en­trance; he besiegeth it, and in the mean time sendeth C. Fabius to possesse himself of the pas­sages of the Pyrenean mountains; which he doth bravely. Then approcheth to Petreius and Afranius, which had their camp below Ilerda, and encampeth on the river Segre, Sicoris. where he ma­keth two bridges. At first there passed onely slight skirmishes between them, untill that two of Fabius his Legions being gone to forrage by that bridge which was furthest from the camp, it happened to break; whereof the enemies be­ing advertised, they go with foure Legions and [Page 41] all their cavalrie to give on upon them; but be­ing retreated to a hill of advantage, and Fabius misdeeming something, going to relieve them, delivered them out of that danger. While these things were a doing, Cesar having left C. Trebo­nius Lieutenant Generall at the siege of Mar­seilles, and D. Brutus commander of his naval armie, arrived in his camp; where being, he would encamp himself between Ilerda and his enemies camp; bu [...] after a long fight (whereof either of them made advantage) both the one and the other retreated into their camp. Pre­sently after, the continuall rain carried away both these bridges, and made the river altoge­ther unpassable, which drave him to extreme necessities, not being able to supply himself with victuall, nor receive those new forces which came to him out of Gallia, nor repair his bridges by reason of the violence of the waters, and the hindrance which his enemies gave him, which were on the other side of the river: At last he caused boats to be made, and whilest the Pom­peians busied themselves to entrap certain Gauls which came to joyn with him, he carrieth boats on wagons twentie miles from his camp, put­teth them into the river, causeth some souldiers to passe over to the other side, and without losing time conveyeth thither two legions more, by favour whereof he maketh his bridge: and by that means recovereth his way, and safe passage for his victuall, and receiveth those troups which came to relieve him. This acti­on reassured his army, astonished the enemy, and gave so much reputation to his affairs (with the news which he received at the same time, [Page 42] that Brutus had defeated the Marseillians at sea) that five good cities yielded themselves, and divers others came to parle. But following this good successe, he maketh divers trenches to cut off the water from his enemies camp, and to make the Segre fordable. Afranius and Petreius, fearing the prosperitie of his designes, resolved to gain Octogesa, sited upon the river Iberus, whither they had beforehand sent to have a bridge made: To this end they depart at midnight; Cesar causeth them to be pursued by his cavalrie, which he maketh to ford over, because his bridge was a great way off: after­ward (leaving his baggage within his camp) he followeth with his Infantery, and pursueth them so hotly that he overthroweth their de­signe, hindring them from going whither they intended, and returning from whence they came, insomuch that he drave them into such extre­mitie of hunger and thirst that (without striking one blow) they were constrained to yield them­selves to his mercy. He dismisseth them all, and winneth them by incredible courtesies, ne­ver used elsewhere towards enemies. Thus he remaineth master of Spain, sending away his enemies laden with disgrace, and also with ob­ligations to publish (though unwillingly) his clemency and valour.

Observations.

IT is a most dangerous thing for a people, a Generall of an army, or an army it self, to be surprised with fear for that it is alwayes seconded with perverse and ruinous accidents: which all Leaders and Commanders of armies ought to foresee and carefully to prevent. There be three not able examples in this book on this subject; The first, [Page 43] when Cesar passed the Rubicon; for before that they declared him enemy to the weal-publick. Pompey under­taketh with a stamp with his foot to raise an armie to him; that at his approch Cesars own souldiers shall deliver their Generall into his hands; neither doth he think him worthie consideration; such as dare but name Cesar are driven out of Rome; briefly, he is proceeded against as a criminall offender. Notwithstanding so soon as he had but set the first step to declare the warre, and though he did the same at Pezaro which he did at Rimini, having not the fourth part of his armie, every man was amazed; Pompey and the Consuls betake them to their heels; the care of leavying of souldiers is cast aside, and Rome it self abandoned. The causes of this great change proceeded from this, that Pompey never imagined that Cesar durst have undertaken so high a designe; grounding upon a presumption which his vertues and good fortune had added unto him; which made him rather thoughtfull how to maintein his partie in the citie, then provide for defense thereof: Insomuch that when he saw things go other­wise then he had published, he stood amased. It was there­fore no great wonder if an ignorant people (which toke as­surance or fear from the good or bad countenance of him into whose protection they had delivered themselves) did the like. Whereupon I will say, that in affairs of such im­portance we ought (in imitation of Cesar) before we enter into them, to consider maturely the worst that can befall, so that evil successe dismayeth us not; but when we are imbarked, we must not check at whatsoever hap­peneth, but with constancie go on to the end.

The second example is, when Domitius Aenobarbus (be­ing out of hope of being relieved by Pompey) took a re­solution to save himself within Corfinium, where he was besieged: but for that his countenance was sadder then usuall, his speeches lesse resolute then the time required, and by some neglect of the necessary works for the common de­fense, he discovered to his souldiers that which he would have concealed from them, so that (preventing his flight they delivered him unto Cesar. It is a fair lesson for a commander, to teach him that in greatest danger he ought to shew most resolution; for his souldiers become courage­ous or fearfull according to that they observe in his coun­tenance.

[Page 44]The third is, when Cesar discovered the fear of Afra­nius and Petreius souldiers, in that they seconded not each other, that they scarcely had received the brunt of the cavalrie but their ensignes were all on a heap, that they made not good their ranks nor distances, and that they stirred not from the field of battel where they could not subsist for want of water. And howsoever in these times armies approch not so near each other as then they did, by reason of the canon; neverthelesse, experimented Captains will make profitable use of such judgements. I have seen Henry the Great chase eight hundred horse with lesse then two hundred; judging they would not dare to combat him because of their confusion and not observing distance [...] which fell out as he had foretold it.

And howsoever to retreat from a besieged citie by a port of the sea seemeth to be no very hard matter, neverthelesse the precautions which Pompey used to retire himself into Brundusium, was that which saved him. For having to do with a people which he abandoned, and an enemy vigilant, he had been lost if he had not walled up the gates and barri­cadoed up all the entries into Brundusium, except onely two (which were covert enough) by which his men issued to the haven; because when his last men departed from the walls, the inhabitants at the same instant of time cause [...] those of Cesars to mount them; for which reason in all kinds of retreats a captain cannot take too much care t [...] make it safe and orderly: and though he may do it whe [...] he pleaseth himself, yet must he do it in so good time an [...] so readily as that he be not engaged to fight. In this place I will relate a dispute between Afranius and Petreius; the one being for retreat by night, the other by day: They which were for the night alledged that they should gai [...] the mountains and places of safetie before they should be discovered: but the others judged that having to do with Cesar, and he strong in cavalrie, they should never be able to get off from him without fighting, and in such a case the day was to be preferred to the night, which alwayes causeth disorders in retreats; which opinion prevailed, but not at all to their advantage. For my part I hold the other opinion the better: for besides that it is a most dan­gerous thing to retreat in the day time, in the presence of an enemy; a well advised Captain will never engage himself to pursue an army by night; for that it is hard for him to prevent falling into an ambush.

The second Book.

WHilest things passed thus in Spain, Caius Trebonius continueth the siege of Marseilles; to the relief whereof Pompey send­eth L. Nassidius, who joyning his navall for­ces with those of the Marseillians, gave bat­tel to Brutus, where he was beaten. The losse fell upon the Marseillians, because they fought more obstinately then the rest, as being more interessed, having to conserve both goods and libertie; and that which afflicted them most was, that they had conceived too great hope of deliverance; howsoever they forbare not to continue a resolute resistance. Neverthelesse, the industry of Trebonius was such, that with mantilets and other engines he approched a Towre, which he sapped, Vincae. and overthrew part of it: which so affrighted the Marseillians, as they promised to yield themselves so soon as Cesar should return, and desired a truce till then: Trebonius granteth it; whose souldiers negligent of their guard upon confidence of the truce, on a very windy day the Marseillians make a sud­den salley, and burn all the engines of the Romanes. Trebonius was but little discouraged for all this, and diligently repaireth them, where­by Domitius was forced to save himself by sea, before Cesar's arrivall, who (though the affairs of Italy called upon him) would not leave Spain untill it was all at his devotion. There onely remained M. Varro, who at first spake of Cesar with great respect; but when he conceived his affairs stood doubtfull, he alienated himself and those of his partie from him: in so much that after the defeat of Afranius and Petreius he found himself engaged to sustein the warre. [Page 46] But Cesar having called an assembly at Cordova, Corduba. all came thither to attend and acknowledge him, and divers towns forced from them Varro's gar­risons: who found himself so farre forsaken, that of two Legions which he had, the one fell absolutely from him, insomuch that he was constrained to have recourse to Cesars mercy as well as the rest. That done, he left L. Cassius Longinus in Spain, and passeth to Marseilles, which yieldeth to him; then goeth to Rome. At the same time Curio passeth from Sicilia into Africk with two Legions onely and five hun­dred horse, encampeth himself in a place called Cornelius camp, near Ʋtica, where Petreius Accius Varus had his camp; against whom he had an advantageous battel with his cavalry. Neverthelesse, upon some discourses which one S. Quintilius Varus had with Curio's souldiers, there grew a panike fear amongst them; which taken away by an oration he made unto them, he went and presented battel, and beat Varus again, and drove him to retreat into Ʋtica; where (with help of the ill will the inhabitants bore him) he put him hard to it; and under­standing that king Juba was coming to relieve him, Curio retireth himself into his camp, with resolution there to attend the coming of the rest of his army which was in Sicilie. But having intelligence that king Juba came not in person and that he onely sent a weak supply under the cōmand of Saburra, it caused him to change that so good a resolution. Then puffed up with his former victorie, and having been more exercised in making orations to the people of Rome then in commanding their armies, he marcheth night [Page 47] and day to encounter this relief: his cavalrie in the night meeteth with some of the Numidian horse, and beateth them. This successe height­eneth him more and more, insomuch that he marcheth as if he had pursued a victory; but thus wearied and in disorder, he meeteth with a fresh and complete army, which defeateth him: whereupon he concludeth it his best course to expiate his rashnesse by his death, and so died a better souldier then commander.

Observations.

IT is a maxime held by all, and neglected by most, That in the time of truce there ought to be a better guard then at any other time. We have here a notable example there­of: Trebonius by a marvellous labour had brought the Mar­seillians to the last gasp, when during the time of a truce (which out of pitie he had granted them) his souldiers so neglected their guards that they invited the enemie to their ruine, and he saw in one houre burnt what had cost him the labour of many moneths. Which should teach us in warre never to slacken the severitie of military disci­pline, though the souldiers grumble never so much: for you ought rather to content them by any other means then that; and when they shall see their commanders share the dangers and labours of the warre with them, they will un­dergo them chearfully. For we may reade that by the exact observation of military discipline many commanders have surmounted great difficulties and obteined glorious victo­ries, and that many others for disregarding it have been shamefully defeated; but it hath never been read that the observation thereof hath been the cause of the losse of one battel or of the overthrow of any one enterprise.

A great courage without experience is likelier to commit a great errour in warre then a more temperate one: for the first is usually accompanied with presumption, and is more incapable of counsel then the other; especially when he hath made his entrie into armies by some happy suc­cesse. Curio is a fair example thereof, who of a Tri­bune of the people seeing himself a Generall of an armie, [Page 48] committed many errours, and those not small ones: for af­ter that he had the good hap to beat his enemies, to shut them up into Utica, and upon the news of king Juba his coming to resolve for the best, which was to retreat into his camp on the sea-side, well fortified and well provided of munitions, there to attend the rest of his armie; upon the first news that was brought him that the relief was weak, and that Juba was not there in person, without staying for confirmation thereof, refusing to advise with, or give credit to any, he crosseth his first resolution, and go­eth to give them battel; after which his cavalrie meeting with some of Juba's horse, of which foure were brought prisoners to him, he asked who commanded them; they answering that it was Saburra, he presupposeth that Juba was not there; so confirmeth himself in the first errour, and marcheth so fast and so farre as that he findeth him­self five and twentie miles from his camp, in a countrey which he knew not, with part of his forces (the rest not be­ing able to follow) much hurried and in disorder: which was the cause that Juba easily defeated them. Which sheweth us plainly, that neither a great courage alone maketh a good commander (however it helpeth well thereto) nor the reading of books, nor abilitie of discourse; but it must be atteined by long experience, and the being present at many overthrows as well as victories: for he that hath not had his share therein, is not able to imagine what belongeth thereto, the bravest souldiers sometimes doing the poorest actions, as it happened here; where (though the residue of this armie was retreated into a well-forti­fied camp, and not assaulted, yet these imbarked themselves so confusedly and disorderly as that a great part of them were drowned. Therefore I conclude that it is much bet­ter to make lesse haste and to know whither to go then to be forced shamefully to run away or perish.

The III. Book.

CEsar being chosen Dictatour provideth for the affairs of the city of Rome, causeth him­self to be published Consul with P. Servilius, giveth over his dictatourship at the end of eleven daies, and after imbarketh himself at Brundusium, [Page 49] whither he had sent seven legions to attend him; but found not shipping enough for half his army; insomuch that he was constrained to passe over with fifteen thousand foot and five hundred horse, leaving Marcus Antonius there with the rest, to whom he promiseth to send back the shipping. Pompey (who had all the yeare to prepare himself) had gathered together great store of men, victuall, and shipping, so that Ce­sar passed over not without trouble and danger; and instantly sent back his vessels to Antonie: but Bibulus, chief Commander of all Pompey's na­vie, took a squadron of thirty of them, which he fired, and put to death all the mariners to the end to deterre the rest from undertaking that passage; and did so obstinately continue his de­signe (notwithstanding the winter-season) as that he hindred Antonie from passing over. At the same time M. Octavius (Pompey's Lieutenant) besiegeth Salones in Dalmatia, which defend­eth it self so couragiously as (without help of any) it compelleth him to raise his siege, and by a sallie beateth him shamfully from thence; from whence he retireth to Pompey at Durazzo. Dyrrachi­um. On the other side, Cesar having possessed himself of divers towns upon the shore, hindred him also from refreshing himself. At last Bibulus dieth: and the sea not being so exacty guarded, Antonie passeth over; where the winds so favour the good fortune of Cesar, as that they change in the just instant to put his navie into safetie, & to cast away that which pursued it. This news coming both to him and to Pompey at one and the same instant, (because they were encamped near each other) the one goeth to joyn himself to [Page 50] Antony, which he doeth; and the other to oppose him; which though he might have done, yet re­turneth to encamp himself at Asperagne, Asparagus. belong­ing to the territory of Durrazo, and sendeth to Scipio to bring his forces, and joyn with him. Ce­sar seing that the warre was like to be drawn out at length, sendeth part of his army into Macedo­nia and Thessaly to make provision of corn; be­cause that Pompey having the command of the sea, he was to expect none from out of Italy. But Scipio in his passage meeting (at the same time) with an opportunitie, thought to have cut in pieces L. C. Longinus, with some of Cesars legions; which he had done had not M. Favo­nius (whom he had left to guard his baggage with eight cohorts) sent to him that unlesse he made hast to relieve him, Domitius was coming to defeat him: So he desisted from than purpose, and arrived oportunely for the relief of Favonius. At the same time young Pompey having under­stood that Cesar (now the third time) was sending his shipping to Brundusium, and having left some few at Oricum under the charge of Ca­ninius, with three cohorts he came and assailed them, and either took or fired them all. That done, Cesar goeth and encampeth himself be­tween Durazzo and Pompeys camp, to hinder him the benefit of Durazzo: but Pompey encamp­ed at a place called Petra on the sea-side, where being a small haven, by means of his shipping he receiveth some benefit by it. Then Cesar at­tempteth to enclose him by trenches, and Pom­pey by other trenches enlargeth himself as much as possibly he could; who finding himself the stronger in forces assaileth the trenches, and in [Page 51] two encounters had the best ont, and hoped to have defeated him. Cesar, not being able to abide here longer, retreateth towards Apollonia and Oricum, where having mustered his army, and taken order for those two places, he passeth into Thessaly to joyn with Domitius his armie. Pompey followeth him, who also joyneth Sci­pio's forces to his own. The two armies (where­on the decision of the whole Romane Empire de­pended) encamp themselves in sight of each other. Cesar sought all occasions to fight, and Pompey evaded them; at last he suffered himself to be overruled, first by the revilings of his soul­diers, and afterward by the valour of Cesar, who pursued him so fiercely after the victory of the battel of Pharsale, Pharsalia. as he gave him no leisure to rally his forces, arriving in Egypt almost as­soon as himself, where king Ptolomee, violating the right of hospitality, & forgetting the benefits which his father had received from Pompey, cau­sed him to be murdered, thinking by this wicked act to gain the victours favour; who revenged it, as we shall see in the book following. At the same time Cassius Generall of the forces of Syria, Phe­nicia, and Cilicia set on fire the shipping which Pomponius kept in the port of Messina; and Lali­us took a little island before the port of Brundusi­um, as Libo had done in former times. But the news of Pompey's defeat overthrew all the de­signes of the Lieutenants.

Observations.

IF the clemency and liberality of Cesar be so much recom­mended in all the course of his life, it seemeth that in this civil warre he hath out-done himself. To refuse to defeat [Page 52] whole and intire armies in Spain by the sword, and having reduced them to yield to his mercy, to let them go with their Commanders, not so much as binding them from making war against him any more: To satisfie his enemies their stipends, whilest he borroweth money of his captains to pay his own souldiers; restoring to Domitius Aenobarbus a hundred and fifty thousand crowns at a clap, which Pompey had given him out of the publick treasury to make warre against him: To release all the prisoners he took without ransome, and even to cause all to be restored which belonged unto them, whilest Bibulus, Labienus, and others, put to the sword as many of his as they could take; are actions in my observati­on rather to be admired then like to be imitated, especially in an age whose practice is much contrary to this generosity, and even to that which he used in Gallia: where (sometimes) he practiced great severity. Therefore searching into the rea­sons which caused in him this blind clemency, who seemed cruel to his own, I conceive we ought to distinguish the de­signes. In Gallia he was a conquerour, in such sort as when they abused his first and naturall clemency, he used severity; to keep those in aw through fear which by affability could not be made pliant. But here is a civil warre, wherein (un­der pretext of mainteining the libertie of the people) he in­tendeth to bring both people and Senate into subjection. For this end he depresseth all passions to attein the height of his designes. The m [...]e cruel his enemies are towards him, the lesse he spleeneth them: insomuch that they which make warre against him, fear him not but in battel, and not de­spairing of pardon, become the more inclinable to yield upon the first reverse of fortune which befalleth them. It is not so in a civil warre, which we make not but for the defense of our person or religion: for then having no designe to possesse your self of the State, you are obliged to repell cruelty by cru­elty, otherwise you should find none to take part with you. But when you fight for rule and domination, you must (to attein it) appear such a one as that they may not suspect either revenge or cruelty in you, and that they believe you to abound in liberality and all other sorts of vertues: for no man at any time desireth change of condition, but to better his own. So by this liberall resolution and clemency, not con­tinuing his Dictatourship above eleven dayes, doin nothing but by the usuall order, alwayes justifying his actions as a Protectour of the Common-wealth, shewing himself so much [Page 53] the more affectionated to peace by how much Pompey held off from it, that so he might the easilier work the indignation of his citizens and souldiers against him, and by that means go the better through with the warres, he atteined the end of the highest and most glorious designe that ever was underta­ken by man.

Cesar having drawn all his forces together, attempteth to fight with Pompey: and not being able to draw him to it, he undertaketh a high designe, namely, to besiege him in his camp, though he were the weaker of the two. This was near Du­razzo, where he goeth about to enclose him with trenches, helping himself with the advantage of little hills of difficult accesse, which in my opinion induced him to this designe. The reasons which he alleadgeth are, that being weak in cavalry, and wanting corn, he could not get it if Pompey's horse were at liberty; from which he should also take away the benefit of forraging, and render it unprofitable to all the offices of war. Besides, it was a way to diminish the reputation of Pompey throughout the whole Empire, and encrease his own, when it should be reported that Cesar kept him besieged, and that he durst not fight with him: a matter of great consequence, for that men usually turn to that side which is strongest. On the other side, Pompey, being unwilling to quit the sea-side or Du­razzo where he had made his Arcenall & Magazine, resol­veth not to budge: and seeing that his cavalry might suffer too much if it were hindred from forrage, he maketh an en­closure of trenches of fifteen miles compasse on his side. So both Generall [...] omit nothing that maketh for their designes. In the end Pompey finding himself discommodated by being thus cooped up, setteth upon one of the angles of Cesars tren­ches; where he had such advantage in two encounters which fell both in a day, that Cesar confessed, if he had known how to have prosecuted his victory he had defeated him. By this may be seen how necessary retrenchments are, & how by means thereof may be prevented to fight with an army one is fearfull of: one may also reassure affrighted forces, and famish a more potent army then ones own. For the art of warre consisteth principally in not fighting but when men are willing; and to this end you must take good order for your victuall, you must well exercise your souldiers in the use of their arms, and in the observation of all orders, and know very well how to make their retrenchments. And if Cesar had had to do with any but Pompey, who shut himself up from the very begin­ning, [Page 54] he had either ruined his army, or else compelled him to fight.

Cesar seeing that he could not continue Pompey longer in that strait, nor stay so near him without a great discommodity for want of victuall, he undertaketh to make a long retreat and for many dayes. To this end he causeth all the baggage to be sent away over-night with one legion, about midnight all the rest of his army saving two legions, and his cavalry (where­with himself marched) at break of day. Pompey followeth him with all diligence, finding him quartered where he had been encamped before, and lodgeth himself also within his own old camp close by him. But upon Cesars making shew of send­ing his cavalry to forrage (causing them to return secretly into the camp again) Pompey sendeth out his horse to the same pur­pose in good earnest; and then also the greatest part of his soul­diers being returned to their old camp to look for baggage which they had left behind them, Cesar departeth suddenly in the same order as the day before. Insomuch that Pompey, not be­ing able to pursue him for the present, & he continually march­ing by great journeys in the same order, leaving him no possible means to overtake him, at the end of foure dayes gave over his pursuit. This is a fair lesson to teach us how dangerous it is for armies to retreat in view of an enemy; besides, how care­fully we ought to avoid fighting when we retreat, and what order ought to be given that we be not pestered with the bag­gage; and that also a retreat is better made with a part of the army then with the whole. For if Cesar were afraid to re­treat in the view of Pompey, with an army so [...]ell exercised and accustomed to overcome, being redoubted by Pompey him­self; what should then the captains of these times do, which command armies newly levied, without order, without obedi­ence, overlaid with baggage, the souldiers not knowing how to use their arms, nor the captains themselves to teach them? Yet neverthelesse they would think it a blemish to their ho­nour to make a private retreat. Certainly presumption and ignorance are two bad counsellers in warre.

At the battel of Pharsalia Pompey was twice as strong as Cesar, especially in cavalry, whereupon he principally ground­ed his victory; but he had not an army so well disciplined nor so exercised to fight as Cesar had: insomuch that fearing that if his gave the charge they would do it disorderly, he com­manded them to attend the giving on of the enemy, with charge not to [...]rre from their places. Cesar, disliking that course, [Page 55] commanded his souldiers to give on upon the adverse army, al­ledging that this exciteth the courage of souldiers to play the men, which ought rather to be increased then abated, not dis­approving the ancient custome of beginning the fight with a generall shout. And experience teacheth us that in all actions of warre, he which giveth the charge redoubleth his courage, and he which is charged diminisheth his.

Touching Pompey's order of battel; Having a river on his right hand, he placed all his horse on the left, promising to himself that after he had repulsed Cesars cavalry, he should enclose his army. Cesar, judging his cavalry not of sufficient strength to resist that of Pompey, str [...]gtheneth it by foot, which were fitted for that purpose, and mingled amongst them. Besides that, he taketh from every battalion one troup, whereof he composed a battalion to be as a reserve, which he placeth without the ranks of the three orders of infantery, and com­mandeth them not to stirre to the conflict untill he appointed: so that when Pompey's horse had repulsed Cesars (which they could not do without putting themselves into disorder) they met with this battalion, which put them to a sudden stop, and afterward to shew their backs, and wholly to abandon the left wing of Pompey's army; by which means Cesar following his advantage easily putteth all the rest to rout. Whereupon we ought to observe two things: the one, That we ought ne­ver to hazard all our troups upon one onely charge, but make a reserve of the one to relieve the other: and the other, That we ought so well to observe the distances or intervalls, as well to the flanks as the rear, that the first troups happening to be reversed, they reverse not those which should relieve them; but to leave them a convenient space to fall back, and to rally themselves again in the rear.

If Cesar knew how to conquer, he knew better how to pro­secute and make his benefit thereof, but in none like to this of Pharsalia; where he contented not himself to force the camp, to besiege the rest of the army on a hill whither they retired, nor to pursue Pompey's person certain dayes journeys, but with three or foure thousand men onely followed him so close both by sea and land, that he found him dead in Egypt, where he arrived almost assoon as the other; never giving him leisure to recollect himself, or reinforce his troups. Which serveth to teach us to make use of occasion when it offereth it self fa­vourable unto us, & not to deferre that to another time which may be presently executed: for the affairs of the world are sub­ject [Page 56] to great revolutions. And the affairs which Cesar yet had after the death of Pompey give us occasion enough to judge, that if (in imitation of many great personages) he had gathered the fruits of his victories before they had been ripe, or tasted of repose before he had been secured, he might full well have repented thereof.

Of the Alexandrine warre written by Aulus Hircius, or Oppius. The IIII. Book.

ASsoon as Cesar was arrived in Alexandria with three thousand two hundred foot, eight hundred horse, ten Rhodian galleys, and some ships of Asia, he understood of the death of Pompey; and upon the bad quarter he percei­ved was between the souldiers of Pompey and the people of the city he sent for new Legions into Asia. Mean time he required to be informed of the testament of the late king Ptolemee, who had made the people of Rome his executours; and to this end ordained that Ptolemee the eldest son & Cleopatra the eldest daughter should discharge their army, & come to him to give an account of their rights. But Ptolemee's Counsel did not ap­prove of this way of accommodation, and under­hand sendeth for his troups which were at Pelu­sium, under the command of Achillas: whereof Cesar being advertised, and that the King him­self had intelligence with the said Achillas, he deteineth him, and prepareth for defense: he giveth them the repulse at their first approch, then cantons himself in one part of the city and the rest in the other part. Arsinoe the Kings se­cond [Page 57] sister causeth Achillas to be slain, putteth Ganymedes into his place, and possesseth her self of the authoritie, who continuing the former de­signe putteth Cesar to great extremities, infect­ing his fresh waters; which he readily remedied by digging great store of pits. He also sendeth for souldiers, ships, and arms from all parts; and upon the news which he received that the thirty seventh Legion with great provisions of victu­all and arms was arrived on the coast of Africa, but could not get to him by reason of contrary winds, he putteth himself alone into a ship, ta­keth all his shipping with his mariners onely, and putteth to sea in the very face of them. The enemies, knowing him to be without souldiers, assail him; he beateth them, and without other relief getteth to his legion; then returneth to Alexandria. This first conflict affrighted the Alexandrians; neverthelesse they make their na­val army stronger then ever, which Cesar defeat­eth the second time; where Euphranor Captain of the Rhodian galleys behaved himself very bravely. There is an isle before the haven of Alexandria built and inhabited, which sheltreth the town, and is joyned to the city by the peer, which is 900 paces long and 60 broad, upon which there were two forts. Cesar thinketh it necessarie to take this isle, that so he may have the sea at liberty. He taketh it, then taketh one of the forts of the peer: but at the other he had a hot skirmish, and was repulsed with so great dis­order as not being able to hinder the souldiers from casting themselves abord, he saveth himself by swimming rather then to perish. The Alexan­drians, astonished by these brunts, betake them to [Page 58] their subtilties, demand of Cesar their King, who delivereth him to them, hoping it would be a means to facilitate agreement. Whilest these things were in agitation Mithridates a Pergame­nian, a man of high descent, a great souldier, of great valour and most faithfull to Cesar, arriveth to his relief with goodly forces, taketh Pelusium in his way, & cometh to passe the Nile at a place called Delta. Whereof Ptolemee being adver­tised goeth in person to oppose him; and Cesar on the other side goeth to relieve Mithridates, who, before the arrivall of either of them, had already encountred with and beaten Ptolemee's forces; and Cesar also before he could come to Mithridates had defeated others. After which he goeth and assaulteth a small fort which was between his camp and that of Ptolemee's, which he taketh; and the day after he assaileth the camp, which he also [...]ceth; and the King at­tempting to save himself by water, is drowned. After which returning victorious to Alexandria, all submi [...] to him. Mean time the provinces of the Empire rested not quiet. Domitius Calvinus Cesars Lieutenant was defeated by Pharnaces, who possessed himself of the kingdome of Pon­tus. In Illyricum Gabinius Cesars Lieutenant was defeated, and died at Salona: And Octavius one of Pompey's party, intending to possesse himself of that province, found Cornificius to oppose him in that designe. So did Ʋatinius; who being a [...] Brundusium and hearing this news putteth to sea, meeteth Octavius, giveth him battel and de­feateth him in Spain. Cassius Longinus, whom Cesar had left there, had made himself hatefull through his covetousnesse as well to those of [Page 59] the countrey as his own souldiers. They combine against him and sorely wound him, and believing him dead each one discovereth his joy: he reco­vering rigourously punisheth the conspiratours; neverthelesse that hindred not the revolt of his army. And as he thought to have remedied it in one place it breaketh out in another, and by a generall consent they choose Marcellus for their commander, who incamped himself beneath Cordova, which was at his devotion. Longinus sendeth to desire aid of the King Boguld, who sendeth him a great recrute: neverthelesse Mar­cellus mainteineth himself without fighting; and Lepidus coming with fresh forces to labour a re­conciliation between them, Longinus mistrusteth him, and withdraweth himself from them; but upon the approch of Trebonius his successour in the government, he imbarked for Africa where Cesar had designed him, and was drowned at the mouth of the river Iberus. Let us return to Cesar: who though he were much pressed to visit Rome, yet would he first revenge the defeat of Domitius; he departeth from Egypt with the sixth Legion onely, leaving the rest of his army for the guard of that kingdome: and with those forces which he gathereth together in Asia he giveth battel to Pharnaces, defeateth him, ta­keth from him what he had possessed himself of, and giveth the kingdome of Bosporus to Mithri­dates the Pergamenian as a recompense for the good service he had done him in the Alexandrian warre: then triumphantly after so many victo­ries he returneth to Rome.

Observations.

OF all the warres which Cesar hath made I find not one lesse necessary, more dangerous, and wherein he hath shewed lesse foresig [...] then in this. For having under­stood the death of Pompey at Alexandria, to set down there with three or foure thousand men, and in this weak estate to attempt to force a young king to make restitution of part of his kingdome in favour of his sister Cleopatra, was an argument that he trusted much to his good fortune, or was very amourous. But as this beginning was much short of his ordinary prudence, so the progresse and the end thereof surpasseth all his other actions; and it seemeth that he hath not here erred but to make his vertues shine so much the brighter. This hath been a warre without rule: for he hath been put to defend crosse wayes of streets, and to barricado himself there, to dispute the one half of the town against the other, to remedy unthought of accidents, to reassure his souldiers, to fight with a navall army with­out souldiers, and to beat them; and, as if he were fallen into another world, to make a warre after a new manner. Which sheweth that he excelled in three things principally; namely, that he was never left hopelesse, that he was of great experience, and that he confounded not himself in his commands.

This warre finished, he goeth against Pharnaces; where­in we will onely observe two things: the first, that howso­ever he desired to finish this war speedily, because his busi­nesse required him elsewhere, yet he goeth not to assault him rashly, but alwayes beginneth by encamping himself strong­ly; then (having left his baggage in safetie) he goeth with all his armie to make another camp near to Pharna­ces, leaving a great valley between both; to the end that if he would hinder him from fortifying there, and assault him, he could not get to him without great disadvantage. The other is to shew the advantage which he hath that assaileth: for Cesar himself observeth, that though Phar­naces assaulted him rashly, yet his souldiers were struck with fear, and put into some disorder upon their first ap­proch. Which may serve to confirm that he which assail­eth hath a great advantage, and that there is nothing more necessary in warre then retrenchments.

Of the Africane war, written by Aulus Hireius, or Oppius. The V. Book.

THe broken forces of Pompey's partie being rallied in Africa under Scipio, Cato, and king Juba, Cesar goeth thither in the moneth of December, and arriveth there at the begin­ning with no more then onely three thousand foot and some few horse. He presenteth him­self before Adrumetum, but Considius seeing him so weak standeth upon his guard: and Cesar in his retreat was assaulted by a sally from the town, and by the horse which were come to their aid, which he repulseth: where it was observed that thirtie French horsemen put above two thousand Moors to the recoil. The fame of his arrivall opened the gates of many cities and castles, which furnished him with victuall. He made choice of the site of Ruspina to encamp himself, and there to expect the rest of his armie; but not having patience to attend, he goeth to the port, imbarketh himself, and goeth to find them out; and as he was about to hoise sail a good part of them arrive. After that he goeth with thirty cohorts to look about for corn, and in the way meeteth with Labienus, with whom he had a great skirmish, and had the best on't, and so retired himself into his camp, which he forti­fied more then ever, because he found himself weak. He drew two trenches from the town to the port for his better securitie: then he dis­patcheth into Sicilia, Sardinia and Italy, for [Page 62] supplies of men and corn. On the other side Scipio and Cato, desirous to fight with him before he should gather more strength, hasten Juba to come with his armie: but he, being on his march to­wards them, is constrained to turn back the same way he came, by reason that P. Sitius Cesars Lieutenant, and king Bogud assaulted his king­dome. Mean time Labienus joyneth with Sci­pio; they come and encamp near Cesar: both sides attempt to take advantages, and divers skirmishes passe between them, yet without ha­zarding a battel. Cesars necessities increased dayly, which he supported with great constan­cy, and onely mainteined the hopes of his own side by chearfull words and looks: he dis­patcheth others to hasten his troups and victu­all: some of his ships are cast away; and hearing that others were chaced even into the port of Leptis, he posteth thither with all speed possi­ble, imbarketh, and with what he could there gather together goeth and relieveth his men, chaceth his enemies, taketh some of their ships, and recovereth his own which were taken. At last his troups come from divers parts, he be­ginneth with purging his army of some seditious persons and libertines; then resolveth upon a de­finitive battel. To this end he goeth and en­campeth before Thapsus, which he environeth with trenches, not doubting but Scipio would come and relieve the town: who having caused king Juba to return again, they come and en­camp near Cesar in three severall camps. And there was the battel fought, which Cesar gained with losse of fiftie souldiers onely, and some few hurt: but on the other side were ten thousand [Page 63] slain, and the three camps taken. Thapsus on the report of this victory was yielded to C. Rebilius. Cato seeing he could not prevail with his men to resolve to defend themselves killeth himself. Ʋtica openeth her gates to the Victour: Adrumetum doth the like. Zama shutteth hers against her conquered king, and calleth in Cesar: all the rest of Juba his kingdome revolteth: he and Petreius kill each other through despair. Sitius having defeated and killed Saburra Juba's Lieutenant, and coming to Cesar, meeteth with Afranius and Faustus Sylla, which were going for Spain: these he defeateth and taketh priso­ners, who afterwards in an uprore were both slain. Scipio and divers Senatours, having im­barked themselves for Spain, were by a tempest cast amongst Sitius his fleet, where all perished or killed themselves. This was the sequele of that battel, wherein all things concurred (as if by consent) to smooth the way to Cesars ab­solute victory, who pardoned all that had re­course unto his clemencie, and after that return­ed to Rome.

Observations.

CEsar hath done three things in this warre which came near to rashnesse: the first, to passe into Africa in the dead of winter with a small force, not having any assured port there, for which cause he was not able to appoint any Rendes-vous for his shipping; which thing was imputed him as a want of foresight. Neverthelesse after his passage his manner of proceeding was altogether admirable: He maketh choice to encamp himself near the citie Ruspina, which was within half a league of the port, which he joyneth to the citie and his camp, and fortifieth it exceed­ingly: for from thence he had one foot on land and the other on the Sea, and could (as occasions should require) [Page 64] act by either sea or land, and be secured from being shut up, whatsoever should befall. This is a good lesson for such as enterprise upon a forrein countrey, being weak at the beginning: for in this posture great attempts may be withstood, and in all extremitie a good retreat may be made. The second, to leave his army near Ruspina, and without giving knowledge to any man to cast himself abord to go seek his shipping. And the third, having news of the defeat of his fleet, to leave his camp, to hasten in full ca­rier to Leptis, to cast himself into a ship, and to rally others, and assault the enemies: and although he perished in none of them, there can be nothing said in his defense, but that he trusted wholly to his good fortune, and that he never was wearied or disheartned in the most dangerous or laborious designes.

It is observable that Cesar in all his warres hath alwayes been inferiour to his enemies in number; for which cause he hath alwayes helped himself by fortifications, more then ever any other hath done, which he made much the better when he found himself not sufficiently strong to give bat­tel, as he was a long time in Africa; insomuch that Sci­pio himself wondered at his coldnesse: neverthelesse he al­wayes continued his souldiers in exercise, and himself exercised new-levied men, and entred them by small skir­mishes, wherein by his industry for the most part he had the best; and alwayes attempted something upon his ene­my. Which is an excellent maxime to give courage to your souldiers, and secure you from being surprised.

The Spanish warre against Pompey's sonnes. The VI. Book.

THe reliques of the Africane troups reassem­ble themselves once more in Spain under Cneus and Sextus, the sonnes of Pompey. Cesar goeth thither: He findeth the one laying siege to Ʋlla, and the other in Cordova. He sendeth re­lief into the first, and goeth and encampeth him­self [Page 65] before the other: which inforceth Cneus to quit his siege to relieve his brother. Some skir­mishes passed between both armies: but Cesar, not being able to draw his enemy to battel, goeth and besiegeth Ategua, and after a bold resi­stance he taketh it in view of Cneus. Afterwards both armies had divers encounters and combats, but to little purpose: at last they encamp them­selves in a champain near Munda, both resolving not to refuse battel: neverthelesse [...]neus took a high an [...] advantageous ground for his field of battel, where Cesar making difficultie to assail him was put upon it by the fury of his souldiers. The fight was long and doubtfull, even by his own confession, and with much ado he got the victory, which was bloudy. Thirtie thousand on Pompey s part died upon the place, and a thou­sand on Cesars: they which saved themselves into Munda were constrained to yield themselves. Sextus Pompeius abandoneth Cordova: Cneus is swiftly pursued, overtaken and killed. All places yield themselves to the victour. This was Cesars last battel, and the deadly wound to Pompey's party.

A TREATISE OF Modern VVar; Written By the late great Generall the Duke of Rohan:

Englished by J. C.

CAMBRIDGE, Printed by ROGER DANIEL, Printer to the UNIVERSITIE, 1640.

To the right worshipfull Sir Thomas Glenham Knight, one of the Deputie-Lieutenants, and Colonel of a Regiment in the countie of Suffolk.

Right Worshipfull,

I Make bold (incited by your many favours) to present you with a short Treatise of Warre. How well the Authour hath acquitted himself therein, Your worthy self (by reason of your known abilities, both for Theorie and Practice, in that profession) are best able to judge. And for my translation, your studies and travels having made that language natu­rall to you, I might justly fear a severe cen­sure; but that I know your candour such, as you will excuse

Your obliged servant, J. C.

A Treatise of Warre.

I Ʋndertake not here to treat of all the functions of warre in particular, because so many have written thereof as it would be a thing superfluous. I content my self to make generall observations upon all those things which depend thereon, and which may in these times be put in practice: being loth to touch upon any thing but what experience hath taught me, and in all to be so brief as I may not weary the Reader.

CHAP. I. Of the election of Souldiers.

THe election of souldiers was by the Ancients and is by Moderns made after divers wayes. The Grecians and Romanes contented not themselves to enroll the souldiers which of their own accord were willing to go to the warre, but chose out of them such as they judged to be fittest for that ser­vice; which is the cause they had so good souldi­ers. The Carthaginians for the most part im­ployed strangers, and therefore had no worse souldiers then their own countrey-men. The Turks choose their souldiers, and train them. The Swisses make use of their own men. The Venetians and Hollanders, in imitation of the Car­thaginians, are served by auxiliarie souldiers. The French and Germanes abound in good souldiers, and may well forbear auxiliaries. England alone, [Page 106] of all the States of our time, may choose them, and take such as she pleaseth. Whereupon we must consider the constitution of these States, on what maximes they be founded, and what either of them may best do to have good souldiers. The greater part of States at this time are more found­ed upon policie then upon warre, and endea­vour rather to conserve themselves then to grow greater. Wherefore we see that learning flourish­eth there, and arms degenerate; in so much that those States which are founded upon warre do devour the other.

The example of the Turk to the shame of the Christians, and that of the king of Spain to the pre­judice of Germany and Italy, are two manifest proofs. That which causeth this mischief is, that men of the gown have possessed themselves of the government of almost all States, which (for that they hate souldiers) cause them alwayes to be ill dealt with, and do advise Princes to imploy au­xiliars rather then their naturall subjects: which is a most pernicious maxime. But this being no fit place to treat of it, we will onely speak of the election of souldiers.

England, which hath right by the laws of that kingdome to make choice of her souldiers, may observe the form of the election of the Romanes, which is very good. The other kingdomes which have not that power must incite their men which are ambitious of honour to cause themselves to be enrolled, aswell for the hope of being advan­ced to other honours by embracing the professi­on of warre, as by shutting up the means of atteining thereunto by any other way then that▪ [Page 107] For example, not to bestow any office of the king­dome, nor of the kings house, nor any charge amongst the souldiers, to any but such, as have served in the warres a certain number of years; nor to make any man Colonel of horse which hath not been a Captain and other officer of the Ca­valrie; nor any to be Marshall of the field, which hath not honourably born lesser charges; nor any to be Generall of the army, which hath not been a worthy Marshall of the field: briefly, that none may be advanced to any office, which hath not passed through the degrees of warre. And as the hope of advancement is a strong spur to encou­rage every man to exercise the profession of arms; so the fear of finding ones self poore and needy after long service is a sharp bit to keep men from [...]. Therefore I would prevent that by establish­ing a foundation for men of that profession, so that they might live out the rest of their dayes commodiously and honourably. Those States which by reason of their form of government are fearfull to arm their own people (as Venice) or where their subsistence dependeth on traffick (as the Low-Countreys) and which for these rea­sons are constrained to help themselves in their warres by auxiliars, must principally be care­full to choose good Commanders; next, to have a certain body of well exercised and [...]sciplined soul­d [...]ers alwayes in readinesse, sufficient as well to guard them from a surprise as to give them time [...]o assemble greater forces. For an armie formed [...]nd disciplined at leisure, though but small, is more capable to defend it self, yea to conquer, [...]hen those armies which assure themselves onely [Page 108] in their great numbers. And great conquests are almost alwayes made by small armies, as great Empires are alwayes lost with their innumerable forces. For that they which were to fight against such numerous armies, opposed them with an exact discipline and good order; and the other, having neglected all discipline and order, have endeavoured to supply that defect by their great number of men; which hath brought upon them the greater confusion and hath served them for no other end but to make their losse the more disgracefull. VVhence I conclude, that the best means to have good souldiers is to choose such as are most fit for warre; the second, to incite men of ambition and vertue freely to enroll themselves, by shutting the doore of any other way to advance­ment; and lastly, to entertein a body of an armie▪ and to be carefull (as well in peace as in warre) to keep them under an exact discipline, without re­laxation One of which three wayes all sorts of States may make use of.

CHAP. II. Of Arms.

THe most usuall arms of the Infanterie at thi [...] present time, are (for the defensive) th [...] head-piece, the cuirace, and the tasses: and fo [...] the offensive, the sword, the pike, and the musket which are rather the arms of the Grecians then o [...] the Romanes. Whereupon we must observe, that ou [...] muskets serve us as the casting-weapons did th [...] Ancients; so that the body of the battel consiste [...] of pikes, which is a very fit weapon to resist th [...] [Page 109] Cavalrie, for that many of them joyned together make a very solid body, and very hard to be bro­ken on their front, by reason of their length, whereof foure or five ranks extend the heads of their pikes beyond the first rank of men, and do alwayes keep out the squadrons of horse from them twelve or fifteen foot of. Maurice Prince of Orange had a great desire to make use of the target, and having caused divers trials to be made thereof, hath found that it hath not onely resisted the pike, but that half the number of targets hath alwayes entred into twice the number of pikes, and hath routed them. Neverthelesse, being but Generall of the armies of a State, and not a sove­reigne and absolute Prince, he durst not make so great a change; whether it were that he feared the Cavalrie, which now-adayes is exceeding well armed or else the reproch of some evil successe; not being ignorant that the people Judge of the actions of such as serve them rather by the event then by reason. For my part, I would adde this kind of arms to our discipline, making alwayes the principall body of my Infantery to be of pikes, and to have for every battallion a small body separate of one hundred or one hundred and twentie tar­gets to charge on the flank, which would work a marvellous effect on the day of battel; and this should be the true place of voluntiers, and of ve­ry brave Nobilitie, which often prove to be but troublesome to an army. Concerning the offen­sive arms of the Cavalrie, there be of five sorts; namely, the lance, the pistoll, the sword, the cara­bine, and the musket: the two first are given to the heavie-armed calvarie, which must have for [Page 110] defensive arms the cuiracecask, vambraces, tas­sets, cuisses, and guard-rein, and (not many years since) some horses have been armed with barbs. Of the two other kinds, they which serve with carabines have the head-piece and cuirace; and because they fight on horseback, they must be well mounted: but they which serve with the musket have no defensive arms. Of these five sorts of offensive arms there be but three much in use; namely, the pistol, sword, and carabine. The Spaniards onely have conti­nued some few companies of lances, which they keep rather for gravitie then reason; for the lance doth no effect but by the violence of the carreir of the horse, and besides there is but one rank which can make use of it; so that their or­der must be to fight by single ranks, which can­not resist the squadrons: and if they should fight in squadrons, they would rather be troublesome then serviceable. And for musketiers on horse­back or dragones, they are also in a manner left off, for that in the civil warres they ruined the Infantery, every man desiring to have a nag, that so he might be the fitter to rob and pillage: ne­verthelesse some well-ordered troups of this kind in an armie are of very great service; either for executions, to gain bad passages, to guard the quarters of horse, or else (on a day of battel) to cause them to dismount as forlorn hopes before the squadrons of Cavalrie.

Now the Cavalrie must be proportioned with the Infantery; which may be distinguished ac­cording to the situation of the countrey where the warre is made, or else according to the ene­my against whom you are to fight. For if you [Page 111] you be in a champain full of forrage, and if ye be to make warre against a great Cavalrie, as that of the Turk, in such a case you must fortifie your self with the greater number of horse. But if the warre be in a countrey enclosed, either by mountains, forrests, moores, or hedges and ditches, and that hath many fortified places, for that the warre is rather reduced to sieges then to battels and field-combats, in such a case you must strengthen your Infanterie. And these two bodies are so necessary the one for the other, as an armie cannot be held to be good nor subsist unlesse it be equally provided of both. Never­thelesse, if I were not induced by some extraor­dinary reason, I would make the proportion of my army for the open countrey of a fourth part of horse to three fourth parts of Infantery; as to twentie foure thousand foot, eight thousand horse: in an inclosed countrey, of a sixth part of horse to five parts of foot; as to twentie foure thousand foot, foure thousand horse. It remaineth to give to these two bodies such arms as were before mentioned with the most profitable proportion. The Swisses have many more pikes then muskets, and for this they have made themselves to be much feared in a cham­pain countrey; for in a day of battel where you come to hand, the number of pikes hath much advantage of that of muskets. Other nations do equally divide the pikes and muskets; and be­cause the war in these times is reduced to sieges rather then battels, we desire to have a greater number of muskets then of pikes. For my self, which adde the targets to them, my opinion should be to have the regiments of 1440 souldi­ers, [Page 112] namely of 600 pikes, 600 muskets, and 240 targets. For the Cavalrie; I would proportion it after this manner: I would compose the regi­ments of 500 horse, whereof I would arm 400 with Cuirassiers arms; 50 with carabines, and 50 to be dragones.

But this is not all, to provide good arms for your souldiers, unlesse you oblige them to wear them; it being an unsufferable shame to see their delicatenesse in these times, and how they dis­esteem them: and to cover this fault, they pub­lish that it is want of courage to go armed, and that they will go in their doublets into the most dangerous places, aswell as they which are arm­ed. It is not enough to go into a place to cause ones self there to be knocked on the head; we should go thither to conquer, and not to be beat­en. Besides this inconvenience groweth of it, that if you use not your self to wear your arms, you are so pestered with them as you cannot fight in them: on the contrary, if you accustome your self to them, they are no more troublesome to you, and you are at as much libertie in them as if you were in your doublet. But the greatest mischief that cometh of it is, that the ruine of military discipline followeth on it; which a good Captain ought to cause to be exactly observed in every part. For if he slacken it in one, or in favour of some persons, the consequences which follow on it by little and little will be such as they will wholly overthrow it: and then he shall find himself without obedience and without re­spect; which he shall never recover without incurring the hatred of those whom he hath too much spared; it being most certain that it is [Page 113] easier to prevent a mischief then to help it when it is befallen.

CHAP. III. Of Militarie Discipline.

BEsides that which hath been said to incite every one to take upon him the profession of arms rather then any other, we must make other observations to make a man worthy there­of, which consist in three things: namely in the recompense of commendable actions, in the pu­nishment of bad ones, and in the continuall and exact exercise of militarie discipline; for there is no profession in the world which hath more need of such helps then that of warre, where for the single pay (which hardly affordeth livelyhood, and with which the meanest artisan would not be contented) the souldier abandoneth himself to all sorts of perils and labours: but none are instigated thereunto unlesse it be by emulation of honour, or by licence to do evil; and as the first aim is vertuous, so you shall have good service of such as enter into it for that end. But of the other you shall reap nothing but shame; for in stead of a good and obedient ar­my you shall find that you have no better then a troup of pillaging rogues, which without order or obedience forsake you, either after a good boot-haling, or in any eminent danger. For this reason the election of souldiers is a better way of forming an army, then onely to receive voluntaries; where all the vagabonds and evil livers, and such as cannot live but by robbing, cause themselves to be enrolled. Therefore to in­cite [Page 114] such as are vertuous to well-doing, and to deterre the vitious from doing evil, recompen­ses and punishments are principally necessary. The Romanes have made very profitable use of these two means: and if we follow not their way we shall never have good nor well-discipli­ned souldiers. It matters not though we use not the very same remunerations and the same pu­nishments they did; it sufficeth that they be equivalent, that so we may receive the same be­nefit by them: and these things are diversly done, according to time and custome. The principall is to be an exact observer of them, that so the remunerations may excite brave men to worthy actions, and the rigour of punishment may keep cowards from doing basely. The manner of de­cimating the souldiers which the Romanes had, is held to be cruel: neverthelesse there be some­times so infamous actions committed, as you are constrained to use great severity, to give a terrour to all; finding it very good to strike a fear into all those that have escaped by the means of the lot, and to put but few to death. For you must imprint this belief into your souldiers, that by base flight they escape not death, but they onely exchange a glorious death which they should have acquired by fighting valiantly for an infa­mous one. After that the souldier be incoura­ged by the honour of being esteemed valiant, and brought to a hatred of being held a coward, it must be made a like degree of honour for every one to know how well to obey his superiour, from the private souldier to the Lieutenant ge­nerall: for on this obedience all the functions of an army depend, and without it you can keep no­thing [Page 115] in rule, nor do any thing that is good. This must be ingraffed into the hearts of the soul­diers, as being one of the principallest vertues re­quired in them. From hence groweth order; by this military exercise is mainteined; briefly, by this brave designes are executed, and without this all goeth to confusion and ruine. I will not trouble my self here to speak of the particular military exercises which the souldier is to be exercised in, because divers books are ful of them, and that custome doth alwaies change something or other in them. I will onely say that there is no­thing so profitable as to exercise every souldier to carry his arms properly, to use them souldier­like, to keep his rank well, and therein well to execute all the motions and charges which are commanded him. So much concerning the soul­diers: But concerning the recompense of Ge­nerals of armies, I will say the same which I said for the souldiers, namely, that according to the time, or the constitution of kingdomes or common-wealths, such courses ought to be ta­ken as the honour of such as have done brave actions and great services be not diminished nor blemished: For that the most generous spirits (which will easily excuse all want of other re­compense for their services) will never endure to be robbed of the honour due to their brave actions, and will sooner stomach such a want of due honour then any other thing whatsoever: whereupon very often great mischiefs have followed.

CHAP. IV. Of the obedience of souldiers.

NOw as the Generall of the armie requireth of the souldiers that obedience which is due to him, so he must have a care to give them no just cause to exempt themselves from it: to this end he ought to keep them in continuall im­ployment, for that idlenesse engendreth cor­ruption of manners and discipline, whence proceed luxury, neglecting of exercises and the guards, and disobedience to superiours. It was the ease and idlenesse of Capua that de­stroyed Hannibals army, and the delicacies of Babylon which corrupted Alexander himself, and from whence he drew away his army to prevent the totall ruine of it; there being no means of greater efficacy to keep it in due order, and to prevent seditions, then to imploy it in warre. It is therefore a maxime which must be exactly observed, never to suffer your souldiers in any place to be idle, especially when the army is brought together in a body; for if you imploy them not in that which is good, they will busie themselves in that which is naught. This course must be taken aswell in the time of secu­rest peace as of open warre; particularly, to ex­ercise them to use their arms well, and to ob­serve good order; and though there be no need, yet to use them to make retrenchments of the camp, and to make their huts: that so they may be so accustomed to remove the earth, that when necessity shall require, it may be no trou­ble to them. I would further imploy them to [Page 117] make fortifications and other works of this kind, not onely to keep them in exercise, but that also they may get (besides their pay) wherewith the better to maintein themselves, and that they accustome themselves to that which in time of warre is as profitable to them as to fight well, there being nothing impossible for twenty or thirty thousand men which will work in the earth; for in eight dayes they will make fortresses which shall be impregnable: And Cesar hath made himself as much redoubt­ed and admired by the great works which he hath caused his souldiers to make, as by his great battels. Moreover, the Generall must take care that they be well clothed and well fed; especially that (out of their payes) they be furnished with clothes and shoes, otherwise he will soon find his army to decay, and diseases to rage in it for want thereof. He must also have a great care of those which are sick and hurt, and therein to spare for no cost; that so the souldiers may not excuse themselves from going on upon dangerous services, or to undergo laborious im­ployments, because they are abandoned when they are sick or wounded. The General ought also to take a particular care not to overlabour his souldiers, nor to put them to extraordinary hard marches without great necessity: but when need requireth it, he must be the first to undergo the labour; for the example of the commander maketh all things easie to the souldier. The examples not onely of the greatest Captains a­mongst the Ancients, but even of the greatest Monarchs and Emperours, should shame our de­licate Captains of these times, which are afraid [Page 118] to spoil their fair complexion in the sunne, and their goodly plumes in the rain, which would believe themselves to be dishonoured if they should march on foot at the head of their compa­nies: and those great men have not scorned to march at the head of their armies, and have re­fused to quench their extraordinary thirst, be­cause there was not water enough to make all the army to drink; and so making themselves companions of the dangers and labours of their meanest souldiers, have made themselves masters of the greatest part of the world, and have gain­ed an immortall glory.

CHAP. V. Of Marching.

THere are divers considerations to be made upon the marching of an army; which may be assaulted in the day-time, or at its dislodging, or even in the night when it is lodged. If it be not encamped, but lodge in villages, you must (to cause it to meet in one body) give it a Ren­dez-vous on the way which it must take; which if the enemy learn time enough to be there first, or that he meet with it there by chance, he will put the army to run a great hazard, which com­eth to its Rendez-vous at divers times and by divers wayes. The best means to guard ones self from such an accident are, to keep your Rendez-vous very secret, to have good spies amongst the enemies, and to send out many dis­coverers for intelligence. When you encamp you are not subject to that danger, because the army is alwayes together. For the march you [Page 119] must consider the countrey where you are, and the number of souldiers which you have. If you march in great plains, you may (for the most part) march in battalia; or at least with form­ed battaillons and squadrons: then it is very easie to put your self readily into a good form to fight well, because you march not in a long order. But when you march through a strait countrey, where but few can march in front, then you must compute the discommodity of the way, and the time you have for your march, with the number of souldiers whereof your army consist­eth; for 10000 foot marching 10 in front, and 1000 horse marching 5 in front, with the lightest baggage they can possibly have, and ten cannons, with equipage for every piece to shoot 100 bullets, take up about 28000 foot of way in length; whereby you may judge how much way in file 30000 foot and 6000 horse will take. Therefore when so great armies find themselves in such a troublesome way, you must of necessity divide them into severall bodies, which may march one after another, and lodge severally; or rather cause them to march by divers wayes, some miles distant from each other; or howso­ever, to make wayes through the fields for your souldiers to march in, leaving the great road for your cannon and baggage. If there be a river to passe where you can make but one bridge, or some passage over a mountain, moorish ground, or forrest where you cannot make severall wayes, then you must march one after another, and on severall dayes. I trouble not my self to shew how you are to passe through such bad passages in view of the enemy, because many [Page 120] have written thereof: yet when it cometh to exe­cution, few will get off well, if they be charged home; but I will onely say that the best way is to calculate the time so well as you may avoid such encounters. Concerning the march; I find it almost impossible that two armies should meet each other, if one of the two Generals be de­sirous to avoid it, especially in an inclosed coun­trey: but whatsoever happen, the best way is to have the baggage wholly separated from the souldiers, leaving onely on the rear some few troups to keep it from disbanding: for if in time of alarm every body have their baggage behind them, it causeth a great confusion, and hindreth the souldiers from rallying themselves and help­ing each other. The time of lodging is also a dangerous time to be assaulted in, because the army is then tired, and every man (desi­rous to be lodged) hastneth to the quarter in dis­order, which is a thing hard to avoid, if (before you enter your lodgings) you cause not your ar­my to stand in battalia, and so cause them to lodge troup after troup, without suffering any to lodge but by command, mean time sending out on all sides upon discovery.

There remaineth the assaulting of a quarter, which is that which is more frequently attempt­ed, especially when the army is not encamped; because it being lodged in severall quarters, the enemy may attempt to surprise some one quar­ter without hazarding a generall combat: fo [...] which I do not find the ordinary guard alone (how exactly soever it be performed) sufficien [...] to remedy such an accident; because it canno [...] give the alarm but at too near a distance, and tha [...] [Page 121] ofttimes you have not leisure to put your self in order to fight; therefore you must be carefull to send out discoverers every night, by divers small troups, which (if they do well perform their task) will not suffer you to be surprised; for an ar­my or a grosse troup capable to assail a quarter of an army cannot march so secretly that it be not perceived. And when you have to do with a vigilant enemy, and that you fear such assaults in the night, there is nothing so good as to prevent him, if it be not in earnest, at least to give him al­arms every night, that so he may be more trou­bled about keeping himself upon his guards, then about assailing you. If it be in an intrenched camp, where all the army is in one body, it is a high enterprise to assault it. And this one chap­ter sheweth the security of an intrenched camp▪ which I will end with this conclusion, That all the forementioned things to assure the quarters must never be omitted, though you believe your self to be far off from any enemy; for that, besides the profit you draw from hence in accustoming your army to do their duties, there may such an occasion befall you as it may be the safety of your army, of your life, and of your reputati­on.

CHAP. VI. Of encamping.

I Will not here describe the form of entrench­ed camps, but onely the profitablenesse of them, not being able to wonder enough that they have been wholly discontinued. No people made so exact use of them as the Romanes; and [Page 122] in our time Maurice Prince of Orange hath revi­ved the use of them, or at least hath given them a great perfection. The entrenchment of a camp assureth an army, in that it is never dispersed in the villages, where some quarter or other is ever in danger to be surprised, but lodgeth all in one body, and in such fashion as being assailed it may fight with great advantage. The entrenchment saveth a great deal of trouble, because by it there is need of the fewer guards by many, & those lesse toilsome, especially to the Cavalry, which when they are lodged in open villages, are constrained to be on horseback almost all night. The en­trenchment encloseth your army as a walled city; from whence you may march privately with such troups as you please, to execute all sorts of brave designes, leaving your baggage in safety. The entrenchment hindreth the enemy from constraining you to fight, unlesse when you please. The entrenchment causeth you to be without danger at the head of the most dread­full armies. The entrenchment causeth you to take strong cities in the face of more puissant armies then your own. Briefly, the entrench­ment is lesse subject to infection then the villa­ges where you lodge, because you choose a whol­some place to sit down in, and in villages you must take them as they fall out: Also, because this is more ayrie, the lodgings are here better divided, those things which may cause bad air are more easily removed; and in effect an army incamped and entrenched wil rather subsist three moneths in health in a camp, then a forthnight in the best villages. Whence I conclude, that one of the most necessary parts of warre is, [Page 123] well to know how to incamp and entrench.

CHAP. VII. Of Battels.

OF all the actions of warre the most glorious and most important is to give battel: the gaining of one or two acquireth or subverteth whole Empires. Anciently all warres were di­vided by battels, which caused such speedy conquest: For the present, warres are managed more fox-like then lion-like; and are rather founded upon sieges then combats. Neverthe­thelesse, there be divers nations at this day which decide the most part of their warres by battels, as the Turks and the Persians: and even amongst the Christians we have seen of late divers bat­tels given in Germanie, whereof onely one had almost inthralled all the Protestant Princes. And an army well-disciplined, and which feareth not battel, hath a marvellous advantage in all de­signes of that which feareth it. For this reason (howsoever the manner of warring at this time be not so frequent in the hazarding of battels as in times past) the knowledge of them must not be neglected. And a Generall of an army can­not be said to be a good Captain, which know­eth not all advantages which may be taken on a day of battel, and all disadvantages which ought to be avoyded; that so he may well disintangle himself. I will not speak of dust, the sunne or rain, whereof it is observed that many Captains have made use, driving them on the face of the enemy by gaining the wind of them; because they are casuall things which may change in a [Page 124] moment, and which by consequence happen ra­ther by hazard then come by designe; but of things more solid.

He then that will give battel must have re­gard to seven principall things. The first is, ne­ver to suffer himself to be forced to fight against his will. The second, to choose a field for the battel fit for the quality and number of his soul­diers: for if he feareth to be inclosed by a great number, he must shelter his flanks▪ or at least one of them, by the nature of the place; as by a river, wood, or some other thing equivalent: and if he be weak in his Cavalry, he must avoid the plains; as he must strait passages or enclo­sed places, if stronger. The third, so to range his army in battel, as according to the quality of his souldiers it may be within its own advantage, sheltring his horse by his foot, if therein he be the weaker; and if the contrary, his foot by his horse; disposing all his souldiers in such order as they may fight divers times before they be wholly defeated: for if we well observe the small troups of souldiers which fight not all at once, and believe that a hundred horse in two troups wil beat two hundred in one entire troup, and have observed in our times that divers bat­tels have been won by him which had made a troup of reserve, which was not to fight untill all the rest had fought, how much greater effect will a second order of battel produce, which will come to the charge after that all the ad­verse army hath fought against the first order▪ and yet after that a third, in imitation of the Romanes, if the two former be defeated It is a maxime, That every troup (how grosse soever i [...] [Page 125] be) which hath fought, is in such a disorder as the least troup that chargeth it, is able to defeat it absolutely: so that that Generall which can reserve some troups to the last without fighting, will with those bear away the victory: it being a long work and difficult to go about to rally an army that hath fought into good order to fight afresh; some gazing about for pillage, others being vexed to return to the danger again, and all being so distracted as they do not or will not understand any command: on the contrary, such as have not as yet fought, are under obedience, and ready to do whatsoever their Generall shall command them. So that the knowledge of a Generall of an army is not so much to rally dis­ordered and defeated troups (which is properly but an action of courage) as to make his troups fight to good purpose, the one after the other, and not all at once: for he must consider that he cannot be well obeyed by his souldiers, but one­ly untill the houre that he sendeth them to the combat. After that all the orations of the world will not stay them when they flie; but this troup which is in good order will easily do it. The fourth is, to have many good command­ers, it being impossible that a Generall should suffice for all places. After that he hath made a good choice of his field for battel, and put his army into good order, it is altogether impossible for him (when it cometh to blows) to give order, more then in that part where he is pre­sent: so that if he be not well assisted every­where else, aswell amongst the horse as foot, though he should work miracles in that place where he himself is, he cannot make good the [Page 126] ignorance of those officers which command in the other parts of his army. Therefore there must be at least five principall commanders to make an army fight well, namely for three bo­dies of Infantery, distinguished by vanguard, battel, and rearguard, and two for the horse which are on the wings. The fifth is, so to observe your distances in your order of battel, that the foremost troups being put to recoil, may not fall upon those which should come up to relieve thē, nor the second upon the third. The sixth is, to place the most valiant souldiers on the wings of the army, and to begin the battel by that wing which you think to be strongest; for if you once break one of the enemies wings, you fall upon his flank and rear, and it is impossible for him to resist you. The seventh and last is, not to suf­fer any to pursue the enemy, nor fall to pilla­ging, untill he be routed on all parts; and al­though it be good to give him a hot chace, you must ever have some troups in order, which must not disband, that so you may avoid all in­conveniences. I will not speak of the advan­tages which may be met with in a field of bat­tel, whereof a good Captain often maketh use with great profit; because there can no certain rule be given for it, by reason the diversitie of situations is such, that you shall never find two every-way alike.

CHAP. VIII. Of Fortresses.

BEcause the gain and losse of battels draweth such consequences after it, as it giveth or taketh away whole Empires at once, it hath caused a resolution of opposing the conquers by fortified places, to stay their first fury with few men, and to ruine their armies: But since the in­vention of the cannon they have been enforced to change their manner of fortifications; and even by reason of the invention of petards we have beene constrained to assure the gates of ci­ties by portculices, pallisadoes, draw-bridges, and other inventions; because there was no place, how strong soever it were, which did not runne a hazard to be surprised by this new in­vention. Now the best fortresses against the can­non are those which are made of earth; because (when they have a sufficient thicknesse to make resistance) they are not subject to endamage the besieged, as those fortifications are which are made of masons work, the shivers where­of do much mischief. Neverthelesse, when a Prince can be at the cost to line them as high as the rampart, leaving the parapet upon it to be of earth cannon-proof, it maketh the work to last the longer.

In fortresses you must observe foure princi­pall things: namely, that the line of defense be within musket-shot; that the flanked angle ex­ceed not ninety degrees, nor be lesse then sixty; that the gorge of the bul-wark be not too nar­row; and that the flank be as great as may be. And [Page 128] these foure generall maximes must be so propor­tioned amongst themselves, as that to make one of them exceeding good you destroy not the rest. You must also avoid tenailles in the prin­cipall body of fortification, unlesse the ground be so small as it will not suffer you to make good flanks. For the interior angle of such a fortifica­tion raised as it ought to be cannot be defended by any flank, and men may lodge themselves at the foot of it without receiving any hurt, un­lesse it be by stones thrown over. This is the reason why tenailles are not used but in the counterscarps. The moats are usually propor­tioned according to the earth necessary to make the fortifications; and such as are full of water are best to hinder a surprise, and the forts defend themselves the best against an assault: their breadth must have a due proportion; for when they are too broad the out-works are too farre distant from the defense of the principall fortifi­cation; but depth never spoiled a moat. The false brayes are joyned to the body of the forti­fication. It is anew invention and excellent to hinder the approching to the bulwarks by gal­leries. The counterscarp, half-moons, ravelins, and horn-works are beyond the great moat; all the out-works (if it be possible) must be com­manded by the body of the fortification. These are in grosse the principall observations which are in fortifications in a place which is levell and approchable: the rest dependeth on the judge­ment of the Enginier, which must make profita­ble use of the situation of the place which he is to fortifie, either in taking what serveth for his advantage, or in avoyding whatsoever is to his [Page 129] hinderance. I adde further, that there be situ­ations so favourable, as nature it self defendeth them, and maketh them more inexpugnable then all the art in the world; as an inaccessible rock, a quagmire or a lake: But every commodity hath its discommodity; seldome you shall meet with such situations on frontier-places, or upon any important passage, or capable to contein a garri­son of sufficient strength to give [...]ealousie to an enemy which would invade your countrey; or else they are found so easie to be blocked up, as five hundred men without are able to besiege five hundred within.

They which desire to know the particulari­ties of fortification, may find them amongst an infinite number of books where they are descri­bed; but much better in the exercise of warre, where expe [...]ence causeth every day something to be added.

CHAP. IX. Of defense against surprises.

NOw that we have spoken of fortresses, we must come to the way of guarding them, and not suffer them to be surprised. It is most certain that men will alwayes attempt to take them by surprise rather then by open force; for that thereby they save charge and time. But be­cause surprises are grounded upon some defects which they find in the place, or in the guard thereof, I will begin with that which must be ob­served to defend your self against such surprises.

The Captain which shall have a place to guard must provide for six principall things, [Page 130] whereon all the rest depend: namely, to see that the walls be out of danger of a scalado; the gates not subject to the petard; the way for the rounds easie and convenient; the sentinels well set; the guard very exact; and to hinder intelli­gences and treacheries. For the five first, the way is beaten for them, there be books full of instructions, a [...]d there be now so many Princes orders in writing and in practice, as he must be very negligent which is not carefull therein. But for the last it is not so easie to give rules. Treachery may be wrought by the townsmen or souldiers: the mingling of them together, whether it be on the guards, rounds, or patroul­lies, may much hinder it; as also the drawing all the functions of the guard by lot, the keeping a guard without the town, and the having of spies amongst the enemies. You must double your guards at times of fairs and markets, in harvest and time of [...]intage, because men use to spy out such times to frame a designe. You must observe to be in arms at the opening and shutting of the gates; and in whatsoever time of peace it may be, you must never neglect the observation of any of these particulars. There is also a way to avoid intelligences, namely, by making double enterprises your self, feigning to discon­tent an officer, private souldier, or townsman, who running over to the enemy, causeth him to undertake some designe probably feisible and fa­cil: for besides the profit which you gain by it, by getting the boldest of them in a trap, you reap this advantage by it, that your enemie dreameth on no other so long as he hopeth in that; for that every one alwayes undertaketh [Page 131] that which he believeth will succeed most assured­ly. Whereby we may see how doubtfull those enterprises are which are grounded upon intelli­gence, either for that they may be double, or else by the fault of traitours, which in the very point of execution may lose courage and discover all; or by their indiscretions and not keeping secret their negotiations. For these reasons in enterprises made upon intelligence both the defendant and assailant must be very suspicious and exceeding di­ligent to observe the words, actions and beha­viour of such as promise to serve them by betray­ing their own side, and to omit no precautions to assure themselves of their persons, so that they may not catch them; the hostages of women and children being not alwayes sufficient (as Mont­luc observeth at the enterprise of Darges) for that some traitours are so resolute as they will ha­zard all to attein the height of their designes, and make account to release their pledges by such prisoners as they intend to take.

There remaineth a word to be spoken of alarms. You may therein use two wayes: the first and usu­all way is to put your self in order in the allarm-place, where the governour must be present, that so from thence he may lead to the place of danger; the second is, for every company to repair to their colours, and from thence to go and find out their squadron which is upon the guard. If the garrison be weak, the scalado easie, and the place large, this last way of going to the alarm is the best, because they go more readily to the defense of the walls; but in this case they must have no suspicion of the fidelitie of the inhabitants.

CHAP. X. Of assaults by surprises.

THe enterprises of fortified places are made after severall fashions, either by petard, or by scalado, or by some holes in the wals, or by sau­cidges, or by some such other wayes and inven­tions which men seek every day to encrease, ac­cording to the measure of the remedies against such as are alreadie invented. But to make them take good effect you must be very carefull of three things; namely, intelligence, conducting, and execution: for for want of one of these we see all enterprises miscarry; either by being pre­vented by the day-light, or being discovered too soon, or for want of some petard or ladder, or by some disorder in the execution. For the first, which is intelligence, they which are imployed in it must inform themselves exactly of the form of the garrison, number of the townsmen, and of their affections. They must observe at the gates whether there be a bridge dormant to come at them; whether it be of wood or stone; and if of wood, whether they use not to take away some planks in the night-time; whether this bridge hath not rails: whe [...]her the moat be deep and broad, and whether by a commodious descending into the moat you may escape the draw-bridge, which is usually made upon the bridge dormant: or whether by the benefit of the moat the gate or draw bridge of the town may be petarded without carriages or rolling-bridge. They must well observe all the hindrances which may be be­fore [Page 133] the bridge dormant, whether they be gates, barres, pallisadoes, or portculices, there being usually a ravelin: and whether there be a corps du-guard kept in the night, either on the outside or upon the bridge dormant: taking notice how many gates, bridges, barres, pallisadoes, portcu­lices, trap-doores, grates, iron-pinnes, chains, and other impediments whatsoever there be from the field to the inside of the town, and how all these things are fastened: how many paces of distance there may be from one piece to another, and (as near as may be) the length, breadth and thick­nesse of all those things, and in what places they are: whether there be loopholes over the gate, or holes in the roof of it: how many corps du-guards there be, in what places they are, and how situated; whether the entrance be straight on, or winding; observing the place of the flanks, whether they be on the side before, behind, above, or below; whether they keep any ordi­nance there, and how many; or whether they be onely for musketiers; what number may be lodged on them, and at what distance they flank the [...]ate; discovering the way by which you are to go from the town you go from to that which you intend to assail: To spie out a fitting place within half a league of it to alight, and to distri­bute the petards and other instruments: they must also observe the places and streets within the town which must be seised upon, all the corps du-guards to be forced; and well consider the condi [...]ion of the souldiers, and other necessarie things, to sur­mount all obstacles which might be met with. If it be to give them a scalado, they must well ob­serve [Page 134] the dvenues, the counterscarp and the moat; to know whether you may come at it undiscover­ed, go down into the moat, and come up out of it easily, especially over against the place where you would make the scalado, or near it. For if you must go farre about the town after you be entred into the moat, the enterprise becometh much the more dangerous and difficult. It must be known whether the moat be drie or frozen, or that the water be but shallow, without mud and easie to passe; whether the wall be low or weak, so as it may easily be scaled or pierced, or whether there be some hole or drain or other means for the water to passe in or out which are ill guarded or weak. You must judge what height your lad­ders must be of, and regard how they may be set on sure footing, and whether there be a scarp or not; whether the place where you mean to give on be far from guards or sentinels; whether the place of scalado be capable to raise good store of lad­ders, and for store of men to enter at once: as if it were very strait, you must see if the first be­ing entred can accommodate themselves upon the rampart to subsist so long untill the rest mount. You must also observe the distances of the wall to enter into the town, and to go and set upon the corps du-guard.

For the second, which is the conducting, it may be made two wayes, by parts or in grosse: by parts, when they are designes upon places of im­portance, and which are farre within an enemies countrey, and whereof the enterprises are held to be very f [...]isible in the execution; for they may not fail, without putting all the souldiers which [Page 135] go on that service into eminent danger: there­fore there must be great prudence used, and none imployed in it but resolute men and secret, be­cause they must either there overcome or perish; which happeneth not in such enterprises where there is as great care taken of the safety of re­treating as of giving on. The Marshall of Brisac made one (being in Piedmont) upon the castle of Millain, which was excellently well conducted, and deserveth to be here taken notice of, to serve for a lesson for such as may desire to under­take the like. He made choice of eightie French men and fourtie Italians, the bravest and resolu­test souldiers of all his army, and made Salvaison Captain of the French, and Peter Maria of Re­cuperat of Bresignolle commander of the Italians, which two onely knew whither they were to go: then he caused them to come by five at once to his Secretaries lodging, and caused twenty five crowns to be given to each of them, and to the chief man of every five there was a note given, wherein was specified the way they were to take, and the dayes journeyes they were to go, that so the brigadoes might not meet each other. The first rendez [...]vous was at an out-house (or farm-house) on the confines of Millanois, whither Lodowick Birague had conveyed him­self some dayes before very secretly in disguised apparel, to give such order to this designe as should be necessary. The manner of meeting at this farm-house was thus; At the parting from the valley Camonica or Bergamasque, the first five or brigado (and so by turns all the rest) found a countrey-fellow having a straw-hat with two pheasants feathers on it; to whom the chief [Page 136] man of every brigado was to say, O buon com­pagno, voi tu vender my quella capelina! that is, Ho, good fellow, wilt thou sell me that hat? to which he was to answer, Messer no, ne ho bi­sogno per me; that is, No sir, I must use it my self. That was the watchword; which being so known, the chief (without speaking a word) followed the countrey-fellow, which conducted him with his brigado to the farm-house where Lodowick Birague was; and in this wise the Marshall of Brisac his hundred and twenty soul­diers passed very secretly to that place. From this farm-house they were to get to the house of one of Sienna near Millain, who was the plot­ter of the designe: to this end they passed along as before, by five and five together, and after they had passed the river Adde at the haven of Vaure, they had measured the time to arrive to­wards night at the bridge Navilio of Millain, near the Monastery of Angels; on which bridge be­ing arrived, the chief of the brigado shaked a little bell, at the sound of which he was an­swered by another like it, and presently there came (from below the bridge) the man of Si­enna (the authour of this designe) who conducted the brigado to his own house, and continued af­ter this manner every night, untill the whole troup was past: which is a matter worth the observing, to cause a hundred and twenty soul­diers to go by stealth from Piedmont to the very gates of Millain, without being discovered, and not a man of them (except onely Salvaison and Peter Maria of Recuperat) untill then, know­ing whither they went or where they were. Concerning the conducting in grosse, which is [Page 137] the more ordinary, you must measure the length of the way to the place upon which you have your designe, with the time which you must have to arrive at the just time to execute it: wherein many deceive themselves very often, for that usually there befall unexpected casualties which prolong the time; insomuch that what measures soever you take (without great experience in such actions) you shall commonly find the time too short, especially if you have a grosse troup to lead. For to make two thousand men to march by night in their long order, the Altes which must be made at the head to stay for the rear, or those which a narrow or troublesome way, or that is cut off by a river compell you to make, are such, and cause you to lose so much time, that unlesse you be very diligent to make them march, and that you have caused good intelligence to be taken of the way, and provided for all these things, you will find you have not half time enough. I speak not of the great showers of rain, nor of frosts, which sometimes happen so unlooked for and extraordinary, that, what fore­sight soever you may have used in all other things, it is impossible to overcome them. After that you have proportioned the time with the way, you must provide your self of good guides, and as many of them as may be: then you must form your order before you depart, as it should be at the execution, giving to every man your commands in writing of what he is to do, and keeping a register thereof. For if you deferre to do it untill you come upon the place where you are to alight, and where all the equipage is to be accommodated (which is usually about half [Page 138] a league from the place) may hinder you there­in, the place haply will not be spacious enough nor commodious to make the order, contentions which may befall, jealousie of honour amongst the souldiers, and divers unthought-of accidents w ch arise, are able to frustrate the designe: which things being resolved on before your going out, and there being nothing to be changed in your order, this (most certainly) is the means to avoid such obstacles. I adde this, That if it be a citie from whence you go out, you must keep the gates shut long before and after; and cause the troups to march by day, that so you may see that not a man go out but they of the enterprise. And afterwards to cause the troups to make Alte, be­yond the gate or in some private place near hand. Concerning the order; you must cause some horse to march foremost, whose scouts must have charge to ride farre enough before, and to seise upon all sorts of persons wheresoever they go, that so they may hinder the giving of intelli­gence to the town which you intend to surprise; especially if there be some bridge or passage by which unavoydably you must passe, you must gain that. Then must fifty musketiers follow; next the train, the petards or ladders, being fol­lowed by those men which are chosen to carry them; whereof there must be a treble number, to ease and succeed each other, in case any be hurt or killed: and these must be men of execution, the most resolute and adventurous of the troup; for on these foremost usually the good or bad successe dependeth: you must also carry double equipage of petards, because all work not that effect which you purpose they [Page 139] should; and often the want of one petard hath caused brave enterprises to fail, and so of lad­ders, which are often broken by the enemies, or break by being too much laden. In the pursuit you must not make any troup of above fifty soul­diers, namely fifty muskets, then fifty pikes, and so successively: for you must consider that the first encounters are in narrow streets, and in the night; so that the grosse troups cause but disor­der. And if you find streets that are broader then the order which you have framed, you must joyn two troups together, that so they may take up the whole breadth of the street. Every troup must have officers at the front and rear of it, and the sergeants on the flanks, to keep them to their duties, and to hinder them from straggling and pillaging. You must also observe in the order you make (when you part from your quarter) that if you make severall assaults, the commanders, souldiers, and equipage must be distinguished into so many troups as you will make assaults, and that they march according to the order they should assail in. In all enterprises (especially in those where the retreat is dangerous and long) you must more regard to have good souldiers then many; for a small troup may come from farther off, march more secretly, and retreat with lesse danger and confusion then a grosse troup. Besides, a small troup with good store of officers, is more obedient in execution, and be­getteth lesse disorder then a grosse, I adde fur­ther, that in enterprises by night you affright an enemy as much with a small troup as with a great one: for it is a maxime, That they which are surprised and assailed fight in fear, alwayes [Page 140] perswading themselves that you assail them with forces sufficient. Briefly, if you overcome with a small troup you get more honour then if it had been with a great, which ofttimes disturbeth you both in fight, in march, and in their retreat: and if you be beaten, the dishonour is the lesse. Con­cerning the third, which is the execution, all the order must be given in writing, that so none of them which have any command in the enter­prise may excuse themselves by pretending they misunderstood you. If it be by scalado, there must be 2 men to carry every piece of a ladder; and because it is almost impossible to do the ex­ecution upon a place where there needeth more then five pieces of ladders in height, it is suffici­ent that there be ten men for every ladder, and one man to command them: The men for eve­ry ladder must be mentioned in a roll by their names and surnames, and of what company they be. You must command them on pain of death to bring back their ladders if you cannot get the town: for they seeing the danger and trouble of bringing them back again, will rather desire to do their uttermost endeavour to enter the town moreover you must command ten other men to enter after the first ten, which must be led by an officer, and another to be on their rear to take care to see them mount without losing of time and without making too much hast: otherwise the ladders will be so much laden as that they will break; after this, ten more must follow, commanded and divided as the former: and every file of ten must know by which ladder they must mount, and in what order, that so al [...] may be done without confusion. The first te [...] [Page 141] which follow their ladder must carry another, though they have no order to raise it; that so if any piece of the first should break, there may another be raised in the stead. If it be by petard, the petardier shall call him that is to carry the madrier or planchier; then he is to call three for the petard (two to carry it, and the third to assist in time of need) and if the plan­chier be fastned to the petard, thē foure men may carry it interchangeably by two and two: and those two which carry not the petard with the planchier shall each of them have a great smiths hammer. After these foure, the petardier shall call two men, each of them carrying a great ax; after them one with a crow-lever, then another with a dark-lantern, then one with three or foure pieces of lighted matches: besides these there must be one to command them, which shall carry a piercing instrument, or a coopers turrell, or some good hooks with steeled points, and a weighty hammer. So that to attend every pe­tard well there must be ten men; this file of ten for the first petard shall be led by some brave Sergeant, which shall have the name of every man of his file in writing, and shall also know what every of them is to carry. The men must know the Mule which carrieth their equipage, and so soon as they come to the place where they are to unlade, they must place themselves about the Mule, that so each of them may receive what he is to carry. If the second petard must be applied to a gate or barres, they which shall carry it must be in the same order as they of the first petard: but if it be for a draw-bridge, the rolling-bridge or carriage goeth formost, with seven or [Page 142] eight men which are imployed as well to carry it as to push it forward: after this the planchier and petard must be carried, after the same man­ner as the first; then shall they follow (in file and in close order) which carry the ladders and planks to cast upon the breach which the petard shall have made upon the draw-bridge; then shall they follow which carry hāmers, hatchets, pinsōs, instruments to pull out bolts and to cut chains; then some with fire-lances and granadoes, and some dark lanterns. The officer which shall have the leading of them must take care that not a man lose his rank, and shall divide them into files, and shall take care to cause the spare men to carry such portions of the equipage as they did carry which shall happen to be hurt or kil­led, which he shall onely cause to be laid out of the way, without suffering those which are to be imployed about the service of the petard to trouble themselves about carrying away any man that is killed or hurt. At all the gates and bridges the men must be disposed in the same order. But when you go against iron-grates or portcullices, you must cause those to march first which carry the tresses or iron-hooks; then marcheth the planchier and the petard; after which follow hammers, hatchets, crows of iron, and other instruments which may be thought fitting: you must not forget to carry fire-balls, granadoes, or fire-lances, if you have observed that you may make use of them; every man must carry a hatchet at his girdle: you must rather have a su­pernumerary number of instruments, then want one. Having thus put all into order, and offi­cers at the head and on the flanks of every file, [Page 143] you must have besides some petards, planchiers, and other instruments for reserve, which must be carried in the same order as the [...]ther: For you must alwayes have a double equipage. When you come near the place where the execution is to be done, you must distribute to every man what he is to carry. The Sergeant ordereth them in file, and commandeth every one duly to follow his leader: then he causeth them to march for­ward to give room to those of the second petard; and so consequently of all the rest, there being a guide for the first file to shew them the way. And that you may not be intangled, sometimes you may cause ten cuiraciers to march before one foot, to discover whether the enemy be not on the advenues; then follow three men bearing good targets, to shelter (amongst others) the petardier; then march they which carry the pe­tards and the other train, in such order as hath been said, which shall be followed by fifty muskets led by a Captain, to give fire for their defense (if need be) with large hailshot. He must look that no man stay by the way as they march; when the enemy asketh, Who goeth there, they must hasten their pace, and then the petar­dier taketh the first petard with him, and the rest must follow very close, that so when the first is fired the second be ready to be put into his hands. The ten horsmen which have marched before all the equipage so farre, shall not ad­vance further then the distance of pistoll-shot from the first bars; then they shall fall back to the Captain which leadeth the fifty musketiers. The first petard being fired, the officer shall cause his men to be placed on the right and left hand, [Page 144] to give room for the second petard; then that shall do the same, to give passage to the third; then that maketh room for the rolling-bridge, and they for the petards and other instruments, and consequently all the rest. And they which are unladen must help the rest, without making any noise. And if the petardier calleth for any thing, he that carrieth it must be ready to give it him, and no man upon pain of death must stirre out of the place where he was placed, but onely to give to the petardier what he calleth for, or to supply some bodies place which in carrying something to the petardier was hurt or killed. The officers must take care that the petardier be presently served, and all be done without noise or confusion. The ouverture being made, they which shall be commanded for the first at­tempts must be ready to enter, and to force whatsoever shall resist them; they which are to follow them must do the like, and so consequent­ly all the rest which are to act any thing: And when they are within, they which first entred must not scatter themselves in the town (whilest they are yet weak) whether it be in pursuing the enemy, or though they meet none: but they must make two bodies, the one to act, the other onely to be put into battalia to sustein the rest. This done, they must march in good order, the one to force that whereunto they are appointed, the other to go and embattel themselves in the streets and market-places which you had resolved ought to be seised upon, by the plat or draught of the town, by which the whole enterprise ought to have been designed. For howsoever it hath sometimes succeeded well to fo [...]low the [Page 145] enemy speedily with such few men as are en­tred, yet is it not the surest way, because they may be repulsed by a few men; which hath of­ten caused brave enterprises to be frustrated.

There must also be a third body which must stand in battalia without during the execution, to the end that if they which entred should be repulsed, they may sustein them; or else to re­medy such accidents which might befall them by some of the enemies troups, which casually might arrive in that place. If you be wholly re­pulsed, that troup which is without shall make the retreat, and shall remain firm in battalia untill that the repulsed troups be recollected and put in order: but if they which entred be­come masters of the town, to hold it they must disarm the townsmen before they disarm them­selves. And being well assured of all the corps du-guards and commodious places, the houses must be shared, that so every man may have his proportion of the bootie, they being not suffered to take it any other way; and they which shall begin to pillage must be severely punished. By this means you may appoint the best houses to them which have best deserved, and do the rest by lot, whereof no man shall have cause to com­plain but of his own ill fortune. If it be needfull, in such places as are assailed by scalado, you may dispose some troups of musketiers, which shall give fire perpetually upon the flanks; and if you can, you may adde to them some fire-lances: and such as give fire at the top of the ladder, must cease so soon as their men begin to mount. I have been more particular in this chapter then in any other; but so many enterprises have failed [Page 146] by the not observing of the least of these things, that I rather chose to be somewhat long herein then to omit them.

CHAP. XI. Of assaults by sieges.

IN the two chapters of surprises I have begun with the means to defend ones self, for that we must never undertake to attempt the surprise of any fort, but upon the defects which are to be found in them: so that he which knoweth not on which part nor after which manner he ought to make his assault, must be prepared for all manner of accidents. In these two I will be­gin to treat of the assailing of towns by sieges, for that you must observe by what place and af­ter what manner you are assailed, to make a good defense against it.

Sieges are undertaken either by blocking up of towns to famish them, or by taking them by force; for both the one and the other you must be master of the field, and you must have two armies, the one to hinder the enemy from undertaking any thing, and the other to form your siege. Or in any case you must be the first in the field, that you may so fortifie your self before the town you besiege as you may be able to maintein your self there in spite of the furious attempts of the enemy. To get the town which you mean to be­siege at the easier rate, you must attempt to sur­prise it when there is but a small garrison in it: to this end you are to use all manner of inventi­ons to keep them from the knowledge of your purpose to besiege it; then all on a sudden you [Page 147] must go and block it up. But if (notwithstand­ing all your stratagemes) you be not able to sur­prise it at unawares, or that you apprehend the charge to be too great, it will be better to make some other siege of lesse importance: for a town well and obstinately defended is the ruine of an army; and if it be not taken, it often diminish­eth the reputation of the commander which as­sailed it.

For this cause, before you undertake any such thing, it must be well considered on; and you must provide your self abundantly of all things necessary to effect it. When you form a siege, you must appoint your quarters (asmuch as may be) in healthfull places, and be carefull to make them spacious enough, and to keep them clean: for you must account upon your time of abode there, that your army be not wasted by diseases. You must make the quarters of your army so near the town besieged as may be, yet so as they be not discommodated by their artil­lerie: And if the ground be level and lie open round about, the quarters must be out of reach of the cannon. You must make as many quarters as the places are which you intend to assault, or at least as the bignesse of the town besieged, or the situation thereof requireth. Neverthelesse I would have the Generals quarters to be so large, as (in a case of necessity) it might receive all the troups of the other quarters; If you make a siege with a small army, and that the garrison be strong, you must fortifie the quarters one after another, with the whole body of the army; and in this case you must make the fewer quarters, and attempt the fewer places. But if you find [Page 148] your self strong enough you may abbridge the businesse and make them all at once. Besides this, you must make a circumvallation wi h forts and redoubts without reach of cannon of the besie­ged, which shall joyn all the quarters one to the other, behind which your army may present it self in battalia, and this line must be led in such manner as it may possesse all the commanding places. And if the garrison of the town besieged be so strong as you may fear to be assailed on both sides, you must make another circumvalla­tion about the town, the nearest that may be, that so it may require the fewer men to guard it: for it being made to oppose your self against the town, you need not take care to make it out of the reach of the cannon. For the opening of the trenches, you are to use the more or fewer ceremonies, according as the garrison is strong or weak. If it be strong, you begin by a good fort, and continue by good redoubts along the trenches, leaving onely sentinels in them. For it is an old errour to think to defend trenches. If the garrison be weak, you need not make so much ado to gain time. The batteries must be well strengthened by good moats, and flanked by good corps-du-guards, to preserve them against the sallies of the besieged. If there be any out­works which are not yet in good defense, and which may be carried by force, you must at­tempt them; otherwise you must approch them by little and little: for it is there where the bravest defense is made, because that at the be­ginning they can easiliest make their sallies. When the outworks are taken, and the cannon is planted on the counterscarp, and you sap into [Page 149] the moat, and prepare your self to lay over your galleries to get over to the bulwarks, you must then place your musketiers all along the coun­terscarp, that so under favour of them and of your cannon you may passe over your galle­ries. If the moats be drie, they will dispute it with you, but at last the stronger overcometh the weaker. If they be full of standing water, that hindereth you not from making your cawsie whereupon you place your gallerie: If they be full of running water, you must make use of flo­ting bridges to put over your miners. When you are got close to the bulwarks, you are to use mines (great or small) so by little and little to get into the ground, and the retrenchments which may be made behind the bulwarks. I trouble not my self here to shew how to make the quarters, forts, circumvallations, the tren­ches, (that they lie not open to the enemy) the batteries, (that they be well assured) the descents into the moat, how to assail the false brayes, how the galleries are to be made, also the mines, and the lodgings which are to be made after they be sprung; because whatsoever may be said on that subject is alreadie written, and it must be experience that must perfect the rest; where every day something is altered or some new thing is added.

CHAP. XII. Of the defense of towns against sieges.

TO withstand a siege well, the town must be well fortified, it must have a sufficient num­ber of souldiers to defend it; it must abound in victuall; and it must have good store of arms and munitions of warre: And these foure things are so necessary, as that if there were an abundance of three of them, if the fourth be wanting the rest will serve for nothing. For what will a well fortified place serve for if there be not souldiers to defend it? or what good will souldiers do if they have neither arms nor munitions of warre to fight? neither will arms nor munitions avail, if they want bread to live by; to which I adde instruments to work in the earth, without which it is impossible to make any great resistance. But it is not enough to have all that is necessary for resistance; there must be a good order and rule kept, otherwise it will all be dissipated by those which will desire to get out of danger quickly, and will find some pretext to yield upon terms which shall not be dishonourable; the number of such being alwayes greater then of those which will re [...]st stoutly. You must proportion the labour an [...] [...]st amongst the souldiers and the townsmen, that so they which are well affe­cted be not suppressed, and that the rest grow not lazie through idlenesse. They must be di­stinguished by companies of pioners, miners, carpenters, smiths, and all artificers usefull for a siege, appointing a commander to every of them. [Page 151] You must take an inventory in the town of all the iron, wood, linen, instruments to work in the ground, drugs fit for artificiall fires, and other such things necessary for a siege: and take care that there be alwayes of them in the maga­zins to serve for the present necessity: and to avoid disorder in the distribution of all these things, there must be a counsel which must have the oversight thereof, and which shall cause all to be delivered out and received in according to the order of the Governour and the Counsel of warre. These things thus put in order, you must think upon defense, which is done princi­pally after two wayes, by holding the enemy off by retrenchment, and by hindring him (when he approcheth) by sallies.

For the first; it is approved and practiced by all; and he which breaketh ground best, and beginneth to dispute it the furthest off, is he which maketh the longest resistance. For the smallest retrenchment without (accommodated with pallisadoes) is hard to be forced. But if it be mined, and that there be another made be­hind it, it is a dangerous piece to enter, and you constrain the enemy to approch by little and lit­tle, and with the same ceremonies which are used to fall upon the bulwarks and the great moat; so that by divers retrenchments you keep off the enemy at a distance a long time before he can come to fall upon the counterscarp, who cannot take away your outworks but by mines, which taketh up good store of time. The moat also may be defended if it be dry by portable casemats (which are called coffers) incircled by little moats or pallisadoes to hinder the ap­proch, [Page 152] which are placed in severall places of the great moat to defend it, and not to be disco­vered by the cannon of the assailant. The bulwarks are also to be defended by retrench­ments, which you are to make either at the point, or at the middle, or at the gorge, accord­ing as they are capable, and that the mines of the besiegers do enter forward within the bul­warks. And when all that is forced, the last defense is a retrenchment of the whole town, reducing it to keep onely one part of it.

For the second way of defense; in stead of ma­ny sallies to drive back them that work in the approches some would have onely some few to good purpose, in great necessitie; alleaging that the besieged there alwayes lose some men, and of the best of them, which they ought to conserve against a strong assault; and that oftentimes they which would have a fair pretext to yield the town cause their souldiers to be maimed by continuall sallies, to shew that they yield not themselves but through necessitie. For mine own part (which do approve of the quantitie of sallies, and which have alwayes seen the works of the assailants retarded by them more in one houre then in eight dayes by other defen­ses) I answer, that these reasons would carry some shew if the town were attempted by as­sault; for they not taking any other but that way at that time, it were fit to preserve the souldiers to withstand them: but whilest the as­sailant getteth ground by little and little, if you defend not the town otherwise then by re­trenchment, you must lose it at last: wherein your quantitie of souldiers standeth you in no [Page 153] stead at all, in so much that the care you have taken to preserve your souldiers doth not pro­long the taking of the town one day; but if by your brave sallies you ruine batteries, throw down trenches, force the redoubts which de­fend them; and when they are within the moat you burn their galleries, they must be inforced to begin their work anew as ofttimes as you overthrow it; insomuch as the besieger finding himself so enterteined, he approcheth with much more ceremonie, and at last his souldiers draw back. So that in my opinion it is very fit that the besieged should make frequent sallies; but they must make them at severall houres, that so they may the better surprise the enemy with few men (but resolute) to avoid the disor­der in the retreat, and to do no other thing but what is commanded. For though you find not resistance at the falling on, as is usuall, if you stay to little purpose, you runne the hazard to be ill led off at the retreat. The other particula­rities of defense depend upon those of assail­ing, the besiegers teaching you by necessitie what you are to do; wherein there is nothing but practice and experience which can well di­rect you.

CHAP. XIII. Of Artillery.

IT is fit to speak of Artillery after sieges, since it is principally by means thereof that towns are taken; and that since this hath been in use, there are no places found impregnable, if they be not inaccessible: It hath changed all the form and matter of fortifications: for in stead of towers and ancient walls, which have not been able to resist it, we now make bulwarks and other works of earth. We may say that it hath even in a manner altered the manner of making warre. Anciently they began their approches to towns where now we end them: for on the first day they lodged on the brim of the moat; and now adayes we must go a great way before we come at it: then the circumval­lation was made out of reach of arrows onely, now they must be made beyond reach of cannon: then it mattered not though the fortresses of the encamped armies were overtopped, so as they had their other conveniences; now-adayes there must be care taken above all things that they be not. In those times two armies were quietly led in batalia at two or three hundred paces di­stance from each other, and remained there whole dayes without being able to be dislodged but by a hazard of a general battel; now one can­not be before another but out of the reach of the cannon, otherwise he that hath most of them, or that hath planted them best, beateth out the other without fighting. At that time a Gene­rall of an army could know the order of his [Page 155] enemy at a near distance, and form his own ac­cording to that, seeking his advantages upon the defects of another, and all without danger; now these things can no more be observed but so farre off as you must rather trust to your own good order then upon any defect in that of your enemy. Then one army could charge another without losing their order, because they had not above two or three hundred paces to march; in these times it is impossible to observe it in sight of the enemy for half a league together, and to find a plain which shall be even and without hindrances. Whereunto I adde further, that without a great exercise of marching in batta­lia you are not able to march a thousand paces without losing all your distances of battalions and squadrons, and by consequence without be­ing in confusion. Since therefore the cannon is of so great use in warre, and hath so great a share in the victory, it is necessary that you know how to make good use of it. It is an engine which all cannot well imploy, for it is of great expense, and belongeth onely to great and puissant States to make ordinary use of them. They tie them to a great charge for draught, there being a hun­dred draught-horses required to draw one can­non for battery through all kinds of wayes, and to shoot onely a hundred bullets. By this you may judge according to the number which you mean to imploy what length of ground it taketh up. To mannage one piece of battery well, there must be eighteen men: besides, how many smiths, carters, farriers, and other workmen must there be in the train to repair the carriages? how many carpenters to make bridges? how [Page 156] how many pioners to accommodate the high­wayes? Briefly an army which carrieth cannon with it cannot march but leisurely, and that which hath none can do no great effect: there­fore in these times the artillery is an essentiall part of an army; but withall, if the Generall suf­fereth himself to be approched too near, without entrenching himself it is impossible for him to disintangle himself without fighting, or losing it; which cannot so happen without losing much of his reputation. For this reason he ought to inform himself very particularly of all that de­pendeth on the artillery: and that he may not be deceived, he must know the least even of the smallest things, namely, of the mixture, founding, proportion, weight, calibre, and carriage; of what wood it must be, how it must be conduct­ed according to the severall wayes, miry or mountainous; how to passe rivers, how to secure the batteries, as well against the cannon of the enemy as against his sallies; what ground the cannon must have for his reverse, what distance between piece and piece; in what manner the platform must be made, at what distance the bat­teries are sufficient, and other things, whereof I do not here specifie the particulars, because others have written of them. It sufficeth me to shew the use of artillerie, the chargeablenesse of it, the turmoil of it, and whereunto it engageth you, to incite Generals not to rely upon others; and to know the benefit and discommoditie thereof so well, that they may make use of the one to their advantage, and avoid the other by their foresight.

CHAP. XIV. Of the baggage and pioners.

AFter the great turmoil of the artillery, I will speak a word of that of the baggage. It is a great shame to lose it, but it is also a hard mat­ter to preserve it when it is excessive; there be­ing nothing that bringeth so much disorder to an army: therefore it is highly necessary to re­duce it to the smallest proportion that may be, and to make a review of it every moneth; for it groweth in the twinkling of an eye. We are so delicate now a dayes as we will hardly carry our arms, much lesse would we carry a weeks victu­all about us. So long as such an abuse be suffered in an army, it will make it self incapable to do any thing that is good. For as in a battel he which can last preserve some troups which have not fought, carrieth away the victory; so he that last keepeth his army in health, complete, and accustomed to labour, doth the like: which he cannot do if the souldiers be so delicate as they cannot carry their baggage. Besides that, sicknesse and famine getteth not into an army, but by this rascalli [...]ie of souldiers boyes: and this thing which seemeth to be a thing of no­thing, is of such importance, as it is for the most part the dissipation of the most flourishing, yea I dare say, of the most victorious armies. It is principally in the time of prosperity that men grow effeminate, and give themselves to take their ease; and in that time it ought least to be done, if after the example of the delicacies of Capua where Hannibals army imbased it self, [Page 158] they would not do the same. Whilst we are about cutting off unnecessary things from the ar­my, I will say a word concerning pioners. There be Captains of our time which will have an unbridled number of them, and say, that it were better to cut off some regiments of souldi­ers, and to take pioners in their stead, which are necessary to make the inclosures of the camp, the trenches in a siege, the accommodation of the wayes; briefly, to take away all imployment from the souldiers of working in the ground, for that they in these times cannot be brought to be subject to such labours as the ancient Romanes were: alledging further, that the souldier when he arriveth at his quarter, is sufficiently tired, though he be not imployed a new to cast up earth. An opinion whereat I cannot wonder enough, and which strengthneth me in that which I hold, that we spoil our souldiers by spa­ring them too much. There must be care taken for their livelihood, for their clothing, for such as are sick and hurt: but they must be hardned to labour, and their Generall and other Com­manders must be examples to them. For if you will reduce them to content themselves with a little whilest you burst your self with excesse of meat, and to labour whilest you glory it, and live in lazinesse; I confesse they will murmure. But to return to the pioners: it is necessary you should have them to accommodate the wayes, for the artillery principally; for which five hun­dred may serve for a great equipage. Con­cerning the inclosing of the camp, the souldier is bound to make it; for that this labour procu­reth him a means to rest himself and to sleep in [Page 159] safetie. I say further, that it is a work which must be done in three or foure houres; to this end all the army worketh at it, or at least half of it, when the enemy is near hand. So that if we must needs have it done by pioners, there had need be as many of them in an army as there are souldiers, which would be a means to famish a whole countrey, and to encrease the turmoil, which we would diminish. Concerning the trenches; I never saw it succeed well when pio­ners did it; and whilest the danger groweth, the most valiant souldiers are not too good for that imployment; and further they must be incited to that work by the gain of it: which will serve to assure themselves the better in that danger, and to give them a means to spare something to cloth themselves; and no money is so well im­ployed as that in an army.

CHAP. XV. Of spies and guides.

THere be yet two sorts of people whereof (contrary to the pioners) there cannot be too many in an army; which are spies and guides. The first advertise you of the deportments of the enemy, upon whose report either you enter­prise something upon him, or you guard your self from his designes. The second give you knowledge of the countrey, of the wayes and passages by which you are to passe, or else by what way your enemy can come to you. Both the one and the other must be faithfull, for that in advising you [...]alsly, or guiding you maliciously, they may cause you to fall into great dangers. [Page 160] You must have good store of guides: for that (especially if you march by night) every grosse troup (or at least every body) hath need of their own; and before you set forward, they must all be agreed on the way which they will take. There must be a Captain of the guides, a man of spirit, and vigilant, and that may take care to get guides frō place to place. Concerning spies, there must be something more observed in them, and you must be alwayes suspicious of them: for that as it is a dangerous task for him that undertaketh it, so it is also for him that imployeth them. To this end it is necessary that no man know them but he which imployeth them; and that spies may not know each other, that so they may not agree to give false advises: for by this means by examining them severally, by the agreement or disagreement of their advises, you may judge whether they be good; and by the verification of those which speak true or false, you shall know who betrayeth you, or doth you true ser­vice. And howsoever when you discover trai­tours, yet I say you may make a profitable use of them, by feigning that you believe them to be faithfull, and giving them commissions which they may discover to the enemy, that you have some designe quite contrary to that which you intend to put in execution; that so whilest he is preparing himself for one side, you may at­tempt something upon him on the other. But this is not all, to beware of your own spies; you must also take heed of those of the enemy; which you must presuppose you have within your camp, as the enemy hath of yours. For this reason be­sides the secresie which must be used in all en­terprises, [Page 161] it is good to give a charge, by publish­ing (in a still way) that you have a quite contrary designe to that which you purpose to put in execution, that so those spies may so report it to the enemy. But the most essentiall means to be well served by this kind of men, is to be very liberall to them; for they are faithfull to them which give them most.

CHAP. XVI. Of victuall.

BUt seeing it is to no purpose to have an ar­my composed of good commanders and va­liant souldiers, well disciplined and obedient, well furnished with artillery and munition, if they have not what to eat; I will distinguish this chapter into five parts: the first to make provi­sions of corn; the second to provide for the car­riage of it; the third of the safe conveying of it; the fourth of the making of good bread; and the fifth of the distribution of it. To this end the Commissary generall of the victuall ought to be a man of authority, faithfull, vigilant, and active; and this office ought not to be despised (as now­adayes it is) nor given to men of mean quality; for it is of such importance, that according as it is either well or ill discharged, it causeth an ar­my to subsist, or go to ruine. And the Romanes alwayes committed it to some eminent person. To come to particulars, I will say that the provi­sion of corn ought to be made in due time, in suf­ficient quantitie, in a commodious place for transportation, and that choice be made of very good corn. For you must not conceive any hope [Page 162] of finding it, either in the champain or towns where you are to go, because the enemy may either hoard it up or burn it; and so on that hope you shall find in this onely point all your de­signes frustrated. In the second, you must make Magazines in divers places, that so you may not be in danger to lose all at once, both in towns and castles which are nearest and most commo­dious for the transporting of corn into your ar­my; and (according to the situation of the countrey) you are to make provision of wag­gons or mules to carry it to the camp, where must alwayes be a Magazine for a forthnight, which should not be meddled with but in extremitie, or for some extraordinary enterprise. In the third place, the carriage of it ought not to be performed without a good convoy; and never on any prefixed day, to prevent the preparation of taking of it whilest it is on the way. In the fourth, to hinder the abuses which are ordinarily used (and I dare say, ever, unlesse there be a very narrow looking to it) about the bread. For, for their private gain, they mingle bad grain with it, yea even earth, and use other base tricks, whence for the most part proceed diseases in an army; which is a mischief which cannot be too severely punished. And in the last place, that it may be well distributed and not wasted; for if you trust the Sergeants, they alwayes take for double the number of souldiers they have in their companies: to this end it is necessary that the Commissarie generall of the victuall from week to week should have an exact list of those that are in the army, signed by the Generall, that so he may order the distribution of bread accord­ing [Page 163] to it. Besides, you must cause them to be punished rigourously which pillage those victu­allers and other persons which bring victuall to the camp; whereof the price must be regula­ted, that so the souldiers may not be sharked upon. When you are at a well retrenched siege, where the hope to make you quit it consisteth in nothing else but in cutting off your victuall, you must have that foresight to cause so much to be brought within your camp as you judge to be necessary to serve your turn for the time you believe you shall stay to take the town be­sieged; as Cesar did before Alexia. There be many rules to be given on this subject, to hinder the abuses which may be used therein, which I omit to avoid prolixitie: b [...]sides they are pettie ord [...]rs which are changed according to the places and occasions; all which should tend to no other end but to draw victuall to the army, and to hinder the excessive prices of it.

CHAP. XVII. Of the generall officers of an army, and of their functions.

THere is nothing more necessary in an army then to have the offices therein well regu­lated, and that every man may know whom he is to command, and whom he ought to obey; and yet I never saw that absolutely decided in any, which is the reason why I have been willing here to make a project, how things therein ought to be established. The Generall ought to have absolute power, which ought not to be commu­nicated to any: for in warre more then in any other profession the command ought to be sin­gular: and it is a very bad introduction to make Generals which command the army by the day, or by the week, or by the moneth. At all times when the Romanes did so, they sped the worse for it.

Then there must be a Lieutenant generall, or Marshall of the field generall, which ought to take care to cause all the Generalls commands to be put in execution as absolutely as himself, thereby to ease him: it being too hard a thing for the Generall to do all, especially when the army marcheth; for that (of all necessitie) there must be a man of eminent authority at the head of an army, and whom all the other commanders do acknowledge. Sometimes there is a Lieute­nant generall and a Marshall of the field gene­rall to perform these two offices; neverthelesse these two places, being born by two men in an army, oftentimes bring confusion, and cause [Page 165] that which we desire to avoid: for in the fun­ctions thereof they never agree; because the Marshall of the field generall doing his office, must distribute the commands of the Generall to all the other commanders; he must march in the vanguard, order the lodgings and encampings: insomuch as I know not what function the Lieu­tenant generall shall have unlesse he usurp the others office, or else that he serve onely as a shooting trunk, that so through him the Ge­nerals commands may be delivered to the Ma [...] ­shall of the field: which is the reason I con­clude that there ought to be but one of these two offices.

That done, I divide all the functions of the army into foure principall parts, namely the ca­ualrie, the infanterie, the artillerie, and the vi­ctuall, and will treat of each part one after ano­ther.

The cavalry is a body which often lodgeth s [...]parated from that of the army, and requireth a principall commander to whom all the rest should yield obedience, which must be of great authority and eminent qualitie, or of such expe­rience and vertue that all the other commanders may voluntarily obey him. For it is in the ca­valrie, where you shall meet with more men of wealth and good families, and consequently more difficult to be made to obey; and therefore this authoritie ought not to be divided. And because in marching the cavalrie is ordinarily in the front and in the rear, and that in lodging you are ofttimes compelled to make two fronts, and for that in time of battel the horse are at least on the two wings, it is necessary that there be a [Page 166] Lieutenant Generall, a man also of great autho­ritie. There must further be a third comman­der, whom the most part call a Commissary ge­nerall, who distributeth the orders, keepeth the list of the guards, of the convoyes, and other fun­ctions; and ought to go and take the orders from the Marshall of the field generall, to carry them to his Generall of the horse, who distributeth them to the Quarter-masters, which come for them from every quarter. All the cavalry must be divided into companies, of which regiments are formed; not after the manner of the infan­tery, under the command of a Colonell; but one­ly to maintein the order of the lodgings and of battel. To form these regiments you put foure or five companies together, with one of carabines, and the ancientest Captain commandeth that bo­dy; and so all the cavalry is divided: which maketh it plainly evident how merely unprofi­table an office it is to have a generall command­der of the carabines; for the carabines cannot make a body, for that their want of fighting permitteth it not, neither were they instituted but to serve the cavalry, either at their quarter­ing, or to discover, or for intelligence, or to give a charge in the flank in time of fight, or in a re­treat to harrie them whom you chace, or to keep you from being so when you are pursued. In effect, good carabines mingled amongst the caval [...]e are of very good service; but alone are unprofitable.

If you make more quarters then there be ge­nerall officers, the ancientest Captain command­eth in the quarter, and therein taketh the most ancient quarter-master of his quarter. Insomuch [Page 167] that the Generall of the horse giving his orders to the Commissary generall, he to the Quarter-master generall, and he to the other Quarter-masters which come for them from the other quarters (where the same order is observed) the commands are carried without confusion, and passe through the hands of few persons; and when there is any deficiency found, it is easie to be verified whence it arose.

The infantery is the more solid body of an army: that of the artillery and victuall alwayes are quartered with it. There is not that diversi­tie between the companies which is between the horse; they are all of the same fashion, com­posed of half-pikes half-musketiers. Many com­panies make a regiment, which hath its com­mander; and many regiments make a body, which we call a Brigado of the army. The army is usually divided into three bodies, Vanguard, Battel, and Rearguard. Every brigado hath its commander; and besides it ought to have a Ser­geant Major of a brigado, and a Quarter-master of a brigado; The first to go and take the orders from the Marshall of the field generall, to carry them to the commander of his brigado; then he giveth the word to the Sergeant Majors of the regiments: and the other to give to every Quar­ter-master of a regiment, either his quarter, or the space of ground which is necessary, for him to encamp in; and he divideth it to the particu­lar Quarter-masters, or to the harbengers of eve­ry company, which afterwards lodgeth them. If there be a Colonel generall of all the infan­tery, he may have a care in generall of all the government thereof; but in an army he must [Page 168] onely command a brigado, otherwise we should not be able to establish the order which we have propounded. Moreover, there be di­vers nations which do not judge a Colonell ge­nerall of the infantery to be necessary, but con­tent themselves with particular Colonels for every regiment, which acknowledge onely the commands of the Generall, or of his Marshall of the field generall.

The artillery ought to have a Generall, a Lieu­tenant generall, a Quarter-master, then other officers. And for that all pioners, miners, en­giniers, conductours of works, smiths, carpen­ters, wheelwrights, and other workmen depend on him, I would establish a commander for eve­ry sort of these men; which I would take either out of the commissaries of the artillery, or other persons apart, to addresse my self to them when I had need of such men. The Quarter-master must every night go to receive the orders of the Marshall of the field generall. The charge of the victuals ought to be performed by a Gene­rall; he ought to have his Lieutenant, his Quar­ter-master, and his other officers: his Quarter-master must every evening go and take the or­ders of the Marshall of the field generall.

So then you see how the commands are dis­tributed: the Marshall of the field generall re­ceiveth them from the Generall, then goeth to his own lodging; there the Commissary of horse cometh and receiveth them for the cavalry; the Sergeant Major generall for the infantery, who delivereth it to the Sergeant Majors of brigadoes: for the artillery to the Quarter-master thereof; and so to him for the victuals: Briefly, the Mar­shall [Page 169] of the field generall speaking with these foure persons, giveth the orders to all the army. All orders and commands ought to be given in writing. The Marshall of the field generall, the Generall of the artillery, the Fiscall, the Control­ler of the Exchequer, the Generall of victuall, the Quarter-master generall, the Sergeant ma­jor generall and the Provost generall must al­wayes be lodged within the Generalls quarter.

If all the army be encamped in bodies, the Quarter-master generall giveth to each of these bodies the space of ground which is fitting; which is afterwards distributed (in every body) by the officers thereunto appointed.

On a day of battel the Marshall of the field generall doth assigne the place for every body; afterwards the Sergeant major generall ran­geth the infantery into battalia.

The Marshall of the field generall ought to have three or foure assistants for the field, to car­ry the extraordinary orders; but they must not pretend to command any officer in chief, unlesse they formerly have been either Colonels or Captains of horse.

The Sergeant major generall must command the Colonels; but that they may the readilier obey him, he ought to be taken out of the Colo­nels; and none ought ever to have that place un­lesse he hath been one: as also the Sergeant ma­jors of brigadoes ought to be taken out of the Sergeant majors of regiments. Things being thus regulated and established, you shall see a great fa­cilitie in the commands, and none shall be able to excuse his fault by putting it off upon another, because presently it will be verified whence it [Page 170] proceeded: which obligeth every man to be care­full to do that exactly which he shalbe cōmanded

CHAP. XVIII. Of the assailing of States, according to their forces and situations.

AFter that you have formed an army, you must imploy it, either for the conquest of a new countre [...], or for the defense of your own. We will begin with the first. The Prince which putteth himself upon the offensive must be the stronger, or must see some garboils in the State which he assaileth, and that he be called thither by a partie: otherwise it would be a rash enterprise.

If the countrey which he assaileth be large and open, he must seek in the beginning to ha­zard a battel or some grand skirmish, that so by the reputation of his arms he may affright the enemies. If it be a countrey enclosed with mountains, or divided by rivers and ditches, or sheltered with forrests, or full of fortresses, it is hard to force an enemy to battel; and in this case you must go to sieges, and make your con­quest by little and little. Now he that will make any progresse by this way must at least have two bodies of armies; that so with the one he may hold his enemy in play, and with the other he may actuate without impeachment. For it is most difficult to accomplish the designe of a siege, so long as you have a good army encamp­ed near you, which shall cut off your victuall. If it be a countrey which is hard to enter, and that hath but few passages whereby to enter in­to it, you must force one; and before you go further, you must there fortifie, and so well assure [Page 171] your way for your victuall as you may not suffer though the enemy should have burned or carri­ed away that of his countrey into his fortresses. If you be called by a faction, that is a very great advantage for you; because you are instructed of the situation of the countrey, and of the de­fects which are to be found in the [...]tified pla­ces, and want not spies nor punctuall advertise­ments of whatsoever passeth amongst the ene­mies. You must also be very carefull to use this faction very courteously, and to engage them by little and little into actions which may make them irreconcilable to their Prince. But when you see they make warre with respect, and that they will but by halves offend him from whom they have revolted, you must have them in great suspicion, and march with them with bri­dle in hand: for whether it be the fear of a ruine without recovery, or the hope of a reconcilia­tion that hindreth them from putting them­selves upon reall extremities, the one and other are equally dangerous; and at last you may fear they may accommodate themselves to your pre­judice: wherefore if they will not engage themselves to do extraordinary and irremissible actions at the beginning, you ought not to joyn with them but under good pledges: You must also use such as do voluntarily yield themselves to you with all humanitie, clemencie, and libe­ralitie, and such as resist you with all severitie; for beneficence towards the one and severitie towards the other are the two principall means which get you obedience. A town taken by force, and hardly used, or one which yieldeth it self of its own accord, and favoured, openeth the [Page 172] gates of a dozen others: as on the other side, a town taken by force and spared, or which ren­dred it self voluntarily and is evil intreated, shutteth a great many. Whence I conclude, that a Conquerour must be as good as his word, what­soever he promiseth, be it in clemency or severity

CHAP. XIX. Of the defense of States according to their forces and situations.

TO treat of this subject well, we must divide it into three parts; namely, into small States, those of a middle rank, and those which are pu­issant. The small ones are of that nature as they subsist not but by the jealousies which their neighbours have one of another; for that if one of them will assail a weak State, the other will defend it: neverthelesse, it is but a tottering condition and ill assured; for if the one findeth himself able enough to assail them, the other will not find himself sufficient to defend them. The counsels of Princes and States are not al­wayes governed so equally, but for the most part one prevaileth above the other. Besides this in­convenience there is yet another, that sometimes they agree to divide the prey; so that such kind of pettie States which have not strength within themselves for their own defense, are alwayes in perill; and they must use very much pliant­nesse to remove all pretexts from their neigh­bours of undertaking something against them. The onely means which they have is to have one or two towns exceeding well fortified, with arms and money enough to defend them well; [Page 173] that so they may give leisure to them which will not suffer the growth of him which shall assail you, to aid you: for if you have no means at all to resist, your countrey will be taken before they shall have time to assist you: and besides that, the happinesse which they conceive of conquering you giveth them a spur to assail you; you shall find many more persons disposed to succour you then to reconquer your countrey: for that the one is easie with equall forces, and the other without greater strength is very difficult. To which I adde, that there is ofttimes as great danger that he which regaineth your countrey as your friend keep it not for himself, as well as he which had taken it as your enemy: or if he restore it to you, it will be with so hard con­ditions, as you shall possesse but the shadow of a Sovereigntie. And thrice happy are they which meet with so good and so generous Princes, which do reestablish them into their lost States, with the same authoritie and liberty as they pos­sessed them before: for such examples are ex­ceeding rare. Concerning those States of a mid­dle condition, I propound a Prince (or common­wealth) which for his defense is able to enter­tein an army of 20000 foot and 3000 horse with all necessary equipage. If his countrey be of a difficult accesse, and that there be no en­trance into it but by certain passages and moun­tains guarded and fortified, he hath a great ad­vantage: but they which too much do trust and rest upon them, and have neglected other de­fenses, have deceived themselves, and have been lost by those wayes wherein they thought them­selves most assured. If it be encompassed by the [Page 174] sea, it is a fair moat, notwithstanding he which is stronger will find means to make his descent into the island. If it be environed with moorish grounds and rivers, yet an enemy will find wayes to passe them, especially when he hath artillery to favourise such passages; insomuch that the su­rest way is to trust to your own forces, namely a good army and good fortresses: I say, both joyn­ned together: for that the army without fortres­ses being weak, and not daring to hazard any thing, leaveth the victuall of the champain to the enemy, and so the means to subsist at your charge, and at last to ruine you. And fortresses without an army are not able to preserve you longer then the time you have made your maga­zines of victuall for, within them: but these things being proportioned with judgement, you may make a great resistance. In these things you must not suffer your self to be led by the fansies of the people, which without considering the situations of their towns, or the publick good, when they see their neighbours fortifie them­selves, will all imitate them; a thing equally dangerous, to have more fortresses then you can guard, or to have none at all. Yet I should ra­ther like the last then the first: for that at least by hazarding a battel you put your enemy to half the fear; but by the other way you must surely perish, without being able to do any other thing but prolong your ruine: for the jealousie which you have to preserve all your fortresses by lea­ving great garrisons in them, hindreth you of the means of keeping an army in the field: and then the spoil of two or three harvests compel­leth you to yield your neck to the halter. I know [Page 175] there are some which ground themselves up­on this reason, That when all the principall places of a State be fortified, all the vi­ctuall of the champain may be drawn into them, so that an army coming thither, if it stayeth there, it dieth through famine; and if it doth but passe through, it doth no great hurt: inso­much that it is almost impossible to make any great siege there. Whereunto I answer, that for­tresses are principally invented for the weaker, that so a few men may resist a great number: and if you have so great a number of for­tresses, and those requiring great guards (as the great fortified towns do) you must have a greater number of souldiers then he shall have which cometh to assail you; otherwise you were not able to provide them all with sufficient gar­risons to preserve them from a siege. And if you be the stronger without any fortified place, you shall preserve your countrey in keeping the field. There is yet a further inconvenience in the for­tifying of great towns; that is, that you make them so proud as they will not acknowledge their Sovereigne but upon good terms; and up­on the least discommoditie they receive in any warre the inhabitants desire rather to change their master then to see their goods wasted. In­somuch that I conclude, that you ought to have so few fortresses that they may not hinder you from keeping the field; that those which you have be so well fortified and furnished with mu­nition as they may make a great resistance; and to place them so well as they may bridle the great towns, and that they may assure the fron­tiers, that so the enemy may make difficultie to leave a place behind him which might discom­modate [Page 176] his victuall, and that by intelligence or otherwise he may not seise upon some princi­pall town which may serve him for a seat to en­tertein warre within the countrey. These things thus disposed of, you must regard what enemy assaileth you. If it be a power of confederates united together, it is the more easie to disunite, then when it dependeth on one alone: and in this case it is exceeding good to cause some dif­fidence to grow betwixt them, by feigning of intelligence with some one of the confederates, to whom shewing more respect and lesse ani­mositie, you may give jealousie to the rest: as also by procuring a diversion upon the countrey of one of the rest. It being a very difficult thing that many sovereigne powers should long hold a league together, without some disgusts to arise amongst them, or mistakings, envies, and even enmities, by reason of the diversitie of their hu­mours and interests; so that that power which onely dependeth upon one State onely, is much more to be feared. And because you may be assailed more or lesse fiercely, I must say a word for that: If it be by forces which are not too much disproportionable to yours, you may pre­serve your countrey without forsaking it, and with your army and fortresses tie up the enemy, in hindring him from victuall; and by en­trenching alwayes so near him as you shall hin­der him from making any siege of importance. For if a Conquerour advanceth not forward he recoileth; and it is impossible for him to subsist in a countrey which he would conquer, if at first he taketh no footing, and doth not strengthen himself by some considerable prise. If also you [Page 177] be assailed by a power altogether disproportio­nable to your forces; in this case you must leave the field, and burn all the victuall which you cannot contein within your fortresses, and also all the towns and villages which you cannot guard: for it is better for you to preserve your self in a ruined countrey, then to keep it for your enemy. And it is in this that a Prince, to gain, as he thinketh, the name of being compas­sionate towards his people (which in such occa­sions turn their backs upon him) becometh cru­el towards himself: But it is rather a vice of irresolution and of weaknesse of courage which possesseth us, then a true compassion which we have of the misfortune of another: as that of the Emperour Otho, who upon the first ill fortune that befell him (his forces being yet entire) durst not trie the hazard of a battel any more. And he who could not afford any pitie to Galba in his decrepit age (being his designed suc­cessour to the Empire) and which had commit­ted all kinds of villanies to attein it, would perswade posterity, that compassion to see the Romane bloud shed had made him resolve to estrange himself from it by killing himself. Thus it is that we oftentimes desire to cover our vices with the vertue which is nearest thereunto. But as it is a maxime, that no publick good can be without some prejudice to some particular men, so a Prince cannot disintangle himself from a perilous enterprise, if he will please every man. And the greatest and most usuall faults which we commit in matters of State and war proceed from suffering our selves to be carried away with this complacencie, whereof we re­pent [Page 178] us when there is no remedy left. But to avoid such storms you must hold this for a fun­damentall law for your own preservation, Never to suffer that neighbour of yours to grow up which maketh himself the strongest: for it is better to offend him by hindring him from enabling himself to destroy you, then to suffer him to grow greater out of fear to offend him. It being a thing certain, that no man preserveth his libertie against a conquering enemy by comple­ments but onely by force.

It remaineth that we speak of puissant States which (without help of another) have arms, money, and what else is needfull to maintein a continuall warre.

Of this kind there be but few, and they need to care for none but themselves; for that one sole enemy is not able to assail them, and that it is hard for the leagues of severall Princes all to agree in such a designe, or for any long time to subsist together: Neverthelesse I will say a word on this subject. Great States are either compacted altogether, or spread abroad in severall places: the first, which have all their forces united, are able to assail, and to defend themselves more powerfully then they which are so separated; because they carry all their forces where need requireth with more dili­gence and facilitie, and lesse charge: the other put a great part of the world into an alarm and jealousie, because they frontier upon the greatest number of States. Neverthelesse, if the one or the other be assailed, they must make use of the defenses we propounded before: one­ly I will say that they ought to have no fortresses [Page 179] but good ones, and few in number, and onely on the frontiers, and none within the heart of the countrey; for that having more cause to fear civil warres then forrein, and without which no man will ever assail a great Empire, it is the way to take away the main root from them which maketh them to undertake the enterprise and to subsist. Besides, you ought not to perpetuate any governments, neither to families, nor yet for life. But the principall and most able remedy against civil warre is to en­tertein a forrein warre; which chaseth away idlenesse, setteth all on work, and particularly giveth satisfaction to ambitious and stirring spi­rits: it banisheth luxurie, it maketh your people warlike, and mainteineth you in such reputa­tion amongst your neighbours, as you are the ar­bitratour of all their differences. It is true that this maxime is not good to be observed but by such States as are of this last sort. For as it is necessary for them, I find it hurtfull for pettie States, which must fear all sorts of warre; for being too weak to gain by it, they run the hazard to be the pray of such as are the stronger,

CHAP. XX. Of the means how to assure a conquest.

A Sovereigne Prince is more capable to make great and ready conquests then a common-wealth; for that finding himself secret in his counsel, courageous in his resolution, ready in his execution, and not fearing to be contradicted by any, he maketh more conquests in ten years of his life, then a common-wealth which is lesse secret, which is long in resolving, which bridleth the authoritie of her Captains, and which every houre contradicteth their actions, shall be able to do in a hundred yeares: So also a common-wealth which goeth alwayes upon her own maximes, which is not subject to the want of one person, and whose government receiveth no alteration by the death of any of them, con­serveth much better and for a longer time that which she hath conquered then a Prince; which ofttimes (and almost alwayes) hath a successour as much a heartlesse dullard as himself was ver­tuous. Neverthelesse, I will here establish (as well for the one as for the other) the true maximes for the well assuring of a conquest: which con­sist in two things; namely to take away the de­sire of revolting from those whom you have conquered, and the means of being able to do it.

For the first, it is a thing very certain, that if you conquer a free people, you shall not take away (at least during the life of those which have lived so) their desire to recover their liberty. If they be subjects to a Prince and a State, and that they have onely changed their master, they will rather desire to remain under the authoritie of [Page 181] him which shall use them the most courteously. Therefore you must alwayes begin by a fair way, and to establish a condition for them which you have conquered which may be sure, both for their life and for their goods. For if even your own subjects find not this assurance, it is to be feared they will revolt; how much more they which are newly conquered? it being a law of nature imprinted in every creature, that the meanest and least animal taketh care for its own conservation; to which man endued with reason addeth the conservation of his honour and his welfare, which he ofttimes preferreth before his own life. Therefore a Prince must govern accord­ing to exact justice, uphold the oppressed in his due right, abstein from all violence himself, aswel concerning the honour of their wives as for their goods: for without this it is impossible to make a conquered people tractable. You must also (so much as may be) maintein them in the form of their government, & exclude none of them out of the possibility of atteining to those offices, digni­ties and honours which they may possesse with­out prejudice to your safetie. And if it be a Prince which maketh this conquest, the means to assure himself well therein is there to establish his resi­dence the most that may be; for that his presence doth hinder many disorders, the splendour of his court imprinteth a certain veneration into the minds of the people, and it bringeth gain to the artificers and citizens where it is kept.

If it be a common-wealth which cannot change the seat of their government, it is there­fore necessary that such as they should send thi­ther to govern live there with splendour. For [Page 182] the people is sometimes more taken with ap­pearance then realitie. These are the means which do insensibly insinuate obedience into a newly conquered people: but because this is not sufficient, and that ofttimes the facilitie of re­volting impunely causeth men to have a desire to it, it is necessary for you to precaution your self by requisite assurances, which consist in having their arms and fortresses in your own hands: I mean not that all the people shall be wholy dis­armed, for if it be possible it must not come to that; but to assure your self of great communal­ties by good fortresses; to have arcenals in seve­rall parts, and not all in one place; and not to leave any town or castle (except your fortresses of garrison) so strong as to be able to endure 100 cannon-bullets. There is a last means, whereof the ancients made a profitable use, and is now wholly left, which I do marvellously approve of; which is, to establish colonies, and to transport the peo­ple from one countrey to another. For besides that it is a great bridle to keep a conquered coun­trey in aw, you recompense by this means the nearer part of those souldiers which have done you good service. And I find not the reason to be sufficient which some alledge, that it is cruelty to make this permutation, and that it is against charity; but to the contrary I find indeed those remedies to be cruel which are commonly used, to keep the people so under as they have nothing but their life, and cannot hope for any honour within their own countrey. For my self I pro­fesse freely, that I had rather be driven out of my countrey into another, where I should have a hope for my self and mine to be able to attein to [Page 183] something more then now I am, then to remain in mine own countrey to be deprived of that hope; finding nothing to be so hard as to take away hope from a man, which is that which in this world, and for the goods of this world, ma­keth him undertake all things; and which for the goods of the other world furnisheth him with constancy to suffer all things: Moreover, there is nothing which distinguisheth a man so much from a beast, nor yet a regenerate man from a sensuall, as hope. Which maketh me conclude, that you should never take from a man the hope of being able to obtein a better condition then that which he possesseth, that so he be not cast into despair.

CHAP. XXI. How you must proceed to relieve your allie and confederate.

ONe of the most honourable actions which a Prince doth, and which bringeth him most reputation, is to succour his allies in their ne­cessities: but it is a thing which for the most part is very difficult. When you will make war, you choose your advantages, and you take your time and your measures according to that which you can and will do: it is not so in the succouring of your allie, which must be assisted with such diffi­culties and discommodities as you meet with. If his countrey be joyned to yours, and that no­thing hindreth you from assisting him with all your forces united, you cannot excuse the not doing of it, unlesse it be that you fear his enemy, and would not offend him; which is an unman­ly and no judicious reason. For by this excuse [Page 184] you escape not the danger which your neigh­bours losse will draw upon you. It being much better for you to resist joyntly, then suffer your selves to be undone one after another. But if it be an allie separated from you by other Princes and States (which ofttimes so hapneth) and that you meet with great difficulties to get into his countrey, you must then well consider after what manner you should succour him: for if the States which are between you both refuse you passage, and that you must be enforced to give them bat­tel before you be able to assist your allie, it is to be feared that you shall not be able to succour him timely enough. And if your neighbour, ei­ther for fear of you, or of him which assaileth your allie, do offer you passage, you cannot ac­cept thereof with safety, unlesse he put you in possession of those places which are necessary to assure your return; which being refused you, you must go no further. But if the enemy of your ally hath territories near you, and such as you may easily assail; you must do it stoutly; and that succour which can be given by diversion is (in my opinion) the surest and that which succeed­eth best; because you do it with all your forces and conveniences, and ordinarily that countrey which you assail is not well provided, because he which assaileth another State leadeth out with him the best Captains and souldiers which he hath. But if you want all these means, there is no other left but that of money, wherewith you may assist him; which ofttimes is not sufficient to save him.

CHAP. XXII. Which is best, whether a great Prince make warre in person, or by his Lieutenant.

IT is to the purpose in this place to treat whe­ther a Prince ought to manage his warre [...] in person or by Lieutenants: for that the practice thereof being different, every man bringeth his best reasons to maintein his opinion. They which disapprove of his doing it in person alledge, that by going out of his territories he openeth the doore for disorders, and robbeth himself of the means to prevent them; that it is more necessary for him to keep peace within then to make war abroad, for which nothing can do so much good as his presence, which keepeth in aw the most stirring spirits; that holding them which are within in obedience he may give the better or­der to his affairs abroad; that there befall greater inconveniences and lesse remediable, when the Prince is ingaged in person out of his countrey, then when he is within it; that if he shall receive some check in his person being farre from his owne territories, those busie heads are more da­ring to make innovations, every man emanci­pateth himself and shaketh off his obedience; if he be slain there, his subjects are affrighted, and his enemie is encouraged by it, and thence draw­eth great advantages; if he be taken, that is still worse; for none being able to declare himself Prince, and the great ones, desiring to make their benefit of his calamity, put all affairs into such a confusion that nothing is done in the State with authoritie, because they which seise upon the government tyrannize over the other great [Page 186] ones which might pretend the same, which oft­times love rather to call in the common enemy then to obey their fellows. Whereunto they adde, that a Prince cannot free himself without giving great advantages to his enemy, which turn to a notable and irremediable prejudice both to himself and his State: So that all things being balanced, they conclude that the incon­veniences are much greater of hazarding the person of the Prince in the warres then to cause them to be managed by his Lieutenants. This opinion is principally mainteined by men of the gown, naturall enemies to souldiers; who for that they can better preserve their authoritie in peace then war, do not onely disswade from going in person to the warre, but even do advise the suffering of all sorts of ignominy rather then to make war. Whereunto flatterers, panders, and all the plagues of Princes do adhere, which en­tertein them within their countrey in a lazinesse w ch bringeth them to all sorts of luxurie, making them believe that their States are but made for them, and not they for their States; that the taking of a maidenhead is more honourable then the conquest of a Province; that there belongeth more industry and trouble to the well-ordering of a feast then of a battel; that labour is not ap­pointed but onely for porters; and that great Kings should cause all things to be acted without moving themselves: which is the usuall way of the losse of kingdomes and empires. They which counsel a Prince to make warre in person, al­ledge that the command of an army is a morsell so delicious that it ought not to be imparted to others without great necessitie: for that to ac­quit [Page 187] a mans self well in such a charge, he must be very absolute; and ofttimes the Generall of an army doth not contein himself within his dutie, especially when the Prince performeth not his own. For in this case he is naturally en­vious of the glory of another, and cannot sup­port the good actions of his Lieutenant, though they tend to his own profit. In which humour they do entertein him which govern the affairs at court, with this fear, least that an eminent vertue should supplant them. And from hence proceedeth the infelicitie of the most part of brave designes, how well soever undertaken, which are made to perish either for want of mo­ney or of victuall, or by restraining the authority of the Generall, or by putting officers upon him which oppose him, and which prove rather shackles to him then assistants: and when affairs have not succeeded as men imagined, the fault is cast upon him which is innocent, and the blameworthy triumph: and thus great Princes shal be served which make war by their Lieutenants: That the reputation of a Prince who is a good commander himself is much greater then a Prin­ces which hath good commanders: that the first is feared for his own worth, and the other onely through others: that the first cannot betray himself, but that the commanders of the other may be corrupted: that the first can make choice of such as are fit for warre, and the other hath no good commanders but by hazard: that the au­thoritie of the one is not so envied nor crossed, seeing he is master, and is to give account of his actions to no man; but that the Generall of the army of another is subject to a perpetuall jea­lousie, [Page 188] and thrice happy is he that escapeth it: that the means to prevent civil warres is to im­ploy the most stirring and courageous spirits in forrein warres, where they shall find where­with to satisfie their ambitions; as also to be al­wayes armed, because that will cool those which are hottest: and that the Prince be at the head of his army, that so none may use it against him. They alledge further, that never Prince hath founded a great Empire, but by making warre in person; nor hath lost any, but when he made warre by his Lieutenants. It is now left to the choice of Princes what is to be done upon these two advises. If he be a drone, which contenteth himself to be admired by his grooms, which ta­keth no delight but in voluptuousnesse, and which leaveth off the acting of the part of a King to act that of a scoundrel, he will never take that counsel to command his armies himself. If he be a wise Prince, which loveth tranquillitie to maintein his people in justice, neverthelesse he will not omit to be prepared for warre, and to inform himself therein, that so when occasion shall serve he need not commit the command of his armies to others. But if he be a generous Prince which hunteth after glory, and desireth to imitate those great men which live still 2000 years after their death, and whose venerable names at this day do honor those which mention them, he will doubtlesse choose for his principall imployment that of war; wherein he will en­devour to make himself expert, that so he need not depend upon others for the leading of his ar­mies, and will make that his chief delight. And this is the true pleasure which contenteth the [Page 189] spirit, which is particular to man, and common to great men: for corporall pleasure hath more of the beast then of man; and so he that wholly addicteth himself thereunto is worse then a brute beast.

CHAP. XXIII. Of reputation.

IT is a thing which cannot be conceived, how available the reputation of a Generall of an armie is; and how hard it is to be preserved. For after that you have acquired the estimation of being a wise man, and of great managing, if you will conserve it by prudence, men will say you are become a coward; and if by hazarding some battel you receive a check, they will hold you to be rash. So that there is no function in the world more subject to blame then that of a Generall of an arm [...]; and very happy is that commander which keepeth his reputation entire untill the the end. Neverthelesse so long as it lasteth it worketh marvellous effects: for when he hath gotten the name of being prosperous in war, the souldiers believe that he cannot be beaten; and go upon his word so securely to the combat, as they take no more knowledge of the danger; perswading themselves that he never command­eth them to fight, but that he is assured of the victory: which doth so encourage them as they fight with much the more resolution. Moreover, the enemies meeting with such a man, fight not but in fear, as being assured to be beaten. There be a thousand of ancient and modern examples of this truth. When the army of Alcibiades (even when he was absent) was beaten, the Athenians [Page 190] believed that it was with his consent. The one­ [...]y report of the arrivall of Cesar and Alexander, howsoever but with small forces, hath often­times caused the yielding of provinces and the defeat of armies. The sole reputation of Henry the fourth, who was taken notice of in the com­bat of Fontaine Francoise, arriving there the day before in post, made the Spaniards abandon Bur­gundy. I have observed the Dauphinois to have this belief, that the Constable le Desdiguires could not be beaten. But as this opinion is of great profit to a Generall of an army when he hath atteined it, so to be thought unluckie in warre is a great hindrance to him: for it is im­possible for him to assure himself on those souldiers which have such an opinion of their Commander. Therefore a Generall of an army must make it his principall aim to begin well; then not to omit any thing for the preserving of what he hath gotten: resolving rather to die gloriously in some great action then to linger out a shamefull life after that he hath committed some unmanly act. For as the profession of war is that of all others which conferreth most ho­nour upon a man which therein acquitteth him­self well, so it draweth the greatest infamy upon him that demeaneth himself ill.

FINIS.

A Table of the books of the Abbridgement of the wars of Gallia.

  • THe warre against the Suisses. page 1
  • 2 Against Ariovistus. page 5
  • 3 Against the Belgae. page 7
  • 4 Against the people of Vannes and their allies. page 10
  • 5 Against the Germanes of Francfort and Hessen. page 15
  • 6 Against the Britans. page 17
  • 7 Against the same. page 20
  • 8 Against Ambiorix. page 24
  • 9 Against Vercingetorix. page 28
  • 10 Against Corbeus and Comius. page 35
The second Table, of the Civil wars.
  • THe war between Pompey and Cesar, the siege of Corfi­nium, Brundusium, and Marseilles. page 39
  • The continuation of the siege of Marseilles, truce violated, a panick fear, the relief of Juba. page 45
  • The siege of Salones. Cesars camp, his retreat, the battel of Pharsalia, the defeat of Pompey. page 48
  • Of the Alexandrian warre. page 56
  • Of the Africane warre. page 61
  • Of the Spanish war against Pompey's sonnes. page 64
A Table of the Grecian and Romane Militia.
  • THe militarie order of the Grecians. page 66
  • Of the militarie discipline of the Romanes. Chap. 1. page 73
  • Of the division of a Legion of 4000 foot and 300 horse. Chap. 2. page 78
  • Of marching. Chap. 3. page 79
  • Of embattelling the army. Chap. 4. page 81
  • Of the orders and guards of the camp. Chap. 5. page 87
  • Of punishments and rewards. Chap. 6. page 90
  • Of their pay. Chap. 7. page 92
  • Of their order of battalia. Chap. 8. page 93
  • Of sieges. Chap. 9. page 96
  • Observations upon some battels of the Ancients. Chap. 10. page 98
  • A comparing of the arms and military orders of the Romanes with those of the Grecians. Chap. 11. page 100
A Table of the Chapters of the Trea­tise of warre.
  • [Page]OF the election of souldiers. Chap. 1. page 105
  • Of arms. Chap. 2. page 108
  • Of military discipline. Chap. 3. page 113
  • Of the obedience of souldiers. Chap. 4. page 116
  • Of marching. Chap. 5. page 118
  • Of encamping. Chap. 6. page 121
  • Of battels. Chap. 7. page 123
  • Of fortresses. Chap. 8. page 127
  • Of defense against surprises. Chap. 9. page 129
  • Of assaults by surprise. Chap. 10. page 132
  • Of assaults by sieges. Chap. 11. page 146
  • Of the defense of towns against sieges. Chap. 12. page 150
  • Of artillery. Chap. 13. page 154
  • Of the baggage and pioners. Chap. 14. page 157
  • Of spies and guides. Chap. 15. page 159
  • Of victuall. Chap. 16. page 161
  • Of the generall officers of an army, and their functions. Chap. 17. page 164
  • Of the assailing of States according to their forces and situa­tions. Chap. 18. page 170
  • Of the defense of States according to their forces and situa­tions. Chap. 19. page 172
  • Of the means to assure a conquest. Chap. 20. page 180
  • How to proceed to relieve an allie or confederate. Chap. 21. page 183
  • Which is best for a great Prince, to make warre in person, or by his Lieutenant. Chap. 22. page 185
  • Of reputation. Chap. 23. page 189
FINIS.

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. Searching, reading, printing, or downloading EEBO-TCP texts is reserved for the authorized users of these project partner institutions. Permission must be granted for subsequent distribution, in print or electronically, of this EEBO-TCP Phase II text, in whole or in part.