CHAP. I. The Definition of Logick.

LOGICK is an Art of discoursing well. Ramus.

In this sence, it is called Dialectick.

This sentence de­fineth, 1 or setteth out the whole na­ture of Logick. Aristotle hath the same for substance. Top: lib. 1. Cap. 2. In these words;

Dialectick is profitable vnto

• Congresse,
• Excercitation,
• Philosophicall science.

Ramus confesseth in his Schooles [Page 2]vpon this place alledged, that, this sen­tence comprehendeth (well neere) all the notable things of Logick: and therefore, (in his Iudgement,) it is a definition of it. The thing it selfe doth say no lesse: for, the three words attributed by him to Logick or Dia­lectick, doe signifie, discoursing well. Ramus makes discoursing the end of Logick: Aristotle doth the same, by the word profitable, for, as we learne by Thom: 1 ^a. 2ae. q: 7. art. 2. incor. q. 8. art. 3. Sed. con. Every good, or­dained to some end, is sayd to be profita­ble: That which tendeth to some end is called profitable.

2 Logick is

• Naturall.
• Artificiall.

Naturall Logick is either the vn­derstanding it selfe, in that respect, that of i'ts proper, and specificall difference, it hath a power of discoursing; or ra­ther, the certaine knowledge of the man­ner, or wayes of discoursing, which the reason it selfe, bringeth forth, without the helpe of any order, or method. Thus [Page 3]farre the Iesuites (in their preface be­fore the Organon Colleg: Conimbr: q. 6. art. 2. col 62. Logick is here taken for artificiall, not naturall: so the same Iesuites tell vs in that preface. col: 67. Aristotle implyes this distinction, in the first chapter, and first booke of his Rhetoricke: A man (sayth he) is a Logician by nature, or art.

[Logick Dialectick.] 3 Both these names are vsed indifferently, to set out the thing defined: and, we haue the fre­quent vse of learned men to avow it: The Iesuites doe expresly teach it, in their Commentary vpon Aristotles Organon, Col: 26. neere to the end, in these words, The whole art of discour­sing, is set out, by, either the word Lo­gick, or the word Dialectick. And, they doe not barely avouch it; but, they confirme it with plentie of proofes, as the Reader may finde, if he please to consult the place-alled­ged.

Both the words doe signifie no more, but, a thing appertaining vnto the vse of reason; therefore, the Iesu­ites [Page 4]in the same Preface, q. 4. art. 4. Col: 40. doe conceiue, that, Logick (in an vniversall apprehension) is no more, but, a director of the art of reason. And, Suarez hath the same thing, in his Metaphysicks disp. 39. D.

[Is:] 4 This word, is the band, to tye both parts of the definition together. By it, the later part is affirmed of the former, and, it signifies an essentiall attribution (that is) that, the latter part of the definition doth giue being vnto the former; so as, the first doth consist in the second.

[An art:] 5 The word art, doth set out the generall nature of Logick: (that is) it doth signifie, that nature which Logick hath in common with divers other things: as, Grammar, and Rhetorick &c. It is called an art, in the most common vse of men; sometime it is called also a science, and, that we find in the Iesuites Preface q. 4. art. 3. Aristotle doth vse both the words in­differently, as signifying the same thing, in his Preface to the Metaphy­sicks and first Chapter.

The word art fignifies, a multitude of Precepts, orderly digested and appro­ved by vse. And, thus the Iesuites teach in their Preface, q. 6. art. 2. and Ari­stotle hath the same thing in his Pre­face to the Metaphysicks and first Chap­ter. Where, wee haue these words; Art is gotten by experience, experience makes art. Art is made, when as one vniversall thing, is framed out of many experimentalls: so as, to doe by experi­ence, differs nothing from art. He brings the same thing, and the reason of it, Poster lib 2. cap. 19.

The word [An] is vsed to shew, 6 that Logick is one intire art, that can­not be divided, nor is subordinate to any other art, as Geometry, and many other arts be. Logick is usually called, the art of arts, the mistris and director of all other: and, there is good cause why, for, Logick disputeth of all things, and is common vnto every being, as A­ristotle hath taught vs in the fourth booke of his Metaphysicks, cap. 2. text 4. Experience sheweth, that Aristotle sayd true, for, there is no art, but by [Page 6]the helpe of Logick, all the precepts thereof are framed together, in a due order, and the parts of each singular precept, are so fitted together, that we may finde truth from falshood.

[Of discoursing] These words, 7 doe assigne the speciall nature of Logick, the very first, and intrinsecall being thereof, and containe the forme, and the end: (I say) they containe them both, because the forme is the foun­taine of the end, and the end is the continuation of the forme; as wee shall see hereafter.

The end of Logick, is

• Next.
• Remote.

The remote end of Logick, is the ve­ry act it selfe of discoursing: but, wee speake not of this end of Logick in the present definition. The next end of Lo­gick, is to prescribe a way, and rules of discoursing; so as the end of Logick, is a framing of the meanes of discoursing; so say the Iesuites in their Comment vpon Aristotles Organon, and the Pre­face [Page 7]thereto, Col. 27.55. So, like­wise saith Gillius, lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. n ^o. 4. The art of Logick delivereth wayes, and rules of discoursing.

8 [To discourse] (As it is here used) is to declare one thing that is lesse knowne, by another thing that is more knowne. This we haue in the Iesuites Preface col. 27. and 62. As for exam­ple, He that knowes not what a man is, is made to know it by saying a man is a reasonable Creature: the addition of rationalitie vnto man, shewes what man is. So likewise, when wee say, God is a spirit, infinite in all perfecti­on; we informe him that is ignorant, and knowes not what God is. In this very thing, this art of Logick doth differ from all other arts whatsoever: for Logick ends in speculation, and proceedeth no further than to judge whether one thing be truly affirmed of another: all other arts, be practi­call: they concerne mans outward or transient actions, as their next end: as, Grammar, and Rhetoricke tendeth vnto mans speech, Geometry vnto [Page 8]measuring, Arithmetick vnto num­bering, &c. That art (saith Okam) is practicall, which directeth vs vnto the doing of a thing to be wrought, In 3. dist. q. 11. lit. V. Yea, in this, mans know­ledge differs from the knowledge that is in God and the Angels: in that they behold the things in themselues, as they are in themselues, distinct each from other: they doe not know one thing lesse knowne, by the light and reflection of another thing, that is bet­ter knowne: wherefore their know­ledge, is called intellection, ours is called rationalitie.

[Well] This word, 9 seemes (vnto some) to be superfluous; and, a man would thinke, that the Iesuites were of that opinion, because they define Logick, to be no more, but an art of discoursing, coll. 27. so Gillius, lib. 1. Tra. 1. cap. 6. n ^o. 4. yet, indeed, in o­ther places, they haue as much as this word comes to: for, thus they writein their Preface the last question, col. 70. He is a good Logician, which doth exercise himselfe in each thing [Page 9]well, and diligently: and, Suarez doth joyne with them, in his Metaphysicks disp. 39. D. Logick (saith he) is an art, directing the operation of the vnder­standing, to exercise itselfe artifically, and according to reason. And all these Authors doe adde, that word to very good purpose; for, thereby Logick is distinguished from Sophistry, which is onely a deceiving science: A So­phister seemes to know, but indeede, knowes not, in the truth of the thing, as we learne from Aristotle, in his Me­taphysicks, lib. 4. cap. 2. text. 4. And thus much shall suffice, for the open­ing of the severall parts of the defini­tion of Logick.

That wee may put a finall end, 10 to the matter in hand, wee must remem­ber, that the word discoursing, imply­eth arguments, wherefore wee must now see what an argument is.

An argument is that, Ramus. which hath a force to argue.

Altissidiorensis saith in his Preface, 11 lit. F. an argument, is a reason, that gi­veth vs knowledge of a thing that is [Page 10]doubtfull: Aristotle saith, that, argu­ments are such, as whereby faith (Lo­gically) may be made, of the thing that is spoken of. Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 22. Logicè igitur &c.

[That] This word importeth, 11 the generall nature of an argument (that is) the thing which is common to arguments of every kinde: and sig­nifieth a notion, which our vnder­standing doth apprehend, a resultancy or reflection, proceeding from a be­ing, obiected to our vnderstanding.

[Which hath a force to argue] That is, hath of its nature a power, aptitude, or fitnes, to bring the thing, obiected unto our understanding, into the knowledge, and intuition thereof. I omit to giue instance of these things, because, that will better be done in setting out the nature of par­ticular Arguments: Wherefore, now, wee haue fully done, with the first precept of Logick; I will proceede to the second.

CHAP. II. The Distribution of Logick.

LOGICK hath two parts, the

• Finding out of ar­guments.
  Ramus.
• Disposing of ar­guments.

This precept must haue the second place: for, 1 the nature of the things themselues doth require it: because by this, we come to know, what par­ticulars are wrapped vp in the former precept, and, Aristotle in the 6. Booke of his Topicks, and latter end of the first Chapter, requires, that, the thing de­fined, be distributed into parts: Ramus tooke this precept out of the second Chapter of Aristotles Categories, where wee haue these words: Those things, which are contained in Logick, bee

• without complexion.
• with complexion.

I sayd, 2 Ramus followed Aristo­tle in this partition, and, the thing it selfe shewes it; for, they both di­vide [Page 12] Logick, into two parts; The first part in Logick (according to Aristotle) are things without complexi­on: so are they, acording to Ramus, as his owne words doe witnesse, when he termes them, Seuerall respects of things, considered alone, and by them­selues. Aristotle giues, his incomplex­ed things no name: but, thereby he meanes arguments, as they are vndis­posed, as, his next precept doth shew, and, Ramus giues them that name ex­presly.

Ramus calls the first part of Logick invention: and, so doth Aristotle too, as wee may gather from the 32. chap­ter, of the first booke of his Priorums: Where, a little after the beginning, he requires, a facultie of inuenting, in him, that makes a Syllogisme: but, more plainly, and fully: we finde the same thing, in the first Chapter of the eight booke of his Topicks; To finde out (saith he) the place, from whence a man may argue, appertaines to Logick: therefore, vnto the first part of Lo­gick, for it can haue no other place. [Page 13] Ramus calls, the second part of Lo­gick, disposition. So doth Aristotle also, in the place last alleadged, where he requires of a Logician, to dispose singu­lar things, by themselues: and, he saith, that, this disposition is proper to a Logi­cian; and, therefore, belongs to Lo­gick; and, consequently, it is a second part thereof: for, it cannot be the first: yea, that Aristotle meant thus, doth vndoubtedly appeare; because, he appoints his Logician, first, to finde out the places, from whence t [...] argue; and then, in the second place, to dis­pose them, being so found out.

[Two parts] That is, 3 the precepts of Logick, tend vnto two things, or ends: and, they be called parts, be­cause, all those precepts be shared, or parted betweene these two ends: some of them appertaine to the one, and the rest vnto the other.

[Finding out] To finde out, some­time signifies, to discover a thing that is secret; but, here it is not so taken, but, the meaning is, that, the precepts of Logick, doe assigne the seates, and [Page 14]places of arguments, and describe, and set forth the nature of them: and so much for the generall Distribution of Logick.

CHAP. III. Of the seates of Arguments in generall.

Aristotle assigneth ten places, 1 or seates of arguments, in the fourth Chapter of his Categories: in these words:

Those things, which we finde in Lo­gick, without all coniunction, doe sig­nifie:

• 1 Substance; as, a man, a beast, &c.
• 2 Quantitie; as, two or three cubits.
• 3 Qualitie; as, white, &c.
• 4 Relation; as, double, halfe, &c.
• 5 Where; as, in the field, &c.
• 6 When; as, yesterday, the yeere past.
• 7 The place; as, he sitteth, &c.
• 8 To inioy; as, to be armed, &c.
• 9 Todoe; as, to cut, &c.
• [Page 15]10 To suffer; as, to be cut, &c.

He repeates the same doctrine in the ninth Chapter of his first booke of the Topicks; and in both places, he doth explicate them by certaine properties, that be common to them all ioyntly; viz. 1. They neither affirme, nor deny. 2. They be neither false, nor true. 3. A coniunction being added to them, they containe negation, or affirmation, truth, or falshood. 4. All propositions are fra­med from them.

In the fift Chapter of his Categories, 2 and in his Prior. lib. 1. cap. 27. Eorum igitur. Post. lib. 1. cap. 22. he doth di­vide them thus.

These ten, be

• Either, subiected onely.
• Predicated onely.
• Or, subiected, and pre­dicated, also.

This distribution, is fitly set out by Altisiodore, in his Preface A. and B. Where, he hath these words:

An Argument, is that, which

• proveth:
• or is proved.

This is all, that I finde, touching ar­guments in generall.

Aristotle delivers the doctrine of Substance (which is the first seat of ar­guments) in the fift Chapter alledged, 3 which containeth these foure things:

• 1. A substance, is every thing, of which we may say, that, it is.
• We finde the same thing in Thomas, Whatsoever (saith he) is essentiall to a thing, appertaineth vnto substance, 1. p.q. 77. art. 1. ad 1 ^m.
• 2. Substance is
  • First: as every singular & individuall thing.
  • Second: as Genus and species.
• 3. Genus, and species, signifie substances, by a figura [...]iue speech, not properly, they signifie, rather, the manner, ac­cording to which, a thing is.
• 4. A singular thing, is most properly, a substance; because, all other things, be attributed thereunto, and that, attributed vnto none.

Thus, haue I set downe, 4 all that I finde in Aristotle, touching the na­ture of those arguments, which are contained in the first place, or seat of arguments: (for this time we must o­mit the consideration of the second substance; for, that hath the last place in this first part of Logick) The first substance comes now to be handled: Thomas doth wholly subscribe vnto Aristotle, for this distinction, and ex­plication of substance, reported out of Aristotle, and, he shewes the same, in this short sentence: viz In the name of first substance, is intended the nature of universall and parts. 1. p.q. 29. art. 3. ad 2 ^m. And, for further explication, he saith, 1. p. q 75. art. 2. ad 2 ^m. A first, or individuall substance, may be taken two wayes: one way, for every thing that hath a substance; another way, for a compleat subsistency, in the nature of any species: from whence, a mans hand may be called a first sub­stance, or an individuall thing, after the first sort: but not after the second: so also, a mans soule, may be called a first [Page 18]substance, or a singular thing in the first sort: because, it is (as it were) a thing, that subsisteth: but, that which is com­pounded of soule, and bodie, is called, a first substance, or an individuall being, in the second sence.

Vnto this place, must be referred, every individual effect, as it consisteth by force of all the causes, and, every individuall subiect, that receiveth a­ny outward change, whether it be by the substracting of something inioy­ed, or the receiving of something that is added.

The nature of these effects, and subiects, is delivered by Aristotle, in his tenth place, or seat of arguments, viz. of suffering. I say, they are con­tained there; for, in the judgement of Thomas. 1. p.q. 79. art. To suffer, is no more, but, to lose things inioyed, whether appertaining to nature, or not appertaining thereto, or, to be brought from power to act: and therefore, A­ristotles tenth seat, of suffering, impor­teth the whole nature, of every indi­viduall effect, and subiect, as it is an [Page 19]effect, and subiect. Now, I conceiue, that, this is wholy agreeable vnto A­ristotles meaning; because, in his doc­trine of predicated arguments, hee speakes not a word, of effects, and subiects.

This Doctrine is peculiar to Ari­stotle: 5 Ramus doth not acknowledge it; for, he hath not a word of it: It may bee, he conceived, that, 1. To set downe all the seats of arguments in one place together, would breed a needles repetition. 2. These single termes did not appertaine to Logick. 3. The first substance, or thing sub­iected, in every sentence, hath not the nature of an argument. It is very like­ly, that, he thought thus; because, this doctrine of Aristotle hath beene anciently receiued; therefore, hee would not depart from it vnles hee had some reason for it: and I con­ceiue, he had no reason, but these 3. I answer, these three arguments bee insufficient: The first, because Ari­stotle doth neuer repeat; or handle these ten seates of arguments twise: [Page 20]but, in stead of them sometime hee brings in the doctrine of a definition, Propertie, Genus, Accident, as the things, which are contained, in those ten seates of arguments: and, this wee finde in the 8. and 9. chapters of the first booke of his Topicks. Some o­ther time, he sets out, the nature of o­ther arguments: but, they are such, as are either, contained in these 4. or arise from them; and, (at most) hee doth but explicate at large, the same things, that he had set downe summa­rily, in the 10. places aforesaid.

Neither, 6 is the second reason good: for, those 10. things, are propoun­ded, not as me [...]re and simple beings: but, in respect of that reflection, or relation which ariseth out of them, vnto our vnderstanding; for, he doth intend them, as they may bee fit to ar­gue, and serue vnto the framing of disputations, either in single proposi­tions, or in syllogismes, as himselfe ex­presly sheweth, in the 8. and 9. chap­ters alledged: and, this is also evident, by the properties which he assigneth [Page 21]vnto them: viz, They containe truth, or falshood, affirmation, or negation, when one of them is attributed to the o­ther.

The third also is insufficient, 7 for the first substance, or subiect part of eve­ry sentence, hath truly, and properly, the nature of an argument, for, it hath a relation, or emanation vnto many things, that may be added, or attribu­ted to it: so as, we conceiue it to be, a receptiue thing, 1. of the causes wher­of it is compounded, and constituted. 2. of the properties flowing from it, 3. and of outward additions, where­by it is beautified and made to differ, and dissent from other, and whereby it is made equall, or vnequall, like or vnlike vnto others: as we shall playn­ly see, when we come to the particu­lars; and, it is plaine, that Aristotle vnderstood that argument, which he calls the first substance, after this sort: for, in the sayd 5 chapter of his Cate­gories, he sayth, it is proper vnto the first substance to receiue contraries, as sicknes, and health, blacknes, and whitnes, and [Page 22]thereby to be changed, from well to ill, from white to blacke.

The onely doubt is, whether an individuall effect, and subiect bee some wayes predicated or not. Ra­mus sayth yea; and brings them as predicated arguments. Aristotle doth not so, and no doubt, he hath the truth. No indiuiduall effect, is pre­dicated. I haue three reasons for it: first, we neuer find any such predica­tion, in the formall writings in the schooles, 2. No man can say, this in­diuiduall thing consisting of soule, and bodie, is this man: for, the predicate is lesse knowne then the subiect; The subiect engendreth distinct and cer­taine knowledge: because, it compre­hendeth all the causes, but no man will say so, of the predicate, nor so much, 3. The authority of the schools is against it. I will alleadge Thomas for them all. An integrall whole (sayth he) 1. p. 1. 77. art. 1. ad 1 ^m. is not predicated of all the parts together, vnles improperly as when we say, these walls, this foundation, and roofe, is this [Page 23]house. For the subiect; the matter is yet more cleere, we cannot say, this learning, is this man. Thomas sayth truly 1. p. q. 29. art. 3. ad 3 ^m Acci­dents doe mans est the subiect: but hee neuer sayd, nor any man else, that, the subiect doth manifest the acci­dent; and no maruaile why: for, if the subiect be predicated of the acci­dent, then we must conceiue, that, the accident is without, and before the subiect: but no man will say so: ther­fore, we may conclude, the indiui­duall effect, and subiect, are fitly comprehended vnder the name of a first substance. Thus, I haue set downe, and explicated, the generall nature of arguments; and, the speciall nature of that argument, which is alwayes subiected or argued. In the next place, I come to those arguments, which be alway predicated.

CHAP. IIII. The distribution of predicated Arguments.

I Finde this doctrine of positiue ar­guments, 2 deliuered by Aristotle al­so, and I will shew it in his doctrine of consenting arguments; in the second chapter of his Categortes, hee sayth, some arguments be of the subiect, and o­ther some, in the subiect: those I say be [Page 25]in the subiect, which are no parts of it, nor can be without that thing in which they are. The same thing is taught by Thomas, yet more plainly, 1. p. q. 25. art. 6. In. cor. Some arguments (saith he) be of the essence, and other some, without the essence of the subtect, of which they are predicated. I say, this of Thomas, and that of Aristotle are the same, with the last two branches, of Ramus his division: or (at least) it is comprehended in them: for, those that be of the essence, doe absolutely agree with the subiect, of whose essence they be. They that be in the subiect, but without the essence ther­of doe agree to the subiect after a sort, seeing therefore, they agree in those two last branches, they must agree also in the former branches of the division: seeing, every argument that agrees ab­solutely, doth consent positiuely with the subiect, of which they be predica­ted; and consequently, it is enough to the vnderstanding of the whole, if we doe explicate, and prosecute, those two last branches: and, because I sup­pose, [Page 26]that the terms of Aristotle, and Thomas, be more significant, and fit, I thinke it best to follow them.

[Of the essence] By these words, 3 are set out such arguments as be essen­tiall vnto the thing, of which they are predicated: now, all the causes be of this kinde, for as much, as the effect is constituted by all the causes, as Tho­mas hath taught vs in 2. dist. 27. q. 1. art. 2. ad. 9 ^m. he saith the effect is con­stituted by all the causes, (that is) each one in its kind, and maner of working; for, all of them, doe concur, and bestow their force, vnto the procuring of the thing to be. These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of ar­guments viz. To doe.

CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause.

THis argument, 1 which we call a Cause, is sometimes taken for e­very thing wherevpon another followes: and so saith Okam, 1. dist. 1. q. 3. lit. N. wherefore (as the same Okam sayth) 1. dist. 41. lit. F. A Cause is taken two wayes: Sometimes, for every thing that hath another thing, as an effect thereof; and, sometime also, for a propo­sition, whereof another doth follow: thus farre Okam.

A Cause in this place, is taken, not so largely, as in Okam [...] first and third senses: but, in the second. A Cause in this notion, is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause; and sometimes also, for the nature of Cau­sing, or, for the thing, as it doth exercise Causallitie in act, or, for the relation of [Page 28]Causing: A Cause, is taken in the se­cond sense, in this definition; wherefore, A Cause is that, of which the effect, e­ven by it selfe dependeth. Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Por­phyrte.

By this it is manifest, that, Ramus, and Aristotle, doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause, and in the expli­cation of that definition: therefore, we need not say more for the open­ing thereof; a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood; but, we may not doe that in this place, least we be for­ced to repeate the same thing againe, when we come to the particulars.

CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause.

THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also. 1 Aristotle [Page 29]makes them these foure, as wee may finde, in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums; his words be these: There be 4. Causes

• 1. That which sheweth what a thing is.
• 2. That which must be when the thing is.
• 3. That which moueth first.
• 4. That for which a thing is.

He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chap­ter. Thomas doth follow him, and doth teach the same things in 1 ^a. 2 a. q. 72. art. 3. in cor. and no man thinks otherwise: therefore, I will descend, to vnfold the nature of the particu­lars.

CHAP. VII. Of the Efficient Cause.

[Efficient] This word imports no more; 1 but, to doe, or to bring to passe: and, therefore, it signifieth, the office of all the Causes, and conse­quently, it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly: yet notwithstanding, we must know, that there is good reason thus to call it; else, the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name; yea, the ve­ry nature of it deserues we should call it so: as we shall see in the next pas­sage.

[From which] These words doe set out the nature, 2 or office of that Cause, which is called Efficient: and signifie the originall, or fountaine, from whence the effect doth receiue tts being. I say the effect, and I meane [Page 31]the whole effect: for, this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes, whereof the effect is compounded: as namely, it bestoweth the forme vp­on the matter, and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good: and there­fore, it deserues well to be called Effi­cient. The forme doth make the ef­fect to be of this, or that kinde: the matter formed, doth make the effect to be this, or that individuall thing: the end makes it fit for this or that good: but, the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely, doth giue being vnto the effect in the e­vent. Wee haue many examples of this Cause, and the operation thereof; we finde one in the second of Genesis, the seaventh verse, where it is sayd, ‘God formed man, of the dust of the ground, and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became a liu­ing soule.’

In this example, the making of man is attributed vnto God: therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of [Page 32]man: the office of this efficiency, is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter; he framed him of the dust, there is the matter, and breathed life into him, and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter, and then, God did destinate him to an end, viz. The actions of life, thereby he made him a living soule.

We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis, the 3. and 4. ver. where it is reported; that, ‘The men of the earth, did build a high tower of bricke, and slime; for a memoriall of their name.’

The men of the earth, are made the builders of the tower, and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke: they take bricke, and frame it into a tower; therefore, they ioyne the matter and forme together: they destinate the same vnto an end; viz. the continuance of their name on earth. And, thus much shall suffice, to set out the nature of the efficient cause. Wee should now divide an ef­ficient cause into the severall kindes; [Page 33]but, that we cannot: for (as Ramus truely sayes) they are vnknowne vnto vs, therefore we will set downe, the di­vers, and various manner, wherein the efficient cause doth worke: for that is well knowne, and doth helpe vs much, in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause.

The efficient cause doth worke,

• By it selfe.
• By accident.

A Cause doth then worke by it selfe, Ramus. when it worketh by force of, and accor­ding vnto the inbred fitnesse there­of.

We finde this distinction, 3 and the explication thereof, in the Schooles of all ages. The efficient cause (sayth Thomas) workes, by it selfe, or by acci­dent; the first is, when it moneth by its owne proper vertue: The second, when something is remoued therefrom, or that which remaines, is hindred from work­ing, 1 ^a. 2 [...]. q. 76. art. 1. in cor. If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas, wee shall finde this matter fully opened; A Cause by accident (sayth Okam. 1. dist. 2. q. 10. lit. B. H.) is that, which [Page 34]worketh by a thing different from it selfe, and a cause, which workes by it selfe is that, which causeth the effect ac­cording to its proper nature, and not ac­cording to some other thing, which out­wardly doth befall it.

The efficient doth worke by it selfe, in naturall things, when it moues ac­cording vnto the instinct, and inbred disposition of nature: as when the li­ving Creature seeth, eateth, sleepeth, avoydeth knowne danger. The plants grow vpright, bring forth leaues, and fruit, in due season; So doth it worke by it selfe in the intellectuall creature, when man moues himselfe vnto do­ing, by the direction of true reason, and the vnrestrained, and free choyse of the will.

Naturall things doe worke by acci­dent, when the instinct of nature is suppressed, or diverted. The intel­lectuall creature workes by accident, when the iudgement of reason is er­ronious, and the choyse of the will, carried by a previall over-ruling pow­er, and all these doe fall out, in case, [Page 35]where nature meets with defection. The vnderstanding is possessed with ignorance, or the will haled by the naughtinesse of corruption, and vio­lence of temptation. Lastly, the secret providence of God (which the Heathen called fortune) makes the creature work by accident: in all Cases when he workes against meanes, as he did, when he brought the people through the red Sea, Exodus the 14. and, as he doth in all miracles; or when man intendeth one thing, but another thing comes to passe: of this, we haue an example in the 45. of Genesis, and 5. vers. & 37. & 27. verse. In this place, they are sayd to sell Ioseph, be­cause they would be rid of him; and, in that, Ioseph sayth, God sent him in­to Aegypt, to preserue their liues. They were the efficient Cause of their owne preserving, when they sold Ioseph; but, yet by accident, through Gods secret providence, that wrought contrary to their intent. The Iewes, likewise, were the Cause of Christs glory, and mans salvation, [Page 36]when they delivered him to death; but, yet by accident, because God himselfe did create light out of dark­nesse, and made their evill intention, serue vnto that good. There be ma­ny examples, wherein wee finde, that, the efficient cause doth worke on this manner: but these are enough, for this present.

4 The efficient doth worke

• Physically,
• Morrally.

This distinction, is received in all the Logick schooles, and, is of fre­quent vse, in the question touching sanctification, and the actuall moti­on of grace, in mans conversion: the Reader may find it in Suarez opusc. 1. lib. 3. cap. 10. no. 1. and in many o­ther places. A Physicall operation, is a reall influence into the effect, we haue an example of this in mans crea­tion: He formed him, and that of the dust, and poured life into him, all these be reall influences: of this kinde, [Page 37]are the builders of the Tower of Ba­bell, they made bricke, and reard a building with bricke, and stone: Of this sort, be all workemen that labour with their hands, and tooles, the strength of nature, doth immediatly flow into the thing that is wrought, making a reall and sensible change in the matter where on they worke.

A morall worke, is a motion of­fered to the vnderstanding, and serues to allure, and draw it on with reasons, and perswasion. Of this kinde, bee be all such things, as be obiected to the vnderstanding, as namely, the testimonie of God, and man, by com­manding, forbidding, promising, threatning, perswading, therefore, so often as wee finde, any of these attributed to God, or man, wee are to know, that then they are effici­ent causes, that worke morally.

Ramus doth call Testimonies, Ex­hortations, Commandements, &c. in­artificiall arguments, because, they argue, not of their owne force, but, by the authoritie of him that doth testifie: [Page 38]but, this is altogether vnfitly spoken, for inartificiall, and argument, im­plyes a contradiction, if inartificiall, then no argument; if an argument then artificiall, for an argument is a member of Art. 2. These things them­selues are no arguments, vnlesse they be referred vnto the Testator, but then they argue as properties or ad­juncts, and otherwayes they are ne­ver attributed to any subject. In this place affirmation, perswasion, &c. are not brought as morall causes in themselues: but the causalitie is re­ferred to him that affirmeth, perswa­deth &c. which makes it very plaine, that, they belong to this place or seat of arguments. God, and his servants, are the morall causes of mans holi­nes, when they command good, and forbid ill, when they promise good, and threaten ill, when they perswade vnto obedience, and disswade from sinne, thus our Saviour Christ is the morall cause of all supernaturall things, when by his obedience, he deserved, that God should bestow [Page 39]them vpon vs, he by meriting (I say) is the morall cause of Gods gifts, be­cause by his merits hee moveth God to bestow them: and so much shall suffice for this distinction.

5 A Physi­call efficient is

• Principall
  • first,
  • second,
• Instrumentall.

This distinction is very ancient in the schooles; and of great vse, when we desire to know, how mans will is wrought vpon, and worketh with the actuall motion of Gods grace; Al­varez received it from Thomas, and makes vse of it. disp. 68. no. 5. &c. where, hee doth thus describe each member of it.

A principall efficient is that, which worketh out of its owne power, or forme, as Thomas sayth, 1. p. q. 18. art. 3. in cor. A first principall efficient, is that which worketh onely, out of its owne power. Thus God only work­eth, [Page 40]of whom it is sayd, hee sitteth in Heaven, and doth what he will.

He is the vniversall cause: for in him we liue, and mone, and haue our being.

A second principall efficient is that, which is so moved by another, that it moveth it selfe, by a power of its owne. Of this sort is mans mind, which is mo­ved by God, yet neverth lesse it work­eth out of an actiue beginning, re­maining in it selfe, Of this sort, be all those sayings in the Scripture, which attribute mans good workes, as his conversion, and the like, sometimes, vnto God alone, and other some­times, vnto man alone.

An instrument (properly taken, 6 and so we speake of it here) is that, which worketh onely out of a power received from the principall efficient, of this kinde are all instruments without life, as namely the tooles of a Car­penter, or Smith, &c: Thus hot wa­ter, heateth another thing that is cold, by the heate received from the fire.

To conclude, the point touching [Page 41]the efficient cause, wee are to know, that, the efficient, Ramus. alwayes worketh af­ter one of these waies, whether it works alone, or with others, whether it begins the worke, or preserues it, being alrea­die made.

CHAP. VIII. The matter, Ramus. is a Cause of which a thing is.

[Matter.] This word is often times vsed to set out every bodily sub­stance: 1 but it is not so taken in this place, for (as Thomas sayth, 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in cor.) The matter (as it is a matter) remaineth onely in power, or capacitie to receiue many formes: and therefore, according to it selfe hath no being, nor can be obiected to our vnderstanding: 1. p. q. 15. art. 3. ad 3 ^m. In this place it signifies a bo­dily substance informed, or some in­tellectuall thing answerable vnto that.

[A cause] These words doe at­tribute an actiue power, and actuall efficacy vnto the matter, wherby the effect is produced.

[Of which] These words shew the nature of that efficacy, and the maner how the matter doth concurre vnto the effect: and importeth the thing that so receiues the forme, that it rest­eth and remaineth in it. This we see in an house, wherin the timber, stone &c. are framed, and fashioned toge­ther, and made fit for habitation: so doth a peece of timber receiue the pi­cture made vpon it by a carver.

[A thing is] By [thing] is meant the effect produced: by [Is] is meant essentially, so as, the matter is a part of the essence viz. in a second degree, or notion. Wee conceiue the timber &c. Of a house to be a part of it: but we know, that there is an o­ther part therof more principall be­fore that: namely, the forme & fashi­on thereof. A thing, signifies an indi­viduall effect, so as, the office of the matter is to bring the effect vnto asin­gular, [Page 43]or individuall being: thus all Philosophers doe conceiue of it. The matter is the principium of individu­ation, saith Thomas. 1. p. q. 86. art. 3. in cor. And againe, the essence is restrained vnto one individuall thing by the matter. 1. p. q. 7. art. 3. in cor.

We haue an instance of this, in e­very singular creature. Peter, is a sin­gular man by his body, every plant, is singular by the stem that groweth vp; for they inioy all other things in common with therest of their kinds. The soule of Peter hath the same ra­tionalitie with all other mens soules: no singular tree differs from other trees in vegititie. Sanctitie makes men christians: Peters sanctitie makes Peter a christian, because the holy Ghost dwels in his mortall body.

This argument brings the subiect to which it is attributed, vnto our cleere vnderstanding, and it is of sin­gular vse, to make vs know the nature and distinction of particular beings.

Yea, of absolute necessitie: for (that I may vse the words, and reason of Ari­stotle. [Page 44]Meta. Lib. 2. Cap. 1 text. 11) It is not possible to know vntill wee come vnto indiuidualls. It is impossi­ble to know vntill we ataine vnto those things which doe not admit division: for things that are infinite cannot possibly be comprehended by our vnderstandings. We haue a preg­nant example of it in the 1. Cor. 15.39 &c. Where, the Apostle doth de­scribe, and destinguish diuers kinds of singular bodies, and saith, some be celestiall, as the Sunne, Moone, and stars. Other some be terrestriall, and those be spirituall, as mans body that is raysed: other some be naturall, viz the flesh of men, beasts and birds: and from hence he deliuers the nature and difference of glory that these particu­lar beings doe inioy. Likewise, the holy Ghost Reuel. 21 18. &c. Makes vs know, what the new Ierusalem is, by the matter thereof. The examples of this kinde are very frequent, and well knowne to every man; there­fore, I take this to be sufficient for the explication of the materiall cause.

CHAP. IX. Of the formall Cause.

[Forme.] As I sayd of the matter, 1 so must I say of the forme: If it be considered in it selfe, abstracted from all matter, and individualitie, it is a certaine thing common vnto many: so Thomas truly sayth, 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in cor. 2. Vnder the name forme, some­times is comprehended a figure, which consisteth in the termination of a quan­titie. This also I haue from Thomas. 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. ad 2 ^m. But wee take not this word, at this time, in either of these sences. By forme then wee here vnderstand, the intrinsicall part of the compounded effect: so sayth Suarez, meta. disp. 10. sect. 1. n ^o. 7. that is, Received of the matter, informing the same: Thus saith Thomas. 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. in cor.

• [Page 46] A forme (saith Thomas) is Generall. 2
• A forme (saith Thomas) is Speciall.

A speciall forme is that which informs the subiect, but it selfe is not informed by any other forme of the same nature: as one colour is not informed by another colour, 2. dist. 27. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1 ^m. Forme in this place, is taken in the se­cond sence, not in the first. Wee haue an example of this, in the rationalitie of man, and vigiditie of plants: both of them are formes, and distinct be­ings, not receiving any thing from o­ther formes of their kinde.

[Is a Cause] (That is) it hath actu­all exercised force to inferre the ef­fect. 3

[By which] These words doe shew, 4 that, the force of the forme, is not re­ceptiue, nor retentiue, nor restrictiue, as the force of the matter is: but it is actiue: for (as Aristotle saith, Meta. lib. 9. cap. 6. text 17.) The forme is an act; (that is) an actuall, determinate, and actiue being: the Reader may see this matter fully opened by Gillius. col. 467.

[A thing is] By these words, 5 the es­sence of every individuall effect, is at­tributed to the formall cause: every thing that doth actually exist (saith Thomas, 1. p. q. 7. art. 2. in cor.) hath some forme; and againe, every being is caused by the forme thereof. 1. p. q. 51. art. 4. in cor.

[That which.] 6 These words doe attribute the whole effect vnto the forme: and this is agreed vpon by the learned in all ages. Each thing is that which it is, by its forme: thus Thomas thinketh, 1. p. q 5. art. 5. & ad 3 ^m. in cor. The whole compound is the effect of the forme; in the iudgement of O­kam. 1. dist. 32. q. 1. & 2. lit. C. And this sentence agrees well with the na­ture of the thing: for, the matter doth finite, and contract the amplitude of the forme, and thereby it becomes the deter­minate forme of this, or that individu­all effect. The forme, on the other side, doth perfit and determine the matter, and bring it, from power, to act, by gi­uing an essence thereunto: in so much, that, by the forme the essence is termi­ned [Page 48]vnto some speciall kinde. And thus much wee receiue from Thomas. 1. p. q. 7. art. 1. et 3 in cor. q. 14. art. 2. ad 1 ^m.

This argument is of necessary vse, 7 to instruct our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect, to which it is attributed: for, how can we know a thing more cleerely, and certainely, then when wee finde the intrinsicall, primary, and proper nature, and be­ing thereof. It is all one saith Aristo­tle 2. post. cap. 8. to know the nature of a thing, and to know the cause of its na­ture. Wee haue examples of this kinde of Cause, in the word of God, and the nature of the Creature: when God would shew vs what sinne is, he doth set it out by the forme thereof. Sinne (sayth the Apostle Iohn 1. Epist. chap. 3. v. 4.) Is a varying from the Law: The Apostle Paul, when he would set out, what the righteousnesse of faith is, he doth describe it (in his Epistle to the Romans ch. 4. v. 6.7.8.) by forgiuenesse of sinnes. The holy Ghost doth yeeld vs many of these examples, but these shall suffice.

In man we haue a full representati­on of every part of this Argument. 8 Wee say, rationalitie is the formall cause of man. Now, 1. Rationalitie is the intrinsecall part of man, all other of his parts, are more overt, and better knowne. 2. Rationalitie hath a force to bestow a being vpon man: for, when God had drawne together the dust of the earth, man had not (as then) his being: but, he receiued that, when God breathed the breath of life into it: at that time (I say) and not before, man became a liuing soule. 3. Rationalitie bestowes vpon man a being, that is actuall, and determined vnto one, and actiue; whereby he is fit to doe the actions of life. 4. There is nothing essentiall vnto man; but his rationalitie bestowes it on him: The body (indeed) doth make him a singular man, by retaining, and con­tracting the soule vnto one: but, in what respect he is a man, that he re­ceiues wholy from his soule, and from hence, the forme is truely sayd to be the beginning of difference, that is he­tweene [Page 50]one and another, and not the dif­ference it selfe. Thom. 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2 ^m. I say, the difference of things doth flow from the forme: for, as vnitie in substance doth make two things to be the same, as Okam doth truely teach, 1. dist. 19. q. 1. lit. B. o­pinio 1 ^a. and Aristotle, meta. lib. 5. cap. 15. text. 20. so difference in sub­stance makes two things to differ. The forme is not the difference it selfe: for, a forme is a subsistence in an vnitie: but, a difference is a dissenting betweene the essence of two: and thus much for the explication of the formall Cause.

CHAP. X. Of the finall Cause.

[End] By end is meant the last no­tion which wee haue of the effect: 1 [Page 51]and importeth that whereunto the thing tendeth. So Aristotle telleth vs, meta. lib. 2. cap. 1. text. 9.

An end is

• Externall.
• Inter­nall, In
  • The intent of the doer. 2
  • The thing it selfe
    • naturally
    • Imposed.

An externall end, is the actuall vse of the thing, to which the effect is fit­ted. Thus the beatificall vision is mans end, to which he tends. An end in the intent of the doer, is no more but either the fitnes (it selfe) of the ef­fect thought vpon, and purposed by the efficient; (this is the condition of every workman, that deviseth and re­solueth vpon the fashion, and forme of the thing to be wrought) Or the commoditie of the workman, and o­thers, sought thereby.

Wee haue example of an end, thus vnderstood, in those words of Iohn 3.16. God so loued the world &c. Where the giving of Christ is an effect, wrought by God, wherein he inten­ded the glory of himselfe, and his [Page 52]sonne, and the salvation of the pre­destinate. Thus the workman that makes an axe intends, that himselfe shall get reputation, and maintenance thereby.

An end of a thing imposed vpon it is, when the efficient inioyned that vse of it, which the thing it selfe doth not yeeld, and this end we finde in lawes, and mony; the one is appointed to be a rule of obedience, the other to set a price of wares. I say appointed by him that hath power to doe it, the things themselues doe not yeeld it; as all men doe know by experience. But the word end in this place doth not signi­fie either of these foure things.

3 The end (as it is in the intent and will of the doer) is a cause indeed me­taphorically, not properly, and must be reduced vnto the efficient not the finall: for, in that sort it doth but moue, and indu [...]ice principall efficient vnto wor­king: and consequently, it is an efficient that workes morally.

That and vnto which the effect tend­eth naturally, 4 is here vnderstood, and [Page 53]defined. I haue receiued all these things from Thomas 2. dist. q. 1. art. 1 2. & 3. 1. p. q. 26. art. 3. ad 2 ^m. Suarez de praedest lib. 2. cap. 3. no: 2. vega in Concil. Trident lib. 7. cap. 2.

[A cause] Therfore the end hath an actiue, and an exercised act, 5 in the producing of the effect: for, that is the propertie of every cause, as hath beene shewed.

[For which a thing is] These words set out the nature of that force: 6 and they signifie, a tendency, aptitude, and fitnes which the effect hath naturally, vnto something without it selfe. It is of the nature of a finall cause (sayth Okam) actually to intend: and whatso­euer doth not so, is not truly, and proper­ly a finall cause in Prologo. 1. sent. q. 11. lit. F.G. In the same sort writes A­ristotle meta. lib. 2. cap. 1. text. 8. An end (sayth he) is that for which a thing is made, that is, whose essence is not so for another, that it followes that other: but, the essence of another followes that.

If any inquire how tendency &c. 7 can haue an actuall exercise vnto do­ing. [Page 54]First I answer it can, because that tendency flowes from the forme, in as much as the forme doth determine the effect vnto an end, according to its owne proportion: as the forme of steele is such, as best fitteth with cutting. Thomas. 1 ^a. 2 e. q. 95 art. 3. in cor. Secondly, the end importeth some good so saith Thomas. 1. p. q 19. art. 1 ad. 1 and all men grant it: therfore it hath an exercised force to constitute, but herein it differs from the form that doth constitute good & no more: this doth both constitute, and diffuse good: It doth constitute, in as much as, it is the perfection of the effect. I say the perfection of it, be­cause, when the effect hath attained thi her it wanteth nothing requisite to a thing of that kind. It is diffusiuely good, in as much as, it is fit, and apt to bestow good vpon others.

Wee haue many examples that shew vs the nature of this argument. Fitnes to rule the day and night is attributed to the Sunne, and Moone Genesis. 1.14. As a thing that followed their na­ture by creation: thus also, fitnes to ac­company [Page 55]and help Adam is affirmed of Evah Genesis. 2.18.21. as the end of her creation. Man is apt, and fit to loue the knowne good, and that is his end; this fitnes floweth from his reasonable soule or formall being, whose propertie it is to judge truly, and choose freely. Now this fitnes hath a maine stroake in the constitu­ting of man, not by the way of moti­on, for that belongs to the efficient, nor by the way of reception, and re­tention: for, that belongs to the mat­ter: but, by the way of setled position as the forme doth from whence it floweth. 2. By this fitnes a man is made a perfit, and compleat humane creature: for, when he attaines vnto that, he wants nothing requisite vnto his being. Vntill he be so fitted, we cannot conceiue him a humane crea­ture: for, he would differ nothing from bruit beasts.

The vse of this argument is of ex­ceeding worth, 8 to informe our vnder­standings in the knowledge of the subiect: for, by it we know the for­mall [Page 56]cause, and consequently the na­ture of the thing.

To conclude the doctrine of all the causes ioyntly; we must not forget, that, from this place, or seat of argu­ments is deriued knowledge, simply so called. We are then thought to know a thing, when we vnderstand the causes therof, thus saith Ramus. And to the same effect speaks Aristotle, knowledge simply so called (saith he) poster. lib. 1. cap. 4. is necessary, that is, when the thing cannot be otherwise then as we know it: and we haue that knowledge, when we vnderstand the causes: so saith the same Aristotle. Poster. lib. 2. cap. 11. Thomas also hath the same thing: knowledge (saith he) opusc. de demonst. cap. 1. is to vnderstand of certainty, and we doe so when we vnderstand the cau­ses of the thing, and that, both as it is a cause, and also as it is a cause in act, of that thing: and he giues a reason here­of, Opusc. 48. de Syllog. cap. 1. viz. Then our reason doth resolue the thing caused into its causes: from whence knowledge doth flow. And thus much [Page 57]for the finall cause, and all those ar­guments which are predicated of the essence of the subiect, and which con­sequently doe absolutely agree there­with.

CHAP. XI. Of Properties.

VVE must now prosecute those arguments which import things without the subiect, and conse­quently consent with it, after some sort: of this kinde, be all adiuncts, as some doe call them.

Aristotle dissents from Ramus in these precepts: 1 Thomas sayth, 1. p. q. 77. art. 1. ad 5 ^m. Not every thing that is without the essence, may be called an accident: Aristotle hath not the termes of proper and common adjunct; nor the thing comprehēded vnder them; but the contrary; he sayth Top. lb. 1. Cap. 5. An accident cannot be proper, otherwise then by relation; as when one sit [...]eth and others stand, then sitting is proper to him. Lastly, Aristotle and o­thers with him doe make a thing pro­per and an accident to differ formally, as we shall presently finde.

Aristotle teacheth, 2 Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. that, Arguments which are without the subiect, be properties and accidents. That is sayd to be proper, that is reci­precall with the thing, but yet doth not declare the essence, nor come into the de­finition thereof. And of these he sayth also Top. lib. 5. cap. 1. They are proper­ties by themselues alwayes, and doe se­parate, and distinguish from all other [Page 59]things. Porphyrie also doth distinguish and describe these arguments as Ari­stotle doth. A propertie (saith he cap. 4.) is that which doth concurre vnto all onely, and alwayes. And againe, cap. 9. A property is that which is in the whole kinde to which it is proper, and onely, and alwayes, so as, if that speciall kinde be taken away, presently the propertie thereof is taken away also. And Thomas doth so set out the nature of this argu­ment, that he giues a reason of all this alledged out of Aristotle, and Porphy­rie. A thing proper, sayth he. 1 p q 77. art. 1. ad 5 ^m. is not of the essence, but is caused by the essentiall principles of the species.

Aristotle, 3 and Porphyrie giues in­stance of properties, in this sentence.

In this proposition, aptnes vnto laughing, and Grammar-learning, is predicated of man: This aptnes flow­eth from his reasonable soule, and that is the principall thing in his nature. [Page 60]I say it floweth therefrom, not as a Contingent motion, but as a naturall emanation; therefore, this aptnes a­grees vnto all men, onely, and al­wayes. No man wants it, none but man hath it, and all men haue it al­waies, and consequently it is proper vnto man, and proper by it selfe, and the nature thereof, and not made pro­per by any outward efficient, so as in necessary consecution it is convertible with man: we may truly argue thus, If man, then apt vnto Grammar skill. If apt vnto Grammar skill, then man.

An accident sayth Aristotle, 4 Top. lib. 1. cap. 5. is neither definition, Genus, nor a propertie, and is in the thing: but so as that it may be, and may not be, in one and the same thing: and Porphyrie recites the same in his fift Chapter; Thomas also in the place last alledged, doth so set out the nature of an acci­dent, that he giues also a reason of A­ristotles Doctrine: An accident (sayth he) is onely that, which is without the subiect, and not caused by the essentiall [Page 61]principles thereof. Now, this doctrine of Aristotle is certainely true: there­fore we ought to leaue Ramus and fol­low him. I say it is certainly true, that there be some things proper, that be not accidents: namely, all naturall ac­tions, as the act of seeing, is proper to all living creatures: the act of discour­sing to man: The bearing of leaues, and fruit to plants: and the outward workes of holinesse, vnto him that hath the habit of holinesse. These are proper, because they are necessary e­manations, from nature in the one, and grace in the other: so as, when all requisite circumstances be present, man cannot but see, and worke, the plants cannot but bring forth fruit, and leaues: wherefore, the holy Ghost doth thus reason; ‘He that doth righteousnesse is righ­teous. 1. Iohn. 3.7.’

Where the holy Ghost doth ne­cessarily ioyne righteous actions, vnto a man that is habituated with righteousnesse, as proper vnto him.

Properties be not adjuncts: 5 for, ad­iuncts doe out wardly befall the subiect: and so much the word importeth, and Ramus expresly affirmeth. Pro­perties doe not outwardly befall the subiect: but, they are necessary ema­nations from the principles of nature: Heat, and light doe not outwardly befall the Sunne, and fire: neither doth swimming of timber in the wa­ter, outwardly befall the same: & such is the condition of properties.

To this seat or place of arguments, 6 the other seven, set downe by Ari­stotle, must be referred: viz. Quanti­tie, Qualitie, Relation, Where, When, The place, To inioy. For, all of them doe outwardly befall the subiect, and are not caused by the principles of na­ture; as a little labour will shew; for, Quantitie imports no more, but Geometricall measure, or Arithmeti­call number. Qualitie signifies the manner, how a thing existeth, or wor­keth. Relation is no more, but the re­ference, or respect of one thing to another. Where importeth the gene­rall [Page 63]place, wherein the subiect is, as in this, or that Country. When expres­seth the time, and duration, as this yeare, this moneth, &c. The place sig­nifies the particular place, as this stoole, this chayre, &c. To inioy signi­fies all indowments, as Honour, Ri­ches, Clothes, &c

Some man (perhaps) will require me to set out the nature of quantitie, 7 and the rest: and alledge Aristotles authoritie for it. I answer, that ought not to be done in this place; for, that belongs to other Arts, as to Geometry, Arithmeticke, naturall and morall Philosophy. This place requires no more, but that I shew, what force there is in them, to bring the know­ledge of the subiect, that receiues them, into our vnderstanding; and that I haue done partly alreadie, and will make it more plaine, and full by that which followes.

Porphyrie, 8 cap. 5. doth divide an accident into

• separable; as sleepe to a man.
• inseparable; as black­nesse to a Crow.

And Ramus followes him.

Aristotle hath not this division; yet it may be allowed, because, it is true, and vsefull. Blacknes to a Crow is an accident: for, a white Crow, is no lesse a Crow then a blacke one, it is inseparable by Gods appoint­ment. Wee may truly say, this divi­sion is vsefull: for, the holy Ghost doth vse it; from vnseparable acci­dents he doth argue thus. Ier. 13.23. The Aethiopian cannot change his skin, nor the Leopard his spots, no more can he leaue his sinne, that is accustomed to doe evill.

Separable accidents are alway of sin­gular vse, 9 and doe aboundantly serue, to lead our vnderstandings into the knowledg of the subiects, vnto which they are attributed. If we take them as they are in themselues, and in that coniunction which is between them and the subiect, then they are but light, and of small force to set out the thing we know not: but because ma­ny of them doe meet together in one subiect, therfore their number toge­ther makes amends for their weaknes [Page 65]severally: yet, none of them are so weake severally, but that they doe cer­tainly leade vs to know the outward qualitie, and condition of their sub­iect, for learning, Riches, beautie, &c. doe vndoubtedly argue their sub­iects to be learned, rich, and beautiful, and therby we know the condition, which the subiect that receiveth them doth inioy, and how they differ from others, that want riches, learn­ing, or beauty: therefore, the holy Ghost doth so often vse this kinde of argument, and then most chiefly, when he would set out his most be­loved obiect. By this argument the spouse is described: Can. 5.10.11.12 My loue is white, ruddie &c. By this argument also, Goliath is set out 1. Sam. 17.4.5.6. &c. Then came a man named Goliath of Gath. &c. To conclude, such force is in this argu­ment, that we doe certainly and di­stinctly know therby, one man from another, and what reuerence, honor, and respect ought to be giuen to this rather then to that: and thus Aristo­tle [Page 66]doth vrge it Top. lib. 1. cap. 5 ad­iungantur autem.

Thus are we come to an end of all the positiue consenting arguments: 10 and that we may conclude them all ioyntly, we are to know, that hitherto is to be referred all kinde of vnitie or identitie: Ramus.I shall not neede to bestow much labour to shew it: for the thing it selfe is evident, there is nothing wherein one man can be the same with another, vnles it be in things essentiall, or without the essence. It is a ruled case in the Schooles, Two things are the same Generally, Special­ly, Numerically, Top. lib. 1. cap. 7. but this differs nothing from that, and both of them containe an vndoubted truth: Two men are the same gene­rally, because both of them haue a living soule, two men are the same specially, because they haue a reaso­nable soule, both of them are one nu­merically, because each of them haue a bodie, flesh, and bones. Two men are the same in riches, health, &c. be­cause they are both rich, and in health.

In the next place we come to dis­senting arguments.

CHAP. XII. Of Diversitie.

RAMVS hath this sentence out of Aristotle, 1 to Differ (sayth Por­phyrie) in a common sence, is no more, but by a varietie to be distant some wayes or other: so as, a thing is sayd to differ after this sort from it selfe, or from another: and we finde the sub­stance here of delivered by Aristotle. Top. lib. 1. Cap. 16.

[Dissenting] This word import­eth, 2 the name of those arguments which belong to this place, and they may very fitly be so called, because the nature of them doth agree thervn to.

[Dissenteth] This word compre­hends the generall nature of all the ar­guments which belong to this place, (I say) the generall nature, because ar­guments doe dissent more waies then one: and it signifieth a distancy, ari­sing from a varietie as Prophyrie hath fitly expressed it: for, we say those things are distant each from other, that are severed by a space, or some bodily substance that is betweene them: and this space is the varietie, or variousnes that is betweene seuerall, and distinct arguments: As riches is a barre, that comes betweene a rich man and pouertie: by reason whereof pouertie dissenteth from him that hath riches.

[From the thing it argueth] This sheweth the terms of this variation, 4 namely, the subiect and the predicate the argument arguing and the argu­ment argued, as for example: Health is an argument arguing, and this dissenteth fom a man that is sic'ke, by reason of that distance, or variation, which ariseth from sicknes: Sicknes [Page 69]doth make such a difference in a sick man from him that hath health, that, that health can no wayes be affirmed of him, therfore saith Porphyrie. chap. 3. Every difference makes a thing va­rious, when it is ioyned thereunto.

These kindes of arguments serue to refell error, and the vse, 5 is very needfull. To know what a thing is, hath the first place, and to know what a thing is not, ought to haue the se­cond: for, by the one our knowledge is begun, and by the other our know­ledge is confirmed: we are sure our knowledge is true, when we vnder­stand that the thing is no other then as we know it, from whence also it fol­lowes that these arguments belong to Logick, seeing we may be truly said to know what we knew not, when wee are confirmed in our knowledge.

To conclude, when wee say these arguments doe leade vs to the know­ledge of the subiect, we meane, the qualitie not the essence thereof; They shew what maner of thing it is: not of what nature it is: so sayth Aristotle [Page 70]Top. lib. 6. cap. 6. Every difference (sayth he) declares after what manner a thing is. We shall see the truth here­of in the particulars following; and thus much shall suffice, touching dis­senting arguments in generall.

Ramus. Dissenting arguments are

• divers.
• opposits.

This precept divideth dissenting arguments, 6 into their severall kindes. Ramus did not invent it; Porphyrie, cap. 3. hath it plainely: Difference (saith he) is by accident, or by it selfe: and Aristotle hath the same thing plaine enough, Top. lib. 6. cap. 6. Con­siderare, &c. But more plainely, Top. lib. 1. cap. 16. where he makes the distancy of arguments to be some great, some small. Wee shall shew the sence hereof, when we come to the parti­culars.

We haue this precept (also) in A­rist [...]l [...]; 7 a difference by accident (sayth [Page 71] Porphyrie) cap. 3. Is that which is not essentiall, nor makes the things that dif­fer, to be another: but divers. And A­ristotle implies the same in both the places last alledged. In Top. 6. cap. 6. (he saith) a difference by accident is in, and is not in, the thing from which it differs: therefore (according to him) their difference standeth in some re­spect onely. In Top. lib. 1. cap. 16. he sheweth that difference which he saith is small, in the example of sence and science. Now all men know that the difference betweene these two, is re­spectiue onely, not simply, and really.

Aristotle giues instance of these ar­guments in Iustice and Fortitude, 8 prudence and temperance, Top. lib. 1. cap. 16. Now, these doe differ, be­cause we conceiue this man that hath the one, differs from him that hath not that, but another: they differ from the subiect which they argue, but in some respect onely, namely, through the present condition thereof, be­cause the subiect inioyeth one of them: but not the rest.

I make it manifest by this sentence: ‘Socrates is temperate, but not iust, nor prudent.’

Here, Iustice and prudence dissent from Socrates, onely, in respect of his present condition, and because he hath them not: this disagreement that is betweene the subiect, and the pre­dicate, viz. Man, and prudence, makes a diversitie betweene them, and no more. For, a iust man may al­so be prudent, and a prudent man is not another man, from him that is Iust.

We haue examples of these argu­ments very often, we say in our Eng­lish Proverbe, This man is at ods with his wits; and we meane by it, his wit, and he differs, onely, because he wants it.

In the same sort it is sayd, ‘Vlysses was fayre, but not eloquent.’

Where, cloquence differs from V­lysses, onely, in respect, that he had it not: for, otherwise it agreed with him no lesse then beautie; he might haue beene the one, as well as the other, [Page 73]notwithstanding the nature of him­selfe, and that qualitie.

The vse of this kinde of argument is very behoofefull: for, hereby a man is shewed his error, that thinkes he hath much, when indeed he hath but little: Thus the holy Ghost argueth against the Church of Pergamus, Re­vel. 2.12.13.14. and 15.

So he argueth the Church of Thy­atira, in the 19.20. and 21. Verses. And thus much shall suffice touching argumēts that differ from the subiect, of which they are predicated, after the manner of diversitie, and in some re­spect onely.

CHAP. XIII. Of Opposites.

1 WE haue this sentence in Ari­stotle, Top. lib. 1. Cap. 16. The difference (sayth he) which is in those arguments that be farre distant, or different is very conspicuous. This of Aristotle, and that of Ramus are the same: for, by farre distant, Aristotle can meane no other but opposition, and by conspicuitie in difference, he can vnderstand no lesse, then an op­position that is made wholy, and eve­ry way: for that opposition is indeed conspicuous: we may finde it with little labour, and iudge of it with great certaintie.

[Opposites] This word signifies such things, as are set against each other.

[Wholy disagree] That is, both re­spectiuely, because the subiect doth [Page 75]want the thing that dissenteth: and really, because the subiect cannot re­ceiue the thing that dissenteth: When the subiect, and the thing dissenting, doth abhorre each other, and are (as we say) incompatible, then there is a totall opposition betweene them: we haue examples hereof in such say­ings as these be:

I say the nature of opposites is found in these, not in those wherein man barely, and simply is subiected: for dissent is in the qualitie not the quidditie, or being of the subiect: as hath beene shewed. 2. Povertie and sicknes agrees to man barely, 3 and sim­ply taken, and so they doe not oppose him at all: the reason why povertie, and sicknesse are opposite vnto a man that is rich, and in health, is because riches, and povertie are of that nature that they cannot befall the same sub­iect, in the same respect, part, and time: therefore, whensoever one of them is affirmed, the other is thereby [Page 76]denied. Thus much of opposites in generall; in the next place, I must set downe the speciall kindes of them.

CHAP. XIIII. Of the distribution of Opposities.

Opposites are Ramus.

• Disparats,
• Contraries,
  • Affir­matine,
    • Relatiues.
    • Adver­satiues.
  • Nega­tiues,
    • Contradic­tories.
    • Priuatiues.

ARistotle doth divide Opposites, 1 Categor. cap. 10. Iust in the same manner that Ramus doth; in these words;

Opposites are

• Relatiues.
• Contraries,
  • Without meane.
  • with
  • meane
    • without name.
    • with name.
• Priuatiues.
• Contradictories.

Thomas doth divide opposites, De veritate, q. 28. art. 6. in cor. agreeable vnto them both: in these words, Opposits import a positiue na­ture

• in both.
• in one, onely, as
  • Contradicto­ries.
  • Privatiues.

That they all agree in the nature of the thing, the explication of the par­ticulars will shew: their difference in manner of speaking, doth helpe (well) vnto the vnderstanding of the whole.

[Opposites are] In this division, 2 opposition is placed betweene argu­ments that be predicated: but that seemes to be disagreeable vnto the definition of dissenting arguments in generall. cap. 12. I answer, opposition is so placed indeed: yet this division disagrees not from that definition: for, they may be vnderstood two wayes, and agreeable to that definition in both. If they speake of the predicates, in case where the one is affirmed, and the other denied of the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time, [Page 78]then they agree wholy with that de­finition; for, then that predicate which is denied, doth oppose the thing argued: and I thinke that these authors meant thus: for, they know that the predicates themselues con­taine neither truth, nor falshood, and therefore no opposition. If they speake of the predicates themselues, not at­tributed to some subiect, then they giue them the foundation of opposi­tion, and not formall, and actuall op­position: and therefore, they agree fully with that definition, and truth: with that definition: for, it doth sup­pose, that the foundation of formall, and actuall opposition is in the pre­dicates themselues: and they agree with truth: for, it is most certaine, that the predicates themselues are the foundation of formall, and actuall op­position: by reason they are of that nature, that if one be attributed, the rest cannot, as is truely delivered by Ramus in this point of opposites: And Altaco. in 1. sent. q. 2. lit. H. even as the dore when it is shut, debarres all [Page 79]entrance: and an armour of proofe repells the bullet. Now, I haue clee­red this doubt, I proceed to set out the nature of the particulars.

CHAP. XV. Of Disparats.

[Disparats] This word importeth inequalitie, and therefore it may seeme vnfit for this place: yet it is duely placed, for thereby we vnder­stand an inequalitie, not in the quan­titie, or force of opposition, as if these opposites did oppose, some more, and some lesse: but of number, and therfore, those opposites which beare this title, are thus defined.

Disparates are opposites, Ramus. one of which is alike opposed, to many.

Aristotle cals these opposites by the name of Contraries, 1 and doth set them out by these properties: 1. They may be, and not be, in the subiect. 2. A [Page 80]third thing comes in the meane, or mi­dle betweene them. 3. This third, ei­ther partakes of both the opposites, or is of it selfe, and partakes of neither. Now it is playne both Aristotle, and Ramus doe speake of one kind of opposites: for, both of them doe instance the opposites they speake of in one and the same example: viz, black and white. If we apply that instance vnto them both, we shall see that they dis­agree not 1. These colours are opposite 2. They may be, and not be, in the same subiect. 3. They haue a third thing that comes betweene them: as greene, red, and all other colours. 4. These midle colours doe partake of black, and white. 5. each one of them is alike, or equally opposed to the rest: a man may truly say, he that is blacke, is not red, nor greene &c: and so of the rest. 6. many doe oppose one: for, he that is any one of them is de­nied to be all the rest.

2 Aristotle doth also instance these opposites in good, and bad: and there­by their nature is fitly resembled: for, [Page 81]experience tels vs, that betweene good, and bad actions there be some, which be both good, and bad: and therefore, they partake of both the opposites. There is also, a cessation or omision of action, and that comes betweene them both, and partakes of neither. Thomas giues these opposites a seventh propertie, viz: They import a positiue nature, sometimes in both, and sometimes but in one, and doth instance the first in blacke, and white; and we might instance the second, in good, and evill.

Thus we see these authors conspire in one, every one of them brings a part, and all of them together doe make a full, and compleat exposition of the thing in hand.

The vse of this argument is very needfull, and comes often, 3 we finde it in the word of God: The holy Ghost doth argue the Church of Lao­dicea, Revel. 3.17. with this argu­ment, thou art (sayth hee) wretched, miserable, poore, blinde, and naked: therefore, thov art not rich, nor increa­sed [Page 82]with goods, nor needest nothing, as thou vainely braggest. Where, all the things denyed, are opposed vnto the wretched Laodiceans, in the next place wee come to Relatiues.

CHAP. XVI. Of Relatives.

VVEe finde this precept deli­vered by Aristotle in the 10. 1 Chap. of his Categories: Those ar­guments (sayth he) which are opposed as Relatiues, the one opposite is refer­red to the other mutually: and Thomas deliuers the same thing, when (sayth he 1 p. q. 28. art. 2. in cor.) Things are spoken relatiuely, then a certaine relati­on, or reference of one opposite, to ano­ther is signified.

[Relatiues] This word importeth things that are referred the one to the [Page 83]other. Relatiues (sayth Thomas 1. p. q. 28. art. 1. in cor.) doe signifie accor­ding to their proper nature, onely, a re­spect of one thing to another.

[Affirming] This word is brought to set out vnto vs, that both termes opposed, doe comprehend positiue beings: Aristotle agrees with Ramus in it, in the place alledged, when hee sayth, That, Relatiues (even) in the thing that they are, be referred: so al­so, hee giues instance of relatiue op­position in knowledge, and the thing to be knowne: and both of them doe sig­nifie positiue beings. And Thomas doth teach the same thing, as I haue shewed in the 14. Chapter.

The onely doubt is, 2 what the terms in relatiue opposition doe affirme, Thomas doth resolue this doubt, 1. p. q. 28. on this maner:

In Relatiues there is their

• Foundation.
• Relation.

Relatiues are founded vpon either [Page 84]quantitie, or action, and passion: art. 1 in cor. In this sence, Relation doth import an accidentall being in the subiect art. 2. in cor: or things assisting outwardly affixed art. 2. in cor. The proper nature of relation, consisteth in a respect of one thing to another, art. 1. ad 1 ^m. which respect doth after a sort befall the thing related, in that it ten­deth from it selfe into another art. 2. in cor.

[Contraries] That is, 3 one single terme, doth oppose another single terme. Aristotle teacheth the same thing, when hee putteth knowledge, and the thing to be knowne, as an in­stance of Relatiue opposition.

[The one &c.] 4 In these words, the proper nature of Relatiue oppositi­on is set out: and they import such an opposition, as wherein the terms op­posed doe mutually constitute each other. Aristotle teacheth the same, when he affirmeth, that the terms op­posed bee mutually referred each to o­ther: and denies, that mutuall refe­rence to all other kinde of opposites. [Page 85] Thomas also hath the same thing: Re­latiues (saith he 1. p. q. 42. ar. 3. ad 2 ^m.) are together in nature, and our vnder­standing; in asmuch as, the one is com­prehended in the definition of the o­ther, wherfore Ramus concludeth tru­ly in these words.

To conclude this point of Relatiue opposition, it may bee demanded, 5 whether all Relatiues be opposits? I answere first; The foundation of Re­latiues bee Adjuncts, or Causes, and effects: therefore, in that respect, no relatiues are opposites. Secondly, the proper nature of relation consisteth onely in a respect, that one thing hath vnto another without it selfe, and so also no relatiues are opposites: for which cause, Aristotle makes Rela­tiues to be consenting arguments, as [Page 86]I haue shewed Chap. 3. foregoing. Thirdly, The things comprehended in the termes related, or referred, be such, that, they agree not vnto the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time: and thus all relatiues be op­posites. Fourthly, The opposition that is betweene the termes related, is made relatiuely, that is, each terme opposed hath a respect, and relation, the one to the other: so as, we con­ceiue the one is against the other, and the one doth constitute the other; neither of them can be in themselues, nor knowne to vs, but by the one, and the other: yet when they are, they oppose one another; And thus, all relatiues be opposites. This I ga­ther from Tho. 1. p. q. 28. Relatiues (saith he) signifie a certaine Relation of one terme vnto its opposite, art. 2. in cor. The nature of relation is a respect of one to another, according to which, one thing is opposed vnto another rela­tiuely, art. 3. in cor. Thus (I hope) this doubt is fully cleered.

6 We finde the nature of these argu­mēts [Page 87]fully layd open in this sentence.

Here. I Father and Sonne are terms referred the one to the other, as things that respect one another. 2. This re­spect goeth out of the one to the o­ther, the Father is a respect that ten­deth vnto the Sonne, and the Sonne a respect that extendeth to the Father. 3. The termes related doe mutually constitute one another, in their owne being, and our knowledge; the Father is, and is knowne to be, by the Sonne, and the Sonne is, & is knowne to be, by the Father. 4. The foundation of this relation is Paternity, and Filialitie: now, Paternitie being referred vnto Filialitie, we finde cause, and effect: but Paternitie being referred vnto the Father, is an adjunct: and Filialitie is an adjunct to the Sonne. Thus farre they both consent with the subiect which they argue. 5. The things com­prehended vnder these two termes cannot agree to the same subiect, in [Page 88]the same respect, and time: so as, now we finde them opposites: no man can be Father, and Sonne in the same re­spect, and at the same time. 6. Wee finde these termes of Father, and Son opposed relatiuely, (that is) in what sort the one doth respect the other, in that sort it is referred, as vnto its op­posite: but so as, one terme makes the other to be in it selfe, and our knowledge. 7. These termes of Fa­ther and Sonne be contraries: for, as Thomas sayth, Contrarietie is a diffe­rence according to the forme. 1 ^a. 2ae. q. 35. art. 3. & 4. in cor. And such a difference there is betweene Father, and Sonne, Paternitie is formally one thing, and Filialitie is formally ano­ther. The same things are to be found in many other examples, as in Prince, and subiect: Priest, and people: Ma­ster, and servant: Seller, and buyer &c. But this shall suffice, as sufficient to o­pen the nature of relatiue opposition. In the next place we must come to adversatiues.

CHAP. XVII. Of Adversatiues.

ARistotle teacheth the same thing touching the nature of these op­posits, 1 (though his words seeme diffe­rent) he sayth of them thus; Those arguments which be so contrarie, that one of them must of necessitie be in the subiect that can receiue them, they nei­ther are referred the one to the other, nor haue any third to come betweene them.

[Contraries] Adversatiues be con­traries, 2 because one alone opposeth vnto one alone: this opposition is taught by Aristotle, when he sayth, One of these opposites is in the subiect that is fit to receiue the same, and doth instance them in health, and sicknes.

[Alwayes] This word and therest which follow, 3 doe set out the speciall nature of these opposits: and by them we vnderstand what these opposites be, and how they differ from all o­thers. This word signifies the conti­nuance, and perpetuitie of oppositi­on that is betweene these opposites, namely, that it ceaseth not at any time: because (as Aristotle sayth) no subiect that is capable hereof can possibly be without one of them: now, in this they differ from Disparates, and relatiues: for, every subiect that can be blacke, and white, may at some time be nei­ther of them; so also, a man may be neither Father, nor Sonne. No Fa­ther, when he hath no childe, and no childe when he hath no Father.

[Directly] This word importeth an opposition that is without mixture, 4 interposition, or diversion; like vnto a straight line that extendeth betweene two points, and this no doubt was in­tended by Aristotle, when he sayd, These opposites be without relation, or a third thing to come betweene them. [Page 91]Herein these opposites differ from Disparats, and relatiues, the one re­ceiues the interposing of a third: and the other admits a mixture of con­senting, and thereby a diversion from opposing: by that relation, and respect that the one hath to the other. Wee haue all these particulars layd open to vs, in that one instance which wee finde in Aristotle: namely, ‘He that is in health, is not sicke.’

In this example we finde, 1. one side set against another. 2. one posi­tiue being is set against another; for, so we conceiue of sicknes. 3. One of these is true of a man alwayes: he cannot be but sicke, or well; because, the temper of his bodie requires it, and therefore this opposition is in man alwayes, because when he is sicke, he is not well: and when he is well, he is not sicke. 4. There is no third thing to come betweene sick­nes, and health. 5. Sicknes is never mixed with health, nor health with [Page 92]sicknes. 6. This opposition is direct: he that falls from health becomes pre­sently sicke: when sicknes is expelled, then health is presently recovered: the one devours the other, and con­trariwise, the one overcomes the o­ther: like vnto two armies in the field, the last motion in fighting on the one side, is the first motion in pursuite on the other side: this may suffice for all those opposites which doe containe positiue being in both terms.

CHAP. XVIII. Of Privatiues.

IN this Chapter and that which fol­lowes, wee must handle negatiue contraries.

ARistotle teacheth the same things in the tenth Chapter of his Cate­gories, 1 Privation and habit vniversally taken (saith he) is sayd concerning one, and the same thing: namely, that where­in nature requires that the habit should be. In this we conceiue the habit, and the privation; To haue the habit, and to be deprived thereof, and these two are not the same: for, both of them can­not be attributed to the same thing. To be deprived, and to haue the habit are opposed as privation, and habit: for, after what sort there is opposition betweene the privation, and habit, in the same sort to haue the habit, and to be deprived of the habit are opposed.

[Privatiues] This is the name of these opposites: 2 but it seemes not very fitly given: for, it belongs vnto one member onely; Aristotle (as we see) cals this opposition a privation, and habit; and Thomas, an opposition according to privation, and habit: de ve­ritate q. 28. art. 6. in cor.

[Negatiue contraries] These op­posites be vnfitly called negatiue, 3 be­cause onely one of them is negatiue. Thomas (in the place alleadged) doth expresse the same thing more fitly: Some opposites (sayth he) are such as one onely imports a cetaine nature, and the rest no more but the removing, or negation of that nature affirmed. Con­traries they may bee called: because one is opposed to one, but not pro­perly, for the negation of a forme hath no forme.

[The one whereof, 4 &c.] These words and the rest doe set out the nature of these opposites, and placeth the same in these properties: 1. The one de­nyes, the other affirmes, (that is) the one hath a positiue being, called a ha­bit, the other the absence of that ha­bit, called a privation, or priuatiue. 2. This habit, and privation is oppo­sed, not the one against the other, ab­stracted from their subject: but as the one is received by the subiect, so the other is substracted therfrom. 3. This subject whereabouts they are exerci­sed, [Page 95]is one and the same: even that subiect, and no other is deprived that hath received the habit. 4. That sub­iect whereabout these opposites are exercised, is not every one vniversal­ly; but onely that wherein the habit ought to be according to the course of nature.

The reason why these opposites must be exercised about such a sub­iect is; 5 because nothing can truely be sayd to be deprived, vnlesse the thing which is remoued, be due thereto by nature. The reason why, to haue the habit, and to be deprived thereof, are opposed, is because the habit and pri­vation thereof, cannot befall the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time.

All these particulars are declared in that one instance which Aristotle giues, 6 viz.

In this sentence we finde, 1. Two [Page 96]terms, viz. sight, and blindnesse. 2. The one imports a positiue being, the other the absence of that being. 3. The one is affirmed, the other de­nied, therefore one is opposed to one. 4. The things themselues abstracted from the subject are not opposed, but their oppositiō is exercised about one subiect. 5. One of the terms is due vnto the subiect wherein they oppose, viz. sight is due to mans na­ture: for God made him a seeing creature. 6. The foundation of that opposition is in sight, and blindnesse, in themselues abstracted from their subiect: we deny blindnes vnto the same man that hath sight: because mans bodie is not capable of them both together, in the same respect, part, and time. And here I put an end, to the opposition of habit and privation.

CHAP. XIX. Of Contradictories.

A Contradiction (saith Aliaco 1. sent. 1 q. 5. lit. M.) is the most manifest repugnancy that is, the affirmation of one, and negation of the same: and this is double, the one is of propositions, the other of terms: when as a fixite terme is opposed vnto an infinite terme. This place speaks of the last not of the first. Some opposites (sayth Thomas) deve­rit. q. 28. art. 6. in cor. doe affirme a certaine nature in one part, the other is a negation of the same, and these are op­posites according to affirmation, and ne­gation.

Aristotle doth teach the same things most fully: A Contradiction (sayth he) is an opposition which by it selfe wanteth a meane, or middle betweene [Page 98]them: Poster. lib. 1. cap. 2. Principium antem &c. And he doth explicate this thing further; Categor. cap. 10. Id quo­que. That opposition (sayth he) that falleth vnder affirmation, and negation, is not affirmation, and negation belong­ing to this place: but the things which fall vnder affirmation, and negation, and these doe oppose the one the other, as affirmation, and negation; for, there is the same manner of opposition in these, as in them, even as affirmation, and ne­gation are opposed, when we say, he sit­teth, he sitteth not. So also the things subiected in both those sentences are op­posed, namely, to sit, not to sit.

[Contradictories] This word is the name of this kinde of opposition, 2 and signifies properly two sentences w ^ch pronounce against each other, but in this place it is vsed to set out things which are subiected vnto such senten­ces, or doe fall vnder affiramtion and negation, and they may be so appli­ed; because, such things d [...]e oppose each other no lesse naturally, and vni­versally then sentences doe: and there­by [Page 99]they are the foundation of the af­firmation, and negation in sentences.

[Negatiue Contraries] One part of the Contradiction is negatiue: 3 they may be called Contraries, because one doth oppose vnto one.

[The one denieth every where.] 4 These words doe place the nature of Con­tradictories in these properties: 1. They containe a deniall, that is, the absence of a positiue nature, affirmed in the one, is implyed, or vertually avou­ched in the other. 2. This deniall is made by one onely, the other alwaies containing a positiue nature. 3. This deniall is made vniversally: for all times, and respects, and every where; and in all subjects, so as, these oppo­sitions containe alwayes a truth in them, whether Socrates be, or be not, one of them is alwayes true, and the other false: wherefore it is proper to the opposition of this ksnde, that one of them is true, or false: as Aristotle hath truly observed in the tenth chap­ter of his Categories. And the reason of it is good, all things that haue any [Page 100]being, must either continue, or dis­continue in that being: from whence it is, that, Aristotle sayth, that this op­position is made by it selfe, and wants the intermission of a third: for no pow­er can put a third thing betweene be­ing, and not being, nor cause that thing not to be which is in the same respect and time, when and as it is, nor make that to be which is not in that respect, and during that time wherein it is not.

Aristotle and Aliaco guievs two ex­amples in the places alledged, that doe fully represent the nature of these opposites.

Wee haue in these two sentences, two terms, viz. To sit, not to sit. A man, a not man. The first of these terms comprehends a positiue, and fi­nite nature: in the second, a negation, or absence of that positiue nature, (by a terme infinite, and vnlimitted) is im­plied. [Page 101]The first is affirmed of a man, the second is denied of the same man. 3. This deniall extends to all times, and respects, wherein that affirmation may be conceiued. 4. This deniall is not voluntary, nor imposed: but, ari­seth simply, and absolutely from the nature of the things themselues: no power can make him that is a man, not to be a man, during the time while he is a man. Neither can any power make that a man which is not a man, during the time wherein he is not a man. 5. It is alwayes true, or false of this, or that singular man, that either he is, or that he is not, there can be no third moment assig­ned, wherein he neither is, nor is not. So as with this I may put an end to Contradictory opposition, and the explication of all positiue arguments, both Consenting, and Dissenting.

CHAP. XX. Of Comparison in generall.

NOw we must come to compara­tiue Arguments.

Aristotle delivers the doctrine of these arguments, 1 fully, and plainely enough, as we shall see anon.

[Comparatiue] These Arguments are opposed vnto positiue, and there­fore, they haue a sense opposite to them.

[Compared together] These words doe set out the speciall nature of these arguments: they are called Compara­tiue, because they are compared with other things; and this nature consi­steth in two things: First, they are compared. Secondly, they are argu­ments, by meanes of that comparing. [Page 103]Things are compared together when the one is measured, waighed, or de­ciphered by the other; Thus timber is compared with the rule; wares are compared with the waights, and the picture with the thing pictured: and thus we vnderstand the word Compa­red in this place. A single terme be­comes a compared argument, when it hath such a force to argue, or set out the subiect, as is receiued from ano­ther thing, that it is compared with­all: and herein, these arguments haue an opposite nature vnto positiue: for, they borrow no force to argue from the qualitie, or quantitie of any other arguments.

These arguments haue these foure properties. 1. 2 They are equally knowne] (that is) the two things compared, haue in themselues no prioritie, or antecedency, to argue, and be argued: as we finde in the effect, and causes thereof: In the subiect, and the pro­perties, and accidents annexed there­unto. 2. [Some men doe know the one better then the other.] That is, in the [Page 104]event, by reason they are acquainted with the one, and not with the other. 3. [They are taken sometimes, from things faigned.] And so, they may well be; for, such things haue a being in our vnderstanding, and that is enough to make them rationall beings; as wee learne from Thomas, 1 part. q. 16. art. 3. ad 2 ^m. That is enough also, to giue them a place in Logick: for every be­ing, as well rationall, as reall is obiec­ted thereunto. 4. [Comparisons taken from fained things doe argue, and set out the subiect.] Because, the force that all comparisons haue to argue, ariseth from the apprehension of our vnder­standing; and not from any reall re­lation, or consent that the one hath to the other.

Now, 3 because the Reader might know, how to finde a Comparison in a Discourse, wee must vnderstand, that, sometimes they are set out by cer­taine words, which are proper to them: and sometimes they lie open in sentences that are fit to expresse them: In this case the first sentence is called the propo­sition: [Page 105]the second the reddition: there­fore, when he findes them, he needs no other direction; Sometimes also, they are set downe without notes, or markes; and the parts are inverted, or contracted: then the matter it selfe must direct him. These are all, that belong to comparisons in common.

CHAP. XXI. Of the Distribution of comparison.

ARistotle hath every branch of this division; 1 In his Categortes in the sixt Chapter, he placeth Comparison, In quantitie, as proper thereto: and divides it into equall, and vnequall. In the 8. Chapter, he placeth Com­parison [Page 106]in qualitie, and doth divide it irto like, and vnlike, and makes this kinde of Comparison, to be found onely in qualitie. Lastly, cap. 6. At ho­rum &c. and cap. 7. Omnta vero, he divides vnequall into greater and lesse: and the things themselues, that these two Authors bring, are received in the Schooles of all ages; therefore, I will proceed to the particulars.

CHAP. XXII. Of Equalitie.

ARistotle doth teach the same thing: 1 Top. lib. 1. cap. 9. Ex his, &c. Quantitie, sayth he, importeth magnitude.

[Quantitie] In the first place, we ought to vnderstand what quantitie [Page 107]is, else we shall not vnderstand, what is meant by a Comparison in quan­titie.

[That which &c] These words set out the nature of quantitie, and place it in a magnitude; for, according to magnitude, things are sayd to be greater, or lesser: now, magnitudeis not taken here Geometrically, nor A­rithmetically: but, in a larger sense: even, for every magnitude, by which a thing may be sayd to be thus, or so much: whether it be spoken of bo­dies, number, or vertues: of things reall, or intellectuall: for, this Logick requires; because it hath to doe with all things, wherein our vnderstanding hath any thing to doe.

One in quantitie makes equall; 2 so sayth Okam 1. dist. 19. q 1. lit. B. o­pinio. 1 ^a. I doe not finde this sentence in Aristotle expresly: yet he implies thus much, as wee shall see when we [Page 108]come to the Comparison of likenes, chap. 25. And no man thinkes other­waies, therefore we must esteeme this sentence to be a precept of Art.

[Those things are equali] That is, 3 two things layd together, be of equall quantitie, or magnitude.

[Which haue the same quantitie.] That is, which are adaequate in mag­nitude: as when two lines be of the same length, the one is neither longer nor shorter then the other: when nei­ther end of the scale waighes downe the other: when two numbers agree together, as, two and two; foure and foure; for, thus every magnitude is one in quantitie. Now, we haue the nature of Equals defined, and set out vnto vs, we must know how to finde and vse them.

As and So, 4 be signes of this com­parison; but not proper to them: for, [Page 109]many times they are found in com­parison of likenes. I doe not finde that Aristotle, or other Schooles, doe thus punctually shew vs how to finde out these comparisons, onely, I finde that Thomas sayth 1. p. q. 42. art. 1. in cor. Then a thing is sayd to be equall, when it is denyed, to be vnequall, that is more or lesse: and I finde the same thing in Aristotle Meta. lib. 10. text 15.16. from whence we may inferre their agreement with Okam, that placeth the equallitie of things, in being one in quantitie.

We haue examples wherein com­parisons of equallitie are set out by these marks, or signes, namely; 5

1. Both the Cherubes were of one measure: 1 Kings. 6.25.

2. Thou hast made them equall to vs: Mat. 20.12.

3. Sinners lend to sinners, to receiue as much againe; Luke 6.34.

4. The length of the Citie is as large as the breadth: Revel. 21.16.

5. I cannot doe lesse, or more then Gods word commands: Numb. 21.18.

[Page 110]6. Ye are not inferior to other Chur­ches: 2. Cor. 12.13.

Sometime the Proposition and Reddition are distinctly set downe. 6

7. As his part is, that goeth to the batile, so shall his part bee, that tarri­eth by the [...]uffe: 1. Sam. 30.34.

8. How much shee hath glorified her selfe, and lived delictously, so much torment, and sorrow giue her: Revel. 18.7.

In these examples, wee finde two Cherubes to bee one in dimension. Two Labourers, one in wages. A lender, and a borrower one in quan­titie of money. The length and breadth of the Citie one in measure. The Corinths and other Churches one in grace, &c. They that went to warre, and they that guarded the stuffe, one in the quantitie of prey. The Whore of Babylons delights, and sorrowes one in extent. By this we see how to finde out such com­parisons, as are marked out vnto vs.

I will also set downe some com­parisons that want those signes, 7 or markes, viz.

What force vertue hath to happi­nes, that force vice hath to cursednes.

The Iewes answered, wee can not tell, Christ answered neither tell I you. Mat. 21.23.

In the first, Vice and vertue, are one in efficacie. In the second, Christ and the Iewes, are one in silence. By this we may know how to finde out these comparisons.

Now I will shew how we should vse them, for, 8 hitherto we finde them comparisons, but no arguments, be­cause thus farre they are wholy desti­tute of relation to any subiect, in this quantitie, the one sets out the other, and no more: but every argument leads vs to know some subiect, which we knew not. I will shew their vse, by one of the examples, (and I thinke that will suffice) on this maner.

The Whore of Babylon hath sor­rowes.

In this sentence, the word sorrow doth leade vs to vnderstand what the Whore of Babylon is: viz: in her e­state or condition. Now, because some [Page 112]man doth not know the quantitie of this sorrow: but doth know the quan­titie of her delight: therefore, her sorrow is layd to her delight, and thereby hee comes to know what is the quantitie of her sorrow, in as much, as, shee is one in the quantitie of both. By this I hope the Reader will finde the way how to make vse of all comparatiue arguments, so as, I shall not neede to doe the like in a­ny of the rest which follow.

CHAP. XXIII. Of Vnequales.

TO the same effect speaks Thomas 1. p. q. 42. art. 1. in cor. 1 Ʋnequals (sayth he) cannot be one in numericall quantitie: and thus much Aristotle and Okam speake: because, they make [Page 113]those things equall, which be one in quantitie.

This definition hath nothing in it to be expounded: for, 2 that is done alreadie in the definition of quantitie. Cap. 22.

The greater is that, Ramus. the quantitie whereof doth exceede.

The termes of this definition, may be vnderstood by that which is past, in the last Chapter.

The proper markes of this Compa­rison, are such as these: 2

Not onely, but also. Rather this, then that: More then: Much more.

Examples of these Comparisons, are these which follow.

I am readie, not to be bound onely: but also, to dye for the name of the Lord Iesus. Act 21.13.

I had rather be a dore-keeper in Gods house, then dwell in the tents of wicked­nes. Psal. 84.10.

The Lord loueth the gates of Sion, more then all the dwellings of Iacob. Psal. 82.2.

If, when wee were enemies, wee were [Page 114]reconciled to God, by the death of his sonne: much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. Rom. 5.6.7.

In these examples, we haue these Comparisons. To be bound, and to dye, doe differ in the quantitie of bitter­nes, & this is esteemed to exceed that. To keepe a dore, and to dwell in the tents &c. are layd together, and this pre­ferred before that, in mans judge­ment, as exceeding in the quantitie of excellency. The gates of Sion, are com­pared with the other dwellings of Isra­ell, in the quantitie of glory, and loue­lines, and these preferred before that. The reconciling of an enemy, and the saving of a friend, are compared in the quantitie of difficultie, and that is jud­ged to excell this.

In these Comparisons, 3 the greater is brought to set out the lesser, to the end, that the lesse may set out and de­clare the subiect, or thing argued: and the holy Ghost himselfe hath shewed vs how to doe it, for in the last of the examples, he doth reason thus;

The reason of this consequence is this, viz. (In the judgement of man) the first is more difficult then the se­cond. It is a hard thing to reconcile an enemie; for, then the whole worke is to doe: But not so hard to saue a friend; for, such a one is next dore to salvation. In the same sort, David ar­gues: If I loue to dwell in Gods house, rather then in mans tents; then my af­fection is exceeding fervent thereto: for, mans tents (in the judgement of man) exceed Gods house for outward pleasure, and profit: and after this sort we may argue from the rest.

CHAP. XXIIII. Of the Lesse.

I Shall not need to explicate, and a­vow this definition: for, that is done enough alreadie, in the two for­mer Chapters: therefore, I proceed to set downe examples of it.

In these Instances, the Comparison we seeke for, is very apparent: A [Page 117]stone and a fooles wrath is Compared, in the quantitie of waight: and that is sayd to be lesse then this. Paul and o­thers are layd together in the quanti­tie of labour, and he exceeds them. The passing of a Camell through a nee­dles eye, and a rich mans going to hea­ven, are compared together in the quantitie of difficultie: and that is in­ferior to this. The Oxe, and Israell are set together, in the quantitie of igno­rance: and these are more blamed then they.

These Comparisons doe argue the greater, by the lesse, and they must be framed thus: A fooles wrath a­bounds in waight: for, the stones and sand are not so heavie as it. If Israell be ignorant of me, then their igno­rance is excessiue: for, the Oxe in his kinde is not so ignorant: because, he knowes who owes him, and feedes him, so doe not they. And thus much for Comparison in quantitie.

CHAP. XXV. Of Likenesse.

I Call a qualitie (sayth Aristotle, 1 Ca­tegor. Cap. 8.) that, of which, things are sayd to be of this or that manner: and a qualitie must be reckoned amongst them which are sayd to be manifold, or of many sorts.

Those are like (sayth Aristotle, 2 meta. lib. 5. cap. 15. text. 20.) whose qualitie is one. One in qualitie makes things to be like, so sayth Okam. 1. dist. 19. q. 1. lit. B. opinio 1. I will end with Gillius, A likenes (sayth he) is an agreement in qualitie. lib. 2. tract. 5. cap. 1. n ^o. 1.

From hence wee may conclude, that (in the judgement of Aristotle) those things be equall, which are one [Page 119]in quantitie: because, he makes them to be like, which be one in qualitie: and consequently, he placeth compa­rison in qualitie in the same thing that Okam doth, whose judgement is al­ledged. Chap. 22.

Aristotle doth explicate the nature of these Comparisons: 3 Top. lib. 1. cap. 17. Similitudes (sayth he) must be considered either in things which are of divers kindes; Or in those which are of the same kinde. The first is after this manner: as one thing is to one, so ano­ther is to another: as for example, as knowledge is to the thing knowne, so sense is to the thing sersible. Againe, as one is in one, so another is in another: as for example, as sight is in the eye, so the mind is in the soule: as, calmnes is in the Sea, so cleernes is in the ayre: and both of them are quietnesse. Wee haue ex­amples of the second kinde, when the same qualitie is in many: as smelling, seeing, &c. in a man, a horse, a dog: for, how farre forth the same thing is in them, so farre forth they are a­like.

I will content my selfe with the bare allegation of Aristotles words: 4 I shall not need to compare them with Ra­mus, nor seeke for their sence: be­cause, all that Ramus brings in this Comparison, is but an explication, and Comment of the words alledged: what Aristotle delivers in briefe, Ra­mus opens at large; therefore, I will set downe what he sayth.

I will shew examples of this Com­parison, 5 where the markes are obser­ved: as followeth,

As in this example,

Of this kinde are all metaphors, or borrowed words, they (I say) con­taine similitudes, as when Christ is called a rocke, a shepheard, a vine; and God the Father an husbandman. For in them, Christ, and God the Fa­ther, are likened vnto those things which be vsually signified in those words.

Foure termes 6 are then found in a full Comparison, when there be two in the Proposition, and two other in the Reddition. These examples will shew it.

The termes in the Proposition are Waxe, Fire: in the Reddition vngod­ly, Gods presence.

The terms in this full Comparison, are these foure: The Hart, River, Soule, God.

And this we finde in this example: ‘Husbands loue your wiues, even as Christ loved the Church. Ephes. 5.29.’

The terms in this Comparison are, 7 Christ, Church; Husbands, Wiues. The Reddition is set first, the Propo­sition last. If we place it orderly, this is the frame of it: As Christ loued the Church, so must men loue their wiues.

And this instance shewes it.

The Comparison lies thus; 8 as is a potsheard, and drosse couered with silver; so are burning lips, and a wic­ked [Page 123]ked heart: fayre without, and foule within. The foure terms are distinct: Drosse, Silver; burning lips, a wicked heart.

This example will make it fami­liar.

In this similitude, 9 there are but three terms: viz. Father, Christ, Disciples; Christ, the second terme, is referred to the third terme, Disciples; so the first terme Father, is referred to the second terme Christ.

The words of our Saviour will ma­nifest this sentence.

The three terms in this similitude are these, Lord, Servant, Fellow: 10 and [Page 124]it ought to haue this forme: As the Lord had pittie on thee: so thou shouldest haue had pittie on thy fel­low.

And so much we finde in Scrip­ture: 11 for, Christ spake much in para­bles, and all parables be similitudes ta­ken from fained things. I should now (according to my former course) ap­ply the examples vnto their severall rules; but I will spare that labour: for, the similitudes doe lye so plaine in them, that much labour will not make them plainer. I may not shew how these similitudes doe argue the subiect, and ingender truth: for, that is not their office, but Comparisons in qualitie, doe onely make our know­ledge more easie, and familiar.

This example will shew it.

In this sentence, destruction is attri­buted [Page 125]to wicked men: and thereby we vnderstand what condition befalls them. To make this knowledge more easie, and sensible, the holy Ghost doth compare them to the meling of Waxe, and thereby we finde, that, this condition befalls them secretly, cer­tainly, vnrecoverably: for, such is the qualitie of melting waxe, that cannot be discerned how it melteth, nor pre­vented from melting, nor recovered againe when it is melted.

Aristotle seems to differ from Ramus, 12 because he maketh similitudes vsefull to the framing of

• Reasons.
• Syllogismes.
• Definitions.

To the first, because by the induction of many particular likenesses, wee con­clude the vniversall. To the second, be­cause we take as confessed as it is in such and such, so it is in the thing in question. To the third, because in Similitudes, the termes are Compared together in one thing, that is, common vnto them: such a thing, is a Genus, and a Genus is re­quired to a definition. Top lib. 1. cap. 18.

I answer, I must not (now) decide this doubt, because the point it selfe doth not fit this place: for, the first branch speakes of things Compared. The third, of the qualitie wherein they are compared; and both of them be­long to the matter of a Comparison, not to the formall nature thereof. The second is a Comparison of equa­litie (if any at all) no Comparison of likenesse: and this I take as certaine, therefore here I will end Compari­sons of likenesse.

CHAP. XXVI. Of Vnlike.

WEe haue little to say touching this comparison: 1 for, the ex­plication of comparison in likenes, doth sufficiently set out, the nature of [Page 127]a comparison of vnlikenes. I will therefore adde examples of it, and that shall suffice; and in that also I will content my selfe with these which follow.

The fourth beast, was vnlike to all the beasts before it: Dan. 7.19.

There is one glory of the Sunne, ano­ther of the Moone, and another of the Starres, for one Starre differeth from another in glory: 1. Cor. 15.41.

There is none like mee in all the earth: Exod. 9.14.

But not as the offence, so is the gift: Rom. 5.15.

The Sunne doth set, and rise, Man dies, and liues no more.

The things compared, and the qualitie wherein they are vnlike: are so easie to bee found in these exam­ples, that, I should seeme to lose my labour, if I should attempt to shew them The last is the most difficult, because it wanteth the signes of this comparison, yet every man may see, that, the Sunne and Man, are com­pared together, in the qualitie of dy­ing: [Page 128]the Sunne dyes by setting, and re­vives by rising, man dyes, but revives no more.

The vse of these dissimilitudes, 2 is also found in this last instance, where every singular man is set out by his subiection to death; as a qualitie of his being: now, although this pre­dication be truly made in the iudge­ment of all men: (for none will deny that man is subiect to death) yet our knowledge hereof is furthered when the truth is vnfolded, and made more easie: for that end, these com­parisons of likenes, and vnlikenes are brought: we doe then more rea­dily conceiue what death is to man, when wee see it is vnlike the death of the sunne, that revives, so doth not man. This that I haue sayd (I hope) is sufficient to shew the nature, and vse of similitudes, and dissimilitudes: and therefore here I will end the mat­ter of comparatiue arguments; and all those which be predicated onely.

CHAP XXVII. Of the Genus and Species.

IN this place wee must set downe, 1 those arguments which bee some­times predicated, and sometimes sub­iected: for, that is the last thing con­tained in this part of Logick; as I haue shewed in the third Chapter forego­ing.

The arguments of this kinde, are called the second substance: consisting in the Genus and Species: as is also de­clared in the place alleadged. In the handling hereof, wee must first set downe their nature. Secondly, how they be predicated, and how subiec­ted. Thirdly, we must shew that they be a second substance.

The Genus is that whole, Ramus. that is es­sentiall to the parts.

And thus sayth Aristotle too. The Genus (sayth Porphyrie, Cap. 2.) [Page 130] Is a certaine whole: yea (as Okam sayth 1. dist. 8. q. 4. lit. D. & E.) The Genus importeth the whole thing: not, because it doth partake of all the spe­cificall differences: for then; one and the same thing should partake of con­traries; which may not be granted, in the iudgement of Aristotle. Meta. lib. 2. Cap. 12. text. 42. But because it is an essence common vnto many: as the same Aristotle teacheth; Top. lib. 1. Cap. 18. ad definitiones, Cap. 5. Pro­prium verò & Porphyrie, Cap. 2. Quod etiam. And a whole not designed as Thomas thinketh: 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad. 2 ^m.

Porphyrie, 2 and Aristotle doe speake to the same purpose; A Species (sayth Porphyrie) is placed vnder the Genus, as a thing that is essentiall thereto. cap. 2. Explicant igatur. And yet more plainly, in the same Chapter. Contine­tur igitur. The Species is both a whole, and a part: a part vnto another (that is) [Page 131] vnto the Genus, sayth Aristotle, meta. lib. 5. cap 24. text. 30. A whole not vnto another, but in others: because it is a whole in the parts.

Wee haue all this in Porphyrie, and thus he writeth in the second Chap­ter alledged. In every Category there be some things that be most generall, and others that are most speciall; and betweene these, there be some that are both generall, and speciall. That is most generall, vnto which there can be no su­perior Genus. That is most speciall, vn­to which there can be no other Species inferior. Betweene the most generall, [Page 132]and the most speciall; There be others, which the selfe same thing, is both Ge­nus and Species, being referred some while to one thing, and otherwhile to another: as for example; a Substance is a Genus, and vnder that, there is a bodie: and vnder a bodie, an animated bodie: and vnder an animated bodie, a living Creature: and vnder a living Creature, a rationall living Creature: vnder that a singular man. Of all these, a substance is most generall, because it is a Genus onely. A man is the most spe­ciall, because it is a Species onely: but a bodie, is a Species of substance, and a Genus vnto an animated body. An ani­mated body, is a Species of a body: A­gaine, a living Creature, is a Species vnto an animated body: and Genus vn­to a reasonable living Creature: but a reasonable liuing Creature, is the Ge­nus of a man. And so much for the na­ture of the Genus and Species.

Wee must now shew, 3 how the Genus, and Species, is subiected, and predicated: for, that is the second thing we vndertooke. Aristotle doth [Page 133]that, partly in the fourth booke of his Topickes, the first and second Chap­ters: and partly, but more fully, in the fifth Chapter of his Categories, where he proceedeth thus: The Genus is at­tributed vnto all, and every the Species, that are contained vnder the same. The Species is subiected to the Genus, the Genus is predicated both of the Spe­cies, and the individuall: the Species is predicated of the individuall. Thus farre Aristotle. Wee may make this familiar to our vnderstanding, by these examples:

In the first, living Creature is a Ge­nus, viz. of reasonable, and vnreaso­nable Creatures. A man, is a species: because it is one kinde of living Crea­ture. Living Creature, is attributed to man: the Genus to the Species. In the second, Peter is an individuall: Man is a species, and thereby we see that the species is predicated of the in­dividuall; [Page 132] [...] [Page 133] [...] [Page 134]and consequently, the Ge­nus is predicated of the individuall al­so: for, the Genus hath no being but in some species, as Thomas hath truly ob­served. 1. p. q. 15. art. 3. ad 4 ^m. And the things themselues do say no lesse. If a man, then a living Creature: see­ing every man is a living Creature. By this (I hope) it is plaine, that the species is subiected, and both species, and Genus are predicated.

Some man may doubt, 4 whether the Genus be not alwayes predicated, and consequently belongs to those ar­guments, that are alwayes predicated. I answer, the Genus (as it is a Genus) is alwayes predicated, and so must be, vnlesse we will divert nature: but that Genus that is sometimes a species, is subiected: and may be so, when it is a species, and that is enough to bring the Genus vnto this place; for, it makes it sometime predicated, some­time subiected. This example will shew that I answer truly.

A living Creature, is a Genus of a man: but a species of a living bodie, and it is subiected in the fore sayd pro­position. A living body, is a Genus to a living Creature: for, vnder that is comprehended, the growing plants, that increase: but cannot moue them­selues: as a living Creature that can both waxe bigger, and moue them­selues also: now, this Genus is predi­cated of a living Creature: therefore, wee may rest assured, that a Genus is sometimes predicated, and other some time subiected.

The third thing that we seeke for is, 5 whether the Genus, and Species be a second substance. Aristotle Categor. cap. 5. proues that they are: on this manner: They are a substance, because 1. We may truely say they be something. 2. They appertaine to the essence of eve­ry particular being. 3. They are subiec­ted vnto others, and others are predica­ted of them which is proper vnto a sub­sta [...]e. They are a second substance: because. 1. They are Communicated to many. 2. They are predicated sometimes, [Page 136]and consequently, they haue not the pro­per nature of a substance: for, that is al­wayes subiected, in so much, as nothing could exist, but by reason of substance properly so called.

The species comes neerer to a first substance then the Genus: 6 because, 1. The species is in nature, and predi­cation neerer to the individuall, then the Genus; as a man is neerer vnto Peter, then a living Creature. 2. The Genus, is Communicated to more then the species. 3. The species, as it is a species, is subiected alwaies to the Genus: and it selfe never predicated; but of the individuall. These things are evident in themselues: therefore, I need not adde any proofes to con­firme them, they are easie, and open to our vnderstanding: therefore, I will not stand to vnfold them. If any require me to shew, how the Genus, and species doe argue, and set out the first substance. I answer, that, that re­quest is not in vaine: because (as A­ristotle truely sayth, in the fift Chap­ter of his Categories.) All other things [Page 137]are predicated of the first substance: therefore, if the first substance were not, none of the rest could be. Yet notwith­standing, this place doth not require me to shew it: because the instances given alreadie, haue done that in part, and the precepts of a definition will shew it yet more, but they belong to the second part of Logicke, and may not be brought hither, without in [...]u­rie to nature, and our vnderstanding.

I will satisfie the demand so farre as this place permits, and this one sen­tence will doe it.

Peter is a man.

Here, man is a species, 7 because it is but one kinde of thing, comprehen­ded vnder the name of living Crea­ture. The lowest species, because no Creatures that haue different formall beings, are contained vnder it. Peter, signifies a first substance, because it im­porteth a thing that cannot be divi­ded, otherwise then into matter, and forme; viz. his soule and body: and they be in Peter, as in a whole, not as in a subiect; as we learne by Aristotle, [Page 138]Categor. cap. 5. Porròue nos &c. Man is attributed vnto this first substance, and thereby every superiour Genus is attributed to it also: for, if a man then 1. a living Creature. 2. A liuely body. 3. A body. 4. A substance, and consequently, when wee attribute man vnto Peter, that goes not alone, all the rest goe with it

I haue now (I hope) satisfied the demand, 8 and shewed the force that these arguments haue to argue the first substance; and therefore, I am come to an end, of all that belongs vn­to those arguments, which be some­times predicated, and sometimes sub­rected: and therewithall, I haue fini­shed all that belongs, to the first part of Logicke, in the judgement of Ari­stotle, and the nature of the things themselues. Ramus doth extend this first part of Logicke further then thus: but vndoubtedly, he followes his own apprehension, against the authoritie of all Logicke Schooles before him: and the nature of the things them­selues. In the next Chapter, I will set [Page 139]downe, what he sayth, and why I dis­sent from him, and thereby giue a full Conclusion to this part of Logicke.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of Coniugates, &c.

THis precept, 1 sets out foure other seats of arguments, more then Aristotle hath, and giueth them place in the first part of Logicke. They be­long to Logicke, and so farre this pre­cept is true; but not to this place, and so faire it is false. I say, not to this place; for, even in the judgement of [Page 140] Ramus himselfe, they belong to other seats of arguments, namely, to them that he calls by the name of privatiue Arguments; for, (according to him) they haue the same force to argue that the primitiues haue, from which they are derived; therefore, they are the same with them, seeing the nature of every argument ariseth from its force to argue: but the precepts of them are alreadie dispatched, and ought not to be repeated againe.

If any say, 2 the force that these haue to argue ariseth not first, and origi­nally out of themselues: but by re­flection, (as the Moone is conceived to haue her light) and that therefore they ought to haue their owne pro­per seates in this Art. I answere first, they doe not argue by reflection, or any force received from others, as the particulars will shew. Secondly, although they did so, yet can they challenge no new places: for, if wee should multiplie the seates of argu­ments, according to the varietie that our vnderstanding doth apprehend [Page 141]to be in them, then wee must haue an endles (at least) a fruitles number: seeing it is in vaine to set ten men to doe the labour of one.

The foresayd seates of arguments, 3 belong not to this place (in the iudg­ment of Aristotle) therefore common vse hath not given it them, and con­sequently, they ought not to haue it; because Art is approved by vse: and so much for them all ioyntly.

Aristotle doth giue the name of Coniugates vnto some arguments; 4 namely, vnto all those that are of the same roote, Case, Conivgation, or ranke: as, Iustice, Iust, Iustly, Strength, Strong, Strongly, Top. lib. 2. cap. 9. therefore, there is no difference touching the name. In their nature they are no more, but either formall qualities, accidents, or properties.

Iustice in the abstract, is nothing; if we referre it to man, it is an accident: [Page 142]because he may haue it, and be with­out it, or a formall qualitie, being de­nominated, and constituted iust by it. Iustly, importeth an action done ac­cording to law; and therefore, what Iustice is to man, that Iustly is to an action: Conformitie to Law may be, and not be in an action, and being there it doth denominate, and consti­tute the action iust. Aristotle (in the place last alledged) calls them Coniu­gates: because when one of them is proo­ved good, and landable, all the rest are so too: therefore, he never meant to make them a seat of argumets distinct from his ten.

Aristotle doth acknowledge, 5 that some words doe interpret the nature of things, and denominate the things them­selues: for, thus he writeth; Those are called denominates, which haue the ap­pellation of a name from some other: but so, as, they differ in case, as from Grammar, man is called a Grammari­an: from strength he is called Strong. [Page 143]Categor. Cap. 1. These are the same arguments with the former; for Grammarian, imports the skill of Grammar, and is an accident, because it may be, and not be in man: It is a formall qualitie, seeing it doth consti­tute, and denominate a man a Gram­marian: Grammar is an abstract, and signifies nothing Logically; being no more but a comprehension of pre­cepts. If we referre it to man, it is the same with Grammarian: namely, the same precepts literally, and habitu­ally.

When we say, a man hath two parts, 6 soule and bodie: Living Creatures are reasonable, and vnreasonable, then we make a distribution: and A­ristotle doth acknowledge these distri­butions. Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1. but in a different sence.

Although it is very probable, that a distribution doth formally consist in an axiome, and therefore it belongs to the second part of Logicke: yet I will not now insist thereupon: be­cause the arguments predicated in a distribution, are meerely the Causes themselues; and we cannot finde a compounded effect more cleerely re­solved into its Causes, then in a distri­bution. In the first example of distri­bution before going, we find the mat­ter informed, arguing the whole ef­fect constituted by that matter In the second, we haue the specificall forme, informing each severall kinde, and ar­guing that whole effect, which com­prehendeth both kindes. The Reader shall finde this answer fully explica­ted, and proved, Chap. 38. &c. in the matter of a distribution.

7 Aristotle doth acknowledge a divi­sion belongs to Logicke: Prior. cap. 31. but he makes it a Syllogisme; because [...]omething is alway concluded therfrom: though a weake one; because it pre­ [...]umes what it ought to proue. He doth [Page 145]acknowledge induction also. Top. lib. 8. cap. 2. lib. 1. cap. 12. Prior lib. 2. cap. 23. and by an induction hee vn­derstands, a collection of all the singu­lars, to make the totall: therefore he doth acknowledge it in the present sence: but (according to him) it is one species, kinde, or forme of dispu­ting, little differing from a Syllogisme: for thus he sayth of it: A Syllogisme, is for Logicians, an Induction for the multitude: Top. lib. 8. cap. 2. Second­ly, It is an instrument more apt to per­swade, more open, better knowne to sence: and is common amongst the mul­titude: but a Syllogisme hath greater force to vrge, and is more effectuall against them that are apt to gaine say: Top. lib. 1. cap. 12.

Therefore (according to him) division, and induction belong to the second part of Logicke; not to the first: and consequently, a distributi­on must be referred thither also: for both division and induction are comprehended, or implyed, in a distri­bution, according to Ramus.

A definition is, Ramus. when wee declare what a thing is.

Therefore a perfect definition, is no­thing else, but a generall marke, or badge of the causes, which make the es­sence, or nature of the thing.

I haue a little to say touching this fourth seate; 8 for, I haue done enough in the last, to satisfie this: for, what appertaines to that, may be applyed to this. Aristotle doth acknowledge definitions, and that in the present sence too: but giues them a place in the second part, as wee shall see, cap. 35. &c. The arguments dispo­sed in a definition, belong to the first part of Logicke: because as Thomas sayth 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad. 2 ^m. a definition, according to the intent thereof. doth l [...]a [...] to the knowledge of the thing definea: and this is the case with all axiomes whatsoeuer. The predicate in a definition belongs to the seat of causes, even in the iudge­ment of Ramus himselfe? for the pre­dicate doth set out what the subiect, [Page 147]or thing defined is, and nothing can doe that, but the causes: therefore a definition deserues no other place in Logicke, but the seat of the causes.

Vpon these premises, we may wel conclude; these foure seats of argu­ments in question are superfluous; because Art hath given them place alreadie in the precepts fore going, therefore wee must not seeke it here. The second part of Logicke comes in the next ranke:

CHAP. XXIX. Of disposition, or iudgment.

Either to wee haue handled the first part of Logicke; called Invention. Ramus. Wee come now to the second, ter­med Iudgement: Iudgement is a part of Logicke, teaching the maner of disposing arguments, that we may iudge well: for every thing is to be iudged according to certaine rules of disposition. Hence this part of Lo­gicke, is called, both Iudgement, and disposition: the same thing being sig­nified by both termes.

THE substance of all this matter, 1 is already set down in the second chapter, and repeated heere, for the benefit of the Reader. There is no great diffi­cultie in the parts, nor difference in the whole, from Aristotle: I haue shewed the consent of both Authors in the place aleadged, and I will now giue my opinion of the sence, of eve­ry thing that seemes not cleere e­nough.

[Iudgement Disposition] These words are vsed for the same thing, 2 and that fitly; for they are the same thing variously considered, the se­cond intends the first, and the first proceeds from the second. The se­cond is the fountaine: the first is the streame: and they make one con­tinued thing. The first is the su­preame, the second the subordinate end, and meanes vnto the supreame, in that respect they vary; and not o­therwise.

[Apart] Logicke hath parts, even by it selfe: for the precepts thereof are of distinct natures, as members in the whole, and therefore we must so conceive of them. The precepts that are contained vnder this name, make a second part: for, the disposing of things doth suppose, that, the things themselues haue a being already.

[Disposing] These words, and the rest that follow, doe containe the whole shot, or generall summe that ariseth from all the precepts, belong­ing to this part of Logicke: and it sig­nifieth, a ioyning together of distinct things in an orderly frame.

[Arguments] viz. Those single, or incomplexed termes whereof wee spake in the former part.

[Iudge] Iudgement, is an act of the vnderstanding, whereby we de­termine in our selues, that this or that is true, or false. This word sets out the end of those precepts which be­long to this part of Logicke; name­ly, the thing they are fit for; and the profit we receiue by them.

[Well] That is, not doubtfully: but even as the things are in them­selues: and this is the perfection of Iudgement.

This first and vniversall precept, may fitly be expressed in these terms.

• 1. Some precepts of Logicke, doe teach vs to dispose argu­ments fitly, that thereby wee might iudge of truth, and fal­shood cleerely, and certainely.
• 2. These precepts make vp a se­cond part of Logicke.

Now wee vnderstand the grosse summe, wee shall the better know the particulars.

CHAP. XXX. Of the Division of Disposition.

IN this Chapter wee must divide a sunder, what we found together in the former; and so proceede, till we haue veiwed every severall pre­cept.

Iudgement is

• Axiomaticall.
  Ramus.
• Dianoeticall.

By this sentence the precepts be­longing to this part, 1 are devided into their severall kindes: and it is as much as to say: These precepts teach vs to frame arguments in an Axiom, & in a discourse, that thereby wee may iudge of truth, and falshood contay­ned in them both. These (I say) are severall kindes, because they be di­stinct manners of disposing. The first branch supposeth, that some speech may be called an Axiome, and that is true. In this place, the word Axiome signifieth no more, but a declaratiue, or pronouncing sentence. This kinde of speech deserues that name, because it is (in the nature therof) more excel­lent then any other speech of Man. An Axiome is thus defined.

An Enunciatiue speech, is that, Ramus. that containeth truth or falshood.

Wee haue this precept from Ari­stotle, 2 de interpre. cap. 4. He assignes it the first place, and well worthy; for truth and falshood is the first obiect of our iudgement, and belongs to all Axiomes whatsoever, and nothing but an Axiome containes truth and falshood.

[Speech] This word containes the essence or nature belonging to all Axiomes, and other speeches which are not Axiomes. In this place it sig­nifies, the inward sentence of the minde, and the written sentence, as well as the sentence pronounced in words.

[Enunciatiue.] This word, impor­teth a species, or one kinde of speech: & restraines that word which is com­mon to many, vnto that one kinde which belongs to this place. Enuncia­ting, or Pronouncing implyeth, that speech is the Herald, and proclaimer of mans minde, and so it is indeede, by institution, not of it selfe. The signi­fication of words, followes the intent of the speaker, and not otherwise: so saith [Page 155] Aristotle in the fourth Chapter alled­ged.

[Truth and falshood] These words, containe the proper, and formall be­ing of every Axiome in common. Ramus makes truth and falshood a pro­pertie belonging to every ax [...]ome: but Aristotle doth more, he placeth the primary nature of an axiome therein; and so he may well doe; for thereby all axiomes are made to differ from all other kindes of speech: If there be any other thing, that giues being to an axiome, from whence this pro­pertie doth flow: either wee are not able to apprehend it, or want words to expresse it. I say, truth, or falshood doth make axiomes to differ from all other kindes of speech: for single termes, as Man, Peter, to run, to sit, &c. and all commanding, and intrea­ting speeches, containe neither truth, nor falshood: as Aristotle hath well obserued, De interpre. Cap. 2.3.4.

Truth (in the iudgement of all Philosophers) signifies, the adequa­tion of the thing, and our vnderstan­ding. [Page 156]Wherefore truth, is radically in the thing, and formally in the vn­derstanding, and declaratiuely in a proposition. Wee must conceiue of falshood according herevnto.

Aristoile sayth thus too; 3 Speeches are then true, when they pronounce as a thing is in it selfe: De interpre. Cap. 9. Quare cum orationes & meta lib. 4. cap. 7. text 27. Cum enim convenit, &c. Thus Tho. 1. p. q. 21. art. 2. in cor. 1. dist. 46. q. 1. art. 2. ad 1 ^m. And so all Philosophers speake; I will giue you the words of Albertinus (a lear­ned Schooleman) in stead of them all. That proposition (sayth he) is true, which is conformable to the thing pro­nounced of, and false if it be inconforma­ble. fol. 265. col. 1.

A true axiome is Ramus.

• Contingent.
• Necessary.

Aristotle speakes wholly after this sort; 4 Euery proposition (sayth he) doth signifie something to be, either necessari­ly, or contingently. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. And further, he sayth Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 33. That is necessary, that cannot be otherwise. Some things are true, and are, but may be otherwise. Opinion is concerning that, that is true, or false, but may be otherwise.

For the full explication of this point, we must first vnderstād, that axiomes are necessary, and contingent, by rea­son that the things whereof they pro­nounce are necessary, and contingent. Now, that is sayd to be necessary, that is so, and cannot be otherwise. This is simply, and after a sort. Simply, when the being of a thing is of, and by it selfe, and the causes thereof, so necessary, that [Page 158]the thing that is, hath its being wholy without relation to any other thing with­out it selfe. A thing is necessary by sup­position, and after a sort, when it is by force of another, the first, is called ne­cessary, simply, and properly: because it is wholy impossible it should be other­wise then it is, thus farre Aristotle me­ta. lib. 5. cap. 8. In the first sence, all Axiomes that pronounce of God, are necessary, either in their truth, or fal­shood. In the second sence, some propositions that pronounce of the creature be necessary, and some con­tingent in their truth, and falshood. I will shew you how or when.

Created effects, 5 (vpon supposi­tion) are

• Neces­sary
  • 1. In their present being.
  • 2. When the next cause is determined to one
    • Naturally,
    • Efficiently
• Contingent, when the next cause
  • 1. Is indeterminate vnto doing,
  • 2. Wants power for doing.

And a proposition, when it pro­nounceth of created effects, is true, or falseaccording hereunto; as wee shall more plainely see when wee come to shew the severall natures of Axiomes:

Every thing (sayth Aristotle) is necessarie when it is, and every thing necessarily is not, when it is not: but this necessitie, to not a necessitie simply. de interpre. cap. 9. Ergo. Quod.

I shall shew the truth, and vse of these precepts when I come to the speciall kinde of Axiomes in the next Chapter: therefore I forbeare it in this place, least I should hale in some­thing before the time, or repeat what I haue sayd sufficiently already: there­fore here I will end those things which belong to all Axiomes in common.

CHAP. XXXI. Of a simple Axiome.

1 ARistotle speakes wholly after this sort: An enuntiatiue speech is ei­ther simple, or compounded of those that be simple. A simple Enunciation, is a voyce that signifieth that something is, or is not, according to the diversitie of times: and he calleth these Axiomes one speech, because one thing onely is predicated of another. de interpre. Cap. 5. & 10.

Now wee haue the definition of a simple axiome, wee must vnfold it: It containeth three things. 1. The termes of it. 2. The extention of one terme to another. 3. The framing of [Page 161]those termes together. I call that a terme (sayth Aristotle) Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. into which the proposition is re­solved, and they be three: viz. The pre­dicate, The subiect predicated of, and the Verbe that comes betweene them: now the Verb of it selfe signifies nothing: but serveth to compound those things that cannot be vnderstood, till they be compounded: and therefore it is a per­petuall signe of things predicated, and subiected. Thus Aristotle hath taught vs De interpre. Cap. 3. The Verbe (in the cōmon language of the Schooles) is called the band, or couple: and that terme agrees well with this doctrine of Aristotle: for a band doth compose diuers things together. Ramus doth call the subiect, and the predicate, by the name of antecedent, & consequent: but very vnduely: for, the predicate doth not follow vpon the subiect; neither in the thing, nor in our ap­prehension. Those termes belong to some compound axiomes, as I shall shew in due place.

For further illustration, it is need­full for vs to know: that,

Identicall predication, is that which nature sayes must be: Direct is that which according to rature may be Con­trary to nature, is when the subiect, and predicate are incompatible: when they abhorre one another (as we say.) Besides nature, when the predicate is vndecent for the subiect: or the subiect vndecent for the predicate. Thus the Iesuites haue taught vs in their Pre­face to Porphyrie. q. 1. art. 4. and that to very good purpose. Now predi­cation, is taken in this place for natu­rall predication, not for that which is against nature: for predication against nature is a defection, no perfection in art: and consequently, when we meet with it in any discourse, we must re­ject it, or reforme it by art.

By verbe, 3 is meant a voyce or name that signifies a time, either present, past, or to come: whose office it is to compound the predicate, and subiect: or to seuere them, each from other. And this is so necessary, that no speech can be enuncia­tiue till that be added: as Aristotle hath duly remembred: Interpre. Cap. 3. & 5.

4 We may make try all of these pre­cepts in this example:

CHAP. XXXII. Of the severall kindes of simple Axiomes.

1 ALl these precepts agree well with Aristotle: for he teacheth vs on this manner. A proposition is ei­ther vniversall, or particular, and in part. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1.2. interpre. Cap. 7. Top. lib. 2. Cap. 1. lib. 3. cap. 6. An vniversall is that, where the pre­dicate is referred vnto all the subiect. A particular, is that wherein the predi­cate is referred vnto some part, not vn­to all that is contained in the subsect. Thus sayth he Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 1. but more plainely at the end of that Chapter. Then (sayth he) the Predi­cate is referred vnto all, or the whole subiect, when as there is nothing in the subiect, vnto which the predicate is not [Page 166]referred. The same thing is taught by Atiaro. 1. sent. q. 5. lit. B. Wee doe then affir me vmversally, when there is nothing contained vnder the subiect, of which the predicate is not affirmed. That is an vniversall negation, when as there is nothing comprehended vnder the subiect, from whence the predicate is not remoued.

2 [Common] This word doth sup­pose, that, predicated and subiected arguments import things vniver sall, and singular, and in that it doth well. Aristotle hath the same thing, and that very plainely opened, de interpre. Cap. 7. These are his words, Some things are vniversall, other some singu­lar. I call that vniversall which of the nature thereof is apt to be attributed to many: that is singular which is not so.

3 [Generally] A thing is predicated generally, when the totall being there­of is referred vnto all, or the whole subiect; Thus no common predicate can truly be attributed vnto the sub­iect. Wee cannot truly say all men is all living Creatures, as Aristotle hath [Page 167]well observed. De interpre. Cap. 7. A common thing is predicated of the subiect generally, when it is referred to all, or the whole subiect, so farre as the subiect can receiue it, and thus a common thing may truly be predica­ted of the subiect. Now in this case the axiome is generall, when the sub­iect importeth a thing common. It is singular, when the subiect importeth a thing singular, or particular; there­fore in this sense, the definitions of a generall, and speciall Axiome are cer­tainely true, and taught by Aliaco. 1. sent. q. 5. lit. M. in these words: When the subiect is sufficiently distribu­ted by this word All, or some other that is equall thereto: then that proposition is sufficiently vniversall. A proposition is then sufficiently singular, when the subiect is a terme truly singular. I call that a singular terme (in proper speech) which cannot be affirmed of subiect; importing reall distinct things.

That we may fully vnderstand the nature of predications, 4 we must ob­ferue (with Aristotle de interpre. cap. 7 [Page 168] & 10.) That, this word All when we find it in a proposition, it doth not signifie the vniversall predication it selfe: but is onely a note of predication: And fur­ther, these words All, or None, doe sig­nifie no more, but an affirmation, and negation vniversally made. According­ly herevnto, Thomas sayth, The predi­cation it selfe is no more, but an abso­lute referring of a thing signified, vnto the subiect: as when we referre white­nesse to a man This word All, or None, doth but goe with the predication, and importeth an order of the predicate vn­to the subiect. 1. p. q. 31. art. 3. in cor. In the like manner, he sayth; This word some, that makes a proposition to be particular, doth designe an vniver­sall, or common terme indeterminately; from whence it doth not determine the same, vnto this or that singular thing. Opusc. 48. De interpre. Cap. 8. By this (I hope) the nature of every predi­cation is sufficiently cleered, and made easie to our vnderstanding.

It may be doubted, 5 whether Ramus and Aristotle doe agree in these pre­cepts, [Page 169]and that for three reasons. 1. Aristotle makes some propositions indefinite. 2. He makes no proposi­tion proper. 3. He doth not require any common terme vnto an vni­versall predication. I answere, not­withstanding all this, yet they doe a­gree. And I doe so answer, because the opening of these three things, doth giue evident light vnto the na­ture of predications: a thing worthy our knowledge, for predication is the very Center, and life of Logicke: all that goes before, descends hither, and all that followes, flowes from hence.

To the first, 6 Arristotle doth not conceiue that an indefinite propositi­on, doth really differ from an vniver­sall, and particular. I shew it two wayes, first, He names it but once in all his writings (so faire as I can find.) Secondly, Hee makes a proper pro­position to be indefinite, onely, be­cause it wants the signes of vniversall, and particular predication. Prior lib. 1. Cap. 1. now the want of them doth [Page 170]not make a reall difference, as wee haue already heard by his owne words: againe, they may well be re­ferred vnto vniversall, or particular: because the extension of predication, followes the intent of predicating: and it is not hard to shew, where himselfe makes a proposition to be generall, that wanteth the terms of all, & none.

To the second, 7 It is true, he makes no proposition to be proper (in ex­presse words) yet hee doth it in the thing: for, that proposition is contai­ned vnder those, which he cals parti­cular, for a particular proposition (formally) hath an vnlimmited sub­iect: but vertually it hath a singular thing for the subiect: when we say, some man is learned, wee assigne no man of certaintie, vntill we descend to a particular, as Plato, or Aristotle &ce. and this is a proper proposition according to Ramus: moreover, if he meant not to comprehend a proper proposition, vnder his particular pro­position, then hee hath omitted one precept, essentiall to this Art: I say the [Page 171]doctrine of a proper proposition is essentiall to this Art: and I avow it e­ven by the iudgement of Aristotle himselfe: for he doth vse them often, and must vse them oftner then any other: for, hee makes an individuall thing, a subiect that receiues all other arguments whatsoever; without which they cannot haue being, nor we any certaine knowledge: but we may not thinke, that he hath omitted it: for that is to charge him vndecent­ly: (seeing he hath deserved so well) and against reason: because of the al­legations alreadie made: to conclude, he doth giue instance of a contradic­tion in singular, or proper Axiomes de interpre. cap. 10.

To the third, 8 Aristotle doth re­quire a common thing in vniversall predications, and a singular in singu­lar predications, and thinkes it must be so: because the common, and sin­gular nature of things, is the very first ground, and originall reason from whence predications must be vniver­sall, and singular: as wee finde by his [Page 172]owne words: de interpre. cap. 7. Here I will put an end to the second thing contained in the definition of a sim­ple Axiome. Cap. 31.

CHAP. XXXIII. Of an affirmed Axiome.

IN this Chapter wee must discusse the maner how arguments are fra­med in a simple Axiome: 1 and then wee shall haue dispatched all that is contained in the foresayd definition. Now, that point is resolved in these words

An Axiome is

• Affirmed.
  Ramus.
• Denyed.

Affirmed when the band of it is af­firmed Denyed when it is denyed.

2 Aristotle teacheth the same thing [Page 173](for substance) de interpre cap. 5. & 6. Prior lib 1. cap. 2. An Enunciatiue speech, is either affirmation, or negation. It affirmes when the predicate is affir­med of, or ioyned vnto the subiect. It denyeth, when the predicate is denyed of, or removed from the subiect. Wee haue the same thing in Aliaco. 1. sent. q. 5. lit. BB. Every affirmation, and negation, consisteth of a Noune, and a Verbe: without a verbe there is no af­firmation, nor negation: and this I say: because the verbe [is] is referred vnto the subiect, as in this example, Socra­tes is lust. Socrates is not Iust. Here, the word is, and is not, is referred in the one, to him that is Iust: in the other to him that is not Iust. Thus farre A­ristotle de interpre. cap. 10. Omnis af­firmatio &c.—Hoc dico &c.

Ramus applyes this precept to all Axiomes whatsoever. 3 Aristotle makes affirmation, and negation proper to simple Axiomes: both say true, in the sense they intended, and both those sences doe agree well enough toge­ther: but Aristotles iudgement is [Page 174]more accurate, and Logicall, as wee shall see when wee come to com­pound Axiomes: therefore, for this time we will proceede.

[From hence] These words, 4 doe referre vs to the ground or reason from whence propositions are con­tradictory: namely, from their vni­versall, and particular affirmation, and negation. Of them I say, if Ramus meant to referre vs to the next, and formall reason of contradiction; then this reference is true: but if they re­ferre vs to the first, and originall ground of contradiction, then it is not true. Aristotle de interpre. cap. 6. doth referre vs to the things themselues which are subiected, and predicated, as to the first fountaine, and originall of contradiction, in propositions: Be­cause (saith he) A thing that is, is pronounced not to be, and that which is not, as if it were, so also, something is [Page 175]affirmed to be after this, or that man­ner: and is not after that manner. At other times, some things are pronounced to be present, which are not present: therefore some thing that is affirmed, is denyed, and some thing that is denyed is affirmed, and thereby affirmation is opposed to negation, and negation to af­firmation: which opposition makes con­tradiction. Thus farre he. If wee take both these Authors together, we shall see the whole reason of Contradicti­on.

Wee haue this sentence in Aliaco. 5 1. sent. q. 5. lit. M. A Contradiction (sayth he) is an affirmation of one thing, and the negation of the same: and this is as well of propositions, as of single termes. Aristotle doth fully a­gree with them both, When (sayth he) the affirmation of one thing, and the ne­gation of the same, are opposed, then there is a Contradiction. De interpre. Cap. 6. Atque hoc esto, &c. Now we [Page 176]see what a Contradiction is, we must inquire further after the manner how one, and the same proposition is af­firmed and denyed.

Aristotle teacheth the same things, 6 but in different words. Propositions (according to him) are opposed as con­traries, or contradictories. When a gene­rall affirmatiue, is opposed by a generall negatiue, then they are opposed as con­traries: but when the same predicate, is vniversally affirmed, in the one: and not vniversally, in the other, of the same subiect; then they are opposed as con­tradictories: [Page 177]de interpre. Cap. 7. A sin­gular proposition is contradicted by a singular: as, Socrates is wise. Socrates is not wise, cap. 10. Perspicuum autem est.

Aristotle hath the same precept, word for word; in the places last al­ledged.

These examples following, will set out the precepts of an Axiome, contained in this, and the former Chapter.

• 1. All men are learned.
• 2. No man is learned.
• 3. Some man is not learned.
• 4. Some man is learned.
• 5. Socrates is learned.
• 6. Socrates is not learned.

The first, is an vniversall affirmatiue. The third, is a particular negatiue; and the one doth contradict the o­ther. The second, is an vniversall ne­gatiue. [Page 178]The fourth, a particular af­firmatiue: and they are opposed as Contradictories. The fift, is an affir­matiue proper. The sixt, is a negatiue proper; therefore, they also are Con­tradictories. The first, and second are opposed as Contraries. Ramus calls their opposition, a generall Contra­diction.

Now I haue finished all that is con­tained in the definition of a simple Axiome, touching the disposing of Arguments. In the next place wee must see, how truth is contained in an Axiome.

CHAP. XXXIIII. Of simple Axiomes necessarily true in common.

IN the 30. 1 Chapter before going, all Axiomes are sayd to containe necessary, or contingent truth, or falshood: and thereby is implyed, that [Page 179]truth is contained in them variously, even according vnto the different kinde of Axiomes In the 31. Chap­ter, we haue divided Axiomes into simple and compound: therefore, we must (now) set downe, after what manner truth is in simple Axiomes; and thereby finish the precepts tou­ching simple Axiomes. I thinke it sufficient to shew how, and in what case, a simple Axiome is necessarily true: for, thereby we shall know, how they containe a contingent truth: and when wee see how they containe truth, we shall be able to judge how they containe falshood.

In a necessary Axiome the Cōsequent is attributed to the Antece­dent.

• 1. To all of it, Ramus. and al­wayes.
• 2. By it selfe, and es­sentially.
• 3. Not only to all, al­wates, & essētially But al [...]o first, of the whole, and en­terchangably.

2 We finde this precept taken out of Aristotle, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 4. In which place he sayth thus.

In a necessary Axiome, the predicate is attributed to the subiect.

• 1. To all, that is
  • To all of it, not to some onely.
  • At all times, not at some onely.
• 2. By it selfe, that is,
  • 1. As essential ther­to.
  • 2. the predicate is in the subiect, et contra
  • 3. It is not sayd of a­ny other.
  • 4. Even for it selfe, not by accident.
• 3. Ʋniversal­ly, that is
  • Of all by it selfe, & as it is in it selfe.
  • It doth de­monstrate the subiect
    • first.
    • In e­very part.

Now, 3 we haue the nature of a neces­sary simple Axiome fully layd out, wee should vnfold such termes as seeme doubtfull: but wee cannot doe [Page 181]that in this place: for, here we speake of them, in an vniversall notion, ab­stracted from all speciall kindes of simple Axiomes. Wee shall come to them in the sixe next Chapters; and then, we shall see the meaning, and vse of this generall precept.

CHAP. XXXV. Of simple Axiomes, necessarily true in speciall.

I Doe not finde this precept, either in Ramus, or Aristotle expresly, yet I bring it by the authority of them both. According to Ramus, every precept of Art, is a necessary axiome: but (according to him also) a Defini­tion, and Distribution, are precepts of art; therefore, he must confesse [Page 182]they bee necessary Axiomes. The principles, and foundation of a de­monstration, are necessary axiomes: in the iudgement of Aristotle. Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 2. But a Definition is a principle, and foundation of a De­monstration, even in the sentence of the same Aristotle, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 33. lib. 2. cap. 3. Therefore, according to him, every Definition is a necessa­ry Axiome. Wee may argue the like from his authority, for a Distribution: for he inioynes him that makes a De­finition, to distribute the thing defi­ned into parts. Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1. and in framing his art of Logicke, he makes Distributions to be precepts, no lesse then Definitions. Lastly, though I had not their authoritie to a­vow this precept, yet I might bring it: because a Definition, and a Distri­bution haue the nature of a necessary Axiome, as we shall see when we ex­amine them.

CHAP. XXXVI. Of a Definition.

IN this Chapter, we must see what a Definition is.

THis precept is avowed by Aristo­tle. 1 He makes a Definition to be double, in the thing, though not in words. He sets out the nature of a de­finition, as Ramus doth. A definition (sayth he) is a sentence that signifies [Page 184]what the thing is. Top. lib. 1. Cap. 5. A notification of the essence, and doth explicate what a thing is. Poster. lib. 2. Cap. 3.

A Definition thus set out, must needs be a perfect one. In the first booke of his Topickes, and 4. Chapter, he hath these words; There is some­thing that is proper, that signifies what a thing is: and some other, that doth not so signifie. The first is called a definition, the other is commonly called a thing proper: when it is attributed to the same subiect with the other. Now, in this latter place he speakes of a Definition that differs from the former. I say it differs. 1. In the name, he sayth, this name is but commonly given, he sayes not so of the former. 2. In this defini­tion, the nature of the thing defined is set out, and more too: it is explica­ted by properties, that doe not de­clare the essence: and therefore, in all these places together, he makes one kinde of definition, that sets out the nature of the thing onely; and an­other that doth so, and more too: [Page 185]and consequently (according to him) a definition is perfect, and imperfect: and that in the sence and meaning of Ramus. Thomas teacheth the same thing expresly: A definition (sayth he) is either perfect, or imperfect, that com­prehends the totall being of the thing, as it is constituted by all the causes. This expresseth some of these, and di­vers conditions also: and is called a de­scription. 2. dist. 27 q. 1. art. 2. ad 9 ^m. In this place we speake of a perfect de­finition; and therefore vnto Thomas, I will ioyne. Aliaco: in him I finde chese words; A good description may be conuerted with the thing defined: not onely for one difference of time; but for all times whatsoever: so as, the pre­dicate cannot possibly be severed from the thing defined. Quest de Resumpta. lit. Q. vnto them two, I will ioyne Richardus de Sancto victore: for, he is most full in explicating of a defini­tion: De trinitate. lib. 4. Cap. 21. fol. 108. That a definition may be perfect, it ought to comprehend the totall; and onely essence of the thing defined: for, as [Page 186]it borrowes its name from the thing, so it ought to extend it selfe vnto the vt­termost limits of the thing defined. Nei­ther must it exceed it, it ought to agree vnto all, and onely vnto the thing defi­ned, and so farre, that it may be con­verted into it selfe: Thus farre he. I might shew the same out of later Au­thors; but I spare that labour, because these, for their iudgement, may goe in stead of all; such is their learning, and antiquitie. Others say the same, and none doe dissent from them.

2 By these authorities we finde what a definition is, and thereby wee are resolved, that a definition is a necessa­ry Axiome, in the sence layd downe Cap. 34. and consequently, wee see how to finde out a definition from o­ther sentences: and to iudge of the truth of it when wee haue found it; But because all this doth shew vs the very secrets of nature, (as I may say) and they cannot be vnderstood, nei­ther speedily, nor easily: therefore it will be very profitable; if I set out a definition by other notes, or markes [Page 187]that are better knowne to vs: that, when wee haue them altogether, the one will lead to the other: and both together will giue vs certaine know­ledge of this roote, and originall of all knowledge: yea of that knowledge, whereby we know single termes in them selues, as Aristotle cales it: Po­ster lib. 1. cap. 3. Nos vero: and that knowledg is no lesse then Angelicall.

3 Aristotle hath done so much in the thing we seeke for, that the assistance of any other authors may seem need­les, he shewes vs, positiuely how to know a perfect definition: and lest we should sorget, he shewes vs also, the naughtines, and faults in a definition, he doth the first in these termes.

1. A definition is constituted of the Genus and the differences: Top lib 1. cap. 8. namely the specificall differences whose office it is to make a difinition compleat: and to designe that which is more generall vnto one speciall kinde: and this it doth, by reason that they are taken from the proper forme of the things differenced, as the roote, and ori­ginall [Page 188]from whence they flow: in [...]e iudgement of Thomas. 1. p. q 29 a [...]. 3. ad 4 ^m. 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. ad 2 ^m.

2. In a definition, the end whereto the thing defined is referred, is not to be omitted. Top. lib 6 cap. 8.

3. A definition must be vniversall, and affirmatiue: Poster lib. 2. cap. 3.

4. He that defineth must vse words (so farre as he can) that shall be of cleerest sence: because, a definition is made for the getting of knowledg. Top. lib. 6. cap. 1.

4 Hee abounds in skoring vp the faults of an evill definition: I will bring some of them to further our vnderstanding. I will not bring all, least I be tedious. He referres them vnto two heads: viz. Obscuritie, and Superfluitie. The Obscurities are set downe Top. lib. 6 cap. 2. and they are 4 in number. First, when the thing de­fined (that admits divers sences) is not distinguished. Secondly, when it is exprest by a borrowed speech. Third­ly, when any words are vsed that bee [Page 189]rude, and vnproper. Fourthly, when the definition is so made, that we can­not find: how it differs from another that is contrary to it, or what the thing is, that is defined: for then it is like a picture that cannot be knowne whose it is, vnles it be shewed by writing. The superfluities of a definition are 6. He sets them downe in the third chapter of the same booke, and these they are. First, when one thing is repeated often. Secondly, when a definition is made of arguments that in nature doe follow, and in our knowledge are lesse knowne then the thing defined. Thirdly, when in the definition the thing defined is brought: cap. 4. Fourthly, if a supe­rior be defined by an inferior. Fiftly, when more is brought in the definition then ought: cap 1. Sixtly, Euery thing is superfluous, that may be taken away, yet the rest that remaine doth make the thing defined to be evident; and declare the essence thereof. I will conclude in Aristotles words; by these things wee may sufficiently know when a definition, is rightly made, and when it is not. [Page 190]Top. lib. 6. cap. 3. and therefore I shall neede to say no more to set out the nature of a definition: or what maner of truth is contained in it. Per­haps some man will require mee to set forth, when a definition contains vntruth: but, I thinke that request needles: because every definition con­taines a necessary truth that followes these rules: and that is vntrue, which doth not obserue them: but, com­mits the faults against them.

Although these things may seeme sufficient to giue vs knowledge of a definition, 5 and the necessary truth thereof: yet, I thinke it very needfull to set downe a definition, and apply it to the rules alledged.

This is a definition in all mens iudgement. That it agrees to the for­mer rules, is very manifest; for here­in first, Life, and Rationalitie are at­tributed to all men; and at all times. [Page 191]Secondly, They are attributed, not by accident, or the application of a third: but, by themselues, in as much as the essence of Life, and Rationali­tie (even of it selfe) hath a relation vnto man: and wee apprehend the one, by apprehending the other. Thirdly, Life and Rationalitie, are at­tributed vnto man vniuersally: that is, not onely vnto all men, and at all times: but, adaequatly: so as, all that is in Life, and Rationalitie, is sayd to belong to man: and all that is in man, is denoted, and set out by life, and ra­tionalitie: the one is as large, and no larger then the other. Fourthly, They are attributed vnto man first: that is, they haue no reflexion, or relation to any thing before man: neither is man receptiue of any thing before life, and rationalitie: but, the first act that they doe, is to giue being to man: and the first being that man receiues is from life, and rationalitie. 5. Life, and ratio­nalitie, even such as they are in them­selues, such reference they haue vnto man: in so much that man is no more [Page 192]but an effect compounded of life and reason: and they no more but an ef­fect resolued into all the causes: I say all the causes, for animalitie ioyned to rationalitie, comprehends all the cau­ses in it. Whereupon the thing defi­ned, exceeds not the definition; nor the definition is larger then the thing defined: but, they are convertible, wee may truely say, If man then a li­ving Creature indued with reason; If a living Creature indued with rea­son, then a man; and both of them containe one, and the same truth.

Thus haue we done with the de­finition, we must come to a descrip­tion next.

CHAP. XXXVII. Of a Description.

A description is a sentence which set­teth out a thing, Ramus. even by other argu­ments.

THis precept is agreed on by all parties, 1 as the Reader may finde in the foregoing Chapter: therefore, we need not make doubt, whether it belongs to this art or no; It is reaso­nable cleere: therefore, a few words will prevent all doubtfulnesse in it.

[A thing] That is, 2 the thing descri­bed. Now, the thing described seemes to be of shorter scantling, then the thing defined. A singular, or indivi­duall substance may be described: but not defined: for, so we heard from A­ristotle in the foregoing Chapter: and he made it a law, that every definiti­on must be vniversall, but that pro­position where an individuall thing is subiected, is not vniversall.

[Other Arguments] These words doe containe the formall nature of an imperfect definition. 3 The word ar­gument, importeth an affirmatiue pre­dication in a description: for dissen­ting arguments cannot describe, nor define: no not in the most vnperfect manner: for defining, how imperfect so ever it is, must needs import, that the thing is in some sort or other: but, dissenting arguments doe not serue in the least sort to set out what a thing is. They haue force to shew what a thing is not, and no more. The word other, doth signifie, that the arguments whereby a thing is descri­bed, are mixed: and are partly essen­tiall, partly without the essence. Where wee must know, that, the more neere arguments be vnto the essence, the more force they haue to set out the thing described: and the more truely that sentence wherein they are predicated, may be called by the name of a Definition.

Here it may be doubted, 4 whether a Description may be made in any [Page 195]part by accidents? I answer: No acci­dent (as it is an accident) hath place in a Definition: and I thinke so; be­cause, Aristotle doth perpetually for­bid accidents to come within the dores of any Definition. An accident (according to Aristotle) may in some respects, and at some time become proper: and in that case, they may serue to describe an individuall sub­iect: as this, or that singular man may be made knowne to vs, and differen­ced from all others, by riches, lear­ning, &c. which he inioyes and none other.

Now we see what arguments are disposed in a description: 5 and how they are referred the one to the other; it remaineth, that, I declare what truth there is in it. In a Description there is a necessary truth. I say necessary truth, not of constitution (for that is proper to a perfect definition, where the thing defined, and the definition doe Constitute each other, and is adaquatly the same thing: according to the sen­tence of Thomas, 1. dist. 25. q. 1. art. 1. [Page 196] ad 2 ^m.) But, of emanation, effluence, and consecution in as much as, the ar­guments describing, are (at least) so proper vnto the thing described, that they come convertible therewith: and it cannot but be so; for, if the pro­perties doe belong to the species, or the whole kinde, then they are ne­cessary emanations from the princi­ples of nature, belonging to that kind: and therefore, they stand, and fall to­gether. If the properties appertaine to an individuall, then they haue a necessary connexion therewith, tho­rough a peculiar right, and possessi­on.

I will adde an instance or two, 6 and thereby the nature, and truth of this precept will be made evident, and cleere.

In this sentence, man abstracted from individualitie, (that is, not con­sidered as this or that particular man) [Page 197]is described: all the words that follow the Verbe [is] containe the descrip­tion; These two terms, viz. mortall, and capable of learning, are ioyned to­gether by that Verbe, and thereby the description is affirmatiue. The word living Creature is essentiall to man: for, it is the whole shott, (as I may say) or comprehension of all the parts of his nature in generall. The words capable of learning, import a thing proper vnto mankinde, that is, as he is formally this kinde of Crea­ture, which we call man: and there­fore, that attribute bordreth next of all to mans particular essence. The word mortall, importeth an accident, now made proper to man. I say it is an accident, and no more; because, it flowes not from the principles of his nature. Mans reasonable soule, is the chiefe thing in his being: but mor­talitie flowes not from that: for, the soule is living, so sayth the Lord: He breathed in his face the breath of life, and he became a living soule, Gene­sis. 2.7.

Mortalitie is now proper to all men, because they all, are subiected to death; I say, it is proper to them all, not because they doe, and must dye: but because all of them, and none but them must dye after that sort (that is) by accident. All other Crea­tures are subiect to dissolution by that nature which they had from God by Creation: but man is sub­iect to death by imposition: he incur­red his mortalitie when he sinned. God threatned it before man sinned. Genesis 2.17. and inflicted it when man had sinned. Rom. 5.12. But that had never beene, if the principles of mans nature had inclined, and fitted him to mortalitie. This being so, we may well conclude; mans mortalitie is very little distant from mans na­ture. And consequently, this propo­sition is a definition somewhat vnper­fect.

There is a necessary truth in this Description: 7 for, the thing defined, and that wherewith it is defined, are convertible: the sentence is equally [Page 199]true, which wayes soever you take it, if it be read as it lyeth, all men will grant it; if we invert the parts, and say thus, Every living Creature that is mortall, and capable of learning is man: no man will deny it. But this truth is not constitutiue: for, mortalitie and capacitie vnto learning (as they are conceived by themselues, and as they are in themselues) haue no share in mans essence; but is a thing flowing therefrom: and were it not for a third thing that comes betweene them, they might, and might not, belong to man any wayes. This truth is ne­cessary by emanation, and consecuti­on: for, take man as he is a man, he must needs be reasonable, as he is rea­sonable, he cannot but be capable of learning: take him as he is now a man, and he must needs be mortall: for, he sinned, and God imposed mortalitie vpon him.

We haue another example of a De­scription, 8 in the 2 Epistle to the Thes­salonians, the 2. Chapter, and 3. verse, &c. which fitteth this place well. [Page 200] Antichrist (an individuall) is sayd to be a man of sinne, the sonne of perdition, an outlaw, &c. Now, all these be ac­cidents, yet they become proper vnto him, in that sense wherein the holy Ghost meant them: and that descrip­tion containes a truth so necessary, that we may certainely know, that he is Antichrist who is a man of sinne, &c. in that sense which the holy Ghost intended in that place. This shall suf­fice to set out the nature of a descrip­tion: and thus haue we finished the whole matter touching a Definition.

CHAP. XXXVIII. Of a Distribution.

THe next thing that comes to be handled, is a distribution: that is defined, or set out in this one generall apprehension.

Aristotle and other Logick Schooles haue left vs these precepts also: 1 as we shall see by the particulars: Aristotle requires, that the thing defined, be di­stributed into parts: Top. lib. 6. Cap. 1 Rursus vtrumque, &c. cap. 2. Idem Contingit, &c. Therefore (according to him) a distribution is then made, when the whole is divided into parts. He sayth further; a whole is no more but a gathering together of the parts. Physicor. lib. 1. text. 17. lib. 4 text 43. And againe, That is sayd to be a whole, that wants no part of that of which it is sayd to be a whole: either by nature, or as a thing containing that which is con­tained: so as, they all doe make one cer­taine thing: meta. lib. 5. Cap. 25. text 31. According to Thomas, that is a whole, which is divided into parts. 1. p. q. 76. art. 8. in cor. These Authors doe not tell vs, what a part is conceived a­part [Page 202]or abstracted from specialties: neither need they, for that is done suf­ficiently already when they tell vs what a whole is; and the same thing will better appeare, when wee come to the particulars: therefore I pro­ceed.

I finde no dissent betweene any par­ties touching this precept, 2 that the Genus, and the Integrall, be wholes, (and in that sence which is now gi­ven) is confessed on all hands. I will alledge Aristotle: A whole, sayth he, is twofold, viz. Vniversall; or a totall existeney. meta. lib. 5. Cap. 25. text 31. And Thomas goes along with him: A whole (sayth he) is either an vni­versall, or an Integrall. 1. p. q. 77. art. [Page 203]1. ad 1 ^m. According to Aristotle, An vniversall whole, is also Equivocall, or vnivocall. The first, when the name onely is common, but the things named be divers: so a man himselfe, and a pic­ture is called a living Creature. The second, when the name is common, and the things named are the same. Categor. Cap. 1. We take an vniversall whole in this last sence. Now, Aristotle in the place of his Metaphysicks last al­ledged, doth call that such a whole, as is one to every part; as a living crea­ture is to a man and a beast: in the like sort speakes Thomas in the place last alledged; these are his words: An v­niversal whole, is present to every part, according to the whole essence, and pow­er thereof as a living Creature, is to a man, and a beast; and therefore it is predicated properly of the singular parts: but an Integrall whole is not in each part, neither according to their whole essence, nor vertue, and therefore it is no wayes predicated of the singular parts; no not of them all together, vnlesse it be very improperly. Thus farre he: Ari­stotle [Page 204]in the place alledged calls this whole, one thing that ariseth of the parts; and thereby agrees with Tho­mas: By these allegations we haue this precept agreed vpon, and made plaine; therefore we may proceed to the severall kindes of Distributions.

CHAP. XXXIX. Of the kindes of Distribution, and first of the Generall into the Spe­cialls.

IN handling the severall Distributi­ons, 1 it is not greatly materiall, either to art, or the things themselues; that we beginne with the one rather then with the other: but in my opinion, the distribution of the Genus into the Species ought to haue the first place; because it is first in nature, and obiected first to our vnderstanding, being a comprehension of the parti­cular kindes; therefore, I will begin with that.

Neither of our Authors hath this precept expresly: yet this place, 2 doth require it, and their doctrine, and practice avowes it, therefore, with­out further labour, I will proceed to the vnfolding thereof.

[Divided] This word is made proper to this distribution, by the common phrase of Logicians. The meaning of it is, The generall is di­vided into the specials, if wee inquire how it is devided to them? it may be answered, It is divided two wayes. First, In it selfe, being applyed vnto, or (as I may say) bestowed vpon, each kinde: (not in the totall latitude thereof; but so farre, as one can re­ceiue it). Secondly, Each speciall kinde containes no more then is in­cluded in the generall, what is expli­citly in any one of the kindes, is im­plicitly in the whole: what is dilated in that, is thrust together in this.

[Severall kindes] The parts devi­ded are called severall: 3 because they be severed by distinct formes. They are called kindes; because both of these distinct formes are one, and the same thing in the generall, or vniver­sall, wee shall see the truth, and evi­dence of this precept (thus vnder­stood) in this instance.

This sentence, is a simple axiome; because, one thing, is ioyned to ano­ther, by a verbe. I say one; for though the branches of the predicate, be two, being referred to themselues; yet they are but one, when they are referred to the subiect.

[Living Creature.] 4 Is the whole that is divided. 2. It is an vniversall whole. 3. The parts into which it is divided, are reasonable, & vnreasonable Crea­tures. 4. This whole, is bestowed vp­on both parts; because the reasonable, and vnreasonable Creatures, (each [Page 207]of them apart) are truly sayd to be li­ving Creatures. 5. Neither the vnrea­sonable, nor reasonable Creatures haue any thing essentiall to them more then is contained in animalitie: for, that word importeth no more, but such a thing, made by God, as hath life, and motion in it selfe. Now, that includeth a corporall substance, and a spiritualitie, called life: This as the forme, informing the matter: That as the matter informed. The reasonable Creature hath no more: thus he hath a bodie made liuely by his soule, and that is the matter infor­med. He hath a soule, or life, and that is the forme informing. We finde the like in the vnreasonable Creatures, they haue a bodie, wherein their life remaines: this corporall substance is the matter informed, and that life is the forme informing. 6. These doe differ in their kindes, (I say) in their kindes, and not numerically; because, they haue different kindes of corpore­all substances: so the holy Ghost pro­nounceth of them. 1. Cor. 15. and [Page 208]so we finde by experience. The flesh of man and beasts doe differ in their proper being, and Gods destination: for, the one is made to perish finally, the other to rise againe. These Crea­tures doe differ also in their life or liuelines: the life of beasts is no more, but as breath that doth vanish at their dissolution: Mans life is more: for, his soule is life; being a living, con­tinuing, and spirituall substance: and no doubt, but that spirituall substance, is informed by a liuelihood, differing therefrom (though our vnderstan­dings cannot but ghesse at it) 1. be­cause wee finde a secret motion of mans vnderstanding, and will in his soule, differing from the spirituall substance thereof. 2. Because mans soule liues when it is parted from the body.

It may be some will obiect on this sort; 5 If the species containes no more then is in the Genus, then the specifi­call difference is also contained in the Genus: but this last is not true: there­fore, the first is vntrue also.

I answer: I grant the assumption; vpon Aristotles authoritie, and proofe alledged before in the poynt of the Genus. But I deny the consequence; because it doth suppose, that the spe­cificall difference, is a reall being, constituting the species: but that is vt­terly vntrue. If that were so, then it is a cause different from the matter, forme, and end. But the last is not true: and this I take as granted: there­fore, the first is vntrue also; and con­sequently, the argument is so too, that is founded therevpon. The spe­cificall difference, is a rationall entitie and no more; namely, our vnder­standings doe apprehend this kinde, to differ from another, when they are both layd together. Now, this appre­hension is a veritie, no fiction: for, it hath a foundation in the thing: namely, the specificall forme, our vn­derstanding doth thus argue: This hath one kinde of forme, that hath a­nother, therefore this doth specifi­cally differ from that. And thus the specificall difference doth flow from [Page 210]the forme, it is not the specificall forme it selfe. Hitherto wee haue shewed what arguments are disposed in this kinde of Distribution: and the manner how they are disposed; now I will declare that it containes a neces­sary truth: and I may easily doe that, for it fully agrees with the rules of ne­cessary truth, set downe Chap. 34. as will appeare by laying them here­vnto.

1. 6 The parts doe belong to the whole, even to all of it, and at all times; there is no animalitie more then is comprehended in the Crea­tures, reasonable, and vnreasonable. We cannot conceiue a time, wherein the Creatures reasonable, and vnrea­sonable are not liuing Creatures: and therefore the first Rule agrees with this Distribution.

2. The Creatures, reasonable, and vnreasonable, are living Creatures, even by themselues, and their owne nature: there is no third thing that comes betweene their nature, and the nature of a living creature, that makes [Page 211]the one belong to the other: but, they are so living creatures by themselues, that the one is essentiall to the other: therefore, this Distribution agrees with the second Rule.

3. The Creatures, reasonable, and vnreasonable, even in that thing wher­in they are, they are living creatures; so also, even in that nature wherein their being doth consist vniversally, they are living Creatures: yea, and this their nature, wherein they are, they are the first thing in living crea­tures; we cannot conceiue any thing in the essence of the Creatures, reaso­nable, and vnreasonable, that exceeds the essence of a living Creature. Nei­ther can we imagine, in any signe, or moment of reason, that there is any thing in the essence of a living Crea­ture, which hath the prioritie, or is before the essence of the creature rea­sonable, and vnreasonable. I say be­fore, either in nature, or time: but in the first moment wherein you con­ceiue a living Creature to be: you conceiue a creature, either reasona­ble, [Page 212]or vnreasonable: Wherevpon a­nimalitie and these creatures are con­uertible. All living creatures, concei­ved as making one totall summe, is no larger in number, then the Crea­tures reasonable, and vnreasonable; and contrariwise. So also we may say; If a Creature reasonable or vnreaso­nable, then a living Creature: If a li­ving Creature, then reasonable or vn­reasonable. And consequently, all the lawes of necessary truth agree vnto this Distribution.

If any desire to know, 7 when a Di­stribution of this kinde, is false: let him lay it to these rules, and by them he shall know. If it agrees not with these rules, but comes short, in any part; then it is false. And the more it disagrees from them, the lesse truth there is in it. Here I will end the di­stribution of the Genus, into the spe­cies.

CHAP. XL. Of the distribution of the whole into the members.

IN this Chapter we must see, 1 what a Distribution of the Integrall into the members, is.

I must say of this precept, as I did of the last; The doctrine, and practice of Aristotle, and Ramus doth patro­nize it; therefore, we may take it for a precept of art, though they haue it not in so many words; the opening thereof, will say, it came from them.

In this Distribution: 1. 2 The whole is an individuall. 2. That whole is se­vered into peeces, as the timber is by the saw, or wedges. 3. The parts haue different, and individuall natures. [Page 214]4. The whole is made by their mee­ting together; therefore this second kinde of Distribution differs really from the former.

This one example will make the sence plaine, and easie.

A man hath two parts,

• Soule.
• Bodie.

This proposition is a simple axiome: for, one thing is, attributed to ano­ther. I say one; because, both mem­bers, viz. soule and body be one in re­ference to man: though they be di­stinct in themselues. 1. Man is the whole divided, (to wit) an indivi­duall man. 2. This whole is shared, one peice to the bodie, another to the soule. 3. The body and soule haue distinct individuall natures, the one corporeall, the other spirituall. 4. The meeting of these two parts together, doth make man, as he is an individu­all whole: the soule in forming the body, and the body being informed by the soule. This shall suffice to shew, what arguments be in this distributi­on: [Page 215]and the manner how they are framed together.

This kinde of distribution containes a necessary truth: because the lawes of necessary truth agree to it.

1. Soule and body are affirmed of all men severally, and at all times, without exception. 2. Bodie, and soule are referred vnto a singular man, by themselues, and their owne essence: not by the force of any third. 3. The soule, and body, in what re­spect they are, and in the very essence, as they are: they are affirmed of a sin­gular man. I say affirmed, both vni­versally according to the totall nature of themselues: and according to the essence of a singular man. So as the essence of a singular man, and the es­sence of soule, and bodie, are of e­quall extent: the one is as large, and no lesse large then the other: so also, this their nature, is affirmed of man in the first instant, and moment of his being; and our apprehension. Where­vpon this whole, and parts, are in their nature convertible. Thus wee [Page 216]may say, If a man, then soule, and bo­die. If soule, and bodie, then a man. These things being so, wee may vn­doubtedly say, this kinde of distribu­tion containes a necessary truth: and therewithall put an end vnto this precept in hand.

To conclude, I haue this to say ioyntly, of these precepts touching a Definition and Distribution: their vse is not knowne to the negligent, nor esteemed of the ignorant: but, he that knowes them, and hath found the benefit of them, will say, they are worth the having: for, by them a man may know when a Definition, and Distribution containe a necessa­ry truth; and an artificiall forme: and consequently, he hath a good guide to lead his reason in the right way vnto true knowledge, and the avoy­ding of error.

CHAP. XLI. Of contingent simple Axiomes.

THat I may put a finall Conclusi­on, 1 to all the precepts that be­long vnto simple Axiomes, I must shew what arguments are disposed in them, how they are disposed, and what truth is contained in such sim­ple Axiomes; as are neither definiti­ons, nor distributions; and touching them we say,

Full Comparisons are iustly excepted, out of simple axiomes, because they containe foure termes distinctly layd, the one to the other, no wayes made one by any Coniunction.

By arguments, is meant single ar­guments, [Page 218]for all the foure causes toge­ther, and essentiall properties, be­long not to simple axiomes of this sort; they are proper to definitions and distributions.

We shall finde necessary truth or falshood in all such axiomes as pro­nounce of a thing either as it is in pre­sent being; 2 or as it is past. I say neces­sary truth, not simply; but after a sort; because, the thing that is, or is not, that was, or was not, cannot but be, when it is; nor but not be, when it is not: as Aristotle hath truely observed, De interpre. Cap. 9.

Simple axiomes that pronounce of a thing to come, 3 containe a certaine truth, or falshood; in respect of God: for, he foreknowes all things possible by his simple intelligence: and all things that shall be, by his intuition or knowledge of vision. In respect of mans knowledge, none of those Axiomes do containe a certaine truth; for vnto man, all future things are contingent, and consequently mans knowledge of them must needs also [Page 219]be contingent: vnto Man (I say) they are contingent: for as much as, their next causes whervpon they depend, are contingent. All humane actions depend vpon mans will, as their next cause, and mans will is a facultie free, and indetermined vnto one: and therefore contingent All other things, not humane, are also contingent: be­cause, their next cause may be hinde­red in their execution. Man is at Gods dispose, and all the other Crea­tures are at Gods, and mans. These axiomes may containe a contingent truth, in respect of man, and that is all he can haue of them. And here a fi­nall end for simple axiomes.

CHAP. XLII. Of compound Axiomes in generall.

COmpound Axiomes come now to be handled; their generall na­ture may be expressed in this propo­sition: [Page 220] ‘A compound axiome is that, Ramus.the band whereof is a coniunction.’

So Ramus, 1 and thus Aristotle. A speech compounded of simple Axiomes, is made one, by a Coniunction, de inter­pre. In which words he doth acknow­ledge. 1. Some axiomes are compoun­ded axiomes. 2. Such axiomes are compounded of simple Axiomes. 3. They are made one by that com­position. 4. Their parts are tyed toge­ther by a Conjunction: therefore, he delivers the same precept with Ra­mus, and vnfolds the meaning of it.

Thus farre Aristotle went: but ne­ver further (for any thing that I can finde:) yet may we not say therefore, that his Logick is an imperfect art: be­cause it may be all his writings are not come to our hands; If that be so, then time hath done iniury both to him and vs. I thinke rather, he omit­ted compound axiomes of purpose. If he did so, he had good reason for it: for, the precepts of simple axiomes giue light enough to shew vs how to [Page 221]iudge of these: for these being com­pounded of them, they must needs be the foundation of these: and conse­quently, he that can iudge truely of them, cannot be ignorant of these. Neither may we accuse Ramus of a su­perfluitie in art; for, reason avowes his deed also; because, these precepts are convenient, and make the know­ledge, and vse of this art more easie. 2. Learned men of all ages haue vsed such axiomes as he calls compound: therefore, he might make the precept; of them to be parcell of this art, seing vse, and experience is the mistris of art. The one did well in omitting; because, he tyed himselfe to exactnes. The other did well to bring them in, because, he regarded precedent cu­stome, and future ease. We will goe with Ramus alone; because, we can­not haue Aristotles company.

[Axiome] This word doth put vs in minde, that, 2 these propositions 1. Haue arguments framed in them. 2. They are framed in these, in a fashi­on differing from simple axiomes, [Page 222]from whence they are called com­pound. 3. They containe truth, or falshood: for such is the condition of all axiomes whatsoever.

[That] This word implyeth, 3 that, a compound axiome, is but one pro­position, or enuntiation, as Aristotle calls it.

[Band] This word giues vs to vn­destand, 4 that, in compound axiomes we shall find two distinct things tyed together: and in this, they ioyne with simple axiomes.

[Coniunction] By this word wee know, the band of a connext axiome is, a coniunction: and herein stands a maine, and principall difference be­tween simple, & compound axioms; they had a verbe; these haue a con­iunction, to tye their parts together. In a simple axiome, we found a pre­dicate, and subiect: in these, we finde parts tyed together, but no name for them: we must seeke for that in the particular axiomes themselues. This is another reall difference betweene simple, and compound axiomes: thus [Page 223]farre, for their generall nature. This generall is thus divided.

CHAP. XLIII. Of a Copulatiue Axiome.

A compound Axiome is

• Congre­gatiue,
  • Copulatine.
  • Connexiue.
    Ramus.
• Segregatiue,
  • discrete.
  • disjunct.

THis Definition, 1 doth send vs to seeke an enuntiatiue sentence, whose parts are tyed together by this word And. But a little labour will not finde it; yea, it seemes vnpossible ever to be found: for, this word, is ve­ry vnfit so to tye the parts of a sen­tence [Page 224]together, that thereby one ar­gument should set out another: and truth, or falshood be pronounced: se­ing it doth neither affirme, nor infer, nor any wayes serue for those ends. It may be, his Copulatiue axiomes bee contained in such sentences as these be;

Both these propositions be com­pound, according to Aristotle; for, each of them is made one by a Con­junction: they may be called Copu­latiue, because that Conjunction is Copulatiue. The forenamed axiomes are compounded of simple axiomes. The first, of two axiomes; the other of fiue. But (according to Ramus) both of them be simple, because their band is a verbe. Neither of them a compound; for their Conjunction [Page 225]tyes not the parts of the proposition together; for, it neither affirmes, nor inferres truth, or falshood. It tyeth one part of the Axiome together, and makes it one by the knitting together of divers parts, and no more. If we take a veiw of them as they lye, wee shall see all these things plainely.

In the first instance, 2 Christ is the subiect, death, and resurrection, are made the predicate: both of these are ioyned together by the word And: and thereby they are made one; that is, not one thing: but one truth toge­ther. This one predicate, is referred vnto that subiect, by the verbe that is included in them both, in the truth of the thing, the first containes two axiomes. Christ dyed, Christ did rise from death, and we finde the same truth in them both, being taken apart, that we doe, when both the predi­cates are put together into one axiom. The same is the case with the second, when it stands in due forme, thus: ‘Whoremongers, I dolaters, Lyers, &c. haue no right to heaven.’

In the truth of the thing, this is a simple axiome, as the former was: the predicate damnation, is referred to the subiect Whoremongers, &c. by a verbe: the subiect consisteth of divers parts, distinct betweene themselues, Whoremongers, I delaters, &c. all those parts are made one by the word And. I say one, not in themselues: but in the truth of this proposition, so as, if wee referre damnation to them all ioyntly, it containes a certaine truth. If that predicate be referred vnto Whoremongers alone, Lyers alone, &c. each one of them doe containe a truth, no lesse certaine, and vndoub­ted.

This precept is made evident, 3 by either of the examples alledged. If I say damnation belongs not to whore­mongers, [Page 227]Christ suffered not death; I put an expresse Contradiction to them both, if these be true, those be false. If they be true, these be false: but, this Contradiction is the same with simple axiomes: for, one, and the same predicate, is denyed of one, and the same singular subiect: there­fore we may conclude, these sentences are compound Copulatiue proposi­tions in their present forme; but sim­ple propositions in the truth of the thing. If you take them, as men doe speake them, then they are cōpound: if you take them as men ought to speake, then they are simple. And this shall suffice for Copulatiue axiomes.

CHAP. XLIIII. Of connexe Axiomes.

A Connext axiome comes next: the nature whereof may be thus set out.

This kinde of Compound axiome, 1 is easie to be found, and fitly thus named: It is in frequent vse amongst men, and the nature of it consisteth in composition. There are presidents of it that seeme much to differ, I will propound examples of them both, that the matter may be fully opened.

• 1. If in this life we inioy all our hap­pinesse, then we onely are miserable.
• 2. If righteousnes be by the law, then Christ dyed in vaine.

These propositions are compound (according to Aristole and Ramus too) for, 2 each of them are made one by a coniunction, that so tyes both the parts together, that, they containe such truth, as the parts doe not, when they are taken in sunder, and each one by it selfe. Secondly, They are com­pounded [Page 229]of simple Axiomes. In the first, we haue these two: first, All our happines is in this life. Secondly, We onely are miserable. In the second we haue the like. First, Iustice is by the Law. Secondly, Christ dyed in vaine. Lastly, these 2 simple Axiomes are made one proposition, by the coniunction; If, and Then, I say they are one, not by mixture but by voyce: that pronounceth the latter certainely to be, where the former is.

These compound axiomes, 3 are cal­led Conditionall, in the common phrase of the Schooles; because, the first part is put Conditionally, not ab­solutely: but (I thinke) the terme of Connex, is more fit: because, the lat­ter part is inferred from the former, and therefore it is made to haue a being together with the former: and consequently, it is annexed, and knit vnto the former.

The parts knit together in this kind of axiomes, are named Antecedent, 4 and Consequent: and they are so in themselues: for, the first in place, is [Page 230]the first in nature, and our apprehen­sion: else it could haue no force to in­ferre the second. The second followes the first, and receiues its being there­from: All arguments may be dispo­sed in this axiome, that haue place in a simple axiome: because, this serueth to conclude all questions, that may be concluded by a simple axiome: so also they may be disposed in the same manner in this, that they may in a simple, (that is) Consenting argu­ments affirmatiuely, and Disenting negatiuely.

The inference, that this rule con­taines, is most certaine, and vndoub­ted: [Page 231]The antecedent part of it, is agreed vpon in the Schooles. I will avow it by two Authors of Credit, and they shall be in stead of all. The first of them is Gregorie de Arim lib. 1. dist. 42 q. 2. art. 1. in aecisio questionis. Condi­tionall speeches may be true, and their parts false. These are his words, and they imply, that, the truth of Condi­tion all speeches, depends vpon their connexion, not their parts. The se­cond is Alvarez. de Auxilijs, disp. 72. n ^o. 5. ad 3 ^m, There is required vnto the truth of a Conditionall proposition, that the Consequent follow vpon the Autecedent. Whether the Antecedent be the adaequate Cause of the Conse­quent, or an effect thereof, or a Condi­tion presupposing another Cause. It is e­nough, if the Consequent followes by vertue of that Condition. Thus farre his words; and they are so plaine, and so full, that, we can require no more authoritie for this question: yet that I may conceale nothing, that may giue light vnto this maine, and important rule, I will proceed a little further.

We must vnderstand: The Illation or Consequence of a Connexe, or Conds­tionall proposition, is either formall, or materiall. The sentences alledged out of Gregory and Alvarez, are vnder­stood of formall Illation. Now, in such there is alwayes a necessary truth, and no contingency. A materiall Illation is, when the consequent goes with the An­tecedent: yet so as it followes the same, not by force thereof. We finde these pro­positions in conditionall promises, and in the iudgements that wee giue of fu­ture things, that depend vpon the liber­tie of mans will. These Illations being pronounced by God, haue alwayes a ne­cessary veritie: for, he cannot deny him­selfe: therefore he keepes his word Iust­ly. Mans will is subiected to Gods do­minion, therefore he will determine it to one. His power is infinite, therefore he cannot be defeated: but these propo­sitions being pronounced by man, doe con­taine (at the best) but opinion, contin­gent, and coniecturall knowledge. Thus much out of Alvarez de Auxilijs disp. 7. no. 7. &c. And Suarez, opusc. 2. [Page 233] lib. 2. cap. 5. no. 8. &c. Where the Rea­der shall finde these things proued, and vnfolded to the full.

This precept is very needfull, for thereby we know how to apply an answer for the refutation, and dis­proofe of such a proposition. By this also, we know what we must proue, when wee would avow a connext axiome: namely, not the parts them­selues; but the following of the later vpon the former. If this opposition to a connex axiome may with reason be called a contradictiō in any sence, then in this art it may goe for a Con­tradiction indeed: but I doubt whe­ther in reason it may be so called or no: because, the whole band that tyes the parts of this axiome together, [Page 234]is not denyed: and Consequently, there is not an opposition made of one proposition vnto the same propositi­on: for one thing is not severed from that subiect, vnto which it was ioy­ned: but onely the same thing is de­nyed to follow, which was once af­firmed to follow: and these things may suffice to set out the nature of a connext axiome.

Before I make a full end of this pre­cept, I must shew what affinitie, or rather foundation, a connexe axiome hath with a simple. I may truely say, a simple axiome, and this compound differ nothing but in the manner of pronouncing. Men vsually speake in a connexe forme, because the manner is more familiar in many things: but they should speake in the forme of a simple axiome, in the exactnes of art: therefore, we may resolue these into them: as I will shew by the instances alledged.

The first example of a connexe axiome, viz. If in this life onely &c. may be reduced vnto a simple axiom [Page 235]in every mans iudgement: because, it hath but three termes in it: but in truth, it is somewhat difficult whe­ther it may be so reduced or no: be­cause, it pronounceth of some kinde of men, not vniversally of all: yet it may be done truely, and plainely, if we first know, that the antecedent part ought to be set downe in these words: They that haue no happinesse but in this life, and here they haue [...]. I say, these last words must be added: because, the Connext axiome doth suppose them, and therevpon inferres the Consequent: which otherwise it could not doe. Those words being added, we may bring this Connext axiome, and the Apostles whole dis­putation therefrom, into this simple forme.

The other Connext proposition, viz. If righteousnes be by the &c. is yet more difficult: yea so difficult, that, if we take it as it lyes, it is not to be re­duced vnto a simple for me: for it con­taines two propositions every way di­stinct: and therefore, it hath foure termes, viz. 1. Righteousnes. 2. Law. 3. Christ. 4. Vaine: but if we take the Apostles whole disputation together, and frame it according to art, it will easily make a simple forme: for thus the Apostle disputeth.

To conclude this point of Connext axiomes; I hope it doth now ap­peare, that, they are fundamentally, and indeed no other but simple. [Page 237]Therefore whatsoever belongs vnto them, it is due first vnto simple axiomes, and Consequently, they de­riue the same from them. They differ onely in manner of pronouncing, and not otherwayes. It is now time that I proceed to a Discrete Axiome.

CHAP. XLV. Of a discrete Axiome.

THe nature of a discrete Axiome is opened in these words.

The Axiome now defined, 1 is of no lesse frequent vse then the former, nor is it lesse vsefull, in the common converse of man: therefore it is well worth our knowing, and consequent ly this precept doth well deserue a [Page 238]place in Art. Wee shall vnderstand it the better, if we put an instance or two. There bee different kindes of this also; I will propound one of each, that wee may be the better a­ble to iudge of them, as occasion serues.

These are compound Axiomes in the iudgement, 2 both of Ramus and Aristotle: for in them, two simple Axiomes are ioyned together by a coniunction; and thereby each of them is one intire sentence. I say one sentence, in their voyce of pronoun­cing, though the coniunction doth thrust the parts one from another: for these propositions doe say, hee that hath the first may bee with out the se­cond: and thereby pronounce but one thing.

In these Axiomes, 3 dissenting ar­guments onely are disposed: and dis­sentingly in the same manner as they are disposed in simple Axiomes: for what can be severed from the sub­iect, but those arguments that dissent from it. The parts of this Axiome can haue no name: because, it con­taines nothing that doth antecede, or follow; vnlesse we will giue it those names which belong to a simple Ax­iome.

The coniunction which tyes the parts together, is called discrete: 4 and in this place it imports no more but a thing that keepes two asunder, for the present, that, at another time may meete together. If we examine these two examples, wee shall easily vnder­stand the rule. In the first, not fearing of ill; is denyed to him that walkes in the vale of death: not simply and ab­solutely, as if no man could so walke, and feare ill; but as a thing which was severed for that time onely; or that did arise vpon that occasion. In the second example, there seemes some [Page 240]difficultie: because it consisteth one­ly of consenting arguments: for a con­stant profession of faith, and guiltines of a fault, are attributed to one subiect: The second example, is like the first, if wee frame it exactly according to Art, it will haue these wordes.

In this proposition; 5 ill doing in some things, is attributed vnto a well doer in some other things: but these two differ only in respect of the pre­sent time, and those parties, they dif­fer not of their owne nature. For these that did ill in some things, might haue done well in all.

[Good] That is in respect of the forme. 6 A discrete Axiome is then framed according to Art, when the partes of it doe dissent by diversitie, [Page 241]not as opposites. This rule must bee vnderstood of such Axiomes, as are most agreeable to Art, and in that sence it is most true. If it be vnderstood vniversally, it is not true. If I shall say, although I am rich yet I am not poore. I shall frame my discretiue Ax­iome according to Art: for I sever povertie from riches, not simply, and every way: but onely as proceeding from, or bearing company with ri­ches: and that is enough to make it a formall discrete Axiome: because this serues for no other end, but to take away an illation, and to seuer a thing falsly inferred, from the thing that did inferre the same. Such an Axiome is ridiculous I grant, but in him that would haue riches, and po­vertie goe together, not in him that denies their going together.

[Both parts true] This rule holds in every discretiue Axiome whatso­ever. The Axiome is false, 7 vnles both parts be true some wayes or other: for in every Axiome of this kinde, the first part is let passe as true. In some [Page 242]Axiomes it is so indeede, and in the thing: but in some other it is so in courtesie onely: not in the thing. The second part must alwaies be true, otherwise it denyes not the inference opposed thereby: and therefore it pronounceth not as the thing is. The examples formerly aleadged, will make the matter plaine. In the first, David presumes, that, hee did walke through the vale of death; and so hee did indeede: yet he denyes, that ther­by he was made to feare ill. If he had feared ill, then hee had pronounced falsely. If neither himselfe, nor any o­ther had presumed, that, he did walke in the vale of death; then (for that also) he had pronounced falsely, for in both these cases, hee had pronoun­ced otherwise then the thing was in­deede. The Apostle Paul 2. Cor. 11 6. is content to yeeld his accusers, that, he was rude in speech: yet hee denyes that he is so in knowledge. The first is true by concession onely; not in the thing: for his speech was excel­lent, both for Logicke, and Retho­ricke, [Page 243]as his disputation and exhor­tations doe witnesse. The second is true indeede, otherwise he had made no answere to them that argued him slender in knowledge: because hee was rude in speech.

Hitherto I haue opened the nature of discretiue Axiomes, 8 it remaines that I shew how they be supported by a simple Axiome. Touching that I say, In the thing it is no more but a simple Axiome, as the yce is no more but water: for Art will resolue these Axiomes into simple, as heate, and raine doth dissolue the yce. The first example is no more but as if David had sayd, walking through the vale of death, and the feare of ill, doe not al­wayes goe together. In the same sort, Paul answers to his accusers: Rude speech and slender knowledge, are not companions. Hereupon wee may con­clude: discretiue Axiomes, are com­pounded as they are pronounced: but they are simple as they ought to be re­solved: therefore whatsoever belongs to a simple Axiome, appertaines to them also.

CHAP. XLVI. Of Disiunct Axiomes.

IN the last place we must come to the precepts of a disjunct axiome: and that may be thus defined.

These axiomes are seldome in vse, 1 and when we finde them, they are ra­ther disputations by Syllogisme, then single sentences by themselues, pro­nouncing truth or falshood: yet not­withstanding, I will vnfold their na­ture, that we may haue a true iudge­ment of them. We may see that, in this instance;

This sentence is a compound axiom, 2 [Page 245]both according to Ramus, and Aristo­tle: for divers single propositions are tyed together, and made one by a Coniunction.

This sentence alledged, is a disjunct axiome: for the band that tyes the parts together, is disjunctiue. Perpe­tuall life, and death at last, are attri­buted to Saul: one of them certainly, neither of them distinctly, but both disjoynedly.

Opposites onely haue place in this axiome: for none may be disioyned, 3 or thrust the one from the other, but such onely as in their nature cannot agree to the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time.

The truth of these propositions, is measured according to the opposites disposed in them; if they containe such as one of them must be in the subiect, (and are also) without a third thing to come betweene them, then the proposition is necessary, thorough the opposition of the parts: the ex­ample now alledged is of this kinde; Perpetuall life, or death at l [...]st; one of [Page 246]them (I say) must needs befall Saul, these two haue no third to come be­tweene them, therefore it cannot be avoyded: but he must either liue per­petually, or dye at last. If wee will Contradict this proposition, we must say; Saul shall neither liue for ever, nor dye once: this is necessarily false: because, the other is necessarily true.

If a disjunctiue proposition con­taine such opposites, 4 as one whereof must be in the subiect, and the sayd opposites haue a meane betweene them, then the disjunction is neces­sary; when as all that comes betweene them be sufficiently reckoned vp (as for example) This action is either su­pernaturally good, or supernaturally e­vill, or naturally good, or naturally evill. Here we haue a necessary truth, be­cause every action of man is either good, or evill: and there is no other thing comes betweene supernaturall good, and supernaturall evill, but na­turall good, or naturall evill. The Contradiction of this disjunction is made, when we say, there is some o­ther [Page 247]thing that comes betweene su­pernaturall good, and supernaturall evill: besides naturall good, and na­turall evill.

If I make a disiunctiue proposition thus: Socrates, is either, a Father, 5 or a Childe: then this proposition containes a coniecture, or opinion, no necessa­ry truth: for it might come to passe, that he was no father, because he hath no childe; nor no childe, because he hath no father. Thus (I hope) the nature of disjunct axiomes, is made plaine enough.

These axiomes doe savour no lesse of them that be simple, 6 then all the former compound axiomes haue done. These are compound in the words wherein they are vttered: but they are simple, in the sense wherein they are vnderstoood. The examples alledged, may be thus reduced; He that must once dye, shall not liue for e­ver. That action, that is supernaturally good, is neither naturally good, nor na­turally evill, nor supernaturally evill. Wherevpon wee may conclude, [Page 248]whatsoever belongs to a simple Axiome, containing these arguments, the same belongs to disjunct axioms. Now at the last, we are come to an end of all Logicall precepts, that con­cerne the making of axiomes.

CHAP. XLVII. Of a Syllegisme.

IN this place we must come to the precepts, which teach vs, to dis­pose arguments in a Syllogisme, and to iudge of them, when they are dis­posed:

This definition is set downe by A­ristotle, 1 almost word for word: for [Page 249]thus sayth he; A Syllogisme is a speech, wherein some things being placed, ano­ther thing differing from them, doth necessarity follow, from them that are so placed. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. Prior lib. 1. cap. 1. Elench. cap. 1.

[A Syllogisme] This terme is bor­rowed, either from accounts, 2 where­in many particular summes are ad­ded together, and thereby made one totall, or else, from many sentences being disorderly placed, or brought into one briefe, or breviate; therefore it serueth well for this place: because, the nature of this discourse may true­ly be resembled vnto either of them.

[Discourse] This word sets out the generall nature of the thing defined. Aristotle calls it a speech: and both of them doe meane the same thing: namely, many axiomes so placed to­gether, that one is drawne out of an­other. I say Aristotle meant thus; be­cause, the rest of his definition sorts with it. And he calls the precepts of a Syllogisme, Dianoeticall Doctrine. Post. lib. 1. cap. 1.

[Question] A question (then) is alwayes disposed in a Syllogisme. By question is meant, a doubtfull axiome: so as, the office of a Syllogisme is to determine a doubtfull sentence. Ari­stotle doth afford vs the same precept: for (according to him) every proposi­tion ought not to be called into question: but those onely, that may be doubted of. Top. lib. 1. cap. 11. yea he accounts them mad that take that for a princi­ple, that no man grants, or put that for a question that all men grants: seing this is without doubt, and that is confessed by none. Top. lib. 1. cap. 10.

[Disposed] Aristotle sayth, 4 placed or put: but both of them meane one thing, namely, ordered, framed, or fit­ted.

[Argument] By argument is meant (here) a third argument: 5 by it wee vnderstand, that, the office of a Syllo­gisme is, to proue one thing by ano­ther: and so much we haue from A­ristotle. A Syllogisme proues one thing, of another, by a medium. Post. lib. 2. cap. 4. There can be no Syllogisme to [Page 251]proue one thing of another, vnlesse some medium be brought, which is referred by a certaine attribution to both ex­treames. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. From whence it followes, that, in every Syllogisme there are three termes, and no more. If there be any other part besides these three, it is called a prosyllogisme. Aristotle teacheth the samething. It is manifest (in his iudge­ment) that, every Syllogisme is made by three termes, and no more: if there be more third arguments then one, there are more Syllogismes then one. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 25. Post. lib. 1. cap. 19.

[Antecedent] This signifies the two first propositions in a Syllogisme, 6 from whence the third is concluded: so sayth Aristotle also: It is plaine that a Syllogisme consists of two propositions, and not of more: for, the three termes doe make those two propositions. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 25.

The first, is called the proposition, because, it containes at least the predi­cate, or Consequent part of the que­stion. The second, is called the as­sumption; [Page 252]because, it is taken out of the first. According to Aristotle, the first, hath the name of Maior, because, it containes the predicate part of the question: the second, the title of Minor, because, the subiect part of the question is disposed in it. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 14. They vary in words, but not in the thing. Onely Ramus speakes of all Syllogismes in generall, as well com­pound, as simple. Aristotle of simple onely, but we shall resolue this diffi­cultie, when we come to compound Syllogismes.

[Granted] The inferring of the conclusion followeth the granting of the antecedent, 7 and Aristotle meaneth the same, when he sayth in his defi­nition: A different thing doth follow from those that are put. By put he can meane no other but granted.

[Necessarily concluded] Aristotle sayth, doth necessarily follow from them that are put (that is) there is nothing required more to inferre the Conclusion, then the termes themselues that are disposed. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 1.

Now the definition is vnfolded, wee will enter vpon the particular things contained vnder it.

CHAP. XLVIII. Of a simple Syllogisme.

THus a Syllogisme is divided, 1 and the first kinde thereof is defined. Aristotle doth divide a Syllogisme into Ostensiue, and Hypotheticall: and therefore heagrees with Ramus who­ly. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. I doe not finde, that he defines a simple or o­stensiue Syllogisme in any one sen­tence: yet, this definition is wholy ta­ken [Page 254]out of him, as we shall see when we vnfold the parts of it.

[Simple] This word is giuen to a Syllogisme, 2 after the same sort, that it was given to an axiome, even be­cause, the third argument is disposed with the question without coniuncti­on, or composition.

[Consequent part, 3 &c.] These words shew wherein a Syllogisme is simple, and how the same ought to be fra­med. It is simple, because one terme of the question, and the third argument makes each proposition: and these two propositions inferre a third, which is a simple axiome also. The predicate part of the question, must be framed with the third argument, in the proposition: and the subiect part with the third argument in the assumption; not so much because, men haue sayd so: but because nature will haue it so: this example will shew it. One sayth, Socrates is vertuous: another doubts of it: if I would proue it to be true, a third argument must be brought, that shall tye the predi­cate [Page 255]and subject of that proposition together. Now then, for that end I bring the terme Iuflice. If this terme be disposed in a Syllogisme, it must be framed after this sort; He that is Iust, is vertuous: but Socrates is Iust. Therefore he is vertuous. I say nature appoints this frame; because, Iustice is a speciall vertue, therefore where Iustice is, vertue needs must be. Therefore Aristotle was a true fol­lower of nature, when he appointed to dispose arguments on this manner. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 4. To conclude, from hence it is manifest, that, the Conclusion inferred, by every true simple Syllogisme, must be gathered out of the proposition, and assumpti­on after this manner, viz. The ante­cedent, or subiect part of the conclu­sion, out of the assumption; and the consequent, or predicate part, out of the proposition: and where this is not found, the Syllogisme is false, and concludes nothing.

As we found in a simple axiome, 4 so shall we finde in a simple Syllogisme: [Page 256]affirmation, and negation: generali­tie, and specialitie.

Affirmatiue, Ramus. when all the parts are affirmatiue. Negatiue, when either part of the Antecedent, and the Conclusion are negatiue.

Every Syllogisme (sayth Aristotle) is either affirmatiue, 5 or negatiue, vni­versall, or in part. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. Ʋniversall is that which consisteth of all vniversall termes; particular consi­steth of termes, as well particular as vni­versall. Wherefore, if the Conclusion be vniversall, the termes must be vniver­sall. But the termes may be vniversall, and yet the conclusion not vniversall. In every Syllogisme, either both or one of the propolitions must be like the con­clusion. Affirmatiue, or negatiue, neces­sary, or Contingent. And thus alwayes the termes in a Syllogisme must be af­fected: otherwise it is not simply a true one. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 24.

From hence Aristotle inferreth fur­ther (in the place last alledged) that, In every Syllogisme there must be one terme vniversall, and one affirmatiue: because, without a vniversall it is not a Syllogisme, or belongs not to the thing in hand, or begs the question. Thus far he. We may say the like of that Syllo­gisme, that consists of all negatiues.

It may seeme by this, 6 that Aristotle doth not acknowledge any Syllo­gisme that consisteth of proper pro­positions. And indeed, it is doubtfull what his iudgement is in the matter: yet, in all likelihood he doth acknow­l [...]dge them no lesse then Ramus, as shall appeare when I come vnto the particular kind [...]s; where this whole precept will be made more certaine, and cleere to our vnderstanding.

CHAP. XLIX. Of Aristotles three figures.

ARistotle delivers the forme of Syllogismes: 1 Prior. lib. 1. cap. 4.5. & 6. & cap. 32. and divides them into three figures, or assignes the ma­king of them three manner of wayes. In the first place alledged, he speakes of them so vniversally, that he com­prehends false or vnprofitable Syllo­gismes, as well as true: but in the lat­ter, he speakes of true Syllogismes precisely, on this manner.

• 1. If the last extreame be affirmed of the middle terme, and the muddle terme of the first extreame, or the last extreame be denyed of the mid­dle terme, and the middle terme af­firmed of the first extreame; then it is the first figure.
• 2. If the middle terme be both affir­med, and denyed of both the ex­treames: then it is the second figure.
• [Page 259]3. If the last extreame be affirmed, or denyed of the middle terme and the first extreame be affirmed of the middle terme: then, it is the third figure.
• And after this manner, the middle terme ought to be disposed in each figure. So farre he. cap. 32.

Every vniversall affirmatiue question, is proued by the first figure onely: and that after one manner of way.

Every negatine vniversall question is proued, both by the first, and second fi­gure: by the first one way, by the se­cond two wayes.

Every particular affirmatiue question is proued, by the first, and third figures: one way, by the first; three wayes by the third.

A negatiue particular, is proued in all the figures, one way in the first, two wayes in the second, and three wayes in the third. Prior. lib. 1. cap. 26.

Thus farre Aristotle doth giue vs rules for the framing of a Syllogisme, 2 and the manner of concluding all [Page 260]kind of questions by them. I esteemed it the best way to set downe all his precepts together; because they are the easier to be remembred. In the next place, I will set downe what Ra­mus hath delivered, and compare them together, that we may the bet­ter see their agreement, and thereby we shall the better vnderstand, then by either of them apart.

CHAP. L. Of Ramus contract Syllogisme.

Ramus doth dispose his precepts, 1 for the framing of Syllogismes, in a different maner from Aristotle; I will report them as I finde them in him, and apply Aristotle to him. Thus then he beginneth:

This forme of Syllogisme is Ari­stotles third figure, reported in the Chapter going before: and containes nothing more then we finde in him, onely they differ in the name.

[Contract] This word giues the name vnto this forme. 2 In common speech it signifies a thing crusht toge­ther: or drawn into a narrow roome: the reason of the name ariseth from the nature of the thing; namely, the short, & briefe disposing of the third argument with the question, in this figure. Wherein it differs from the rest: and it must bee so contract, be­cause wee finde it so in the common vse of men, and not otherwise vnfol­ded.

[Argument brought &c.] 3 By these words, and the rest which follow, the different kind of this forme is set out [Page 262]by foure properties, whereof this is the first namely, that the third argu­ment, (or middle terme which is v­sed to proue, that the latter part of the question is rightly ioyned vnto, or se­uered from the former part) is put for an example, or an instance assig­ning the thing wherein the question concluded is true: as wee shall see a­non in the Syllogisme it selfe.

In this all the Logick Schooles doe agree. 4 First they call this forme an Expository Syllogisme onely, because the third argument is as it were an ex­position, or commentary to vnfold the truth of the question concluded: or else, because the argument doth ex­pose the indeterminate subiect part of the question, vnto one certaine, and singular thing: as wee shall see when wee come to giue instance of this precept. Secondly; The Authors of best credit doe expresly teach the same thing with Ramus, An exposite­ry Syllogisme (sayth Aliaco 1 sent. q. 5. lit. Z.) is then good, when the mid­dle terme importeth one thing, and no [Page 263]more. If it comprebend many distinct things, it is naught. According to A­ristotle, this forme concludes particu­lar questions onely, as hath beene shewed, cap. 49. therefore in his iudg­ment the third argument must bee put for an example, for such questi­ons cannot be proved by any other.

[Particular question] This is the second propertie of this form, 5 no que­stions are concluded here, but parti­cular: and so sayth Aristotle in the chapter going before, and hee adds, that, they are concluded three wayes by it. If therefore any question that is generall, or proper; be concluded in this figure, then the Syllogisme is false, and proues nothing.

[Antecedent in both parts] This is the third propertie of this forme, 6 the third argument hath the first place, or is subiected both in the proposition, and assumption. Aristotle hath the same thing expresly in the 49. Chap­ter: The middle terme (say the Iesu­ites, in their commentary vpon Ari­stotle: Prior. lib. 1. cap. 6.) is subiected [Page 264]to both parts of the extreame in the third figure.

[Assumption affirmed] This is the last propertie of this figure. 7 Aristotle requires the same thing too: namely, that, the first extreame be affirmed of the middle terme, therefore the as­sumption is affirmed: for (according to him) the first extreame is alwayes disposed in the assumption: and the Iesuites in the place last alledged doe expresly teach, that, in the third figure the Minor must alwayes be affirma­tiue.

We haue an instance of this figure in this briefe Discourse.

Here we finde a particular question concluded. 8 Some confidence, &c. This I say is particular; because, ver­tue is attributed to confidence, but in some part, not to all kinde of confi­dence vniversally. The third argu­ment is a singular thing, viz. Con­stancy, [Page 265]and this is put as an example, or singular instance; reducing the in­determinate subiect part of the que­stion vnto one determinate thing: and thereby expounding, or vnfol­ding that which was darke, by that which is cleere, and exposing vncer­taintie to a certaintie. This forme is contracted, because it containes no more expresly but the question, and the third argument: The affirmatiue assumption, and conclusion are both wanting: if they be supplyed it will stand in this forme.

• Constancy is a vertue.
• Constancy is a Confidence.
• Therefore some Confidence is a ver­tue.

By Aristotles rule the proposition of this figure may be negatiue, 9 and Ramus agrees with him when hee debarres the assumption onely from negation. In a Contract forme wee haue this figure, in this example.

If we doe explicate this contracted forme, we shall haue it stand thus.

• No audaciousnesse is a vertue.
• All audaciousnesse is confidence.
• Therefore some confidence is not a vertue.

We learne from ARistotle. 10 cap. 48. that, the proposition and assumption may be vniversall, yet the conclusion not vniversall: here we see it avowd. More examples are requisite to illu­strate this precept, wherefore I will adde some others.

• Some man is prudent: as Socrates.
• Some man is not fortunate: as Hec­tor.

Both these examples may be thus vnfolded.

• Socrates is prudent.
• Socrates is a man.
• Therefore some man is prudent.
• [Page 267] Hector is not fortunate.
• Hector is a man.
• Therefore some man is not fortunate.

Aristotle requires (as we haue set downe cap. 48.) 11 that every Syllogisme must haue one proposition vniversall. It seemes, either that rule holds not alwayes, or else he doth not acknow­ledge that such Syllogismes as these be, to be true: but (if I may say what I thinke) I beleeue neither of them; for, the nature of the things themselues will avow this kinde of disputing. No conclusion can be inferred, vn­lesse there be one proposition vni­versall: for nothing can be deduced out of mere singulars.

If any demand which proposition in these two last arguments are vni­versall?

I answer, 12 the assumption of them both be vniversall: for that is a vni­versall, where the predicate is attribu­ted vnto all, or the whole subiect; so as, to attribute vnto all, and vnto the whole subiect, is one and the same thing (in the [Page 268] iudgement of Aristotle) Prior. lib. 1. cap. 1. Now, the terme man, is attri­buted to Socrates, and Hector wholy: so as, there is no part of Socrates, vnto which that terme doth not belong. If any obiect, that Socrates is an indi­viduall, and therefore that terme can­not be subiected in a vniversall pro­position. I answer, If that terme did import no more but an individuall, then I grant the argument to be good, but in this place it doth not import a meere individuall: for then we must say: This Socrates, &c. which we may not, yea although we might say so, yet that terme imports more then an individuall; for he is spoken of as a man, and therefore as a species, not as this, or that individuall body, or nu­mericall subsistency. If this be true, then Aristotles rule is vniversall; els it comes too short; and he hath omit­ted one kinde of Syllogisme out of his Logicke, which I dare not grant.

I suppose, that, this precept is made cleere enough, therefore I passe to the next.

CHAP. LI. Of an explicate Syllogisme in generall.

ARistotle hath not shewed vs the difference of explicate and con­tracted Syllogismes expresly; 1 and in the thing: but (according to him) we must follow nature in every pre­cept of Logicke, and that is as much as if he had sayd so: for nature com­mands, that, some Syllogismes be ex­plicate, and not contract: because no third argument, that serues to proue a question that is vniversall or pro­per, can be put as an example of ei­ther [Page 270]of them; therefore there must be some Syllogismes explicate, that can­not be contracted: and there may be some contracted, that need not be ex­plicated; and consequently (accor­ding to nature) some Syllogismes may be explicate, and some contract.

2 The presence of the two propositi­ons, and conclusion is a sufficient rea­son why we should call a Syllogisme explicate: for thereby it is vnfolded to the full. The first propertie, that be­longs vnto the Syllogismes of this kinde, is this, viz. The proposition is al­wayes generall, if the conclusion be vni­versall, or particular, if the conclusion be proper, then the proposition is proper also. Now, this law followes the dis­posing of the third argument, with the question: not the will or device of man (as we shall see by the parti­cular instances;) The conclusion must be like the proposition, and assumption, when both of them are vniversall, and affirmatiue, or proper, and affirmatiue, then the conclusion must be so too, when the assumptionis particular, and nega­tiue, [Page 271]or proper and negatiue, or the pro­position negatiue, then the conclusion must be accordingly; therefore, when­soever an explicate Syllogisme varies from any of these rules, it is false, and concludes nothing: nature sayes it must be thus, therefore when it is o­therwise, nature is perverted, and we erre from truth. These rules, and no more but these, belong to an explicate Syllogisme in common.

CHAP. LII. Of the first kind of an explicate Syllogisme.

1 THis kind of Syllogisme hath two properties: The one, that the third argument alwayes followes (that is) it [Page 272]is the predicate, or consequent part, in the proposition, and assumption. The se­cond propertie is, that either the propo­sition, or assumption, is alwayes denyed. I say, either; because sometime the proposition is denyed, and sometimes the assumption indifferently; as the question and third argument require. If one be negatiue, it is enough. Therefore, in this figure negatiue questions (onely) are concluded. I say negatiue, either vniversall, particu­lar, or proper.

2 We haue this whole precept contai­ned in Aristotles second figure: as the Reader may see, reported cap. 49. therefore I need not repeat it here. I will alledge some instances to shew the practice of this rule.

In this argument the proposition is an vniversall affirmatiue, the assump­tion, [Page 273]and conclusion is vniversall ne­gatiue.

3 This frame containes a proposition negatiue vniversall, an assumption af­firmatiue speciall, and a conclusion negatiue speciall.

In this example, the proposition is affirmatiue proper; the assumption and conclusion is negatiue proper These three are sufficient to shew vs the vse of this rule; therefore I will content my selfe with them, and passe to the next.

CHAP. LIII. Of the second kind of an Ex­plicate Syllogisme.

1 THis figure hath also two proper­ties. The first: the argument go­eth before in the proposition (that is) it is subjected and thereby it hath the first place. In the second propertie, the argument followeth in the assumpti­on. (that is) it is predicated in the as­sumption; and the assumption is affir­med, or affirmatiue: as if it were sayd, the argument is predicated affirmatiue­ly in the assumption.

Aristotle made this law, and cals it his first figure: as his owne words doe shew, related Cap. 49.

It may be doubted, 2 whether Ari­stotle or Ramus hath kept best order in placing the figures of a Syllo­gisme. [Page 275]I answere, it is not materiall, whether of them be first, or last: for, no one of them doth giue light, or knowledge to the other: neither doth it further our vse of them, when this is set before that, or that before this: Aristotle preferred the one, because all questions might be concluded in it: Ramus preferd another, because the argument is disposed with the question after a more single, or sim­ple maner: therefore both did well so farre as they had reason, neither of them did better, because (as I sayd) their order doth neither profit, nor hinder their vse, therefore I haue said enough to satisfie the doubt, and will goe on to shew how this rule may be vsed.

In this example, 3 all the parts are vniversally affirmatiue, wherefore I [Page 276]will shew another.

Here we haue the proposition, and conclusion vniversally negatiue, and the assumption vniversally affirma­tiue. In the like sort, this rule is vse­full, in all other questions that are concluded.

Aristotle, 4 is of opinion, that this onely is the forme or figure of a perfit Syllogisme: because, every question may be proved by this, and both the other may be referred vnto this, therefore they are made perfit by it. Prior. lib. 1. Cap. 4. Thus much must be granted, and so farre it is perfit; yea and the onely perfect figure. The second, and third figures, are no lesse agree­able to Aristotles definition of a Syl­logisme, then the first; as he shall see that will examine them thereby: therefore they want nothing of that [Page 277]essentiall perfection, that is in the first, what can haue greater perfection then that, which every way agrees to the definition thereof; and conse­quently, they inferre their conclusi­ons as necessarily as the first. The first figure onely hath perfection, essenti­all, and accidentall. The second, and third haue perfection essentiall, but not accidentall, and this is the diffe­rence betweene them. By these things that are past, wee haue finished all those precepts, which teach vs, how to frame arguments together in a simple Syllogisme. In the next place, we must come to a compound Syllogis­me, if we looke no further then Ra­mus, but we must looke further; else we shall make our art defectiue: for Logicke doth teach vs to iudge, as well as to dispose. If we must iudge, then we must looke for truth, or falshood, and consequently for precepts that shall teach vs how to finde out truth, and the severall kindes of it: For this, wee must consult with Aristotle, therefore in the next Chapter, I will [Page 278]report his precepts, with as much bre­vitie as I can.

CHAP. LIIII. Of a Demonstratiue Syllogisme.

IN the first place, 1 we must set downe the precepts which concerne neces­sary truth; which vsually is called Science: for, that is first in nature, time, excellency, and our apprehen­sion, of that Aristotle sayth thus.

Science is

• Indemonstrable.
• Demonstratiue. Post. lib. 1. Cap. 3.

We haue delivered the precepts of Indemonstrable Science, in the mat­ter of a definition, and distribution, wee must now come to the precepts of Demonstratiue science: and first to the definition thereof.

But for asmuch as, 2 to know is dou­ble [Page 279] viz: To vnderstand what, or wher­fore a thing is, and secondly, That a thing is, Poster. lib. 1. Cap. 13. there­fore, both of them are defined by this one sentence.

This sentence is obscure in it selfe, therefore hee doth vnfold it in these words.

Thus farre the nature of demon­stratiue science, is set out in common.

The proper nature of that science whereby wee vnderstand what or wherefore a thing is; 4 is set out in these words.

By this whole discourse we haue rules to know, 5 what Syllogisine con­taines a truth simply necessary, and we are sent vnto them onely, whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion, and such causes also, as are better knowne vnto vs then the conclusion it selfe. Where­fore, for further explication hereof, Aristotle doth shew vs what causes these be, and how they concurre; [Page 282] In these words:

Now wee doe fully vnderstand, 6 where to finde necessary truth in a Syllogisme. Our next labour must be, to set out these scientificall Syllo­gismes by other properties; that we may know them the more easily, and certainely; for that cause, Aristotle doth distribute a demonstration after this manner.

This distribution followes the na­ture of a Syllogisme, 7 for every demon­stration is a syllogisme, though every syllogisme be not a demonstration. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very vsefull to giue vs knowledge where to finde this ne­cessary truth, and the degrees of it. To conclude, this matter of demon­stratiue science, he sayth: ‘The first figure is fittest for a demon­stration, yea, chiefly proper vnto this science, and it is to be sought out, one­ly by that. Poster. lib. 1. cap. 14.’

Some perhaps will looke, 8 that I [Page 284]should giue instances, to open the vse of these precepts: and it may seeme the more needfull, because some are of opinion, that, no example can be given answerable to this rule.

I answer; this conceit is very vaine: for, cannot any of the causes, or all of them together, serue to proue a sen­tence that is called into question? or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions? Without doubt they may. Also, it is most certaine, that, every propositi­on comprehends a necessary truth, wherein the effect is argued by the causes; for the effect is no more, but a comprehension of all the causes: and when the causes doe argue the effect, the effect is resolued into the causes; therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect. And consequently, such propositi­ons are necessary; and what they are, such the conclusion must be, that is lawfully inferred from them.

If there may be premises, and con­clusion answerable to this rule, then [Page 285]no doubt, there be examples of it, and we may shew them if need were, but I will saue that labour for this time, for divers reasons. 1. Aristotle hath done that alreadie, Poster. lib. 2. cap. 11. so as, he that will, may make vse of them. 2. This kinde of know­ledge cannot easily be discerned, see­ing it is very hard for vs to vnderstand those principles of a thing that are true, first, and of the same kinde: as Aristotle doth admonish, Poster. lib. 1. cap. 9. Difficile autem &c. 3. By a mans owne practice, and obseruation, he shall finde them, and their vse in na­turall things: and in them onely: for in matters divine, and spirituall, such arguments can haue no place. In them we vnderstand by faith, not by sence, and faith hath Gods authoritie for the principle thereof, not the nature or causes of the things themselues. I say, a man may finde them by practice, because by sence we get memory, by the remembring the doing of the same thing often, we get experience, by our many times remembring, our experience is [Page 286]one: amongst all these that we doe re­member, there is one thing wherein mans minde doth rest satisfied aboue many: that which is one, and the same amongst the rest, becomes a principium of science, if it belong vnto a thing that is. Thus much we learne from Ari­stotle, Poster. lib. 2. cap. 19. Exsensu, &c.

The medium of a demonstration, 9 whereby wee know that a thing is, consists in some of these that follow.

Thus farre goe Aristotles precepts, to shew vs what Syllogismes containe necessary truth; and the degrees thereof. If any expect examples of these last: I answer, they may be gi­ven; because we may haue examples of the former, as I haue alreadie pro­ved. They may be given with more ease then the former; because the things contained in them are neerer [Page 288]to our vnderstanding: but I will saue that labour, least I make my discourse ouer long, and the Reader too idle. We vse that rule with most profit, which we vnderstand and practice together.

CHAP. LV. Of Syllogismes containing con­jecturall truth.

IN the former Chapter, 1 I haue dis­patched all the precepts that con­cerne a Demonstration. In this, I must set downe those, which teach vs how to finde out Syllogismes, that containe probable, and coniecturall truth. Aristotles precepts that con­cerne this kinde of truth, are these vnder-written.

These two precepts are all that I can finde in Aristotle, 2 touching these Syllogismes: and I thinke, they are full and plaine enough, so as, wee neede not seeke for more, either pre­cepts, or examples to set out their na­ture, and make vs vnderstand them, therefore, they shall passe without further search or explication.

From hence wee may inferre that thing we seeke for on this manner:

To conclude this point, 3 we ought not to forget, that Aristotle giues vs rules of such Syllogismes, as hee cals Contentions, and a Paralogisme: his deed was good, because it doth some waies serue to giue vs vnderstanding, in the precepts of Syllogismes afore­sayd: but I will omit the sayd rules, because they tend to shew vs precepts by privation or negation onely. Ari­stotle did well, because from him we haue the first formall Art of Logicke. I must omit them, in as much as all things that might explicate a precept, fitte not my present purpose, there­fore here I will put a finall end to this matter.

CHAP. LVI. Of the first kinde of connex Syllogismes.

HItherto I haue supplyed the o­versight of Ramus, 1 thereupon the nature of Art requires, that, I en­ter vpon the rules of a compound Syl­logisme, Ramus doth define them all in this one short sentence.

Aristotle doth acknowledge com­pound Syllogismes, 2 as I haue shewed Cap. 48. But hee doth not define them at all, (for any thing that I find) neither is it greatly needfull, for their nature will appeare well enough, when wee come to each speciall kinde.

In simple Syllogismes, 3 the argu­ment, and the question made two distinct propositions: in these, they make but one. In them, one thing was simply attributed to another: here the whole question, and argu­ment is compoūded together, which properties doe make them really to differ, in their maner or kinde of dis­posing. These compound Syllogis­mes are thus divided.

Aristotle doth call all compound Syllogismes by the name of Hypothe­ticall, 4 because they inferre the conclu­sion vpon the supposition of some part [Page 293]thereof: & doth divide them into such as conclude according vnto transumpti­on: and qualitie, (that is as Pacius vn­derstands it) when the minor is taken out of the maior; as in this example. If a man, then a living creature. But a man, therefore a living creature. And when it concludes by force of the qualitie of things disioyned: as in this example; It is either day, or night. But it is day. Therefore it is not night. He brings this at large Prior. lib. 1. cap. 23. & 29. If we vnderstand Aristotle thus, he agrees wholy with Ramus, and in all reason we should so vnderstand him. In the last place alledged, he doth promise to explicate how many wayes a Syllogisme is made Hypo­thetically: but (as Pacius truely sayes) the place where he doth it, is not to be found. And I am of opinion, that, he did willingly neglect it, because he doth suppose, that, every question, and argument may be framed, and con­cluded in a simple Syllogisme: and thus himselfe teacheth, prior. lib. 1. cap. 23.

The parts of the proposition, 5 in a connexe Syllogisme are called by the name of antecedent, and consequent; and that very fitly: for the one goes before, in place, and nature, the other followes accordingly; the one inferres, and the other is inferred.

The antecedent is ass [...]med, when the words of it are barely repeated in the second proposition, or assumption. If affirmatiue, or negatiue there, then they are affirmatiue, or negatiue here.

The consequent is concluded, when the latter part of the proposition, is barely repeated in the Conclusion. We haue examples of this kinde ve­ry frequent.

In this example, the former part of the proposition, is barely repeated in [Page 295]the assumption: and the latter part, in the conclusion. And thus the que­stion, and the third argument, is al­wayes disposed in this kinde of Con­nexe Syllogismes: sometimes the proofe of the antecedent is assumed, not the antecedent it selfe: In that case, it must be reduced vnto this forme; an example of this is layd out in Moses words, Numb. 12.14.

This example assumes not the an­tecedent, but the proofe thereof, ar­guing the same from the greater to the lesse, thus. Her Father did it, be­cause God did it. Her face is defiled with spittle: for it is Leprous.

This sort of Connexe Syllogismes, 7 may easily be reduced vnto a simple, for it doth change the manner of dis­posing very little: Wee may frame it thus;

In the 1 Cor. 15.12. 8 we haue an example of this kinde of Connexe, that seemes to be somewhat more dif­ficult; Where the Apostle reasons thus:

I say, this example is more difficult then the former: for, the proposition hath two intire, and distinct simple axiomes in it: but it may be reduced, and brought into this forme.

And this is wholly agreeable to the Apostles disputation: for he argueth against them that denyed the last: but in his judgement they might not doe so; because they did confesse the first. I hope I haue made this cleere enough to our vnderstandings: there­fore I will passe to the next.

CHAP. LVII. Of the second kinde of Connexe Syllogismes.

TO take away (in this place) im­porteth, 1 the putting of a Contra­diction: [Page 298]so as, the Contradictory to the latter part of the proposition, makes the assumption, and the Con­tradictory vnto the former part of the proposition, makes the Conclusion. The Apostle Gal. 3.18. giues vs an instance of this precept.

The assumption in this argument, is Contradictory, to the latter part of the proposition, That sayth, the inhe­ritance is not of promise. The assump­tion sayth, the inheritance i [...] of promise. In the like sort, the Conclusion is con­tradictory to the first part of the pro­position. The one sayth, the inheri­tance is of the Law. The other sayth, the inheritance is not of the Law. This kinde, is easily (also) brought into a simple, thus:

This kinde of Conn [...]xe hath but three termes in it, viz. 1 Inheritance. 2. Promise. 3. Law. And the first is repeated, or twise subiected in the proposition, wherevpon this kinde is easily turned from compound to simple.

We haue an example Gal. 2.21. 2 that is not so easily conuerted.

I haue propounded this Syllogisme cap. 44 and haue there shewed, how it may be made into a simple forme: therefore it is needlesse to repeate it here. The truth contained in these Syllogismes, is to be judged of, accor­ding to the precepts of a connexe axiome: if we take them as they are [Page 300]Connex. But if we take them as sim­ple syllogismes, then their truth must be judged of, according to the pre­cepts of a simple syllogisme. There­fore we haue sayd enough touching their naturall vse.

CHAP. LVIII. Of the first kinde of a Dis­junct Syllogisme.

BY taking away, 1 and concluding, is here vnderstood Contradicting and repeating, in the same sort as I haue shewed, cap. 56. & 57. Aristotle calls these Hypotheticall; and so he well may: for the principall all foundati­on of them, is a supposition: for one [Page 301]thing is taken for granted, and that must be granted, or else they can con­clude nothing.

By the word [one] is meant, 2 not one terme; but one part of the oppo­sition: for, we must remember, that, no arguments but opposites come in­to the Syllogismes of this kinde; now opposites are sometimes one, against one, and some other times many a­gainst one: so as, those many make one part, and the other one, makes the other part: therefore, it is truely sayd, one is taken away, when all those are contradicted that make one part of the opposition: and one is as­sumed, when those many are barely repeated. Againe, that word one, is not vnderstood indifferently of either part of the opposition: for then, the cōtradicting of any one single terme, must inferre the concluding of all o­thers that oppose that one: but that may not be: for onely one of them at once, can agree to the same subiect, in the same respect, part, and time. Therefore it is vnderstood of all the [Page 302]single termes that are disioyned, ex­cept one: because from thence, that one that is not Contradicted, may well be Concluded: but where one single terme is opposed vnto another single terme, there the Contradicting of either of them indifferently, doth inferre the Concluding of the o­ther.

By this precept the proposition may be negatiue in some part, 3 and there­fore those arguments that are oppo­sed as Contradictories, haue place in this kinde of arguing. I will bring in­stances of all sorts to make these things plaine.

The second terme opposed in the proposition is negatiue, and that is Contradicted in the assumption: the first terme in the proposition is affir­matiue, and that is concluded or re­peated in the Conclusion.

We haue another instance of this. 4 2 Sam. 24.13.

This argument doth presume, that David must vndergoe one of these three, and no more, but that one. If that be granted, it doth inferre the Conclusion necessarily. If that be de­nyed, it hath no force to Conclude. In the assumption, two branches of the disjunction (comprehended in the proposition) are Contradicted: The third branch (vntouched in the assumption) is barely repeated in the Conclusion. We may bring this ar­gument into a simple Syllogisme, in this sort.

The proposition presumes, that one of the three must be indured, and no more but one of them. If that be granted, the whole argument is good, if that be denyed, it hath no force to proue.

I will adde one example more, 5 that I may make this precept cleere to the vttermost.

Here is supposed, that every man hath one of these two, and but one of these: and thereupon, it inferres the conclusion necessarily: otherwise not. Wherein it agrees with the two for­mer; It hath two single termes onely, opposed each to other; and it is in­different [Page 305]whether of them two had beene Contradicted in the assumpti­on, and concluded, or barely repeated in the Conclusion: for the forme of Syllogisme, and force of truth, is the same in both: and this doth make it differ from the two former. If we de­sire to see it made a simple syllogisme, we must frame it thus.

This precept is now made plaine e­nough, therefore I proceed to the se­cond sort of a disjunct Syllogisme.

CHAP. LIX. Of the second kinde of Dis­junct Syllogismes.

BY assuming, 1 is vnderstood a bare repeating, and taking away, is a contradicting: in the same sort as hath beene before set downe.

In this second kinde of disjunct Syllogisme: there are three proper­ties. First, The proposition is who [...]y af­firmatiue. Secondly, One single terme onely of the opposition, is repeated in the assumption. Thirdly, The other part is contradicted in the conclusion therfore this forme doth really differ from the former. That concludes affirmatiues, and no negatiues: this concludes ne­gatiues, and no affirmatiues. Gal. Cap: 3 ver: 2.3. doth yeeld vs an ar­gument of this kinde.

2 This disputation doth suppose two [Page 307]things: first, They had the spirit. Se­condly, one of these two, the law, or the Gospell gaue it them (not both together.) Those two things being granted the argument cannot be de­nyed. If either of them might be deni­ed, the argument may not be gran­ted. The assumption doth barely re­peate the second terme opposed: and the conclusion doth contradict the first, I will adde this second instance.

Here we finde first, 3 divers termes opposed in the proposition, one a­gainst many; and many against one. Secondly; They are all affirmatiue. Thirdly; The first terme is barely re­peated in the assumption. Fourthly; The other three, are contradicted in [Page 308]the conclusion; Fiftly, A supposition that every action hath one of these properties, and no more but one of them.

The reason why one opposite terme onely, is assumed; and the rest contradicted, is: because but one op­posite, can be in the subject at once, and the presence of that, doth inforce the absence of the rest.

We may bring these into simple Syllogismes, after this sort.

I doubt not, 4 but this will suffice to shew the truth, and vse of this precept. It is needles for me to set forth what truth is contained in these Syllo­gismes; for if we take them as dis­junctiue, then they containe truth no [Page 309]otherwise then as disiunctiue axioms doe. If we take them as simple, then they must be referred vnto simple Syllogismes: therefore in the precepts of them, we shall know what truth is contained in these. I might also al­ledge the reason why Ramus doth prosecute all the precepts of Com­pound Syllogismes; and thereby ju­stifie him. And for what cause Ari­stotle did but name them, & not pro­secute them; and so justifie him also; but (I thinke) I haue done that suf­ficiently in the matter of Compound Axiomes. Cap. 42. they, and these, draw in one, and the same line: there­fore I referre the Reader vnto that place. Repetitions are but lost la­bour.

Now we are come to an end of all the precepts of Logicke: so as, 5 there is no more required, to make a Logici­an, then what hath beene sayd alrea­die. But that seemes not enough to Ramus, for he brings another mem­ber of this art, and calls it Methode: but I omit the same of purpose; for [Page 310]divers reasons. 1. No precepts of Lo­gicke can teach it, because even (ac­cording to him) Method is no more, but the orderly placing of sentences to­gether. But the precepts of Logicke cannot teach that, it being no more, but the generall nature of art, as wee haue alreadie found Cap. 1. (I say of art simply, abstracted from all parti­culars, and not applyed to Rhetorick, Logicke, or any other; as we do when we say Rhetoricke is an art &c.) 2. If any precepts of Logicke, haue power to teach the orderly framing of sen­tences together, then they must be, either some that are past, or some that are yet to come: if we must haue re­course to these, then their Authors, and places must be named. But that is impossible. If the precedent pre­cepts do teach it, then we haue done enough alreadie, and can doe no more, except wee will repeat the same things againe. 3. If we define, and distribute according to the pre­cepts of a definition and distribution, Cap. 34. &c. We cannot place defi­nitions, [Page 311]and distributions, nor any o­ther sentences that depend vpō them, vnduly and out of order; for then the most generall will come first, and the most speciall will come last: and this is all the Method Ramus required. 4. He alledges Aristotles authoritie for method; but altogether without cause; for he alledgeth no place, nor words, and I am sure he cannot. A­ristotle calls all the precepts of Logicke a Method, whereby wee come to know, how to discusse. Top. lib. 1. cap. 2. lib 8. cap. 12. prior. lib. 1. cap. 31. therfore he did neuer meane to make Method, one member of his Art, distinct from the rest: seeing therefore we haue nothing to say touching Method, I must here put an end to the whole Worke.