GREAT [...] Fires happening in Townes or Cities, are sometimes the cause that other contiguous houses are spoyld and demolisht, besides those which the flame it selfe cea­zes: So now, in the case of Shipmony, not onely the judgement it selfe which hath beene given against the subject, doth make a great g [...]p and breach in the rights and Franchises of England, but the arguments and pleadings also, which conduced to that judgement, have extended the mis­chiefe further, and scarce left anything unviolated. Such strange contradiction there hath beene amongst the pleaders, and dissent amongst the Judges, even in [Page 2] those Lawes which are most fundamentall, that we are lef [...] in a more confused uncertain­ty of our highest priviledges, and those cu­stomes which are most essentiall to Free­dome then we were before. To introduce the legality of the Ship-scot, such a Prero­gative hath been maintained, as destroyes all other Law, and is incompatible with popular liberty: and such art hath beene used to de­ny, traverse, avoid, or frustrate the true force or meaning of all our Lawes and Charters, that if wee grant Ship-money upon these grounds, with Ship-money we grant all be­sides. To remove therefore this uncertain­ty, which is the mother of all injustice, con­fusion, and publike dissention, it is most re­quisite that this grand Councell and Tres­ [...]ault Court (of which none ought to thinke dishonourably) would take these Ard [...]a Reg­ni, these weighty and dangerous difficulties, into serious debate, an solemnly end that strife, which no other place of Judicature can so effectually extinguish.

That the King ought to have aid of his subjects in time of danger, and common aid in case of common danger, is laid down for a ground, and agreed upon by all sides, But about this aid there remain [...]s much variety and contrariety of opinion amongst the grea­test Sages of our Law; and the principall [Page 3] points therein controverted are these foure: First, by what Law the King may compell aid. Secondly, when it is to bee levied. Thirdly, how it is to be levied. Fourthly, what kinde of aid it must be.

1 Some of the Judges argue from the Law of Nature, that since the King is head, and [...]ound to protect, therefore he must have wherewithall to protect: but this proves on­ly that which no man denies. The next Law insisted upon is Prerogative; but it is not punctually explained what Prerogative, whe­ther the Prerogative naturall of all Kings, or the Prerogative legall of the Kings of Eng­land. Some of the Judges urge, that by Law there is naturall allegeance due to the King from the subject; and it doth not stand with that allygeance that the Princes cannot com­pell aid, but must require the common con­sent therein. Others presse, that the Law hath [...]etled a property of goods in the subject, and it doth not stand with that property, that the King may demand them without consent. Some take it for granted, that by Royall Pre­rogative, as it is part of the Lawes of Eng­land, the King may charge the Nation with­out publike consent, and therefore it being part of the Law, it is no invasion upon Law. Others take it for granted, that to le­vie money without consent is unjust, and [Page 4] that the Kings prerogative cannot extend to any unjust thing: So many contrary points of warre doe our Trumpets sound at once, and in such confusion doe our Judges leave us, whilest either side takes that for granted, which by the other is utterly denied. By these grounds Royall prerogative, and popular li­berty may seeme things irreconciliable; though indeed they are not; neither doth ei­ther side in words affirme so much, though their proofes bee so contradictory. King Charles his maxime is, that the peoples liber­ty strenghteus the Kings prerogative, and the Kings prerogative is to maintain the peoples liberty; and by this it seemes that both are compatible, and that prerogative is the more subordinate of the two. The Kings words al­so since have beene upon another occasion, That he ever intended his people should en­joy property of good [...], and liberty of per­sons, holding no King so great, as he that was King of a rich and free people: and if they had not property of goods, and liberty of per­sons, they could bee neither rich nor free. Here we see, that the liberty of the subject is a thing which makes a King great; and that the Kings prerogative hath only for its ends to maintaine the peoples liberty. Wherefore it is manifest, that in nature there is more fa­vour due to the liberty of the subject, then to [Page 5] the Prerogative of the King, since the one is ordained onely for the preservation of the other; and then to salve these knots, our dis­pute must be, what prerogative the peoples good and profit will beare, not what liberty the Kings absolutenesse or prorogative may admit [...] and in this dispute it is more just that we appeale to written Lawes, than to the breasts of Kings themselves. For we know Nationall Lawes are made by consent of Prince and people both, and so cannot bee conceived to be prejudiciall to either side; but where the meere will of the Prince is Law, or where some few Ministers of his may alleage what they will for Law in his behalfe, no mediocrity or justice is to be ex­pected: we all know that no slave or villaine can be subjected to more miserable bond­age than to be left meerly to his Lords abso­lute discretion▪ and we all see that the thral­dome of such is most grievous, which have no bounds set to their Lord discretion. Let us then see what Fortescue writes, not regard what Court-dependants doe interpret, and his words are, [...]ol. 84. cap. 36. Rex Angliae nec per se, nec per suos Ministros Tollagia subsidia, aut quaevis onera alia impo [...]it l [...]gis suis, aut leges corum [...], aut nova condit sine concessione vel asse [...]su totius regni sui in Parliamento suo expresso. These words are full and generall, [Page 6] and plain, and in direct affirmance of the an­cient Law and usage of England, and it is not sufficient for the Kings Counsell to say, that these words extend not to Ship-money: for if there were any doubt, the interpretation ought rather to favour liberty than Prero­gative.

It is not sufficient for Judge Iones to say, that it is proprium quarto modo to a King, and an inseparable naturall Prerogative of the Crowne to raise monies without assent, un­lesse he first prove that such Prerogative be good and profitable for the people, and such as the people cannot subsist at all without it: nay, such as no Nation can subsist without it. This word Prerogative hath divers accepti­ons: sometimes it is taken for the altitude of Honour, sometimes for the latitude of Pow­er. So we say the Prerogative of an Empe­rour is greater than that of a King; and that of a King greater than that of a Duke, or petty Poten [...]ate: and yet of Kings we say that the King of Denmark hath not so great a Prerogative as the King of England, nor the King of England as the King of France, &c. For here though their honour and title be the same, yet their power is not. Sometimes Pre­rogative signifies as much as Soveraignty; and in this generall consideration wee say, that all supreame Commanders are equall: [Page 7] and that they all have this essential insepa­rable Prerogative, that their power ought to be ample enough for their perfection, and good of the people, and no ampler: because the supreame of all humane Lawes is salus po­puli. so this Law all Lawes almost stoope; God dispences with many of his Lawes, ra­ther than salus populi shall bee endangered; and that iron-law, which we call necessity itselfe, is but subservient to this Law: for ra­ther then a Nation shall perish, any thing shall be held necessary, and legall by necessi­ty: But to come to the Prerogative of Eng­land, and to spe [...]ke of it in generall, and comparatively; we say it is a harmonious composure of policie, scarce to be paralleld in all the world, it is neither so boundlesse as to opresse the people in unjust things, nor so strait as to disable the King in just things; by the true fundamental constituti­ons of England, the beame hangs even be­tween the King and the Subject: the Kings power doth not tread [...]nder foot the peo­ples liberty, nor the peoples liberty the Kings power. All other Countries almost in Christendome, differ from us in this mo­dule of policie: some, but very few, allow a greater spheare of Soveraignty to their Prin­ces; but for the most part now adayes the world is given to republistes, or to condi­tionate [Page 8] and restrained forms of government: howsoever we ought not to condemne any Nation as unjust herein, though differing from us; for though they seem perhaps very unpolitick, yet it is hard to be affirmed that God and Nature ever ordained the same me­thod of rule, or scope of loyality to all States whatsoever: besides, what dislike soever we take at other regiments, yet except it be in very great excesses or defects, we must not thinke change alwayes necessary, since cu­stome in those great and generall points ob­tains the force of another nature, & nature is not to be changed. Divines of late have beene much to blame here in preaching one univer­sall forme of government, as necessary to all Nations, and that not the moderate & equall neither, but such as ascribes all to Soveraign­ty, nothing at all to popular liberty: Some Lawyers also and Statesmen have deserved as ill of late, partly by suggesting that our Eng­lish Laws are too in [...]urious to our King; and pa [...]ly by informing, that this King is more limited by Law then his Progenitors were, and that till he be as the King of France is, Rex As [...]orum, he is but a subject to his subjects, and as a Minor under the command of guar­dians: bnt what hath ensued out of the Kings jealously of his subject, and overstraining his Prerogative? nothing but irrepairable [Page 9] losse and mischiefe both to King and Com­monwealth: and indeed the often and great infections and insurrections which have hap­ned of late, almost all over Europe, may suffice to warn all wise Princes, not to over­straine their Prerogatives too high; not to g [...]ve eare to such Counsellors as some of out Judges are, who affirme our Kings Prero­gative to be in all points unalterable, and by consequence not depending upon Law at all: by another exception of this word Preroga­tive in England, we mean such Law here esta­blisht, as gives the King such and such pre­heminences and priviledges before any sub­ject; such as are not essentiall to royalty, but may bee annulled by the same power by which they were created. That a King shall defend and maintaine his subjectes, is a du­ty belonging to the Office, not a priviledge belonging to the Crowne of a King; this obligation nature layes upon him, and no other power can dissolve it. Also that sub­jects shall afford aid, and joyne with their Princes in common defence, is a duty arising from the allegeance of the people, and not an honor redounding only to the Prince; natures law hath made this a tie, not to be changed or infringed: for that which is annexed by an eternall superiour power cannot be made severable by a temporall humane power: [Page 10] but that such an Emperour, King or Poten­tate, shall have such or such aid, and com­pell it by such or such meanes, at such or such times, as to the particular modes and cir­cumstances of his aid, particular municipall Lawes must direct, and these it would bee as dangerous to alter, as it is absurd to hold un­alterable. In a Parlament held by King James, it was debated, whether or no Te­nures in Capite, and allowance of Purveyor [...] might bee repealed and divided from the Crowne, and it was held that by [...]o Act or statute they could bee taken away, be­cause they were naturally inherent to the Crowne.

This resolution seemes very strange to me, since the Law of Tenures and Purveyors is not so naturall and essentiall to Monarchy, that it cannot; or may not subsist without it. For if in other Countries it be held a meere politicall way, perhaps an inconvenient thing, then why may not the Princes Roy­alty, and the peoples safety [...] preserved in­tire without it in England: And if so, then why shall not the same authority have vigor to rep [...]ale it, which wanted not vigor to in­fo [...] it. I cannot conceive that the Parlia­ment herein reflected upon what was formall in Law to be done, but rather upon what was convenient: such i [...]signia supremae, Maje­jestatis [Page 11] as these; I did not hold it fit to be dismembred from the Crowne in policy, I onely hold it a thing possible in law, nay though the King enjoyes diverse such like prerogatives more, as I. Jones thinkes, then a­ny Prince in Christendome, yet should not I desire or advise to pl [...]ke away one the least Flower out of the Regall Garland, nor would it be (perhaps) Profitable for the State, to suffer the least diminution thereof. Wee know also, that in England the Prerogative hath beene bound in many cases, by Statute­law, and restrained of diverse such priviled­ges, as were not essentiall, but meerely poli­ticall. Nullum tempus occurrit Regi: this was one of the English Royalties, and very be­neficiall many wayes, yet wee know this is in diverse cases limited by Act of Parliament, and that very justly, as I. Hutton argues, The great and ancient Tax of Dangelt, it was a Subsidue taken by the Kings of England▪ for the common defence of the Kingdo [...]e, yet this was first released by King Stephen, and after abolished for ever by the statutes of Edward the first: and there is no reason why an Act of Parliament should not bee as valid in our case as it was in that. Wherefore it is to be admired, that J. Iones should account this way of a [...]d by ship-money, or any o­ther, without publike consent, to bee Pro­prium [Page 12] quarto modo to the Kings of England▪ and since irrepe [...]lable, since our Kings have in all ages done such noble acts without it; and not onely defended, but also enlarged their Dominions. The last kinde of accept [...]on of this word Prerogative is improper. Thus to pardon malefactors, to dispence with penall Lawes, to grant Non obstantes, to be free from attainders, to call or discon­tinue, to prorogue or dissolve Parliaments, &c. are not truly and properly called Prero­gatives: these all in some sense may be cal­led Munities, or indemnities belonging to the sacred person of the King, as he is invio­lable, and subject to no force & compulsion of any other, And as he is the soule of Law, in whose power alone it is to execute Law, and yet not to be constrained thereto. To grant a pardon for some malefactors for some crimes, may perhaps be as heynous as to commit them; and that which drawes a guilt upon the King, cannot be said to be his pri­viledge. If it might be tearmed a Royalty, that the King is not questionable, or punish­able, or to be forced to such acts as tend to the obstruction of justice, it might as well be so tearmed in acts tending to the trans­gression of Law: for in both he is alike free from any coercive or vindicative force. For it is out of necessity, not honour or benefit, [Page 13] that the King hath a freedome from con­straint, or restraint in these cases; and that this freedome is inseparable, because no force can be used but by superiours or equals, and he which hath either superiours or equall, is no King. If a King should shut up the Courts of ordinary Justice, & prohibit all pleadings and proceedings betweene man and man, and refuse to authorize Judges for the determi­ning of suits, hee would bee held to doe a most unkingly thing: and yet this may be as truly called a Prerogative, as to difuse and dissolve Parliaments. But it may be obje­cted, that the King, besides such negative pri­viledge and freedome from force, hath also a positive and siezing subjects lands, &c. in di­vers cases, as in making Bulwarks upon any mans land for common defence, &c. To this it may be answered, That to such power the King is not intituled by his Prerogative, nor is it any benefit to him, necessity herein is his only warrant: for either this private in­convenience must happen, or a publike ruine follow; and in nature the lesse and private evill is to be chosen: and here the party tres­passed enjoyes safety by it, and shall after re­ceive satisfaction for his detriment. Were there such apparent unavoidable necessity in the Ship-scop, that either that course must be taken, or the community inevitably pe­p [...]rish, [Page 14] or where the King wholly disinteressed in point of profit, or were there hope of re­stitution, it could not be without consent, and so not against Law. So then, for ought that is yet alleaged, Prerogative, except that which is essentiall to all Kings, without which they cannot bee Kings, is alterable, and it ought to be deducsed out of the written and knowne Lawes of the Kingdome, and Law is not to be inferred out of that▪ we ought not to presume a Prerogative, & thence con­clude it a Law, but we ought not to cite the Law, and thence prove it to be Prerogative. To descend then to our owne Lawes, yet there our Judges vary too. What the Com­mon Law was in this point is doubted by some▪ and some say if the Common Law did allow the King such a Prerogative, to lay a generall charge without consent, then Sta­tutes cannot alter it.

Some doe not accept against the force of Statute Law, but avoid our particular Sta­tutes by divers severall evasive answers. Some say our Great Charter was but a grant of the King, extorted by force; some except against the 25. of Ed. 1. because there is sal [...]o in it: some against the 34. of Ed. [...]. as made in the Kings absence; some object against the 14. of Ed. 3. as if it were temporary, and because it is not particularly re [...]ited in the Petition of [Page 15] Right: and the common evasion of all be­neficiall Statutes, & of the Petition of right, is, that they binde the King from imposing pecuniary charges for the replenishing of his owne coffers, but not from imposing such personall services, as this Ship-scot is, in time of danger and necessity. J. Crawly maintaines this Ship-scot to be good by Prerogative at the Common Law, and not to be altered by Statute. What the Common Law was, this Court can best determine; but it is obvious to all men, that no Prerogative can be at the Common Law, but it had some beginning, and that must be from either King or Sub­ject, or both: and in this, it is not superiour to our Statute Law, and by consequence not unalterable. The Medes and Persians had a Law, that no Law once past, should ever be repealed; but doubtlesse this Law being re­pealed first, all others might after suffer the same alteration, and it is most absurd to think that this Law might not be repealed by the same authority by which it was at first en­acted. J. Iones sayes, our Statutes restraine tollages in generall termes, and cites divers cases, that a speciall interest shall not passe from the King, but in speciall terms: but his cases are put of private grantees, over whom the King ought to retai [...]e a great prehemi­nence: but the Law is, that where the whole [Page 16] state in grantee, that grant shall have the force of a Statute, because it is pro bono publico, and because the whole State is in value and digni­ty as much to be preferred before the King, as the King is before any private grantee. But J. Iones sayes further, if generall words shall extend to these extraordinary publike levies, then they may as well extend to his ordinary private rights & intradoes, & so cut off Aide pur faire filz Chivalier, &c. The contrary hereof is manifest, for the intent of all our Statutes is to defend the subject against such publike tollages and impositions, as every man is equally liable to, and as are not due in Law otherwise, or recoverable by ordi­nary action. Now these aids, &c. and the Kings ordinary revenues and services, are not such as are due from every man, but re­coverable by ordinary action. Howsoever in all these doubts the Law would now be made cleare, and not onely the vertue of Sta­tutes in generall, but also the true meaning of our particular Charters would be vindicated from these exceptions.

2 I come now to our second difficulty, when a publike charge may be laid. Here the favourers of Ship-money yet agree, that the King may not charge the subject meerly to fill his owne coffers; or annually, or when he will invade a forraigne enemy, or when [Page 17] Pirates rob, or burn Townes and Burroughs, for these ordinary defence is sufficient: and when there is imminent and eminent danger of publike invasion, we agree that the subject may be charged.

The quaere then is, whether the King bee sole Judge of the danger, and of the remedy, or rather whether he be so sole Judge, that his meere affirmation and notification of a danger foreseene by him at a distance, or pre­tended onely to be foreseene, shall be so un­questionable that he may charge the King­dome thereupon at his discretion, though they assent not, nor apprehend the danger as it is forewarned. J. Crooke proves the con­trary thus: If danger, sayes he, be far distant, if it be in report only of French Armadoes, and Spanish preparations, &c. though it be certaine, and not pretensive, yet Parliamentary aid may be speedy enough: and if it be imminent, then this way of Ship-scot will not be speedy enough; for either the design [...] is really to have new Ships built, and that will require longer time than a Parliament; or else money onely is aimed at, whereby to arme other Ships, and for this the Law hath provided a more expedite way than by Ship-scot, in case of imminent danger.

If then the King have power to presse all mens persons and Ships, and all are bound [Page 18] exponere se, & sua, and to serve propriis sumpti­ [...]us, when imminent danger is, and this de­fence hath alwayes beene held effectuall e­nough, it is consequent, that if he be not de­stitute of competent aid in present distresses, he cannot pretend a greater necessity in dan­gers more remote, when they are but suspe­cted, or perhaps pretended onely.

My Lord Bramston sayes here, that there is a necessity of preventing a necessity: and that the Sea is part of the Kingdome, and therefore of necessity to be guarded as the Kingdome. The answer is, That the safety of the Kingdome does not necessarily depend upon the Ship-scot, and so this necessity be­ing removed, the necessity grounded upon this, fals off of it selfe. For if the Kingdome may escape ruine at hand when it is a storme, without Ship-money, it may much more escape it afar off being but a cloud. But grant the Sea to be a part of the Kingdome to some purposes, yet how is it a part essentiall, or equally valuable; or how does it appeare that the fate of the Land depends wholly upon the dominion of the Sea? France subsists now without the regiment of the Sea, and why may not we as well want the same? If England quite spend it selfe, and poure out all its treasure to preserve the Seigniory of the Seas, it is not certaine to exceed the Na­vall [Page 19] force of France, Spaine, Holland, &c. And if it content if selfe with its ancient strength of shipping, it may remaine as safe as it hath formerly done. Nay, I cannot see that either necessity of ruine, or necessity of dis­honour can be truly pretended out of this, that France, Spaine, Holland, &c. are too po­tent at Sea for us.

The dominion of the Seas may be consi­dered as a meer right, or as an honour, or as a profit to us. As a right, it is a theame fitter for schollers to whet their wits upon, then for Christians to fight and spill bloud a­bout: and since it doth not manifestly ap­peare how or when it was first purchased, or by what Law conveyed to us, we take no­tice of it only as matter of wit and disputa­tion. As it is an honour to be masters of the Sea, and to make others strike saile to us as they passe; its a glory fitter for women and children to wonder at, then for States-men to contend about. It may bee compared to a chaplet of flowers, not to a diadem of gold: but as it is a profit to us to fence and inclose the Sea, that our neighbours [...]hall not surprise us unawares; its matter of moment, yet it concernes us but as it doth other Nations: by too insolent contestations hereupon, wee may provoke God, and dishonour our selves: we may more probably incense our friend [...], [Page 20] then quell our enemies, we may make the land a slave to the sea, rather than the sea a servant to the land; but I pray Master Selden to pardon me for this transition, and I re­turne my matter▪ if the Kingdome could not possibly subsist without Ship-money in such a danger, yet there is no necessity that the King should be so sole Judge of that danger, as that he may judge therein contrary to the opinion, and perhaps, knowledge of other men. I allow the King to be supreame, and consequently sole Judge in all cases whatso­ever, as to the right, and as to the diffusion of Judgement; but as to the exercise and re­straint of judgement, he is not, nor ought not to be accounted sole Judge. In matters of Law the King must create Judges, and sweare them to judge uprightly and impartially, and for the sub [...]ect against himselfe, if Law so re­quire, yea, though he be of contrary judge­ment himselfe, and by his Letters sollicite the contrary. The Kings power is as the disgestive faculty in nature, all parts of the body con­tribute heat to it for their owne benefit, that they may receive backe againe from it a bet­ter concocted and prepared supply of nou­rishment, as it is their office to contribute, so it is the stomacks to distribute.

And questionlesse sole judgement in matters of State, does no otherwise belong [Page 21] to the King, then in matters of Law, or points of Theologie. Besides as sole judgement is here ascr [...]bed to the King, he may affirme dangers to be foresee [...]e when he will, and of what nature he will: if [...]e say onely, Datum est nobis intelli [...]i, as he does in his Writ, &c. To his sole indisputable judgement it is left to lay charges as often and as great as [...]e plea­ses. And by this meanes if he regard not his word more than his profit, he may in one yeare draine all the Kingdome of all its trea­sure, and leave us the most despicable slaves in the whole world.

It is ridiculous also to alleage, as J. Iones does, that it is contrary to presumption of Law to suspect falsity in the King: for if Law presume that the King will not falsly pretend danger to vex his subjects, of his owne meere motion, yet no Law, nor reason, nor policy will presume, that the King may not be induced by mis-information to grieve the people without cause. The Sunne is not more visible than this truth, our best Kings, King Charles, King Iames, Queene Elizabeth, and all the whole ascending line, have done undue illegall things sometimes, contrary to the rights and Franchises of England, be­ing mis-informed, but having consulted with the Judges or States in Parliament, they have all retracted and confessed their error. Nay, [Page 22] there is nothing more knowne, or universally assented to than this, that Kings may be bad; and it is more probable and naturall, that evill may be expected from good Princes, than good from bad. Wherefore, since it is all one to the State, whether evill proceed from the King mediately or immediately, out of malice or ignorance: and since wee know that of all kinds of government Mo­narchicall is the worst, when the Scepter is wielded by an unjust and unskillfull Prince, though it be the best, when such Princes as are not seduceable (a thing most rate) reigne, it will be great discretion in us not to desert our right in those Lawes which regulate and confine Monarchie, meerly out of Law-pre­sumption; if we must presume well of our Princes, to what purpose are Lawes made: and if Lawes are frustrate and absurd, where in doe we differ in condition from the most abject of all bond-slaves?

There is no Tyranny more abhorred than that which hath a controlling power over all Law, and knowes no bounds but its owne will: if this be not the utmost of Tyranny, the Turks are not more servile than we are: and if this be Tyranny, this invention of ship-money makes us as servile as the Turks. We must of necessity admit, that our Princes are not to be mis-led, and then our Lawes are [Page 23] needlesse; or that they may be misse-led, and then our Lawes are uselesse. For if they will listen to ill councell, they may bee mooved to pretend danger causlesly; and by this pretence defeate all our lawes and liberties, and those being defeated, what doth the English holde, but at the Kings meere dis­cretion, wherein doth the excell the Cap­tives condition? if wee shall examine why the Mahometan slaues are more miserably treated, then the Germans, or why the French Pesants are so beggerly, wretched, and bestially used more then the Hol­landers, or why the people of Millaine, Naples, Sicily are more oppressed, tram­pled upon, and inthralled then the Na­tives of Spayne? there is no other reason will appeare but that they are subject to more immoderate power, and have lesse benefit of law to releeve them.

In nature there is no reason, why the meanest wretches should not enjoy free­dome, and demand justice in as ample mea­sure, as those whom law hath provided for: or why Lords which are above law should bee more cruell then those which are more conditionate: yet wee see it is a fatal kind of necessity onely incident to immode­rate power, that it must bee immoderately used: and certainly this was well knowne to [Page 24] our incestors, or else they would not have purchased their charters of freedome with so great an expence of blood as they did, and have endured so much so many yeeres rather then to bee betrayd to immoderate power, and prerogative: let us there­fore not bee too carelesse of that, which they were so jealous of, but let us look nar­rowly into the true consequence of this ship-scot, whatsoever the face of it appeare to bee. It is vaine to stop twenty leakes in a ship, and then to leave one open, or to make lawes for the restraynt of loyalty all other wayes, that it may not overflow the estates of the comminalty at pleasure, and yet to leave one great breach for its irrup­tion.

All our Kings hitherto have beene so circumscribed by law, that they could not command the goods of their subjects at pleasure without common consent: but now if the King be but perswaded to pre­tend danger, hee is uncontroleable Master of all wee have, one datum est intelligi, shal make our English Statutes like the politicke hedge of Go [...]e [...]ham, and no better: I doe not say that this King will falsifie, it is e­nough that wee all, and all that wee have are at his discretion if hee will falsifie; though vast power bee not abused, yet it is a great [Page 25] mischiefe that it may, and therefore vast power it selfe is justly odious, for divers reasons. First, because it may fall into the hands of ill disposed Princes, such as were K. Iohn, Henry the third, Edward the second, Richard the second. These all in their times made England miserable, and certainely had their power beene more unconsineable they had made it more miserable. The alterations of times doe not depend upon the alteration of the people, but of Princes: when Princes are good it fares wel with the people when bad ill.

Princes often vary, but the people is alwaies the same in all ages, an [...] capable of smal, or no variations: If Princes would endure to heare this trueth it would bee profitable for them, for flatterers alwaies rayse jea­lousies against the people; but the trueth is, the people as the sea, have no turbulent motion of their owne, if Princes like the windes doe not raise them into rage. Se­condly, vast power if it finde not bad Prin­ces it often makes Princes bad: It hath of­ten charged Princes, as it did Nero from good to bad, from bad to worse: but Ves­pasian is the onely noted man which by the Empire was in melius mutatus: daily expe­rience teaches this. Dangelt in England [Page 26] within 20. yeares increased unto a four-fold proportion.

Subsidies were in former times seldome granted, and few at a time, now Parlia­ments are helde by some to be of no other use then to grant them.

The Fox, in Esop, observed that of all the Beasts which had gone to visite the Lyon, few of their foot-steps were to be seene retrorsum, they were all printed adversum. And we find at this day, that it is farre more easie for a King to gaine undue things from the people, then it is for the people to re-gaine its due from a King: This King hath larger Domi­nions, and hath raigned yet fewer years, and enjoyed qu [...]ter times then Queene Elizabeth: And yet his taxations hath beene farre grea­ter, and his Exploits lesse honourable, and the yet people is still helde in more jealousie.

To deny Shippe-mony which sweeps all, is [...]eld and accounted a rejection of naturall Al­legiance. I speake not this to render odious the Kings blessed government, God forbid, I hold him one of the mildest, and most gracious of our Kings: And I instance in him the ra­ther, that we may see, what a bewitching thing flattery is, when it touches uppon this string of unlimitable power: if this ambition and desire of vast power were not the most na­turall, and forcible of all sinnes, Angels in [Page 27] Heaven, and man in Paradize had not falne by it; but since it is, Princes themselves ought to be the more cautious and cautilous of it.

Thirdly, vast power if it neither find nor make bad Princes, yet it makes the good go­vernement of good Princes the lesse pleasing, and the lesse effectuall, for the common and publicke good: And therefore it is a rule both in Law, and Policy, and Nature, Non re­currendum est ad extraordinaria, in jis quae fieri possunt perordinaria: All extraordinary aides are horrid to the people, but most especi­ally such as the Ship-scot is, whereby all liber­ty is over-throwne, and all Law subjected unto the Kings meer discretion.

Queene Elizabeth in eighty eight was victo­rious without this Taxation, and I am fully perswaded she was therefore Victorious the ra­ther, because she used it not. Her Arte was to account her subjects hearts as her unfailing Exchequer, and to purchase them by doing legall just things, and this Arte never failed nor deceived her, and in that dismall gust of danger, it was good for her and the whole State, both that she did not relye upon forced aides of money, or the Swords of grieved Souldiers; For this Ship-money, nothing can be pretended but necessity, and certainly neces­sity is ill pretended; when the meere doing of the thing, is as dangerous as that for which it [Page 28] is done: did not this Ship-scot over-throw all p [...]polar Liberty, and so threaten as great a mischiefe as any Conquest can? And were not the people justly averse from it? Yet meerly for the peoples [...] to it, it is dangerous to be relied upon in case of great danger.

Wee know Nature teacheth us all, Of two Evils to chuse that which wee thinke the least, though it bee not so; therefore if the people apprehend this Remedy as a Thing worse then the Disease, though they be mis­taken therein, yet that very mistake may proove fatall.

The Roman Army beeing harshly treated by the Senators, and their proud Generall, did refuse to charge upon the Enemy, or to re­sist the charge of the Enemy, they chose rather to be slaughtered by Strangers, then Enthral­led by their Country-men. The English also in the late Scotsh invasion, by reason of this and many other causes of Discontent, made so [...]aint resistance, that they did almost in a man­ner Confesse, That they held themselves as miserable already, as the Scots could make them.

Thus wee see there is no necessity of levying Ship-money, there is rather necessity of Re­pealing it: And we see that presumption of Law doth no [...] [...]bet this Necessity, but rather [Page 29] crosse it. And whereas I. Iones further saith, That the Kings Majesty hath no benefit by Ship-money, and therefore presumption is the str [...]nger, that the King will not take it causelesly. We may answere: the Ship mony is a [...]ery great benefit unto the King: For i [...] not immediatly, yet [...] it is become a Re­venew, inasmuch as by this [...] al other Re [...]enues of the Crowne, nay▪ and Tunnage and [...], which were not designed on­ly for ordinary Expences, but for extraordi­nary imployments, and publicke Charges also, are now become d [...]scharged of that tie, and the Common-Wealth hath quite lest all its intrest and property in them. In point of benefit therefore it is all one to the Kings Majesty, and in point of burthen, it is all one to the Sub­ject, whether Ship-money be acc [...]unted of as part of the Kings annuall Rents, or no, since by it his rents are enlarged: And as to the Sub­ject there is no obligation, that this [...] shal not hereafter incorporate with the rest of the Kings Majesties Intradoe [...], and be swallowed up as Tunnage and Poundage now are. Thus we see what the Necessity is, and presumption of Law, which was so much insisted uppon; and yet for a further confutation of both, Time, the mother of Truth, hath now given us more light Now that great danger which was pretended so many yeares together for the [Page 30] necessity of raysing so great supplies of trea­sure, is a small cloud blown over, making it apparant that Kings may bee mis infor­med; and by mis information take Mole­hils for Mountaines, and cast heavie burthen [...] upon their subjects. 3.

But I come now to my third D [...]fficulty, how a publick charge is to be laid upon the king­dome. The law runs generally, that in Eng­land no Tollage or pecuniary charge may bee imposed Forsque per common assent de tout la Realme, or Si non per common consent de Parliement. Some presidents, or matters of fact appeare, wherein some Kings have di­vers times invaded this right of the subject, but upon conference had with the Iudges, or petition in Parliament, redresse was ever made, and the subjects right re-established. All the colour which can be brought to an­swer the Law in our case, is, that the words of the law are generall Taxes and Tollages, but doe not by special mention restrain extra­ordinary impositions, in time of extraordi­nary danger. But wee know the Petition of Right, 3. Car. is grounded upon former Statutes, and recites divers of them, and is a cleare affirmance of the common right of England; and yet by that the commissions for Loanes were damned: and it is evident that those Loanes were demanded for the [Page 31] generall defence of the Kingdome in time of imminent danger; and by the same Sta­tute, not onely Loanes, but all other levies of money upon what pretence of danger soever, Si non per common consent, are con­demned as illegall, and contrary to the Lawes and Rights of England. Two things therefore are objected against Parliaments: First, that they are of slow motion, and so most of the Iudges alledge. Secondly, that they may be perverse, and refuse due aid to the King, and so I. Crawley boldly suggests. For answere wee say in generall: First, that it is the wisdome of Kings to bee alwayes vi­gilant, and to have their eyes so open upon forraigne Princes, and to maintaine such in­telligence that no preparation from abroade may surprize them before recourse had to Parliament; and this is very easie to insu­lar Princes, who have a competent strength of shipping, Secondly, to have alwayes in readinesse against all sudden surprizes, a sufficient store of ammunition and arms both for sea and land-service: and the revenues of the Crowne of England are sufficient for this purpose, and have beene held more then sufficient in former times, when hostility was greater, and the Kingdome smaller. Thirdly, to seeke advise and assistance from Parliaments, frequently in times of quiet, [Page 23] as well as of danger, as well when warre is b [...]t smoaking, or kindling, as when it is blown into a flame. Before the conquest this was held policie, and since in Edward the thirds time, a statute past to this purpose; and if parliaments of late bee growne into dislike, it is not because their vertue is decaid, it is because the corruption of the times cannot endure such sharpe remedies. Fourthly, to speake particularly of this case of ship-money, wee say that it is a course more slow then by parliament: there was more expedition used in parliament to supply King Ch [...]rles, since hee came to the Crowne, then can this way. And wee say moreover, that as the extremi­ty of the Kingdome was when ship-money was demanded, whatsoever was pretended to the contrary, a parliament might have beene timely enough called, and seasona­bly enough supplied the King. As to the second objection of I. Crawly, too unfit to come out of any honest wise mans mouth, but much more for a Iudges, Iudge Crooke replies, that as there is nullum iniquum in Lege, so neither in parliamento. The three noted factions which are adverse to Parlia­ments, are the papists, the prelates, and Court parasites; and these may bee therefore supposed to hate parliaments, because they knowe themselves hatefull to parliaments. [Page 33] It is scarse possible for the King to finde out any other that thinkes ill of Parliaments, or is ill thought of by Parliaments. Of Papists little neede to bee said, their enmity is con­fest, they have little to pretend for them­selves, but that parliaments are growne pu­ritannicall. The prelates thinke themselves not to have jurisdiction and power enough▪ and they knowe that Parliaments thinke they have too much, and abuse that which they have much more: therefore to uphold themselves, and to crush their ill-willers, they not only tax Parliaments of purita­nisme, but all puritans of sedition: as much as in them lies, they wed the King to their quarrell, perswading him that Parliaments out of puritanisme, do not so much aime at the fall of Episcopacie, as Monarchy, and that Episcopacie is the support of Mo­narchy, so that both must stand and fall to­gether. Howbeit because they cannot up­braide Parliaments of attempting any thing against Monarchy further then to mainetaine due liberty, therefore they preach an unli­mitable prerogative, and condemne all law of liberty as injurious to Kings and incom­patible with Monarchy. M [...]n [...]arring denies Parliamentary power and honour, C [...]well denies propriety of goods, further then it [Page 34] the Kings discretion, and Harrison accuses Iudge Hutton of delivering law against G [...]ds Law, in the case of Ship-money. And the common Court doctrine is, that Kings are boundlesse in authority, and that they onely are Cesars friends which justifie that doctrine; and from this doctrine hath growne all the jealousies of late betweene the King and his best subjects; and this is that venemous matter which hath laien burning, and ulcerating inwardly in the bo­wels of the common-wealth so long. The other enemies of Parliaments, are Court dependants, and projectors, which have taken advantage of this unnaturall dissenti­on betwixt the King and his Subjects; and have found out meanes to live upon the spoile of both, by siding with the King, and beeing instruments to extend his prero­gative to the purchasing of preferment to themselves, disaffection to the King, and vexation to the common-wealth. These three factions excepted, and some few Courtiers which are carryed with the cur­rent of example, or are left to speake un­pleasing trueths, there is scarce any man in all the Kings dominions, which doth not wish for parliaments, as the States best physick, nay almost as its naturall ne­cessary [Page 35] food: but I will instance in three things wherein parliaments excell all other Councells whatsoever.

1. For wisedome, no advice can bee gi­ven so prudent, so profound, so universal­ly comprehending, from any other author; it is truely sayd by Sir Robert Cotten, that all private single persons may deceive and bee deceived; but all cannot deceive one, nor one all.

That an inconsiderable number of Priva­does should see or knowe more then whole Kingdomes, is incredible: v [...]x populi was ever reverenced as vox Dei, and Parlia­ments are infallble, and their acts indispu­table to all but Parliaments. It is a just law, that no private man must bee wiser then Law publickly made. Our wis [...]st Kings in England, have ever most relied upon the wise­dome of Parliaments.

Secondly, no advice can bee so faithfull, so loyall, so religious and sincere, as that which proceeds from parliaments, where so many are gathered together for Gods service i [...] such a devout manner, we cannot but expect that G [...]d should bee amongst them: and as they have a more especiall blessing promised them; so their ends can­not bee so sinister: private men may thrive [Page 36] by alterations: and common calamities, but the common body can effect nothing but the common good, because nothing else can bee commodious for them.

Sir Robert Cotton in the life of Henry the third, according to the Court Doctrine at this present, saies, that in Parliament Kings are e­ver lesse then they should be, and the people more. If this bee spoken of irregular Kings, which will endure to heare of nothing but prerogative go­vernment, it may cary some semblance of trueth: but sure i [...] is, good and wise Kings are ever greatest when they sit immured, as it were, in that honourable Assembly: as the Historie of Queene Elizabeth and many of her pro­genitors testifies. Tis true, K. Henry the third, met with divers oppositions in Parliament: Hee was there upbrayded, and called dilapidator regni; it was true that hee was [...]o, and the most unworthy of rule that ever sate sate in this Throne; yet those words became not subjects: I doe not ju­st [...]fie, but in some part extenuate such mis­demeanors; for the chiefe blame of those times is not to bee throwne upon the [...] and commons, but upon the King and his out-landi [...] parasites. It is without all question also that in those bloudy unjust [...]imes, had it not beene for frequent parlia­ments, [Page 37] and that soveraigne remedy which thereby was applyed to the bleeding wounds of the Kingdome, no other helpe could have stanched them.

Even then, when Parliaments were most pre­valent, and when they had so much provocation from so variable an uncapable a Prince, they did not seeke to conditionate prerogative, or to depresse Monarchy for the future, though they were a little to injurious to him in person for the present.

Since that time also many Parliaments h [...]ve had to struggle for due liberty with insolent princes, and have had power to clip the wings of Royalty; and the custome of all Europe almost besides hath seemed to give such countenance to such attempts; but the deepe wisedome, & inviolable loyalty of Parliaments to this com­posure of governement hath bin such, that they never made any invasion upon it. As it was in all former ages, so it now remaines intire with all its glorious ensignes of ho­nour, and all the complements of power; and may hee be as odious which seekes too alter or diminish Monarchicall governement for the future, as he which seekes to make it infinite, and slanders Parliaments as enemies to it, or endeavors to blow such jealousies into the Kings eares.

[Page 38] 3. No advice can bee so sit, so forcible, so effectuall for the publicke welfare, as that which is given in Parliament: if any Cabi­net Counsellours could give as wise sin­cere advice as Parliaments, yet it could not bee so profitable, because the hearts of the people doe not goe along with any other, as with that.

That King which is potent in Parliament, as any good King may, is as it were so in­skonsed in the hearts of his subjects, that he is almost beyond the trayns or aimes of trea­son and rebellion at home, nay forraign ho­stility cannot pei [...]ce him, but through the sides of all his people.

It ought to bee noted also, that the Eng­lish have ever beene the most devoted ser­vants coequall, sweetly-moderate Soveraign­ty; so in our English Parliaments, where the Nobility is not too prevalent, as in Denmark, nor the Comminalty, as in the Netherlands, nor the King, as in France, Iustice and poli­cie kisse and embrace more lovingly then elsewhere. And as all the three States have alwayes more harmoniously born their just proportionable parts in England then else­where, so now in these times, in these lear­ned, knowing, religious times, we may ex­pect more blessed counsell from Parliaments [Page 39] then ever we received heretofore. May it therefore sinke into the heart of our King to adhere to Parliaments, and to abhorre the grosse delusive suggestions of such as dispa­rage that kinde of Councell. May lie rather con [...]ide in that Community which can have no other end but their owne happinesse in his greatnesse, thè [...] in Papists, Prelates, and Pro­jectors, to whom the publick disunion is ad­vantagious. May he affect that gentle Pre­rogative which stands with the happinesse, freedome, and riches of his people, and [...] that terrible Scopter which does as much a­vert the hearts, as it doth deb [...]lita [...]e the hands, and exhaust the purses of his Subjects. May he at last learnd by [...]; that the grie­vance of all [...], that that mischiefe which makes all mischiefes [...], and almost hopelesse in England at this day, is that Parliaments are clouded, and disused, and suffered to be [...] by the ill bo­ding incendi [...]ries of our State. May it lustly enter into his beleefe, that it is impossible for any Kingdome to deny publicke assent for their [...] when publicke danger is [...], and when it is fairely required, and not by pro­jects extorted: that no Nation can unnatu­rally seeke its owne [...] may make their Subjects [Page 40] purses their owne private coffers, if they will demand due things, at due times, and by due meanes.

4. I come now to the last difficulty, about the condition and nature of such aydes as are due by Law from the Subject to the King, Though much have beene argued both at the barre and on the Bench, for the King, that he may raise moneyes from his Subjects, with­out consent by Law, Prerogative, and neces­sity. Yet at last, because the Petition of Right absolutely crosses this tenet, it is resto­red to us backe againe, and yeelded, that the King may not impose a pecuniary charge by way of Tollage, but onely a personall one by way of service. And now all our contro­versie ends in this, that we must contest, whe­ther the Ship-scot be a [...]ecuniary, or a perso­nall charge: For though the intent of the Writ, and the office of the Sh [...]iffe be to raise moneyes onely, yet the words of the Writ, and the pretence of State, is to build and pre­pare Ships of warre. The Kingdome gene­rally takes this to be a [...] delusion and imposture, and doubtlesse it is but a pick lock tricke, to overthrow all liberty and proprie­ty of goods, and it is a great shame that so many Judges should be abetters to such frau­dulent practice contrived against the State. It is not lawfull for the King to demand mo­neyes [Page 41] as moneyes, but it is lawfull to demand moneyes under another wrong name, and under this wrong name all former Lawes and Liberties shall be as absolutely cancelled, as if they had beene meere cobwebs, or enacted onely out of meere derision. If former lawes made to guard propriety of goods were just, and grounded upon good reason, why are they by this grosse fallacie, or childish abuse defeated. If they were not just, or reasona­ble, what needes such a fond subtiltie as this? why should they not be fairely avoided by Law? Why were they made at all? But be this invention what it will, yet we see it is new; if it be quashed, the State is but where it was, we are still as our Ancestors left us; and since our preceeding Kings never here­tofore put it in use in the most necessitous calamitous times, we may from hence infer [...]e, that the plea of State necessity falls off of it selfe; if we admit not of this innovation, then the State suffers not; but if we admit it, no necessity being of it, we can frame no other reason for our so doing, but that our former franchises and priviledges were unjust, and therefore this way they must be annulled. Some of our Judges doe prove, that if this were a personall service, yet it were void; and they cite the case of Barges, and Ballin­gers [Page 42] vessells, built truly for Warre in time of Imminent danger, and yet these charges upon complaint made by the Subject, were revo­ked, and disclaimed. But here in this case many other enormities and defects in Law Lare, for if ships be intended to be built in In­land Countries, a thing impossible is injoyn­ed; and if moneyes be aimed at, that very ayme is against Law: and if the Kingdome were to be disfranchised, it were not to be done by all illegall way.

Besides, in the Writ, in the Assessement, in the Sheriffes remedy against Recusants of it, in the execution of Law, by, or after judg­ment, many inconveniences, errors, and mis­chiefes arise many wayes: and sure take the whole case as it is, and since the Creation no whole Kingdome was ever cast in such a cause before.

Besides, though the Iudges ought wholly to have be [...] themselves upon this, to have proved this a personall service, and no pecuniary charge, they have roved after necessity, pre­sumption of Law, and Prerogative, and fearce said any thing at all hereof.

My Lord Brainston argues very eagerly, that personall services by Sea and Land are due to the King in cases of extremity, and all their records, case, and presidents prove no [Page 43] more, and that men may be arrayed, and ships pressed, and that sumptibus populi; but there is nothing proved that the meere raising of moneyes in this case, is a personall service. I. Iones indeed argues to this purpose: If the Law intrust the King with so great a power over mens persons, why not over their estates? There is cleare reason for the con­trary: because the King, if he should abuse mens personall aides, could not inrich or pro­fit himselfe thereby, and we know it is gaine and profit, it is Auri sacra sames which hath power over the breasts of men. It is not or­dinary for Tyrants to imbattaile hoasts of men, and make them charge upon the Sea-billowes, and then to gather up Cockles and Piwinckle shells in lieu of spoile, as one did once: but the World abounds with stories of such Princes, as have offended in abusing their power over mens estates, and have vio­lated all right divine and humane, to attaine to such a boundlesse power.

Good Kings are sometimes weake in co­veting boundlesse power; some affect riva­lity with God himselfe in power, and yet places that power in doing evill, not good: for few Kings want power to doe good, and therefore it misbecomes not sometimes good Subjects to be jealous in some things of good [Page 44] Kings. But J. Iones farther sayes, that Ships must be built, and without money that can­not be done: ergo. This necessity hath beene answered, and disproved already: and I now adde, that for the good of the Kingdome there is more necessity that Ship-money be damned then maintained. Such unnaturall slavery seems to mee to be attendant upon this all-devouring project, and such in [...]amy to our An­cestors, our Lawes, and our selves, nay, and such danger to the King and his posterity, that I cannot imagine how any forraigne conquest should induce any thing more to be detested and abhorred.

Those Kings which have beene most cove­tous of unconfined immoderate power, have beene the weakest in judgment, and common­ly their lives have beene poore and toylsome, and their ends miserable, and violent: so that if Kings did rightly understand their owne good, none would more shunne uncontrollable absolutenesse then themselves.

How is the King of France happy in his great Prerogative? or in that terrible stile of the King of Asses? [...]ee see that his im­moderate power makes him oppresse his poore Pesants, for their condition is most deplorable, and yet set his power aside, and [Page 45] there is no reason why he should not be as a Father to cherish them, as a God to comfort them, not as an enemy to impoverish them, as a tormentor to afflict them.

2. His oppression makes him culpable before God: he must one day render a sad ac­count for all the evill which he hath impo­sed, for all the good which he hath not pro­cured to them. That the Vicegerent of God should doe the office of a tyrant, will be no light thing one day.

3. His sinne makes him poore: for were his Pesants suffered to get wealth and enjoy it, the whole Land would be his treasury, and that treasury would containe twice as much as now it doth.

4. His poverty makes him impotent, for money being the sinewes of warre, how strong would his joynts be, if all his subjects were abounding in money, as doubtlesse they would, if they wanted not liberty, and propriety? besides, poverty depresses the spirit of a Nation: and were the King of France, King of an Infantery, as he is onely of a Cavalrie, were he a King of men, as he is onely of beasts, had he a power over hearts as he hath over hands, that Country would be twice as puissant as it is.

[Page 46] 5. His impotence, together with all other irregularities, and abuses is like to make his Monarchy the lesse durable. Civill wars have ever hitherto infected and macera­ted that goodly Countrey, and many times it hath been near it's ruine: it now enjoyes in­ward peace, but it doth no great exploits a­broad, nor is ever likely to doe, unlesse by practising upon the distemper of other Na­tions: should some other Prince practise in the like manner upon that, and propose liber­ty to the grieved people, much advantage might be taken: but these avisoes would better proceed from that most heroick, most terrible, most armipatent Churchman, which effects such great wonders here: wee see hence that Princes by some gaine lose, as the whole body pines by the swelling of the spleene: we see that Reh [...]oam catcht an im­moderate power, as the Dog in the fable at a shadow, but in stead of an uncertain nothing, he let fall and lost a certaine substance; and yet flatterers have scarce any other bai [...]e then this shadow of immoderate power, whereby to poison the phantasies of weake humours, undiscerning rash Princes.

My humble motion therefore is: First, that the judgement given in the Chequ [...]r Cham­ber [Page 47] for Ship-money, may bee reversed, and damned, as contrary to the right of the Sub­ject.

Secondly, that those Iudges which adhered to equity and integrity in this case, might have some honourable guerdon designed them.

Thirdly, that some dishonourable penalty may bee imposed upon those Iudges which ill advised the King herein, and then argued as Pleaders, not as Iudges; especially if any shall appeare to have solicited the betraying of the Kingdome.

Fourthly, that the meaning of our Lawes & Charters, may bee fully and expresly decla­red, and the force and vertue of Statutes and publicke Grants, may be vindicated from all such exceptions and objections as have beene particularly or generally made against them.

Fifthly, that a clearer solution may be gi­ven in the foure maine points stirred, how farre prerogative is arbitrary and above Law; and how farre naturall Allegeance bindes to yeeld to all demands not of Parliament: next, how the King is sole Judge of danger, as that his meere cognizance thereof shall be sufficient, though there be no appearance or probability thereof. Next, how a necessity [Page 48] of publicke [...]ine must be concluded now, if Ship-money be not levied, when no such ru­ine hath been formerly, when this new plot was not devised. Lastly, how this Ship-scot pretending ships, but intending money, and really raising the same, can be said to be no pecuniary tollage within our Statutes, but a meere personall service.

Sixthly, that any Officers, or Ministers of State, which shall attempt to lay the like taxes hereafter upon the Subject, by vertue of the like void warrants, may be held and taken as Felons, or Traytors, or forcible Intruders.

Seventhly, that something may be inacted against forraigne and domesticall Forces also, if they shall be congregated for the like pur­poses; and that the subject may be inabled by some fit and timely remedy to be given against a military kinde of government.

Eighthly, that the due way of publicke de­fence, in case of imminent and eminent dan­ger, or actuall necessary warre, for the pressing of men, and other charges of warre, such as Cote and Conduct money, and all doubts thereabouts, may be made more certaine and settled for the time to come.

Ninthly, that if the Kings ordinary [...] now taken for the Crowne, be not suffi­cient [Page 49] to maintaine him, as our great Master, some legall order may be taken therefore, and that he may be sensible of his Subjects loy­alty, and his Subjects live safe under him, that his enemies may finde him considerable, and his true friends usefull.