CAP. 1. OF THIS WORD REFORMATION, AND A generall description thereof, and howe the same is devided into two severall parts and members.

A REFORMATION of a declined common-weale, is nothing els but an hap­py restitution vnto his first perfection: this worde Reformation being thus described, may in like sorte be devided into two parts and members: the one may bee termed an absolute and a thorough reformation of the whole bodye of the common-weale, namely of the ancient lawes, customes, go­vernementes and manners of the people: the other may be ter­med a reformation of particuler mischiefes and inconveniences onely, which like vnto evill and superfluous humors dailie arise to the annoyance and disturbance of this politicke body. For like as in our naturall bodies, saith the Phisitian, so in common weales there daily ariseth that, Quod curatione indiget, & nisi tollatur, inde mor­bos laethales parit. This maner of reformation of particuler mischiefes and accidents consisteth of two partes and members: the one by the profitable laws, which are framed to meete with such mischiefs and inconveniences, which doe or may arise to the annoyance of the common-weale: such was the law called [...], which pa­cified the poorer sort of people called Hectemarij, then in armes a­gainst the rich and better sorte of Athens: the other is the true discipline and execution of lawes so made and established. This manner of reformation of particuler mischiefes and inconve­niences by good and profitable lawes, was mightily endevoured [Page 6] by your selfe, when as the Athenians made choice of you as their general reformer of their lawes and common-weale. For you did not change the whole state thereof, but altered onely that which you thought by reason you might perswade your Citizens vnto, or els by force you ought to compell them to accept; and framed your lawes to the subiect and matter, and not the matter & subiect vn­to your lawes, as sometimes Lycurgus did in his reformation of Sparta.

You have saide the truth, for if I should have attempted to turne vppe side downe the whole government, & to have chan­ged the whole state thereof, I might afterwardes never have beene able with that smal power and forces then granted vnto me, to set­tle and establish the same againe. Againe, I did not thinke, but that Athens then declined, might well have beene restored by this kinde of reformation.

CAP. 2. What common-weale may be restored vnto his first perfection by ap­plying thereunto this manner of reformation.

No verily: for Quae primis institutis omninò corrupta fuerit, eanunquam in tales casus incidet, propter quos novis legibus institui queat. For this cause the first institution of Athens being meer­ly popular, corrupt, and vnperfit, coulde never after by any lawes made for the reformation thereof, be defended from the tyrannie of such as did aspire vnto the principalitie, or from the ruine first conceived in the corrupt institution thereof. For notwithstanding they established many lawes for the reformation of the insolencie of the noble men, as also to restraine the libertie of the people, non eam tamen conservare supra centessimum annum potuerunt. But such common-weals as have their first institution and foundation good▪ though not altogether perfit and complete, at any time declining from the first state and perfection, may by this manner of reforma­tion (made by profitable laws as occasion shal them require) be not only restored to their first perfection, but the happie estate there­of may thereby belong continued and augmented: such was the [Page 7] common-wealth of Rome, whose first institution and foundation was so wel laid by Romulus & Numa, as that after by new laws made for the reformation thereof, as the necessity of that common weale did require, the same was rendered long, happy, and prosperous, in so much as it attained at the last an happy temper and forme of go­vernement, compounded of three sortes and kindes of gouerne­ment, namely the Monarchia, Aristocratia, and Democratia: so that wee maie conclude, that those common-weales which have their foundation good, though not perfit and complete, ex ijs quae subin­de occurrunt, emendari & perfici queant ad exemplum Romae: for it is saide, non prima illa Romanae reip: institutio tantum a recta via aberra­bat, vt perfici non posset. Lastly such common-weales which in al the parts thereof are found corrupted and declined from their first in­stitution, maie not by profitable lawes made and established as oc­casion shal them require, be reformed; whereof sometimes the Ci­tie of Rome and nowe the state of Salamina may be vnto vs an ex­ample: sith neither the one after her finall declination, which did chiefely growe by a general corruption of manners in the people, could be reformed by the lawes against Captainship, against Coyney, and Lyvery, or against the vnlawefull custome of supporting and maintaining of rebels or any other new lawe whatsoever; nor the other by their lawes sumptuarij ambitus, and such like, the reason whereof shall more at large appeare in this discourse following.

There remaineth nowe the discipline of lawes as the second parte and member of this particuler reformation not as yet con­sulted of.

CAP. 3. Of a reformation made by the discipline of lawes.

This maner of reformation is nothing els but a feare to of­fende, bred in the hearts of the people by the true discipline of lawes, after which manner the Citie of Rome was some­times reformed per supplicium de Bruti filijs sumptum, poenam Decem­viris impositam, Spurij Moelij caedes, & similia, post captam vrbem Manlij [Page 8] Torquatipaenā de filio sumptā, eò quod pugnasset cortra Imperatoris manda­tum, Fabii Magistri equitū accusationem a Papyrio cursore institutam, eò quòd praeter Dictatoris imperiū pugnam commisisset, Scipioni diē dictā, all which beeing most memorable and feareful examples, did admo­nishe all others of their duty and obedience vnto lawes and magi­strates.

Therefore wisely saith a learned writer, In conservandis imperiis regnis (que) faciendum est, vt antiquae leges & consuetudines in vsum reducantur, ex earum praescripto vitia puniantur.

After this maner by a severe discipline of lawes, did the Lorde Gray in times past, and now Sir R. Bingehame, mightily reforme and advance the govern­ment of Salamina, so as wee may truely say, by such governours must this nation be reformed. By this manner of reformation hath France in times past, mightily advanced their government, and es­peciallie the Citie of Paris, which alwaies hath most severely pu­nished offendours.

But what order of times in this reformati­on made by profitable lawes and discipline thereof is rightly ob­served?

This manner of reformation is made after two sorts: either by lawes limiting the times certaine for this reformation; or accidentally thereunto led and provoked by occasions: for so the Citie of Rome after the overthrowe given by the power of the Gaules did reforme their common-weale and all discorders for­merly by them committed. The Athenians also after the Megari­ans had recovered from them the Ile of Salamina, and the haven of Nicoea, reformed that common-weale. And not long after the sedition betwixt the people of the mountaines, the valleies, and sea coasts, did occasion a generall reformation to be made of our Citie and common-weale of Athens. Againe, the Romaines to give an ende of many contentions raised betwixt the senators & people, sent Sp: Posth: Albus, A. Manlius, and Sulpitius Gamerinus, as legates vnto Athens, that they might the better be enformed of the laws which you Solon had established for the reformation of Athens, that thereby as by a line, they might the better reforme the Citie of Rome; and further made choice of their Decemviri to perfit this their intended reformation by profitable lawes.

Now you have declared to vs the reformation which is made accidentally: there remaineth nowe the other reformation, which is made by [Page 9] force of laws & at times certaine, wherin I would willingly vnder­stand the reason, that should limit the times certaine of our refor­mation, and that by lawes certaine in that behalfe established, fith the accidents, and occurrants in al common-weales, which doe oc­casion this reformation made by profitable laws, be in themselves vncertaine, and accidentall.

This manner of reformation made of particular accidentes at times certaine, and that also by lawes and statutes certaine, established in that behalfe, is founde more profitable then the other which is made accidentally. For lawes are required herein, Ne opus sit per vim peregrinam idem prae­stare, and time herein is also to be respected, ne si impunitas longo tem­pore cōcedatur, vs (que) adeò augeātur vitia, vt sine periculo publico deinde nec puniri nec extirpari queant; and for these causes especially, the rulers and governours of Florence were accustomed to say, Singulis quin­quennijs redintegrare formam reip: oportere, otherwise the discipline of law may not be wel preserved. And therfore it is said, that if Roome, singulis decennijs, secundùm leges, aliquod magnum exemplum in de­linquentes statuissent, nunquam tanta morum corruptela potuisset civium animos occupare; sed quia tandem rara esse caepit, aucta est tantopere mo­rum corruptela, vt remedium nullum adhiberi potuerit. In like maner may we truely say, that so great a corruption could never have pos­sessed the mindes of the people of Salamina, if there the exact dis­c [...]ipline of lawes had in good time beene applied.

Now sith you have declared at large the order and time, which is rightly ob­served in this manner of reformation, proceede vnto the dangers and difficulties, which do vsually accompany the same.

CAP. 4. The sundrie difficulties and dangers that followe this maner of reformation.

The difficulties which herein arise, may lively appeare by the question, which Caesar propounded sometimes vnto Pampey, and Crassus, when he was Consul preferring then vn­to the Senate, the law for division of landes, called Agraria; doe [Page 10] you Crassus and Pompey, saith he, give your consents vnto the laws which I have now propounded? They answered, yea; then he pray­ed them to stande by him, against those that threatened him with force of sworde to let him. It may appeare also by that action of Pompey, when as he filled the market-place with souldiers, and by open force established the lawes, which Caesar made in the behalfe of the people. The same also was sometimes lively expressed in the person of Lycurgus, which for the better establishing of profitable lawes, gaged the losse of his eie; and you Solon the losse of your cre­dite and reputation with the people of Athens; when as by the law [...], otherwise called discharge, you incurred the generall displeasure and hate, as well of the poore as of the rich: all which sometimes you lively expressed after this maner.

You have nowe revived the memory of my former sor­rowes, the which I labour rather to forget. Proceede therefore vn­to other difficulties, or rather tell me, why such dangers should a­rise and follow these actions, which are found so profitable for the common-weale.

They arise, partly from the contrarietie of hu­mours, and opinions, lodged in the brests even of the wisest; partly from the insolency of the multitude.

It is most true: for Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, allowed the division of landes, and established the lawe Agraria; but Calphurnius, Bibulus, Cato, Considius, and other Senators reiected the same: the people allowed therof, but the no­bility condemned it, and the ambition of Caesar. In an other assem­bly also of the Senate of Rome, Crassus, Appius, and Nepos, prayed the Senate to proroge the government of Caesar for five years long­ger, and to deliver money vnto him out of the common treasure to pay his army, but others impugned the same; especially Phan­nins.

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For these causes (be you remembred) I helde it a mat­ter very difficult and dangerous, to deale betwixt the poore and the rich, whereunto I was required sometimes by the City of A­thens, fearing the covetousnesse of the one, and the arrogancy of the other; the poore desiring, that the lande might againe be devi­ded; the rich also of the contrarie, that their bargaines and cove­nantes might a newe be confirmed. But what waies and meanes may be found that may avoide these difficulties and daungers?

CAP. 5. The readie waies and meanes to avoide these difficulties and daungers.

Such Princes and governoures, which will avoide the difficulties and daungers, which commonly arise in establi­shing of profitable lawes and ordinaunces; by reason of di­versitie of humours, opinions, and factions, they must of neces­sitie remove for a time, or otherwise imploy the leaders and heades of all such factions, as may giue any waies impediment vnto their proceedings; imitating herein Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, who purposely sent Cato vnto Cipres, knowing assuredly, that he would otherwise give impediment vnto their lawes and proceedings, es­pecially for the proroging of Caesar his governement, and allow­ance for his army; or otherwise with Caesar, they shalbe forced to suppresse them by authoritie, and to put Cato to silence by im­prisonment, the which may fortune to displease as well the no­bles, as the people.

Or otherwise, we are to delude either facti­on by faire promises and sweete wordes, the which subtletie you Solon sometimes vsed (as Phanias the Lesbian writeth) when as you secretly promised the poore to devide the lande againe, and the rich also to confirme their covenantes and bargaines; when as you vsed these wordes and sentences, namely that aequality did bre [...]de no strife; by which aequivocation of wordes, you did winne as well the poore as the rich, vnto a reformation of disorders; the one supposing, that all thinges shoulde bee measured according to the [Page 12] quality of the men, and the other tooke it for their purpose, that you would measure thinges by the number, and by the poule on­ly, whereby you did safely proceede, and mightily further your law called [...], and did therein overcome all difficulties, by the which, the mighty sedition, which was then entertained be­twixt the poore and the rich, was appeased.

You saie true­lie: and for the better iustifiyng of this manner of proceeding herein, you shall vnderstande, that in a publike magistrate, the same is rightlie tearmed pollicie, but in private persons, the same is not vniustly condemned by the name of deceite.

We have remembred the same, not as condemners, but as approvers of the fact, and therefore needelesse you have iustified your selfe here­in.

Be it so: proceede then further vnto other difficulties and daungers, which arise herein from the insolencie of the mul­titude, whereof you made mention in this former treati [...]e but did not at large discourse thereof.

Many daungers and difficul­ties arise from the insolencie of the multitude, as I have saide, for that never with one consent of minde, they doe admit or obey a­ny new lawes or ordinances, vntill they plainly vnderstande the same to bee necessarie; but the necessitie of lawes never appea­reth without daunger to the common-weale, which often falleth to his last ruine, before the lawes can bee perfitly established, which might support the same. The Athenians first received the evill and mischiefe, even into the bosome of that common-weale, before they sought to withstand the same by profitable lawes, yea they suffred the sedition, & vproares, betwixt the issue of Mega­cles & Cylon, still fighting & quarrelling, before they could be per­swaded to chuse you Solon, as the reformer of there commonweale.

You maie best witnesse the same, for they suffered the invasi­on of the Megarians, they lost the haven of Nysea, and the Ile of Salamina, before they sent vnto you Epimenides into Creta, by whose advise they then reformed there common-weale, greatlie to your laude and praise.

But more greatly Solon to your commendations, were the mighty factions long entertained be­twixt the people of the mountaines, vally, & sea coasts, quenched and pacified to the great good of Athens.

they suffered the [Page 13] factions betwixt the poore and the rich, so long to fester in the bowels of the common-wealth, as the poorer sort did rise in armes with a purpose to chuse vnto themselves a captaine, and to sub­vert the whole state of that common-weale, before they coulde be perswaded to make a generall reformation of their lawes and common-weale: they suffred many vproares and braules, before they condemned the excommunicantes. The state of Florence also may with their perill and danger witnes the same: which con­tended not to suppresse the corruptions in the Aretines, before they well neere tasted of their rebellions. In like manner, the Athenians could not be induced, either by my auctoritie, or els by the vehement perswasions which then I vsed, to withstande the tyrannie of Pisistratus, before they endured the weight thereof so heavily, as they could neither cast the same from their shoul­ders, neither yet endure the burden thereof.

This did oc­casion you sometimes to write and speake after this manner,

But if we suffer daungers and difficulties in the establishing of good and profitable lawes, how much greater shall these daun­gers appeare vnto vs, when wee shall vse and apply the sharpe dis­cipline of lawes? the same no doubt is great, and farre exceedeth the other; for at such time as Claudius vvas accused, and indited of high treason, by one of the Tribunes of the people, and by o­thers of the nobilitie and Senate, the rude multitude and people, did so boldlie and stoutly maintaine his vnlawfull factes, as the Iudges for feare durst not proceede against him, vvhereby hee was discharged of his accusations: after the like manner did they compasse the Senate house, & called for Caesar, and willed the Se­nate to let him out at such time, as he was to answere sundrie accu­sations laid against him. But what waies and meanes are now left vnto vs, whereby we may overcome these difficulties and dangere?

CAP. 6. The severall waies and meanes to overcome all difficulties and daungers, which arise in this action of reformation, made by profitable lawes and the discipline thereof.

First we are to remove all occasions, which may move the people or beholders, to pittie or favour offendours. For when Manlius Capitolinus was sometimes accused as a mover of sedition in Rome, his case was no sooner pleaded, but the sight of the Capitoll troubled his accusers, and the Iudges al­so; when as pointing with his hand, he shewed the place vnto the Gods, and weeping tenderly, laide before them the remembrance of the hazarde of his life, in fighting for the common liberty and safetie of Rome, and in defending the Capitoll it selfe, and repul­sing the Gaules; in such sort, as the Iudges moved with pittie, knew not what to doe, and therefore put over the hearing of his cause vnto another day, because the place of his so notable good service was ever still before their eies: wherfore wisely Camillus finding the cause of delay of Iustice, did make the place of Iudgement to be removed without the Citie into a place called the wood Petelian, from whence they coulde not see the Capitoll, where his accusers gave apparant evidence against him, and the Iudges considering all his wicked practises, conceived a iust cause to punish him as he had deserved, so as they gave sentence of death against him. Fur­ther no orator, or pleader of causes, is to be suffered to speake in the behalfe of offendors, either to move the Iudges to compassion, or to winne the offendors favour in the eie of the beholders. The mischiefe which ariseth hereby, did sometimes appeare, when as Caesar was suffered to speake in the behalfe of Lentulus, and Cothe­gus, companions of Catiline in his conspiracie, by whose eloquence the offendors had then beene delivered, or at the least not com­mitted to the handes of the officers to be put to death, if the gra­vitie and authority of Cato, and vehemency of Catulus, had not dis­swaded [Page 15] the contrary. Lastly, the more often princes shal acquaint their subiectes with the discipline of the lawe, the more great obe­dience shall the subiects yeelde, as well vnto lawes, as magistrates, and the lesse difficultie and danger shall princes finde therin. For the right discipline of lawes, doeth admonishe men of their du­tie, and doeth cause them to leade their lives agreeable to lawe, and from time to time doth suppresse the malice of the offendors. For proofe whereof, the Romaines so long as they vsed the iust and exact discipline of laws, they punished the offendors without feare danger, sedition, or mutiny; yea farther, when as they condemned Camillus vniustly, there was found no friend, no souldier, the num­ber whereof were many and great, that durst make any resistance in his behalfe: for when as hee called vnto him his friendes and souldiers, which had served vnder him in the warres, or that had taken charge with him, which were manie in number, he ear­nestly besought them, that they would not suffer him thus vilely to be condemned, through false and vniust accusations laide a­gainst him, and to bee so scorned and defamed by his enemies: his friends having laide their heads togither, and consulted there­vpon, made him answere, how that for his iudgement they could not remedy it, but if he were condemned, they would al ioine togither with a very good will for the payment of his fine. But not long after, Cum toto decennio nullum Romae statuebatur exemplum paenae delinquentium, then could not the Senate examine Cesar with their safetie, neither yet coulde the Iudges condemne Claudius without peril.

Therefore in such common-weales, where the manners of the people are altogether corrupted, for not apply­ing in good time the discipline of lawes, it behoveth the Iudges, and such as shall revive the force of auncient lawes by the exact discipline thereof, strongly to be garded, according to the exam­ple of Cicero being accompanied with a strong garde of Iustie men, when as Consull he was to convict and execute Lentulus, and Ce­thegus, for their conspiracies with Catiline. But Caesar vnadvised­ly refusing a garde in such cases for the safetie of his person, did eft­sones with the losse of his life approve his follie: for Brutus, and others, finding him asked in the Senate, without any strength, or [Page 16] garde did easilie execute their malice vpon him.

In like ma­ner, governours in cases of great extremities, for the avoiding of daungers and difficulties, may proceede against offendors, without observing the vsuall ceremonies of lawe. After this maner did Ci­cero proceede against Lentulus, and Cethegus, when as vpon proofe onely, in open Senate, without any lawful inditement or condem­nation, he commanded their delivery into the handes of the offi­cers to be put to death; for so much may be gathered out of Caesar his Oration, who at that instant mightily inveyed against that ma­ner of proceeding, saying, it was not lawfull, neither that the cu­stome of Rome did beare it, to put men of such nobility to death, without lawful inditement or condemnation, but in cases of extre­mity. This severe course and maner of proceeding in cases of extre­mity, may not be deemed any part of tyranny, if either we wil give credite vnto the opinion of Caesar, or vnto the fact of Cicero, and the Senate; or followe the custome of Rome, or deeme Cato to be milde and iust, who then being in the Senate, did vehemently perswade the same, and whose heart was so farre from crueltie, as beholding the dead bodies slaine in the campe of his enimies, in the last skir­mishe betwixt Pompey and Caesar, he covered his face and went a­way weeping.

I call to remembraunce one Sir R. Binghame provinciall governour of Salamina, in my time a most valiant and honourable Knight, and withall a most wise and grave governour, being given to vnderstand of a generall rebellion, with an intenti­on, not onely to overthrowe the state and governement, but also to make deliverance of principall rebels of the sect and nation of the Burkes, then in prison and safegard, did forthwith deliver those traitors and rebels to be put to death, without lawfull inditement or condemnation. For seeing himselfe fallen into these extremi­ties, that either he must spare the lives of open and manifest rebels to the damage of the common-weale, or execute them without lawfull inditement and other ceremonies, like a wise governour, two mischiefes offering themselves at once, made choice of the least, not beeing as then to learne that which Caesar sometimes taught Merellus, The times of warre and lawe are two thinges: so as in this action and in all other partes of his governement, hee [Page 17] hath shewed himselfe to bee the person, which Archilocus descri­beth in these his verses

It seemeth also convenient for the better avoiding of difficulties and dangers, that such heads and leaders, as shall be found to give impediment vnto this maner of reformati­on, be committed to some safe-gard or prison, and there detained; all which Dionysius advised Dion sometimes by his letters, wishing him thereby, not to set them at liberty, which hated him and the action which he had then vndertaken of reformation.

If the Earle of Desmonde late of Salamina, committed to safe-gard & pri­son for his sundry rebellions against the Citie of Athens: had there beene safely detained, the warres of Salamina had neither beene chargeable nor troublesome vnto the Citie of Athens, and if Iames Fitz Morrice in like maner being in safetie and custody of officers to aunswere all accusations of high treason, had not beene set at large by the Iustices for the time beeing, he had not then wasted, burned and spoiled a great part of Salamina, neither had he put the Citie of Athens to so huge and mighty a charge, nor yet combined with the enemy to the great daunger of that estate. Therefore it is a chiefe suerty vnto Princes, and great furtherance vnto actions of importance, to commit to safe-gard and prison, such as may give impediment thereunto: for the which cause king Fredericke did no sooner intend the warres against the French, but he apprehended and put in prison the Prince of Bisignā and the County of Molotte, as friends vnto the French. But now sith we have spoken at large of the first part and member of this reformation, let vs descend vnto the other, which you have tearmed a reformation absolute and vniversall.

CAP. 1. A description of a reformation vniversall, and of the whole state and bodie of the common-wealth.

This reformation vniversall of the whole state and body of the common-wealth, is nothing els, but a thorough and absolute mutation and change, of auncient lawes, customes, and manners of the people, and finally of the com­mon-wealth it selfe, vnto a better forme of governement.

It seemeth then, that this reformation respecteth three matters principally: first, the mutation of auncient lawes and customes; secondlie, the alteration and change of manners in the people; and finally, a new institution and a better forme of governement, then before, prescribed.

CAP. 2. Of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes.

You have well observed my meaning and purpose: and to this effect, a subtile writer making mention of this reformation generall and absolute, saith, that he which shall attempt the same, must alter and chaunge all the auncient [Page 20] lawes and customes, quia ne leges quidem, quae in ipso ortu reipub: à bonis viris late sancitae (que) sunt, sufficientes vtiles (que) sunt ad eos c [...]ves fre­nandos, qui in eadem repub: à maiorum virtute degenerarunt, & pra­vi facti sunt, for, saith he, where we finde, the times and people thoroughly changed, embracing now that which is found contra­ry to their former course and manner of living, wee ought also to chaunge the auncient lawes and customes: for, contraria subiecta non debent eodem modo tractari. The Romaines may herein be vnto vs a liuely example: for after they had subdued Asia, Africa, and in a manner had reduced vnder their governemental Greece, they fell eftsoones into a corruption of manners, contrary to all their former discipline, institution, and accustomed manner of living: their auncient lawes and customes established for creating of Magistrates, they mightely abused; selling their voices of e­lection openly in the market place for mony: in like manner did they abuse al other their auncient lawes and customes, namely the lawes and customes, which devided the common-weale and power thereof into the handes of the people and Senators, so as there could not be a reformation of that estate, without a mutati­on made of those auncient lawes and customes, then growne by the iniquitie of those times out of vse.

But what neede vvee search forraine examples? when Salamina doth afforde sundry proofes thereof, where we may beholde many auncient customes and privileges, granted (no doubt) at the first, for the advancement of publike services, but now turned by a generall corruption in the subiect, to the ruine of themselves and the lande of Salamina; which must of necessitie bee altered and chaunged, before any thorough reformation may there be established: all which may appeare vnto such as shall reade the Act of Absentes, which is lefte vnto vs as a register of the fall and declynation of the state of Sa­lamina; wherein it is manifest, that the Lords of the several coun­ties, of Carthelagh, and Wexforde, being places priviledged, maie keepe and hold all manner pleas within the same, by occasion and vnder pretence and collour whereof, the kings lawes, writtes, or other processes, be not obeyed, neither anie other lawe or iustice there vsed or administred, for the quieting and good ordering of [Page 21] the subiect: so as in defaulte thereof, the kings enemies have them in servage; al murders, robberies, theftes, treasons, and other offences, remaine vnpunished; the kings wardes, reliefes, escheates, and all other his profits and revennewes are there with­drawne; and the service, strength, and assistaunce of the saide subiect, is greatly minished; all which more at large shall appeare to such as shall pervse the saide statute: so as we may conclude, that without a mutation, made of these auncient customes and privi­ledges now growne out of vse, and declyned from their first insti­tution by a generall corruption in the subiect, the state of Salami­na may never be perfitly and thoroughly reformed. For as the state of Rome, in manner as afore declined, coulde not by the lawes, sumptuarij ambitus, neither by any other new lawe be sustay­ned and vnderpropped, without a thorough alteration made of all other the auncient lawes and customes thereof; so may we not expect in these daies a thorough reformation of Salamina, by the lawes of Captainshippe, the lawes against Coiney and Liverie, the lawes against taking of pledges, the lawes against wilfull murder, or any other new lawe whatsoever made for the reformation of Salamina, without a thorough alteration made of the auncient cu­stomes and priviledges thereof, all which we there sometimes imployed in that service, were daily taught, rather by experience then by any learned or deepe discourse, that may be made ther­of. In like manner if the custome of Captainshippe, the custome of Coiney and Livery, and the custome of taking of pledges, the cu­stome of Tanistery, the custome of protecting and supporting of traitours, had not beene abolished by lawes, then all newe lawes whatsoeuer would have beene founde vnprofitable for the refor­mation of Salamina: for in such cases it is saide by learned writers, that leges novae minus prodesse queant ad tollenda vitia quae regnant. Now sith it is evident, that a thorough reformation may not bee made without a mutation of auncient laws & customes, which are found evill in themselves, or els by mutation and chaunge of times have now lost their first vigor and force, it behoveth that we doe vnder­stand, what order and rule herein is to be observed, for the more ready effecting thereof.

CAP. 3. Of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes, and what things therein chiefly are to be considered.

In all mutations made of auncient lawes and customes, three matters especially fall into deliberation: first the meanes; secondly the forme and maner; lastly the subiect and matter. The meanes are in number five: the first is authority; the goodwill and consents of the people, the seconde; the thirde perswasions; a sufficient power and force, is the fourth; the fifth and the last is a magistrate, of rare and excellent vertues, which may suppresse the envie and malice of such, as shall oppose them­selves against this intended reformation, made by the mutation of auncient lawes and customes.

But what authority is required for the better effecting of a reformation? For this as the first mat­ter, you have well observed to be requisit herein.

All au­thority herein graunted is after two sortes: the one absolute; the other limited by time, and other circumstances. This authoritie absolute, was given sometime into your handes by the Athenians; for after such time as they had well tasted of the lawe and ordi­nance, called [...], they forthwith did choose you their ge­nerall reformer of the lawe, and of the whole state of the common-weale, without limiting this power then granted vnto you, but re­ferred all matters indifferentlye vnto your will, as the offices of state, common assemblies, voices in election, iudgments in iustice, and the body of the Senate. Finally, they gave vnto you all power and authority, to cease and taxe anie of them, to appoint the num­ber, and what time the cease should continue, and to keepe, con­firme, and disanull at your pleasure, anie of the auncient laws and customes, then in being. But this authority absolute, without anie limitation of the power it selfe, or of the time and continuance thereof, hath sometimes turned to the great preiudice and danger of such as formerly have graunted the same: for the Romaines af­ter [Page 23] they had elected their Decemviri, for the making of a thorough and absolute reformation of the common-weale of Rome, they forthwith gave into their handes the sole and absolute power of Rome, so as all other authorities and iurisdictions either of Consull, Senate, or Tribunes, ceasing, they wholy and only governed Rome, without any provocation or appeale to bee made to any other. Thus when no Magistrate remained, which might observe the a­ctions of such as were founde ambitious, easily did Appius Claudi­us, fall into the thoughtes of the principality of Rome; he doeth strengthē himselfe with friendes, & clyēts, and daily increaseth his wealth, and nowe of a Citizen is become a fearefull enemy to the state of Rome; in such sorte, as they may neither endure his pride and insolencie, neither may they safely suppresse the same with­out their common perill and daunger. Therefore more wiselie did the Lacedemonians give great authority to their kinges; and like­wise did the Venetians to their Dukes; but yet with certaine limits and bondes, not lawfull for them to exceede; and farther did appoint certaine watchmen, as daily beholders and observers of all their actions and doings.

But what limitation of time, in gran­ting this absolute authority, may breede safety vnto him that gi­veth the same? This is the seconde and last matter, nowe remem­bred by you, and worthie of consultation.

The provinciall governement over the Gaules, with an absolute power given into the handes of Caesar, for the better reformation thereof, was so long proroged and continued, as at the last with the sword of the Romaines, and the money of the Gaules, he became terrible, as well to the Gaules, as to the Romaines, & returned not a Citizen now of Rome, but as a fearefull enemie, and conquerour, as well of the Ci­tie, as of all the other territories and dominions thereof. And was not also the provinciall governement of Spaine sometimes given into the handes of Pompey with an absolute authority for the re­formation thereof, so long proroged and continued, as with one stampe of his foote he was able, (as himselfe reported) to fill the Citie of Rome with weapons, and armed men? And did not Appius Claudius by proroging his authority but for one yeare, be­come fearefull to the Citie of Rome? And did not the Romaines by [Page 24] making a Dictator perpetuall, loose the libertye of their Citie? and doeth authority thus easily corrupt the maners of good sub­iectes? and is the age also wherein we live free from such corrup­tion? Nay, more then that, is there not an enemie on foote, that laboureth the corruption of the whole? Then what authoritie here may be limited so straight, as in this time may not be thought too large? what time may be so shorte, which may not be deemed too long? Therefore let every good and faithfull councellour vnto the state, with Cato resist here the proroging of Caesar his go­vernement, least too late with Pompey they acknowledge their er­rour: it shall not suffice here to graunt but one yeare more vnto Appius Claudius; neither is it sufficient that Caesar is holden in dis­grace with the Citie of Rome; neither may we here safely beleeve all which shall saie vnto Pompey, Caesar is hated of the garrisons, and souldiers: for when Caesar commeth with his fortune, he shall then force, as well Pompey, as the Citie of Rome, to acknowledge their former follies and errours:

But nowe vnto what per­son may this authority be safely graunted, is a matter herein, not vnworthy of consultation.

It is safely graunted vnto a man approved to be good and honest, with this caution, that he be not of such power and force, as the state may stand in feare of his great­nes. For the best sometimes have fallen by reason of honours and dignities into a generall corruption of manners, and therefore we receive it as a proverbe, honores mutant mores.

At no time then is it safely committed into the handes of personages of great might, power, and wealth.

You have saide the trueth: for what daunger did arise to the state of Athens, by constituting Garralde Fitz Garralde attained, Liuetenant of Salamina? who having at once might, power, and soveraigne commaunde­ment in his handes, did eftsoones conspire, and combine, sun­dry treasons, and rebellions.

The recordes of Salamina doth witnes so much as you have saide, for there it is alleadged, that he did conspire with the French king and Emperour, for the inva­ding and possessing of Salamina: he did also in proper person in­vade the Countie of Kylkennie, there burning, destroying, & mur­thering the kinges subiectes: he did invade also with Oneyle, and [Page 25] his forces, O Coner, and other of the saide Earle his friends, alies, and servants, by his commandement the County of Vriell; where­in he was aided, and assisted by Sir Iohn, brother vnto the saide Earle. The like or greater daunger did growe vnto the state of Athens, by constituting Thomas Fitz Garralde, sonne and heire to the saide Earle, Lieutenant of Salamina: who succeeding in the place of his father, having the like might, power, & forces lent vn­to him by his friends, alies, and servantes, and soveraine authoritie given from the king, did eftsoones revile that famous Citie of A­thens, and his lawfull soveraigne, and moved all rebellions against them; and did therewith also addresse his letters vnto the Bishop of Rome, & the Emperour, for the invading of Salamina: and farther did put to death, and cruelly murthered all those which were re­sident within the lande of Salamina, being borne Citizens of Athe­ns, and amongst others did put to death that reverende father and faithfull counceller Iohn Allin Archbishoppe of Deublin, and primate of Salamina. More then this, he constrained with his pow­er and forces, the subiectes of Athens, to give vnto him an oath of obedience, & forthwith besieged the Castle of Deublin, where with his whole armie by the sea coast he incamped, for the better resisting, destroying, and murthering the army of Athens, Statutes of Ire: 35. H. 8. ca. 3. fol. 11. as they landed. No lesse dangers then these formerly rehearsed, appeared at such times, when as the Duke of Yorke pretending himselfe Live­tenant of the saide lande, did with his power, and forces, occupie and possesse all the territories and dominions thereof. Therefore of late daies, hath the Counsell of Athens most providently com­mitted this soveraine authority vnto such, as may not be able with forces and power to vsurpe the same. But if vnto this authoritie thus given, to effect a reformation, the consentes and good-wils of the people be founde agreeable, no doubt the [...]am [...] shall migh­tily further that action.

CAP. 4. The good-will and consent of the people is a readie meanes to effect a reformation.

You have saide the truth: for where the good-will of the people is first wonne and obtained, there the mutation is made, without difficultie and daunger. All which may live­ly appeare in the history of Tarquine, who having lost as well the good-will of the people, as of the Senate, by changing the aunci­ent lawes & customes of the Citie of Rome, was easily expelled that kingdome.

It is true that you have said; for he did drawe vnto himselfe all the authority, as well of the Senate, as also of the liber­ty of the people, which sometimes they inioied vnder their former kinges, and for this cause chiefely, he failed of the good-will of the people, in this his mutation and alteration of thinges. But Brutus on the contrary, having wonne the good-wil of the people, for the effecting of a reformation, and expelling of Tarquine, did chaunge the state of the common-weale, without anie difficultie, daun­ger, or iniurie sustained by anie other, then the expelling of Tar­quine. Likewise, when the Medicei Ʋrbe Florentinorum Anno salutis M.CCCC.XL.IIII. pellebantur, the chaunge was made without daunger and difficultie, for as much as the same was effected by the good-will and consentes of the people. Sith therefore the consente of the people, doth give so great furthe­raunce vnto this action of reformation, it seemeth a matter verie necessarie, that everie Magistrate shoulde retaine the arte, skill, and knowledge, of perswading and inducing the multitude, as you have in the first chapter of this booke well remembred.

CAP. 5. The force of perswasions, and how necessarie the same is to effect a reformation.

So it is indeede, for the good-will and con­sente of the people, doeth promise no small security vnto the Magistrate which intendeth this action of reformation: and therefore not without cause, Pythagoras was of all sortes of persons greatlie honoured, for his singular arte and knowe­ledge in winning the affections of the multitude, and in perswa­ding, and disswading the people, all which Plutarch witnesseth after this manner,

Though Lycurgus vvas the eleventh which descended from the right line of Hercules, though a man of great authoritie, of great force, of long continuance a king, yet indevoring a reformati­on of many disorders, which did chiefely arise in that estate, by the inequallitie of landes and possessions, therein (as Plutarch witnesseth) he vsed more persuasions, then force: a good vvit­nesse thereof was the losse of his eie. You Solon also altered and [Page 28] reformed that in the common-wealth of Athens, vvhich you thought by reason you shoulde perswade your citizens vnto, or els by force you ought to compell them to accept.

The Romaines therefore well vnderstanding the force of persuasions, in all actions of reformation, did institute the holy order of the Fae­ciales, vvho retayning the art of perswading, and disswading the people, did much further the common-weale of Rome; for they went many times in person to those that did the Romaines iniurie, and sought to perswade them with good reason to keepe promise with the Romaines, and to offer them no wrong: they did also perswade the people, to deliver Fabius Ambustus, vnto the Gaules, as one that had violated the lawes of armes, and farther proved by manie reasons, that a present reformation made of that disorder and iniustice, woulde deliuer Rome from many ca­lamities, then like to insue by the power of the Gaules. By this art and skill of persuading, did Camillus appease the great sedition and mutinye, raysed sometimes by the people of Rome against the Senators, for that they had not their full minde and libertie, to inhabite the citie of Vies. By this art and skil, you Solon have now of late induced the Athenians to make warres with the Megari­ans for the possessing of Salamina, contrarie to their former liking, publike lawes, and proclamations made in that behalfe: and the like honour did you sometimes winne by your oration, made in the defence of the temple of Apollo, in the citie of Delphos, de­claring, that it was not meete to bee suffred, that the Cyrrhaeians should at their pleasure abuse the sanctuarie of the oracle; by force of which persuasions, the councell of Amphictions was tho­roughly mooved, so that they sought a present reformation thereof. By this your art and skill, you also perswaded those which in Athens they sometimes called the abiectes and excom­municates, to be iudged, whereby you did quench and appease two mighty factions, the one supported by the issues of the rebels, that rose with Cylon, and the other by the ofspring of Megacles.

I acknowledge this your friendly reporte, not as a testimo­nie of anie art or skill, but of the office and duetie which I beare vnto the citie of Athens. But after this manner sometimes a no­table [Page 29] mutinye and sedition raysed by the citizens of Salamina, a­gainst the Iustices of assizes and iayle deliverie, in my presence was happely appeased. But nowe sith the necessitie of the art and skill of perswading is sufficiently made knowne vnto vs, there remaineth, that you describe vnto vs the art it selfe, with the partes and members thereof.

CAP. 6. The art and skill of perswading, worthely knowne and observed of all publike Magistrates.

The art and skill of perswading, consisteth in the know­ledge of two matters especially: first we must know hovve to commende the matter, or person of such as vve intende to perswade; then how to moove, winne, and dispose the affecti­ons of the people. For the first, the Poet saith truly, that he singeth most sweetely, that singeth my praise and commenda­tion.

This which you have saide, did manifestly appeare after the battaile of Xerxes fought with the Graecian army, for then all the Graecian Captaines being in the straight of Peloponne­sus, did sweare vpon the altar of their sacrifices, that they vvould give their voices after their consciences to those they thought had best deserved it, where every one gave himselfe the first place for worthines, and the seconde vnto Themistocles. After this manner, did Publicola winne the good-will of Appius Claudius, a man of great strength and reputation among the Sabines, in gi­ving honour vnto him, by the way of an embassage, whereby he gave Claudius to vnderstande, that he knevv him right well to be a iust man, and hated vvithout cause of his citizens; and there­fore if he had any desire to provide for his safetie, and to repaire to Rome, leaving them which causelesse wished him so much evill, they would publikely and privatly receiue him vvith due honour; by vvhich meanes, Publicola did not onely winne Ap­pius Claudius vvith those of his faction, which were great and ma­nie in number, but also staied and turned the warres from the [Page 30] Romaines, then intended by the Latynes and Sabines.

There remaineth now, that you disclose vnto vs the knowledge, howe to vvinne, move, and dispose the affections of the people, as the second part and member, of the art and skill of perswading.

CAP. 7. The skill and knowledge how to winne, moone, and dispose the affections of the people.

Herein three matters especially are founde worthy of consideration: first the affections what they be; secondari­lie the subiect and matter, wherewith they vsually are moo­ved, and carried awaie, as with the violence of some tempest; thirdly the waies how to winne, moove, and perswade the peo­ple, according to the example of the worthiest and wisest in times past. The affections which be the first, are in number these; love, hatred, hope, feare, dispaire, and such like; the matter and subiect which is the second, is parentage, consan­guinity, friendes, goods, possessions, landes, the custome and manner of living, honours, libertie and life; the presence whereof wee loue and imbrace, and with their absence wee are soone carried away vnto wrath, hatred, revenge, hope, feare, and dispaire: therefore from hence as from a fountaine, have the wise governours in former ages, drawne all the force of per­suading; by the same have they induced the people to imbrace matters profitable to the common-weale, even against their wils. And hovv mightely these transitory thinges haue alwaies appeared in the eie of the multitude, it may appeare by the aun­swere given from the Athenians vnto Themistocles, whereas he perswaded the people to leave their citie, goods, possessions, and landes, and to get them to the sea for the better eschewing of the Barbarian forces, vvhich then were so mighty, as the same might not vvell be withstoode by the proper forces of the Athe­nians: In vaine (saith the people vnto Themistocles) doe we then seeke the preservation of our lives, vvhen wee shall forsake the [Page 31] graves of our fathers and auncetours. Such vvas the love they bare vnto those transitory thinges: and therefore one amongest the rest, spake in choler vnto Themistocles after this manner; The­mistocles, for a man that hath neither citie nor house, it is an e­vill part to will others that haue, to forsake all; but Themistocles turning to him, replied, vve have willingly forsaken houses and walles (saith he) cowardly beast that thou art, because vvee vvill not become slaves, for feare to loose thinges that have nei­ther soule nor life.

Novv you are to give vs to vnderstand, of the sundry vvaies and meanes, hovv to vvinne, mooue, and dispose the affections of the people, vvhich is the thirde and last matter by you remembred, worthy of every publike magi­strate, vvhich shall indevour the knovvledge and art of per­swading.

CAP. 8. Perswasions are after two sortes; the wales, and meanes, how to perswade, and induce the multitude; the art and skill required in all perswasions ordinary.

The vvaies and meanes how to vvinne, mooue, and dispose the affections of the people, are vsuallie after tvvo sortes: the one ordinary; the other extraordinary. The ordinary vvaies and meanes, are in number three: First you shall vvisely observe the affections of such persons, as you intende to perswade; secondarilie, you shall vviselie acquit, and deliver, as vvell the matter, as the person of him that perswadeth, from all suspition of fraude and guile; lastly you shall dravv the people vnto a particular consideration of the matter you intende to per­swade. We must diligently observe their affections; for so Pha­nias Lesbian vvriteth, that the mighty and daungerous faction sometimes entertained betwixt the rich and the poorer sort of the citie of Athens, vvas by you Solon easelie pacified, in that you dili­gently observed the affections of either, and did secretly pro­mise the poore to devide the landes, vvherewith they remained [Page 32] highly pleased, to the rich you promised the confirmation of their contracts, which was the matter they chiefely desired. Also you did not let to feede their humours and affections with the dailie publishing of this sentence, equality doth breede no strife; the which did please as well the rich and wealthie, as the poore and needy sorte; for the one conceived of this worde equality, that you woulde measure all thinges according to the quality of the men, and the other tooke, for their purpose, that you would mea­sure things by the number, and by the poule onely; thus both be­ing pleased with you, for that you well observed their humours and affections, they gave into your handes soveraine authoritie for the ending of all quarrels, whereby that mighty faction was happely appeased, to the generall good of Athens. You also well observed the affections of the people, when as you clothed things bitter and vnpleasant, with pleasing names; calling taxes, con­tributions; garrisons, gardes; prisons, houses; and such like: by the which pollicie, you made even things odious, pleasing and acceptable to the people, and easily thereby perswaded the em­bracing thereof. In like manner Themistocles indevouring like a wise generall to augment his strengthes by the aide of the Ioni­ans, in his warres against the Persians, did wisely observe the affe­ctions as well of the Ionians, as of the Persians then his enemies: for passing by some places, where he knewe the enemie must of necessity fall vppon that coast for harborough, hee did in­grave certaine wordes spoken vnto the Ionians, in great letters in stone, which he founde there by chaunce, or otherwise brought thither for that purpose; these were the wordes, that the Ionians should take the Graecians part, being their first founders and aun­cetours, and such as sought for their liberty; or at the least they shoulde trouble the army of the Barbarous people, and doe them all the mischiefe they coulde, when the Graecians shoulde come to fight with them: by these wordes thus in graven, and dispersed in fitte places, where the enemy was likely to harborough, he hoped either to induce the Ionians to take their part, or at the least, that therby he should make the Barbarous people, ielous and mistrust­full of them.

CAP. 9. How that the Magistrate which intendeth to perswade the mul­titude, must wisely acquite himselfe of all suspicion of fraude.

Nowe you have sufficientlie discoursed of the first meanes, whereby the multitude doe rest perswaded, the se­cond nowe remaineth, namely, the knowledge howe to deli­ver the matter and person of him that perswadeth, from all sus­pition of fraude and guile; for then all perswasions move migh­tily, and make a deepe impression in the heartes of the people, when like vnto cleare waters, they descende from the pure foun­taine of integrity. Therefore when Alcibiades perswaded the people of Athens to invade and occupie the empire of Sicilia, wel hoping that the people woulde assigne him general of that armie, Niceas a man of rare and excellent virtues, rather regarding the publicke good then his privat profit, disswaded the contrarie; and to the ende the people shoulde be throughly perswaded of his in­tegritie herein, he spake vnto them after this manner: in times of peace, the Citie of Athens affordeth many Citizens, which shall have place before me, but in times of warre, I nothing doubt but to be the chiefe and first among them; and therefore be you confident in this, that I nowe disswade the warres, for that it standeth more with the publicke good, then with my private pro­fitte. In like manner Numa, the better to deliver himselfe from the suspicion of fraude, in all matters wherein he laboured to in­duce and perswade the people, hee observed two matters especi­ally: first he perswaded them, that he did worke t [...]e reformati­on of that common-weale by the meanes and helpe of the Gods, in which action no fraude may receive place, for that they be for the most parte, alwaies accompanied with integrity and since­rity of minde; secondlie hee perswaded nothing vnto the peo­ple, but that which himselfe performed in person: for Numa iudging it no light enterprise (saieth Plutarch) to plucke downe [Page 34] the hautie stomackes of so fierce and warlike a people, did paci­fie their fierce courages to fight, with daily sacrifices, prayer, and devotion, wherein he ever celebrated himselfe in person. In like manner, when you Solon were to publish your lawe called [...], the better to perswade the people of your integrity here­in, you were the first that followed your owne proclamation, and clearely released your debters of fifteene talentes then due vnto your selfe.

So I did, though it stoode with my losse and hin­derance. But nowe there remaineth the thirde and last meanes, vvherewith the multitude is mightely induced and perswaded, formerly by you remembred, vvorthy of consultation, namely, that vve drawe the people vnto a particular consideration of such matters as vve intende to perswade.

CAP. 10. The magistrate which intendeth to perswade the multitude, must draw them vnto a particular consideration of such matters as he endevoureth to perswade.

You have remembred that which I could not well for­get, the fame being alwaies founde the most assured vvay to induce the people: for in consulting and disputing of mat­ters in generall, they greatly erre, iudging all thinges to pro­ceede from other causes, then from the true causes thereof. Ther­fore vvisely Camillus, vvhen as he indevoured to perswade the people of Rome, from the inhabiting of the citie of Ʋies, then for the same cause being fallen into a mutinie, he descended vn­to particulars with the multitude, and pointed vvith his finger vnto the graves of their fathers, and auncetours, saying, will you needes inhabite the citie of Ʋies? And will you forthvvith forsake the graves of your fathers and auncetours? And will you now leave the holy temples dedicated to the Gods, and sanctified by Numa and Romulus? And wil you suffer the holy fire now new­ly kindled, now once againe to bee put out? And finallie, vvill you leave this your naturall citie (pointing with his finger vnto [Page 35] the citie of Rome) to be inhabited by straungers in time to come, or els to be a common pasture for vvilde beasts to feede on? By vvhich manner of perswasion he eftsoones appeased the mutinye, and quenched their ardent desire for the inhabitinge of Ʋies. Af­ter this manner, did Pacuvius proceede in pacifiyng and subduing the peoples affections from killing their Senatours; which matter by them was fully determined, vntill such time, as he conven­ting the people and Senatours, as for the hearing and determining of some publike and waighty cause, did proceede with them af­ter this manner: now my friends and Citizens (saith he) that which you have even with an ardent desire and affection long wished, namelie the punishment and correction of this detestable and wicked Senate, the same hath fortune now given into your powre and handes, freely to dispose of them at your pleasure, being nowe altogether naked, and closed in on everie side with walles, where, without tumult of the Citie, and perill of your persons, you may freely dispose of them; but least you shoulde preferre the desire of private revenge, before the common safety of al here gathered together, it behooveth before you give sentence of these Senatours, whom you doe mortallie hate, that you proceede first to the choice of others; for of force you must either have Sena­tours, which alwaies have bene the most wise and fit councellors of free estates; or otherwise you must of necessitie fall into the hands of a Lorde or King, which free estates haue ever hated; proceede therefore to the election of new, and make choice of better men, which may supply their places: this matter appearing vnto the people doubtfull, did hold them long in silence, but at the last one among the rest beeing nominated, their clamour and noyse farre exceeded their former silence, some affirming they knewe him not, some accusing his person, others despising his base art and science; and much more in the choice of the second, and third, this dissension was increased, they being more base and obscure, then the first: then beholdinge the grounde, vvith shame fastnes they confessed their former errour, sayinge, they did chuse rather to tollerate an old evill, then a new, which might farre exceede the olde. In like manner the people of Rome, con­sulting [Page 36] at large, founde that they sustained in all warres the grea­test force of the enemie, they found themselves also to be called to all labours and workes, whereby the common-wealth was to be preserved or augmented, and so forthwith they iudged them­selues as worthy of the office and dignity of the Tribuneship, and Consulship, as any Patrician whatsoever: and therevppon con­tended, that the Tribunes should be equally elected, as wel of the one as of the other sorte; the which beeing vnto them graun­ted, and descending to make election, could finde none in particu­lar worthy of that honour, or at the least so worthy as the Patrici­ans and nobles were; then forthwith they did acknowledge their former errour, and made choice of the Patricians only. After this manner, the people generallie consulting of the delaies and cunctation, which Fabius vsed in repelling the forces of Hannibal, forthwith they condemned him to be a cowarde and faint harted; but afterward they waighing that their councell by the severall e­vents and overthrowes they received by the rash and over-hasty proceeding of Ʋarro the Consull, and of Marcus Senteinius, with others, they did soone after adiudge the wisedome of Fabius to be some rare and divine influence received from the Gods. In like sort the people of Rome, after such time as Brutus and Cas­sius had fully executed the conspiracie then intended against the person of Caesar, generally consulting of that action, remained for a time, as indifferent beholders thereof, neither accusing, neither yet making allowance thereof; but no sooner did Caesar his friendes shevv forth his testament, his severall legacies vnto the people, his manie and cruell woundes, and those every where freshly bleeding and increasing like a running streame, the peo­ple as possessed with some furie or frencie, every vvhere in the market place, every where in the corners of the streete, in pri­vat houses, in the fieldes, and in the vvoodes also, cruelly mur­dred all such, as vvere partakers vvith Brutus in that action. After this manner, the auncient Tirantes of Athens, contending some­times to perswade the people to labour, and especially to til and ploughe the grounde, thereby to render them more obedient vnto their governement, did give out a certaine fable; they [Page 37] tell of the Goddesse Pallas, that shee contending vvith Neptune about the patronage of the countrie of Athens, brought foorth and shewed to the Iudges the Olive tree, by meanes whereof she obtained the preheminence: by vvhich particular demonstra­tion made, the people vvere mightily induced to labour and till the land. After this manner the people of Rome, generallie con­sulting of the division of landes gained by conquest, did fall in­to mutinies and seditions against the Senators; then vvisely the Senators deducted forthwith certaine colonies out of the confines of Italie, vvhereby eftsoones the multitude vvere given to vn­derstande, of the particular charge, travell, and other sundry in­conveniences, that did arise by possessing of lands gained by con­quest, vvherewith all mutinies vvere appeased. Thus the magistrate that intendeth to perswade the people, must not ge­nerally consult of matters, but must descende vnto particulars vvith them; and therefore that oratour shall most readilie per­swade, vvhich shall dravv his argumentes and the force of his perswasion, ab effectibus, ab exemplis, or such like: and these be the ordinarie perswasions.

There remaineth nowe the other sote, tearmed by you perswasions extraordinary,

CAP. 11. Perswasions extraordinary, and when or at what time they be requisite and necessarie.

Such were they which Themistocles sometimes vsed, for (saith Plutarch) vvhen all other perswasions failed, and coulde not worke that publicke good which he then inten­ded, hee did threaten the Athenians with signes from heaven, and with Oracles, and aunsweres; and when as he coulde not per­swade the Citizens of Athens, no not for the safegarde of their lives, to departe the Citie at the comming of Xerxes, vvhose for­ces they were not able to withstande, hee pollitiquely caused a brute to be spread abroade among the people, that the Goddesse Minerva, the protector and defender of the Citie of Athens, had [Page 38] forsaken the Citie, pointing them the vvaie vnto the sea; and againe, he vvonne them with a prophesie, which commaunded them to save themselves in walles of woode, saying, that the walles of woode, did signifie nothing else but ships; and for this cause Apollo in his Oracle, called Salamina divine, not miserable and vnfortunate, because it shoulde give the name of a most hap­pie victorie, vvhich the Graecians shoulde gette there; by vvhich extraordinarie perswasions, hee did induce them at the last to leave the Citie of Athens, and to betake themselves to the sea: by occasion vvhereof, they did not onely deliver themselves from the handes of their enemies, but became at the last conquerours, and victours over them. In like manner, when all ordinarie meanes of perswading failed to effect the re­formation sometimes intended by Numa, he made his recourse to these extraordinarie helpes and meanes, laying before the peoples eies a terrour and feare of their Gods, bearing them in hande, that they had seene straunge visions, or that he had heard voices, by vvhich their Gods did threaten them with some great troubles and plagues: whereby hee did pull downe and humble their hearts (as Plutarch witnesseth) and made thereby a thorough chaunge and reformation, aswell of the common-weale, as of the manners of the people. Therefore Plutarch not without iudgment affirmeth, that the multitude in matters vvaightie, and difficult, rest satisfied and perswaded, rather by extraordinarie, then by or­dinary meanes: all which he doeth lively manifest, vvhereas he induceth the multitude exclaiming vppon Themistocles, for not sacrificing the three young prisoners, in so much as Themistocles for­ced by their rage and clamour, did sacrifice at the last the three pri­soners; wherewith the people remained fully perswaded, that the victorie shoulde be given vnto them over their enemies. Againe, sometimes it fareth vvith the multitude, as with the sicke patient, vvhich being overcome with the greatnesse of his malady, is ther­by become so impatient, as he refuseth all wholesome medicines, vvhich may breed his health and safety; the vvhich malady some­times possessed the people of Athens, when as they reiected your counsell for the vvithstanding of the tyranny of Pisistratus, ha­ving [Page 39] then newly vvith his forces entered the castle, and forte of A­thens, vvherewith the people stoode so amazed, as they shewed themselves more vvilling to suffer that evill, then able to pre­vent the same by your counsell.

This happeneth oftentimes, when the people with the suddennes or waightines of the matter, are found dulled, mazed, and oppressed, and thereby as with some great malady remaine overcome; or otherwise, when they finde themselves formerly deluded, by the like matter, or by the same persons, & dare not, or wil not nowe give confidence, though for the present he perswadeth nothing, but that which is expedient & profitable for thē: the which matters, the people of Rome obie­cted sometimes against the Senators, when by the feare of forraine warres, they went about to frustrate the lawe of division: and in these cases as Danta reporteth in his Monarchie, even with open voice, they embrace their ruine, and abhorre their safetie and welfare. But now let vs proceede vnto the fourth way and means, namely, sufficient forces which in such cases are to bee prepared, whereby the Magistrate with greater safety and assurance may ef­fect a reformation.

CAP. 12. Howe strength, power, and forces, are necessarie for the better effecting of a reformation, and how in good time, the same ought to be applied.

In the reformation of Athens, you Solon found the ne­cessity of forces, when neither the good-wils and consents of the people, neither the absolute auctoritie which they gave into your handes, neither yet the art and skill of perswading vvhich then in the highest manner you retained, vvas found suf­ficient to suppresse the ambition of Pisistratus, or to confirme the reformation which you had newly established, for that you wan­ted sufficient power and forces, for the better effecting thereof. Therefore this magistrate which shall intende this action of re­formation, [Page 40] must with Publicola have sufficient powre to execute his vertues and well disposed minde: for by this meanes especial­ly did hee alter, chaunge, and reforme a mighty kingdome, vvhich had continued a long time, and vvas thoroughly establi­shed.

For this cause chiefely, I must confesse, that I was alto­gither vnprovident in taking vppon me the function and office of a king, to decide all controversies and broyles, at the instance of my friendes and citizens, and yet refused the kingly name and powre, the which then vvas offred vnto mee, and vvithout the which I founde by experience, that I coulde never safely execute that which seemed to me then profitable for the beter reformation of the common-weale of Athens.

So it appeared; for soone after you well vnderstoode your former errour, the vvhich you did sometimes liberally confesse, saying after this manner, that with the authoritie and power then committed into your handes, a man possiblie

You have saide the truth: and for the same cause also at ano­ther time, I coulde not appease the sedition vvhich did some­times arise in Athens by reason of the inequality of landes and possessions after the example of Lycurgus, by making an equall division thereof, for that I had not then the power, forces, and authority of Lycurgus. Howbeit I performed that which possi­blie I might vvith the small power and forces then given into my handes by the Citizens of Athens.

Surely this occasion of reformation is full of difficulties, as you have saide, and manie will still be founde, which shalbe discontented therewith; the which hath beene espied by men of wisedome, and such as have beene experienced in such cases, and sometimes your selfe not without iust cause did acknowledge in these verses follow­ing.

Many and vniust are the accusations and attemptes of the mul­titude, against such as have authority and commaundement o­ver them; great and many be they in number, especially in com­mon-weales corrupted in manners, vvhich doe labour and tra­vel so with envy against all excellent men, as that they rather wish their countries destruction, then by them a prosperous reforma­tion thereof; by the which occasions, the faith and services of men, are oftentimes sinisterly interpreted, sometimes by opinion, some­times by malice, as well to the overthrowe of great and profita­ble actions, as also of worthie and faithfull servitors.

There­fore Moyses, before he coulde establish the lawes, which God vnto him had delivered, and commaunded, founde it necessa­rie, vvith forces to remove such, as being pricked forwarde with envie, did oppose themselves against his intended reformation, And Hieronymus Savanarole vvanting sufficient forces, was soone oppressed by the envie of others, and fayled of his intended re­formation, as it may appeare by his sermons, Contra sapientes hu­ius mundi.

Neither is it sufficient in these cases to have for­ces, but as necessarie it is to make vse thereof, and in due time to applie the same to the better furtheraunce of this action of reformation: vvhereof Lycurgus fayling, did establish his refor­mation with the losse of his eie, and with no small daunger vnto his person, for that he contended rather with perswasions then with forces, to establish a reformation of auncient lawes and cu­stomes, and of the landes and possessions of the Citizens. In like manner Peter Soderin, having sufficient forces that might well have overcome the envy and malice of such as were founde to oppose themselves against him, did not in time applie the same, and make vse thereof, but rather contended with benefites and with a iust and honest course of life, to overcome the envie and [Page] malice of such as vvithstoode his reformation; whereby in a short time, he did not onely perish and vndoe himselfe, but also did o­verthrowe his country and regiment; forgetting that which now is everie where in experience, that the malice of the envious man, may neither with offices nor benefites be pleased and reconciled.

If the necessity of forces be great to effect a reformation, (as it plainely appeareth by that which hath bene saide) in such com­mon-weals especially where the manners of the people are found corrupted, then much greater is the necessity thereof, when re­formation is to be made of a common-weale, gained by the sword and conquest, as also corrupted in manners; for that the people having here sustained many iniuries by force and violence, where­unto the conquerour is drawne oftentimes by their disobedience, maie not at anie time after with newe benefites, offices, and re­wardes, be reconciled and pacified: neither shall we finde here profitable lawes, or any sufficient meanes to effect a reformation, without sufficient forces, to repell all daungers, and difficulties: all which Salamina may well witnes vnto the worlde; for when as the governour there, did contende to suppresse by publike pro­clamation thorough out the whole province of Mounster, that detestable custome of Coiney and Livery, and other extortions, which had then consumed the marrowe and fatnesse of that com­mon-weale of Salamina; then it was founde not sufficient to have the same established by late lawes, whereunto the whole par­liament had agreed and consented; neither vvas it sufficient, that the same tended to the vniversall good of the common-weale; but forces herein also were requisite, to suppresse the But­lers, and Garroldines, which then on every side did arise in the mainteinaunce of that detestable custome of Coiney and Livery: all which Sir Warram Sentlenger, then provinciall governour, can well witnes: by whose care and diligence togither with the aide and as­sistaunce of the forces and garrisons of Salamina, they were soone suppressed. Forces being thus necessarie for the effecting of a re­formation, into whose handes the same is to be given, is the fifth and last meanes worthy of consultation.

CAP. 13. Howe a Magistrate of rare and excellent vertues is required in this action of refor­mation.

This action of reformation with sufficient forces, for the better effecting thereof, is to be given into the hands of some man of rare and excellent vertues, by whose constancy and integrity, the envy and malice of the enemy may be quenched. Therefore the Florentines did not a litle erre, which in the times of their difficult warres, helde Antonie Iacomine above all others in greate estimation, for that onely he had taught the Florentine ar­my, as it were with his finger, to fight, conquer, and commaund: yet in milder times, when as the warres by his industrie were growne easie and placable, they little regarded those his vertues, in such sort, as when three Captaines were propounded to be cho­sen for the suppressing of the Pisans, he was not accepted to be one of that number; from the which errour this mischiefe did arise vn­to the Florentines, that the Pisans, which by the industry of Antonie might easily have beene reformed, and forced to have obeyed the Florentines, made eftsoones head against those vnskilful Captaines so strongly, as the Florentines were forced dishonourably to pur­chase their obedience with money. Againe Phillip of Macedonie, after he had behelde the affaires of the Athenians to be given into the handes of Molosses, Caridemus, and such other vnskilfull Cap­taines, he conceived a great hope to overcome them. In like man­ner, the weakenes and facilitie of Collatinus the Consull, did much encourage the traitours, in such sorte, as he had never prevailed against the Tarquines, nor reformed the state of Rome, if the great vertue and severitie of Brutus had not governed at that time the helme and sterne; whereby the courage and boldnes of the traitours, raised by the suffrance and lenitie of Collatinus, as a tempest was suddenly calmed and pacified.

Therefore pro­vident [Page 44] were the counsel of Athens in committing this actiō of the reformation of Salamina, sometimes into the handes of the L. Gray, sometimes into the handes of Sir William Russell as vnto another Iacomine, by whose rare skill and knowledge in militarie discipline, the Pisans have and will be forced at the last to obey the Floren­tines. But let vs nowe proceede vnto the forme and manner of al­tering of auncient lawes and customes, as the second parte and member of your generall division, worthy of consultation.

CAP. 14. The forme and manner of altering the auncient lawes and customes of common-weales.

The forme and manner of altering auncient lavves and customes, is vsually after two sortes: either simulac statim; or othervvise, s [...]sim panlatimque, antequam ab omnibus id a­nimadvertatur. After this first manner, you Solon reformed the citie of Athens: for you did not straight plucke vp the mischiefe by the rootes, but by little and little you chaunged their lawes, cu­stomes, and manner of living. After this manner, did Numa alter and chaunge the accustomed manner of living, and the manners of the citizens of Rome, from a warlike liberty to a life peaceable and obedient, and that by little and little as ( Plutarch witnesseth.) But others led with the opinion and reason of Plato, say, that to re­forme a mischiefe after this manner, is no other but to cut of one of the Hydraes heads, of the vvhich came afterwardes seven in the place: and therefore Agis and Cleomenes toke vpon them to make a chaunge and innovation even at once, and as it vvere with one constant stroake of the hande, to cut of all the mischiefes of their country, so as wee may conclude, that the formes and maners of reforming of mischiefes in the common-weales, be sun­dry and diverse, the which proceede sometimes of the diversi­tie of meanes and occasions, which diverslie doe offer themselves; as also from the diversitie of the subiect and matter, which being [Page 45] diverse in it selfe, requireth a different forme of governement.

You have saide the truth; and therefore a vvise governour doth governe diverslie according to the meanes and occasions offred, taking every thing in his best time vvherein hee meanes to deale, the which commendacion was sometime given not vndeservedly vnto Publicola.

You Solon did sometimes reforme the citie of Athens, not as you might have done, neither yet as the necessi­tie of that common-weale required, as well in respect that the first institution thereof was meere popular, corrupt, and not du­rable, as also for that it vvas declined by many and infinite dis­orders, so as it could not for these causes rehearsed have long con­tinuance, vvithout making a thorough reformation of auncient lawes, customes, and governement, and vvithout pulling vp the mischiefes even by the rootes; the which with that small powre and meanes then left vnto you, you durst not attempt, least by turning vpside-downe the vvhole governement, you might af­terwards have never beene able to settle and establish the same a­gaine: for these defectes chiefely in that reformation, it hath beene observed even of the wisest, that you Solon have already seene the overthrowe of your common-weale of Athens, and the tiranny of Pisistratus.

Yes verily, I did well foresee the same, but yet having neither meanes nor power to resist so hard destinies, I was forced to sustaine the person, rather of a sorrow­full beholder, then a reformer of so great calamities: but more happie and fortunate was Lycurgus, Publicola, and Cleomenes, and such others, though nothing superiours to my selfe in that care and love which every citizen beareth vnto his Countrie, for that they had sufficient power and meanes left vnto them (as Plutarch wit­nesseth) to execute their vertuous desire, vvhereby they made a thorough chaunge and reformation of their common-weales, by cutting vp all mischiefes by the rootes, by reason whereof the state of their common-weales continued long, happy, and pros­perous.

But what difficulty ariseth from the diversitie of the subiect and matter?

CAP. 15. The consideration of the subiect and matter of all reformations, and howe the same is divers in it selfe, and con­sequently requireth a different forme of governement.

The matter and subiect of all reformations is diverse in it selfe, and therefore admitteth the sundry formes of refor­mation aforesaid: for sometimes the matter or subiect which is to be reformed, is a mischiefe or evill by long continuance in­veterate, and growne to the height of his strength and perfection, and there the same shalbe more wisely sometimes indured, then hastily rooted out, to the overthrow of the common-wealth: the which caution if Tiberius Gracchus had sometimes well observed, the citie of Rome had not so hastily declined, and fallen to her last ruine and destruction.

But Plutarch led with a contrarie opinion, commended the law Agraria, as the worthiest act that ever Tiberius performed.

Therein he erred much: for this law was not vnworthy onely of a wise citizen in those times, and in that manner as he then preferred the same, but farther was the overthrow of the common-weale.

It seemeth also requi­site, that so often as the subiect or matter of this reformation commeth in question, that we make a difference in the manner of reforming of a free and popular estate, from the Monarchy; for in this one, we shal wisely make a thorough alteration and change, without leaving any resemblaunce or shadow thereof; but in the other, we are to chaunge the substaunce, leaving in the place onely a shadowe and resemblance of that which is chaunged, for the better contentment of the people; for they discerne all things by the outward sence, and not by the sounde discourse of reason, iudging thinges to be such as they seeme to be in outwarde appea­rance. This order did the Romaines sometimes obserue in institu­ting of there popular governement, and in reforming of auncient lawes and customes, after they had expelled their kings; for they [Page 47] altered the substaunce, and left in place thereof onely a shadow and resemblaunce of the thinges altered; for in place of their kings they produced two Consuls, sed vnum tantum faces habere vo­luerant, & quidem totidem numero quot reges vsurpare solerent: and whereas their kings in person did perfourme certaine publicke sa­crifices, regem sacrificulum creant qui hisce sacris praeesset, vt ne­quaquam apud eos regum desiderium esset. Thus by retayning the shadowe onely of auncient lawes and customes, the people re­maine thereby perswaded, that nothing of the substaunce there­of is taken away or diminished: in like manner, they carefully observed this rule of pollicie in the creation and election of Ma­gistrates and officers, for although they assigned vnto them newe offices & functions, yet they did wisely holde the auncient names, stile, and number with their former magistrates, that the people might deeme thereby nothing to be altered and chaunged.

CAP. 16. Of the right institution and reformation of a monarchie.

BVT otherwise wee are to institute and reforme a Monarchy, by making there a thorough alteracion and chaunge of aunci­ent lawes, customes, and governement, yea and of the honours, ti­tles, and dignities also, not leaving any shadow or resemblaunce in place thereof. For after this manner did king David establish an vniversall reformation. In like manner Lysander, did pull downe the pride of the citie of Athens, and tooke from them the libertie of a popular governement, vvhereby in former times it was ru­led and governed, and established there sharpe and severe ma­gistrates. But some others carried with a contrarie disposition of minde, have not attempted a thorough and generall reformation of the common-wealth, but reserved onely vnto themselves a principalitie and commaundement, the which forme of governe­ment was observed by Sylla; for when he had taken the citie of A­thens, after the citizens had made fierce warres with him, yet hee [Page 48] lefte it free vnto them, enioying their owne laws. The same coun­sell did other of the Romaines followe, as it appeareth by the wordes of Camillus vsed vnto the Senate after he had conquered the Latines: Dij immortales ita vos potentes huius concilij fecerunt, vt sit Latium an non sit, in vestra manu posuerint, si vultis crudelius consulere in deditos victos (que); sed si vultis exemplo matorum augere rem Romanam vi­ctos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppe­tit. It seemeth therefore by the wordes of Camillus, that the Ro­manes made not at al times a thorough and vniversal reformation of common-weales which they gained by conquest, but embra­cing rather the counsell of Sylla, reserved onely a prncipalitie and commaundement; for by this meanes, they did easily nourish the ambition which they had in conquering: for such as have a pur­pose to performe great actes, and to winne fame and glorie, ha­ving a mighty power to effect the same, they maie safely follow the steppes of Sylla, and other of the Romaines, they may say with Camillus, let vs exemplo maiorum augere rem Romanam victos in civitatem accipiendo, materia crescendi persummam gloriam suppetit: but such as shall contend to make continuance of their conquest, being not of great forces and power, should imitate Lysander, and make a thorough and absolute reformation of the whole com­mon-weale. For Plutarch erred not, when he saide that Sylla did performe the greater actes, but Lysander committed the few­er faultes, and did possesse with greater securitie that which he conquered. Phillip of Macedonie, followed the steppes of Lysan­der, whereby, possessing at the first but a small kingdome, he be­came in a shorte time a mighty commaunder of all Greece.

The Gaules in like manner following the steppes of Lysander, did securely possesse for a long time the partes of Italie, called Longo­bardia: some others have beene found neither to imitate Sylla, nor Lysander, but have helde a meane course betwixt both, in establi­shing their governement. Such were the Florentines, which in suppressing the rebellion of the Aretines, did remove some of their principall commaunders from their place and offices, others they bannished, manie they condemned, but they did not resume in­to their handes the landes, which might have afforded sufficient [Page 49] maintenaunce vnto their citizens, neither did they destroy the principall citie, but preserved the same; whereby they lost the opportunitie of confirming their empire and governement, and of augmenting their common-weale. This meane course hath never as yet beene founde happy and prosperous: For not throughly conquering our enemy, neither by sworde, neither yet by our boun­tie and liberalitie, vve may not long holde them, either as sub­iects or friendes. Therefore such as shall contend to be prosperous, and make continuance of their state, and governement, must with the Romaines, so suppresse and sharpely punish the Latines, as at no time they be able to rebell, or with bounty and goodnes so winne the affections of the privernates, as at no time they should be willing to rebell. The meane course in times past hath beene holden for the governement of Salamina by a long space; In which times they were never founde happy and prosperous in their governement.

Now sith we have discoursed at large, of the reformation of auncient lawes and customes, and of the helps meanes and other rules therein to bee observed, as the first and principall matter in all reformations absolute and vniversall to be respected, there remaineth now a reformation of manners in the people, as a second matter worthily considered.

CAP. 17. Of the reformation of manners, and how that this vniversal and absolute reformation maie not be effected without the same, and how that the corruption of manners may be discerned by his fruites and effectes.

The reformation of manners, doth mightily advance all common-weales, and doth render them prosperous, and fortunate, of long continuance.

Therefore not vvith­out cause did the Romanes, constitute Iudges, and Censors of the manners of the people, which did carefully from time to time, execute all the lawes, De morum censura. Neither was the place [Page 50] of the Censores holden to be sacred, without due consideration of the common-wealth: Neither were they without cause above all other officers honoured in that common-wealth, in such sort, as they did depose, and displace, sometimes the Consuls, some­times their Dictator, at their pleasure; for no doubt, what by the refomation made by the industry of their Censors, and by their skill and knowledge in militarie discipline, they quietly gover­ned at home, and fortunately conquered abroad in all partes of the world. Therefore since the reformation of manners, is a matter of so great importaunce vnto estates and common-weales, it shall bee convenient, that you doe describe at large vnto vs what you intende thereby.

We intende nothing els by a corruption of manners, but a departure from the feare and reve­rence of God, from the honour and obedience due vnto Princes governours and Magistrates, from the love which wee owe vnto our Country, and generally a declining from a iust care and re­garde of publike affaires, and all heroicall vertues, vnto plea­sures, wantonnesse, vices, and other such private respectes and regardes.

You have exactly described the same; for as the fatnesse and goodnesse of the earth, is easily discerned by the large profit and benefite it yeeldeth to the labouring hande; and the goodnesse of the tree by his pleasaunt fruite; so the corrupti­on of manners in the people, by his infinite evils, miseries, com­mon calamities, ruines, and destructiones of states, which eve­ry where it begetteth and bringeth forth, as by his several fruites and effectes may be discerned. For it breedeth in men a base opi­nion and estimation of vertues, and a contempt of magistrates, it offreth in open market the sale of offices, the voices of election, yea even Iustice it selfe, it enableth Caesar with the money of the Gaules to purchase not onely favour, and offices, but even the libertie of Rome. From this fountaine springeth ambition, desire of revenge, mutinies, sedition, treason, and rebellion, final­lie it leaveth no place, no not the Senate house of Rome, nor the pulpit for orations, nor the image of Pompey, no not the o­pen & publicke market places vndefiled and free from bloud, no not the pallace of princes, Ʋte Galbae & Pertinaci accidit, both which [Page 51] most vertuous kings were killed by their subiectes; the which mischiefe did arise vnto them, chiefely for that the manners of their subiectes and souldiers were corrupted by the malice and e­vill governement of their predecessors, so as generally it may be reputed the mother, and nourse of al common calamities.

That detestable custome, and more detestable confirmation thereof, for receiving and supporting of traitours, rebels, and evil disposed persons, comming and arriving into the lande, did first occasion so generall a corruption of manners in Salamina, Anno. 10. H. [...]. as more at large the same may appeare in the act of repeale thereof made by king H. the 7.

Sith then this generall corruption of manners doth draw with it so many publicke miseries and calamities, as are before remem­bred, we can not, except men be altogither voide of humanity and reason, but abhorre even the remembraunce of these lamen­table times, and be forthwith kindled with a desire of reforma­tion.

CAP. 18. The severall occasions which breede in the heartes of the people or nation, a generall corruption of manners.

That we may the better effect this reformation of man­ners, it behooveth vs to vnderstande the severall occasions which doe nourish the same, and lastly the sundry waies & meanes which may be found for the better reformation there­of.

First let vs vnderstand the occasions as you have saide.

Sometimes we remaine corrupted in manners by ease, wealth and security, with the Romaines after their severall conquestes of Asia, Africa, and the greatest partes of Greece, and vvith the in­vincible army of Hanniball, by the pleasures of Capua; sometimes by bitter adversities, with the Athenians we become haters & des­pisers of vertue, and we make vnto our selves that hatefull lavve of Ostracismus, whereby we banish and put to death men of rare and excellent vertues, with the Hectomarij and Hiereling; some­times [Page 52] we mutine, and rise in armes against the rich, and other times with the poorer sort of the oppressed factiō of Marius, we cōpasse the Senate house, and demaunde the delivery of Caesar; sometimes by the malice and practises of forreine enemies with the Ile of Eu­boea and the other partes of Greece, by corruption of Phillippe of Macedonie we depart from our obedience; sometimes by contēpt and neglect of religion and the professors thereof with Samaria & the citie of Ninivie, we fall into a generall corruption of manners, lastly either by our lightnesse or incredulitie with the Ʋandales, sometimes in Africa of the Arrian sects we dismember the body of the Church by sects and factions, so as either with the Churches of Greece, Rome, and Ravenna, we rise in armes one against another, or at the least the common people amiddest so great variation of sectes and opinions, finding no an core or place of rest, that may quiet their troubled soules and consciēces, die and live for the most part in great anxietie and incredulitie.

Nowe you have at large discussed the occasions vvhich maie draw the people into a generall corruption of manners, it shall not be impertinent, to intreate of the severall remedies which may be found to resist so great an evill, vvhich worketh the ruine of states and common-weales.

CAP. 19. The readie waies and meanes to reforme and resist a generall corruption of manners.

The chiefe and principall remedies are found to be in number three: namely a secret prudence and wisedome; secondarily good lawes well executed; thirdly a succession of severe Magistrates: for no doubt like as the wilde olive and figge tree, by the continuall addressing of a skilfull husbandman, is made at the last kindely, profitable, and fruitfull, and not in­feriour to the naturall braunches; so a common-wealth over­growne with a generall corruption of manners, and thereby become savage, barbarous, and barren, like vnto the vvilde [Page 53] olive and figge tree may by the continuall pruning and addres­sing of a skilfull magistrate, be made obedient, civill, and profita­ble vnto that prince, whom God hath constituted to be the labou­rer in that vineyarde; the which is to bee effected by the three waies and meanes before remembred: the first whereof is a secret prudence and vnderstanding, wherein two matters principallie are found worthy of consideration: first the subiect and matter; se­condarily the time; for as the infirmities in our naturall bodies, growing vppon contrarie causes, receive not their cure by one selfe same councell, and medicine, for the which cause we ende­vour, to cure the frenzie by rest, and by motion the lethargie; so it fareth with the infirmities of a pollitike body; for where the corruption of manners in the multitude groweth by wealth, rest, and securitie, there it receiveth his present cure with the lethargie by motion, dispersing the humours, and finally by sharpe corre­ction and discipline: but otherwise it is where the same procee­deth from extreame aduersitie for there it receveth a happy cure, with the frenzie by ease, pacience, and sufferance, for Contraria sub­iecta non debent eodem modo tractari: Wherein Charles the fift hath lefte vnto vs an example, when as he stoode before Meats in Loranie with his army, vvhich vvas then so distressed by extreame sicknesse and famine, as they openly railed on him, especiallie his Spanish woulde call him the sonne of a mad woman with all the vile wordes they could devise, yet he would not heare them, but threw crownes amongest them, saying to his nobilitie, harken these knaves, yet if I call the worst by his name, he will not refuse to doe anie thing for me though it cost him his life. The like wise­dome was shewed in the like matter by Caro, and other Senatours of Rome, at such time as when the poore and needy persons which at that time had reposed all their hope and confidence in Caesar, had compassed the Senate house and called aloude for Caesar then accused before the Senatours, bidding them to let him out, Ca­to then to acquite the common-weale of the insurrection of the poore and needy persons, did not severely correct them, but con­trariwise perswaded the Senate to make a francke distribution of corne amongst them for one moneth the which amounted to one [Page 54] hundreth and fiftie Myriades made at the common charge of the citizens, by the which councell he quenched not onely a present great feare, but did in happy time scatter and disperse abroade the best part of Caesars force and power, at such time as hee was made Praetor, and that for respect of his office he vvas most to be feared. The same councell did Pericles sometimes imbrace, when as the people of Athens did mutine against him, for that he would not suffer them to hazarde the battaile with the Lacedaemonian army, then burning and spoiling in all the partes of their countrie; for he did not then with bitter speeches and sharpe punishmentes paci­fie that mutinie, but contrariewise with a large distribution which he caused to be made amongst them out of the common treasure, and division of lands that were gotten by conquest, he did quench that sedition. And it is said, that when Luctatius, one of the greatest authority at that time in Rome, did inveigh against Caesar, in that he had seditiously set vppe the honoures and victories of Marius contrarie to their publike lawes and decrees, and vrged then a condigne punishment aunswerable to so greate an offence, he spake nothing for the punishment of the people which then ga­thered themselves together for the aide of Caesar, and the rather for that they being of the faction of Marius, had bene long oppres­sed and troden vnder foote by the authoritie of Sylla. In like manner, when we shall beholde men of rare vertues and great de­sertes towardes the common-weale, in times of peace and libertie contemned and despised, with Narcetus that rare and excellent captaine, least thereby they fal with him into a generall corruption of manners, and combine with the king of Lombardy, for the inva­ding of Italy, wee shall wisely vvith the Venetians in such cases, al­waies better the fortune of those which have faithfully served, & never remoue them from their former dignity, without giving to them places of higher and greater commaundement, and vvith Themistocles not only speedily revoke the banishment of Aristides, and such others of his quality, but also to advaunce them to grea­ter honour then before, fearing least otherwise he take part with the Barbarian nation to the ruine of the state of Greece. But herein one caution is wisely observed, that in such cases contending to [Page 55] remove a corruption of manners, which may otherwise possesse the mindes of rare and excellent personages, by a contempt and disdaine vvhich followeth them, chiefely in times of happinesse, wealth, and securitie, wee doe not endaunger thereby the whole state of the common-wealth, the which vvee shall then easilie prevent, if we shal not imploy them in the greatest places of com­maundement, least contending to acquit themselves vvith Clau­dius Nero, of all disgraces and iniuries wrought by the deceit of Hasdruball, they desperately hazarde, and put in adventure the vvhole state thereby. Neither are wee in such cases with the Ro­maines, to giue vnto Camillus discontented with his banishment the supreame commandement of the City and army; for after slaugh­ter made of all other their captaines by the power of the Gawles, they vvere ledde therevnto rather by necessitie, then by vvise­dome; neither doe all men banished and disgraced, carry vvith them that honourable minde of Camillus, and that ripenesse of iudgement, to preferre the honour and publike good of the com­mon-vveale before his private reputation and vvelfare: But on the contrary, if vve shall labour to cure the corruption of manners that groweth by peace, vvealth, and securitie, vve are in such cases, vvith Luctatius to remove the same by sharpe discipline, whose councell if the Senatours had then followed, many miseries and publike calamities, vvhich the ambition of Caesar soone after vvrought against the citie of Rome, had beene vvisely foreseene and prevented: or otherwise in such cases, if wee shall like vnto the wise phisition disperse abroad those pestilent humours accor­ding vnto the example of Camillus, and with him imploye the citizens of Rome, novv puffed vp with the pride and insolency of their nevv obtained victorie and conquest of Vies, and with the rich spoiles thereof, now in mutinie against the Senatours and no­bles, novv resorting vvith great tumult about the pulpit for ora­tions, for establishing of laws tending rather to the destructiō then to the division of Rome, as in the warres against the Phalerians, and there besiege the chiefe citie, not so much with a purpose to winne the same, but rather with him to keepe our countrie men busied, least by repayring to Rome, they should take occasion to mutine; [Page 56] whereby with the wise phisition we shall disperse abroad those hu­moures, which may trouble the quiet state at home. Lastly if wee shall wisely take holde of time, whilst she is running her swif­test course with her force and violence, perhaps vve may be ca­ried more then vvith an ordinary expedition vnto the height of our thoughtes and desires; for the times which shall represent vn­to vs the shevv and face of publike calamities, as famine, plague, pestilence, povertie, and warres shall mightily advaunce this ac­tion of reformation: for so the Senatours of Rome by an appea­raunce of forraine warres did often pacifie the mutinies and seditions of the citizens of Rome, raised for the law of division of lands gained by conquest: and the Romaines after the battell of Cannes gave due obedience vnto Magistrates, and did severely prose­cute their lawes against the Vestall Nuns, and finally whatsoe­ver the Magistrates did commaunde, the people would most rea­dily obey. The like obedience was sometimes found vnto lawes and Magistrates, after the people of Rome had received their o­verthrow by the power of the Gawles, in such sort, as the corrup­tion of manners that then reigned in them vvas soone quenched and reformed. The times also which did produce sundry publike calamities in Vlster parcell of the dominions of Salamina, did worke there the like effectes, as it appeareth in the statute of Attainder of Shane Oneile; where it is saide after many publike calamities sustained by the warres, they cried first for mercy, and then for Iustice, in such sort, as the reformation of that country did offer it selfe easie vnto the handes of the Magistrates that woulde laie holde thereof, as by expresse wordes of that statute more at large may appeare. Wisely therefore Plutarch in comparing the actes of Fabius with Pericles, saith, that Pericles governed the Athenians in their chiefest prosperity and wealth, whereby they were cor­rupted in manners, and rendered insolent, and mutenous, and not easily governed; but Fabius then governed Rome, when as it was humbled by many adversities, esteeming it a matter of no great difficultie, to rule a citie all ready brought low by adversi­tie, and which compelled by necessitie is contented to be gover­ned by a wise man.

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But sith this matter is at large discoursed, let vs proceede vnto the other meanes which are lefte vnto vs for the better resi­sting of a generall corruption of manners, and what force, good & profitable lawes may have therein.

CAP. 20. The necessitie of good and profitable lawes for the better effecting of a refor­mation of manners.

The Aegyptians by a long space prevented this generall corruption of manners, which either peace, wealth, security, or otherwise the fertility of place might breed in the hartes of the subiectes. The like lawes did Romulus, Numa, and other go­vernoures which succeeded them, carefully from time to time e­stablish, as neither their long peace and rest which they enioyed in the governement of Numa, neither yet the fruitfulnesse of the soile of that empire, nor the commodities of the sea, neither their daily victories, could by the space of a long time and many ages, corrupt the manners of the people. In like manner the Germanes above all others have best continued the integritie of manners in the subiect, chiefely for that they have not onely beene most studious of profitable lawes, but also most faithful observers there­of, the which thing above all others hath preserved their people and country, as well from this corruption of manners, as also from the servitude and oppression of others. And where it is said, that Spaine hath not fallen so deepely as Italy, and Fraunce, into a generall corruption of manners, this proceedeth not from the goodnesse of their nature, but from the strict observation of the auncient lawes and customes of that kingdome.

I have viewed the lawes of Salamina, and I finde them no lesse profita­ble then the lawes either of the Aegyptians, Romanes, Ger­manes, or others whatsoever, for the reformation of manners; so as there remaineth nothing, but that vvith the Germanes wee be faithfull observers of our lawes▪ for so it may appeare [Page 58] by expresse wordes contained in the statute made against mary­ing and fostering, Act. 28. H. [...]. c. 13. fo. 1. where it is related after this manner: Notwith­standing diverse good statutes and actes of parliament made for the reformation of that countrie, wherein is contained, that eve­ry of the kings subiectes offending the same, shoulde be a traitor attainted, yet by the default and negligence of the heads and ru­lers of that lande vnder the kings highnesse, the saide statutes vvere not duely put in execution, so as no reformation hath fol­lowed the same. In like manner, disorders were sometimes com­mitted in the countries of Flamminia and Emillia, by the negligence of Magistrates in not executing the lawes, before Pope Alexan­der the fixt had wisely displaced and removed the negligent go­vernoures thereof; before which time, these regions were full of theft, robberies, and rebellions, the vvhich offences did not arise from the nature of the place or people, as some did then suppose, but rather from the malice and negligence of their go­vernoures; for they beeing poore, woulde notwithstanding live richly, and sumptuously; they made lawes, and were the first that offended against the same, and by their example invited others therevnto; neither did they punish any that offended the lawes, vntill they increased to great strengthes and numbers, ac tunc demum (saith the author of this historie) non Iusticiae conservandae causae, sed praedae dulcedine permoti, paenas ab omnibus simul gravissimas exigebant; ex quare hoc sequebatur absurdum, vt expilati assiduis il­lis mulctis homines ad paupertatem redigerentur, atque hinc impelleren­tur ad vexandos alios, quibus existimabant se viribus esse superiores, quo quidem modo vitia non emendabantur, sed ad ea homines institueban­tur, dependebant que haec omnia ex prava eorum regulorum natura. Lastly, the many and sundry priviledges are found to give impedi­ment vnto the execution of profitable lawes, and to nourish a cor­ruption of manners in the subiect, as more at large it doth ap­peare in the act of Absentes, which is lefte vnto vs as a register of the fall and declination of the state of Salamina, vvherein it is manifest that the Lordes of the several countries of Catherlagh and Wexfords being places priviledged, may keepe and holde al man­ner pleas vvithin the same, vnder colour whereof the kings lawes, [Page 59] writtes, or other processe bee not obayed, neither any other Iu­stice there administred, for the quieting and good order of the subiect, so as in the default thereof, the kings enimies have them in servage, all murders, robberies, theftes, treasons, and other offences remaining there vnpunished.

But what Magistrate may be found sufficient to establish a reformation of manners?

A severe Magistrate is herein required: for that a common-weale mightily corrupted in manners, is squared and reformed onely by the rule and line of Iustice which wee call distributive, the which for the inequality thereof, may not without great motions and sharpe remedies reforme the enormities and mischiefes of the common-weale. Lastly where the manners of the people remaine corrupted, there the lawes, De morum censura, and all other lawes are found vnprofitable, vnles by a severe and stout Magi­strate they be supported and maintained. For if Brutus had not severely proceeded, as well against his owne sonnes, as against all other traitours, he coulde not have reformed the corruptions of Tarquine, and of other his confederates.

He that shal in these waighty actions of reformation proceede as you have saide with lenitie and softnesse, shall never with Collatinus bee able to suppresse a corruption of manners in the subiect, but he shall by that course rather imbolden and comforte traitours in their inten­ded purposes; therefore herein the wisedome of Ʋalerius vvas highly commended, vvho though by nature curteous, and gen­tle, and thereof surnamed Publicola, yet by wisedome now be­came so severe & sharpe for the reformation & good of his coun­trie, as he most sharpely and bitterly prosecuted the treasons of Tarquine.

They which shall live and governe Sparta, where the people are in manners corrupted, must with Cleomenes sharpely prosecute and punish offendours; but where the man­ners of the people be not corrupted, there a milde course of go­vernement doth worke his office, and carrieth with it allowance and commendations. For this cause it is said, that the patience of Peter Soder [...]n was profitable as well to the common-weale as to himselfe, so long as the age and time continued milde and gen­tle, but after the times were chaunged into an iron age, the [Page 60] same then required a greater severitie then could be found in Pe­ter Soderin, which by no meanes nor occasions, nor by the change of times, could be ledde from his accustomed patience, by the which he did not onely overthrow himselfe, but did also perish his whole countrie. Therefore very well saith a learned author, for the better reformation of manners corrupted in the people, and for the better reviving of the force of auncient lawes, a severe Magi­strate is requisite.

But great is the hatred which in such cases followeth the person of a severe Magistrate, and it draweth with it sometimes perill and daunger vnto Princes.

This que­stion admitteth one other distinction: for an absolute Prince is to imitate the humanity of Cyrus described by Xenophon, but such as shall governe by way of deputation, are rather to follow the seve­ritie of Manlius Torquatus, least otherwise with Peter Lawredane, we doe not onely make the Venetians ielous, but also disable our selves by our lenitie and softnes, to performe this difficult acti­on of reformation, wherein severitie is required. To conclude, it must be that grave and severe Tymasicheus, that shall reforme the licentious citie of Lyparensis, and drawe them from spoiling, praying, and rebelling. Lastly, wee must make a continuall succession of severe Magistrates, as before I have remembred. For Epaminondas with a iust severitie may reforme a corruption of manners in the Thebanes, but if he once fortune to dye, the The­banes shall eftsoones returne to their former corruptions.

Nowe fith you have at large discussed of the two partes and members of this vniversall and absolute reformation, name­ly the reformation of auncient lawes, customes, and lastly the cor­ruption of maners in the people, there remaineth nowe a newe and better institution then before prescribed, as the third and last member of your generall division.

I will proceede then vnto the institution it selfe, wherein forme matters are found worthie of consideration: first, the soveraintie and commaundement; se­condly, the forme of governement; thirdly, the forme and man­ner of the institution it selfe: lastly, the severall endes and scopes of this institution? For the first, which is the soverainty and com­maundement, the same is given sometimes into the hands of one, [Page 61] sometimes in the handes of fewe, and sometimes into the handes of all in generall. This one is termed a Democratia, or a popular estate; the other an Aristocratia; the last a Monarchie, Thus be common-weales properly distinguished by the soveraintie and commaundement, and not by the diversity which sometimes appeareth in the forme and governement thereof: for all insti­tutions are made after the one of these kindes, and all other are but corruptions of these estates, and no proper or distinct com­mon-weales.

But which institution is to be preferred above others?

The institution no doubt of the Monarchie, is the most firme and durable, and freest from al dissention, mutinies, and sedition. And the wise men of Rome vvere not deceived, when beholding the market place filled with bowes, slings, and swordes, and the pulpit for orations sprinckled with bloud, they said, there remaineth nowe no other way to give helpe and re­medie to these troubles of our common-weale, but the authori­ty of one man onely, that may commaunde vs all. And as this estate is freest from trouble, as you have saide, so is it of all others most honourable and glorious, and even the very lively image of God and nature, as Artibanus did sometimes faithfully deliver vnto Themistocles. The next manner of institution in account, see­meth to be the Aristocratia, for that it acquiteth it selfe best of al o­ther common-weals, from corruption & errours in their censures and iudgements: for as the large and running waters, are not so easily corrupted, as the standing poole; so many wittes, and mindes, are not so easily deluded and corrupted, as one. But worst of all others doeth this common-weale acquite it selfe of en­vie, dissention, and emulation amongest themselves, which like vnto a mothe or worme, gnaweth a sunder the heart and intralles of that common-weale, and at the last confoundeth and destroi­eth the same. But yet the popular estate is of all others least per­manent, especially where the common-weale is mere popular, as­well in regard of the soveraintie and commaundement, as of the forme & manner of governement; wherof the common-weale of Athens maie be vnto vs an example, which was instituted by you Solon, and after in the same age confounded by Pisistratus:

[Page 62] So it was: for wanting sufficient power and forces, I was forced to make such lawes for the instituting of that common-weale, as they vvere willing to receive, and not such as I was willing to give: for I must confesse, that popular institution, which is equallie tempered, and compounded of the three sortes and formes of go­vernement, after the maner and institution of Rome, to be more firme and durable; and this forme of governement also doeth give a perfection and continuance to all other estates before re­membred. Therefore Romulus after the death of Remus, and Tatius Sabinus, did ayme at that forme of government in the insti­tution of the common-weale of Rome; for he reserved vnto him­selfe the sole and kingly auctority over the armie onely, and to convent the Senators for the affaires publicke, the which forme of governement, in his person was kinglike, and after the forme of a Monarchie; but in the person of the Senators, who had auctoritie to consulte, and publikely to perswade and disswade the attempts for wars, and to discusse all other civill causes, as the state of that common-weale required, the forme of an Aristocratia, was right­ly by him observed; and in the other partes of his governement, as in framing of his lawes and such like, he rather affected a popu­lar liberty, then a Monarchie.

After this manner the king of France hath reserved vnto himselfe a kingly name, stile, honors authority, and commandement over the Senate, and to assemble them for the affaires publicke, and a sole absolute and royall au­thority over the armie for making or finishing the warres, lastly an authority for the levieng and receiving of the revenews belon­ging to the crowne, but the execution of lawes he leaveth to the Senate, and Iudges, who governe by such lawes as respect a po­pular liberty and free estate, in the making of which lawes, the people have also their voices, like as in popular estates, where the people holde the soverainty and commaundement; so as by this forme of governement as well to the king, and the nobles, as also to the people, such power is graunted, with so iust and equall pro­portion, as either the dignitie of the one, or the liberty of the o­ther may iustly require; in the well tempering wherof, all the skill, arte, and pollicie of governement is wholy contained, and he that [Page 63] shall holde the best and most iust temperature herein, commeth nearest to the perfection of nature; who by how much more equal­ly shee doth temper the foure humours and elements in our natu­rall bodies, by so much we receive a more perfit strength, & a lon­ger being & continuance.

This is the best forme of instituting of common-weales, the which you have now described; but in this institution some are founde to ayme at peace, some at honour, as the butte and scope of all their actions; so as their ende and scope being divers, it seemeth they may not imbrace one forme of insti­tution.

You say well: for they which shall aime at a common-weale peaceable & permanent, it behoveth them to seclude stran­gers, not to traine their people and subiectes in militarie discipline, according to the example of the Lacedaemonians, and to possesse a place or fort, as well by nature and the situation thereof, as by art rendred invincible, according to the example of the Venetians. But such as shal ayme at honour and glory, as the butte & scope of their institution, must entertaine straungers, they must indevour to render the common-wealth populous, they must daily traine and exercise the people in military discipline, and they shal wise­ly deliver the feble, and weake, from the hands of the oppressour, they must entertaine many associates & friends, by the which pol­licies they shall render themselves every where invincible accor­ding to the example of the Romanes.

But what manner of in­stitution is most permanent and to be preferred?

Neither the one nor the other may be founde so happy and permanent, but at the last, with the apple in his fulripenes, they fall with their owne weight and poyse to the ground; the one by discord and mutinies of the soldiours, for that their citizens are rendred bold by the con­tinual vse and trayning in military discipline; the other by effe­minacie, ease, rest, and security, hasteneth in like maner vnto muti­nies and discords, as to his last ruine; so as either by a fatall desti­nie (as it were) imbraceth there owne confusion: but not after one manner; for the one like vnto a flowre, or the pride of youth, in the height of his glory, vanisheth, away, and leaveth the image of true glory, as a lively picture, to invest a perpetuall memory of a worthy and excellent Institution. But the common-weale [Page 64] which in his first Institution aymeth only at peace and permanen­cy, with effaeminacy, discorde, and mutinies, bredde by long ease, rest, and security, embraceth with the other his final & last destruc­tion, but leaveth not the like memory of his Institution.

It see­meth thē by that which you have said, that the institutiō of that cō ­mon-weale, which aymeth at vertue, honour, and glorie, is to be preferred before the other, & of princes much more to be desired. But may not one selfesame common-weale, ayme at the one and the other?

No verily: for as the tree which hath but a slen­der roote, may not long support waighty and mighty braunches, against the furie and violence of the winde and tempest; so com­mon-weales which ayme at peace, having but a slender roote, and foundation, laide for the supporting thereof, as before I have remembred, may not be long victorious, and hold themselves vp­right in actions of great importance: and if they fortune to be so with the Venetians, which have much regarded this manner of in­stitution, they shal no sooner winne, but eftsoones for want of pro­per forces to defende, they shall loose the same againe: so as for free estates and common-weales, this manner of institution see­meth not to be the best, but for servile common-weales, and such as have lived alwaies subiect to others, as Pisa sometimes to the Flo­rentines, Cremona to the Venetians, and Salamina to Athens, it may be holden for the safest: for by this maner of Institution, they shall more easily retaine the subiectes in their obedience and subie­ction.

CAP. 1. A description of this worde Declination, with the severall signes and tokens thereof, whereof some are tear­med ordinary, others extraordinary.

You have made a perfect anatomye of this worde Reformation, and not onely with the cun­ning Painter you have described the outwarde shews and lineaments, but with the wise Phisition you have well knowen, and laid open the inward partes therof: but now disclose vnto vs, the secrets which lie hidden vnder the words subsequent, and contained in the first and generall description, namely of a declined common-weale.

These words offer sundry matters worthy of considera­tion.

What be they?

First, the description of this word Declination; secondly, the signes and tokens; thirdly, the times; fourthly the partes and members; fiftly, the causes and occasions; and lastly, the meanes to resist the same.

Make the first step vnto the description thereof, which is the first matter herein to be considered.

A Declination of a body polliticke, is nothing els but a fall and departure from his first institution, and perfection, so as we may rightly tearme it the subiect and matter of this our re­formation.

You have aptly described the same: therefore make your progression vnto the second matter, and declare vnto vs the signes and tokens, which with Ionas as forerunners and messen­gers, giveth the City of Ninivie to vnderstand of their declination, and destruction.

The death of noble and worthy persona­ges, doeth threaten a declination of the welfare and happines of [Page 66] estates, and common-weales. For the first token (saith Plutarke,) that threatned some great mischiefe to the common-wealth of Rome, was the death of Iulius one of the Censores: for the Ro­manes, saith he, doe greatly reverence the office of a Censor, and esteeme it as a sacred place.

And hath not the cittie of Rome, of late yeares beene deprived of grave and worthy Censores, by vntimely death, not inferiour to Iulius?

Yes verily: and for this cause we are greatly to feare that chaunging our auncient Consuls for new Decemviri with the citie of Rome, wee perish and fall in actions of great importaunce and difficulty: and there­fore with that faithfull and worthy citizen Camillus, I pray dailie vppon my knees, that this bitter calamitie vnto vs now threatned, if the same may not be turned from vs, doe light vpon my selfe, and such other private citizens of Rome, that have deserved the same, so as the citie vvith her noble armie and forces may be pre­served.

Passe this over with this comfort, that the new Decem­viri retaine in them the great vertue and worthines even of the auncient Consuls; and proceede vnto signes of declination.

There may not be greater signes founde of common calamities ensuing, then an vniversall securitie, which sometimes possesseth the mindes and heartes of the subiectes. The which was founde in the Romanes, at such time as they sustained the great overthrow by the power of the Gawles; for then all sortes of persons in the citie were founde to be possessed with a generall securitie, in so­much that they neglected all religion, they contemned the holy order of the Faecials, and made no account of their propounded religion, and lastly they were founde so secure, as they neglected all their former discipline of warres, yea they iested and made themselves merry with Marcus Cedicius, which gaue them vvar­ning thereof. In like manner a generall security did possesse the Philistians, when as Ionathan said to the young man that bare his armoure, come, and let vs go over vnto the garrison of these vn­circumcised, for it is not hard for the Lord to save with many or with few, so as they both shewed themselves to the Philistians; but they as men secure, scorned Ionathan, and said, see the Hebrewes come out of the holes wherein they have hid themselues for a [Page 67] long time, but Ionathan eftsoones put them to the sworde. But for that the histories and reportes of ages past, doe afforde infi­nite proofes and examples hereof, let vs proceede readily vnto o­ther signes and tokens of declinations.

Before a generall de­clination, the people are found possessed vvith a generall feare; for before the overthrow given by Samuel vnto the Philistians, the peo­ple were holden with a mighty feare of their future fortunes, and of the event of those warres, insomuch as it is saide, there was a feare in the hoast, and in the fielde, and amonge all the people, the garrison also and they that vvent out to spoile vvere afraide themselves, and the earth trembled, for it was striken with feare by the Lord. And after this manner Christe prophecieyng of the destruction of Ierusalem, vnto such as asked what signes shal there be when these thinges shall come to passe, he saide, there shall be trouble vpon earth, and amonge nations perplexity, & mens heartes shall faile them for feare, and for looking after those things which shall come on the vvorlde.

After such time as Ca­millus was vniustly condemned and banished, there vvas not a Romane of any vnderstanding, but believed certainely, that some great punishment would follow them incontinently, and that the wronge and iniurie which they had done him, would be quicklie requited with some sharpe and terrible revenge, not on­lie vnpleasaunt to thinke vppon, but farther most notable to be spoken of thorough the world: then fell out so sodainely vpon the same, such mischiefes towardes the citie of Rome, as it was doub­ted to bee the handy worke of some God, that woulde not suffer vertue to be vnrecompensed vvith ingratitude.

There re­maineth yet a greater signe of declination.

What may the same be?

When the common-wealthes shall generally de­part from all the partes and right rules of governement, the same is a manifest signe of declination. For before the overthrow of Rome by the power of the Gawles, there was found all disorder and confusion, they were not governed by one selfesame com­maunder, as in former times, but their governoures being many, contrary to the discipline of warres, bredde naught else but con­fusion. The like disorder did they admit in all the other partes of [Page 68] their governement, as in the historie thereof more at large appea­reth, the which did breede the ruine and destruction of that citie. These bee the ordinary signes of declination.

You seeme hereby to give vs to vnderstande of signes extraordinary.

Yea verily.

What be they?

Great earthquakes shalbe in divers places, hunger, pestilence, and fearefull thinges, and great signes shall there be in heaven, there shall be signes in the sunne, and the moone, and in the starres, the sea and waters shal roare; this is the time wherein Ierusalem shal be troden vnder foote of the Gentiles, vntill the time of the Gentiles be fulfilled; these be the times wherein they shall fall on the edge of the swoorde, and shalbe ledde captive to all nations; these be the signes whereby as by the budding of the figge tree, wee knowe summer to bee neare at hande, so by these we may discerne common calamities a farre of, as also when they approach neare vnto vs.

Before Caesar was murdered in the Senate house, there appeared many ter­rible signes in the heavens, in the aire, and vppon the earth, vvhich did threaten his overthrowe and destruction, and many common calamities vnto that citie: in like manner before the sac­king, burning, and destroying of Rome by the Gaules, one Mar­cus Cedicius a man of faire condition, honest, and of good consci­ence, tolde vnto the Tribunes a thing that was well to be consi­dered of: for he saide that the night before as he was going on his waie, in the new streete, he harde one call him alowde, and returning backe to see what it was, he sawe no living creature, but onely hearde a voice bigger then a mans, which saide vnto him, Marcus Cedicius, goe thy way to morrowe morning to the Tri­bunes of the souldiers, and bid them looke quicklie for the Gaules.

Surely God governeth the worlde, and the creatures vppon earth, mercifullie and lovingly, in sending sometimes Marcus Cedicius vnto the citie of Rome, yea sometimes Ionas vnto the ci­tie of Ninivie, nay that which is more, in making the dumbe creatures, as well in heaven as in earth, to speake vnto vs, and foretell vs of our destruction.

To the good they be tokens of his mercie and favour, and to the wicked they threaten his Iustice and iudgement, so as what the highest hath determined in his se­cret [Page 69] fore-knowledge, the same shall stande and may not passe. For in vaine shall Caelphurnia crie out in the night, Caesar is slaine, for hee shall not give credit vnto dreames; in vaine shall she perswade him in the day to keepe his house, & not to go abroad, for he shalbe deluded with the hopes and flatteries of Brutus; in vaine shall the southsaier forewarne him of his destruction, for he shal not regarde prophecies; in vaine doe his friendes and vvelwillers set downe in writing the daies, times, and meanes of his destruction, and de­liver the same into his handes, for he shall not once reade or re­garde it; so the highest hath determined and the same shall stand and may not passe: Brutus shall flatter, wounde, and kill him, and he shall fall with the stroke thereof; in vaine shall Marcus Cedi­cius forewarne the Tribunes of the people, that the Gaules with their armie are marching towardes Rome, for they shall laugh and make themselves merry thereat, and not foresee howe they may resist them; they shal be as men amazed and bewitched, and forget even their ordinarie discipline, and fall into all disorder of governement, their Citie shall be wasted and destroyed; for so the highest hath determined, and the same shall stande and may not passe.

To this purpose Plutarch writing of the death of Cae­sar, saieth, that the declinations and destinies are more easily fore­seene then avoided.

CAP. 2. The times wherein common-weales doe vsually fall and decline.

But what may be the times ordained by a secret fore­knowledge in the brest of the highest, of the declination of common-weales?

The same onely is known to the highest, and to vs left vncertaine.

But what doth hee not manifest every where by his ordinary power and governement of this inferiour worlde, of that whereof we may in no sort be igno­rant?

By his ordinary governement you meane naught els but his power, wherby he giveth to all things their first being, pro­gression, [Page 70] continuance, perfection, and declination.

Thus you make the perfection of all thinges, to be the ende of his con­tinuance, and the beginning of his declination, and to be the last shewe of his being, and the first of his declining.

I will shewe you the trueth, even from the mouth of that Prophet Daniell, a mighty king shall stande vp, saieth he, that shall rule with great dominion and doe according to his pleasure, and when hee shall stande vppe, his kingdome shall be broken, and shall be de­vided towardes the foure windes of the heavens, and not to his posterity nor according to his dominion, which he ruled, for his kingdome shalbe pluckt vppe by the rootes, and the same gi­ven vnto others.

By this example, you seeme to inferre, that kingdomes and principalities, being at the highest, doe then decline and fall: for so did this mighty king Alexander (whome the Prophet Daniell nowe intendeth) sometimes rule great do­minions, but even then saieth the Prophet did he perish, even when he commanded at his pleasure, and lastly, even when this king (saith the Prophet) did stand vppe, and was at the highest, e­ven then did he fall with a disease which followed his drunkennes and superfluitie, or otherwise by the poison which was given by Cassander, even then was his kingdome broken, saith the Prophet, and pluckt vppe by the rootes, even then was the time wherein it was devided amongest straungers, namely his twelve chiefe princes, and not given vnto his posterity, then it was wherein his posterity did murther and destroy one the other, even these were the times, wherein his kingdome soone after vvas devided to­vvardes the foure windes of the heavens: for Seleucus had Siria, Antigonus Asia Minor, Cassander the kingdome of Macedonia, and Ptolomaeus Aegypt.

You well vnderstande as well the matter, as my meaning, and to the same purpose, saieth the Prophet Da­niell, there shall arise a king so mighty, that he shall doe what him list, he shall exalte and magnifie himselfe, against all that is God, but vvhen his glorie shall be every vvhere encreased, then the king of the South shall pushe at him, and the king of the North shall come against him, and like a whirlewinde, with chariots, and horsemen, and vvith manie shippes, shall enter his pleasant [Page 71] countrie, and have power over all the treasures of golde and sil­ver, and over all the princes things of Aegypt, and none shall bee founde that may withstande him, he shall plant the tabernacles of his pallace, betweene the seas and the glorious and holy moun­taine, but even then is the time, saieth the Prophet, that he shall come to his ende, and none shall helpe him.

These vvere the Romanes, vvhich sometimes raigned vpon earth like Gods: but even then eftsoones they perished as men. For when Augu­stus had overcome the Parthians, and recovered that which Anto­nius lost, vvhen they were found to raigne quietly from sea to sea, and in Iudaea, then came they to their ende, and none was founde that could helpe them.

The same Prophet saieth, the king of the South shall be angry with the king of the North, and shall set forth a great multitude, and fight with the king of the North, and the multitude shalbe given into his handes, then the multi­tude shalbe prowde, and their hartes shalbe lifted vppe, for he shal cast downe thousandes, but he shall not still prevaile, for the king of the North shall come and cast vppe a mount and take the strong Citie, and the armes of the South shall not resist, neither shall there be anie strength to withstand, but he shall come and doe with him what he list, and none shall stande against him.

The Prophet intendeth Philopater which sometimes governed great dominions, yet coulde he not withstand the power of Anti­ochus, & Phillip king of Macedonie, which thē came against him, nei­ther shal the Aegyptians be able to resist Stopus Antiochus captaine, for this is the the time wherein none shall bee founde that may withstande them.

And in the same place it is saide, that when the king of the North shall take the stronge citie, yea even when the armes of the king of the South shall not resist him, yea then when there may not be founde any strength to withstande him, even then when he hath planted himselfe in the pleasant lande, even then, saith the Prophet, shall a Prince be founde, which shall cause his shame to light vppon him, beside that hee shall cause his owne shame to turne vppon himselfe by re­tiring towardes the fortes of his owne lande, but he shall be over­throwne and fall, and be no more founde.

Thus did Antio­chus [Page 72] sometime fall, whom the Prophet heere intendeth, when as Attilius and Lucius Scipio, did put him to flight, so as for feare of the Romanes, hee was forced to flie to his holdes and fortes, and after robbing the temple of Iupiter Dodonaeus, was slaine by the people of the country: so as we may inferre by these examples nothing els, but that common-weales doe participate with the qualitie and nature of all other creatures, in that first they haue their being, their progression, their continuance, their perfection, and lastly their declination; so as from their being they receive progres­sion, from progression they receiue continuance, from conti­tinuance a perfection, from their perfection a declination: for his perfection is naught els, but his ripenesse which is gathered by continuance, by whose poyse and weight, eftsoones it falleth to the ground and declineth.

You well vnderstande the mat­ter.

Then let vs make our progression vnto the partes and members of every declination.

CAP. 3. All declinations are in number two, the one ad sanitatem, the other ad interitum.

All declinations are after two sortes: the one, ad sani­tatem; the other, ad interitum; both which declinations did sometimes appeare in the common-wealth of Rome: the one, whē as the Senate and people by cōtending for honours, gave occasions of most happy lawes, and more happy restitution of the declined state of that polliticke body. But after declining by peace, rest, and security, vnto a corruption of manners, they never could give an ende vnto their contentions then raised for profitte and gaine, so as the same may be said to be a final declination, not ad sanitatem, but ad interitum.

CAP. 4. The severall occasions and causes of all declinations, and first of occasions malitiously suggested.

There remaineth nowe that we doe proceede vnto the occasions and causes of all declinations, which is the fifte matter remembred by you worthy of consideration.

You have well put me in remembrance thereof. For as the declination of our natural bodies ariseth chiefely either from occasions, as rest, labour, heate, colde, hunger, thirst, superfluity, abundance, or from the malice or distemperature of the disease or sickenes it selfe: so the declination of this polliticke bodie groweth partely by occa­sions, and partely from the malice and corruption of the subiect, as from the vnnatural distemperature of that body.

The truthe of your opinion neither wanteth proofe nor example: for in the declination of the common-weale of Rome, in the times and regi­ment of Tarquine, we may behold first a generall distemperature bred in the body of that cōmon-weale by his misgovernment, so as the people and Senatours did expect nothing more then a fitte occasion to execute the same. And if the deflowring of Lucre­tia had not happened, yet noe doubt this distemperature and ma­lice of the subiect would have attended other occasions, as they should conveniently have offered themselves. But if this malice and distemperature had not proceeded with the occasion, or if the occasiō had not accompanied this distemperature, no doubt Bru­tus and Collatinus would have desired the iust punishment of this offence, rather at the hands of Tarquine, then by the aide & helpe of the people.

Therefore wisely saith one, sine occasione fru­stra virtus, sine virtute frustra occasio sese obtulit. For in vaine shall oc­casions profer themselves, where they finde not the malice of the subiect ready to rescue and assist them. And in vaine likewise shall the malice of the subiect swel and overflow his bounds, when all occasions shall be removed, which are in place of the feete and [Page 74] legs that support this distemperature.

To disclose therefore the chiefe & principal occasions, which may further and nourish any way the distemperature of this polliticke body, seemeth a matter not vnworthy of deliberation.

Nay it is a matter rather which should possesse the highest thoughts of the minde & vnderstāding of Princes and Emperours.

Let vs proceede to enumber them if we may, and set them downe vnder the accompt of matters ne­cessarie for the better sustaining and vpholding of this polliticke body.

Occasions are vsually after two sortes: either given; or malitiously sought and suggested.

You have saide the truth: for when Darius preferred Daniell above all the other rulers and governours, because the spirit in him was excellent, they sought an occasion against Daniell, concerning the kingdome, but they coulde finde no fault, and therefore it is saide, we may finde no oc­casion against Daniell, except we finde it against him concerning the lawe of God: whereupon the rulers craftely conspired to go vnto the king, and after this maner to advance their malice they spake vnto him, king Darius live for ever: all the rulers of thy kingdome, the officers and governours, the counsellers and dukes have consulted togither to make a decree for the king, and to establish a statute, that whosoever shall aske a petition of any God or man for thirty daies save of thee O king, he shall be cast in­to the denne of Lions. Nowe O king confirme the decree, and seale the writing that it be not chaunged according to the lawe of the Medes and Persians which altereth not. This request fee­ding the ambition of king Darius, was eftsoones sealed by him, & he made a law and decree. Then these men assembled and found Daniell praying and making supplication vnto his God. The which eftsoones they embraced as a fit occasion lente for the de­stroying of Daniell, and repayring to the king, saide vnto him after this manner, hast thou not sealed the decree that every man that shall make request to any God or man within thirty daies save to thee O king shall be cast into the denne of Lyons? the king an­swered and saide, the thing is true according to the lawe of the Medes, and Persians, which altereth not. Then aunswered they and saide vnto the king; this Daniell which is of the children of the [Page 75] captivity of Iudah, regardeth not thee O king, nor the decree that thou hast sealed, but maketh his petition three times a day. But vnderstande O king, that the lawe of the Medes and Persians is, that no decree or statute which the king confirmeth, may be altered or broken. Then forthwith by the kings com­mandement, Daniell was cast into the Lyons denne. This one ex­ample may suffice for occasions malitiously suggested.

CAP. 5. Of occasions given by misgovernement, and such other meanes.

Let vs now proceed to enumber the occasions given.

Occasion of declining is then given, when the nobility is not respected: for Caesar by holding a light estimation of the Sena­nators and nobles, at such time as they repayred to give vnto him honours, and by depriving and abusing the Tribunes Marullus and Flavius, did give the first occasion, saith Plutarch, of his fall & declining: & Romulus intreating the Senators and nobles of Rome, more severely and rigorosly then in former times they were accu­stomed, was for this cause by treason murthered.

And no lesse occasion is then given of falling and declining, when either by the iniquity of times, or the proper industry of princes, the nobilitie is in so great measure advanced, as they become thereby dangerous & feareful vnto the state: by the one occasion Salamina hath often & sundry times declined.

What by the iniquitie of times?

Yea verily: for vpon the division of the house of Lankaster & Yorke, iustice there declining, the nobility helde as it were a soveraigne commandement over the cōmonalty, they call their lands by the name of their cuntries, their tenants by the name of their followers and men, they give laws, and prescribe vnto the people their man­ner of living, they oppresse where they dislike, they reward whom they favour, they perish whom they hate, and finally they make themselves iudges and arbitrators of the goods, lands, life, liberty, and of all the fortunes of the subiect. Anno [...] decimo E [...] cap. 7. fol. 168. The which over great power and commandement doth lively appeare in the act made for the taking awaye of the great authority of Captainship with all exa­ctions: vvherein it is declared, that the Lordes of Salamina in the [Page 76] time of iustice declination, vnder the pretence of defending the people of Salamina, & their own possessions, arrogated vnto them­selves absolute and regale authority within large circuits; by the di­stributiō whereof each man had as much righte as force would give him leave, by meanes whereof they grew vnto such greatnesse as they acknowledged no superiour, no obedience vnto the coun­sels of Athens; they holde for lawes there owne willes and desires, by their proper authority they gather and assemble the people of the saide pretenced countries, rules, and Captaineships, to treat, conclude, and agree for making of warre, or peace, roades, iniuries, granting of ceases, bene volences, finding of men of warre, as horse­men, footemen, galloglasse, kearne, hasbutteres, horses, horseboyes, huntes, studkeepers, officers, and adherentes: and more then this, these Nobles and Lordes did leade as Captaines, the peo­ple thus assembled vnto the accomplishing of act and actes offen­sive, and invasive without speciall authority.

By these sta­tutes and recordes thus by you remembred, it seemeth that all the warres of Salamina did proceede from the greatnesse of the Nobles and Lordes.

So much the recorde it selfe doeth re­port, Anno 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fol. 168. Vid Attay. of the earle of Kildare. acts 28. H. 8. cap. 1. where as it it is saide, that their greatnesse was such, as they did acknowledge no superiour, nor any obedience vnto Athens. It is saide also that the might and greatnesse of Iames sometimes Earle of Desmonde; Garralde Fitz Garralde, Earle of Kildare, and Thomas Fitz Garralde his son, was the occasion of many rebellions, as by the recordes of Salamina more at large it may appeare.

It seemeth also by the recordes of Salamina, by you now remembred, that the Nobles & Lords by their greatnes did mightily oppresse the cōmonalty, inforcing thē to graunt ceases, benevolēces, finding of men at armes, as horsemen, footemen, galloglasse, kearne, has­butters, horses, horseboyes, huntes, studkeepers, officers, and adhe­rents.

Yes verily: for by way of protection and defence the no­bility did levie exactions intollerable, so as they were forced to e­stablish a law, that no man within the land of Salamina shall have a­ny tribute, or exaction, or any other vnlawful imposition of or vp­pon any subiect within the same lande.

Herein they were provident of the preservance and continuance of the estate of Sa­lamina; [Page 77] for nothing giveth greater occasion of declining then the oppression of the cōmonalty. For the Israelites beeing migh­tily oppressed by the Aegyptians, vvere thereby inforced to fol­low Moyses, by whom they vvere restored vnto their libertie. The Persians, Medorū imperio infensi, were thereby induced to fol­lovve Cyrus. And the naturall citizens of Rome, being not de­fended from the oppression and furie of Hanniball, tooke occasi­on of revolting and rebelling. How displeasing oppressions be e­very where vnto the multitude, the same the people of Sala­mina have livelie vvitnessed, when as they tearmed sometimes the exactions of Coiney and Liverie, imposed by the nobility and Lordes of that land, by the name of grievous exactions: nay vvith great Emphasies they tearme it the frette of our times, and sub­staunce: nay yet with greater indignation carryed against this manner of oppression, they tearme it by the name of that horrible and most detestable custome of Coiney and Liverie, yea they terme it to be the very nurse, and teate, that gave sucke and nutriment to all disobedience, rebellions, enormities, vices, and ini­quities of that realme over fowle and filthie, here to be expres­sed, and such as did iustly provoke the wrath and vengeance of the almighty God vppon the people of that lande. The like oppression of the nobility over the meaner people, was some­times the authour of many seditions in Rome, and provoked the people to demaunde Tribunes, which as arbitrators of the insolen­cie of the nobility, might give them iust defence from their oppres­sion. And this stirreth the people sometimes the better, to make their deliveraunce from the oppression of the mighty, with the consent of the forrain enemy, even to the invading and destroying of the people & country.

CAP. 6. The meanes to withstande all occasions of de­clining, growing vnto the com:+mon-wealth by the great­nesse of the nobi­litie.

Sith this seemeth to be a matter of so great importance, to defende the multitude from the oppression of the mighty, it shall be convenient that we now proceede vnto the meanes whereby we may in such cases, as well abate the greatnes of the Lordes and Nobles, as also deliver the multitude from their op­pressions and wrongs.

The meanes are sundry.

What be they?

First we are to establish lawes, wherby as well the dig­nity of the Nobles, as the liberty of the people, may be preserved and defended, according to the example of all common-weales well governed.

Herein Salamina is found inferiour to noe na­tion, especiallie for lawes, which respect the liberty and welfare of the people, the which is the matter nowe in deliberation.

What be they?

The lawes against Coiney and Livery, the lavves against Captainship, the lawes against taking of pledges contrarie to the common law, with many other lawes prohibiting vnlawfull customes and exactions; so as it seemeth that good lawes are not sufficient to render a common-weale, happie and prosperous.

Noe surely, no more then a medicine well prepared may cure the diseases of the body, if the same be not rightly applied: it re­steth therefore, that governoures provinciall, doe diligently in­tend the observation of these lawes, in such sort, as they be inviola­ble, whereby in a short time they shall confirme the mindes of the multitude, and render them secure, quiet, and contented.

This which you haue saide, by sundry actes and recordes, nowe extant for Salamina, maie appeare: for there it is saide, that the people [Page 79] were not onlie drawne from rebellions and vnlawfull attempts, by the extirpation of this exaction of Coiney and Livery, but they were sometimes by the due exaction of that lawe, stronglie indu­ed to affect and imbrace iustice and peace, so as al commaunde­mentes by waie of iustice are there obeied. Naie that vvhich is more, in place of cursing and rebellions, there is founde ioie, io­litie, and blessing of that goddesse Minerva, the protectour and defendour of Athens, by whose providence so great an evill was remooved. So as we maie conclude, that nothing doeth so much induce a nation or people, be they naturall subiects or gai­ned by conquest, to imbrace that governement which is prescri­bed vnto them by those which have rule, power, & authority over them, there is nothing (I say) so availeable to render thē loyall sub­iectes, & willing embracers of governement, as a iust defence given by due execution of profitable lawes from all oppressions and wronges.

You have saide the trueth: for a nation con­quered desire their former libertie; for no other cause so greatly, as thereby to possesse that which is their owne freelie and secure­lie; so as enioying the same, they have attained the ende of their desires, and rest for the most parte contented with the governe­ment. But on the contrarie, with the oppression of the mighty, the thoughtes and desires of their former libertie are daily kindled, in such sorte, as they sticke not to practise with forraine enemies the restitution thereof. It is necessary therefore in such countries, that the lawes for the defence of the multitude against oppressions bee holden inviolable, in such sort as everie one maie▪ confidentlie saie with the governoures of Darius, it is the lawe of the Medes and Persians which maie not be broken.

But some provinciall go­vernoures of Salamina, have beene founde more studious with Savanorola in making of profitable lawes, then faithfull observers thereof, whereby the whole countrie of Salamina hath vvell neare perished: but I could vvish, that with Savanorola at the least they might loose their honour and estimation amongest the Florentines: for much evill ariseth vnto Salamina, not onelie from the malice of the people, but by the negligence of Magistrates, in that they holde not their lawes inviolable; for the vvhich causes they maye [Page 80] never confirme the mindes of the multitude vnto the state, nor render them quiet, and contented. But what other meanes is now left vnto vs to deliver the multitude from oppression?

Com­missioners in every of the several Provinces are to be constituted, which as iudges shall restraine and suppresse the ambition of the nobles, and shall carefully defende the people from oppressors. Therefore wisely the king of Fraunce hath constituted a iudge or arbitrator, which as a third person sine regis invidia proceres caederet, & tenuiores tueretur. Nihil melius, nihil sapientius hoc decreto esse potuit: nec regni aut ipsius regis potior securitatis causa.

But what num­ber of iudges may suffice herein?

You say well: for if one iudge bee ordained, the mighty and great personages shall more easily corrupt him, then manie. Therefore the Florentines ha­ving entertained but one iudge for the suppressing of the ambi­tion of the nobility, whom they called Capitaneū, seeing him sedu­ced by the nobilitie, in his place constituted eight iudges or Com­missioners.

But in this second institution, they founde lesse security then in the first: for vvhere a fewe are placed for the rule and governement, there they be founde commonly ministers and pleasers of the nobility, and contemners of the people; the which the Venetians wisely foreseeing, have not onely ordained their De­cemviri, but also other magistrates, quos Quarantos vocant, & further for the same onely they have constituted Concilium Praegium qui summus est magistratus, to this ende, that neither iudges nor accu­sers should be wanting for the suppressing of the ambition of the nobilitie.

As you have saide, this must needes be the best forme of governement that may possibly be ordained in such ca­ses; for many iudges are not so easily corrupted as one: againe ma­ny are founde to be of greater strength and integritie to resist the displeasure of the nobilitie then fewe; and like as many eies dis­cerne more perfectly then one, and that which escapeth or de­ceiveth one eie, maie be perceived and that without errour by ma­ny; so many wits iudge more soundly and sincerely then one. Last­ly, wee all obey more willingly the censures of many, then the iudgements of a fewe, or one person whatsoever.

But vvhi­ther are we in such cases more to endevour the favour of the no­bility [Page 81] or the multitude?

It is saide that a Monarchie gover­ned popularlie is then secure and voide of perill: for in the mul­titude or people consisteth the strength and force of every king­dome; the vvhich Nabid king of the Lacedaemonians well vn­derstanding, endevoured wholie the love and favoure of the peo­ple, so as with his proper forces hee was able to vvithstande and resist his enemies, vvithout the aide of forraine princes. And Appius Claudius on the contrarie, neglecting the favoure of the people, did vvholy cleave to the nobilitie, and lost there­by the principalitie and commaundement vvhich then hee had obtayned.

It must be confessed that in common-weales gained by conquest, you shall advance your governement more assuredly by the favoure of the people, then by the might of the nobilitie; for nature it selfe by an inforcing necessitie hath taught the weaker part to adheare vnto that which is the strongest; and for this cause the people diverse vvaies oppressed by the ambi­tion of the mighty, are forced thereby to hasten and runne vn­to their conquerour, as vnto a large palme tree, to bee defended from the stormes and violence of the mighty, so as delivering them from oppressions, they vvillingly yeelde their obedi­ence; but of the contrarie the nobilitie are not so readily wonne nor so easily kept. Therefore the Romaines in all countries by them conquered, did labour nothing more then to humble and deiect the mightie, & to protect and defend the feeble & weake, and deliver the people from oppressions. The like order of go­vernement did the Graecians observe, especially in provinces by them conquered, which differed in language and maner of living: for there the people, if they be not carefully defended from the oppressions of the mighty, by these outward differences as signes and badges of their former liberty, doe hasten for the restitution thereof vnto all rebellions, and doe provoke some forraine enemy to invade. Farther in common-weales where generally the man­ners of the people are found corrupted, there dangerous it is to advance the Lords & chieftaines, Anno: 11. Eliz. cap. 7. fol. 168. as it may appeare by the statuts & records of Salamina: for there it is declared that the L: and chief­taines of that land, in the times of iustice declinatiō, by pretext of [Page 82] defending the people and their owne possessions, arrogated vn­to themselves absolute and roiall authority within large circuites, by meanes wherof they grew vnto such greatnes, as they acknow­ledged no superior, nor obedience vnto Athens, they held for laws their owne willes and desires, and finallie they assembled and led the people vnto the accomplishing of all actes offensive and inva­sive, without speciall authority, as before we have at large discour­sed. Therefore in Salamina, and in other common-weales gai­ned by conquest, where the manners of the people remaine cor­rupted, we are to give impediment (saith a learned authour) vnto all the meanes wherby the nobles may raise themselves vnto such greatnesse, as thereby they may become fearefull vnto the com­mon-weale, and providently shall we favour and deliver the peo­ple in such estates from oppression.

For this cause wisely have the councel of Salamina suppressed and cut of al exactions and tri­butes, by a firme and stable law before remembred, as the meanes, whereby the nobles and cheifetaines did raise themselves vnto such greatnesse, as they became daungerous vnto the common-weale. And to the same purpose have they made another sta­tute, wherby it is ordained and enacted, that no Lorde nor gen­tleman of the said land, retaine by liverie, wages, or promise, signe or token, Act Anno. H. 7. [...]0. cap. 6. by indenture or otherwise, any person or persons, but onely such, as be or shalbe his officers, as baylifes, stewardes, learned counsels, receivers, and meniall servantes, daily in house­holde, at the saide Lordes proper costes and charges entertained. Thus if wisely we give impediment vnto the meanes which raise the chiefetaines and nobles of Salamina vnto this greatnes; if with Pompey we shall impeach the forces of Caesar by calling awaie two legions or regimentes; if with Pompey we shal withdrawe from Cae­sar, Labienus, and other his friendes and commaunders; if we shall cut off all exactions, and tributes, which Caesar leavieth vppon the people; if we shall cut off all that infinite number of retainers, fol­lowers, and men which followe Caesar more then his menial hous­holde according to the statute of retainers; if we shall suppresse all vnlawfull authorities of Captainship and such like, which Caesar chalengeth over the meaner people; if the great and large coun­tries [Page 83] which Caesar possesseth, we shall part and dismember by draw­ing in the custome of Gavelkinde, by the whch pollicie, Wales was sometimes reformed, and brought in subiection; then Caesar shall be no more able to rebell, and we shall rightly manage the state of Salamina,

Doe you thinke, that the statute against Coiney and Livery, is a sufficient barre against the Lordes and cheiftaines that they raise not thēselves vnto their former greatnesse?

No verily: for nowe they chalenge those exactions as lawfull services and reservations by the way of tenier heretofore reserved by their aūcestors, & predecessors, & by these meanes holde the subiect in servage, or otherwise they drive them to particular shiftes, vvhich are tedious, infinite, and troublesome to the state, and the vtter vndoing of the subiect; all which may well be appeased by way of composition betwixt the Lordes and tenantes: and the better to enable vs to make an equall composition herein, we are to vn­derstande that these demaundes are of three sortes, and kindes: The one received his beginning by vnlawfull meanes, namely by force and by violence, these are commonly called by the names of blacke rentes; such were the exactions which the Obrians some­times levied vpon the inhabitaunce of the countrie of Limbricke. Other demaundes there be, which did growe by way of giving protection and defence, from such as founde themselves oppres­sed with the power and might of others; such exactions some­times have beene yeelded by the inhabitants of the small coun­trie of Limbricke, vnto the auncestors of the nowe Earle of Kildare, and such did Mac Morris sometimes yeelde vnto the late Earle of Desmond attainted. Lastly, other demaundes there be vvhich did growe by the way of tenier; these may easily bee discerned from the others, in that they be due vnto the Lorde onely, from the handes of his proper tenantes or freehoulders, and the same commonly shall appeare to be so by vvriting or indenture.

You have vvell disclosed the meanes whereby the greatnesse of the nobility and chiefetaines may be abated, and the people de­fended from the oppression of the mighty, in times peaceable, wherein lawe and iustice doeth prevaile. It seemeth also that it is a matter of like necessitie that the good subiect bee defended [Page 84] from the oppression of the enemie or rebell: for the naturall sub­iectes of Rome, revolted vnto Hanniball, when as they found them selves not defended from his oppression.

We must with Fa­bius providently from time to time sende aide sufficient to such as are our subiectes and friendes, vvhereby we shall still holde and keepe them in obedience and subiection.

If this course had generally beene holden by some governours of Salamina, the re­bellions had neither beene great, neither yet of long continu­aunce; therefore wisely it is saide, Qui non defendit nec obsistit si po­test iniuriae, tam est in vitio, quàm si parentes aut patriam aut socios deserat: and after this manner speaketh a christian Doctor, say­ing, Fortitudo quae per bella tuetur â Barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel â latronibus socios, plena iusticia est. By which course of governement, the Romaines almost conquered the vvhole vvorlde, as Cicero witnesseth saying, Noster populus, socijs defen­ [...]endis terrarum iam omnium potitus est.

It seemeth also to bee a matter of like necessity, that the governours of Salamina doe vvith all care and indevour confirme the mindes of the sub­iectes by having a due regarde of their merites and services to­wardes the state, least otherwise when no estimation is had of their merites and publique services, they take occasion thereby of dis­contentment. For the slender care & estimation the French some­times helde of the publicke merites of such as had well deserved, gave the first occasion of their expelling out of Italy; for so much doe their Cronicles and histories witnesse, where it is saide, that the nobility were not imbraced vvith that humanity they looked for, and much lesse had recompenses equall to their merites, yea they found manie difficulties to enter into the chambers and audi­ence of the king. There was no distinction of persons, the merites and services of men vvere not considered, but at adven­ture, the mindes of such as were naturally estraunged from the house of Arragon, vvere not confirmed, many delaies and diffi­culties were suborned touching the restitution of the landes and goods of those that vvere of the faction of Aniow, and of the other Barrons that had beene banished by the olde Ferdinando. And lastly favoures and graces were imparted to such as procured them [Page 85] by corruption and meanes extraordinary, & not to such as had de­served the same. Wisely therefore shall the governoures of Sala­mina confirme the mindes of such as are estranged from the house of Arragon, and countenaunce such as were banished by Ferdi­nando, and lastlie if they shall imparte favoures and graces to such as have deserved the same, according to the advise of Plinie, which saith, Tu largiere bellorum socijs, periculorum consortibus.

CAP. 7. The occasions of declining, which vsually arise vnto the state by the disorders and oppression of the souldier.

Noe lesse occasion is offered of declining, when by the oppression of the souldier, the people remaine discontented.

You saie truely: for the disorder and violence of the souldiers draweth with it a suspition of perpetual servitude, which caused the Italians to abandon the power of the French, for that they committed many disorders, and offered violence vnto the people; so as that loue, that desire, that affection, wherewith they honoured them before, had now taken contrary qualitie, and not only turned into hatred, conspiracie, and accursings against them, but also in the place of the malice they bare to the Arra­gons, there was new insinuation of compassion to Ferdinando, in such sorte, as all the kingdome vvith no lesse desire expected an opportunity, to repeale the Arragons, then a fevve monethes be­fore they had desired their destruction.

The same historie doeth witnesse the like in sundry other places, saying, that garri­sons governed vvith a desire to spoile, and pray, be the authoures of great discontentment: yet some there be carried with a contra­ry opinion, which give liberty vnto the souldiers to oppresse and spoile the people, following the counsell of Severus Imperator, which sometimes he gave vnto his children, saying, Inter vos con­sentite, milites vitate, reliquos omnes spernite.

This counsell of Severus Imperator, no Prince maie safelie put in practise, but [Page 86] such as have a collected power and force into the strength of one entire armie, vvhich shall farre exceede the force and strength of the people: as the Sulthan, the Turke, and such like kingdomes, which hath of footemen, twelue thousande in number, and six­teene of horsemen, for the garde of his person. These king­domes and such like, shall more wisely favour and enrich, rather the souldier, then the people. But such Princes which have not a collected power, and force, and such as doeth farre exceede the strength and power of the people, are no farther to satisfie the souldiour then iustice, his desertes, and the lawes of the lande shall require. Therefore Carolus passing manie countries, where the forces of his souldiers were inferiour to the people, did streight­ly commaunde, that they shoulde abstaine from committing of vvronges and iniuries.

This vvhich you have saide agreeth vvith reason, but sometimes not vvith the necessity of times, vvhich vvas never yet subiect to humane discretion.

It must be confessed, that the times of warres, and peace are not all one, but yet as vvell in the times of vvarres, as also in times peaceable, we ought to shew our selves studious in delivering the people from oppression: For vvhat hope may we have of those cities, vbi milites in cives graviùs quam in hostes grassantur.

CAP. 8. The readie waies and meanes to resist all occasions of declining, which maie arise by the op­pression of the Souldiers.

Then we shall readily performe the same, if we shall remove the occasions which are in number two: namely the want of pay; and want of other discipline; for if the soul­dier vvere well paied, and offending by martiall discipline well punished, all disorders by these meanes would be easily refor­med.

You saie well: payment ought first to be made, and then discipline exercised, for disciplinam, inquit Cassiodorus, servare non potest icinnu [...] exercitus, dum quod deest semper praesumat armatus.

[Page 87]

But ought this payment to be made at the charge of the Prince, or of the subiects.

At the common charge of the subiects? be­cause it is a common safegard [...] benefite which equally re­doundeth to all.

You say well: for garrisons are placed for naught else, but to garde the good subiect from the sodain invasi­on or oppression of the enemy or rebell, and if they ought to defray the charge, that reape the benefite, then every subiect shoulde make equall contribution herein.

Wee doe agree herein, that payment ought to be made at the common charge of the subiect, but convenient it were that this charge were drawne to a contribution certaine; for where the contributions are alto­gither vncertaine by the waie of cease, or otherwise, there the people are vsuallie oppressed, and the Prince vvearied with com­plaints, or the same reiecting, the people, take occasion thereby to mutinie and rebell. Therefore wisely Henricus secundus rex Fran­corum nostra aetate tributum imperarat, Anno. 1549. Quod vul­gus talionum appellavit, testatus seid militum stipendio daturum, ne cum caeteris vectigalibus conturbaretur, vt plebs abiniurijs ac direptionibus mi­litum tuta esset. At an other time, payment was made by cer­taine citties for the maintenaunce of tenne legions, vt ab incensio­nibus ac direptionibus militum tutae essent. In like manner the counsel of Athens by receiving a composition certaine from the handes of the subiect, in liew of cease and duties vncertaine, have there­by mightily quieted and pacified the subiect, augmented the pub­like treasury, and advaunced and reformed that governement.

Shew vs I pray you the order and manner of the compositi­tion.

The first composition taken for the west partes, was framed after this maner, as it may appeare by this president vvhich I doe here deliver vnto you:

I finde sundry matters ob­served in the making of this composition worthy to be commen­ded. First for that the same was effected with the consentes of the subiectes, and not forced and commaunded, as sometimes the Isra­elites were by Samuel, which in his oration vnto the people, saide, Regem habituri estis, qui decimas fructuum vobis imperaturus est: neither here are they pressed by the authority of any duke of Albane, to render the tenth part of all things vendable, Vnde porro Belgarum ab Hispanis rebellantium orta seditio.

I hold reasonable tributes to be a matter of so great importaunce and necessity, as Princes may lawfully commande and exact the same at the hands of the subiect, and therefore saith one, Quid enim restaret, quo prin­ceps imperium tueri possit, sublatis portorijs ac tributis? And therefore when Nero offered to acquite and deliver the subiect of all tri­butes and impositions, wisely the Senate after thankes rendred vnto Nero, disswaded the fact, Ne Respub: aere diruta, momento collabe­retur; saying, though many seditious persons desirous of innovatiō have promised the people immunitie of all tributes and imposi­tions, yet to graunt the same it were altogither vnlawefull; and if [Page 89] it were lawful, yet ought you not to do the same for the safety of the common-weale, Cum eo veluti firmamento Resp: nitatur.

Be it so, that they may commaunde a matter so necessary for the su­staining and vpholding of the common-weale; yet for the avoi­ding of sedition, and the discontentment of the people, their con­sentes are required, the time also is to bee regarded, the nature of the common-weale is to be respected, and lastly the imploy­ment of those tributes ought to be vnto publike vses. For Princes in the beginning of their governement are not to impose tributes, fearing least the ten tribes for this cause shall rebell, and that a new king be chosen in the place of Roboham. But at such times they shal more wisely with the Frēch King being newly possessed of the Duchey of Milbaine, acquite & discharge the people of al tributes, which did mightilie as then advance his conquest. Againe, the na­ture and condition of the common-wealth is a matter no lesse worthy of consideration, then the time: for if the common-weale hath beene from time to time a free estate and not subiect to o­thers, as sometimes the Romaines were, to such estates all manner of tributes are grievous, and therefore not to be exacted, but vp­pon vrgent causes, the which ceasing, the people ought to be de­livered from tributes. But the people of Florence on the contrary, having alwaies lived in servitude, and as tributaries to others, admitte vvillinglye all sortes of impositions and tributes from time to time imposed vppon them by their duke: and for this cause Salamina long ere this might have beene made profitable vnto Athens, for that they have alwaies lived in servitude, and subiect to all impositions and tributes, and many exactions have beene reared there by force and violence, to the maintenaunce of idle and evill disposed persons, the which being converted to private vses and not to publike services, have little profited the Citie of Athens; all which the recordes and statutes of Sala­mina, doe many waies witnesse, and especiallie the statutes a­gainst Coiney and Liverie: and therefore the last matter which is the imployment of tributes to publike vses, is not the least; vvherein vvee are to have diverse regardes: first, care is to bee had of the Prince and his family; secondarilie of the stipen­darily [Page 90] souldiers, the vvhich two matters are chiefely respected and regarded in the composition before remembred; thirdly of ma­gistrates, which for want of their pay and stipend, doe more egerly sometimes then the souldiers rob and devour the people; fourth­lie of such as have well deserved of the common-weale. Finallie care is to be had of the poorer subiects, least by want, and extreame povertie, they become movers of sedition.

The charge be­ing thus defrayed, to the ende exact paiment may be made, it were convenient that the souldiers vvere payed by the poule; for if paiment be made as now vnto the Captaines, the souldier recei­ving not the same in due time, dareth not complaine against him, but is driven to seek his maintenance by oppressing of the people. Thus oftentimes the souldier is founde to hate his captaine which faileth to make paiment, and the captaine disliketh the souldier, because he faileth in order and government, so as by this private malice, impediment is given oftentimes vnto publike services. The which mischiefe hath reigned long in Salamina.

Do­ctor Sutliefe that learned and skilfull writer hath discoursed here­of at large in his militarie workes, and therefore we vvill proceede vnto the other occasion of all the disorders in the men of garrison, which is the want of militarie discipline; for having neither a iudge nor court martiall orderly kept for the due triall and punishment of offendours, the souldier for the most part receiveth no punish­ment for his offence, or being punished in courtes civill, they may well complaine of their manner of triall by the native borne peo­ple of the countrie.

It is prohibited in all countries well gover­ned to the men of garrison, to holde any affinitie, consanguinitie, contract, or bargaines, with the native borne people of the coun­trie, fearing least by this entercourse of friendshippe, the garri­sons may be at the last corrupted: but greater occasion of corrup­tion is there given in Salamina, vvhere not onely these disorders are admitted by the negligence of Magistrates there placed, but that vvhich is more, the native borne people are made tryers of the life and fortunes of the men in garrison: and may they bold­lie prosecute in times of warres such as be enemies to the state, whome in times of peace they maie iustlie feare as malicious cryers [Page 91] of their goods, life, and fortunes whatsoever. Therefore most ne­cessarie it is, that a court martiall be established and orderly kept, as you haue said, thoroughout the whole province of Salamina, for the reforming of disorders and mischiefes before recited.

CAP. 9. Occasions of declining are then given, when Magistrates placed for reformation of any Countrie or province, are not supported and countenaunced during the time of their go­vernement.

There remaine yet other occasions of the declining of common-weales, worthy of remembraunce.

What maie the same be?

If Princes, Kings, and States, shall not publikely grace, countenaunce, and support all governoures and Magistrates by them placed for reformation of any province or nation during the time of their governement, the subiects shal take thereby occasion of rebelling. For the Gaules vnderstanding that Rome did conspire to disgrace Caesar, raised themselves forth­with in armes vnder the leading of Ambiorix, and Vercingentorix, in such sort, as if they had not to hastily proceeded therein, they had put all Italie in as great feare and daunger, as it was sometimes when the Cimbri came to invade their cittie.

Wee neede not search forraine examples herein: for Salamina by this errour committed was for many yeares vexed with the rebellions of the Burkes and the Orurkes, vntil that famous knight Sir B. Bingham by his singuler art and skill in military discipline, as an other Caesar, suppressed at the last Ʋercingentorix, and the rebelling Gaules.

What governoures were there, that were found so vnskilful in their charge?

A late deputie of Salamina, whose name here I passe over with silence, for that I may not say, honoris cau­sa nomino. But O you governoures, Princes, Kings, and Emperours, [Page 92] whatsoever, countenaunce all inferiour governoures and magi­strates placed for the reformation of any nation or province: coun­tenaunce Pericles, which beholdeth alwaies the Amazon holding his dart with a hande stretched forth even in his face, with whome as with a deadly enemy hee must alwaies be fighting: countenaunce Camillus, which now is placed to reforme and sup­presse the mutinous citizens, wherein if he fortune to be inferiour for want of your countenaunce and assistaunce, he shall be sup­pressed, condemned; and banished, or at the least hee must of force surrender his office of Dictator. Countenance Pericles, for otherwise he shall be as one that hath committed incest, he shal be a coward, the author of warres, yea of the plague, and of whatsoe­ver else, which maie draw with it the hatred of all the citizens of Athens. Countenance Camillus, for there shall be a Lucius Apulius, which malitiously shall accuse him for stealing part of the spoile of the Tuscans: Lastly countenaunce this Magistrate placed for reformation; for with David, he is placed to fight with a beare after a lion, with a Giant after a beare, with a King after a Gi­ant, and with the Philistians after a King. They must fight with infa­mie after envye, with accusations after infamy, with condemna­tion after accusations, with iudgement after condemnation, with imprisonment after iudgement, with banishment after imprison­ment, for Simul ista mundi conditor posuit Deus, odium atque regnum. But if you shall not countenance them, the Gaules shall rebell a­gainst Caesar, the citizens shall mutinie, but Camillus shall not be of force to suppresse them; yea this action of reformation shal fall to the ground, and the common-weale it selfe may not long continue.

CAP. 10. Occasions of declining, which arise vnto the common-weale sometimes, by secluding a nation con­quered, from bearing of offices, and dignities.

Let vs proceede vnto other occasions of declining of estates and common-weales, which arise oftentimes by seclu­ding a nation or people conquered from bearing of offices or dignity in the common-weale: for they remaine possessed with a desire to be restored vnto their former liberty, for this cause es­pecially, Ʋt ipsis dominari, & publicis muneribus praefici liceat.

And one the other side, no lesse occasion is given of declining, if you shall advaunce them vnto the offices, and dignities of the common-weale. For did not Salamina decline sometimes by constituting Garralde Fitz Garralde attainted, Lievetenant of Sa­lamina? did they not at other times decline by constituting Thomas Fitz Garralde sometimes Lievetenaunt of the severall provinces thereof? and at other times, by giving authority into the hands of Iames of Desmonde? all which, to them which shall viewe the seve­rall recordes of their attainder, more at large may appeare. For the like causes, Nec Achaeorummerita in Romanos, vel Aetolorum vn­quam effecerunt, vt aliqua sibi imperij fieret accessio; nec Antiochi po­tentia fuerunt inducti, vt suo ipsorum consensu aliquam in ea provincia po­testatem haberet. If the Lacedaemonians in their petition exhibited to the counsel of Amphictyons, held it convenient and necessarie, that the townes and Cities of Greece, which were not of the league with the Graecians, against the barbarous people, should be remo­ved from the place of a councellour; then much more, those which are not onely, not parties with the Graecians, but of league with the barbarous people, yea their feeed and sworne servantes, are to be dismissed by the counsell of Amphictyons; for to such we shall more safely give offices of profite, then of commaunde­ment, [Page 94] whereby the multitude shall rest pleased, and the state ac­quitted of peril and daunger: and if we shall give any higher pla­ces to anie then those of profite and gaine, let vs then carefullie with Antipater make choise of such Athenians, as shall not be studious of any innovation.

CAP. 11. Occasions of declination, which arise sometimes by the difference of lawes, religi­on, habite, and lan­guage.

You have well discussed this matter: therefore let vs proceede vnto other occasions, amongst which I may finde none that doth more containe, and holde the subiect of Sa­lamina, in their disobedience and savage life, then the difference of lawes, religion, habite, and language, which by the eie de­ceiveth the multitude, and persuadeth them that they bee of sundry sortes, nations, and countries, when they be wholy to­gither but one body, as the same more at large appeareth by the statutes and records of Salamina, Act. 28. H. 8. cap. 16. in the which a manifest proofe is alleadged of that which I have saide; for there it is affirmed, that those partes of Salamina, which embrace an vinformity of lawes, religion, habite, and language, vvith the Cittie of Athens, are founde by daily experience, much more loyall, civill, and obedi­ent, then all the other partes of Salamina, which are not as yet re­duced vnto so good an vniformity: for the which causes as wel the counsell of Athens, Act: 28. H. 8. cap. 16. as of Salamina, have established certaine lawes for the vniformity of religion, lawes, habite, and language, and therby have charged the subiects and governours of Salamina vp­on their dueties of allegeaunce, to holde throughout all the partes thereof, one vniformity.

The Citties and townes which the Romaines did not destroy, were permitted as free subiectes to live, and to enioy their owne lawes: and it is saide, that the king of [Page 95] Fraunce beeing taught by experience, that it was the most ready way to win the affections of the people, to permit them as free sub­iectes to live, and enioy their owne lawes, did revoke & call home his deputy from the governement of the Cittie of Genuenses, and permitted them to make choise of their owne governour.

These obiections which you have made, doe receive severall aun­sweres: and as for the Romaines, they helde that course and order of governement by you remembred, vntill their power did ex­tende beyonde the confines of Italy, but then they gave Praetors, and provinciall governours vnto their Citties. Againe, their lenitie by you remembred, did as much aduāce their ambitious thoughts in conquering, as sometimes their knowledge in militarie disci­pline, so as it may be commended for a ready way to conquere, but not▪ as a safe waie to holde and keepe. And as for the French, we may not safely followe their steppes as guides herein, for that they are deemed of all nations valiant conquerours, but not provident defenders and keepers thereof, so as vnto them we may rightlie say, Vincere scis Hannibal, sed vti victoria nescis.

CAP. 12. The ready wayes and meanes to remoove alocca­sions of declining.

BVT now let vs close vppe this long discourse with one pol­licy vsed by the Romaines, which being rightly applyed maie remoove all occasions of declining: for after they had subiected Macedony vnto their rule and governement, for the better pre­venting of all occasions of rebelling, they devided the kingdome into fower provinces, with a capitall punnishment to be imposed vppon such, as should wander and travell from province to pro­vince, or should chaunge their habitation, or contract affinities, or vse marchandise with those of other provinces, by which course of governement, they did eftsoones remove all occasions of de­clining and rebelling: for traytours and rebels having once incur­red [Page 96] the penalty of lawes, may finde no safety but in wandering from province to province; their broken and decayed forces may not be repayred, but by contracting of affinities with such of other provinces, which they finde to be of strength and force; and sometimes vnder the coulour of merchandise, they transporte letters, importing and nourishing thereby a generall combina­tion; by which meanes Shane Oneile attainted, sometimes labou­red the corruption of all the West partes of Salamina, as in the statutes of his attainder it doth lively appeare: and by the like pra­ctises before remembred, did the late Burkes and Orurkes of Co­nought nourishe for a long time all their wicked rebellions. And therefore Mummius Consul Achaeis victis, quo minus rebellarent, cae­tibus ac societatibus interdixit, Corinthum quae duo maria brevi terra­rum intervallo iungebat, disturbavit.

CAP. 13. The subiect and matter, as also the forme, from whence every distemperature of this pollitike bodie hath his being and subsi­sting.

But sith wee have discussed at large of the principall occasions of declining of estates and common-weales, and of the waies and meanes to suppresse the same, it remaineth that we intreat at large of the distemperature of this polliticke bo­dy: for it behooveth princes not onely to foresee and prevent oc­casions of their declining, but also to knowe the nature of this di­stemperature, and howe it hath his subsisting and being, and by what meanes the same may be suppressed; for in vaine shall oc­casions offer themselves, where this distemperature is not kindled, or being kindled where it is suppressed.

You have moved a matter of good importaunce, whereof the first is a distempera­ture of this polliticke body, the which is nothing els but a decli­ninge [Page 97] from a iust proportion eyther in obeyinge or governing the subiecte. This distemperature with all other thinges hathe his beeinge and subsistinge from his proper matter and forme: the matter also hath his beeing, eyther from a generall corrup­tion of maners in the people, as in the times wherein Galba, and Pertinax lived and raigned, who though most iust and vpright kings, were notwithstāding slaine by their subiects; or els it procee­deth from a corruption in the heade onely, the which sometimes raigned in Tarquine; for if the people had then beene corrupted in maners, they could not have beene founde so constant defendors of their liberties, and so desirous of reformation. The forme as in all other things, so vnto this distemperature as vnto his proper matter it giveth his subsisting & being, the which forme if we shal describe, it may be resembled to a faire cloake givē to cover foule practises, shaped out by a cunning workeman, whereby the people often­times remaine deluded, and the common-weale subverted; for so ambitious persons desirous of innovation, have alwaies procee­ded vnder an honest cloake and shew, to distemper and disquiet the common peace of the weale publike, and therefore it is true­ly saide, Ambitio tam per virtutes quam per vitia nos oppugnat.

But heere we are to observe this caution, that if this forme hath not his proper matter vvhich is the corruption of manners in the people, vvherein it maie make a deepe impression, the distem­perature that groweth thereby, shall easilie be recovered: and for this cause the forme vvhich Tarquine gave to his ambition, was easilie defaced by Brutus, and Ʋalerius, for that the manners of the people vvere not then corrupted. In like manner Marcus Manlius, and Spurius Cassius, had set downe vnto themselves a forme of disturbing the peace of the common-weale, and for the advauncing of their owne ambition, but finding the manners of the people then vncorrupted, the matter wanting into which, the forme which they before had framed, might be received, they both failed of their purpose. But otherwise it fareth vvith the common-vvealth, when this forme hath founde his proper mat­ter and embraceth the same, namelie the corruption of man­ners in the people; for in such a case there is kindled foorthvvith [Page 98] so mighty a distemperature, as without great resistaunce it maie not be quenched: and for this cause the forme of ambition vvhich sometimes Sylla, Marius, and Caesar, had framed vnto themselves, meeting and concurring at once vvith the corruption of manners in the people as his proper matter, did assuredly advaunce their ambition, to the overthrow of that estate. Therefore most false is that position, vvhich affirmeth, that the people corrupted in manners, are more easily held in subiection, then a nation vncor­rupted. The seconde caution to be observed, is the considera­tion of the sundry formes of disturbing common-weales, vvhich vsually doth advaunce her ambition not after one selfesame man­ner, but sometimes vvith a shevv of profit, sometimes vvith the shevv of magnanimitie, and at other times shee promiseth an alteration and chaunge of thinges to the contentment of al. After this last manner she presented her selfe sometimes vnto the A­thenians, and therefore it is saide, that notwithstanding the citi­zens of Athens observed and obeyed the lawes, which you Solon made for their reformation, yet they were found so corrup­ted in manners, partly by reason of their severall factions, and partly by idlenesse, vvherewith the citie of Athens was well neare destroyed, as they desired nothing so much as a change and alte­ration of thinges, every man hoping thereby to be better then his adversaries. Secondarily by a shevv of magnanimitie, the peo­ple of Rome were sometimes induced so farre to imbrace the coun­sell of Ʋarro for the resisting of Hannibal, as thereby they neare perished themselves and the common-vveale. Finally, many are no lesse bewitched with a glistering shew of profit and gaine, the which Pericles vvel vnderstanding, did forthvvith devide the ene­mies landes gayned by conquest, among the people, and did appointe them rewardes for all thinges, and did make large di­stributions among them, whereby at the last he did withdravv their obedience from the counsell Areopagite, vnto his sole rule and governement: in like manner Phillip of Macedonie corrupted certaine tirauntes of the Ile of Euboea, who with money in like sort corrupted the people, vvhereby they became rebels and trai­toures to their countrie; after the same manner he corrupted and [Page 99] subdued the most partes of Greece, but shall not now the infinite calamities and miseries of the other partes of Greece: admonish vs not to be deceived with this forme of ambition vvhich Phillip of Macedonie hath now framed to our vtter destruction? O you Graeci­ans, let him not say as heretofore, with my treasure I have corrupted and subdued the most parts of Greece, & have found there no fort so strong, but that with an Asse laden with golde, I might enter the same, fearing in the ende hee make vs his Asses and Mules, to carrie his silver & golde and not to vse the same, or rather slaves to be committed to perpetuall bondage: but let vs with the noble Ro­maines, refuse the money of Spurius Cassius, Ne libertatem vendere eo pretio videamur; let vs not give credit to his flattering orators the Iesuits, which bribed by Polycarphon laboure the destruction of Athens; let vs not be infamous with the Neapolitanes for vncon­stancie; let vs not be led this day to affect the French, and to mor­row with a new insinuation of Ferdinando; for so it will be, when the yoke of the French shall once seeme heavie and vntollerable vn­to our shoulders. In vaine then with the labourer of Phrygia, shal we digge the earth, and searching say, we seeke for Antigonus; for such as governe, doe rule as tyrauntes and oppressors over vs: in vaine with the vvorthy woman of Megara, shal we take vp the bones of Phocion in the night, & give vnto them the honorable ceremonies of buriall, for the affaires of the Athenians may not prosper, because Phocion is dead; in vaine shal we then cry and say, O deare hearth & toombe, we pray thee faithfully to keep the bones of this honourable personage, vntil such time as the Athenians shal repent them of the many iniuries and wrongs done vnto him, for Phocion is now dead, and the affaires of the Athenians may not pros­per: in vaine shall we make vnto our selues a costly stand or image in remembraunce of so worthy a personage, for the affaires of the Athenians shall not prosper, in that Phocion is dead. Let vs therefore in time with the wise governour suspect the flattering of this our enemie, as the calmenes of the sea, which is naught else but a mani­fest token of a present and imminent tempest; and with Cicero and Cato, withstande in time the flatterie and ambition of Caesar, least with the Romanes to late we repent the same: let vs not as men [Page 100] overcome with the greatnes of the tempest, desperately seeke our safety in the middest of the rockes and sands, but rather let vs figh­ting for our Prince and country, say, we will overcome, or die.

CAP. 14. The sundry waies and meanes lefte vnto vs for the suppressing of every distemperature raigning in this polliticke bodie.

But what meanes are left vnto vs to suppresse this dis­temperature?

First we are to give impediment vnto the forme and manner, and vvith Ʋalerius deny the embassa­doures of Tarquine to speake vnto the people, least by flatterie they be deluded: with Brutus vve are to condemne and execute even our owne sonnes, corrupted by Tarquine: and with Ʋalerius we ought to deny the deliverie of Vendicius vnto the traitoures: thus we must give impediment vnto the forme, wherein this cauti­on is to be observed, that the same be done in the beginning. For the Romanes having sometimes laide a forme of their ambition for the disturbing and conquering of others, the same was at the first litle regarded, vntill they had advaunced their ambition so highly, as to late their associates and neighboures did acknowledge their errour, and when they much desired, they founde themselves much vnable to suppresse the same.

What other meanes re­maine to suppresse this distemperature?

First wee are to proceede by good and profitable lawes to the suppressing thereof: for the Romanes being given to vnderstand, that forty several nati­ons had combined for their ruine and destruction, they did forth­with create a Dictator to manage the affaires of their vvars, vnto whome they gave an absolute power; all which, as well the man­ner of the creation, as his authority and continuaunce was establi­shed by lawes, fearing least when this distemperature should bee once thoroughly kindled in the bowels of the common-weale, [Page 101] they might want either time to effect the same, or that this innova­tion might then give occasion of mutiny. Secondly, we are to make preparation for the wars, and with Themistocles daily to arme and exercise the Athenians, to builde and vittaile our gallies, for the battaile of Marathon (saith he) will not give an end vnto these warres, but rather it doeth foretell vs of greater troubles. Third­ly, we are to resist this distemperature by the force and strength of our alies, confederates, and associates: and herein above all others, we are highly to esteeme and regarde the confederation of free Citties and estates; for they doe not easily, or for light cau­ses depart the same, in regarde they proceede iudicially by voi­ces, as well to establish, as to dissolve the same; the which caution Tusci olim observabant, and therefore it is saide, Multum negotij fu­it populo Romano cum Tuscis hoc modo inter se confederatis: by which observation they became as well by sea as by lande, mighty com­maunders; so as it is saide, Quod ante tempora Romanorum Tusci po­tentissimi fuerint terra mari (que). After this manner doe the Helvetians at this day proceede in their warres: and in times past, Achaei at (que) Aetoli. In like manner the Romaines the better to overcome all difficulties in their warres, did make an association with other free Cities and states, by the which manner of proceeding, they did every where conquere and commaunde. But the Lacedaemoni­ans, and the Athenians, not making anie confederation, or associ­ation with other free Cities, did not long continue their greatnes. Fourthly, wee must bee able at all times to produce a collected power and strength of our proper subiectes, well trayned and ex­ercised in military discipline, for the suppressing of this distem­perature; for otherwise the Thebanes and the rest of the Citties of Greece, shall decline and revolte from the Lacedaemonians; and I­taly shall revolte from the Venetians, Quoniam resp: Spartanorum & Venetorum populum habuit imbellem; therefore saith one, In promptu habeas exercitum egregium ad exemplum Romanorum, quo motos liceat componere fluctus. Fiftly, necessarie it is, that we doe possesse all the strong fortes and holdes, the which although they shall litle availe vs against any general or strong assault made against them, by such as commaunde the fielde, for that either [Page 102] with the forte or rocke of Arazze, they shall give place vnto the furie of the artillerie, or with the towne and forte of Avon for want of succours, or with the towne Valencey by the treason of Donate Raffaguin; yet they beeing placed vpon the confines of the countrie, may withstande all sodaine attemptes, and give succour vnto the wounded and diseased. Sixtly, for the better suppressing of these distemperatures, we are to take hostages and pledges vvith king Porsenna, from such persons as are likely to de­parte from their obedience, to the disturbance of the common peace, and tranquillity of the subiectes, by the vvhich way hee suppressed the malice of the Romaines; then shall we safely with him dissolve our armie, and vvithdrawe our strength. The people of Salamina hath in all ages beene founde so factious and rebel­lious, even in the times before Athens made their conquest over them, as the whole kingdome being then devided into foure se­verall partes and provinces, vvhich they tearmed kingdomes, yet all beeing commaunded by the king of Ʋlster, they did from time to time yeelde many of their best and chiefe personages, for pled­ges and hostages of their obedience vnto the king of Ʋlster: if then their native borne kinges alied, fostered, maried, and continued even one in the others bosome, did yeelde pledges for their obe­dience, howe may we in this troubled age safely dismisse pledges, and set them at liberty? may we expect greater fidelity, then they bare sometimes to their native kinges? or doe these times offer more securitie? or doth this nation vse more fidelitie? who so loo­keth into the histories and recordes of their newe and late warres, shall finde in them their olde disposition to rebell; and that this vniversall obedience which nowe they yeelde, is nothing but a so­daine heate or calme, vvich is the true messenger of a tempestu­ous weather. The seventh caution observed for the suppressing of this distemperature, is speedily to disarme the people, and not suffer them at all to be trained or exercised in militarie discipline, especially where the people be not free, but obedient and tribu­taries vnto vs: for the vse, knowledge, and exercise of militarie discipline, doeth render them bolde, turbulent, disobedient, and rebellious against vs: for what boldnesse and disobedience raig­neth [Page 103] in the people of Salamina, by trayning and exercising them in the feates of warres, Anno. 10. H. 7. cap. 13 the same may lively appeare in their re­cordes and statutes, where it is saide, that diverse persons have assembled with banners displaied against the lievtenaunt and de­putie of the saide lande, whereby many times the deputie hath beene put to reproch, and the common-weale set in adventure: for this cause it is saide, that Veneti & Spartani opera plebis in bellis non vterentur; and more wisely the Lacedaemonians holding Thebes vnder their subiection and obedience, woulde not permitte that anie Cittizen of Thebes should be trained in the warres, but rather laboured to render them peaceable, and by ease and rest, soft and effeminate; and there was no smith to be found through all the lande of Israell, during such time as the Philistians held them in subiection, least the Hebrewes make them swordes and spades, saie the Philistians. Let vs then drawe the people of Salamina from the exercise of the warres; let vs with Numa coole and pa­cifie the hoate courage of the Romaines to fight, by the daily vse and exercise of religion, prayer, and devotion; and let vs vvith the ancient kinges of Athens, draw them vnto planting, sowing, & ploughing the land; and let vs there advance and shewe forth the olive tree vnto the iudges; let vs there from henceforth honor the Godesse Pallas, and not Mars or Neptune, as heretofore; for she of right ought there to prevaile, and have preheminence; for she it is that shall cause the people to imbrace with all humility and o­bedience the governement of kinges. Put that great number of Heilotes to laboure, and plough the grounde, and let no man be trained but the free Citizen, saieth Lycurgus, let them yeelde vn­to vs magna vectigalia, and let vs give vnto them magnum & egre­gium exercitum, if nede shall require. Lastly, let vs advance all oc­cupations and sciences with the counsel Areopagite, that thereby they may be drawen from the study and thoughts of innovation and change, for difficilis res est, saith a learned writer, innumera­bilem multitudinem a principe vel a paucis coerceri, nisi plebs operibus intenta quaestum faciat. Therefore wisely did sometimes Pericles, Vespasianus, Augustus, and nowe the Venetians, holde the mindes and thoughts of their Citizens alwaies occupied and imploied in [Page 104] labours, occupations, and sciences.

There are which fin­ding this polliticke body distempered, have devided the same in­to partes and factions, whereby as a smoke parted into many ri­vals it looseth his principall force: for with the aide and assistance of the weaker parte, they have suppressed the stronger, and then easily commaunded the weaker; and for this cause it is saide, that the kinges of Aegypt have heretofore devided their regions and kingdomes by factions, Ne vnquam conspirare inter se Aegyptij om­nes possent.

This course of governement is never to be em­braced, but vpon a great extremitie, when as neither there re­mayneth counsell, nor forces, which otherwise may suppresse this distemperature: for thereby foure mischiefes shall arise vnto the state; first the rentes, revenewes, customes, compositions, tributes, escheates, and other profites annexed vnto their crowne, shall thereby cease; for it is saide, the Florentines by their civill factions, that first received their beginning of the disorders which were in the governement popular, were rendred as well vnable to pay the French king the residue of the money which had beene lent them by the Duke of Millaine, as also to defray the ordi­narie charges of the warres with Pisa. The like mischiefe did arise vnto the severall townes of Bomagua, from their severall factions and disorders; but why doe we seeke forraine examples? did not all compositions, customes, rentes, revenewes, tributes, and other escheates, and profits, for a long time cease by the extreame povertie of the subiectes of Salamina, which did first arise vnto that countrie by reason of their severall factions? as it may appeare by the statute of Captaineship, where it is declared, that in the time of iustice declination, the Lords and chiefetaines fell into much strife for greatnesse of rule and governement, by reason whereof they drewe vnto them other inferiour states to be of their severall factions, vvhereby the countrie was drawen into that povertie, as for a long time, all rentes, revenewes, and other profits there ceased, and more then that, a newe charge and trouble did growe vnto Athens for the appeasing of those disorders. Againe, the honour of well governing and commaunding is hereby lost, which is a second mischiefe that ariseth vnto vs herein; for ob discordias ci­vium [Page 105] aceidit, vt vnius imperio non pareant, sed in diversas partes divisare­gio nullis principibus parere cogatur. All which did sometimes lively appeare in Salamina, when as the Lordes and chiefetaines of that land, by drawing all other inferiour states vnto their severall facti­ons, did thereby withdraw the feare, obedience, Act. of cap­tainship. 11. Eliza. cap. 7. folio. 168. and attendance of the subiect of Salamina, due vnto the state of Athens, and wholy converted the same vnto themselves, as in the statute of Captain­ship more at large may appeare. Thirdly by factions and discordes there groweth a neglect of al publike affaires; for it is truely saide, that in the civill discords of the Florentines, no man having a sound care of the affaires publike, & many of the principal citizens being suspected, either to frēd the Medices, or mē that desired an other forme of governement, things were overruled more with confusi­on then with counsel. Lastly, greater mischiefe then any before re­membred, ariseth by factions and discordes; for in such cases a third person shall easily atchieve vnto the principallity, & suppresse ei­ther faction at his pleasure; for so Clearchus by the assistance of the faction of the nobility, was inabled to hold the place & kingdome, as wel against the people as nobles, which were then the two facti­ons that raigned & disturbed the politike body: & it is also said, the particular factions of the citizēs of Millaine drawing to privat coun­sels, did immediatly conspire & take armes against Lodowicke Sforce, in such sort, as he was forced thereby to make his present departure with his wife & childrē, at which instant the citizens of Millain with francke & ready goodwil received the enemy: & have not several factions of Salamina, offred thēselves with frācke & ready goodwill to receive the enemy? hath not Iames sometimes Earle of Desmond sent vnto the french king, & by al means excited & provoked him to send an army for the invading of Salamina, the which conspiracy did not then take his desired effect, by reason of a peace thē imme­diatly cōcluded betwixt King H. the 8. & the french King? againe being frustate of that hope, hath he not many waies provoked the emperour, to send an army for the invading & possessing of Sala­mina? in like maner hath not Thomas Fitz Garrald addressed his let­ters vnto the Bishop of Rome, as also vnto the Emperor, by one Gale in Granyll, otherwise called Charles Raynold Archdeacon of Kelles, [Page 106] for the invading of Salamina? Act. 28. H. 8. cap. 1. all which in the act of the attainder more at large may appeare. And hath not Oneile, who by suffe­raunce and tollerance, long supported his faction against the state, sometimes addressed his letters vnto several forraine Princes, for the drawing in of straungers to invade and possesse Salamina, the which vvere publikely intercepted by the Lorde Deputie? &c. All vvhich may evidently appeare in the statutes of his attainder. Againe did not the faction of the ancient Brittains lay open a gap vnto Caesar his invasion, and did hee not by the aide of one fa­ction of the Gaules subdue the rest, and them also in the end? Was not the Duke sometimes of Ʋalentinois, emboldened to invade the dominion of the Florentines, with a weake and slender armie, by the feare, suspition, and great disagreement, that then pos­sessed them, for that he had in his army Vitellozze, and the Vr­sins, and for that also Peter de Medicis was abiding at Loiana in the countrie of Bollognia at his direction? for it is saide that hee did entertaine Peter de Medicis, Ʋitellie, and the Ʋrsins, not vvith a minde or desire to advaunce them, for nothing more then that could be farther from his thoughtes, but to augment the mutinies and disagreementes of the Florentines, by the vvhich he hoped to vrge them either to better conditions, or be able to occupy some place of importance in their iurisdiction. And did not the Megari­ans during the vproares raised by the severall factions then main­tained by the issue of Cylon, and the ofspring of Megacles, take from vs the haven of Nysea, and the ile of Salamina? then vvee may rightly conclude, that so long as vve have an enemy, vvhich raiseth himselfe against vs, so long we ought for the safetie of the whole, strongly to suppresse all factions vvhatsoever: for facti­ons breede an vnsetled minde in the people, and doth nourish this desire of chaunge and alteration; the vvhich did livelie ap­peare in the people of Athens, during the continuance of the se­verall factions, then entertained betwixt the people of the valley, sea-cost, & mountaine; for not withstanding they al kept & obser­ved the laws made by you Solon, for their reformatiō, yet there was none founde but gaped for a change, and desired to see thinges in another state, either parties hoping their condition & state of life [Page 107] would amend by chaunge, and that every of them should be bet­ter then their adversaries. There remaineth now that vve deduct colonies, which is the last, but not the least meanes to suppresse this distemperature, vvhich of all others is the most beneficiall for the cōtaining of a nation conquered in their duty and obedience; wherein foure matters are worthily considered: first the necessi­tie of deducting colonies; secondarily the benefite that redoun­deth thereby vnto common-weales; thirdly what order and man­ner in deducting colonies is to bee vsed and observed; lastly, the impedimentes which are vsuallie given vnto the deducting of colonies.

Shew vs the necessitie of collonies.

A nation conquered may not be contained in their obedience vvithout the strength of colonies or garrisons: for may we be induced to be­leeve, that that people or nation, who daily bewaileth & accuseth his present state and condition, may persist therein longer then they be pressed there vnto by necessitie? and more then this in the act of Absentes, the meere native borne people of Salamina, 28. H. 8. cap. 3. are tearmed to be mortall and naturall enemies vnto their con­querour and all his dominions. After this sort did the citizens of Cremona affect the Venetians; and the Pisans, the Florentines: but now to suppresse this distemperature, if wee shoulde give vnto them garrisones, and Praesidia perpetua, nihil isto intollerabilius est, saith a learned writer, quia tantum abest vt victi vincentium impe­rijs assuescere condiscant, vt non prius a novandis rebus conquiescant, quam aut praesidia interemerint, aut arces ceperint, aut finitimos principes ac populos ad bellum accerserint; whereof we neede not search forraine examples, when the daily calamities of Salamina doe witnesse the same, which happened since the times, where­in we gave vnto them praesidia perpetua: for how many waies did this people incite the French King, hovv oft have they provo­ked the Pope to invade this lande of Salamina? Againe the Emperour and all other Princes and Potentates, vvhat fortes and holdes have they not taken, and how many of our garrisons have they most cruelly slaine and murdered, the same, in the several actes of Attainder of Shane Oneile, Garralde Fitz Garralde, 28. H. 8. cap. 1. Iames of Desmond, and by severall other recordes, may appeare at [Page 108] large. Neither doth this forme of governement drawe with it a perpetuall discontentment onelie, but also an infinite and conti­nuall charge in maintaining these severall garrisons, as well to the Prince, as to the subiect; for so in the act of subsidie and o­ther recordes it may appeare. Neither be these all the discommo­dities that perpetual garrisons drawe with them, for these notwith­standing, 28. H. 8. cap. 11. we have beene forced to send at sundry times armies roi­all to suppresse disorders and rebellions, as the same more at large may appeare in the act of restraining of tributes; so as wee may conclude, that where colonies are not strongly and faithfully de­ducted, there the ende of the first warres, is but a beginning of the second more daungerous then the first; the vvhich maie ap­peare by the recordes of Salamina: for no sooner were the people or sects, called Omores, Odempseis, Oconores, and others, expelled by great forces and strengthes, to our great charges, out of the severall countries of Liece, Sl [...]wmarge, Irry, Glimnaliry, and Offaile, but eftsones for that we deducted not colonies, they traiterouslie entered the said countries by force, Act. An. 3.4. Phil. & Mariae c. 2. folio. 145. and long detained the same, vntill they were with greater forces expelled, all which more at large may appeare in the act made for the deviding of countries, into shiere groundes, so as we may conclude, that it is not for wise Princes to persevere in that course of governement, which doth nourish as it were a perpetuall interest in troubles, charges, and expenses: for the which causes chiefely did the Ʋenetians willing­ly abandon the governement of Bybienna and Pisa, and wee of Athens, Salamina, the which did chiefely arise vnto vs, for that in steede of planting of colonies, we placed garrisons. Now then if we be willing to cast of our former and manifolde troubles, if we be desirous to dismisse our selves of these infinite and perpetu­all charges, and lastly if we indevour to be strong against the in­vaders, and such as shall contend to occupie Salamina by force, let vs loose no opportunity of deducting of colonies, for they be de­ducted and maintained with small or no charges, & with no great offence, but onely to such whose landes and houses they possesse, the which remaine for the most part pacified, in that they enioy their life which stoode in the handes of the Prince, as vvell as [Page 109] their landes to dispose, for their offences: and if they should remaine discontented, for that having respect to the whole king­dome they be but a handfull, and also dispersed and poore, they may never be able to hurt or disturbe the state, & all others which finde themselves free from their losses, shall rest pacified, partely fearing, least they commit any thing rashly or foolishly, and partly doubting, least the like befalleth them as to those which remaine spoyled for their offences. Againe, being thus deducted with small or no discontentment, and maintained with far lesse charge, they bee founde also more faithfull and stoute defendours of the confines of the country then garrisons, and therefore it is saide by a man of great vnderstanding, Si reges nostri capto Ludovico 12. rege Insubriae, Colonias eo misissent, vt quondam Celtarum reges fecis­se dicuntur, Insubria a Francorum ditione ac potestate non tam facile defecisset: nec vero Hispani praesidijs militaribus nulla Colonia deducta perpetuum eius regionis imperium tuebuntur, sed ab imperio subditi arrepta occasione desciscant oportet; non aliter quam Belgae, quos iam pri­dem colonijs Hispanorum ad imperium retinendum coniungi necesse fuis­set, quoniam nec vlla vis diuturna esse potest, & pessimus diuturnitatis custos est metus: in like manner Salamina notvvithstanding the strength of garrisons, doth daily take all occasions of declining, but in former times, after colonies were deducted, then Salamina continued for many ages in their obedience, in such sorte, as none durst beare vppe heade, but lived as vassals and obedient people, vntill partly by the iniquity of the times, partly by our domesti­call factions, and lastly by a negligence and security then found in these colonies, they were overthrowne and expelled by the na­tive borne people of that lande, all which in the act of attainder of Shane Oneile more at large may appeare, as also in the statutes of Absentes.

Nowe sith the necessity of colonies doeth manifestly appeare by vnfallible proofes and examples, let vs proceede vnto the profite and benefite that grovveth thereby.

The benefites that hereby arise to the common-weale, are sundry and diverse: first the people poore and seditions vvhich were a burden to the common-weale, are drawen forth, vvhereby the matter of sedition is remooved out of the Cittie; and for this [Page 110] cause it is said, that Pericles sent into the country of Cherronesus, a thousand free men of his Cittie there to dwell, and to devide the landes amongst them; five hundreth also into the Ile of Naxus, into the Ile of Andros others, some he sent to inhabite Thracia, and others to dwell with the Bisaltes; as well thereby to ridde the Cittie of a number of idle persons, who thorough idlenes began to be curious and to desire chaunge of thinges, as also to provide for the necessity of the poore towns-men that had nothing, which being naturall Citizens of Athens served as garrisons, to keepe vnder those which had a desire to rebell, or to attempt any altera­teration or change: secondly by translating of colonies, the peo­ple conquered are drawen and intised by little and little, to em­brace the manners, lawes, and governement of the conquerour: lastly the colonies being placed and dispersed abroade amongest the people, like Beacons doe foretell and disclose all conspira­cies, and as a garrison also are wont to suppresse the mutinies of such as are desirous of alteration and change; and to this effect it is saide, in the statute of Absen [...]es, that the colonies, which were sometimes deducted for the defending of the confines of Salami­na, then and many ages after abiding in the saide lande, did nobly and valiantly defende the same against all enemies whatsoever, as also kept the same in such tranquillity & good orders, as the kings had due subiection of the inhabitance, the lawes were well obey­ed, and of all the revenewes and regalties they were duely aun­swered as in any place whatsoever: lastly, they yeelde a yeare­ly rent, profite, or service vnto the crovvne for ever; for these causes above rehearsed it is saide, Romani victis hostibus Colonias de­ducebant: and the French conquering Lombardy, did chase out the auncient inhabitants, and in their dwelling placed colonies: in like manner the Emperour of the Turkes from time to time, of Christians whome then he reduced in servitude, deduceth co­lonies, so as it is saide, that Carolus 5. imperator debellatis Pernanae re­gionis gentibus, eadem quam Turcarum rex, in coloniarum translatio­ne, ratione vsus est.

Nowe sith as well the necessity as the pro­fite of deducing colonies doth sufficiently appeare vnto vs, let vs proceede vnto the manner and order of translating of colonies, as [Page 111] the thirde matter vvoorthy of consultation.

In the or­der and manner of deducting collonies, certaine rules are to bee observed: first that the lands be so devided, as strengths by great numbers may be deducted, and therefore Duo cui (que) iugera tributa sunt; but not long after, Prolatis finibus, lege Licinia septem iugera cui (que) civi assignata legimus, the which order was observed by the Romaines. But otherwise the Emperour of the Turkes, iugera quindecim cui (que) attribuit. The Romaines laboured to deduct co­lonies by great numbers, especially out of the confines of Ita­ly, to the ende that by the proper strength and forces of colonies, they might easilie defende the confines of their dominions, and suppresse al such as were founde desirous of innovation. Secondly we are to plant and place our colonies in the most rich and fruit­full landes, Ʋt in eo civibus numero auctis alimenta suppetant, potenti­a (que) auctae huiusmodi novae vrbes, omnem internam vim propulsare atque etiam opprimere queant. Thirdly, such as are to be deducted in the number of colonies, we shall wisely make them but proprietaries of the landes, during life onely, Vt fructuarij occasu fructus in ae­rarium cogerentur, quoad principis beneficio alius succederet, quemad­modum Amurates cum Timariolis egit: by vvhich constitution three matters beneficiall to the weale publicke shall arise; first op­portunity shall be lent from time to time, to recompence servi­tours by these casuall profites that shall arise, without imposing a­ny newe charge vpon the common-weale; secondly by the death of this tenaunt for life, the profites thereof growe vnto the prince vntill the landes be newly disposed by him; thirdly, the prince or state being to dispose these landes at his or their pleasure, shall with this rewarde binde the proprietarie of the lande during life, in all services to be loyall and faithfull; lastly, by holding this course, sundrie inconveniences shall be eschewed which vsually followe such as graunte these landes in perpetuity; for in such cases they have beene founde in Salamina, especially after two or three descentes, to inter-marry and foster with the meere native people, and by that occasion decline sometimes from their obe­dience; at other times they are founde to make leases of their landes, or to make a grant over of their estates vnto such as are not [Page 112] well affected vnto the governement, to the overthrowe of them­selves and common-weale, as it may appeare in the statute of Ab­sentes, where it is saide, that the colonies being possessed of their landes, did make leases of diverse of their holdes and manners vnto the late Earle of Kildar attainted, by occasion whereof the same came to the possession of Thomas Fitz Garralde, his sonne and heire, who intending a daungerous rebellion, was aided, assisted, and maintained against the state, by the inhabitants, & occupiers of the saide lande, so as the state was compelled of force to sende thither an army royall for the better suppressing of those disorders and rebellions; lastly, these colonies must vnite and gather them­selves together into places of strength, walled or intrenched for their better defence against sodaine incursions, and never be de­stitute of provision sufficient for their defence: for such of our aun­cient colonies in Salamina, which in times peaceable suffered their townes, holdes, and castles to decay, and neglected the maintei­ning of such garrisons, as of right appertained vnto them to main­tain, were in difficult times exiled, bannished, or put to the sword, onely such remained and prevailed, which with a collected power and strength, did inhabite places walled or intrenched, and were not founde destitute of sufficient provision for the wars, as it may more at large appeare in the act of Absentes. Therefore of late daies two worthy Knightes, Sir Henry Walloppe Treasurer, and Sir Nicholas Bagnole Knight Marshall, being the principall per­sonages of the late deducted colonies, for the better strengthe­ning of the confines of Salamina, have not dispersed their forces but wisely collected them into one place of strength, vvhereby they have repelled from time to time, all internall forces or so­daine incursions.

You have at large described vnto vs the necessity, the profite, and the order and manner of deducting of colonies, you shall orderly proceede, if you nowe intreate of the impedimentes vvhich vsually are given vnto such actions.

The impediments are sundry and diverse: the first is given by such as vsually oppose themselves against all newe orders, for that they reape a benefite by the olde disorders. The second is equall with the first, and proceedeth from a generall incredulitie ingrafted in [Page 113] all sortes of persons, which never yet have given affiance or con­fidence vnto newe attemptes, be they never so profitable. The thirde impediment ariseth greater then the rest, when the au­thours of these new orders, shall become faint defendors thereof, and shall give leave and waye to others, which give impediment thereunto. The last impediment is the great trouble and charge, which followeth such as shall inhabite landes farre removed; with the consideration whereof, the Romaine Cittizens were sometimes withdrawen, and discouraged from the inhabiting of the lands re­moved out of the confines of Italy, and the same also doeth not a little withdraw the newe colonies from inhabiting Salamina: But Muhamedes the Emperour sometimes of the Turkes, contēding to remove this impedimēt, Cui (que) coloniae duos bubulos ac sementem dedit.

Now you have at large discoursed of a reformation of declined common-weales, declare vnto vs what you intende by the subse­quent words which followe in your generall and first description, where you tearme it an happie restitution vnto his first perfection.

I have tearmed it an happy restitution, when the same is effe­cted without bloud-shed and spot of tyranny, or cruelty; but yet it must be confessed that where sanandi medicina may not prevaile, there execandi, is rightly vsed; neither is nature saide to hate those members and partes, which shee cutteth of for the preservation & safety of the whole body: and by this word perfection, I intend no­thing but that good, which even from the first institution we did aime & shoote at, Nam omne principium bonum aliquod spectabat, and this is the ende and scope of al reformations: as for example, when Athens had first conquered Salamina, they labored nothing more, then to conteine the subiect in his obedience vnto the Cittie of Athens vnder good & profitable lawes, & that the people might more assuredly be drawen thereunto without any great grie­vance or offence, they strongly deducted colonies into all parts of Salamina, and established there many and profitable lawes, the which were truly and iustly observed by many ages, and so conti­nued their obedience from time to time, vntil these colonies were by the iniquity of times exiled. Let then our second reforma­tion be like vnto the first, for Omne principium bonū aliquod spectabat: [Page 114] so as I may ende like as I began this discourse, saying, that a refor­mation of a declined common-weale is an happy restitution vnto his perfection.

You have wisely discoursed of all the partes of this general description, and happily have made an ende thereof, for beholde my messenger hasteneth vnto me more then with an ordinary expedition.

My Lord and generall Solon, the Megarian army approacheth neare at hand; for nowe standing vp­on the pinnacles of the temple of Venus, we did plainly discover their ships. Solon then turning himselfe vnto Epimenides saide, I go armed against the Megarians with the wisedome of Epimenides; in such sorte, as with Numa I may safely sacrifice when as they re­maine in armes, in requitall of which good counsell from hence­forth I shall confesse to holde my life from Epimenides.

These meane lightes which I have given for the reformation of Salamina, with the wisedome of Solon as with the beames of a bright sunne, remaine extinguished, so as there resteth nothing but our former goodwill which may tie you to make acceptance thereof

And the same may never die but with Solon; farevvell then Epimenides.

And you Solon in like manner a due.

Then with the great noise and clattering of the weapons, and armour of the souldiers, I so­denly awaked, and remained for a small time amazed with the e­vent of so weighty and great matters, but at the last my drousie sence being newly refreshed, I might beholde, all was sodenly va­nished and nothing left in place but a vision or dreame, the which according to my small skill, and vnderstanding, I have heere expressed in pelting prose and not in heroicall verse; wherewith Solon as then it seemed to me, did much commende and grace the matter, vvhich then he vt­tered vnto Epime­nides.