VVhat VVitcraft is.

1 WItcraft is a cunning to frame and to answere a reason.

The partes of a reason.

2 A reason standeth of certayn sayings, and a saying of wordes.

3 So that wordes are the firste and the least partes of a reason: and therfore first to be taught and learned.

4 For he that will kéepe a good trade in teaching, must begin with small and easy matters at the first, and by them procéede to greater and harder poyntes, so farre till at the last he attayne to the ende, which is first in purpose, and last in woorke.

VVhat vvordes are.

5 Words are voyces framed with hart and toung, vttering the thoughtes of the mynde.

The first deuiding of vvordes.

6 Wordes eyther agrée in sounde, and differ in meaning: or they agrée in mea­ning, and differ in sounde: or they agrée in bothe: or else they dissent in both.

7 They of the fyrste sorte maye [...]ée termed Lykesounding wordes: They of y ^• secōd sort, like meaning words: They of the thyrde sorte, playne [...]: [...]ng wordes: and they of the fourth sorte, wordes ful­ly differing one from an other.

Wordes

• Lykesounding.
• Lykemeaning.
• Playnemeaning.
• Fully differing.

8 Lykesounding wordes, are woordes of double vnderstandyng, whiche haue one sounde of letters, and accordyng to that one sounde, diuers say whats, expres­sing sundrie substances.

9 For example thus: The Woodcocke hath let my woodcocke flye away.

10 Nowe thys worde Woodcocke in bothe places of thys [...]ne sentence, for sounde of letters is one and the same:

11 But if ye séeke the true meaning of [Page 3] this worde Woodcocke, as it is twice pla­ced in this one saying: ye shal fynde in ey­ther place, a sundry sayewhat, expressing in the first place, an vnwittie man:

12 And in the second place, a bird haun­ting the woods, and making his flyght of pleasure onely in the twylight.

13 The double vnderstanding of wor­des and sayings, must be warely marked, and declaration made of theyr sundrye meanings: that it may certainely be kno­wen, in what sense they are to be taken.

14 Wordes restrayned to one saywhat ar no lōger words of double vnderstādīg.

15 Lykemeanyng wordes are one in meaning, and diuers in sound as rich, wel­thie: colour, hue, quickning, bar [...]e, yest:

16 Plainmeaning words haue one soūd, & according to that one soūd, one saywhat.

17 Here we vnderstand such a saywhat as declareth the substance of a thing: and not such a one as only noteth y ^• force & sig­nification of a worde.

18 Words fully dissenting are such as haue neyther one sound, nor one saywhat: as an herbe, and a trée.

The second deuision of vvordes.

19 Wordes are also thus deuided, some signifie a thing that hathe his beeing by it selfe: some signifie a thing that hath his beeing in an other.

20 The firste maye be called an Inhol­der: the seconde an Inbeer. For example thus: Man, beast, herbe, trée, corne, grasse, stones, mettall, fire, ayre, water, earth, and all other substaunces bodyed, or bodylesse, are Inholders:

21 But length, breadth, thicknesse, wei­ght, measure, number, power, shape, ver­tue, cunning, sleight, vice, ignorance, heate, calde, moystnesse, drynesse, and all other wordes placed in any storehouse, (excepte the storehouse of substance) are inbeers.

The thirde deuision of vvordes.

22 There is a third deuision of wordes to be likewise considered.

23 For some wordes are common, and are affirmed of many things, as man is [Page 5] sayde of many seuerall men.

24 Some are sole wordes, and are sayd but of one thing alone: as Iohn, or this man, are sayd of no moe men then one.

Certaine preceptes or generall rules to be learned afore ye enter into the treatise of the storehouses.

25 Ther are rules in euery arte, which authors vse as groundes and sure princi­ples, not to be denyed or doubted of.

26 For if nothing shoulde be cleare and certaine of it selfe: then should we be dri­uen by wranglers from point to point, to make reason vppon reason infinitely, and neuer come to issue of any one matter.

27 Therfore hath God appoynted some things to be euident and certaine of them selues, that they mighte be as stayes to mans wit, and as helpes to fynde out and to discusse things that are not so euident as they are.

[Page 6] 28 And this is the cause why ye maye not aske of a Principle why so? yet maye principles bée opened to beginners by examples,

29 Whyche is a kynde of proofe by Experience, thoughe it bée no proofe by rule.

30 A common Inholder is sayde of o­thers: but it hathe not hys béeing in an other.

31 A sole Inholder is neyther sayde of any other thing, besides it selfe: nor yet hath his béeyng in any thing, but in it selfe.

32 A common Inbeer is bothe sayde of others: and hathe also his béeyng in o­thers too.

33 A sole Inbeer, hath his béeing in an other: but it is not sayde of any other.

34 Diuers kyndes, whereof one is not subiecte to an other, haue sundrye kyn­reds, and sundrie differences, as a wight and an arte.

35 For the kinreds of a wyghte, are man and beaste: but the kinreds of arte are, The arte of numbryng, the arte of measuring, witcrafte, speachcraft, starre­crafte. [Page 7] &c.

36 Agayne, the differences of a wight are flyable, goable, swimmable, and créep­able: For one wight differeth from an o­ther by these meanes:

37 But the differēces of artes are, some to teache, to number: some to measure: some to speake: some to reason: some to tel things to come.

Of the ten storehouses, and of their vse.

38 There are tenne generall woordes whiche maye well be called storehouses, not onely for the store of woordes, which they conteyne (comprising all playn mea­ning wordes,)

39 But also for the good order they kéepe in placing of wordes in their parti­cular roumes, with bréefe rules, (as notes sette on packets,) declaring theyr nature and properties.

40 So that storehouses teach y ^e nature of simple wordes as they are considered by thē selues. For there is no playnmea­ning worde but it signifyeth eyther,

a

• Substance.
• Quantitie.
• Qualitie.
• Respecte.
• Dooing.
• Suffering.
• Where.
• When.
• Placing.
• Hauing.

Of the ten Demaunders.

41 There are also ten demaunders, e­uery one peculiarlye perteyning to som [...] one storehouse.

• 1 What?
• 2 Howe muche, or how many?
• 3 Whatkynone?
• 4 To whome, or then what?
• 5 Dooing what?
• 6 Suffering what?
• 7 Where?
• 8 When?
• 9 Howe placed?
• 10 Hauing what?

[Page 9] 42 What? demaundeth a substance: how much or how many? demaund a quantitie: whatkinone? demaundeth a qualitye: to whom? or then what? demaūde a respecting terme: doing what? demaundeth a do­ing: suffering what? demaundeth a suffe­ring: where? and when? demaunde tyme and place, with some circumstance either of the person, of the fact, or of the matter: how placed? demaundeth a placing: and hauing what? demaundeth an hauing.

43 For example thus. If you bée asked what is a man? ye must aunswere that which doth appertaine to the substance of a man, saying a mā is a wight indued with sense and reason.

44 But if ye be asked, howe much is a man? or howe many men are they? then must ye aunswere such matter, as pertai­neth to the quantitie of a man.

45 And saye for his bignes, according to his length, bredth, thicknes, talnes, grosse­nes, and so forth, and for the multitude, ac­cording to the number they be of, more or lesse.

46 If ye be asked whatkinone is a man? [Page 10] ye must aunswere, suche thynges as ap­pertaine to the qualitie of a man, as wise, folishe, liberall, couetous, learned, ignoraunt, a runner, lame, sober, hastye swart, faire, blacke, foule, proper, yll fa­ [...]ored or such like.

47 If ye be asked to whō? or then what? man is this or that: ye must aunswere, fa­ther to his sonne: husbande to his wyfe: higher then this thing, or lower then that, which aunswere standeth of respectyng termes.

48 If ye be asked what doth a man? ye must aunswere that a man diggeth, plow­eth, soweth, reapeth, buyldeth, playeth, hauketh, hunteth, rydeth, goeth, walketh, which wordes and such like are placed in the Storehouse of doing.

49 If inquirie bée had, what this man or that man hath suffered: y ^• returne is made that hée hath béene spoyled, robbed, may­med, stiefeled, killed, and these wordes doe importe a suffering.

50 If ye bée asked where thys or that man is? ye must aunswere, wythin, a­broade, at home, from home, in the [Page 11] Citie, or in the fielde, whych sayinges are referred to the Storehouse where.

51 If ye be asked when this man or that man dyd this or that: yée must aunswere, an houre, a daye, a weeke, a moneth, a yeare ago, which sayinges are ascribed to the Storehouse when.

52 If ye bée asked how is man placed? ye must aunswere, he lyeth, be sitteth, he boweth, he leaneth, he frowneth, he smi­leth, whych woordes doe euer thsynuate a placing.

53 If ye bée asked how man is appareled or furnished: ye must aunswere, he is na­ked, clothed, armed, weaponed, booted, shodde, frended, monyed, wyued, whych woordes doe alwayes importe an ha­uing.

54 Here yée must take héede that euery demaunder haue suche an aunswere shap­pen vnto it, as maye bée placed in the Storehouse, whereto the Demaunder properlye belongeth: other wayes, yée shall not aunswere directlye nor to the purpose.

Hovv substaunce is deuided.

2 There is a sole substance, and a com­mon substaunce.

3 A Sole substaunce, is a substaunce pe­culiar and proper to one selfe thing alone, as Iohn, William, this man, or that man.

4 For although many men be called by the name of Iohn, or William, yet when wée adde Iohn, William, or anye other proper name to man, or els adde this, or that to any common worde: wée meane to separate it from all other thinges, and to poynt out a sole thing: so that though these names bée referred to many men, yet the thing meant by them is one selfething.

5 A common substaunce is either a kin­red, [Page 13] or a kynd, conteyning many sole sub­staunces, as a horse is a kinred, conteining al particuler horses: and a wight is a kynd conteyning al kinredes of beastes, flying, swymming, going, créeping, drawing, or stilstanding.

Of certayne peculiar rules vvhich belong to the storehouse of substance.

Hovv Substance is deuided.

37 Substaunce doth admit manye deui­sions accordyng to hys manyfolde and gaynse [...] differences, as. 1. a bodyed sub­staunce, [Page 19] a bodylesse substaunce. 2. a mor­tall substaunce, animmortall substaunce. 3. a naturall substaunce, an artificiall sub­staunce, or a substaunce partlye artifi­ciall partly natural. 4. a lyuing substance, a lyuelesse substaunce. 5. a féelyng sub­staunce, a substance voyde of sense. 6. a reasonable substaunce, a wytlesse sub­staunce. 7. a moueable substaunce, an immoueable substaunce. 8. a tame sub­staunce, a wylde substaunce. 9. an earth­lye substaunce, a watery substaunce, an airye substance, a [...]yerye substance. [...]c.

Here foloweth the table of Substaunce.

Hovv Quantitie is deuided.

2 Some quantities stand of seuered and [...]ncoupled partes: as number, speach: [...] of partes that are [...]ed and [...]ed toge­ther by some common bounder: as a line, an ouershew, a body, time and place.

3 A common bounder is the end of one thyng and th [...] beginnyng of another, and [...]et part of neither.

4 That the partes of number are not ioyned or knit together [...] anye common boūder it is plain by particular examples.

[Page 21] 5 For thrée and fiue being the partes of eight▪ are not coupled together by any cō ­mon bounder: neither can one shew in a number any common bounder where the partes do meete and ioyne together.

6 The like may be said of speech, for though sillables and words haue some more time in pronouncing, & some lesse, yet are they not ioyned one to another, without pause at all, for then there should be no distincti­on in speache.

7 That speache is placed in this store­house, it is plain, bicause it is measured by sillables short and long.

Another diuision of Quantitie.

8 Quantitie admitteth also this diuision that some stande of partes which haue a placing one by another, some stand of parts which haue no placing at all.

9 A line, an ouershew, a body and a place stand of parts that haue a placing, for that their parts are séene to lye somewhere.

10 But in number no mā can shew how his partes are placed one by another, or where they are set, or how they are ioyned [Page 22] or coupled together.

11 The like may be saide of tyme, for sée­ing the partes of tyme stay not, howe can they admit any placing.

12 Yet there is an order among the part [...] of time and number: bycause one tyme commeth before, and another time cōmeth after, and in the natural rewe of numbers one is reckned afore two, and two afore thrée, but placing of partes are not eyther in number or time.

13 The like maye be said of speache also, for eche worde and syllable passeth away as it is spoken, so that the partes of speach tarye not, nor stay not to haue anye pla­cing.

14 The least thing that can be imagy­ned in a number is one: and the least thing that can be imagyned in a lyne is a pricke: here note that one is a parte of eche num­ber, but a pricke is a bounder of a lyne and therfore no part therof.

15 A number is a multitude of ones.

16 A lyne is length without bredth.

17 An ouershew is length, and bredth, without thicknesse.

[Page 23] 18 A body is length, breadth, and thick­nesse.

19 No man can mount by adding to the greatest number: nor come by diuidyng to the smallest bignesse.

20 For as number is able euer to ad­mytte some number to bee added to it, to make it bygger: so is bignesse able euer to admit some bignes to bée taken from it to make it lesse.

21 For euerye bodye is deuisible and hable to bée deuyded into many bodyes, and euerye ouershewe into manye o­uershewes, and euerye lyne into manye lynes: and all bygnesse consisteth in these thrée.

23 All kynde of measures which are consydered in respecte onely of length, are referred vnto a lyne, as an intch, a foote, a pace, a fatham, a myle. &c.

24 And those that are consydered in respecte of Length and breadth, are referred vnto an ouershewe, as a try­angle, a foursquare, a circle, a r [...]de, an aker. &c▪

25 And those that are considered in respect [Page 24] of length, bredth, & thicknesse, are referred vnto a body, as a foote of tymber, a tun [...] of timber, or any other measure where re­spect is had to these thrée kinds of bignesse.

26 All other measures & weightes which haue no respecte to length, bredth or thick­nes, are referred vnto nūber, as an ounce, a pound, a stone, a pynt, a pottle, a peny, a [...]rote, a shilling &c.

27 Tyme is a space or number measu­red by the course of the heauens, as a my­nute, an houre, a day, a wéeke, a moneth, a yeare, an age, a world.

28 A place is an hollow ouershew of an hollow body.

29 These things afore rehearsed, are properlie of them selues called quantities, other thynges vnfitlye, that is, not of them selues but by reason of another, to wit, respect had vnto these.

30 For wée vse sometymes to say, here is muche whyte, or here is a long worke, for that the ouershew where the white is is much: or that the tyme is long while the worke was a doyng.

Of the propreties of Quantitie.

31 One quantitie is not contrarie to an other: As for many and fewe, greate and little, they are not quantities, but respec­ting wordes, neyther are they contraries at all.

32 Respecting words they are, for thin­ges are sayd to be many or fewe: greate or little, in respecte of others of the same kynde: else shoulde there neuer be little hill, or greate musterséede: fewe in a Ci­tie, or many in cribbe.

33 And contraries they are not, bicause they may be said of one thing at one time, as twentie in respect of two are many, but in respect of a thousand, they are but few: so Gogmagog hilles in respect of the So­phisters hilles by Cambridge are greate: but in respecte of the Alpes, they are but small. These therefore and suche lyke, as hang only vpon respect, can haue no con­traries at all.

34 One quantitie is bygger or lesser then an other is, as sixtéene is a bigger quantitie then sixe: and a shilling is a les­ser quantitie then a pound: yet is not one [Page 26] [...]e quantitie rather a quantitie, or lesse sayde to be a quantitie then an other.

35 For sixe are as well a quantitie a [...] [...]xscore: and a long lyne is no more a line then a short lyne is.

36 This is a thing moste peculiar and propre to quantitie, that by it things shold [...]e equal or vnequall one to an other.

37 As one body is equall or vnequal to an other body: one ouershewe equall or vnequal to an other ouershewe: one lyne to an other line: one time to another time: one place to an other place: one number to an other number: as for like and vnlyke they are euer sayde of qualities proprely, as one color like or vnlike to an other co­lour: one voyce lyke or vnlike to an other voyce: one fashion ly [...]è or vnlyke to an other fashion.

Of the deuision of Qualitie.

2 This storehouse is parted vnto foure seuerall roomes.

3 The firste roome conteyneth those qualities which are giuen to the inholder by nature, and those also which come by reason nature is letted of hir course.

4 The second roome conteyneth those which the inholder getteth by doyng.

5 The thirde conteyneth sensible quali­ties, and affections of the mind.

6 The fourth conteineth the shape and forme of euery thing.

Of Qualities first roome.

7 In the first roome are placed all the powers eyther of the bodye alone, of the soule alone, or of that, that standeth of thē both: to this place are added also, al weak­nesse and want of power naturall.

8 Weakenesse and want, differ in thys, for that of Weakenesse there bothe procéede imperfecte actions: but of [Page 28] [...]ant there can aryse no action at all.

9 As blearednesse causeth a man thrugh weakenesse of sight to iudge vnperfectely of colours: but blyndnesse through wa [...]t of sight, lettes a man to giue any iudge­ment of colour at all.

10 Power is a gifte of nature, wherby the Inholder may the better doe, or with lesse harme suffer.

11 The common Inholder of wordes placed in this roume is very generall. For there is no substance which hath not some power.

12 Here is to be noted, that no inholder is sayde to want any power, which eyther nature hath not appointed it should haue: or else the tyme of hauing it, is not fully expired.

13 For it is vnproprely said, that either a stone, or a chylde newe borne, wanteth power to goe or to runne of it selfe. For God hath not ordeyned that a stone shuld goe or runne at all: and the tyme is not yet come, for a newe borne chylde to doe eyther.

14 But if the tyme bée fully expyred [Page 29] when as nature hath appoynted, that chil­dren should goe and runne of themselues, and that certain children at that tyme can doe neyther: then may it well be sayde, that suche children lacke power to go, and are lame.

15 Here is to be noted, that from power to want, wée may fall both by nature and by chaunce: but to returne from want to power agayne, it is impossible.

16 As from sight to blyndnesse, from speache to dumbnesse, we may fall at any tyme: but the returne from dumbnesse to speache, or from blyndenesse to sight, is a thing that can not be broughte to passe, eyther by arte, or nature, or anye other meane, (Gods extraordinarie dooings on­ly excepted.)

17 Note further, that the power is not alwayes taken awaye where the in­strument is hurt for a tyme, or letted: as if a mans eyes, toung, and eares, were so hurt for a tyme, or letted, that hée coulde neyther heare, speake, nor sée,

18 Yet were it not for all that to bée sayde, that the power of his seeing, spea­king [Page 30] or hearing were taken awaye or di­minished: but rather that the action and worke of his eares, toung, and eyes, were letted for a tyme.

19 If the instrumente of sense be so hurt, that it be vncurable, and neuer able to do any part of his woorke, then do wée saye, that the power is vtterly destroyed or taken away.

20 Memorie of things past, iudgemēt of things present, forsight of things to come, & other qualities of the mynd, as they are giuen to any inholder by nature, are pla­ced in the first roome of qualitie: but as they are increased by arte and diligence, in the seconde.

Of Qualities second roome.

21 Qualities that are gotten by dooing, are eyther déepely rooted in their inholder, and continue in it long: or else they come and goe lightly, and tarie but a short time.

22 Uertue, vice, sciēce, knowledge, arte, crafte, cunning, sleyght, vr [...]. &c. whiche a man can not soone alter and chaunge, are [Page 31] are suche dispositions, as commonly take déepe roote in their inholder, and by rea­son of long vse, and many actions wher­of they growe and spring, they maye bée called grounded dispositions.

23 But sodeyn anger, light displesure, small knowledge, a smattering sight. &c. for that they spring and ryse of fewe acti­ons, come & go lightly, and therefore may be termed wauering dispositions, these béeing as it were, the first entrie into set­led dispositions.

24 The inholder of qualities placed in this roome is not so generall, as is the in­holder of those of the firste roome. For this inholder is but eche wight, which by practise can attayne to any good or badde trade, in dooing of things well or yll.

Of Qualities thirde roome.

25 In the third roome of this storehouse wée place all suche qualities as eyther proprely moue one of the fiue senses: as coloure moueth sighte: sounde hearing: sauours smellyng: tast tastyng: heate [Page 32] colde, moystnesse, drynesse, hardnesse, soft­nesse, and feeling.

26 Or else the affections of the mynde, as mirth, gladnesse, grief and feare, with other affections whiche spring of these in maner infinite: as mercie, pitie, loue, le­nitie, softnesse of mynde, hope, affiaunce, trust, enuie, hate, disdayne, spyte, distrust, contempte, palenesse, blushing, trem­bling. &c.

27 Affections consydered as they are giuen of nature, muste bée placed in the firste roome of thys storehouse: but con­sydered as they are gotten by dooing, in the seconds: and béeyng taken as they moue the outward or the inward sense, in the third: we sée, heare, smell, tast, & feele,

28 By receiuing a certaine influence, and suffering of an action that doeth pro­céede from the thing séene, hearde, smelt, tasted, or felte, into suche partes of eche wightes bodie, as hath in it those foresayd senses.

Of Quantities fourth roome.

29 In this roome are placed the forme & figure, shape, and fashion of euery thing.

[Page 33] 30 The inholder of words in the third or fourth roome of this storehouse, is the same that is of those whiche are placed in the first roome.

Of Qualified things.

31 There are certayne wordes whiche do signifie qualified things, relation had, bothe to the qualitie, and to the inhol­der thereof.

32 As a iust man, a liberal man, a craf­tesman, a lame man: or iust, liberal, lame, withoute adding the inholder in whyche they are. These are to be placed in the roomes of the qualities, wherof they are deriued.

Of the propreties of qualities, and of qualified things.

33 Some qualities and qualified things haue contraries, and some haue none: as right is contrarie to wrong: and a righ­teous man is contrary to an vnrighteous man.

34 But qualities and qualified things whiche are placed in the first and fourthe roome: yea and many of those which are [Page 34] placed in the seconde and thirde roome, of this storehouse, admitte no contraries at all.

35 Qualities and things qualified, ad­mit degrées of more and lesse, as among many learned men it is commonly seene that one is more or lesse learned then an other.

36 This rule taketh place not in all. For among many circles, triangles, and squares, one is not sayde to bée rather a circle, then an other: or rather a triangle, or a square.

37 Here is to be noted, that qualities considered as they are in fome inholder, admitte degrées of more and lesse: but if ye in minde seuer them from their in­holder, and consider them apart, (as ye define them and tell what they are) then doe they admitte no degrées of more or lesse.

38 For all and euery arte of Physike doe equally and indifferently agree to the say what of Physike: but Hippocrates physike, and [...] physicke admit de­grees, the one béeyng more and the other [Page 35] lesse, and so dothe Fuchsius physicke alone considered, when he had great experience, and when he had small.

39 To make things lyke or vnlyke, is a worke belonging only to qualitie.

40 If any man gaynsay this rule, af­firming that it is commonly and truely sayde, howe that one man is lyke or vn­like to an other, in going, ryding or spea­king: which things béeing deedes and no qualities, the foresayde rule maye séeme vntrue:

41 It may be answered, that the lyke­lynesse standth not in the action it selfe proprely and in very déede: but in the ma­ner of dooing, which is referred to the store house of qualitie.

42 For the murtherer and the hang­man doe both kill and committe one ge­nerall action: yet the maner of dooing in them is diuers, whiche causeth the one to be guiltie, and the other guiltlesse.

43 For it is not the déede, but the ma­ner of dooing, that maketh the cryme.

The propreties of respecting vvordes.

Of the propreties of dooing and suffering.

Hovv, vvhere and vvhen, are deuided.

5 As time and place are deuided, so are where and when.

6 Tyme is deuided into tyme to come, time present, and time past.

7 It may also be many other wayes de­uided, by reason of the manifold varietie of matters that chaunce in it.

8 As the time of warre, y ^• time of peace, [Page 42] the time of dearth, the tyme of plenty, the tyme of sicknesse, the time of health, the time of shutting in the dores, the tyme of opening of the dores.

9 Furthermore, spring, summer, haruest, winter, are seuerall seasons and tymes of the yeare.

10 Likewise a minute, an hour, a day, a wéeke, a moneth, a yeare, an age, a world, are common wordes, vsed of men to note and set forth particular times.

11 There are sixe differences of place, as aboue, beneath, on the right side, on the left side, afore, and behind.

12 These are two wayes taken, eyther as they are placed in respecte to vs warde: or els as they are appoynted by nature.

13 Althoughe aboue and beneath: on the ryghte syde, and on the lefte: afore, and behynd: in respect to vs warde, bee not al­wayes one and the same, but alter as wee are altered: yet in nature they are alwayes certayne.

14 For aboue, by nature is that where vnto light things ascend.

[Page 43] 15 Beneath, that where vnto heauye things descend.

16 The right syde, which is toward the Weast.

17 The left side, which is toward y ^• East.

18 Afore, which is towarde the South.

19 Behind, which is toward the North.

20 For trées and plantes haue héeles, which whiles they growe in the earth, are alwayes toward the North.

21 Aboue and beneath, are the begyn­ninges of length: the right side, and the lefte syde, are the beginnings of bredth: a­fore and behind, are the beginninges of thicknesse.

22 Places are thus deuided, some are na­turall, some artificiall, some fained, some neare, some farre of: some holy, some pro­phane: some common, some priuate: some healthful, some contagious: some fertill, some baren: some hote, some colde, some temperate.

23 There are manye other deuisions of time and place, and they in maner infinit: but of these fewe anye meane wit maye with ease finde oute manye moe to serue [Page 44] his purpose as he shal be occasioned.

That Storehouses helpe to inlarge a mat­ter, and that euerye vvord may after a sorte be deduced through them all.

[Page 47] 15 The Storehouses serue: not onely to teache vs the sorce and nature of ech plain meanyng word, as whether it doth signi­fye a substaunce, a quantitie, a qualitie, a respect &c.

16 But they serue also to amplifie and to set for the a matter at large, and then they teache vs to séeke the substaunce, the quantitie, the qualitie, the respecte, th [...] place, the tyme, the ordering and the ha­uing of the thing wée speake of, and so to deduce one woorde throughe all the Storehouses. Which though it bée pro­perly placed in some one: yet indirectlye and after a sorte, it maye be deduced and brought through them all.

1

2 The words of art inuented to expresse y ^• rules of any sciēce, as a nown, a pronown, [Page 48] a verbe, &c. a foreset, a backset, a shew­say. &c.

2

3 Unperfite wordes, which by them sel­ues teach the hearers no matter, but serue onely, to helpe to furnishe out a sentence, and to make it perfite, as, or, if and, &c.

3

4 Wordes that signifie lacke or want of any natural power, as, dumbnesse, deaffe­nesse, darkenesse. &c.

4

5 Wordes that signifie matters which are not in déede, but are fayned to bee, as Hobthrus, rawhed, purgatorie.

5

6 Wordes that signifie a parte of any whole thing, as an hand, a soote, a legge, an arme: so long as they remaine partes not seuered from their whole.

6

7 God for that he is infinite, and not a­ble to be comprehended of any thing, how­beit some men doe iudge him to be a most perfect substaunce.

7

8 Wordes that signifie all things with­out destinction, as a thyng, a matter, a whatsicallit.

9 The Storehouses are called generall wordes, for that they containe manye, but these may be termed surmounting gene­ralls, bycause they containe all.

8

10 Two or moe wordes expressing mat­ter that is contained in diuers Storehou­ses, as a white horse a righteous man.

11 For white and righteous are placed in one Storehouse: and man and horse in another.

9

12 Wordes of double vnderstanding: for these afore they bée restrayned to one say­what, maye haue place in diuers Store­houses: and therefore vnfit to be assygned to one.

1

4 First if anye of his gay [...]ettes bée of double vnderstanding: then is the princi­pall also, as:

5 Sharp, is a word of double vnderstan­ding: for his contrarie gainset, in voyce is, flat: and in edge, dull.

6 Therefore it must folow of necessiti [...] that it is not one sharpnesse, which is con­trarye to flatnes in voyce, and to dulnesse in edge.

2

7 If it be found to be in many storehou­ses, as this worde grey sig [...]fiyng a beast [Page 51] that pastureth in the night, is a substance: but signifying a colour mixed, and made of blacke and white, it is a qualitie.

3

8 If it be perceyued by dyuers senses, as clearenesse, for it is not one and the same clearenes that is sene & heard: the one con­sisting in colour and the other in sound.

4

9 If his ofspring be diuersly taken, then is his originall also: or contrary wise if in the originall there be doublenesse, then is there dublenesse in the ofspring too, as,

10 If to iudge rightly [...]e two wayes takē, the one to gyue sentence accordyng to the euidence broughte in: the other to gyue sentence accordyng to the truthe of the matter:

11 Then must a ryghteous iudge be two wayes taken, that is, righteous so farre as [...]idence leadeth: and righteous so farre as truth requireth.

5

12 If a worde haue diuers saywhattes, not differyng onely in wordes, but also in meaning.

[Page 52] 13 And here it is sometimes good to con­sider the say whattes of wordes as they are defined and set forth wh [...] they are coupled and ioyned with other wordes.

14 For taking so much awaye from the saywhattes, as is proper to ech worde an­nexed to the originall: the rest in all the saywhattes, must be one and the same.

15 For example thus: if ye ioyne to this word cleare, aire, and voyce, defining a cleare aire, and a cleare voyce seuerally: and then after take so muche from either say what, as properly apperteyneth to aire and voyce: the rest that remayneth in both the saywhattes, shal be one, if cleare were a plaine meaning word.

16 Nowe the thing that remaineth▪ is not one, and therefore cleare is diuersly taken.

17 For a cleare voyce is a voyce plea­sant to the eare, wythout horsenesse, or iarring.

18 But a cleare aire, is an aire voyde of cloudes: so that voice, and aire, taken from these two saywhattes, the rest that re­maineth is not one in them both.

[Page 53] 19 For pleasant to the eare, and wyth­out horsenesse or iarring, is a thing dis­senting muche from that which is voyd of cloudes.

20 By these meanes and suche lyke, woordes are proued to bée of double vn­derstanding,

VVhat difference there is betvvene de­priuyng termes and contra­rye termes.

9 Depry [...]ing termes differ from con­trary termes which haue no meane, for that the one of such contrary termes, must at all tymes be in his inholder: where as [Page 55] the depriuing termes, may for a tyme bée both absent.

10 I meane the time, afore power com­meth to the inholder by nature.

11 Now from contrarye termes whych haue a meane, they differ in this:

12 For that there is a time appointed by nature, when as the one of the depriuing termes must of force bee saide of hys in­holder: but of contraryes which haue a meane, there is at no tyme anye suche necessitie.

13 For example thus. After nyne dayes that a bitch hathe whelped, hir whelpes must of force either see or bée blinde: but afore the time be expired that nature hath set and appoynted that whelpes shoulde sée in, ye can not ryghtlye saye that the whelpes are either blind or do sée.

14 As for white, and blacke, which are contraryes that haue a meane, they haue no suche force in a whelpe at anye tyme, that the one muste bée in it, and the other from it,

15 Bicause the whelpes may at all times be of some other meane colour.

Of contrarietie in mouing.

27 Generally, rest is contrarie to mo­uing: but particularly begetting is con­trarie to corrupting: and increasing to diminishing: and mouing in place, to re­sting in place: or else mouing vpwards contrarie to mouing downeward.

28 And as for alteration which is a mo­uing in qualitie, it hath eyther rest from suche a mouing, to bée his contrarie: or else a chaunge into a contrarie▪ qualitie.

VVhat a saying is.

5 A saying is a voyce whose seueral par­tes do by consent signifie some matter.

6 I saye by consent, for that euery lan­guage or speache groweth by consent, and is learned by imitating and followyng of others: neither is there any toung gy­uen naturally to man without a teacher, as weeping and laughing are.

That there are diuers kyndes of sayings, and vvhich of them are proper to this arte.

7 There is a perfect saying, and an vn­perfect saying.

8 A perfect saying maketh a perfect sense of it self, as, man is mortall.

9 An vnperfect saying causeth the hea­rer to looke for moe woordes to make vp a full meanyng, as, man mortall.

10 Agayne a perfecte saying is deuided into three sortes, into a shewsay, a bidsaye, and a wishsaye.

11 In the firste wée shewe or declare, in [Page 67] the seconde wée bid or commaunde, in the thirde wee wyshe or desire things to be or not to bée.

12 For example thus: Iohn commeth hether, is a shewsay: come hether Iohn, a biosaye: I woulde Iohn came hether, a wishsaye.

13 Of these the shewsaye onelye apper­tayneth to thys arte, for it onely maye be true or false.

The matter of a shevvsay.

2 A nowne and a verbe are the matter wherof a shewsay doth stand.

Of a Novvne.

3 A nowne is a voyce signifying some thing by consent, & noting besids no diffe­rence of tyme, whose partes seuerally ta­ken, signifie no matter: as a mā, an herbe, [Page 68] an house, vertue, righteousnes. &c.

4 As for letters and syllables, they sig­nifie a sounde onely, and doe not further importe any matter.

5 An houre, a day, a moneth, a yeare, doe lymit and appoynte tymes: but yet they note no difference of tyme, as the Uerbe doth, who euer includeth either tyms pre­sente, tyme past, or tyme to come, which are ryghtlye called the diff [...]rences of tyme.

Of a Verbe.

6 A Uerbe is a woorde notyng some difference of tyme, vnto the which if yee adde a nowne in fitte order, there dothe a­ryse a perfect vnderstandyng, as, is, was, shalbe.

Of the forme of a shevvsay, and vvhat appertayneth to the perfecte knovvledge therof.

7 Moe thyngs appertayne to the forme of a shewsay then to the matter.

8 For to the forme it appertayneth to [Page 69] consider whether the shewsaye be simple or compounded, one or manye: secondlye whether it bee a shewsaye of the fyrste or­der or of the seconde: thyrdlye, howe the backeset agreeth or disagreeth wyth the foresette: fourthly, how the one of them maye bee changed into the roume or place of the other: fiftlye, which shewsaye is generall, whyche speciall: 6, which affir­meth whyche denyeth: 7, which is true, which is false: 8, which is an impossible shewsaye, whych is a necessarye shew­saye, and whych is a chaunceable shew­saye: 9, what gaynsettes eche shewsaye hathe: 10, whyche bée shewsayes of lyke force and strength.

VVhich is a simple shevvsaye and one and vvhiche is a compounded shevvsay and many.

9 A symple shewsaye standeth of one Uerbe: as man is mortall. A compoun­ded shewsaye of manye: as if you marry my Daughter I make you myne heire: or impossible it is, that a stone shoulde haue feelyng.

[Page 70] 10 Often times in a shewsaye one verbe is but once spoken: and yet the meaning of the same shewsaye requireth the same verbe to bée diuers times vnderstand: such a shewsaye is compounded, and not one, but manye.

11 For, Iohn and William are riche and in health, is not one shewsaye, but manye: for it is as muche to laye, as Iohn is riche: Iohn is in health: William is riche: Wil­liam is in health.

12 Firste wee will intreate of a simple shewsay, and after of a compounded shew­say, in his proper place and order.

Of the tvvo orders of a simple shevvsaye.

13 There are twoo orders of a simple shewsaye: a shewsaye of the firste order, sheweth onely the being or not being of a thing, as, man is, or, man is not.

14 A shewsaye of the second order, affir­meth or denyeth one thyng of another, as, man is iust: man is not iust.

15 A shewsay of the first order, standeth euer but of one nowne and one verbe: a [Page 71] shewesaye of the secoude order, of twoo nownes and one verbe, one alwayes pla­ced afore, and another after the verbe.

To vvhat vse foresettes and backesettes serue.

3 The storehouses serue to shew the na­ture of wordes as they are taken and con­sidered by themselues alone.

4 The foreset & backset of a shewsay de­clare the respecte that wordes haue one to [Page 72] an other, as they are coupled and linkes together in a perfect saying.

To knovve vvhat respecte the backset hath to the foreset in euery simple shevvsaye of the se­conde order.

5 If the backset [...]is deuided and parted a sunder from the foreset by a naysay, then doth it but eyther differ from it, or els it is a gainset to it.

6 What differing words and gaynsets are, we haue shewed afore in the. 12. Chap­ter of the first booke.

7 If it be affirmed & coupled to the fore­set by a yeasay: then muste the foreset and backset be such as either may be saide of o­ther turne for turne, or not [...]ide.

8 If either may be said of other turne for turne, then is the one of them the kindred, and the other his saywhat: or els one the kindred and the other his propertie.

9 For onelye the saywhat and the pro­pertie compared to the kindred, maye bée said of it, and it of them, turne for turne: but the saywhat expresseth what the kin­dred [Page 73] is, and the propretie doth not.

10 If the backset be sayd of the foreset, and the foreset can not be laid in lyke sort of it agayn: then is the backset to be rec­kened, eyther in the number of those thin­ges, that are vsed to be placed in the saye­what of the foreset, or not vsed to be pla­ced there.

11 If the backsette be [...] the number of those that are vsed to be placed in the say­what of the foreset: then is it either y ^• kind or the difference: for a saywhat standeth of these two.

12 If the backset be sayd of the foreset, and be neyther his sayewhat, propretie, nor difference: then is it an Inbeer.

13 For that we count an Inbeer, which being in a thing, is neyther his saywhat, propretie, kinde, nor difference.

Generall rules appertyning to a sayvvhat.

5 Fiue poyntes are to be obserued in a perfect saywhat.

1

4 Some appertaine to one kindred a­lone, though not to all the selfe things of that kindred: as to be cunning in physike, pert [...]yneth only to man, but not to eachs man.

2

5 Some appertayne to eche selfe thing of one kinred: and yet not to that kinred alone: as to haue two eyes appertayneth to all men, but not only to man.

3

6 Some appertayne to one kindred a­lone, and to eche selfe thing of that kinred: but not at al tymes: as to ware grayhea­ded in age, appertayneth only to man, and to eache man that is aged, but not at all tymes.

4

7 Some apertain to one kinred alone, to eche self thing of that kinred, and at all tymes: As feelyng appertaineth only to a wyghte, to eche wyghte, and at all tymes. And thys is moste proprely called a pro­pretie.

Of selfe things.

2 A selfe thing is that whiche is sayd but of one solo thing alone: as London, Englande, this man, or this horsse.

3 Selfe things are not proprely hande­led of any a [...]te, but so far as they are con­teyned in some kinred or kinde.

4 For arte intreateth of general mas­ters: as physike teacheth not to cure Wil­liam, or Robert, but man thus or thus dis­eased.

Of a kinrede.

5 A kinred is sayde of many, differing but in number onely, and aunswerabl [...] when drmaunde is m [...]r, what self t [...]n­ges are.

6 Or t [...]us, a kinred is that, whyche is contained of a kinde, or whereto a kynde [Page 78] is answerable, when it is demanded what a kinred is.

7 The first of these saywhats apper­tayneth to the lowest kinred: the other two saye whattes appertayne to a large kinred.

8 The lowest kinred is next vnto selfe things, and euer called a kinred, w [...]er it be compared to selfe things that are vn­der it: or to the kynde that is above it.

9 A large kinred is that whiche deth o­ther kinreds vnder it, and maye be taken both for a kinred (as it is referred to the kind that is aboue it:) or for a kynd (as it is sayde of kinreds that are vnder it.)

10 For example thus: A wight is a large kinred, for it hathe vnder it, a man, and a beast, whiche are kinreds them selues: so that if ye referre a wighte to a substance, then is it a kinred: but when ye referre a wight to a mā, or a beas [...], then is it a kynd conteynyng many kinredes of wyghtes vnder it.

Hovv differences are deuided.

There are thrée sortes of differences, a common difference, a propre difference, and a most propre difference.

3 A common difference is a remoua­ble marke, wherby a thing differeth from it selfe, or from some other thing, by any maner of meanes.

4 A propre difference is an insepara­ble mark (chaunceable notwithstanding) wherby one thing differeth from another.

5 A most propre difference is that which [Page 81] is that whiche is sayde of many differing in kinred, when we demaunde whatkin a one, a thing is.

6 This difference is eyther taken in a saywhat to shew [...] what a kinred is: or in a diuision to [...] a kynde.

7 A difference differeth from a pro­pretie, for a propretie is sayde [...]ut of one kinred: and a difference of many kinreds.

8 One worde according to diuers res­pects, may be both a difference, and a pro­pretie: as feeling referred to a wight, is a propretie: and compared to a man, it is a difference.

Hovv inbeers are deuided.

2 There are two sortes of inbéers, one remoueable, the other vnremoueable.

3 A remoueable Inbeer may in deede be seuered from hys inholder: as know­ledge from a man.

4 An vnremoueable inbéer maye in [Page 82] thought, but not in déede be seuered from his inholder: as blacknesse from a crowe, and heate from fire.

Of the affirming or denying of a Shevv­say compounded by adding the man­ner of beyng or not beyng.

5 Generally they neuer denie, but when this nayworde (not) is placed afore the preamble.

6 For if it bée not put to at all: or else placed after the preamble, they affirme.

7 For example, it chaunced that Iohn comming from London, was robbed: the naysaye is, it did not chaunce, that Iohn comming from London was robbed.

8 As for this saying, it chaunced that Iohn commyng from London, was not robbed, is a yeasay: and thus in like ma­ner of the rest.

9 This saying it is vnpossible, for man to flye, is in forme and maner of speaking, a yeasay, and in meaning a naysay.

Hovv Shevvsayes compounded by adding the manner of being or not being follovv one vpon another.

10 Shewsaies compounded by adding the manner of being, or not beyng folow one vpon another, but not in like sort.

[Page 98] 11 For where we afore deuided a shew­say, Side. 87. ver. 1 reckning some to be [...], some necessary, some vnpossible, we had [...] how the foreset was coupled or not cou­pled to the ba [...]kset vpon the sequele of the matter.

12 But here deuiding a shewsay, into a chaunceable shewsay, a possible shewsaye, an vnpossible shewsay, and into a nessa­rye shewsay, we doe respect the pr [...]amble onely for the naming of the shewsay. As for the truth of such sayings, that is to bee considered, as it falleth forth in matter vttered by them.

VVhat a reason is.

4 A reason is a compounded shewsaye, prouing that which lyeth in controuersie by knowne and graunted sayings.

[Page 100] 5 For euen as certaine words must bée coupled together in due order to make a perfect sentence: so muste certaine shewe­sayes be ioyned together in a due [...] to make a perfect re [...]son.

Examples of a reason by example.

4 If a skilfull Lawyer be the best Law­yer: and a skilfull Mariner the best Mari­ner: and a skilfull Phisition, the best Phi­sition: then is he accompted best in eche arte, that hath most skill therin.

5 Another: all light things ascende: for smoke, breath, flame, and fire do so.

[Page 101] 6 Here are we brought by diuers par­ticulars [...] by examples, to come to the knowledge of two generall rules.

7 The fir [...]t rul [...] is, that he is best artifi­cer, that hath most skill in his arte.

8 The s [...]conde is, that all light things ascende.

Of a Reason by rule.

9 A reason by rule, is a reason that stan­deth of three shewesayes, framed in suche sorte, that two of them being graunted to be true, the third must by force of them be true also: for example thus.

10 For he that graunteth that all lyghte things do ascend, & also that breth is light, must néedes graunt by force of these, that breath doth ascend too.

VVhat things are chiefely to be noted in a reason by rule.

6 There are in a reason by rule (as in eche other thing whatsoeuer) two speciall poyntes to bee mack▪ the matter, and the forme.

VVhat names the three Shevvsayes haue, vvhich are in a reason by rule.

3 The two first shewsayes that are placed in a reason by rule, are called foresayes, the third may be t [...]rmed, an endsay.

4 This is proued, and they doe proue.

5 This is first in purpose, and last in or­der: they are first in order, and last in fin­ding out.

6 When you goe precisely to worke, you must expresse three shewsayes in ech rea­son [Page 104] that is made by rule: yet men in wri­ting, and common speache, vse oft to leaue out some one of them.

7 When any one is left oute, to knowe which it is: ye shall haue a rule for it here­after.

Of the three termes vvhich are in a reason by rule.

8 The thrée termes that are chiefly to be noted in a reason by rule, and whereof the thrée foresayd shewsayes are made, be thus named: the generall terme: the speci­all terme: the prouing terme: eche terme being twice repeted in one reason.

9 The backser of the endsay, is alwayes the generall terme.

10 And the foreset of the endsaye is euer the speciall terme.

11 The prouing term is that terme, which is placed in both the foresayes: and is the meane whereby the other two termes a­grée or disagrée among themselues, in the endsaye.

Hovve many vvayes a reason by rule may bee made.

15 A reason by rule maye be directely framed fouretéene wayes, and moe ways it can not. Foure ways in the first ranke: and foure wayes in the second ranke: and sixe wayes in the thirde ranke.

16 Now for these four [...] seueral four­mes of arguyng, there are foureteene woordes artificially inuented, eche worde [Page 108] appoynted to his propre seate, which par­te [...] into thrée syllables a p [...]ce, serue for di­uers purposes.

Proper seates appointed for eche ranke.

Barbara, celarent, darii, ferio, to the firste ranke.

Cesare, Camestres, festino, Baroco, darapti: Felapton, Disamis, datisi. Bocardo, Ferison. Sixe last here downe sette, be seates pro­per aye to the thirde ranke.

6 Besides the name of eche particular seate, learne also of thys that followeth, what matter eche one of these artificiall wordes doth include in it selfe.

7 Firste, as eche reason by rule stan­deth of thrée shewesayes: So eche seate is parted into thrée syllables. The firste syllable is sette agaynst the fyrst foresaye, the seconde syllable agaynste the seconde foresay, the third syllable agaynst the end­saye.

8 The fyrste and capitall letter of eche worde sheweth to what seate eche vn­perfect [Page 112] reason must be reduced vnto.

9 For the reasons made in the seconde and third ranke, must (or they be accomp­ted perfecte) be reduced to those seates of the first ranke, whiche beginne with the same capitall letter that they doe: as,

10 M. p. s. c. shewe how the vnperfect [...] seates must be reduced.

11 M. noteth, that the foresayes must be chaunged eche into others place.

12 P. noteth a turning of the shewsay, with rebatement of the signe.

[Page 113] 13 S. Noteth a turning of the shews a without rebatement of the signe.

14 C. If it be not placed in the first syl­lable, noteth a reducing of the reason by way of impossibilitie.

15 The vowels note the quantitie and qualitie of eche shewsay: as,

16 The reste of the Letters serue to no purpose, but to make vp the verse.

17 Although this which we haue nowe sayd concerning the matter and forme of a reason by rule, may seeme to a pregnant wit, to be sufficient: yet to make the mat­ter playne to beginners, and to those that lackes an instructer: we wil declare what manner of three termes will serue, and howe they must be furnished and set foorth with quantitie and qualitie, to make a good reason in euery particular seate, set­ting foorth the same by plaine examples.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the first ranke.

3 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof the firste maye wholly be sayde of the se­conde, and that the second also may whol­ly be sayde of the thirde, they do serue to make a reason in Barbara concluding that the first terme is generally sayde of the thirde: as,

[Page 115]

4 If ye will laye foorth this reason at large, and furnishe euery shewsay w [...]h due quantitie and qualitie, you must vtter it thus.

Bar ba ra

• All wights are cereatures,
• All men are wightes, therfore
• All men are creatures.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the firste ranke.

5 When ye haue thrée termes where­of the first is wholly denyed of the second, and the seconde wholly affirmed of the thirde: they serue to make a reason in Celarent, concluding that the firste terme is generally denyed of the thirde: as,

[Page 116]

6 Set this reason downe at large thus

Ce la rēt

• nothīg lerned by imitatiō is natural
• euery lāguage is lerned by imitatiō, therfore,
• No language is naturall.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the thyrde seate of the firste ranke.

7 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first is wholly affirmed of the second, and the second partly affirmed of the third, they serue to make a reason in Darii, con­cluding that the first terme is affirmed of the thirde in parte:

[Page 117] 8 Set this reason downe at large thus.

Da ri i

• All vertues are commendable
• Some kinde of sparing is a vertue therfore,
• Some kind of sparing is cōmēdable

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourthe seate of the first ranke.

9 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first is wholly denyed of the seconde, and the secōd partly affirmed of the third, they serue to make a reason in Ferio: con­cluding that the firste terme is denied of the thirde in part: as,

10 Sette this reason downe at large thus.

Fe­ri o

• No wanton tricke is to be vsed,
• Som daunces are wāton tricks, therfore
• Some daunces are not to be vsed.

11 If the termes wherof you be willed to make a reason by rule, beare not suche respect one to an other, as is sette foorth in these foresayde rules: knowe for a cer­taintie, that no good reason can be made of them: to be placed in the seates of the first ranke.

12 For when the thrée termes are such as none can truly be sayde of an other: or when the first is sayde of the seconde but in parts: or the seconde is denyed of the third, eyther in whole, or in part: y ^• reason that is made of suche termes, hath no ne­cessarie sequele, but is called in Gréeke [...], that is a reason which standeth in ranke and maketh a shewe of an argu­ment, but it is not placed in any seat that kéepeth a necessarie forme of arguing.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the second ranke.

4 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first is wholly denyed of the seconde, and wholly affirmed of the thirde: they serue to make a reason in Cesare, conclu­ding that the seconde terme is wholly de­nyed of the thirde: as,

[Page 120]

5 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Ces a re

• Nothing tame by nature hath a ta­land,
• All haukes haue talandes therfore,
• No hauke is tame by nature.

6 C. in this word Cesare, sheweth that the reasons placed in this seate, muste bée reduced vnto Celarent: and S. telleth how, euen by turning of the firste foresay with­out rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the second ranke.

7 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof y ^• first is wholly affirmed of y ^• secōd, & whol­ly [Page 121] denied of the thirde, they serue to make a reason in Camestres concluding that the second is wholy denied of the third: as,

8 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Cam es tres

• All haukes haue talands
• no tame foule by nature hath a ta­land therefore
• no tame foule by nature is a hauke

9 C. in this worde Camestres, sheweth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Celarent: and M. and the [Page 122] two S. S. teach howe, to wit, that the fore­sayes must be chaunged eche into ethers place: & that the seconde foresaye and the endsaye, must both be turned without re­batement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the third seat of the seconde ranke.

10 When ye haue thrée termes whereof the first is wholy denied of the second, and affirmed of the third in part, they serue to make a reason in Festino, concluding that the second is denied of the third in part: as,

• 1 Forbidden
• 2 Lawfull
• 3 Apparell.

[Page 123] 11 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fes ti no

• No lawfull thing is forbidden,
• Some apparell is forbidden, therefore
• Some apparell is not lawfull.

12 F. In this word Festino sheweth that the reasons placed in this seat must be re­duced to Ferio: and S. sheweth howe, euen by turning the first foresaye, wythoute rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the seconde ranke.

13 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof the first is wholy affirmed of the second: and denied of the third in part, they serue to make a reason in Baroco, concluding that the seconde is denied of the thirde in part: as,

[Page 124]

14 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Ba ro co

• All lawfull things are indifferent,
• Some apparell is not indifferent, therfore,
• Some apparell is not lawfull.

15 B. In Baroco noteth that the reasons placed in this seate muste bee reduced to Barbara and C. sheweth that they must be reduced by waye of impossibilitie, taking a sentence more then a contrarye to the endsay with the first foresaye, and conclu­ding more then a contrary shewsay to the seconde foresay: as,

Bar ba ra

• All lawfull things are indifferent,
• All apparell is lawfull, therefore
• All apparell is indifferent.

16 The endsaye in this reason is mani­festly false, therefore one of the foresayes must néedes be false too, but the first fore­saye it can not be, for that was graūted to be true in the first reason, therfore it must néedes be the seconde, whose more then contrary shewsay, was denied to be true afore, so that by this meanes y ^• answerer is forced to graunt that which can not be, to wit, that more then contrary shewsaies should both be false.

VVhat maner of termes, vvill serue to make a reason in the first seate of the third ranke.

2 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first and the second, are both saide of y ^• third generally, they serue to make a rea­son in Darapti, concluding that the firste must néedes be said of y ^e second in part: as,

3 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Da rap ti

• All Deuils are euill,
• All Deuils are creatures, therefore,
• Some creatures are euill.

4 D. In this word Darapti, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be re­duced to Da [...] and P. sheweth howe they must be reduced, euen by turning of the se­conde foresaye, without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the second seat of the thirde ranke.

5 When ye haue thrée termes whereof the first is generally denyed of the third, and the second generally affirmed of it too, they serue to make a reason in Felapton, concluding that the first is denyed of the second in part: as,

[Page 128]

8 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fe lap ton

• No arte is forgotten vpō the sudden,
• All artes are gotten qualities, therefore,
• Some gotten qualitie is not forgot­ten vpon the sudden.

7 F. In this word Felapton, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat are reduced to Ferio, and P. sheweth how they must be reduced, euen by turning of the seconde foresay without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat manner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the third seat of the thirde ranke.

9 When ye haue thrée termes wherof [Page 129] the first is said in part of the third, and the second wholy affirmed of it too: they serue to make a reason in Disamis, concluding that the firste is saide of the seconde in part: as,

9 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Di [...] am is

• Some correction is necessary,
• All correctiō is bitter for the present time, therefore
• Some thing bitter for the present time is necessary.

[Page 130] 10 D. In this word Disamis, noteth that the reasons placed in this seate, are redu­ced to Darij: and the two. S. S. and M. shew how they must be reduced.

11 For the two. S. S. do note, y ^t the first fore­say and the endsaye must be turned with­out rebatement of the signe: & M. noteth that the foresayes must be chaunged eche into others place.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the thirde ranke.

12 When ye haue thrée termes whereof the first is generally said of the thirde, and the second is saide therof but in part: they serue to make a reason in Datisi, conclu­ding that the generall is saide of the speci­all in part: as,

[Page 131]

13 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Da tis i

• All offenders are to be reproued,
• Some offender is a magistrate, therefore,
• Some magistrate is reprouable.

14 D. In this worde Datisi, noteth that the reasons placed in this seate, are to bée reduced to Darij: and S [...]eweth how they must be reduced, euen by turning the se­conde foresaye, without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fifte seat of the thirde ranke.

15 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof [Page 132] the firste is denyed of the thirde in parte, and the seconde wholy affirmed of it too: they serue to make a reason in Bocardo, concluding that the firste is denied of the second in part.

16 Set downe this reason at large thus,

Bo car do

• Some true preacher is not euill,
• All true preachers are ministers, therefore,
• Some minister is not euill.

[Page 133] 17 B. In this worde Bocardo, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be re­duced to Barbara: and C. sheweth how, to wit, by forcing the aduersarye to graunt an impossibilitie in reason, which in Bo­cardo is done thus.

18 Ye must take more then a contrarye to the endsay, with the second foresay, and conclude more then a contrary to the first foresaye: for example,

Bar ba ra

• All Ministers are euill,
• All true preachers are ministers, therefore,
• All true preachers are euill.

For the rest, looke the. 16. sentence of the thirde chapter.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the sixte seat of the thirde ranke.

19 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof the first is generally denied of the thirde, and the second affirmed of it in part: they serue to make a reason in Ferison, conclu­ding [Page 134] that the generall is denied of the spe­ciall in part: as,

20 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fe ris on

• No correction is pleasaunt,
• Some correction is profitable, therefore,
• Some profitable thing is not pleasāt.

21 F. In this word Ferison, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be re­duced to Ferio: and▪ S. sheweth howe, euen by turning the second foresaye withoute rebatement of signe.

[Page 135] 22 In this ranke, no forme of arguing is good, where the second foresay is a naysay: that is to saye, when the speciall terme, is denyed of the prouing terme, either wholy or in part.

To knovve in hovv many seates eche endsay may be concluded.

1 An vniuersall yeasaye is onely proued in Barbara.

2 An vniuersall naysaye is thrée wayes concluded, in Celarent, Cesare, and Cam­estres.

3 A particular yeasay is foure wayes pro­ued, in Darij, Darapti, Disamis, and Datisi.

4 A particular naysaye is concluded in sixe seates, in Ferio, Festino, Baroco, Fe­lapton, Bocardo, Ferison.

5 By this it is plaine, that an vniuersall yeasaye is moste harde to proue, and most easie to disproue: & that a particular nay­saye is most easy to proue, and most hard to disproue.

Other generall rules appertayning to a sayvvhat.

7 Whatsoeuer the saywhat doth de­clare and set forth, the same in that respect is a kindred, and neither a selfe thing, nor a kinde.

8 The saywhat and the kindred (that is to say, the thing declared and set for the by the saywhat) differ only in words and termes, and not in substance of matter.

[Page 146] 9 And therfore nothing (cōcerning sense and meaning) is conteyned in the one, but the same also is comprised in the other.

10 And whatsoeuer is denyed or sayd of the o [...]e, may in like sort, be denied or sayd of the other.

Examples of argumentes dedu­ced of a sayvvhat.

11 Eche man is mortal, for euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.

12 If you will set downe this reason in frame, according to the precise rules afore giuen, dot this.

Bar ba ra

• Euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.
• But euery man is a wyghte indued with reason and sense, therfore,
• Euery man is mortall.

13 Euery wighte indued wyth reason and sense, is the saywhat of man: so that it béeing mortall, forceth man to be mortall too, by the generall rule of the saywhat. [...]erse. 9.

14 Again thus, death maketh an end of eche man: therfore euery man is mortall, frame this reason in rule thus.

Bar ba ra

• [...]ch thing ended by death is mortal
• Euery man is ended by death,
• Therfore eche man is mortall.

The vse of this place.

15 The first reason is taken of the say­what of man: the seconde of the saywhat of mortall.

16 For necessarie reasons may be dedu­ced aswel from the sayewhat of the ende­sayes backset, as from the saywhat of the endsayes fores [...]t, and that to proue or dis­proue in differently.

Rules belonging to the generall terme by the vvhiche thou maist also learne the vse of this place.

8 Al things are cōteyned in the general that are conteyned in any speciall.

9 For if life, reason, sense, learning, wil, cūning, &c. be in man, the same things are also of force in a wighte, in a creature, and in a substance, whiche thrée are all ge­neralls to man.

10 What thing soeuer may be gene­rally affirmed of the generall, the same thing also may be generally affirmed of [Page 149] euery one of his specials.

11 The generall is generally taken, when an vniuersall signe is ioyned to it, and it not diminished of his quantitie by any nayword, as when ye say, eche earth­ly creature is mortall.

12 Upon this generall, generally gran­ted, you may wel conclude, that euery mā is mortall.

13 But when a generall word is ioyned to a particular signe, or granted in a shew­say to be true without any signe at al, then it maketh no sufficiēt proofe of the special.

14 As when it is alledged, that a wight or some wight is learned, these things be­ing granted, do not of force inferre that all men or some men are learned, more then any other earthly creature that hath sése.

15 Howbeit, if the general be generally graunted, it maketh good proofe of all and euery one of his specials: for who so gran­teth euery earthly wighte to be mortall, granteth also by good sequele in reason, that al men, and al beasts are mortal too.

16 What thing soeuer is denied of the generall, without restraint of any parti­cular [Page 150] signe, the same thing may séeme wel, to be denied of any of his specials.

17 For if it be wel sayd, learning is not gotten with ease: it is also well sayd: wit­craft is not gotten with ease, speechcrafte, starcraft, Physike, lawe, or any other kind of learning.

18 But if any thing be denied of the ge­neral, by restraint of the particular signe, y ^• same is not therfore denied of any of his specials, but of certaine, suche as the re­straint may séeme to limitte.

19 For though I graūt y ^• som houseduck flieth not, yet am not I thereby forced to say, y ^e wildduck [...]ieth not, seing y ^• restraint may séem to be made but to the tame duck.

20 No generall is affirmed of any spe­ciall ofspringingly.

21 For it cānot be truly affirmed, y ^e wit­nesse is [...]lored, séeing witnes is a colour, and the inholder of witnesse is coloured, be it cloath, wooll, yarne, or any thyng else that is accustomed to be dyed or coloured.

Rules belonging to the speciall.

2 Whatsoeuer is sayd of the speciall in part, is sayd also of the general in part.

2 For if some men be learned, some wight is learned.

2 But on the other side in the behalfe of the generall this rule holdeth not.

3 For it foloweth not though some wight be foure footed, that therfore man shuld bée foure footed too.

4 Whatsoeuer is graunted to be in any speciall, must of force be graunted to be in all his generals.

5 If al the specials be graunted, they are sufficient to proue or disproue the general generally, one or many are not.

8 Al specials a [...] partakers of their general indifferētly, [...]out respect of more or lesse.

9 For an Egle is no rather nor no more a birde or a foule, then an Oule is, nor an Oule more or lesse then a Wrenne: but they and all other foules equally and in­differently, are named and be in déede bir­des, without degrée of more or lesse.

The vse of this place.

2 Of that which is most properly called a propertie, necessarie reasons are made, either to proue y ^e kinred, or to disproue it.

3 But of the other three kinds, the rea­sons are not of like force, which thing may well be sene by examples thus.

4 Concerning that which is most pro­perly called a propertie, this is a firme and good profe.

5 Here is present that which is apt to laugh, therefore a man is here present.

6 Or to disproue, here is not presente that which is apte to laugh, therefore no man is here present.

7 Thus it appeareth, that of suche pro­perties as this is, necessarie reasons are gathered either to proue or disproue in­differently.

[Page 153] 8 Bycause the kinred and this kinde of propertie are necessarily annexed one to another and are neuer seuered asunder.

9 Now properties which appertaine to the first and thirde kinde, they serue well to proue the kindred, but they serue not to disproue it.

10 For it foloweth well, one cunning in Phisicke is present: or one that is gray headed, is present: Ergo a man is present.

11 But these sequels are naught, here is none that is cunning in Phisicke, Ergo here is no man.

12 Or here is none gray headed for age, Ergo here is no man.

13 For there are many men being nei­ther cunning in Phisicke nor graye hea­ded.

14 But there is none either cunning in Phisicke or graye headed, but that he is a man.

15 Bicause therfore these properties ap­pertaine to self things of one seueral kin­red, it must néedes be good in reason, that where the propertie is graunted to bée, there must be also the kinred.

[Page 154] 16 For that onely in it the propertie hath his being.

17 The second kind of propertie serueth to disproue the kinred: but it will not al­waies of force serue to proue it.

18 For this is a necessary reason, no two footed thing is present, therefore man is not present.

19 But to proue a man present, it is not sufficient to say, that which hath two féete is present, for manye things els besides man, haue two féete.

Examples of partes, prouing, or dispro­uing an vvhole.

20 To proue thus: his coate is wel made for the coller is well, the body is well, the fleues are wel, and the pleates are al wel.

21 Againe, to disproue on this sort: this house is not wel builded, for the roufe wil not well auoyde water, the walles stande not righte vp, neyther is the foundation sure and fast.

22 But if the case so stande that ye can­not alledge al, or manye chiefe partes, yet [Page 158] alledge one: for one principall parte will serue for disproufe or disprayfe of the whole.

Examples of a vvhole prouing or disprouing the partes.

23 To proue: this coate is well made, therfore the coller, bodye, sleeues, and the pleates therof are well made too.

24 To disproue: this ceate is not good, therefore of force eyther the stuffe or the fashion therof is not good.

The vse of these tvvo places.

25 Argumentes holde of these places di­uersly, some beyng necessary, some proua­ble, some variable, and that as well when the partes are alledged to proue or dys­proue the whole: as when the whole is a­ledged for proofe or disproofe of his partes.

26 If all partes be recited eyther to proue or disproue: to praise or dispraise the whole, the argumēt is necessary: if many, [Page 159] it is probable: if one or a fewe, it is vari­able.

27 For though one principall parte bée good and of force, to disproue or disprayse foe whole: yet one or fewe partes of small value are not.

28 For if the head be naught, the whole body is naught too.

29 But it foloweth not, thoughe some one, or some fewe pynnes in an house be rotten or yll driuen, that the whole house shoulde bee sayd to be ill and naught ther­fore.

30 One or many parts, whether they be principall or of small importance, are not alwayes of force to proue or to prayse a whole.

31 For a song that standeth of foure parts, that is to saye of the base, the meane, the triple, and the contratenor, is not therfore fine and good, because two or thrée partes be excellently well song.

32 For in such whole things as song and melody are, all the partes are necessarily required to be good, otherwise there shalbe a discorde and a iarre in the whole.

[Page 160] 33 Neither is it a good reason to say this image is wel painted bycause the haire of the head and of the beard, the nailes of the fingers and of the toes be liuely expressd and set forth.

34 For if many or one principall parte bée omitted, a let maye bee in it or them, why the sequele is not good.

Rules belonging to an vvhole or to a parte.

35 Euery whole is bigger then any one of his partes.

36 A whole is equall to all his partes.

37 One parte is not equall in quantitie nor comparable in worthinesse with hys whole.

38 A corruptible parte in time may be both afore and after his whole.

39 As the timber and nailes of a shippe maye haue a being bothe afore the shippe be made, and after it is taken asunder.

Hovv of springs are deuided.

5 Some are ofsprings in meaning and not in name, as goodnesse and wel: some in name and not in meaning, as sleep [...] and sleepingly: some in bothe, as vertue and vertuously.

Rules belonging to an Ofspring.

6 Ofsprings haue like sequele in reaso­ning.

7 For as one originall is affirmed or de­nied of another: so is one deriuall, affir­med or denied of another.

8 And contrarywise, as one deri [...] all is affirmed or denied of another: so is one ori­ginall said or not said of another.

9 For example thus: if wealth be a good­nes, thē things procuring wealth are good things: & to liue wealthely is to liue well.

10 Againe, if to iudge erroniously, bee to iudge falsely, then is errour falshood.

11 Or if erroniously, be not falsely: then is not errour falshood.

12 Erroniously to iudge, & falsly to iudge, differ in this, for that he y ^• iudgeth falsely, hath alwayes a purpose to deceyue: when as he that iudgeth erroniously, swarueth from the truth, & yet not for lacke of good will, which thing when it chaunceth, the partie can not properlye be called a false iudge, nor his errour falshood.

[Page 163] 13 This rule holdeth not in those of­springs which are ofspringsonly in name: for it foloweth not, though sléepe be a good­nes, and though those things that procure sleepe, be good things too, that therfore, that which is sleepingly done, should be saide to be well done: neither is he properly to bee called a sléeper, that sleepeth: but hee that sléepeth to much.

14 So that sléep, a sléeper, and sléepingly, being ofsprings in terme and name, and not in sense and meaning, folow not one vppon another in reasoning, as the other two sortes of ofsprings do.

Example.

15 I am an huswife, therfore huswifenes should appertaine vnto mée.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in number.

5 If you will builde with spéede, hire ma­ny laborers: for many handes make radde woorke.

6 And againe, striue not against many: for force lieth in a multitude.

7 Item, pardon mée this fault: it is the firste.

8 Item, forgeue this second trespasse: for twice is not often.

9 The force of these and suche like rea­sons consist in number.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in bignesse.

10 My shooes are euer ill made: for they [Page 165] neuer fit mée, but are alwayes eyther to long, or to short, to wide, or to streight.

11 These arguments are framed onely of bignesse.

12 But sometimes bignesse and num­ber runne ioyntlye together, sometymes number and weight, as in these.

13 It is past your handreache, being thrée yardes highe.

14 Or it is more then you can spanne, being twelue intches broad.

15 Or it is more then you can fatham, being a yard square.

16 Or it farre passeth your lift, being an hundreth weight.

Of Povver.

5 No déede is atchieued, excepte power and will concurre, and méete together: it either want, the worke ceaseth.

6 It is to bee considered, whether the power lye in one, or in many: whether it be néere or far of: what it can do by it self, and what, if it beioyned and coupled with others.

Hovve argumentes holde of povver or vvant of povver.

7 Argumentes taken of the want of po­wer, are good and necessarye to disproue: for this reason is of force. Hee had no [Page 167] strength or power to doe this déede: Ergo he did it not.

8 But argumentes grounded vpon po­wer, that he could do such a facte, and con­cluding thervpon y ^• he did it, are not good: for many good men can do ill deedes, which they will not doe: and ill men can do good déedes, which they do not.

9 Thoughe power bée not sufficient to proue a fact to bée done: yet is power pro­fitable to perswade, and to exhorte, that a thing maye be done. And the reasons ga­thered therof, are probable.

10 For if you would perswade a man to take warre, building, or any other enter­prise in hand: your purpose shal be greatly furthered, if ye proue that the matter once begon, maye be well accomplished, eyther with ease or with honour.

Of VVill.

11 Will is a desire of the minde, to doe, to speake, or to thinke.

Hovv VVill is deuided.

12 There is a good will, and an ill will.

[Page 168] 13 A good wil in our english tong, is not alwayes taken for a will to worke that which is good: but for a readines, when the person is prest of himself, not needing any forraine occasion to pricke him forward.

14 An euill will is a will constrayned, and vrged by some outward meanes.

15 The first is called a freewill: and the second, a forced will.

The vse of this place.

16 If the will of the doer be forced, and not frée, he loseth the praise of his weldo­ing in vertue, but not in arte.

17 For no deede can be good or vertuous on the doers behalfe, except it be done vp­on a good intent: the intent can not be good, if the will be constrained.

18 But in deedes that are wrought by arte, wee praise the cunning of the craftes man, nothing considering with what good will he wrought his worke.

19 If a man be constrained to doe ill a­gainst his will, there is a double conside­ration to be had: one of the force, another of the harme.

[Page 169] 20 If the harme be small, and the force great, the partie is to be holden excused: but if the facte bee haynous, no con [...]raint can make the doer vnblameable, muche lesse if the force were smal, or suche as he myght haue withstand without any great perill.

21 Thoughe will bée not sufficiente to proue an acte to be done: yet may wil de­serue prayse or dispraise, euen in them that want power to doo good or yll.

22 For this reason is not good, he wold haue done wrong, therfore he did wrong in deede.

23 But these are good, he would fayne do well, therfore he deserueth thankes: or he would fayne do harme, therfore he de­serueth blame.

Of dispositions.

24 Consider whether they be good or ill: and whether they be settled and rooted in the partie, that he cannot soon leaue them: or that they be subiecte to sodeyn chaunge, and without continuaunce.

[Page 170] 25 They of the firste sorte serue to en­large, or to increase a matter, eyther in praise of the good, or disprayse of the badde: they of the second sort, are rather fit to extenuate, then to amplifie.

26 Here we haue to cōsider the maners of the partie, his entertaynment, the vsage of himselfe, his vertues, his vices, his cun­ning, his knowledge, his ignoraunce, his craft, his sleyght, his trickes, his knacks, his prankes, his touches. &c.

Examples of disposition, or manners.

27 Place not this fellowe in any office: for he is negligent, and a riotous person.

28 B [...]ie not this gelding: for he is restie.

29 Commit not your lyfe into this Phy­sitians handes: for hee is ignoraunt in his booke, and lacketh experience.

30 Laye no wager vpon the running of this greyhound: for he vseth to lye off.

Of sensible qualities.

31 The vse of this place is very common, [Page 171] and yeldeth many argumentes, some gathe­red of the colour, which the eye séeth: some of the voyce, whiche the eare heareth: some of the fauor, which the nose smelleth: and some of the tast, which the toung decerneth: some of hotnesse, coldnesse, moystnesse, dry­nesse, hardnesse, softnesse. &c. whiche féeling iudgeth.

Examples.

32 Take thys cloth, the colour is good.

33 Choose this boy querister, for his voice is swéete and pleasant.

34 Get some gréene herbs and Mayflou­res, for a good smell is comfortable.

35 Dippe youre meate in vineger, and it shall taste the better.

36 This grounde is waterish, therfore it is not good to be sowen.

Of affections.

37 There are diuers opinions cōcerning affections: some men hold, that all affections are euill, and that no good man will vse or nourishe any of them: some hold, that many of them are good, and that they are giuen of God vnto man, for sundry good purposes.

[Page 172] 38 Doubtlesse mercie, pitie, loue, anger, spite, disdayn, hope, affiance, hate, distrust, contempt, enuie, malice, mirth, gladnesse, greefe, and feare, &c. are oft alledged as good matter to proue or disproue, to exhorte, or dissuade.

Examples of affections.

39 I will not be his seruant, he is too testie: he will not long dwell in one opi­nion, for hée is fickle headed: this bitche will not hunt, for she is proude.

Of passions.

40 Some take passions for any affecti­on, be it greate or small: but in oure En­glish speeche we vse this terme, when wée would expresse a vehement pang, eyther of the bodie, or of the mynde.

The vse of this place.

41 If a fault be committed, through any passion or pang, eyther of the mynde or bodie, the pang shall excuse the fact, if the pacient himself were no cause herof at al.

42 If he were some occasion, yet not the chiefe occasion therof, then it shall ex­tenuate [Page 173] the facte:

43 But if he was the onely cause, or the chiefe cause of his owne maladie: then the passion procureth to the partie, neyther pardon nor pitie: for it is commonly and truely sayde: He that will kill when he is drunke, shall be hanged when he is sobre.

Examples of Passions.

44 This mans déede of gifte, is not good in the lawe: for he was straughte, and be­sides himselfe, when he sealed it.

45 Take héede of that Dogge, for he is madde.

Of Forme.

46 Forme, fashion, shape and making: are counted of some, as parte of a thyng, and so they be in very deede, if the matter bée narrowly considered: howebéeit, a parte (by the iudgement of the common sorte) is taken onely for a bodyed portion of a sole substaunce: and manye reasons are gathe­red of the forme of a thyng, by them which neyther thinke forme or fashion any parte at all.

47 Wée will therefore make forme a [Page 174] place by it selfe, folowing that in arte, which we learne to be common in practise.

48 Fairenes and fauour appertaine to this place, they differ in this, that fairenesse [...] ­sisteth chiefly in colour, and fauoure in pro­portion.

The deuision of forme and fashion.

49 There is a newe fashion and an olde fashion: a straunge fashion, and an vsual fa­shion: a trimme fashion, and a rude fashion: a commodious fashion, and an vnprofitable fashion. &c.

Examples of Forme.

50 My yong Lord will loue my lady his wyfe righte well: for she is bothe faire and well fauoured.

51 This horsse and this greyhounde can not choose but be good: there is such trimme making in them both.

The deuision of causes.

3 There are foure causes: the matter, the forme, the workman, and the ende.

The

• 1 Matter.
• 2 Forme.
• 3 Woorkman.
• 4 Ende.

4 Matter is the stuffe, whereof a thing is made.

5 Formeis the sh [...]e and fashion, which added to the matter, maketh the thing per­fect, and yeldeth both [...]ame and béeing ther­vnto.

6 Woorkmen are doers, from whence mouing first commeth.

7 An ende is the vse of a thyng that is made, causing the workman to take the en­terprise in hande.

8 Of this it is playne, that matter with­out forme is vnprofitable stuffe: and that forme is not added to the matter withoute a workeman: nor that any thing worketh, ex­cept it be moued by some profitable ende.

9 Therfor do authors knit these four causes [Page 176] togyther, which knowledge are very pro­fitable: and reasons are gathered of them very orderly.

Examples of the causes.

10 As if I say: My bootes are good, for they keep out wete wel: Myne argument is taken of the matter: for the cause is the goodnesse of the leather, whereof my boo­tes are made:

11 But if I saye, I lyke my bootes wel, for they are fit for me, and well shapen: my reason is taken of the forme, whiche consisteth in the fashion of the boote.

12 If I say, My bootes are well made: for he that made them is a cunning shoe­maker: my reason taketh his force of the workeman.

13 If I say, I make my bootes thus, for I mynde to ryde drye: my reason taketh his force of the ende, whiche is the vse, I purpose to haue of my bootes.

14 Thoughe forme and matter maye well for bréefenesse sake, bée reckened as partes, and so be referred to the first ge­nerall place whiche we called substaunce, bicause the cause séemeth to be without the [Page 177] thing, where as these haue their béeing in the thing: nay rather the thing it selfe is nothing else but the forme and matter ioy­ned together, and taken as one: yet in com­mon speach, we neuer séeme otherwise to consider of a part, then as it is a bodied por­tion of some whole.

15 Therefore haue I made Matter and Forme, places by themselues.

16 If any man be contentious, and say, that it is but that, to teache one thing often: I aunswer, that it is no inconuenience, that one argument (vpon sundry respects) be re­ferred to sundrie places.

Rules appertaining to the Matter and the Forme.

17 The matter may be good of a thyng, though the forme [...] ill: as the golde in the ring may be good, and the fashion of the ring nought.

18 Agayne, the forme may be good, and the matter nought: as the shoe maye bee well made, and yet the leather kéepe oute no water.

[Page 178] 19 So that nothing can be ill, whose form and matter are both good: nor nothing can be good, if eyther his matter or his forme be ill.

Hovve vvorkmen are deuided.

20 There are thrée kyndes of workers: some things doe worke as nature teacheth them: some as reason guydeth them: and some at aduenture.

21 The first worketh of necessitie, the se­conde of fréewill, the third by chaunce.

22 Workemen are also many sundrye wayes deuided: for some do worke thinges in common, and some do things alone: some worke more in short tyme, and do it ill, and some work little in long tyme, and do it wel: some worke for pleasure, and some for pro­fite: some of force, and some of fréewill. &c.

Generall rules belonging to vvorkmen.

23 When there are naturall and neces­sarie workemen, there muste néedes be ne­cessarie and naturall woorkes.

[Page 179] 24 And againe, where the worke is ne­cessarie, and naturall, there the workeman must bée so too.

25 One workeman alone can not doe a common worke.

26 He worketh fast inough, that worketh that well, which he doth.

27 And he worketh ouerfasic, that doth any thing ill, or amisse.

28 He worketh well, that worketh with aduisement.

29 And he ofte faulteth in his work, that hasteth to muche.

30 He is a singular workeman that will ridde much in shorte tyme, and doe it well withall.

Generall rules and principles gathe­red of an ende.

31 If the ende of a thing be good and law­full, then is the preparation, and all things tending to that ende, lawfull too.

32 For if it be lawful to fight in defence of of a mannes countrey, then is warre, and [Page 180] the vse of a mans weapon lawfull:

54 But if the ende be vnlawfull, and ill, then are all thinges ill, and vnlawfull, that are appointed to that ende.

Hovve vvorkes and effectes are deuided.

2 Some workes are doone only with the bodie: some only with the mynde: some by helpe of them both: some are workes that tende to profite: some to pleasure: some are vaine, tending to no good vse at all: there is a long woorke, and a short woorke: a slowe worke, and a quicke worke, an ill worke, and a good woorke. &c.

Rules gathered of an effect, or of the vvorke that is done.

3 If the worke be well done, the cost that [Page 181] is made therevppon, is well bestowed, and the workeman deserueth his praise.

4 If the worke be not more worth, then the coast that is bestowed vppon it, there is laboure lost.

5 That worke is good, whiche commen­deth the workeman, and that a naughty worke which putteth the doer to shame.

6 The worke of the mind in good things is alwayes more excellente, then the worke of the body: but in il things, it is farre worse.

An example of an Effecte.

7 Fuchsius was a good Phisitian: for hée hath done many notable cures.

8 If ye will set downe this reason at large, do thus:

Da ri i

• Whosoeuer hath doone many nota­ble cures was a good Phisitian,
• But Fuchsius hathe done many no­table cures, therefore
• Fuchsius was a notable Phisitian.

Hovve preparation is deuided.

3 Preparation is eyther greate or small, sumptuous or meane: open, or secrete: law­full or vnlawfull: to muche, to little, or in a meane.

Rules belonging to preparation.

4 If preparation be made, there muste néedes be an ende purposed: but contrary­wise it followeth not, that yf there bée an ende purposed, there shoulde bée by and by preparation made, bycause the ende is in purpose, afore the means can be gotten, that are prepared for an ende.

5 Agayne, if preparation be not made▪ [Page 183] nor things prouided that are necessarily re­quired for an ende: it foloweth that the end is not obteyned.

An example of preparation.

6 There will be warre, for there is a generall muster taken through the whole realme: a number of souldiers are prest in­to wages, the Quéenes Ships furnished with men, vitayle, and shot: and greate pro­uiding of armoure.

Hovv doings and laboure are deuided.

2 Some dooinges leaue a woorke which [Page 184] remayneth to be séene after the labor is en­ded, as the doing that is bestowed in buil­ding an house, leaueth an house to be vew­ed and séene when the worke is finished.

3 Some doings leaue behinde them no suche worke, as may be séene with eie, and yet a worke too, as the trauaile and payne that is taken in getting of learning.

4 Learning is the worke that remay­neth of the laboure, which though it cannot be vewed by the eie, yet maye it not there­fore be called no worke, or sayde not to re­maine.

5 For learning remayneth in déede in the minde of man, and differeth much from the paine that was taken in getting of it.

6 Agayne, there is a sharpe laboure, a softe laboure, and a meane laboure: the firste serueth for spéede, the seconde for ease, the thirde for continuance.

Rules of Laboure.

7 That laboure is well bestowed that bringeth forth a good worke.

[Page 185] 8 That is lost labour, and in vaine, that faileth of his appointed ende.

9 Haste in doing maketh waste in the woorke: as the common saying is: haste [...]keth waste.

An example of Doing.

10 These are ill men: for they sweare, they dice, they rauishe, they robbe, they kyll.

An example of Suffering.

2 He loueth mée entirelye: for hée hath ventured his life, and sustained great dys­pleasure for my sake.

An example of place.

4 I had no libertie this moneth to bée where I woulde: for I was all this time in prison.

An example of time.

5 Aristotle was not king Alexanders scholemaister: for Aristotle was deade a­ [...]ore king Alexander was borne.

Of the vse of these tvvo places.

6 Necessarye argumentes maye be ga­thered [Page 187] of time and place to disproue: but to proue or perswade, they are but proba­ble.

7 For this reason holdeth of force: the partie that is accused, to haue done thys murther, was not in that place, where the fact was don, or had no being at that time: Ergo he is not giltie of that crime.

8 Nowe if you reason, he was there at that time, and none sene there but hee: it argueth a probabilitie, that he should haue bene the doer, but it forceth no necessitie.

The vse of this place.

2 This place yeldeth manye probable argumentes, to perswade or disswade, to praise or dispraise.

3 But necessary reasons to proue a facte to be done or not done, it yeldeth fewe.

4 Thoughe placing, of it selfe (narowly sifted) admit no degrées of more or lesse: yet when the ordering of one thyng is compared to the ordering of another, cō ­mon speache vseth to make degrées, and to saye one thing is better ordered, then an­other.

5 For we vse to say: the armie is in bet­ter order nowe, then it was afore: or the common weale is better gouerned now, then it hath bene heretofore.

An example of Order.

6 The state of the common weale must [Page 189] néedes soone change, all things are so farr [...] out of order.

Of the vse of these places.

3 Forecommers serue to proue that a thing shal be, or shall not be: and they ap­pertaine to the time to come.

4 Aftercommers, serue to proue, that a thing hath bene, or hath not bene: and they appertaine to the time past.

5 Withcommers serue to proue that a thing is or is not: and they pertaine to the time present.

6 If the commers chance alwayes after one sorte: then are the reasons deduced therof necessarye.

7 If they chance often, or for the more parte: then are the argumentes taken of [Page 191] them likely and probable.

8 If they chance but seldome, and misse as oft as they hitte: then the reasons ga­thered of them are coniecturall, and prog­nosticallike, as oft false as true.

Examples.

9 Of forecommers we reason thus: whē those things come to passe, then doe these and these things folowe: but these fore­things are come, therefore the aftercom­mers will folowe.

10 For example thus: if it be a ruddie eue­ning, & a gray morning, thē the day folow­ing shalbe faire: but yesternight was rud­die, and this morning is graye, this days therfore will be faire.

11 Of aftercōmers we reason thus: these things cannot be, but such and such things went before: seing then the aftercommers are past, the forecommers are past also, as for example: this woman geueth milke, Ergo she hath had a childe: for geuing of milke commeth after hauing a childe.

12 Of withcommers thus: the sword was solemnly caried abrode in the court: Ergo. [Page 192] the Quéenes maiestie was there.

13 Item, if you will haue warre, looke for cost, trouble, and daunger, for these are incident, and cleaue to euery person, that will liue in warres.

14 He hath a cough, a stitch, and an ague: Ergo, he hath the pl [...]uresie.

Rules belonging to the equall.

7 Among equal things this is a general rule, looke what is good or lawfull in one, the same shalbe good or lawful in another: and what is ill or vnlawfull in one, the same shalbe ill or vnlawfull in another.

8 Item, looke what one can or cannot: the rest in like manner can, or cannot: o­therwise they are not equall.

9 With thine equall thou shalte haue e­quall lawe and portion: like labour, like wage: like paine, like reward: like fault, lyke punishement: and generally like re­quireth like.

Rules of the likelier.

10 That the likelier cannot, the vnlike­lier much lesse can.

11 That will please the worthier, maye content the meaner.

12 Loke what wyll not fit the lykelyer, the same will not fit the more vnlike.

Rules of the vnlikelier.

13 That which the vnlikelier can com­passe, may be compassed of the likelier.

14 Loke what will serue the vnlikelier, the same will serue the likelier.

15 That which will not please the mea­ner, will ill please the better.

16 They that take the likelier to be that which is more: and the vnlikelier to bée that whych is lesse: and the aslyke to bée that which is equall in quantitie, and so terme these places, places of y ^• more, of the lesse, and of the equall, are foulye decey­ued.

17 For likelier, vnlikelier, and aslike, consiste in other things, as well as in quantitie: wheras more, lesse, and equall, [Page 195] (if they be properly considered) consist on­lye in quantitie.

18 Further, often times the argument that is taken of the likelier is grounded vppon the lesser quantitie, and that argu­ment that is taken of the vnlikelier, vpon the greater quantitie, which thing should neuer be, if their supposition were true.

19 For if I say, two are likelier to spéede then thrée, therefore sende not thrée, but two:

20 The reason is grounded vppon two, the likelier to disproue thrée the vnlike­lier, yet are two in verye déede the lesser number, and thrée the bigger.

21 Therfore likelier and vnlikelier, are not alwayes more and lesse in respecte of quantitie, but likelier is that which is of more possibilitie in reason: and vnlikelier that which is of lesse possibilitie, and that in any respect whatsoeuer.

Hovv VVitnesse is deuided.

2 The witnesses vpon whose authoritis proofes are grounded, are either heauen­ly, earthly, or infernall.

3 Gods word, his wonders, his miracles, and his message, sent to men by angels, and Prophetes, are alledged as heauenly witnesses:

4 Law, custome, othe, bargain, writings, sayings, and so forth, are accompted as hu­maine witnesses, and such as are taken of the credite of man:

5 Coniuring, witchcraft, appearing of ghostes, oracles and answeres of diuels, [Page 198] are infernall and vngodlye witnesses, vsed onelye of the wicked, and suffered of God for a punishement to deceyue them, that will not beléeue the true meanes that god hath appoynted.

6 Witnesses are not so muche founde out by the arte and cunning of the spokes­man: as they doe arise of the matter it selfe, and are ministred to him by the in­formation of others.

7 Therfore, arte teacheth not so muche to finde oute witnesses: as to vrge them forceablely for prouse of the matter that lyeth in question.

Of respecting termes and yokefelovves.

2 Respecting termes may well bée na­med yokefelowes, for that they are knit, and coupled together with a certain band of societie.

3 For the maister, and the seruaunt: the parentes, and the children: the goodman and the goodwife: the landlorde, and the tenaunt: the guest, and the hoste: and all other respecting terms, are alwaies coup­led and ioyned together in some kinde of felowship.

Hovve reasons doe holde of yokefelovves and respecting termes.

4 When reasons are gathered of yoke­felowes to proue the being, or not being the one of the other, they are necessary: but when they are taken of the duetie and af­fection, that is or should be betwene them, then are they but probable.

Examples.

5 He is a father, therefore he hathe a sonne: he is not my guest, therefore I am not his hoste: these and suche like are ne­cessary reasons.

6 But if I saye, the iudge will take my parte, for he is my frende: or if I saye, he wyll iudge against me, bycause he is my foe: or els my matter shall haue good suc­cesse in the lawe, for I pertaine to the Courte: these and suche like reasons, take their force vpon respecte, and are but pro­bable reasons, not necessary argumentes, and such as holde of force.

Of depriuing termes.

7 Naturall power and want of natu­rall power, compared together, and one proued or disproued by another, are taken for depriuing termes.

8 Wée vse to reason vppon them in this sorte: he séeth, therefore he is not [Page 201] blynde: or agayne, hée is blynde, therfore he seeth not.

9 This kinde of reasoning alwayes folo­weth of force, that where the power is, ther can not be the want: and where wante is, there can not be the power.

10 Wee may also reason vpon the depri­uing termes, on this sort and maner.

11 If lack of sight be a lack of some sense, then must sight it selfe néedes be a sense: or if sight it selfe be a sense, then must lacke of sight, be a lacke of sense too.

12 Here is to be noted, that this place ser­ueth as well to proue the wante by the po­wer: as contrarywise to proue the power by the want.

13 Now for contraries this is to be noted: that arguments gathered of them, take their force, sometyme of contrary termes, some­tymes of contrarie sayings.

14 Contrarie sayings are here taken not only for two generall shewsayes, which dif­fer in qualitie, and make no chaunge at all, eyther of foreset or backset (as was sayde in 3. verse of the. 88.. side) but also those are con­trarie sayings, whiche stande of contrarie [Page 202] termes, and doe appertayn to contrarie ma­ners, be the sayings particular or general.

Hovve to decerne contrarie sayings, vvhich are contrarie by reason of termes, and not by reason of qualitie.

15 When the foresette and backset of a shewesay, haue eyther of them a contrarye terme, then those foure contrarye termes, may two seuerall wayes bée coupled togy­ther, to make contrarie sayings:

16 Eyther when the forset is one in both the shewsayes, and the backsets be contra­ries: or else when the backsette is one, and the foresets contraries.

17 But and if bothe the foreset and back­set in two shewsayes be contrary eche to o­ther: then those sentences stande of contra­rie termes, but they are not contrarie say­ings: bicause suche are of lyke ioyce in rea­son, neyther is there any resistance in the sayings, but a contrarietie in the termes.

18 They that think this rule obscure and strange, may by this example that foloweth and suche lyke, make it to themselues fami­liar and playn: as thus,

[Page 203] 19 Uertue is worthie prayse: the foreset of this shewsaye, hath vice to his contrarie, and the backsette, hath blame. Nowe these foure contrarie termes, Uertue, vice, prayse, and blame, are two seuerall wayes coupled together in shewesayes, to make contrarie sayings.

20 Either when the foreset remayneth one in both the shewsayes, the backsets be­ing contraries: as,

Uertue is

• worthy prayse,
• worthy blame. or,

Uice is

• worthy prayse,
• worthy blame.

Or else when the backset is one, and the foresets are contraries: as,

21 But and if the foresayd foure terms be coupled any third way togither, to make two shewsayes: the shewsayes themselues shall not be contrary, though the termes wherof they stand be contrarie, as they are cōpared one with another: For example thus:

22 For the two firste are bothe true and good: and the other two are both false and ill. Nowe for the two firste, it is reason good inough, to say, they are both true and good, ergo, they ar not contrary sayings. For one true saying is neuer contrary to an other true saying: nor one good thing, is neuer con­trary to an other good thing.

23 But for the two seconde sayings, it is no sufficient argument, to say, they are both false, or both ill, ergo, they are not contrary sayings: bicause an ill thing, may be contra­ry to a good thing, and to an ill thing too: and a false saying may be contrary, as well to a false saying as to a true. Therfore it beho­ueth to adde this withall, that they are both of like choice, and may bothe at once fall to be in one man.

24 For a man may both praise vertue & blame vice, and yet vse therein no contrari­etie of speach at al, which thing could not be, if they were contraries in déede.

Of the vse of this place.

25 Of this place wée maye gather bothe probable and necessary arguments, to proue or to disproue.

26 For if I argue thus: Socrates is sick: Ergo he is not in health: or say, this lyne is not streight, Ergo it is crooked: the reasons are necessarie, and doe inforce the one a bée­ing, the other a not béeing.

27 But and if I reason on this wyse, and say, The lawe alloweth mée to prayse well doers, though I can not proue they did wel, Ergo the lawe suffereth mée lykewyse, to disprayse ill dooers, thoughe I wante wit­nesse to proue they did yll: My reason may séeme probable: for that it standeth wyth reason, that contrary maners should haue contrarie fame and report.

28 Yet is it not necessarie, séeing it doth not generally holde: neyther is it lawfull in a good common wealthe: for one man a­lone without sufficient proufe to disprayse, though to prayse it be lawful, bycause there ryseth no suche stryfe about prayse, as doth commonly aboute disprayse: therefore [...]or [Page 206] quietnesse sake, the law forbiddeth the one: and for an incouragement to well dooing, it alloweth the other.

Of those that are termed more then contraries.

29 Arguments gathered of those whiche we terme more then contraries, are always necessarie, eyther to proue, or to disproue, taking their force, somtimes of the worde, sometymes of the saying.

30 Of the worde, bycause the yeaword and nayeworde are of suche propretie and force, that if one of them be sayde of any thing, the other can not be sayd of the same.

31 And againe, if the one be not, the other is: he therefore that proueth the one, doth consequentely disproue the other: and he that doth remoue the one, inforceth the o­ther.

32 Of the saying, bicause that more then contrary sayings, are euer one true, and an other false,

33 Therefore, if this saying (All fayre women are good) be false: then this saying, [Page 207] (Some faire women are not good) muste néedes be true: and againe, if this saying (some faire women are good) be true, then is this saying (no faire women are good) false.

24 This place shall yelde necessarie ar­gumentes also of the worde, when wée change the termes, and argue thus: If man be a creature, then that which is no creature is no man: and againe, if no creature bée no manne, then is euery manne a crea­ture.

25 This kind of arguing is alwayes ne­cessary, excepte the backset be a chanceable inbeer to the foreset, and then the argumēte is not necessarie, bycause the chanceable in­béer may be saide, and not saide of his inhol­der: and therefore this reason holdeth not, man is iust, Ergo he that is not iust, is no man.

26 Those argumentes that driue men to an impossibilitie in reason, are com­monlye gathered of this place: and the rule wherevppon they bée grounded, is moste certayne, in so muche that some Authoures laboure to proue all [Page 208] principles by it, and makes it an only stay▪ why wranglers cānot proceed [...] to an endlesse worke.

Of the vse of this place.

8 Thys place yeldeth necessarye argu­mentes to disproue, as when ye argue and saye: Yonder is a skarcrowe, and there­fore no man: or an Horsse, and then no Asse: Or it is Wyllyam, and not Iohn.

9 These reasons and suche lyke, are of force, bycause of thinges whiche dissent in generall or specal béeing, it cannot be, that one of them shiould be that thing, which an other of them is.

10 But to proue this place, yeldeth no ne­cessarie arguments, except it be vpon some graunted supposition: as when it is suppo­s [...]d and iudged of the gaynesayers, that [Page 211] the thing whereabout they striue, is eythe [...] an Horsse or an Asse: then if one of the gaynsayers proue the thing in controuersie, to be no horsse: it followeth by force of the supposition graunted, that it is an Asse.

Hovve deuision is deuided.

4 There is a deuision of matter: and a [Page 213] deuision of wordes.

5 Matter is deuided, when a discourse is reduced and brought vnto certayne speciall poyntes.

6 The deuision of woords, is thrée wayes considered: when a woorde of double vn­derstanding is deuided into his seuerall sig­nificatiōs: or when an whole is deuided in­to his partes: or else when a generall is de­uided into his specials.

7 Here note, that thoughe euerye one of these foure wayes bée in common spéech na­med and taken for a deuision, yet for lear­ning sake, and to make a diuersitie amongst them, eche one hath his seuerall and propr [...] name. The first béeing called an ordring of the cause: the seconde, a distinction of wor­des: the thirde, a partyng of an wholé: and the fourth, a deuiding of a generall.

8 Deuision differeth from partition, for that in a deuision, the generall is alwayes verified of his specials: where as in a par­tition the whole is not truely sayde of hys partes. Distinction diffreth from them both: for they deuide matter, and it deuideth wor­des or termes onely. The ordering of the [Page 214] cause differeth from them thrée: for it in­treateth of compounded matter: and they of thinges, as they are consydered withoute composition not coupled together in anye perfect sentence.

Rules belonging to this place.

9 A deuision ought to be playne, perfect, and briefe.

10 For playnnesse, ye oughte to séeke v­suall termes, and to auoyde borowed spéeche as much as conueni [...]ntly ye can.

11 For perfectnesse, ye must sée that ther [...] be in the membres, neither too much, nor too little: that is to say, that nothing be reckned amōg the membres, which is not comprised in the whole: nor any thyng cōteyned of the whole, whyche is not set foorth among the membres: that one membre bée not com­prehended of an other membre: nor that any one thing be found to be vnder dyuers membres.

12 And for briefenesse, yée muste bryng your Deuision into as small a compasse as [Page 215] may be: yet so, that if ye can not come to your purpose by your firste deuision: ye ef [...] ­soone deuide the partes, and that so o [...]e as néede shall require: But here ye muste be­ware, that yée doo not euercharge or con­founde the memorie of youre hearers, with many or confused deuisions.

Examples.

13 Your sugred talke wanteth one chiefe poynt of cunning. For in manye of youre Orations, eyther yée make an vnperfecte D [...]uisyon: or else yée vse too make none at all.

14 The matter wée stryue for, is con­teyned vnder the firste parte of the Deui­sion: therefore ye doe wrong (the Deuision béeing good) to say, that it is conteyned vn­der the seconde parte.

15 This thing is within the compasse [...]f the principall: therefore of force it muste eyther bée a membre thereof: Or at the leaste be conteyned vnder one of the mem­bers.

VVhat a Question or de­maunde is.

2 A question or a demaunde is a shew­saye, requiring a yea, or a nay: as, do fishes breath in the waters, or no?

3 If you aunswere this demaunde, and make your choise, saying: either that fishes doe take breath vnder the water: or that they do not: ye make of a question a shew­saye.

4 But if ye procéede further, and adde a reason why ye so saye, in concluding of