CAP. I. Of the definition and diuisions of Dialecticke.

DIalecticke otherwise called Logicke, is an arte which teachethe to dispute well.

It is diuyded into two par­tes: Inuention, and iudge­ment or disposition.

Inuention is the first parte of Dialecticke, whiche teachethe to inuente argumentes.

An argumente is that which is naturally bente to proue or disproue any thing, suche as be single reasons separatly and by them selues considered.

An argumente is eyther artificial or with­out arte.

Artificiall is that, which of it self declare­and is eyther first, or hathe the beginning from the first.

The first is that which hathe the begīning of it self: and is eyther simple or compared. [Page 18] The symple is that, which symplie and ab­solutelie is considered: and is eyther argea­ble or disagreable.

Agreable is that, wich agreethe with the thing that it prouethe: and is agreable ab­solutly, or after a certaine fashion.

Absolutely, as the cause and the effecte.

CAP. II. Of the cause efficient.

THe cause is that by whose force the thing is: and therfore this first place of inuention is the fountayne of all sciences: for that matter is knowen perfectly, whose cause is vnderstanded: So that not without good reason, the Poet dothe saye:

The cause is eyther efficiēt and materiall, or formal and fynall.

The efficient is a cause from the which the thing hathe his being. Of the which althoughe that there be no tru formes, yet a grea­te aboundance we fynde by somme certay­ne meanes distincte.

And first the thing that engendrethe or de­fendethe is called the efficient cause. As [Page 19] Ouide, in his first booke of the remedie for loue callethe Slouthfullnes the efficient cause of loue, which beyng taken awaye loue ceasethe: for thus he there sayethe.

The father also, and the mother which en­gendrethe, and the nursses which bring vp, ar causes efficients. As Dido. in the 4. boo­ke of Eneidos beyng sorely offended with Aenee, and sekyng a cause of his crueltie, denyethe hym to be Venus or Anchises sonne, and faynethe other parentes to hym.

So Romulus was buylder of Rome, and after hym, Kynges, Cōulls, Emperours [Page 20] and Tutors were the vpholders of it: which all are called causes efficients.

CAP. III.

SEcondlie the cause efficient is eyther so­litarie or ioined with some others, of the which some be principall and chief doers, others helpers & seruers to the principall. An example of the cause solitarie we haue in the 9. of Eneidos:

The solitarie cause with others diuerse bo­the principalls and adiuuantes in the Ora­tion which Cicero wrote for Marcus Mar­cellus is diuerslie shewed.

For often tyme (sayethe the Orator) some vsethe to extenuate martiall vertues by wordes, and pull them awaye from the Captai­ne and principall doers, and comunicate them to Souldiers, that they shoulde not be proper to the Gouernour of the warre: And certainly in warre, the fortitude of the Souldiers, the oportunitie of places, the ayde of the Alies, nauyes, and prouision of victualls helpethe muche: and fortune lawfully dothe ascribe to her self the greatest parte, so that whatsoeuer is [Page 21] prosperouslie done, that almost all she estemes her owne. But of this glorie (o Caesar) which thou hast not long agoe obtained thou hast no fellowe: for all howe muche so euer it be (which verelie is most greate) all I saye is thyne, for neither the Centurion, the Captaine, the bonds of men, nor yet the troupes, maye plucke any thing of this awaye frō thee: yea that more is, fortune that mystres of all thinges offerethe not her self in the societie of this glorie. She ge­uethe thee place, and cōfessethe this glorie who­lie to be thyne owne.

The instruments also are nombred amon­gest the causes adiuuantes. By this argu­mente the Epicure prouethe that the worl­de was neuer made, as Cicero testifiethe in his first booke of the nature of Godds.

With what eyes of mynde (sayethe he) myght your Plato beholde that composition of so greate a worke, by the which he makethe the worlde to be made of God: what labouring: w­hat toolles: what barres: what scaffoulds: who were seruants of so greate a worke?

This vngodlie Epicure knewe not that God was able to make the worlde without any instrumente, or other causes eyther materiall or adiuuante.

CAP. IIII.

Thirdlie the cause efficient workethe by it self, or by accidente.

The efficient by it self is that, which wor­kethe by his owne strengthe, suche as by nature or counsell do worke. As for exam­ple the naturall workyng of the wyndes is sett forthe in the first booke of the Eneidos.

The confession of Cicero containethe an example of counsayle, as.

The warre beyng taken vp, yea and almost ended (o Caesar) by no strengthe of hande, but of myne owne mynde and wyll I come vnto thiese warres, which were raysed against thee.

By accident the cause workethe, which by some externall power workethe, as in tho­se thinges whiche are done by necessitie, or by fortune.

By necessitie, when the efficient is compel­led [Page 23] to do, Suche a one is the excusation of the Pompeyans:

Yf I woulde seke (sayethe the Orator) a proper and tru name of this our sorowe, the­re appeares a fatall calamitie to be suddenly fallen, which hathe preuented vnawares the myndes of men: So that no man ought to mar­uell that the counsells of mortall men are ouer­come by the fatall necessitie of the Godds.

Fortune is a cause by accident, when besi­des the intente of the worker, some other thing chauncethe: as,

By chaunce (sayethe Cicero in his 3. booke of the nature of Godds) Iason was healed by his ennemie, who with stroke of sworde opened his rotten impostume, which the Phisitions coulde not heale.

Amongest thiese sort of causes, ignoraunce or lacke of forsight is nombred: as, Ouide, in the 2. booke of sorowfull matters excuse­the hym self and lamentethe that he had se­ne by chaunce some of Cesars secretes: as,

Here rysethe the asking of pardon, as Ci­cero for Ligarius.

Pardon and forgeue father he hathe erred, he hathe done amysse: he thought not to do so: yf euer he shall do suche a thing agayne? &c. And a litle after, he sayethe, I haue erred: I haue done rashelie: I repent me of my doyng: I flie to thy clemencie, I aske pardon, I praye thee that thou wylt forgeue me.

The ignorance of the cause raysethe the o­pinion of fortune. For when any thing chanceth beside the hope & entension of the doer, it is commonlie called fortune. And ther­fore wysely it is sayde of Iuuenall.

CAP. Ʋ. Of the materiall cause.

THe matter is a cause of the which the thing hathe his beyng: as, Ouide in the [Page 25] 2. booke of the Metamorphosis, settethe forthe the composition of the Sonnes how­se, by the materiall cause, as golde, car­buncle stone, yuorie, and syluer.

Caesar in the first booke of ciuill warres com­maundethe his souldiers to buylde Shippes of suche a matter as they had learned before in Brytayne, To wytte, that they shoulde make the keele and bottome of some lyght and lieger matter, and the rest of the bodie of the Ship­pes with twigges couered with leather.

CAP. ƲI. Of the formall cause.

THe efficient and materiall cause beyng expounded, now folowethe the formall and fynall.

The formall cause is that by the which the thing hathe his name and beyng. And ther­fore euery thing is distingued from another by his forme.

[Page 26]The forme also is engendred togeather, with the thing it self: as, a reasonable soule is the forme of man, for by it Man is man, and is distingued from all other thinges. The Geometricall figures haue their for­me, some beyng triangles, and some qua­drangles. So hathe naturall thinges: as the heauen, the earthe, trees, fyshe and su­che others. So that euery thing is to be ex­pounded as the nature of it is, if we maye attayne to the knowledge therof, as in arti­ficiall thinges is more easie to be founde. Cesar in his 7. booke, settethe forthe the forme of the walles of Fraunce.

The walles of Fraunce are almost buylded after this forme: The beames of one peece direct in longitude, euery one being equally distante from another, are sett on their two endes in the earthe, hard bounde within, and couered with a greate countermure. The places betwixt the beames are stuffed vp before with greate sto­nes: Thiese beyng so placed and sett togeather, there is added, to ouer aboue the same another ranke, so that the same space and distāce is al­wayes kept, that none of the beames do touche another, but eche beame being distant from the other by an equall space, is fast ioyned togea­ther [Page 27] with stones, sett in betwixt beame and beame. And so consequentlie, the worke is ioyned togeather, vntill the height of the wal­les be accomplished and fylled vp. And this worke is bothe well fauored, by reason of his forme and varietie: hauing here a beame and there a ranke of stones one after another, ob­seruing their rankes in a straight lyne: And also it is muche conuenient for the profitte and the defence of cities. Because bothe the stone dothe kepe it salf from daunger of burnyng, and lykewyse the stuffe and matter from rus­hing or beating downe: Which for the most parte beyng made fast fortie footes inward with continuall rankes of beames, maye nei­ther be broken throughe, nor beaten a sundre.

On this maner dothe Virgill describe the forme of the heauen.

CAP. ƲII. Of the finall cause.

THe fynall cause is that for the which the thing is made or done. The ende, of na­turall thinges is man, and of man God. Al­so euery arte hathe the finall cause: as, The ende of Grammer is to speake congrouslie, Of Rethoricke, eloquētlie, and of Logicke to dispute well and orderlie. Iuno. 1. of E­neidos, promysethe to Aeolus the fayre Nymphe diopeian for solace and procrea­tion of children.

In the defence of Ligarius, Cicero vrge­the his accusator Tubero, with the fynall cause of the warres raysed agaynst Cesar, and surely (sayethe he) he ioyned battell agaynst Cesar in armes.

What did thy naked sworde (o Tubero) in the Pharsalike armie? whose sydes pearced the pointe therof? which was the sence and fealing of thy weapons? what mynde, eyes, handes? what feruencie of spirite? what diddest thou couett or desire? what didest thou wyshe?

CAP. ƲIII. Of the effect.

THe effecte is that which rysethe of the cause. And therfore the mouing of thin­ges that are engendred, corrupted, or by any other maner of waye moued: and the thing also that by the mouyng rysethe is called the effecte, as for example, Christ in the 11. chap. of Math. prouethe hymself by this place, to be the true Messias promy­sed: beyng asked of Iohn Baptists disci­ples, Arte thou he that shoulde come, or shalt we looke for another? And Iesus aun­swering sayde vnto them.

[Page 30] Go and shewe Iohn what thinges ye haue hard and sene: The blynde receyue their sight: the halte go: the leapers are clēsed: the deaf heare: the dead are raysed vp: and the poore receiue the Gospell: and blessed is he that shall not be offended in me, the sayinges and workes of men ar contained vnder this place as the wyse mens seynges and Platoes and Ari­stotls workes, counsails also and delibe­rations although the neuer take effect.

Vertue also and vyce haue their effecte, as Horace in the first booke of his Epistles, settethe forthe the effecte of dronkēnes: as,

CAP. IX. Of the subiecte.

NOw folowethe the argumente which dothe agree after a certain fashion: as [Page 31] the Subiect and the Adioynt. The Subie­cte is that which hathe any thing adioyned vnto it, as, the soule is the subiect of know­ledge, ignorance, vertue, vyce, because thiese are added to the soule, besydes the substance of the same. The bodye is the sub­iect of healthe, sickenes, strengthe, infirmi­tie, beawtie, deformitie, and suche others. A man, is the subiect of ryches, pouertie, honours, infamie, clothes, & of his trayne. A place is the space in the which the thing placed, is contayned: So the Philosophers do attribute to their deuyne substances (al­thoughe voyde of all magnitude) a place: So the Geomatricians vnto their figures Geometricalles, geue bothe place, & the differences of places. The naturall philoso­phers also more accurately in the heauen, symple elementes, and compounde thin­ges, dothe acknowledge a place: Which is nothing els, but the subiecte of the thing contayned in it: as for example.

The lande of Canaan (a subiect) is praysed in the 12. of Numeri by the adioyntes or thinges adioyned vnto it.

So Moyses sent them to spye out the lande of Canaan, and sayde vnto them: go vp this [Page 32] waye towarde the southe, and go vp into the mountaynes, and considere the lande, what it is, and the people that dwell therin: whether they be stronge or weake, eyther fewe or ma­nye. Also what the lāde is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad: and what Cities the­re be that they dwell in, whether they dwell in tentes, or walled townes: And what the lande is, whether it be fatte or leane, whether there be Trees therin or not, and be of good courage, and bring of the fruyte of the lande. And after fortye dayes they retorned agayne and toulde Moyses, saying, we came into the lande whither thou hast sente vs, and suerly it flowethe with mylke and honye: and here is of the fruyte of it, neuer thelesse the people are stronge that dwell in the lande, and the cities are walled, and exceeding greate: And mo­reouer we sawe the sonnes of Anacke there: The Amelekytes dwell in the sowthe coun­tree, and the Hethites and the Iebusites, and the Amorites dwell in the mountaynes, and the Cananites dwell by the sea, and by the co­stes of Iordan.

Here Canaan is the subiect: The people of the lande, the cities, the fruytes, trees, and the goodnes and badnes therof is the ad­iointes [Page 33] for the which it is eyther praysed or dispraysed.

CAP. X. Of the adiointes.

THe adioynt is that which hathe a subie­cte to the which it is adioined: as, vertue and vyce are called the adioyntes of the bo­dye or soule: and to be shorte all thinges that do chaunce to the subiecte, besyde the essence, is called the adioynt: as, tyme, qua­litie, eyther proper: as laughyng to men: barking to dogges: or common: as in the example folowyng. Cicero in the Oration for Rossoius Comodus.

Dothe not his verye head and ouer browe al­togeather shauen and scraped so cleane, signifie that he is malicious and sauorethe of knane­uerie? do they not vtter and crye that he is a craftie foxe? Dothe he not appeare frō the top­pe of his head to the sole of his feete (if the pro­portion and figure of the body without any speaking or vttered wordes maye bring a con­iecture) that there is nothing in hym but cra­fte, deceipte, and lying: who therfore hathe his head & ouer browe alwayes scrapen and sha­uen, least some shoulde haue the occasion to saye [Page 34] that he had an heare of an honest man. So do­the Martiall in his 2. booke, mocke Zoilus.

Clothes also, and thinges partaining to our trayne are nombred amongest the ad­iointes: as, Dido, passing to the hunting, is sett forthe magnifickly by her adiointes, in the fowerthe booke of Eneidos.

CAP, XI. Of differing argumentes.

THe agreable argumente being expoun­ded, now followethe the disagreable, w­hich dissentethe from the matter. The ar­guments disagreable are equallie knowen amonge them selues, and disprouethe e­quallie one another: yet by their dissention, they do more clearlie appeare. They be parted into differing argumentes, and gay­nesettes.

The differing argumentes be suche, as be disagreable by some fashion onlie: and are knowen by thiese notes: not this, but that: althoughe, not withstanding: as, Cicero for Pompey.

They did not bring home the victorie, but the signes and tokens of the victorie. And Oui­de 2. of loue: Ʋlysses was not fayre, but he was eloquent. Also Virgill. Althoughe Priamus was almost dead, yet he did not abstayne: Ly­kewyse Terence in Eunuchus: Althoughe [Page] I be most worthie of this contumelie, yet thou arte vmworthy to do it vnto me. Also Cicero for Ligarius, Callest thou it a myscheuous acte o Tubero? Why? surely as yet it was cal­led by no man so: some in deede called it an er­ror, others feare: some namyng it more hard, eyther hope, desire, hatred or obstinacie, those that call it most hard, name it rashnes: a mys­cheuous acte, no man as yet but thou.

CAP. XII. Of gaynesettes, or opposita.

GAynesettes are argumentes alwayes disagreing, so that they maye not be at­tributed to one parte of a thing after one re­specte, and at one tyme: as, Socrates can not be white and blacke on one parte: father and sonne of one: sycke and whole at one ty­me: yet he maye be white on a parte, and blacke on an other, father of one man, and sonne of another: hole this daye, and sycke to morowe: And therfore vpon the affirma­tion of the one, followethe the negation of the other. And contrarie wyse also. Gayne­settes are parted into disparates and con­trary argumentes.

The disparates are gaynesettes of the w­hich [Page 37] the one is opponed to many: as, grene, ayshe colour, read, are mydde colours be­twixte white and blacke, of the which euery one is a disparate argumente bothe with the extremities, and amonge them selues also. So liberalitie, a Man, a tree, a Stone, & other thinges innumerable, because that one of these cā not be sayde to be the other: as, Virgill 1. of Eneidos.

O Ʋirgyn what shoulde I call thee, for thy visage and voyce declarethe that thou art no mortall woman, Truly thou arte a Goddess.

CAP. XIII. Of Relatiues.

COntrarie argumēts are gaynesettes, of the which the one is only opponed to the other: and be parted into affirmatiues & ne­gatiues. They are called affirmatiues whē they bothe affirme: as the relatiues & repu­gning argumente. The relatiues are cōtra­rie affirmatiues, of the which the one hathe his being of the mutuall societie & affection with the other, for the which cause they a­re called Relatiues: as, he is a father: which hathe a sonne, & he is a sonne which hathe a father for by this mutuall relation they are and cease to be bothe at once. So that who­soeuer [Page 38] knowethe the one perfectlie, knowe­the the other also, as Martiall agaynst So­libian.

Athanasius prouethe the eternitie of the sonne of God thus: as, It is not possible that a father maye be before the sonne (meanyng of the relation) But the father hathe ben father from the begynning (as all men do graunte) er­go the sonne hathe ben from the begynning. And Quintilian in his 5. booke the 10. cha­piter sayethe thus, Yf it be honest to the Rho­dians to sett out the custome, it is honest also for Hermacrion to hyer it Here (sett forthe) & (hyer) are relatiues. After the same ma­ner Cicero in his booke de Oratore saye­the: Is there any daunger (sayethe he) lest so­me shoulde thinke it filthy, to teache others a glorious and excellent arte, the which to learne was most honest. Here (teache) and (learne) are relatiues. Thiese also the aduocate and clyent: the lessor and the lessee: free and bon­de: byg and litle: the hoste and the guest: the husband and the wyfe, with suche others.

CAP. XIIII. Of repugning argumentes.

THe repugning argumentes are contra­rie affirmatiues, which amonge them selues do repugne cōtinually: as, Eneid. 11.

There is no healthe in warre, therfore we aske the peace. So hotte and coulde, white and blacke, vertue and vyce, repugnethe. Likewyse Cicero in Parad. against the E­picuriās. They helde this opinion stowtely & diligently do defende, that pleasure is felicitie, whiche appeares to me to be the voyce of bruyte beastes, and not of men, for thou when God or the mother of all thinges nature, hathe geuen to thee a soule of all thinges most excellent and deuine, so thou contemptously castest awaye and abasest thy self that no difference thou esteamest betwixt thee and a bruyte beast.

Here Cicero opponethe beastes and men, as pleasure is beastes felicitie, therfore it is not mans, So libertie and seruitude: as in Tibullus 2. booke.

CAP. XƲ. Of denying argumentes.

[Page 40]COntrarie negatiues, are when the one affirmethe and the other denyethe the same. And are parted into denying and de­pryuing argumentes.

Denying argumentes are contrarie nega­tiues, of the which the one deniethe euery where: as, Iust not iust: a beast, not a beast: blude not blude: as Cicero in the defence of Murena.

Thou shalt forgeue nothing, yes some thin­ge, not all. Grace shal haue no place, yes when office and dutye requirethe. Be not moued with mercie, yes in dissoluing of seueritie, yet there is some prayse of humanitie. I stande to my pur­pose, yea surely, without a better gett the vi­ctorie.

Also Martiall in his first booke,

Lykewyse Cicero in the first booke of his Tusculane questions compellethe the Epi­curian by this argumente to graunte that the dead are in no miserie: which thing the [Page 41] Epicurian defendethe. Now (sayethe he) I had rather thou shouldest feare Cerberus the dogge with thre headdes porter of hell, then that thou shouldest so vnaduisedly speake the­se wordes. Atticus. What his the matter? Marcus. The same which thou denyest to be, thou admittest to be. Where is the Sharpnes of thy vnderstanding? For when thou sayest that the dead be in miserie, that thing which is not thou admittest to be. And after a long dispu­tation, Atticus sayethe, Now I grante that they are in no miserie which are dead, because that by strengthe of argumente thou hast ob­tained that those which be not at all, are no­wyse in miserie. This fellowe (sayethe Te­rence in his Eunuch.) sometime affirmithe and sometyme denyethe.

CAP. XƲI. Of depryuing argumentes.

DEpryuing argumentes are contrarie negatiues: of the which the one denye­the vpon that subiecte only, in the which the other which affirmethe, is naturally cōtai­ned. And the affirmatiue is called the habi­te, the denying argumente, the priuation. So mouing and quietnes: Sobrrietie and dronkennes: as Martiall in his 9. booke.

[Page 42] There is no sober man that woulde do so, Ergo thou art dronke.

So to be blynde and to see: Ryche and poo­re: as Martiall in his 8. booke.

Yf poore thou be, thou shalt alwayes be poore Aemilian, for nothing is now geuen: but to the ryche. Of this sort be lyfe & deathe: as Cice­ro for Milo. Sitt you reuengers of this mans deathe, whose lyfe if you thought it mought be restored ye woulde not.

To speake also and to holde peace: as the firste for Catiline: Why dost thou wayte for the aucthoritie of the speakers, whose myndes, thou perceiuest by holding their peace.

CAP. XƲII. Of equall argumentes.

COmpared argumentes are those which are compared amongest them selues, and are equally knowen, althoughe the one be sometymes more manyfest and cleare then the other.

The comparaison is eyther in quantitie or qualitie.

Quantitie is that wherby the thinges com­pared are knowen how muche or how litle they are.

[Page 43]And qualitie is eyther of equall or vnequall thinges.

They be equall which be of one quantitie. The equall argumente is, when an equall is declared by an equall: whose signes and notes be, equall, alike, the same that, aswell as, asmuche as, asmanye as, neither more nor lesse: There is a greate aboundance of suche comparisons in the holy Scripture, as the most parte of the parables whiche Christ vsethe: as in Mathew. 11.

The Kyngdome of heauen is lyke a graine of muster seade, Deut. 11. Also I wyll cause thy seade to multiplie, as the starres of heauen. This argumente is diuersly, vsed by the Ethnicke authors: as Cicero for Silla:

Neither maye I perceyue wherfore thou arte moued agaynst me: yf because I defende hym whom thou accusest: why am I not moued with thee also that accusest hym whom I de­fende: yf thou saye I accuse myne ennemie: I answere a like, I defende my frende. So the 5. of Tuscul. When as they graunte no lytle strengthe to be in vyce, to lyue a miserable lyfe: must it not be also graunted, the same strengthe to be in vertue to lyue godly? This also I praye thee tell me Xenophons wyfe (sayethe [Page 44] Aspasia) yf thy neigbour had golde more pre­cious then thou hast, whether had thou rather haue hers then thyne owne? hers sayethe she, and yf she had clothes and the rest of the orna­mentes of women, of greater estimation then thou hast, hadest thou rather haue hers? yea sayethe she: Go to then yf she had a better hus­band? then thou, hadest thou rather haue her husbād also? here she was ashamed to answere. Then Aspasia began to speake to Xenophon, I praye the sayethe she, yf thy neighbour had a better horse then thou, whether hadest thou rather haue his or thine? his sayethe he: and yf he had a better grounde then thyne, hadest thou rather haue his? his, to wytte the best: and yf he hadde a better wyffe then thou, haddest thou rather haue his also? here Xenophon helde his peace also.

CAP. XƲIII. Of the more.

THey be vnequall which be of a diuerse quantitie.

The vnequall be eyther more or lesse: That is more, whose quantitie exceedethe: whose notes are, not only, but also: I had rather this then that: seing this muche more that: [Page 45] as, Eccle. 24. Beholde that I haue not la­boured for my self only, but also for all them that seke wysdome. Psalm. 84. I had rather be a dore keper in the house of my God, then to dwell in the Tabernacles of wyckednes. Rom. 5. But God settethe out his loue, that he hathe to vs, seing, that while we were yet synners, Christ dyed for vs: muche more then now (seyng we are iustified in his blode) shall we be saued from wrathe thoroughe hym. For yf when we were ennemies we were reconsiled to God by the deathe of his sonne: Muche mo­re, seing we are reconcilied, we shalbe pre­serued by his lyfe. Not only so, but we also ioye in God by the meanes of our Lorde Ie­sus Christ, by whom we haue receyued re­consiliation. And Cicero for Milo: Not only he yelded hym self to the people, but also to the Senate neither to the Senat only, but also to the stronghe garrison of souldiars: yea not to these only, but to his power & auctoritie to whom the Senate hathe geuen cure of the w­hole cōmō wealthe, of the whole youthe of Ita­lie, & of the whole munition of the people Ro­maine. Ouide in the remedie for loue,

CAP. XIX. Of the lesse.

THat is sayde to be lesse which an other dothe excede by quantitie: whose notes be thiese: not this only, but not that: this be­fore that: as Cicero for Catiline. 2. There was no man not only in Rome, but in no corner of Italie ouerlayed with debte whō he had not associate to the incredible leage of that mische­uous entreprise. Cicero to Philippica 9. All men whatsoeuer age they be, which in this citie haue the knowledge of the lawes, yf they were gathered togeather in one place, are not to be compared with Seruius Sulpitius.

CAP. XX. Of the similitude.

THe comparison as yet hathe ben in quantitie, now folowethe the compari­son in qualitie: By the which we knowe what kynde of one eache thing is, whether lyke or vnlyke. These are sayde to be lyke which be of one qualitie: as Math. 23.

[Page 47] Who be vnto you Scribes and Pharisees, ye hy­pocrites, for ye are lyke vnto whytned tumbes which appeare beautifull outward, but are w­ithin full of dead mens bones, and of all fyl­thynes, so are ye also: for outward ye appeare righteous vnto men: but within ye are all full of hypocrisie and iniquitie. Gen. 1. Further­more God sayde, let vs make man in our owne image according to our lykenes. Phillip. 2. Let the same mynde be in you that was euen in Christ Iesu, who being in the forme of God, thought it no robberie to be equall with God, but he made hym self of no reputation, and to­ke on hym the forme of a seruante, and was made lyke vnto man, and was founde in his apparell as a man. And 1. Eneid. Bothe his mou­the and shoulders were lyke a God. And Cice­ro in 9. Philip. Althoughe Seruius Sulpi­tius myght leaue no monumēte more cleare, thē his sonne, which is the very picture and shape of his conditions, vertue, constancie, pietie, and engeyn. The similitude is eyther separated or ioyned togeather. The similitude sepa­rated is when the 4. or single termes are se­parated and distingued: as in Math. 23. Ierusalem, Ierusalem, which kyllest the Pro­phetes, & stonest them which are sente to thee, [Page 48] how often woulde I haue geathred thy chil­dren togeather, as the hen gatherethe her chic­kens vnder her wynges, but thou wouldest not. And Virgill in Eglog. 5.

Here, as the hen to her chickens, so God is to the Israelites: And as slepe to the wea­rie, so verse is to the hearer. And agayn Ci­cero ad fratrem 1. As the best gouernours of Shippes often tymes maye not ouercome the strengthe and rage of the tempest: So the most wyse man may not alwayes vanquyshe the in­uasion and violence of fortune. The ioyned similitude is when as the first terme hathe it self to the seconde, so the seconde to the third: as Cicero 3. Ligar. Perceiue ye not that the magistrate hathe the power to ouersee and prescribe good and profitable thinges a­greing with the lawes, For as the lawes are aboue the magistrate, so the magistrate is abo­ue the people.

CAP. XXI. Of the dissimilitude,

[Page 49]THey be vnlyke whose qualitie be di­uerse: as 2. Peter 6. Lord God of Israell there is no God lyke the. And therfore the ethnicke Antistenes vsethe this argumēte. There is nothing lyke God, therfore God can no wyse be knowen, by any image or signe made by men. The author of the booke of Kynges 2. the 18. chapter. Hauing declared the good qualities, the which Esekyah was a­dorned with, sayethe thus: He trusted in the Lord God of Israel, so that after hym, was none lyke hym amonge all the Kyngs of Iuda, neither was there any suche before hym, Ci­cero 2. Phillipic. Hathe a greate compa­nie of dissimilitudes, speaking of Varro his groundes whiche Antonius had obtai­ned by stronge hande. O miserable buyldin­ges (sayethe he) by how vnlyke a maister (but how is he a maister?) were they with holden: Marcus Ʋarro they shoulde haue ben for his studies, and not a resorting place for filthie lu­stes, what excellent thinges were spoken before within that manner place, what thinges there writen? The lawes of the people Romaine: The monumētes of our forbeers, all maner of wysdō and learning: But now sence thou hast dwelled on his groundes (hauing no right therto) all the [Page 50] house ryngethe with the clamour of dronkar­des, the flore ouerfloweth with wine, the wal­les be moyste: children of good inclinations with those that were sett for aduantage, and whoores amongest mens wyues were dwelling.

CAP. XXII. Of ofspringes.

VVE haue hetherto expounded the first argumentes: Now do followe those which haue their beginnīg of the first, which bearethe them selues to the thinge that they proue or disproue: as the first w­hence their are driuen. Suche be ofsprin­ges: the etimologie, distribution, and de­finition.

Ofspringes are argumentes which do be­gin alyke, but ende diuersly: as iust, iustice, iustly: fredom, free, frely: loue, louer, loue­ly: good, goodnes, goodly: man, manlynes, manly: as, Iustice is flede out of the Real­me, therfore there is no man iust whithin the Realme. Propercius lib. 2.

Here fredom is the cause why thou art free. Cicero 3. booke of the Nature of godds, when he speake the of Dionysius the tyrāte: [Page 51] Now (sayethe he) he chargethe that all the golden tables shoulde be taken out of the Tem­ples in the which (after the fashion of the Gre­cians) it was writen of good godds, saying he woulde vse their goodnes. The godds are good, therfore their goodnes is to be vsed. Here he disputethe from the effecte to the cause also, He is a man, why maye he not be then manly.

CAP. XXIII. Of the notation or etimologie,

THe Etimologie is the interpretation of a worde: For wordes are nothing els but notes of matters signified: as Isaac, was so called because his mother laughed at the promise of God made to her. And in the 25-of Genesis, is sayed, After warde came his brother out, and his hande helde Esau by the hele, therfore his name was called Iacob: that is to saye: an ouertbrower or deceiuer. And therfore Esau being twyse deceiued by Ia­cob, sayethe thus in the 27. of Genesis. Was he not iustly called Iacob, for he hathe de­ceiued me now two tymes: He toke my byrthe right: and lo now he hathe taken my blessing. Exod. 2. And she called bis name Moyses, because sayd she, I drewe hym out of the water. [Page 52] The Hebrewes vse to geue their sonnes and their daughters names which myght euer put them in remembraunce of some poynte of religion, and knowe when they come to perfection, that they were of the chosen people. And therfore Nabuchadne­ser 1. of Daniell, commaundethe the chief of the Eunuches to geue other names to Da­niell, Anania, Misaell, and Azaria, which were chosen to stande in te Kynges palace, and teache the learning and tongue of the Caldeans. The Grecians did vse the same, for some were called Timotheus, that is to saye, an honorour of God: some Philotheus which is a louer of God: some Demosthe­nes, the strenght of the people: & therfore (some saye) that Aeschines his mortall en­nemie shoulde haue sayed thus: shouldest thou be called Demosthenes? no not so, but rather Demouorus, that is a deuowrer of the people. So do we in the Scottyshe ton­gue (to sturre the youthe to the imitation of them whose name they beare) call some Abraham, others Isaac or Iacob, and some Susanna after the Hebrewes: And agayne other some Timothie, and Christofor after the Grecians. This argumēte is copiously [Page 53] vsed amongest the Ethnicke authors: as Cicero 4. Verr. O trymme Swyppinges? for to what place didest thou euer come, to the which thou didest not bring with thee this daye? To what house, to what citie, yea and shortly to what Churche? which thou didest not leaue spoiled? cleane swipped behynde the? Therfore these thy doynges maye well be cal­led swyppinges, not so muche for thy name (al­thoughe thou be named verres, which may si­gnifie a swypper) as for thy maners & nature. Cicero 2. Philip. Bambalio was father to thy wyfe, a man of no estimation, and aboue all thinges contempned: who for his stutting and stamering of his tongue and dulnes of spirite, had this surname Bambalio, for a rebuke and a taunte. The phisicions also do geue na­mes to their herbes: to some from the cau­se: as Hirundinaria, from the inuentor: Fi­lipendula, from the forme: To other some, from the effecte and working: as Selfwhole, and suche lyke: from the subiecte and place: as parietaria, and sea trifolie. From the ad­iointe and qualitie: as styncking marubium deade nettle: from the similitude which they haue with other thinges: as Mouse eare, fo­xe tayle, dogges tōgue: And so forthe from the [Page 54] rest of the places of inuention. The vse then of this place is, to proue or disproue, pray­se or disprayse any thing by the Etimolo­gie of it: as in the former examples, thou mayest perceiue.

CAP. XXIIII. Of the distribution.

YEt there remainethe of the argumētes which haue their beginning of others. The distribution and definition: bothe the one and the other dothe reciprocate: in the distribution, the whole with the partes: in the other the definition, and the thing that is defined. Distribution is a diuision of the whole into his partes. The whole is that which dothe containe some partes within it. The parte is that which is con­tained of the whole: And as the deuiding of the whole into his partes, is called distri­bution: So the collecting of the partes to the whole, is called Induction. The distri­bution rysethe of argumentes, whiche do­the agree with the whole, but amonge them selues dothe disagree. And therfore howe muche the whole with the partes agreethe, and the partes amonge them selues disa­greethe: [Page 55] so muche is the distribution the more accurate.

CAP. XXƲ. Of distribution taken from the cause.

THe first sorte of distribution is of those that agreethe absolutely, to wytt the cause and the effecte. The distribution is taken from the cause, when the partes are causes of the whole. So Grammer is par­ted into Etimologie and Syntaxe. Retho­ricke, into Elocution and Action: Diale­cticke, into Inuention and Iudgemente. For of these partes the artes do consist: So Virgill deuidethe his Georgickes into fower partes: as,

Cicero for murena. I vnderstāde (honorable Iudges) that theire was thre partes of the ac­cusation, [Page 56] one in rebuking and blaming of his ly­fe: an other in contencion and stryfe of dignitie The third to consist in the crimination of vn­lawfull sute for offices. Catullus dothe vse this argumnete bothe from the partes to the whole, and from the whole to the par­tes: as,

CAP. XXƲI. Of the distribution from the effecte.

THe distribution from the effect is when the partes are effectes, as in the simili­tude of Cato, wherin he shewethe them to haue erred that sayde, olde men dyd no­thing. Those (sayethe he) that affirmeth ol­de men cōstitute ouerseers of the comon wealthe to do nothing, sayethe asmuche as yf they should saye the Gouernour of the shippe dothe no­thing, when some of the Maryners clymethe the mast, others ronne the hatches vp and dow­ne, [Page 57] some do make the pompe emptie the Gouernour in the hynder parte of the shippe guyde­the the rudder and sterne. Heare the distri­bution af the generall argumente into the speciall dothe excell. The generall is the wohole, of one essence with his partes: The speciall or kynde is a parte of the generall, as Animal, a lyuyng thing is the whole, whose essence or definition, (to wytt, a cor­porall substance hauing lyfe and sences) do­the alyke appartayne to men and beastes, which are the specialles conteyned as par­tes vnder the generall animal. So is Man the generall to syngle men, and a lyon to syngle lyons: and agayne syngle men are the specialles of man, and single lyons, of the lyon. The generall argumente is ey­ther chief generall or subalternall. The speciall argumente is eyther subalternall or most speciall. The chief generall is that which hathe nothing a boue it more gene­rall: as in our deuision sett furthe in the fyrst chapter, the argumente is chief generall of argumentes artificiall, and of the inartifi­ciall: The most speciall which might not be deuided into other inferiours was the mar­ter and the forme. The subalternall which [Page 58] maye be the generall in respect of one, and speciall in respecte of another as the cause contained vnder the artificiall argumente, as a speciall, and was generall to the mat­ter and forme which it dyd containe vnder it self. The generall and the speciall are no­tes and signes of the causes & the effectes. For the generall containethe the cause, w­hich dothe equally appartaine to his spe­cialles: and agayne the speciall containethe the effecte of their generall. This is then the reason wherfore the vniuersall excelle­the in dignitie, by reason it containethe the cause, as, Ouide in his Metamor. deuide­the the generall, to wytt, A lyuyng thing into his specialles, as starres (to the which he geuethe a life, as the Philosophers do) fowles, beastes, fyshe, and men: as,

Therefore at last was man borne, &c. So, Cicero, in the first booke of his Offices, de­uidethe vertue, into fower speciall kyndes: Wysdome, Iustice, Fortitude, & Tempe­raunce. All thinges (sayethe he) that are honest, dothe ryse of one of thiese fower partes, eyther it consistethe in the perfecte knowledge of the truthe and quycknesse of wytt, or in the defending of the Societie & felloweshipp of mā, by geuyng to euery man his right, & fullfilling of thinges promysed: Or in the noble courage and strengthe of a valyante and mightie spiri­te: Or last in obseruing a good maner and order in all thinges, eyther done: or sayed, in the w­hich modestie and temperancie consistethe.

Sometyme we argue or reason from the generall to the speciall: as, All men maye marrie who haue not the gyfte of Chastitie, ergo, Preistes and ministers may marrie. And con­trarye from the speciall to the generall in a parte: as, Abraham was iustified by faythe, therfore man maye be iustified by faythe.

CAP. XXƲII. Of the distribution from the Subiecte.

[Page 60]NOw folowethe the distribution of tho­se that after a certen fashion dothe a­gree: as of the Subiecte and the adioynte. The distribution is saide to be of the subie­cte, when the partes are Subiectes: as, The xii Trybes of Israell had the Lande of Ca­naan, which was a subiecte parted amonge them, vnto the Rubenytes the playne of Me­deba, &c. vnto the Gaddes, Iazer and Gy­lyad, &c. vnto Manasses the Kyngdom of Og, &c. vnto Iuda was geuen the wyldernes of Zin, &c. vnto Ephraim from Iericho to the wyldernes, &c. vnto Beniamin from Iordan vp the side of Iericho on the northe parte, &c. vn­to Semeon was geuen Beersheba Sheba and Moladah, &c. vnto Zabulon from Sarid ea­stward vnto Chisloth, &c. vnto Issachar Izreelah Chesulleth, and Shunen, &c. vnto Assur, Nephtali, and Dan, euery one his porcion: as is described the 13. 15. 19. 18. and 19. chapiters of Iosua. Cieero 5. Tuscul. There be thre sortes of goodes: Goodes partai­ning to the body: goodes partaining to the soule. & externall goodes. He who dothe attaine the heauenly goodes partaining to the soule, is ra­ther to be named most blessed, then blessed.

CAP. XXƲIII. Of the distribution taken from the adiointe.

THe distribution from the adiointe is: when the partes and members of the distribution are adiointes: as Of men some be whole, some sicke, some ryche, some poore. So Virgill 1. of his Georgickes, partethe the worlde after the adiointes into fyue partes, whereof the myddle is parching hotte, the two extremities coulde, and the rest temperate.

Caesar the first booke of Frenche warres. Gallia (now called Fraunce) is parted into thre partes, wherof the people called Belgi, do holde one: Aquitani an other parte, and Cel­ti, the third parte.

CAP. XXIX. Of the definition.

THe definitiō is an Oration which dothe clearly declare what the thing is, The definitiō, is eyther perfecte and called pro­perlye definition, or vnperfecte and called description. The perfecte definition is a de­finition which consistethe of the sole causes that accomplyshed the substāce of the thing defined. Suche as be the generall argumē ­te and the speciall or forme. So Man is de­fined a reasonable lyuyng thing: Here (by lyuyng thing) which is the generall argu­ment, we vnderstande a corporall substance partaker of life and sence, which is the mat­ter of Man: and parte of the forme: vnto the which, yf ye wyll put to (reasonable) yeshall comprehende the whole forme of man: So that the perfecte definition is nothing els but a collection of the causes which do con­stitute and parforme the substance and na­ture of the thing defined: suche as be the de­finition of Artes. Grammer an Arte which teachethe to speake well and congruouslye: Rethoricke eloquentlye: Dialecticke, an Arte which teachethe to dispute well: Geo­metrye, to Measure well.

CAP. XXX. Of the description.

THe description is a definition which de­finethe the thing not only with the cau­ses, but with other argumentes also: as, a Man is a reasonable thing mortall, and apte to learne: Here with the cause are ioyned bothe the cōmon and proper adioynte. This compendious and shorte briefnes is not al­wayes to be fownde in this sorte of argumē ­te, but desyrethe somtymes to haue a more excellent & magnificall explication: as Glo­rie, is described by Cicero in his oration for Milo. yet of all the rewardes of vertue, if there were a respecte to be had of rewardes, I iudge glorie to be the most greate: which only dothe cōforte the shortenes of this lyfe with the memorie of the posteritie to come, which dothe make vs when we be absente, to be as presente, and when we be deade dothe make vs to lyue. And lykewyse fame is that, by whose occasion and meane, men seame to ascende and mounte vp to the heauens aboue. So fame is described by Virgill 4. Eneidos.

Suche be the descriptions of plantes, and [Page 65] beastes in naturall thinges: Of flowdes, mountaines, and townes in geographicall and historicall.

CAP, XXXI. Of deuine testimonie, The first sort of the vnartificiall argumente.

THe artificiall argumēte being expoun­ded followethe cōsequently the vnarti­ficiall. The argumēte vnartificiall or with­out arte is an argumente which prouethe or disprouethe not of his owne nature, but by the strengthe which it hathe of some ar­gumente artificiall. And therfore when the matter is deapelie considered, it hathe but a lytle strengthe to proue or disproue. In ciuil and temporall affaires, the aucthori­tie of the disputer geuethe no litle creditte ther vnto yf he be wyse, vertuous, and haue the beneuolence of the auditour: all these by one name maye be called a testimonie. The Testimonie is parted into a deuine and humaine. Amongest deuine and spiri­tuall testimonies are nombred not only the Oracles of the godds, but also the answers of prophetes and deuinours: as Cicero the third for Catiline. And to omitte (sayethe [Page 66] the Orator) the lightning torches which did appeare by night in the Occident, the vehemēt and parching heate of the heauēs: as thrawes of lightninges, and fyer breaking out of the clowdes, earthquakes, and manie other suche tempestes, which (I being Consul) did appea­re, so that the godds with a lowde voyce sea­med to synge those thinges which be now pre­sent. And a litle after, he sayethe: At the whiche tyme when out of all Hetruria the Southsayers being gathered togeather, conclu­ded that greate slaugther and burning did ap­proche, the destructiō of the lawes, bothe ciuill and domesticall warres, and the vtter ruine of the whole towne and impire: without the im­mortall godds by all meanes appeased had by their deuine power, chaunged almost the very fatall necessitie. Tibullus.

CAP. XXXII. Of humaine testimonie.

THe testimonie humaine is eyther gene­rall or singular. Generall, as the lawe, [Page 67] and famous saynges. There is an example of the lawe, bothe writen & vnwriten in the oration of Cicero for Milo: as, There is a law (honorable Iudges) not writen, but na­turally spronge vp, which we haue not lear­ned, read, nor receaued of others, but taken, receiued and drawen from nature it self, the which to attaine, we are not taught, but made: not instructed by other, but taught by nature. To witt, That if our lyfe should fall into an ambushe or cōspiracie, into the power and wea­pons, eyther of robbers, or of our ennemies, that we shoulde by all honest meanes, deliuer our sel­ues from all daunger. And a litle after. Yf the 12. tables woulde a thief taken in the night to be kylled by any meanes, and a thief taken in the daye (yf he by weapon defended hym self) to be kylled also without daūger: who is he that thinke the Slaughter to be ponyshed, howsoeuer it be committed, seeing he maye perceiue, that the very lawes them selues: doo offer to vs some­tyme the sworde to kyll men. Prouerbes are nombred amongest famous sentences: as lyke drawethe to lyke. The sayinges also of wysewen: as, Knowe thy felf. Mediocritie is best of all thinges. There is an exemple of the singular testimonie. Cicero 1. ad fratrem. [Page 68] And surely that prince of engeine and know­ledge Plato, had this opinion that the common wealthes shoulde then be most happye and bles­sed, when that eyther learned and wyse men began to gouerne them, Or that those who had the care ouer them, should geue them selues to wysdome and knowledge. So Christe hym self, the Apostles, and Euangelistes do confirme their doctrine, by the lawe of Moy­ses: The Phisicians, by the auctoritie of Hippocrates, Dioscorides, Galen, and su­che others: the Philosophers, by Plato and Aristotle: the lawyers, by Iustinian: and the mathematicians, by Euclides. So when there rysethe any question or contro­uersie of landes or slaughter & suche other matters, we vse to produce their obliga­tions, and bynde them whith their cōfession and othe, we haue an example of Obliga­cion, of Cicero, in 5. Phillippicke. Yea I shall be bolde to bynde my faythe to you (be­lowed Iudges) & to the people Romaine, which yf nothing compelled me I woulde not take in hande but woulde very muche feare (in a most dangerous matter) the fame and suspicion of rashenes. I promise, I vndertake, I bynde my self (honorable Iudges) that Caesar shalbe at [Page 69] all tymes suche a Citizen as he is this daye, and suche a one as you ought to wyshe and desire hym to be. We maye comprehende vnder the name of obligations, gages geuen for the suertie of any thing: as, Virgill 3. of E­glogs. A herdman hauing no artificiall ar­gumente to proue that he coulde synge bet­ter then his fellowe, braggethe that he wyll laye downe an heyfer for a gage. The confession is eyther voluntarie, or forced. Voluntarie, when we do graunte any thing of our owne wyll. Forced, when by tormen­tes we are compelled to graunte that which otherwayes we woulde not, and is proper­ly called a question. Miloes ennemie vsethe suche an argumente agaynst hym, but it is mocked of Cicero: Go too I praye you (saye­the Cicero) what was the question, or after what fashion? hoe, hoe? where is Rushio? where is Casca? hathe Clodius wrought treason a­gaynst Milo? he hath wrought, then a cer­tain Gibbett for hym. He hathe wrought none, then there is a hope of his libertie. Hereto also maye be referred the sorte of argumente which we vse, whē we do offer to proue our sayinges by experience: as Cicero 4. of Verren. Is there any bodie that would haue [Page 70] geuen to Ʋolcatius (althoughe he comethe of hym self) the tenthe parte of a denyer? Let hym come now and see: there is no man that wyll receiue hym within his house. Terence in Eunucho. Examyn in knowledge and lear­ning, in wrastling and fygthing at the bariers I shall geue you one conynglye learned in all thinges, which is decent for a gentleman to knowe. And Othe is also nombred amongest the testimonies: as, Virgill 6. Aeneidos.

CAP. I, Of the definition and deuision, of the dispo­sition and proposition.

WE haue intreated in the for­mer booke the first parte of Dialecticke, which is inuention: Now followethe con­sequently the other parte, which we did name Iudgement and dispo­sition. Disposition is a parte of Dialec­ticke, wich teachethe to dispone and place orderly the argumentes inuented, to the ende we maye iudge well and rigthly: for we iudge of euery thing according to the disposition therof. And therfore this parte of Logicke is eyther called iudgement or disposition vnder one signification. Dispo­sition is parted into the proposition (other­wise called enunciation) or sylogisme and methode. Proposition is a disposition in [Page 72] the which one argumente is spoken for another. The proposition hathe two partes, the first is called the antecedent, the secōde the consequent: Of the which the qualities of propositions do ryse. And first the affir­mation and the negation. The proposition affirmatiue, is when the consequent affir­methe vpon the antecedent: as, a man is mortall. The proposition is negatiue, whē the consequente denyethe vpon the antece­dent: as, Man is not mortall: and here ryse­the the contradiction of propositions, when one consequente dothe bothe affirme and denie vpon one antecedent

CAP. II. Of the true proposition and false, contingent, necessarie, and impossible, and of the thre documents of artes.

THe proposition is eyther true or false. It is tru when the consequent is truly ioined with the antecedent, or truly separa­ted from the same: as here it is truly ioined: all man are synners: and here truly separa­ted: no man is iust. The proposition is cal­led contingent, when the consequent be tru­ly said of the antecedēt, so that sometyme it [Page 73] maye be false: as fortune helpethe hardye men, for granting it to be true to daye, it may be false to morowe: So that the veritie of this sorte of prositions is only certain in thinges present, or past, and not in thinges to come. The proposition is necessary when the cōsequent maye at all times truly be sayde of the antecedent: as, all men are mortall. And contrarywyse, the proposition impossible, is when the consequent maye at no tyme be sayde of the antecedent: as, A man is a horse. The necessary is eyther of one kynde, or of a diuerse kynde. The neces­sary of one kynde is when the partes are coessentiall amonge them selues, as when the generall is sayde of the speciall: as, A man is a liuing thing, or the difference of the forme, as, a man is reasonable, or the adioincte of his proper subiecte, as, A man maye laughe. And this sorte of proposition is sometyme reciprocate, when the conse­quent, not only maye be sayde alwaye of the antecedent, and of all thinges contained vnder the antecedent, but of it self also, so that the antecedent contrariewyse may be sayde of the consequent, on the same ma­ner: as Man is a reasonable lyuing thing. [Page 74] nomber is equall or vnequall. The propo­sition of diuerse kynde, is when the partes are not coessential: as, A man is blacke or white. And here we haue three generall documentes to be obserued in all artes and sciences. The first is that all the preceptes and rules shoulde be generall and of neces­sitie true: and this is called a documente of veritie. The seconde that euery arte be contained within his owne boundes, and withholde nothing appartaining to other artes, and is named a documente of iustice. The third, that euery thing be taught ac­cording to his nature, that is: generall thinges, generally: and particuler, particu­lerly: and this is called a documente of wysdome.

CAP. III. Of the simple proposition.

THe proposition is eyther simple or com­pounde. The simple with the whiche a simple sayng is declared: and therfore it contaynethe a simple consequent: which yf it do affirme, makethe the whole to affir­me, and contrarywyse, yf it denyethe, the whole denyethe: as, fyer burnethe, fyer is [Page 75] hotte, fyer is not water. Here, burnethe, hotte, and water, are the simple consequen­tes: vpon the affirmation or negation of the wich dependethe the affirmation or nega­tion of the whole. And this is the first dispo­sition of thinges inuented, when the cause is ioyned with the effecte, as in the first example. Or the subiecte with the adioynte as in the second: Or the disagreable with the disagreable, as in the thyrd. After the which maner all sortes of argumētes maye be pronounced (except full comparisons and distributions) the agreable by affir­myng, and the disagreable by denying.

The simple proposition is eyther generall or speciall. Generall, when it speakethe ge­nerally. And here the one parte of the con­tradiction is not alwayes true, & the other false. For in thinges contingent they maye be bothe false: as, All man are learned: No man is learned. And in thinges also which be not contingent: as, All lyuyng thinges are reasonable. No lyuyng thing is reaso­nable. The proposition is speciall, when it speakethe specially and of a parte. And here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other false. The speciall is eyther [Page 76] indefinite, or proper: Indefinite when it speakethe of no certain thing: as, Some man is learned, whose generall contradi­ction is, No man is learned. Proper when the consequent is sayde of some proper na­me: as, Fabella is fayre, whose contradi­ction is, fabella is not fayre.

CAP. IIII. Of the proposition compounde,

THe propositiō compounde is when moe sayinges then one are ioyned togeather by some coniunction. And therfore vpon the affirmation or negation of the coniunction, dependethe the affirmation of the whole proposition: and here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other is false. The compounde proposition is eyther con­gregatiue or segregatiue: The proposition is congregatiue, when the coniunction ga­therethe, and is eyther copulatiue or con­nexiue. Copulatiue, when the coniunction is copulatiue, as. Bothe Eurus and Afri­cus rusht forthe. Whose negation and con­tradiction is, not bothe Eurus and Africus rusht forthe. And here is to be noted, that the veritie of the proposition copulatiue de­pendethe [Page 77] vpon the veritie of bothe partes: for yf one parte be false, the whole is said to be false, as in this example. Bothe man and beast are reasonable, the whole proposition is false, because the last parte is false. Here­to maye be referred the proposition contai­ning the relation of qualities, in the which the relation standethe in place of the con­iunction: as.

As thoughe he woulde saye, Slepe is swete to wearye mē, so is thy verse to me. Whose negation is,

CAP. Ʋ. Of the proposition connexiue.

THe proposition is connexiue, whose cō ­iunction is connexiue: as, yf thou haue faythe, thou must haue charitie: Whose ne­gation is, not althyoughe thou haue faythe, it folowthe that thou must haue charitie. [Page 78] Cicero de fratre. Neyther yf a proposition be true or false, by and by it followethe that causes are immutable. The affirmation si­gnifiethe that yf the antecedent be, the con­sequent must be also. The negation or con­tradiction signifiethe, that althoughe the antecedent be, the consequent must not be therfore. Wherby we must vnderstande, that whensoeuer this sorte of proposition is true, it must be necessarye also. The ne­cessitie is knowen by the necessarye conne­xtion of the partes, and not by the veritie of the same: for bothe the partes maye be fal­se, and the connexion necessarye, as this: yf a man be an horse, he hathe fower feete, is a necessary connextion. But if the connextiō be contingent, and only for his probabilitie supposed to be, there arysethe no necessarye iudgement, but only opinion: as, Terence in andria. Yf thou do that (Pamphile) this is the last daye that euer thou shalt see me. The proposition containing the relation of tyme is hetherto referred: as, when Iustice is mayntayned, then shall peace be in the Realme.

CAP. ƲI. Of the proposition segregatiue.

[Page 79]THe proposition segregatiue is, whose coniunction dothe segregate: and ther­fore it speakethe only of disagreable argu­mentes. It is parted into discerning propo­sitions and vnioynyng. The discernyng is, whose coniunction dothe discerne. Cicero in Tusc. 5. Althoughe that by the sence of the bodye, they be Iudged, yet they are to be refer­red to the spirite: whose negation and con­tradictiō is, Not althoughe that by the sence of the bodye they be iudged, they are therfore to be referred to the spirite. This sorte of pro­position is true, when bothe the partes is true and discerned also. Otherwyse it is false and ridiculous.

CAP. ƲII. Of the proposition vnioynyng.

THe proposition vnioynyng, is a propo­sition segregated, whose coniunction dothe vnioyne: as, eyther it is night or daye: all lyuing thinges, are eyther man or beast: whose negations are, It is not eyther daye or night: all lyuyng thingeh are not eyther man or beast: Here the negatiō declarethe, that the one parte or the other is not true of necessitie. For yf the disiunction be abso­lutely [Page 80] true, it is also necessarye, and the partes opponed imediatlie one to another. Yet althoughe the true disiunction be ne­cessarie also, it is not requyred that the par­tes separated be necessarye: as, This is a necessarie disionctiō: A man is eyther good or not good: and yet this, (A man is good) is not necessarie: Nor this, (a man is not good:) But the necessitie of the disiunction dependethe vpon the necessarie opposition and disiunction of the partes, & not of their necessarie veritie. The disiunction is som­tymes with a condition, as if one shoulde aske, whether is Cleon, or Socrates come? because it was so promysed that the one shoulde only come. And therfore if the dis­iunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but only opynable, suche as oftenty­mes we vse in commen speakyng: as, Ouide in Leanders epistle.

CAP. ƲIII. Of the Sillogisme.

A Sillogisme is a dispositiō in the which the question beyng disponed with the argu­mēte [Page 81] is necessarilie infered in the cōclusion. For if the propositiō be doubtfull, it is made a question: And to proue the question, we take an argumēt, & dispone it with the que­stion. The Sillogisme hathe two partes: one which goethe before, another that fol­lowethe, & maye be called, the antecedent and the consequent. The antecedent which prouethe or disprouethe the question, and hathe two partes: the proposition and as­sumption, otherwyse called the Maior and the Minor. The propositiō is the first parte of the antecedēt, in the which the whole questiō or the cōsequēt of the questiō is disponed with the argument. The assumption is the 2. parte of the antecedent, which is assumed vnder the proposition. The consequent is the last parte of the Sillogisme, which containethe the partes of the question, and con­cludethe the same, and therfore it is called the Conclusion: yf any of those partes be absent, it is called a mutilet Sillogisme, or Entymema) if any thing be more then tho­se thre partes, it is called a Prosillogisme. Sometyme also the order is confounded: therfore yf any doubte shall ryse throughe any of these thinges, it is good to putto that [Page 52] to which is absent, and pull awaye that which aboundeth, and last to put euery thing in his owne place.

CAP. IX. Of the first forme.

A Sillogisme is eyther symple or com­pounde. Symple when the partes of the question are disponed with the argumē ­te, so that the consequent be in the proposi­tion and the antecedent in the assumption. The Sillogisme is affirmant, when the proposition & assumption affirmethe: And negant, when eyther the one or the other is negant. Generall, when they are bothe ge­nerall: Speciall, when there is but one ge­nerall: Proper, when they are bothe pro­per. The symple sillogisme is eyther muti­late or whole. Mutilate, when the conclu­sion is brought in after on proposition or on assumption: as,

• All men be synners
• Ergo Socrates.

And

• Socrates is a man,
• Ergo hi is a synner.

The symple sillogisme is of two sortes: first the argumentt only goethe before, or fol­lowethe [Page 83] only. The first sorte then of this kynde is, when the argument goyng before in the proposition sometyme affirmatiuely and somtyme negatiuely, and in the assum­ption only affirmatiuely inferethe a spe­ciall conclusion: as, in the examples fol­lowyng.

• Constancie is a vertue:
• But Constancie is Confidence:
• Therfore some Confidence is vertue.

• Folyshehardines is no vertue:
• But folyshehardines is Confidence:
• Some Confidence therfore is no vertue.

• A wyseman is to be praysed:
• But some wyseman is a poore man:
• Therfore some poore man is to be praysed.

• A foole is not alwayes happye:
• But some foole is fortunate:
• Therfore some fortunate is not alwayes happye.

• Socrates is a Philosopher:
• But Soceates is a man:
• Therfore some man is a Philosopher.

• Thersites is no Philosopher:
• [Page 84]But Thersites is a man,
• Some man therfore is no Philosopher.

But here, in comon speakyng to the ende we maye iudge the more easly, we vse to dis­pone thus:

• Some Confidence is a vertue, as Constancie:
• Some is not, as, folyshehardines.

CAP. X. Of the second forme.

THe second forme is, when the argument being consequent affirmatiuely in the proposition or assumption, in the proposi­tion definitelie: the conclusion is brought in lyke to the antecedent: as,

• The troubled man reasonethe not well
• The wyseman reasonethe well:
• The wyseman therfore is not troubled.

And Cicero in 3. Tuscul. As the eye (saye­the he) being troubled, is not able to satisfie his office verie well: and the rest of the partes, yea the whole bodie being moued out of his good state, is not able to performe his office: euē so the spirite being troubled is not well disposed to exe­cute his dewtie well and wyselie, and the dew­tie of the spirite is, to vse reason: but the wyse [Page 85] man his spirite is alwayes so disposed that it maye most perfectlie vse reason, and therfore he is neuer troubled.

• Mortall thinges are compounde,
• The spirite or soule is not compounde:
• The soule therfore is not mortall.

As Cicero Tuscul. 1. prouethe the immor­talitie of the soule by this sillogisme.

In the knowledge (sayeth he) of mans soule we maye not doubt (without we be most dull and ignorant in naturall thinges) But there is nothing admixt with the soule, nothing com­pacte or made of elementes, nothing compounde or dowble: Which, if it be so, suerly it maye neither be put a sunder nor deuided, nor torne, nor pluckte in peces. For deathe is nothing els but the departing, separating and deuision of those partes, which before deathe were cou­pled togeather by some copulation.

• The enuyous is not valyante,
• Maximius is valyante:
• Maximius therfore is not enuyous.

As Ouide in Elegia 3. dothe conclude,

• A daunser is Ryotous:
• Murena is not Ryotous:
• Murena therfore is no daunser.

Which Cicero for Murena, hathe vnder this forme. Almost no sober man without he be madde dothe leape eyther when he is alone, or yet amonge a moderate and honest companie: for immoderate daunsing is the companion and follower of inordinate bāketting, pleasante & delectable places, and shortly of all delytes, and pleasant phātasies. But thou captiously takest that which most neadethe be the extreme of all vyce: and yet vnawares leauest those thinges, without the which that vyce is not to be fown­de, [Page 87] for thou shewest no filthy bankettyng, no in­opportunate loue, no feasting: no loue of bodye: neyther any extraordinarie expences. And seyng those thinges be not to be fownde, what maye these wordes, voluptuousnes or sensua­litie signyfie and those thinges which be vyces? Beleuest thou to fynde the vmber and shade of ryotousnes in that in the which thou caest not fynde ryotousnes it self.

• Agesilaus is not paynted of Apelles:
• Alexander is paynted of Apelles:
• Alexander therfore is not Agesilaus.

• Caesar oppressethe his natyue countreye:
• Tullius oppressethe not his natyue countreye:
• Tullius therfore is not Caesat.

CAP, XI. Of the seconde kynde of Sillogisme.

WE haue hitherto expounded the two sortes of the first kynde of the symple Sillogisme: Now folowethe the seconde. The symple sillogisme of the second kynde is, when the argument definitely goyng be­fore in the proposition, and followyng affir­matiuely in the assumption, the conclusion is brought in lyke to the antecedent.

• That which is iust, is profitable,
• But that which is honest, is iust,
• Therfore that which is honest is profitable:

Which Cicero 2. Offic. concludethe thus. The Philosophers of greatest aucthoritie, yea very sharply & honestly haue by cogitation distingued these thre, which be confused. For whatsoeuer is iust, that also they esteme to be profitable: and that which is honest, the same to be iust: Of the which it is concluded, that whatsoeuer thing is honest, the same to be pro­fitable.

• That thing which is voyde of all Counsell, can not be gouerned by Counsell:
• But loue is voyde of all Counsell:
• Loue therfore cannot be gouerned by any Counsell.

As Terēce sayethe in his Eunuche almost vnder the same forme.

Affirmant speciall.

These Cōsulls which for their vertue are cho­sen, ought diligētly to defēde the cōmō wealthe: Cicero is chosen Consull for his vertue: Cicero therfore ought diligently to defende the Com­mon wealthe. So the Orator 2. Agrar. con­cludethe his owne diligence and care: For seyng all Consulls ought to haue a greate care [Page 89] and diligence in kepyng of the common wealthe: Those ought most chieffly so to do, who not from their youthe, but in open place are chosen con­sulls. My predecessors made no suertie to the people Romaine for me: They beleued my self: It is your dutye to aske of me that thing which myne office requyrethe, and to call myne owne self into iudgement. For as when I sued for this office, none of my predecessors cōmended me vnto yow: Euen so yf I offende in any thing, there is no shyfte that maye deliuer me frō yow: wherfore, if God prolōge my dayes (althoughe I am the man who is able to defende the same from their mischeuous & subtille conspiraties) this I promise vnto yow Quirites, that ye haue geuen the charge of your cōmon wealthe vnto a vigilant man, & no fearefull fellowe: To a di­ligent man, and no Coward or feyntharted.

• He that deceyueth a louyng mayde is not to be praysed:
• Demophon is a deceauer of a louing mayde, as Phillidis:
• Demophon therfore is not to be praysed.

Phillis thus inferethe in Ouide.

• Octauius was Caesars heire:
• I am Octauius:
• I am therfore Caesars heire.

• Anthonius is not Caesars sonne:
• Thou art Anthonius:
• Thou art not therfore Caesars sonne.

CAP. XII. Of the compounde Sillogisme.

AS yet we haue intreated of the simple Sillogisme: Now followethe the com­pounde: The compounde Sillogisme is, when the whole question is the one parte of the proposition affirmant and compounde, and the argument the other parte. But the argument is somtyme consequent to the antecedent of the question, and somtyme it is the other whole parte of the proposi­tion: and than it is only assumed in the as­sumption. The compounde sillogisme is eyther ioyned or disioyned. The sillogisme ioyned is a cumpounde sillogisme, whose [Page 91] proposition is ioyned with this coniunctiō, if, and suche others, and is of two sortes: The first affirmethe the antecedent, & con­cludethe the consequent, as Cicero conclu­dethe. 2. Diuinat.

• If there be Godds, there is a diuination:
• But there are Godds:
• Ergo there is a deuination.

Cicer. 3. offic. Suerlye yf nature prescribe that man shoulde wyshe the commoditie & fur­therance of man, whatsoeuer he be for that he is man, of necessitie it is required according to the self same nature, that the vtilitie and profitt of all be comon: Which yf it be so, we are contayned all vnder one lawe of nature: And yf this be also, truly we are forbydden by the lawe of nature, that one shoulde misuse another. But the first is true, therfore the last is true. Here often tymes the same is not as­sumed, but some thing greater. 1. Catal. Yf thy parētes shoulde feare thee & hate thee, so that thou couldest by no meanes appease thē, I beleue that thou wouldest get thee some waye out of their sight. Now thy natyue countrey, which is the mother of vs all, bothe hatethe & fearethe thee, & knowethe that thou thynkest nothing but her destruction and ruyne: Shalt thou neither feare her auctoritie, neither shalt [Page 92] thou followe her Iudgement, neither shalt thou be afrayed of her mightie power? The same sorte of concluding is, when the proposition contaynethe a relation of tyme, as Oenone concludethe her error of folyshenes.

The secōde sorte of ioyned Sillogisme pul­lethe awaye the consequent, that it may pull awaye the antecedent also.

• Yf a man were immortall, he woulde be a simple substance, without composition of elementes:
• But he is neuer without the mixture of elementes.
• He is neuer therfore immortall.

Alexāder the greate asking one of his wyse men by what meanes a man might be God: ‘Yf (said the wyseman) he shall do those thinges which a man is not able to do.’ Of the which answere I make this sillogis.

• Yf a man would be God, he must do that which is impossible for man to do:
• But the consequent can not be:
• Nor yet the antecedent therfore.

CAP. XIII. Of the disioined sillogisme.

THe disioined sillogisme is a compounde sillogisme, whose proposition is disioi­ned: [Page 93] And is of two sortes: The first takethe awaye the one, & concludethe the other: as,

• It is eyther night or daye:
• But it is not daye:
• It is night therfore.

Cicero for Cluentio. But when this choyse was offered to hym that eyther he shoulde iustly and godly accuse, or dye cruelly and vnworthely: he chosethe rather to accuse how soeuer he might, then to haue dyed after that sorte: as he woulde saye.

• Eather he must accuse or dye:
• He wyll not dye:
• He wyll accuse therfore.

The second sorte of disioined sillogisme ta­kethe one in the proposition for the most part affirmant, and pullethe awaye the rest: as,

• It is eyther night or daye:
• It is daye:
• It is not night therfore.

And sometyme the proposition negant, af­ter this forme,

• It is not bothe night and daye:
• But it is daye:
• It is not night therfore.

CAP. XIIII. Of the methode.

[Page 94]THe methode is a dispositiō by the which amonge many propositions of one sorte, and by their disposition knowen, that thing which is absolutely most cleare is first pla­ced, and secondly that which is next: and therfore it contynually procedethe from the most generall to the speciall and singuler. By this methode we proceade from the an­tecedent more absolutely knowen to proue the consequent, which is not so manifestly knowen: & this is the only methode which Aristotle did obserue.

CAP. XƲ. Of the illustration of the methode by examples of artes.

THe chiefe examples of the methode are found in artes and sciences: in the which although the rules be all generall, yet they are distinct by there degres: for euery thing as it is more generall is first placed. The most generall therefore shalbe first placed: thē next shall followe these which be imme­diatly cōtained vnder the general, euery one orderly vnto the most speciall which shalbe last disponed. The definition therefore as most generall, shalbe first placed: next fol­loweth [Page 95] the distribution, which yf it be ma­nifold, and of diuers sortes shalbe first diui­ded into his integrall partes, next into his formes and kindes. And euery part and for­me shalbe placed and described in the same order & place which he had in his diuision. It shalbe expedient also if the prolixt decla­ration part them far a sonder, to gather them by a short transition, for that doth re­create and refresh the auditor. But that the matter may be the more easily vnder­standed we must vse some familiar example. If thou wilt aske (hauing all the defini­tiones, diuisiones, and rules of Grammer writtē in diuers tables, & mixt out of all or­der) what part of dialectick teachethe thee to dispone orderly these rules so confunded: first thou hast no neede of the places of inuē ­tion, seeing they be all ready found out: nei­ther hast thou neede of the first disposition of propositions, seeing they are disponed already: neither of the secōd disposition, which is the iudgemēt of the sillogisme, seeing all thinges which might fall into controuersie is proued and concluded: only the methode doth remaine. The Logitian therefore by the lyght of this artificiall methode, shall [Page 96] take a part out of this confused masse the definition (for it is most generall) and place it first of all: As, Grammer is an art which teathech to speake well and cōgrusly. Then shall he seeke out of the sayd masse the di­uision of grammer, & shall dispone the same in the second place: Grammer is parted into two partes, Etymologie, and syntax. And thereafter he shall find out the definition of Etymologie, to the which he shall giue the thirde place. Then he shall seeke out the partes of the Etymologie, & first the most generall as letters: next syllabs & wordes. Hauing the partes, he must seeke the for­mes: as wordes hauing number, & without number. And last he shall knyt and ioyoe togeather with short & apt transitiones the end of euery declaratiō with the beginning of the next. And so hauing defined, deuided & knyt to geather the partes of the Etymo­logie, he shall make euery thing more ma­nifest and playne with most fitt and speciall examples. And after the same order he shall intreate the syntax. This is a generall me­thode obserued in all artes.

CAP. XƲI. Of the illustration of the methode by examples, of Poetes, Orators, and Historiographers.

WE doo not only vse this methode in the declaration of artes and sciences, but in the expounding of all thinges which we woulde plainely sett forth. And therefore the poetes, orators & all sort of writers how oft soeuer they purpose to teach there audi­tor, doo alwayes follow this order of methode, althoughe they do not euery where insist therein. Virg. in his Georgicks parted his matter as we haue sayd into fower partes: & in the first booke he intreateth of common & generall thinges, as of Astrologie, and thinges engendred in the ayer, & of cornes and there manuring, which is the first part of his worke: then he vseth a litle transition in the beginning of the second booke:

Next he writeth generally of trees, then specially of vines: the second translation is put in the thirde part, but more imper­fect and without the conclusion of the thirde [Page 98] booke, of oxen, hors, sheepe and dogges:

And last the third trāsitiō of the fowrth part is put in the begnining of the fowrth booke:

Here therefore we may see that the poet hath studied to place the most generall in the first place, and the next generall in the midest, and the most speciall last of all. So doth Ouide in his fastes first propone the somme of his worke, and shortly after parte the same: and last hauing declared the par­tes, knytteth them togither with short trā ­sitions: the Orators also in there proemes, narrationes, confirmationes, and perora­tiones labour to obserue this order which they call the methode artificiall & naturall. Here Cicero first proponeth the matter and next parteth it. Thou hast bene this fowerten yeares questor (sayeth he) Cn. Papyrius being cōsul: & I accuse thee of all thinges which thou hast done frō that daye to this daye: there shall not be one hower found voyde of thy theft, ma­litious doyng, crueltie, and mischief. Here is [Page 99] the somme: now follweth the generall par­tition. All the yeares (sayeth he) are spent eyther in the office of the questure: in the am­bassade made in Asia: in the office of the pre­ture pertaining to the towne: or in the office of the preture, amonge the Siciliens. And there­fore into these fower partes my whole accusa­tion shalbe parted. Of the which fower par­tes, and the least member of euery part he intreateth afterwarde, euery on in his owne order and place. And in the thirde oration knytteth togeather the first three partes with transitiones. Now (sayeth he) seeyng I haue shewne his office of questure & first digni­tie to be full of theft & mishieuous doing, I pray you geue eare to the rest. Then after he had shewne the faultes of the Ambassade, fol­loweth the transitiō to the office of the pre­ture. But now let vs come (sayeth he) to that worthie preturie and to those faultes, which be more manifest to those that be here present, thē to me although I haue studied & prepared my selfe to declare the same. This transition is more imperfect lacking an epiloge. And last in the begīning of the fowerth oratiō he maketh such a trāsition to the fowerth, part which is of the preturie amōg the Siciliēs. [Page 100] There is many thinges (honorable Iudges) which of necessitie I most pretermit, to thēde I maye speake a litle of these thinges committed to my charge. For I haue taken vppon me the cause of Sicilia, that charge hath pulled me to this busines. So Liuius in the beginning comprehendeth the some of seuentie yea­res, and therafter deuideth the same by de­cades.

CAP. XƲII. Of the craftie and secrete methode.

THis methode then in dyuers enuntia­tiōs of one kynde, being knowen eather by there owne disposition, or the disposition of the sillogisme shalbe obserued how often soeuer the matter is clearly to be vnderstanded: But when with delectation or some o­ther motion thy chief purpose is to deceaue the auditor, then thou shall put some thing away which doth appartaine to thy matter, as definitions, diuisions and transitions: & set in there places thinges appartaining nothing to the matter: as digressiones from the purpose, & long tarying vpon the mat­ter: but most chiefly see that in the begīning thou inuerte thy order, and place some ante­cedentes [Page 101] after there consequentes. And su­rely this more imperfect forme of methode in respect of the exact rule obserued in the other, is not only mutilate by reason of the taking away of some of the matter: and re­doundeth by the eking to of thinges extra­ordinarie: but hauing some degrees of the order inuerted, is preposterous and out of all good fashion and order.