1 THe First Clause, I A B, &c. all English Catholikes (although otherwise vehe­ment impugners of the Oath, as Doctor Kellison In his Trea­tise of the Pre­late, and the Prince, &c. cap. 15. nu. 12., and Father Parsons) doe willingly admit; for that every English Catholike (saith Father Parsons In his Booke entitled, The Iudgement of a Catholike Eng­lish man, &c. part. 1. nu. 22. pag. 13.16.) will sweare and acknowledge most willingly all those parts, and Clauses of the Oath, which doe any way appertaine to the Civill and Temporall obedience due to His Majestie, whom he acknow­ledgeth for his true and lawfull King, and Sove­raigne over all His Dominions. Neither can there be any difficultie therein, except onely to know, what is that, which in this Clause, and the next, by vertue of the expresse words, and the plaine, and [Page 7] common sense of them (to which the Seventh Clause expresly bindeth the Swearer) I am bound to sweare immediately; to wit, whether by force of the words I must sweare immediately, That our Soveraigne Lord, &c. And that the Pope, &c. or only my sincere acknowledgement thereof. For al­though in regard of the matter, it is lawfull to sweare them both, that is, both the things them­selves, and also my sincere acknowledgement of them, and therefore we need not to contend about the words: Yet it is very probable, if not certain, that by force of the words I am bound to sweare im­mediately only my sincere acknowledgement. Be­cause all the swearing both in this Clause, and the next, consisteth only in those words [Before God] which being taken away, there would be no swea­ring, or Oath at all, in affirming, or denying any thing contained in these two Clauses. And the plaine meaning of these words [Before God, and the World] is this, that I A B doe call God, and the World to witnesse, that I doe truly, that is, un­faignedly, and sincerely acknowledge, professe, testifie and declare in my conscience, That our Soveraigne Lord, &c. And that the Pope, &c. although, as I said, in regard of the matter, it is lawfull to sweare them both.

2 IN the Second Clause, And that the Pope, &c. (which is the root and ground of all the Branches following) there is no such difficultie as some pretend, if wee duely consider the expresse words thereof, and the occasion, end, and reason, for which this new Oath was devised. For, as Sua­rez doth well observe, Suarez lib 6. de Leg. cap. 1. Vpon the will, and intention of the Law-maker (which is the soule of the Law) the substance, and force of the Law doth chiefly de­pend. Whereupon, if by any meanes the will of the Law-maker may be knowne, according to it especially we must interpret the words of the Law, because that is the true interpretation of the Law, by which we fol­low the will, and meaning of the Law-maker: not his will meerely internall, but as it is expressed by words, because a Law is not enacted by the Princes will, un­lesse by the words of the Law it be sufficiently expres­sed, seeing that the will alone is not of it selfe suffi­cient to binde, neither also is it sufficient, that it bee privately knowne by some other way, but it is necessa­rie, that it be sufficiently contained in the Law it selfe. And especially we must consider the beginning, Pre­face, or Preamble of the Law, and joyne with it the rest which follow: for to the beginning if there be no other let, all that followeth is to be applyed, because in the beginning, or Preamble of the Constitution is usually contained the finall end, cause, and reason, [Page 9]which chiefly moveth the Law-maker, and which mo­rray is a sure meanes to finde out his will, and meaning, and by which the ambiguitie of any doubtfull word, or sentence is chiefly to be determined.

3 Now upon the occasion, and discovery of those barbarous Powder-Traytours, who were all of them Roman Catholikes, and, as it appeareth by their confessions, grounded their divellish Conspi­racie chiefly upon the Popes power to deprive Princes of their Kingdomes, and Lives for the good of Religion: The Kings Majestie knowing right well, that many other Roman Catholikes did from their hearts detest, and abhorre such Trayterous and Diabolicall practises, and the wicked grounds thereof, thought it needfull for the better disco­vering and repressing of such bloudie Assasinates, and their disciples, to devise, and establish in the next Parliament following such an Oath, wherein true temporall Allegiance due to all temporal Princes what Religion soever they professe, should be ac­knowledged, and no true spirituall obedience due to the Popes Holinesse should be denied, and yet the wicked principles of that most damnable Conspira­cie should be detected, and abjured. Whereupon the Parliament, in the very beginning, or Preamble of the Oath Anno 3. Iacobi cap. 4. sect. And for the better triall, &c., setteth down the end, and reason there­of, to wit, for the better triall how His Majesties sub­jects stand affected in point of their loyaltie, and due obedience, which (as afterwards in the next Anno 7. Ia­cobi cap. 6. Session they declare) every true and well affected Subject not onely by the bond of Alleagiance, but also by the com­mandement of Almightie GOD ought to beare to His [Page 10]Majestie, his Heires, and Successours. And more­over, the Kings Majestie Himselfe hath often by publike writings In his pre­monition pag. 9. and i [...] h [...]s Apologie for the O [...]th, pag. [...]. & 9. in expresse words declared, that in this Oath He intended to demand of His Sub­jects nothing else, than a profession of that temporall Alleagiance, and Civill obdience, which all subjects by the Law of GOD and Nature, doe owe to their lawfull Prince, with a promise to resist, and disclose all contrary uncivill violence, and to make a true di­stinction, not betwixt Catholikes and Protestants, but betwixt Catholikes of quiet disposition, and in all other things good Subjects, and such other Catholikes as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloudie Maximes, as the Powder-traytours did. Whereup­on He caused the lower House of Parliament, who at the first would have had the Oath to containe a deniall of the Popes power to excommunicate Him, to re­forme that Clause: So carefull was He, that nothing should be contained in this Oath, except the profession of naturall Alleagiance, and civill, and temporall Obe­dience. He said [ in this Oath] for as the Oath of Supremacie, saith His Majestie, was devised for put­ting a difference betweene Papists, and them of our pro­fession; so was this Oath ordained for making a dif­ference betweene the civilly obedient Papists, and the perverse disciples of the Powder treason.

4 First, therefore, in this Clause is not denied the power, authoritie, right, or title, which tem­porall Princes, or Common-wealths have, or may pretend to have in temporals, as to make warre, in­vade, annoy, &c. upon just cause. For this tempo­rall power either of Princes, or Common-wealths, [Page 11]and consequently of the Pope, as he is a temporall Prince, is not in this Clause medled withall, neither is there any thing concerning it affirmed, or de­nied therein, as the expresse words doe plainely shew, but only concerning the power, and authority, which the Pope formally as he is Pope, Bishop of Rome, or supreme spirituall Pastour, or Prince, either of himselfe, or by any other meanes with any o­ther, hath to depose the King, &c.

5 Secondly, neither in this Clause is denied that that power, or authoritie, which the Pope, as Pope, hath to command temporall things, as invadings, annoyings, &c. in order to spirituall good, or, which is all one, to concurre therein with others, who have, or may pretend to have such power to in­vade, annoy, &c. by way only of morall influence, or motion, as by hiring, perswading, or comman­ding; neither can the words of this Clause, being taken properly, admit this sense. For to have power or authoritie to doe a thing, as to invade, annoy, &c. is a farre different thing, than to have power, or authority only to command the doing thereof, or to concurre by way only of morall influence, with others who have true, and lawful power to doe it. As to have art, or skill to paint, is a farre different thing, than to hire or command a Painter who hath skil, to paint, or to concur with him to the making of a picture by way only of moral influence, or mo­tion. Neither can a King, who hireth, or com­mandeth a Painter to make such a picture, bee truly said to make or paint that picture, or to con­curre to the painting thereof, as having himselfe [Page 12] art, or skill to paint it. And in like manner it is to be said that a Pope, who by way onely of morall in­fluence, as by perswading, hiring, or comman­ding, concurreth to the invading of a King with others, who have perchance true and lawfull power to invade him, be truely said to invade that King, as having himselfe true and lawfull power to invade Him, of which power and authoritie to invade, annoy, &c. and not of morall influence, or of power onely to command Invasions, &c. this Clause expresly speaketh. And therefore albeit we should falsly suppose (which some doe greatly, but perniciously, indiscreetly, and to no purpose urge against this Clause) that the Civill Common-wealth in some case hath power to punish and de­pose her Soveraigne Prince, and that the Pope may concurre with her therein by way of morall influ­ence, or motion (which neverthelesse for practise, which is chiefly to be regarded, is certainly false, for the same reason, for which as I wil shew forth­with, it is certainly false, that the Pope hath not any true, and lawfull power to depose, or practise the deposition of Princes, because so long as it is but probable inspeculation, or, which is all one, so long as it is but an opinion, or controversie among Phi­losophers, and Divines, the Prince being in possessi­on, cannot upon any probable, or controversed power or title, be deprived thereof without open injustice) yet this being falsly supposed, would no way impugne this Branch of the Oath, which speaketh not of the Popes concurring with any o­ther to deposing, invading, annoying, &c. by way [Page 13]onely of morall influence, but onely of his Power, or authority to depose, invade, annoy &c. or of his con­curring with any other to the doing of those acti­ons, as having himselfe true power, and authority to doe them.

6 Neither thirdly can any man with any mo­desty, charity, or reverent respect to the Kings Majestie conceive, that He would by Act of Par­lament have all His Subjects to sweare, or sincerely to acknowledge by Oath that to be true, which Himselfe, and all the Christian world know to be clearely false, to wit, that the Pope, as Pope, hath not any power to depose the King, as also other Prin­ces, so much as in the opinion of the Pope himselfe, and of many other Divines, who are of his opini­on. For His Majestie knew right well, and which being a thing so manifest, no man of any judge­ment can deny, which therefore Father Lessins, Lessins in his Singleton de Discussione de­creti Lateran. concilii part 2. num. 38. and Docter Kellison, In his Trea­tise of the Pre­late, and the Prince &c. cap. 11. num. 7. pag. 241. doe in expresse words ac­knowledge, that a power, which is not altogether cer­taine, but onely probable, or in controversie, cannot be a sufficient ground, whereby immediately any man may be punished, and deprived of any his right, and Dominion, nor can be practised without open in­justice. And consequently that a power to depose, which is onely probable, is not any true, reall, law­full, sufficient, and valid power to depose, and there­fore for practise neither in law, nor conscience to be accounted any power at all: seeing that power, and practise are correlatives, which doe mutually in­ferre, and destroy each other, Arist. in Prae­dicam. cap. 3. and where there can be no true, reall, and lawfull effect, or practise, there [Page 14]is no true, reall, and lawfull power. For in vaine is that power, and therefore none, seeing that God, and Nature doe nothing in vaine, Arist. lib. 3. de Coelo [...]ea. 32 be re­duced to effect, or practise.

7 And that it is a Doctrine truely probable, it being approved by so many learned Divines, who have seen and examined all the arguments on either side, nor grounded upon any reason, or principle which is cleerely false, that the Pope hath not pow­er to depose Princes, it is manifest.

First by the Acts, and proceedings of the Sor­bon Doctours See the French Mer­curie tom. 2. ad Ann. 16 [...]2. p. 597. & seq. against the English controversie of Becanus, who held, that it is certaine, and out of all controversie among Catholikes, that the Pope hath power to deprive Princes of their Kingdomes, yea and of their lives, falsly pretending the High Priest in the old Law to have the same authority, and there­fore the Pope in the new.

Secondly, by the Censure of the said Theologi­call Facultie This Censure is printed at Paris in Latin, and may bee seen in French in the French Merc tom 11. ad Ann. 1626. p. 9 [...]. and see it beneath nu. 44. against the Doctrine of Santarellus, which teacheth, that the Pope hath power to de­pose Princes for heresie.

Thirdly, by the publike Declaration of Sixteene the chiefest Iesuites of France dated the sixteenth of March 1626; and exhibited to the French King, See the French Mere. tom. 11 ad An. 1626. pag. 92. wherein they renounce, and detest the Do­ctrine of Santarellus as wicked, in that which concer­neth the Persons of Kings, their Authority, and their States &c. Promising to subscribe to the censure, which shall be made against that pernicious Doctrine by the Clergie, or the Sorbon.

Fourthly, by the publike Declaration of three [Page 15]French Bishops, to wit, of Auranches, of Charters, and of Soissons, See the Fren. Merc. tom. 11. ad Ann. 1626, pag. 105. wherein also they insinuate, that the Bishops of France in their Generall Assemblie did agree with them in these three propositions: 1. That it is not lawfull to rebell, or take Armes a­gainst the King for any cause, or occasion whatsoever. 2. That all Subjects are bound to obey the Kings, and that no person can dispence with their Oath of Allegiance. 3. That the King cannot be deposed by any power what­soever, nor under any pretext, or occasion whatsoever,

Fifthly, by the first Article, See the Fren. Merc. tom. 3. ad. Ann. 1615. pag. 235. or Oath of France (which in substance is all one with our English Oath) agreed upon in the yeare 1615 by the Third Estates, or Lower House of Parlament, wherein of two hundred Persons, or thereabout, there were but six Protestants, and no one Protestant was pre­sent at the making thereof, or privie thereunto, as President Miron, Speaker for the House, did pub­likely before them all, Cardinall Peron being then present, confidently affirme Ibid. p. 312.

Sixthly, by the uniforme consent of all the French Prelates in the generall Assembly of all the Estates held the yeare 1614. 1615. who (as the Bishop of Montxillier Ibid p. 253. and the Lord Cardinall Pe­ron Ibid. p. 270. sent by the Ecclesiasticall Chamber to the Third Estates about their First Article doe affirme) were willing to joyne with the Third Estates in this common Article, That it is not lawfull for any man to touch the person of their Kings for any crime, or up­on any cause or occasion what soever; which they offered to signe not onely with their hearts, but also with their blouds, and to cry Anathema, eternall malediction, and [Page 16]damnation against all those, who shall attempt to kill their Kings for any crime, or upon any cause what­soever. And neverthelesse (as President Miron very well answered the said Cardinalls Oration ex tempore) the Doctrine of deposing, and of killing Kings, are Cousin Germans, Ibid. p. 320. for that they proceed from the same roote, and offspring of the Popes power to dispose of all temporalls, and conse­quently not onely of Kingdomes, but also of Lives in order to spirituall good; and also (as the Prince of Conday Ibid. p 332. in his learned, and Religious speech to the King sitting in Councell doth well ob­serve) the Doctrine of deposing Princes, as a thread in a needle, leadeth to usurpations, Rebellions, and the murthering of Soveraigne Princes.

Seventhly, and lastly by the testimonie of Car­dinall Peron, Card. Peron in his great Fren. Reply. cap. 91 pag. 633. who expresly saith, that this controver­sie, concerning the Popes power indirectly in tem­poralls, ought not to hinder the reunion of those, who should desire to be reconciled to the Church: To omit the Decrees of the Parlament of Paris forbidding under paine of Treason the Treatise of Cardinall Bellarmine See the Fren. Merc. tom. 2. ad An. 1610. p. 19. against Doctour Barclay, the Defensio Fidei Catholicae, &c. Of Suarez: Idem tom. 3. ad An. 1614. pag. 441. See also tom. 3. ad An. 1615. pag. 327. the Treatise of Santarellus de Haeresi &c. Idem. tom 11 ad An 1626. pag. 87. The burning of Doctour Schulckenius Apologie for Cardinall Bellarmine a­gainst Widdrington Idem. tom. 3. ad An. 1623. pag. 277. by the sentence of the Pro­vost of Paris, besides many learned Catholikes both of our owne Nation, as Bishop Watson, Abot Fecknam, Doctour Cole, Iohn Harpsfield, Nicolas Harpsfield, Iohn Hart, Iames Bosgrave, the Thir­teene [Page 17]Priests protestation, and also of other, related, and confirmed by M ^r In his conta­tation of Mr Fizherbert p. 1. per [...]c [...]. Widdrington against all the exceptions, which Doctour Schulckenius hath ta­ken against them: All which doe so clearely con­vince the probabilitie of this Doctrine, which de­nieth the Popes power to depose Princes, that no man of any reading can from his heart now deny the same.

8 Wherefore the plaine meaning of this clause is, [That the Pope] that is, properly, and formally as Pope [neither of himslefe] that is, as a sole, and totall Efficient cause [nor by the authority of the Church, or See of Rome] that is, as an instrument or Minister of the Church, or See of Rome [or by any other meanes] that is, as a Principall Agent, using some helps or meanes, as his instruments [with any other] that is, as a Partiall Agent concurring par­tially with some other. Which Partiall Agents although they have not alwaies compleat and suffi­cient power to produce the effect severally, and by one of themselves alone, yet if they be properly Partiall Agents, See the Phi­losophers upon 2. Phys. or 5. Metaph. where they treate of the Efficient Cause, and also shew the diffe­rence betwixt a Physicall or Reall Agent, and a Morall, who sometimes is reputed a Princi [...]ll A­gent in gene [...] moris, [...] [...]h [...] rea [...]h d [...]th nothing. they must alwaies have in them­selves the same specificall active or virtuall power, by which they concurre joyntly with each other to the producing thereof: As two men drawing a Ship, which one of them alone is not able to draw. And therefore a Maister, who onely by morall in­fluence, as by commanding, or hyring, concurreth with his Servants to the drawing of the Ship, is not properly a Partiall Agent concurring with them, nor is said to draw partially with them the Ship, but hee is a Principall Agent of a farre different [Page 18]kinde, and nature, to wit, Morall; and his Servants, as drawing by his appointment, are onely his Mo­rall Instruments.

9 [Hath any power or authority] that is, not meerely probable, or in the conceit, opinion, or spe­culation of the Pope, and of many other learned men, for this, as I said, is for practise to be accoun­ted no power at all, but true, reall, lawfull, suffici­ent, and valid power, or authority [to depose the King] that is, by his definitive sentence to deprive him of his Regall authority, and to make him to true, and rightfull King, but a private man: [or to dispose any of his [Kingdomes, or Dominions] that is, to take them away from him, and to give them to an o­ther, which supposeth, that the Pope hath power to depose the King, and to deprive Him of his Royall right and Dominion: [or to discharge any of his Subjects of their obedience] because, according to Cardinall Bellarmine, and Suarez, every Subject by the law of God, Bell. in Tract. contra Barcla. cap. 21. p 2 [...]2 Suar. in Defen. &c. lib 6. cap. 3. num. 6. and Nature, oweth true obedi­ence, and Allegiance to his lawfull Prince, so long as He remaineth Prince: [or to authorize] that is, to give authority to any forraigne Princes to in­vade, or annoy Him, or His Countries: Because all the authority, which temporall Princes have in temporalls, to invade, or annoy &c. they have not derived from the authority, or commandement of the Pope, as he is Pope, but granted them by the Law of God, Nature, or Nations: [ or to give licence, or leave to any of His Subjects to beare Armes &c.] Because the Pope, as Pope, hath no such authority, licence, or leave himself, and therfore cannot give it to others. [Page 19]And by this is easily answered the common objection urged against this Clause, that no man can sweare a probable opinion to be certainly false, but it is a probable opinion at the least, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, or, which in substance is all one, no man can sweare, that the Pope hath not any power to depose the King, seeing that he hath a probable power to depose him; but a probable power to depose is some power. For it is not a probable opinion in practise, how­soever it be in meere speculation, and abstracting from practise, that the Pope hath power to de­pose Princes, or to practise their deposition, sup­posing, which is most manifest, that it is not alto­gether certaine, but onely probable, and in contro­versie among learned Catholikes that he hath power to depose them, unlesse we will absurdly admit, that it is a probable opinion, that the Pope may lawfully commit open injustice. Neither is a meere probable power any true, lawfull, and suf­ficient power to depose, punish, or dispossesse (of which power onely this Clause is to be under­stood) and therefore for practise neither in law, nor conscience to be accounted any power at all.

10 THe Third Clause, Also I doe sweare &c. hath in it no difficulty, supposing the [Page 20]former, to which it hath relation, as practise hath to power. For if it be lawfull to acknowledge be­fore God, that the Pope hath not by any meanes, either of Excommunication, Deprivation, Absolu­tion, or any other Sentence, or Declaration, any true, lawfull, sufficient, and valid power, or au­thority to depose the King, and to make him no King, and consequently to discharge or absolve his Subjects from their Allegiance, it cleerely followeth, that I may also promise by Oath, that notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication, Deprivation, Absolution, or other Declaration made, or to be made by the Pope, or his Successours, against the King, his Heires, or Successours, First, I will beare faith, and true Allegiance to His Majesty, his Heires, and Successors: Secondly, I will defend Him, and them to the uttermost of my power against all conspi­racies &c. And thirdly, I will doe my best endea­vour to disclose, and make knowne unto His Majestie, his Heires and Successours, all Treasons, and Traite­rous Conspiracies &c. Because to performe these three things every faithfull Subiect, although he neither had, nor should make any expresse Oath, or promise to performe them, is bound by the absolute law of God, and Nature to performe, so long as the King remaineth King, and cannot bee deprived of his Regall authority by the Pope.

11 Secondly, in this Clause is not meddled withall, but rather supposed, th [...]n denied the Popes power to Excommunicate, as King Iames of [Page 21]renowned memorie hath by In praefat. Monitor. pag 11.12 & in Consu [...]at. men­daciorum Tor­ti, mendacio 1. publike writings not onely declared to all Christian Princes, but also very well proved against Card. Bellarmine. But this onely is here denied, that Excommunica­tion, being a spirituall Censure can worke this temporall effect, as to make a King, no King, but only of a Christian, as a Heathen, and a Publican, and to deprive him of Ecclesiasticall communion, but not of his Regall authority. Thirdly, by Heires, and Successours are not understood Vsur­pers, but such onely as shall lawfully, and by right succeed: for as according to law, Glossa in can Faciat 22. q. 2 & leg. Vulgo f. de statu homi­num lib. 1. we can onely doe that, which we can lawfully, and honestly doe, so in law, and conscience they onely are reputed Heires, and Successours, who lawfully, and by right shall succeede. Lastly, by Treasons, and Traiterous Conspiracies are not understood impro­per, positive, or spirituall Treasons, and which in regard chiefly of Religion are by the positive lawes onely of some Kingdomes, or Nations, but not of all made Treasons, as are the comming in of Priests into this Realme ordained by the Popes authority &c. But onely such Treasons are he [...]re understood, which are true, proper, and naturall Treasons and which all Kingdomes, and Nations account for such, as being repugnant to that Naturall, and civill See above [...]am. 3. Allegiance, which all Subjects both Heathen, and Christian by the law of God, and Nature doe owe to their lawfull Sove­raigne, whatsoever Religion He, or they shall pro­fesse.

12 THE Fourth Clause, And I doe further sweare, &c. if it be rightly understood, is as cleare as the former. For therein, by force of the words, the practise only of the Popes power to depose, or murther Princes, and the doctrine which maintaineth it for lawfull, to wit, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or deprived by the Pope, may, that is, by vertue of the Popes sentence of Ecommunication, or Deprivation, bee deposed, or murthered by their Subjects, or any other whatsoever, is abjured, I doe not say, as an heresie, but as the words of this Clause are, as hereticall. For (as Pe­trus Aragona, Aragona 2 a. 2 ae. q. 11. ar. 2. Suarez disp. 19. de Fide. sec. 2. nam. 8. and Suarez, doe well observe) here­sie, and an hereticall proposition properly, and in ri­gour are not the same, but doe differ as the act, or sin, and the matter thereof; because heresie properly doth signifie a certaine sinne of infidelitie, but an hereti­call proposition doth onely signifie the matter of that sinne: And therefore although pertinacie belongeth to the nature of heresie, it doth not therefore follow, that it belongeth to the nature of an hereticall pro­position. I said (saith Suarez) properly, and in rigour; for heresie may also be distinguished into materiall, and formall, and so it may be said, that an hereticall proposition is a certaine heresie, not formall, but materiall, and so it is not necessary, [Page 23]that it depend upon the pertinacie of the speaker; for this only belongeth to formall heresie, which is a sin­full act, and doth formally make an Hereticke, as whitenesse doth formally make the subject, wher­in it is to be white. From whence it followeth (saith Aragona) that when Doctors call an hereticall pro­position an Heresie, they speake not properly, because it is not to be called an heresie, but an hereticall pro­position. For according to all Divines, See S. Thom 2a 2.e q. 11. art. 2. Cajet. Bannes, ibid. Aragona art. 1. Suarez disp. [...]9. de Fide sec. 3. to He­resie, as it is a sinne against Faith, and maketh a formall Heretike, is required pertinacie against the Doctrine, Declaration, and Sense of the Church.

13 Now supposing these two principles, which are so cleare and evident, as I have shewed a­bove n [...] 6▪, that no man of any reading, and judge­ment can deny either of them: the one, that it is a great controversie among learned Catholikes, and a doctrine approved by many of them, that the Pope hath not power to deprive Princes of their Kingdomes, much lesse of their Lives; and there­fore truly probable, their approbation being not grounded upon any principle, which is clearely false: The other, that a power, which is not altoge­ther certaine, but only probable, and in controver­sie, can be no sufficient ground to punish, depose, or deprive any man of any his right, and dominion, or of any other thing, which he possesseth; and conse­quently, as M ^r. Doctor Kellison well inferreth, cannot be practised without open injustice: it cleare­ly followeth, that this Doctrine, which appro­veth [Page 24]the practise of deposing, or murdering Prin­ces by the Popes authoritie, and by vertue of his sentence of Excommunication, or Deprivation is manifestly false, as teaching open injustice, to wit, Theft and Murder in a most high degree, and may therefore be abjured for such, and consequently for impious, damnable, indirectly, and by a neces­sary consequence repugnant to faith, and divine truth revealed in the holy Scriptures, Exod. 20. Thou shalt not steale, Thou shalt not kill; Kill him not, &c. Ren­der to Caesar, &c. and in this sense hereticall, as the word [Hereticall] is usually, and properly taken both by Protestants, and also by the most part of Catholike Divines R [...] 26 M [...]. 21. i [...] S T [...]. 2 a. 2 a q. 1 [...]rt 2. Baan. s & A­tagon ibid. Turrec [...]em. in Summa de Ec­cles. l. 4. part. 2. c. 3. Director. Inquisit. par. 2. c [...]m. 27. p. 233. Canus, lib. 6. de l [...]ci [...], c [...]lt. ad. 10. Scot in 3. dist. 35. Vulpes tom. 1. [...]isp. 2. art. 5. & disp. 3. art 7 Faber. q. 1. Prologi, disp. 6. cap. 1. Cast [...]o lib. 1. contr. hae­res▪ cap. 8. Vega li [...]. 9 in Concil. Trid. cap. 39. T [...]a [...]c. a Chri­sto, [...] 3. se t. dist. 23 q 3. de hae es [...] Co [...]er. l. 4 [...] [...]. Re­g [...]at. c. 14. Mo­lina in part. 1. q. 1. a [...]. 2 [...] p. 1. Vasquez ibid. disp. 5 c. 3. Fas­solm ibid q. 1. dub. 13., who hold, that the Church doth not make any doctrine to be hereticall, or of Faith, but only declare it to be such, which be­fore her declaration was truly such, and that what­soever is indirectly, secondarily, or by a necessa­ry consequence repugnant to faith, is truly and properly hereticall, although hee that without pertinacie should maintaine any such doctrine in this sense hereticall, before the Church hath de­clared it to be such, is not to be accounted an he­retike, nor doth incurre Anathema, or any other penalties ordained against Heretikes.

14 I said above [ their approbation being not grounded, &c.] Because the approbation of Do­ctors, though they be never so many, if it be groun­ded upon any principle, reason, or supposition, which is manifestly false, cannot make their opi­nion to be truly probable, to those especially (as [Page 25] Vasquez Vasq. 1 a. 2 ae aisp. 62 cap. 4. sect. Observan­dum tamen m [...]xime est. well observeth) who see the manifest falshood of that principle, reason, or supposition. As all those Popes, and Doctors, who have approved, or doe approve the lawfull practise of deposing Princes by the Popes authority, either did, or doe thinke, and suppose, that it is most certaine, and of faith, nor in controversie among learned Ca­tholikes, that the Pope hath such power to depose them, which all the world now seeth to be clear­ly false; or else they did not, or doe not consider the difference betwixt meere speculation, and pra­ctise, and betwixt a probable power to favour, and to punish, depose, or dispossesse; whereas all learned Catholikes, both Divines, and Lawyers doe agree in this manifest principle, that a power, right, or title, which is not certaine, but in con­troversie, is no sufficient ground to deprive, or put any man out of his possession, nor can be pra­ctised without open injustice, untill an undoubted Iudge, and whose authority for the determining of that matter is not questionable (as is the Popes authority to define undoubtedly matters of faith without a Generall Councell, See Beneath. num. 29. as I will shew be­neath) shall decide the question.

15 I omit now two other Expositions of this Clause, and which some learned Catholikes doe greatly applaud. The one of the Adverbe [as he­reticall] which being an Adverbe of similitude, doth alwayes by force of the word, signifie a simi­litude, and not a realitie, or identitie, but onely in regard of the matter, to which it is applyed. So [Page 26]that considering in penall lawes (as is this law for taking the Oath) all doubtfull words are ever to be taken in the more favourable sense, and which maketh the law to containe no falshood, or inju­stice, they will have the sense of this Clause to be this, I abjure this doctrine, and position as here­ticall, that is, as having onely a similitude, and af­finity with that doctrine and position, which is hereticall. The other is of the Conjunction dis­junctive [or murthered] which according to the usuall signification of our English speech, when­soever it immediately followeth the verb [may] implyeth a free choice to take which part of the Dis-junction we please, and maketh not an abso­lute, but a conditionall dis-junctive proposition, which, for as much as concerneth the truth, or falshood thereof, followeth the nature, and con­ditions of a copulative, and not of an absolute, or common dis-junctive proposition. And it ma­keth the sense of this Clause to be equivalent to this; I abjure as hereticall this doctrine, and position, That Princes, which be excommunicated, or depri­ved by the Pope, may be deposed, and murthered by their Subjects: Which doctrine, and position in regard of the second part, [and murthered] being by all Catholikes accounted hereticall, especially seeing that murther is alwayes taken with us for an unjust, and wicked killing, and not for every killing, or manslaughter, the whole entire condi­tionall dis-junctive proposition in regard only of this part may be truly abjured for hereticall. But [Page 27]because the First Explication may abundantly suffice to make it apparant even to such Catho­likes, as are willing to take all the exceptions they can against any ambiguous word, or sentence contained in the Oath, that not only the practise of murthering, or killing, but also of deposing Princes by the Popes authority, may be abjured for hereticall in a true, proper, and usuall sense, as I have shewed, without making him that with­out pertinacie shall maintaine it, to be properly an heretike, and also that these two later may bee seene more at large related, and confirmed by M ^r. Widdrington In the Ad­joynder to the second part of his Confutati­on of M. Fitz­herbert, per t [...] ­tum. against all the exceptions, which M ^r. Fitzherbert hath taken against them, it may suffice for this present onely to have tou­ched them thus briefly.

16 IN the Fifth Clause, And I doe beleeve, &c. is not denied the Popes power to absolve from all Oaths, or any part thereof, because there is not the same reason of this Oath, as there is of many other Oathes, which doe not concerne a third person, from which that the Pope hath power to absolve, or to dispense in them, no Ca­tholike will deny. Neither is there in this Clause any other thing immediately sworne, than that I doe beleeve, that is, not with divine and superna­turall [Page 28]beleefe, but only with morall credulity, and humane perswasion, and in conscience am resolved, that neither the Pope, nor any other person hath power to absolve me from this Oath, or any part ther­of, that is, can give mee leave and licence not to performe those three things, which in the Third Clause I promised to performe. For, according to the doctrine of all See S. Thom. 2 [...] 2 [...] q. 89 ar. 7. & 9 Cajec. ibid. Aragona art. 3.7. & 9. Silvester verbo juramentum, 1. qu. 2 & jura­mentum 5 q 2. Sotus lib 8. de Iustitia, art. 9. Vatentia, tom. 3. disp. 6. quest. 7. punc. 4. Sayrus lib. 5. Thesauri, cap. 2. Divines, Absolution, and Dispensation, hath not place in assertory Oaths, wherein some thing is affirmed, or denied, which, as soone as it is spoken, is immutably, and indispensably true, or false, but only in promisso­rie Oaths, wherein something is promised to be done, or omitted. And to performe those three things, although I had made no Oath, or promise to performe them, I am bound by the absolute Law of GOD, and Nature See above, num. 10., from which nei­ther the Pope, nor any other Person hath power to absolve, or to dispense therein.

17 IN the Sixth Clause, Which I acknowledge, &c. there is no other thing immediately sworne, than my acknowledgement, that this Oath is lawfully ministred unto me by good, and full au­thority, which doubtlesse I may lawfully acknow­ledge, and also sweare, supposing it to be an Oath of true temporall Allegiance, and no falshood, in­justice, [Page 29]or deniall of any true, spirituall obedience due to the Popes Holinesse to be contained there­in. Neither doe the King, and Parliament take upon them in this Oath (as some doe ill inferre) the Churches authority to define matters of faith, as what doctrine is hereticall, and what Oath is lawfully ministred by good, and full authoritie: But only with the inward judgement of their under­standing, (which, to distinguish from judgement of authoritie, or of a Iudge doing justice, is usu­ally called judgement of discretion, and is nothing else than a right determining, S. Thom. 1a. 2ae. q. 93. ar. 2. & 2a. 2ae. qu. 60 art. 1. Ban­nes, Aragona, ec Salon, ibid. So­tus lib. 3. de Iu­stitia, q. 4. ar. 1. Hurtadus dist 7. de anima, sect. 2. paragr. 9. or discerning of the understanding betwixt truth, and falshood, good and evill in every matter either speculative, or pra­cticall) they did determine, define, judge, and suppose the whole Oath, and every part thereof to be lawfull, and to containe no falshood, or in­justice, but only a sincere profession of true tem­porall Allegiance, and that a temporal Prince hath good, and ful temporal authority to command the abjuring of any false, and hereticall doctrine, if it be repugnant to this Allegiance, and thought ne­cessary to the publike quiet of the Kingdome, whereof the Prince hath charge, and to forbid, and punish with temporall punishments, spirituall actions, as ministring of Sacraments in a poisoned matter, the publike maintaining of Heresies; yea, of unnecessary opinions, though they be probable in speculation, if they be occasion of Tumults, not as they are spirituall actions, but as they disturbe the publike temporall peace, and in regard of the [Page 30] temporall wrong done to the Common-wealth, they become temporall injuries. And upon this their in­ward judgement of discretion, and determining of their understanding, which is agreeable to the grounds of Catholike Religion, See [...]ellar. lib 5. de Rom. Pont cap. 7.1 [...] quinta ratione loan. Paris. de potest. Reg & Pag. cap. 2 [...] [...]d 37 S [...]tus. [...]n 4 dist. 29. q. 1. ar. 4. Victoria Re­lict. 1. de po­ [...]est. Eccle. sec. 7. paragr. oct [...] ­ [...] propositio. Pannes 2 a. 2 ae. q. 11 at. 4. q 1. in fine, Aragon. ibid. they thought it requisite for the publike peace of the Kingdom, for maintaining the Kings temporal Soveraignty, and to prevent the danger of future Conspiracies like to that of the Powder-Treason, to ordaine this new Oath of Allegiance, and to binde all the Sub­jects of the Realme under the penalty of a Prae­munire to take the same, which doubtlesse, as I said, the King, and State have good, and full au­thority to doe, supposing it to be an Oath of true temporall Allegiance, and no falshood, or injustice to be contained therein. Neither doe those words [ and do renounce all Pardons &c.] imply a renoun­cing of all Pardons, and Dispensations in generall, but onely of such, which shall dispense with me, or give me leave to doe contrary to that which I promised in the Third Clause, to beare faith, and true Allegiance to his Majestie &c.

18 THe plaine meaning of the Seventh Clause, And all these things &c. is, that I must use no fraude, or guile, but plainly, and sin­cerely acknowledge all the former things, and also [Page 31] sweare them all, either immediately, or mediatly, according as the expresse words of every Clause, and the plaine, and common sense, and understand­ing of the same words shall import, without any equivocation, mentall evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever; that is, I must neither equivocate, or use equivocation, which is to speake equivocall words, or which have diverse significations, not in that sense, wherein the hearer, or Law-maker doth, or ought in reason to understand them: nor use mentall, or secret reservation, that is to re­serve in my minde some hidden, and inward sense, which the outward words by me spoken, accord­ing to their imposition, and the common under­standing of them, all circumstances considered, cannot signifie to others. As if one being de­manded, whether he ever heard Peter speake such words, should answer. that he never heard him speake such words, reserving in his minde, in the Tower of London, or the like: which inward, secret, and reserved sense those outward words, cannot signifie to others. And therefore this mentall reservation (howsoever the speaker in his minde, which is unknowne to others, intendeth to make a Chimericall mixture, and union of the reserved sense, and the outward words) is nothing else then a flat, and formall Lie, as to Lie is taken, and de­fined by Saint Austin, and other Divines. S. Aug. lib 1. de Meadacio cap. 3 S. Th [...]m 2 a 2 e. q 110 See S. Austine beneath▪ nu. [...]3 So that know, whether I am bound to sweare imme­diately every thing contained in any clause, or onely my sincere acknowledgement, declaration, be­leefe, [Page 32]or resolution of that thing, I must regard the expresse words of every Clause, and in what man­ner they binde me, either to sweare the thing im­mediately, or onely my sincere acknowledgement &c. thereof.

19 THe last Clause, And I doe make &c. hath in it no difficulty, supposing the Oath to be lawfull, and commanded by good and full authority: for that every good Subject is bound to obey the constitutive precept of his lawfull Superiour in that manner as I will shew beneath, num. 26. heartily, willingly, and truely, that is un­faignedly, not onely for wroth, or feare of punish­ment, as the wicked doe, but for conscience, obe­dience, and vertue See Vasquez 1 a 2 ae. disp. 51. cap 3. & disp 73. cap. 7. & disp. 86. cap. 5. sake.

Five generall observations for the better un­derstanding, how all the chiefe objections, which are usually made against the Oath in generall, may bee easily answered.

20 HAving explained all the clauses of the Oath in that briefe, and perspicuous manner as you have seene, whereby any prudent man may easily answere all the chiefe objections, [Page 33]which are commonly made against any Clause thereof in particular, I thinke it not amisse to an­nexe hereunto five generall observations concer­ning doubtfull words, Perjuries, the Popes Breves, Scandall, and the safer way, whereby all the prin­cipall arguments, which are usually urged against the Oath in generall, may also according to the grounds of Catholike Religion be clearely confu­ted. For against the Oath in generall it is com­monly objected, First, that there are contained in the Oath diverse ambiguous, and doubtfull senten­ces, which may have a double signification, good and bad, true and false, which therefore being so doubtfull cannot bee absolutely sworne without danger of Perjury 2. That the Popes Holinesse our supreme spirituall Pastour; whose voice we are bound to heare, and follow, hath by his Bre­ves forbidden the Oath, as containing many things flat contrary to faith, and salvation. 3. That to take the Oath is no small scandall to the weaker sort of Catholikes, which our Saviour in the Go­spell Matth. 18. with a fearefull curse, and woe be to that man by whom scandall commeth, commandeth us to avoid. Lastly, that to refuse the Oath is the more safe, and the more probable opinion, which every man in those things, which are dangerous to the health of the body, much more of the soule, ought in wisedome to preferre before that, which is the lesse safe, and the lesse probable.